Christian Insecurity: A Case Study

In his latest fit of insecurity, Paul Manata again expresses his dislike for me. Instead of tackling criticisms of apologetic treatments that I have posted on my site, Paul aims for the author of those criticisms himself, hoping to discredit me by means of personal attack. Indeed, if one takes Paul’s word for it (apparently this is what he expects of his readers), I come across as someone who’s really bad, all apparently because I don’t believe in Paul’s invisible magic beings. Like an adult who explains the truth about Santa Claus to a child, an atheist can be the ultimate of spoilsports.

Ever one to exaggerate his own reactionary angst well beyond the limits of the credible, Paul makes it clear that he’s sore at me. For instance, he tells us that

atheologians like Bethrick do not really care about truth. If their side makes a mistake we do not see them lambasting their side.

Notice the us-against-them presupposition here, the tendency to view our differences in terms of rival groups populated by unspecified numbers. This is symptomatic of the religious mind’s preoccupation with dividing men into two opposing collectives, the chosen vs. the damned. Paul of course numbers himself among the chosen, and yours truly among the damned. (Perhaps if Paul Manata were god, I’d already be in hell.) The mentality of the desert primitive is indeed alive and well in the 21st century. Apparently Paul thinks that atheists are like Christians - members of a sheeplike herd who are led about by seductive, self-appointed apostles who pretend to be spokesmen for the supernatural. But this is simply unexamined projection. Paul apparently does not appreciate the fact that many atheists think of themselves as individuals, not as members of a "team" looking to score petty points in some inconsequential contest. ("Christianity: 1, John Loftus: 0.") In my case, I have no obligation to support, encourage, correct, or ridicule someone else simply because he does not believe in invisible magic beings. Meanwhile, someone should explain to Paul that non-believers tend not to pretend to have access to invisible omniscient and infallible beings which pre-chew their thoughts for them; I've tried, but he won't hear it from me. The religious mind fears error for this indicates separation from their perfect deity, a blemish unbefitting the chosen status believers want to claim for themselves. Meanwhile, the man who is free of the bondage of religious insecurity, is happy to learn from mistakes – both his own as well as those occasioned by others.

As for my blog, I make its purpose quite clear in the headstock banner, which states:

In this blog, I will post my criticisms of presuppositionalism as it is informed and defended by apologists such as Greg Bahnsen, John Frame, Cornelius Van Til, Richard Pratt, and their latter-day followers.

This should be clear enough to inform Paul that the purpose of my blog is not for "lambasting" other non-believers, since non-believers typically do not promote presuppositionalism. (An expert at logic that should be able to figure this much out on his own.) This of course does not in any way support the would-be conclusion that I therefore affirm everything that other non-believers hold to be true. My time is quite limited, so I have to choose my focus carefully. Other non-believers are free to consider my model, or ignore it. The choice is theirs, and the choice is mine as well.

Paul writes:

When it comes to Christianity we see them claim that they are on the side of reason and truth. They defend "reason." But constantly, we see atheists refusing to lay down their own strict rules on fellow atheists (or, unbelievers).

What does Paul “see” which serves as evidence suggesting that “atheists [are] refusing” to do anything? Does he not understand that I presume no authority over others such that I should "lay down… strict rules on fellow atheists"? Certainly he cannot point to any position that I have affirmed which pretends otherwise. I’m quite live and let live about things: adult atheists are free to govern themselves according to their own chosen yardsticks, and I acknowledge their right to do so. Apparently Paul finds this unsatisfying for some reason. Perhaps he wants me to divert my light away from presuppositionalism and onto something else. What else could “account for” his complaining?

So Paul needs to do more than merely assert things like

Atheists, like Bethrick, are about the group first, reason next.

What "group" is he talking about? In fact, I've been invited on numerous occasions to join other blogs. To date, I have politely declined this invitation (though I am free to reconsider this), primarily due to limitations on my time and the areas of my writings' focus. Furthermore, unlike Christians who prefer the safety of the affirming huddle and network of support ministries, I do not go out looking for other non-believers to "hang out" with. In fact, I rarely discuss my atheism with casual acquaintances. My experience is that the very thought of atheism very much disturbs many people; I have found that the concept of atheism tends to bring a lot of people's insecurities out into the open (especially in the case of lifelong believers), and as adults who suckle on imaginative stories of miracle-workers and fortune-tellers, many are visibly ashamed of their religious confession. Again, I prefer a live and let live approach in this regard, as mystics are an unpredictable and potentially violent bunch (many would love to be able to cast people like me into an eternal hell).

With all the vices and moral failings Paul attributes to me, it's quite extraordinary that the worst he can come up with is a charge like the following:

Bethrick did not blog on how poor Derek did.

Perhaps he is personally offended that I didn't take much notice of his debate with Derek (Paul makes it clear that Derek must have been mortally wounded by an apologetic prowess that I have yet to see). Does Paul really think that I have some obligation to "blog on how poor [sic] Derek did"? To hold it against me that I have not done so, it appears that Paul does in fact think this, but he does not give very clear reasons why. We get a glimpse of Paul's "logic" behind this assumption when he writes:

Bethrick blogs on how poor he thinks Bahnsen did (Bahnsen v. Stein)

Here Paul is apparently referring to my article Bahnsen's Poof, in which I present an analysis of Greg Bahnsen's opening statement - the statement he should have been most prepared to present - in his debate with Gordon Stein. (Incidentally, my conclusion that Bahnsen presents no actual argument for the existence of his god, remains unanswered to this day.) Does Paul suppose that my blog commenting on a statement made in one public debate, somehow obligates me to post another blog commenting on statements made in another debate? It's not clear, but it appears that this is what's turning round in Paul's mind. Well, there are a lot of debates out there, so Paul can wait patiently in line if he likes. It would help, however, if there were a written transcript of his debate with Derek; that way I could review it on my daily commute on the subway. In fact, while Bahnsen debated Stein in 1985, I did not write Bahnsen’s Poof until 2004. So apparently Paul not only expects me to produce an analysis of his debate with Derek, he expects me to do it on his timeline. With so many expectations, is it any wonder why Paul is so dissatisfied?

Now Paul may complain that I have not posted a blog critiquing Gordon Stein's performance in his debate with Bahnsen. But again, such a complaint would miss the stated purpose of my blog. Why would I devote a blog to harping on Gordon Stein's mistakes when he's not a champion of Christian apologetics? Blank out.

Of course, there are things I can say about Stein, and two shall suffice for the time being. The first point is that a debate over the existence of the non-existent is typically a fruitless use of time for rational human beings; when a rational individual encounters someone who holds to belief in invisible magic beings on the basis of faith, the proper response is to be happy he's not one who is so deluded, not assume that such an individual is interested in rational discourse.

The other point I'd make about Stein's performance in his debate with Bahnsen is to point out that Stein said all he needed to in his response to Bahnsen's question at this point in the debate:

Dr. Bahnsen

Okay Dr. Stein, you mentioned eleven basic proofs for the existence of God. Did you mention the transcendental proof for the existence of god?

Dr. Stein

No, I didn’t mention it by name. I think it is not a proof. I would not call it a proof as I understand it the way you said it.

Here Stein rightly points out that the so-called "transcendental proof for the existence of god" is in fact “not a proof” after all. Indeed, as as my analysis of Bahnsen's opening statement demonstrates, it is in fact “not a proof,” but a poof. Apologists today seem not to have grasped the difference between the two, for they are continually presenting variations of the latter while calling them the former.

Paul then writes:

I constantly see this religious attitude in the allegedly non-religious. "Get as many people to deny God first; truth, whatever that is, takes the hindmost" seems to be the motto of many of them.

Here Paul shows his proclivity to insert words into other people's mouths (which, we will see below, he does again later in his blog). But can he find any statement affirmed by me which suggests that I am trying to "get… people to deny God"? Such a construal indicates deep misunderstanding of my position, for I do not encourage people to deny something that does not exist. (Why would one need to do this?) As I mentioned above, I'm quite easy-going when it comes to other people; what they might believe or disbelieve really does not matter to me. They are free to examine my verdicts and the cases I present in their defense, or ignore them. Again, the choice is theirs. If they want to invest themselves in fantasies about supernatural beings, I will not stop them.

Paul then links to his blog More on Moore which in turn posts a link to a posting of his on Triablogue. He asserts that Dr. Zachary Moore made some unpardonable blunder of logic, and after exposing this error those most loathsome of spoilsports - the atheists - "refused to tell him that he was wrong." (My, what gall they have!) Paul then says

Some, like Bethrick, implied that he didn't know who was right.

I checked the comments sections of both these blogs, and did not see where I had posted any comments myself. At any rate, Paul does not quote me saying what he says I have implied, nor does he link to where I might have implied this. But in spite of this undocumented accusation (as if reserving judgment were some grave vice), Paul announces:

This just shows how serious he (and his ilk) should be taken.

Apparently I'm not to be taken seriously - at least, no more than writing an entire series of blog articles with the ambition of smearing me.

Continuing to air his own dirty laundry (apparently his frustrations have been accumulating for several months now), Paul turns his attention to a question that I posed in response to assertions that he made in his blog titled (no, I'm not making this up) Your Post Stunk When The Christian You Tried to Debunk With Your Awful Junk – a title which, as an incomplete sentence, leaves the reader wondering where its author finishes his point. In this blog, Paul responds to questions posed to Christians on another blog.

One of these questions has to do with the myth of Cain and Abel, and apparently the question gets some little detail of the myth wrong by placing the two legendary figures in "the Garden" at some point. (Were Paul a little more careful in his ambitions to rival Oxford scholars, he might have made it clear that I was not the author of the questions he sought to tackle.) Such oversights are simply an open invitation to the "aren't you stupid!" scoldings of Mighty Manata. In his response to this question, Paul asserts that

Cain was afraid that the other people who lived on the planet would kill him.

When I read this, it appeared that he knew something that I had not read in my version of Genesis, so I asked him if he could indicate how many people were allegedly on earth at the time in question, and if he knew any of their names. In other words, I was looking for him to authenticate the statement he was attributing to the Genesis myth. He says that the point of my question "eludes" him, but he did manage to eke out an answer nonetheless, stating that

there were approximately 890 of them,

but that he could not name them all, adding that

some are: Bob, Nick, Dan, Pete, Frank, Eddie, and Arnold.

Naturally, Paul did not give any sources to authenticate this response. Apparently Paul's faith is so insecure that minor questions, such as I had asked him, make him bristle, and so he found it necessary to berate his questioner (namely me) by inserting words into his mouth. Paul writes:

The only way it can be charitably read in a way other than making Dawson look like a stooge is to read it as Bethrick offering a rhetorical question with the implied conclusion: "If you don't know their names and how many there were, how do you know there were any? Since the Bible doesn't say there were others, then there were no others." This is the best way to read Bethrick. We see, though, that the best way to read Bethrick is to read him as committing the fallacy of argumentum ad ignorantium!

In Paul's narrow universe the options are always few and torn between miserable alternatives: either Dawson makes himself "look like a stooge" merely by posing a question (that’ll teach me to go to Paul for answers!), or Paul can make Dawson "look like a stooge" by attributing to him an argument he never made. For nowhere do I make the argument that, if Paul does not know the names or how many people there were at the time, then there couldn't have been any people on the earth besides Adam, Eve, Cain and Abel. (I do realize that the imagination needed by the religious mind is free to invent details not revealed to it from above.) Nonetheless, Paul tells his readers that "this is the best way to read Bethrick" - that is, by attributing to me obviously weak arguments that I have never made in the first place. And though he nowhere presents a conclusive case to support his accusation that I have committed any fallacy here, Paul tells his readers that “the best way to read Bethrick" is to presuppose that I am "committing the fallacy of argumentum ad ignorantium." And Paul says people like me "do not really care about truth."

Continuing to complain about my comments, Paul writes:

I had pointed out that the purpose of the Bible was not to give an answer (or a detailed and precise answer) to everything there is. For example, the Bible doesn't tell us how to change a flat tire. Bethrick said, "I agree, the Bible doesn't give us knowledge of anything."

What I had actually written was:

I agree that it would be naive to expect anything approaching useful or precise knowledge from the primitive writings collected in the bible.

Paul himself seems to agree that the bible does not serve as a source for knowledge on "many, many things" - for he writes:

There are many, many things the Bible gives us knowledge on.

In response to this, I asked:

Such as how the mind forms abstractions?

But I have not seen where Paul answered this question.

Paul then writes:

His [sic] tried to imply that he was agreeing with me but I pointed out that I never said the Bible doesn't give us knowledge of anything

But nowhere did I indicate that I was agreeing with Paul. I even pointed out to him that "I did not specify that I agree with you." So how does Paul now think that I was expressing agreement with him? Does the universe truly revolve around this man, Paul Manata?

Paul then made my point for me, writing:

I pointed out to Bethrick that it gives us knowledge on how to escape the wrath to come.

As I had stated, we "would be naive to expect anything approaching useful or precise knowledge from the primitive writings collected in the bible." As evidence, I pointed out to Paul the laborious confusion in the bible on the issue of salvation. Apparently Paul, like so many Christians, is in the habit of presuming that the books of the New Testament are wholly uniform with one another, and yet this is the very point that's been brought into question. But instead of recognizing the pervasive disharmony within the New Testament, apologists prefer to gloss over this, merrily swallowing the party line and uncritically accepting what their sheepherders order them to believe. As a mild introductory piece, I pointed Paul to B. Steven Matthies' Christian Salvation? I had suggested to Paul that, "if it worries you, perhaps you can devote a blog entry to sorting out the mess." Apparently it did worry him, because Paul sat down and picked through Matthies' article.

Paul writes:

Bethrick claims he was a Christian, but if he agrees with Matthies article then one must wonder if he ever was a believer. Maybe he was in the youth group of some touchy-feely church and now just uses his past childhood (leaving out the details) to give him some credibility when talking about Christianity. One thing is clear, though, as a believer he never studied his faith.

Yes, it is true that at one time I was a Christian, and no, this is not something I'm at all proud of. Quite the opposite in fact, it is painfully embarrassing. I look back on that time in my life and shudder at what I had allowed to happen to me. But now that I have recovered from the experience, I can appreciate how deep the delusion of Christian god-belief can run. It does not surprise me when believers want to deny a non-believer's past sojourn as a Christian, but the ways in which they try to convince themselves that Christianity's critics were never themselves "real Christians," are typically not as inventive as their doctrinal teachings. Nevertheless, I don't think that someone needs to have been a Christian in order to have credibility on the topic of Christianity, any more than I would think that a psychologist trained in counseling those diagnosed with suicidal tendencies needs to have committed suicide himself.

Paul also writes:

We hardly ever find a Christian, who was intellectually satisfied, becoming an atheist. Indeed, in most cases (actually, all) the reason people leave the faith is for moral reasons (i.e., cheating on their wife), not intellectual ones. The intellectual ones always come after, as a way to justify their moral rebellion.

Indeed, someone who is “intellectually satisfied” with Christianity, has in fact sold short his cognitive potential. And it is most telling that Paul segregates the moral from the intellectual here, as he does in fact do so openly, treating morality as if it were not intellectual. On the contrary, morality requires a mature and confident intellect, one which requires the conscious choice to be honest to oneself, whereas religion implores the believer to “deny himself” (cf. Mt. 16:24). One cannot be honest to himself, and deny himself, at the same time. And just as Paul openly divorces the moral from the intellectual, so Christianity divides a mind against itself. I realize that Paul resents atheists, not only because he feels threatened by them, but also because he worries that one day he too will renounce his faith. Only then will it be possible to embrace reason.

by Dawson Bethrick

Manata's Powers of Flawgic

There are times when someone makes it clear to you that he's not playing with a full deck.

This is one of those times (yes, I realize there are many others):

I wrote:

Paul, everything is invisible to a blind man.

Paul responded:

That translates to: Everything is visible to seeing men.

Can someone rescue Paul here? There's gotta be someone out there who can throw him a life-preserver!

Apologetics: the ultimate in stand-up comedy.

by Dawson Bethrick

Hitler vs. Mother Theresa: Antithesis or Symbiosis?

The Ever-Hasty Presumption of Antithesis

In developing an argument for the existence of a god, Paveille introduces the topic of morality and asks the following question:

What is the difference between Mother Theresa and Hitler? To most people this question is outlandish and the answer is simple: Mother Theresa helped people and Hitler killed people. One was good, the other bad. Such distinctions are important because they imply and absolute Moral Law.

Many thinkers, particularly Christians who want to defend the bizarre claim that their religion offers man the only reliable standard of morality, seek to draw our attention to the differences between Adolf Hitler and Mother Theresa, not simply because the differences are so prima facie striking, but also because both individuals are thought to represent diametrically opposite ends of the moral spectrum. Such comparisons are typically introduced only long enough to score an immediate debating point on behalf of religion, one that is primarily emotional in nature, and beyond that the contrast loses argumentative stamina. Typically it is taken for granted that Mother Theresa represents the ideal model of moral behavior while Hitler serves as the pinnacle of viciousness.

It is true that, on the surface, Mother Theresa and Adolf Hitler appear to register at different ends of the moral spectrum. After all, Mother Theresa dedicated her life to "helping others" while Hitler dedicated his life to ruling and slaughtering others. This is why it would seem "outlandish" to ask what distinguishes the one from the other. In fact, it might strike many thinkers that an even more "outlandish" question would be: What is the similarity between Mother Theresa and Hitler? This is the question we should be willing to explore precisely for the very reason Christians are reluctant to ask it, for in fact there is a fundamental similarity between Mother Theresa and Adolf Hitler, and it's more than simply the fact that both had lungs and donned footwear.


The Philosophical Common Denominator

The fact - uncomfortable especially to theists - is that both Hitler and Mother Theresa lived their lives by the same code of morality, namely a morality based on sacrifice. The difference is that Mother Theresa assumed the role of the sanctioning victim, perpetually sacrificing herself to others, while Hitler assumed the role of the tyrannical victimizer, perpetually demanding and collecting the sacrifices of others. While Mother Theresa saw herself as the means to someone else's ends, Hitler saw others as a means to his ends. Thus, contrary to what Christians will want to highlight when they invoke the tiresome Mother Theresa-vs.-Hitler dichotomy, in terms of principle, a Hitler cannot exist without a Mother Theresa, and a Mother Theresa cannot exist without a Hitler! Indeed, those who choose to sacrifice themselves to someone else's ends needs someone who views others as a means to their own ends. This may sound a little extreme, but in terms of principle this is accurate.

The point should be easy enough to grasp once we look past the outward features of the symbiotic moral roles assumed by Hitler and Mother Theresa respectively. The point is that both roles - sanctioning victim and despotic victimizer - are two sides of the same moral coin. Since both sides accept as an unquestionable given that morality consists of and requires sacrifice, both sides need each other to complement their roles and give them purpose, for neither is complete without the other. A Hitler can get nowhere without those who enable him through their self-sacrifice, and those who think they have a duty to sacrifice themselves cannot actualize their moral ideals without someone who is willing to collect their sacrifices. Thus the apparent antithesis between the two is little more than a mirage masking a hideous symbiosis, and the root of that symbiosis is religious in nature.

Philosophically speaking, the cause of a Mother Theresa is clearly religious. Religionists are actually quite proud of the example Mother Theresa provided, even if most of them do not follow her model or align themselves with her particular theology. (Perhaps Mother Theresa really believed her religion's teachings, and the typical "believer" is in it only for lipservice and afternoon banquets.) But we should not forget the fact that the cause of a Hitler is also religious in nature. Both Mother Theresa and Adolf Hitler were raised in the Catholic tradition, a religion which takes the claim that the Jesus of the New Testament is Messiah or "divine incarnation," and it can be confidently said that it was thus the influence of Christianity which set their lives in motion. In terms of philosophical essentials, both ascribed to the notion that there is a supernatural consciousness which determines reality, judges men's spirits, and demands sacrifice. Thus both ascribed to a worldview of supernaturalism, specifically the subjective premise that there exists a cosmic ruling consciousness whose wishes are the final arbiter of reality, truth, and right and wrong. This of course necessitates a faith-based epistemology in which "knowledge" originates from consulting an internal source while the evidence of the senses must submit and be "interpreted" according to dogmatic views accepted as "divinely revealed," all resulting in a worldview of unquestioning obedience to personal authority. This lethal combination of obedience to commandments held up as a virtue, belief in the supernatural and the assumption that sacrifice is essential to morality, makes for a worldview that is tailor-made for both a Hitler and a world full of self-sacrificing Mother Theresas. In truth, religion is not the solution, it's the source of the problem.

The bible says that "the love of money is the root of all evil" (I Tim. 6:10), and yet the most notorious examples of evil are not men who were after money. And even though it was later learned that Hitler evaded paying taxes on the proceeds from his seminal book Mein Kampf, in which he wrote "a man does not die for business, but for ideals," tax evasion is not what made Hitler evil. Rather, his brutal tyranny over others is what made him evil, specifically his use of force to compel other human beings to sacrifice themselves to his aims. (Notice the primacy of consciousness in operation here: Hitler's wishes are to hold moral primacy over the life needs of other human beings.) Neither Hitler, nor Stalin, nor Mussolini, nor Mao Tse Tung were "in it for the money." If anything, money was just a means to other other ends, namely in the interest of increasing their power over others. "It may be that today gold has become the exclusive ruler of life," wrote Hitler in Mein Kampf, "but the time will come when man will again bow down before a higher god."


The Culpable Bible

The bible's teachings actually encourage the despotism of such tyrants by exhorting believers to obey masters (Col. 3:22), offer themselves as "a living sacrifice" (Rom. 12:1), generally to just "go with the flow" while supposing that "rulers are not a terror to good works, but to the evil" (Rom. 13:3). Believers are "to be subject to principalities and powers, to obey magistrates" (Tit. 3:1), for they are instructed to "obey them that have the rule over you, and submit yourselves" (Heb. 13:17). In addition to the repeated exhortations of indiscriminate submission to even secular authorities, believers are commanded to "resist not evil" (Mt. 5:39), which can only mean that believers cannot suppose that their worldview will back them up if they choose to act in their own self-defense. After all, since "flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God" (I Cor. 15:50), why should believers care what happens to their earthly lives?

The instruction found in 1 Peter 2:13-17 is particularly chilling in this regard:

Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake: whether it be to the king, as supreme; Or unto governors, as unto them that are sent by him for the punishment of evildoers, and for the praise of them that do well. For so is the will of God, that with well doing ye may put to silence the ignorance of foolish men: As free, and not using your liberty for a cloke of maliciousness, but as the servants of God. Honour all men. Love the brotherhood. Fear God. Honour the king.

The influence of Christianity has seen to it that we do not have to imagine a society of men who take such instructions seriously, "honoring" of all monsters an Adolf Hitler as he gives the order to fill the gas chambers to capacity in order to solve "the Jewish problem."

We should not forget that Germany was one of the most religious societies in Europe in the years leading up to Hitler's meteoric rise to power, and that his ascension to Reichskanzler would not have been possible without the herdlike mentality of the German populace so reliably fostered by religion. Christianity, which was by far the dominant religion of Nazi Germany (ask any surviving Jews if you dispute this), is well known for its use of sheep as a metaphor for characterizing the desired mindset of the faithful (cf. Mt. 25:32-33, Mk. 6:34, Lk. 15:6, Jn. 10:1-27, Rom. 8:36, 1 Pet. 2:25, et al.). As Hitler himself wrote,

...for the masses, faith is often the sole foundation of a moral attitude. ...if religious doctrine and faith are really to embrace the broad masses, the unconditional authority of the content of this faith is the foundation of all efficacy. (Mein Kampf)

Like Mother Theresa, Hitler understood that pleasing the supernatural ruling consciousness requires sacrifice. "A sacrifice to be real," said Mother Theresa, " must cost, must hurt, must empty ourselves." Likewise Adolf Hitler also prized self-sacrifice, writing in his book Mein Kampf, "the most sacred sacrifice [is] the blood that a man sheds for this earth." Compare John 15:13, which says: "Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends." According to what Mother Theresa said, the sacrifice that Hitler commended was a real sacrifice, for the shedding of blood surely costs, surely hurts, and surely empties a man. A society which adopts any variation of the ethics of self-sacrifice is literally a "dog eat dog" society: one "dog" must be willing to sacrifice itself to another "dog," and the other "dog" must be willing to be the collector of that sacrifice. Thus a nation of Mother Theresas would be nothing if there were no Hitlers to give them a sense of purpose.


The Persistence of Delusion

Christian apologist Phil Fernandes, in his debate with Michael Martin, makes use of the apparent contrast between Hitler and Mother Theresa in framing an argument from undesirable outcomes:

Would life have any ultimate meaning if there is no God? If nonexistence is what awaits us, can we really make sense of life? You live and then you die. There are no eternal consequences. Hitler and Mother Theresa have the same destiny. We all finish our meaningless journeys in total nothingness.

Of course, this line of reasoning could only make sense if we accept the unargued premise that one's destiny can only be found in death rather than in life. But if life is an end in itself, as rational philosophy teaches, then Fernandes' concern reduces to emotive rhetoric. Moreover, as a pillar in his cumulative case for the existence of the Christian god, Fernandes essentially endorses consequentialism, the view that the issue in question cannot be the case because the consequences which would obtain if it were the case would be unacceptable. Consequences are certainly a factor to consider in determining a specific course of action to take. For instance, if Jones is running late and wants to take a shortcut to work, he opts against driving through his neighbor's backyard even though doing so would allow him to avoid two stoplights, because he does not want to damage his car or his neighbor's property. But the supposition that the outcome of a certain fact will be disappointing or unsatisfying, is not a criterion for establishing truth. If something is true, it's true whether we like it or not. Fernandes' point is an example of basing what he wants to accept as truth on the premise that if what he wants to be true were not true, the resulting state of affairs would be unacceptable. Apparently we're supposed to think that the Christian god exists because otherwise "Hitler and Mother Theresa have the same destiny," and who wants to think this? Therefore, the Christian god must exist, otherwise we have a very depressing fact to contend with.

This kind of "argument" is actually quite persuasive for many uncritical thinkers, especially those who have been automated to think that one needs to believe in a ruling consciousness in order to have a "meaningful" life. This is the view that man should not presume to choose his own purpose for his own life, but rather should allow someone else to determine it for him. And we already saw above that Christians have no philosophical defense against a tyrant who seeks to tell everyone what their purpose in life is supposed to be. As Christian Gary North writes in his article Mother Theresa: The Efficiency of Self-Sacrifice:

there is no doubt that everyone can strive to be more like leaders who adopt self-sacrifice as their way of life. I once saw a forgettable movie in which Stockard Channing uttered this memorable line: "I always wanted to be somewhere in between Mother Teresa and Imelda Marcos." Better to model ourselves by the former than the latter.

You go, girl. As for me, I'll not arbitrarily restrict myself to such needless dichotomies, for I know of good models to admire and follow, and their greatness is in what they achieved, not in what they "gave up."


The Neglected Archetype

Religionists tell us all about their worldview when they hold up Adolf Hitler and Mother Theresa as the archetypes representing moral opposites. They tell us that their worldview considers sacrifice to be non-negotiable. But why posture as if Hitler and Mother Theresa represented the only moral options available to human beings? Why not consider other models? Personally, I admire men like Thomas Edison, a prolific inventor and creator of boundless wealth who did not dedicate his life to seeking gain at the expense of others, or to enable others to gain at his expense. "Without Thomas Edison," writes David Harriman,

we would have no light bulbs, recorded music or hundreds of other inventions. Yet his goal was not to sacrifice for others, but to pursue and prove his passionately held ideas, no matter what others wanted of him. Do we really wish that he had dedicated himself to "citizen service," perhaps by collecting donations to buy candles for the poor?

As a musician who has made numerous recordings of original compositions, I am definitely one who can appreciate the astounding achievements which Edison brought to fruition. Similarly, I am thankful to those who invented and developed musical instruments, magnetic tape, four-track home recorders, high-definition equalization, distortion pedals, CD players and CD burners. These inventions have served to enhance my profoundly selfish pleasure of music-making for over 25 years. The lust for achievement, not the duty to sacrifice, is what made them possible. And what made the achievements possible if not uncompromising determination, indeed the refusal to sacrifice one's ideals for the wishes of others? Take a tour sometime of a manufacturing plant, a printing house, a lumber mill or other facility which produces values. If there were ever a genuinely rational "house of worship," it would be one of these establishments, not some sterile church with a wooden scarecrow nailed to the wall in front before which some incompotent nobody postures as having everyone's best "spiritual" interest in mind, droning on and on about how miserable humanity is. They speak for themselves.

Religionists are welcome to uphold Mother Theresa as their moral ideal - they can have her! And they can have the Hitlers that such models inevitably invite. I'll go with the great achievers, the religionists can enshrine their great losers.

by Dawson Bethrick

Responding to Pavielle

A new blog has been created called The God Debate where opening statements in a debate on the existence of a god have been published.

In the opening statement of the pro-god position, its author Pavielle affirms "the absolute nature of truth" as "the solid base on which much of my argument rests." Pavielle rightly points out that certain positions on the nature of truth are self-defeating, such as those which affirm as a truth the view that truth cannot be known. Such views are often the outcome of frustrated mysticism.

Additionally, Pavielle asks readers to "check out some characteristics of truth," which are listed as follows:

- Truth is not invented, but discovered
- Truth is transcultural
- Truth is unchanging even though our beliefs about the truth may change
- Beliefs cannot change a fact
- Truth is not affected by the attitude of the one professing it
- All truths are absolute truths

Pavielle then proceeded to present a case intended to prove, not the existence of the Christian god per se, but what is identified as "a generic theistic God," which I understand to refer generally to an invisible conscious entity whose consciousness has the power to bring matter into existence, assign objects their identity, essentially to create reality in one way or another.

In the comments section of Paveille's opening statement, I interacted with a small portion of what was presented, focusing on the issue of "the origin of life." In that section, Pavielle accused "Darwinists" of taking their views on the origin of life "on faith," which I called into question. Additional commonplace criticisms against evolution and abiogenesis were also introduced in Pavielle's opening statement, and I responded to a few of them as well. Specifically I raised the concern that Pavielle's overall argument, as presented in the overview so far presented, is difficult to distinguish from an argument from incredulity. This is because much of his case in this section dwells on what are thought to be probabilities that are so unlikely as to be considered "astronomical." I found this ironic given Pavielle's own pointers regarding the nature of truth: if something is true, it's true regardless of our beliefs (for "beliefs cannot change a fact") and one's estimation that something is utterly unlikely to happen does not trump the actual state of affairs (for "truth is not affected by the attitude of the one professing it"). Since unlikely things do in fact happen, our estimation that some postulated occurrence is highly improbable is not sufficient to rule it out.

Pavielle then responded to my criticism, and that's where we begin. (From here on, I will address Pavielle in second person address.)

Pavielle wrote:

Origon of Life- That it sright. Darwinists take the origon of life theory on faith."

Yes, you did affirm this, but I'm wondering how you would support the highly generalized claim that "Darwinists take the origon of life theory on faith." Nothing you have presented indicates why one should suppose this is the case. It may be the case that some do this, but that would only speak for those who do, not those who do not or might not.

Pavielle wrote:

I was not condemning faith by any means. I was merely pointing out the hypocrisy of most atheists.

Now it seems you're mixing issues. You asserted (without argument) that "Darwinists take the origon of life theory on faith," and then seem to conflate this to atheists as such. But an atheist is simply someone who has no god-belief, and this requires no faith since it is not a commitment to any affirmation. Non-belief in square circles, for instance, is not a faith-based position. It's not even a "position" per se, since it does not posit anything. At any rate, I thought you were trying to present an argument for the existence of a god. Whether or not any particular atheist is guilty of hypocrisy is irrelevant.

Pavielle wrote:

They take certain things on faith, but then mock those who have faith in God.

I'd like to see an example of this, in the words of card-carrying "Darwinists" themselves. Specifically an example showing that they "take the origon of life theory on faith" and then ridiculing others for accepting views on the basis of faith.

Pavielle wrote:

Deduction must be used of course. As for explenations, I believe that is what I am trying to do right now. Both theists and atheists should be able to logically explain their stance.

Fair enough. Let's proceed.

Pavielle wrote:

the mathematical probablility of biogenesis is astronomically low.

Low probability is ultimately irrelevant. The mathematical probability of the bullet fragment hitting James Tague on his cheek in Dallas on November 22, 1963 was also "astonomically low," and yet it happened. Probability assessment is fine for estimating future outcomes. But if something happened, it happened regardless of the odds. Again, truth is absolute, right?

Pavielle wrote:

And there is little evidence that supports it. You say there is some, but did not actually mention any. Until you bring it in, there is no evidence to support biogeneis in this debte.

Just by saying that "there is little evidence that supports it" suggests that you are already aware that at least some evidence which supports it exists. But to clarify my position (since I am not here to argue in defense of abiogenesis per se; others are far more able than I am on this matter), let me just say this. I'm open to supposing that abiogenesis occurred, and I'm also open to supposing that life has always existed. If it's the case that abiogenesis occurred, and we learn this is the case, I'm open to accepting that as truth. If it is discovered that life has always existed, then if that's true, it's true. This is to say that it is a curiosity, but it is not an important issue in my worldview. Life exists. That's a fact, and that's something I need to deal with an act on. How it "got here" is rather moot to me. But I will also mention that I see no good reason to suppose that life is the creation of an invisible magic being which has the power to turn its wishes into reality at will. Where you say that you don't have enough faith to be an atheist (as if non-belief in invisible magic beings were a product of faith; it's not), I'm too honest to be a theist.

Pavielle wrote:

A single cell is considered the simplest lifeform by all scientists. Virus particularly. Simple life exists today and it cannot be made any simpler. Biochemists have proved this. It couldn't exist now, and it couldn't have existed a long time ago.

Can you explain how you know that, just because it's supposed that "it couldn't exist now" (based only on what we know now), it also "couldn't have existed a long time ago"? I'm sure you're aware that scientists are generally open to new discoveries (especially if they make these discoveries themselves). What conclusively rules out the supposed possibility that at some time in the distant past there existed some life form, which may now be extinct for all we know, and which was even simpler than the single-celled organisms we currently consider to be the simplest life forms? Again, I'm not claiming there was such a thing. But I see that you are claiming there could not have been such. Should scientists go into the field of paleo-biological research with the assumption that organisms less complex than the life forms currently considered to be the simplest in existence could not have existed? What would drive such an assumption? A confessional investment in a religious devotional program? Is that responsible science? Is that openness to absolute truth?

Pavielle wrote:

It woulnd't have functioned and therefore would not have evolved. Hard knocks for evolution.

And yet below, we'll find that the concern for simplicity vs. complexity in nature is really a moot issue after all. Again, if evolution took place, it took place, whether we find it incredible or not.

Pavielle wrote:

And you make a good point in my favor by saying that even non-organic molecules aren't simple. That decreases the chances that they would develop naturally.

I think you missed my point then. Recall what you had written:

Even the earliest organisms would have had the equivalent of 100,000 encyclopedias of information stored in them!

But if this is the case with non-organic molecules as well, then the concern for simplicity may in fact be nothing more than a chimera after all. If nature, in the form of both organic and non-organic compounds, is info-packed, then highlighting the (unargued) supposition that "the earliest organisms would have had the equivalent of 100,000 encyclopedias of information stored in them" loses its power to impress. Indeed, simply because some article of fact is by itself impressive does not constitute an argument securing desired conclusions.

Pavielle wrote:

Incredulity? You think my argument is based on that? Incedulity is an emotion. My argument is based on mathematical probabilities. And since the attittude of the person does not affect the truth (As you so aprtly reeaffirmed) then your attitude does not affect such probabilities.

From what I can tell, your argument seeks to employ mathematical probabilities to secure the view that things are so unlikely that they are beyond reasonable credibility. That's the overwhelming impression that I walked away with when I read it.

Pavielle wrote:

Okay: You want an exact definiton of the Principle of Uniformity. Here it is.

Yes, it would be beneficial for your argument to inform it with some indication of what you take to be its key principles. Recall what you had written:

The Principle of Uniformity suggests that such complexity of life could not have evolved without guidance.

So as I look through your (unattributed) definitions of the principle of uniformity, I'll be looking specifically to see how they might "suggest" that complex life forms "could not have evolved without guidance." By 'guidance' I am supposing you have in mind some consciously directed oversight administered by some (presumably *living*) entity which deliberately sought to bring about the current state of affairs on earth (a planet teeming with diverse life forms) as a desired outcome. If you meant something fundamentally different (i.e., some natural process which did not involve a form of consciousness directing outcomes), then you may want to clarify this in future statements.

Pavielle wrote:

The principle of uniformity or the 'The Principle of Uniformity of Nature' postulates that the laws of nature discovered on Earth apply throughout the universe.

It's not clear to me how this rendition of "the Principle of Uniformity of Nature… suggests that such complexity of life could not have evolved without guidance."

Pavielle wrote:

A stronger Uniformity principle is that the laws of event causation have remained constant throughout time (uniformitarianism) as well as applying everywhere in the 'modern' universe. For instance, the idea in Physics that there has been no change in the fine-structure constant since the Big Bang.

Again, it's not clear how this "suggests" some form of "guidance," as I understand this term to mean.

Pavielle wrote:

There is also another definition that the Principle of Uniformity states that nothing that is now impossible in principle was ever the case in the past.

It's still not clear how some form of "guidance" is suggested by any of this. In fact, quite the opposite is suggested (at least, by my understanding). These suggest to me that guidance would not be needed, since natural laws were in operation. Is "guidance" needed for the movement of tectonic plates? I don't think so; geological forces, operating according to natural law, make this happen. Is "guidance" required for intercellular activity? I don't think so; biochemical forces are at work here. From what you have presented, I'd say quite the opposite is suggested.

Pavielle wrote:

There it is. The Principle of Uniformity affirms that natural laws are uniform throughout the universe. In my argument, I am reffering to the laws of probability, which make it highly unlikely that the universe could have spontaneoulsy come into being.

But if the universe always existed (which is my view; see below), then there's no need even to entertain the notion "that the universe could have spontaneously come into being." Existence exists, and the things that exist act according to their natures (that's the law of causality). So again, some form of conscious direction choreographing it all is not even implied, let alone "suggested."

Pavielle wrote:

My watch example is not about comparing natural life to that which is artifical. You misenterpereted.

It may not have been your intention, but that is what your use of the watch in fact does: it compares (quite explicitly in fact) biology to artificial mechanisms, and I see this in itself as a means of stacking the deck. If your case has solid facts behind it, you wouldn't need to do this.

Pavielle wrote:

It was a simple demonstration in probability.

One that actually misses its own point. Suppose you take that watch, as you suggested we do, put it into a bag and smash it with a hammer, and then shake it, every time you dump the contents of the bag onto a table top, you're going to have a new arrangement. Each arrangement is going to be statistically unique, and given the number of pieces involved and the spread of their distribution upon pouring out of the bag, just as astronomically improbable as the next outpouring will be. The whole thought experiment invites us to impose anthropomorphic conceptions of order to natural causality, which is why the comparison of biological organisms to artificial devices begs the question. It does this by seeding our expectation of a specific outcome: that the destruction of an object will result in its reassembly. But why should we expect this? Appeals to probability do not address this question, nor do they actually serve what the case intends to establish, for every outcome can be assessed as improbable in one way or another.

Take for example a deck of cards. If I were to give the deck of cards a good shuffle, and then I asked you to draw four cards, and you drew four aces right off the top, you'd probably say "Wow! What are the odds of that happening?!" That's because we put a certain value on like cards that the universe as such does not apply (the universe does not "value" anything; it wouldn't need to). But suppose you drew a seven of clubs, a queen of hearts, a two of diamonds and a nine of hearts. I could just as easily exclam "Wow! What are the odds of that happening?!" Statistically both outcomes are equally improbable, equally unique. I could say in equal amazement to both outcomes, "I've never seen that before!" So appeals to probability really do not impress me in the final analysis. I'm more interested in why you think a conscious agent is involved in the appearance of life on earth. But your argument seems to skirt from directly engaging this specific issue, which is the big daddy issue of theism.

Moreover, it remains to be explained exactly to what in nature (or in the details of the theory of evolution) the smashing of the watch and shaking of its parts in a bag are supposed to be analogous. The theory of evolution does not teach that new species evolve from the smashing and shaking up of their ancestors. So this in itself constitutes a weakness in your analogy.

Pavielle wrote:

In fact, becuase the universe is more complex than any watch, the probability of the universe simpley coming into being without guidance is actually less.

Well, for one thing, I see no reason to suppose that at one time the universe did not exist, so it seems arbitrary as well as conceptually fallacious to look for an explanation for how it "came to be." If the universe has always existed (again, see below), then there's no need to fuss over "the probability of the universe simpley coming into being," with or without guidance. Again, the issue which needs your attention is this notion of "guidance" which you want to introduce. Splitting hairs about probability is beyond moot; we all know that highly improbable things take place all the time. But since your case for divine guidance rests on the assumption that the universe did not always exist, just by knocking out the latter I've already provided good reason to reject the former. Hence my atheism (that is, non-belief in theism) is on solid ground.

Pavielle wrote:

If you would like, I can use a different analogy, but the effect will be the same: All the parts of a cell are floating in infinity. What are the chances that they will come together perfectly? Astronomical. Even after millions and millions of years? Still astronomical.

And the lack of impressiveness remains the same. Not to mention that the notion of "floating in infinity" is meaningless to me, the supposition that it is highly or "astronomically" improbable that the contents of the first cell would somehow unite into a single entity, is not sufficiently conclusive to warrant our consideration of alternative explanations, especially if they are arbitrary and internally contradictory, such as is the case with theism. It remains to be proven that such is impossible. By saying that the occurrence in question is merely improbable, you are, whether you realize it or not, tacitly conceding that said occurrence is still possible, just unlikely. So if the occurrence is conceded to be possible, then the urgency to consider alternatives loses steam.

But now step back and get a wider picture: suppose you want me to think that it is patently impossible for this to happen, given the known laws of nature. But then you want me to accept as not mere possibility, but as a holy fact, that a form of consciousness wished the universe into existence. Think about that for a moment. What known laws of nature support this notion? You appealed to the known laws of nature in order to rule out the possibility of life somehow generating from non-living substances, but then when it comes to considering the alternative that theism promotes, the laws of nature are no longer to be consulted in the matter. Is there any evidence in nature of a consciousness which can make real and actual something it wishes in its imagination? I'd like to see this. Perhaps it could wish me a million dollars.

Pavielle wrote:

This is a kind exapmle, since I am even giving the cell (A natrual thing) time. Time wouldn't have existed prior to the Universe becuase time, space, and matter must coexist. Also, the cell (Analogous to the Universe) already has all its parts. The Universe would have come from nothing. FInally, the universe is more complex than a cell.

None of this is meaningful to me since I do not begin with non-existence. Since I begin with existence (i.e., the universe), I have no need to hypothesize about what could or could not have existed "prior to the Universe." In fact, the expression "prior to the Universe" is utterly referenceless (unless of course one sacrifices his rational faculty on the altar of his imagination and proceeds to invent fantasies). If we begin with existence, then there's no problem. But if we begin with non-existence, then you've got an insurmountable problem: questions of how existence came to exist where there was no existence before necessarily presuppose the law of causality (for you cannot answer the "how" part of the question without at least implicitly assuming the law of causality), and yet the law of causality itself presupposes the fact of existence (since causality is the relationship between an entity and its own actions). So, unless you're willing to commit the fallacy of the stolen concept, you need to begin with existence.

Theism, however, seeks a compromise between these two: it wants thinkers to take seriously the notion that existence needs an explanation in something beyond it (e.g., "The universe had a cause!"), but it also tries to pass itself off on the legitimacy of beginning with something already existing. The stipulation of theism, however, is that this pre-existing something cannot be the universe as such (even though the universe is the sum total of existence, and we know this exists); rather, it wants to begin with a form of consciousness, which simply dooms theism to metaphysical subjectivism: it asserts that a subject of consciousness holds metaphysical primacy over all objects distinct from itself. There's nothing more subjective than such a view, and nothing more antagonistic to the concept of truth as such.

Pavielle wrote:

As for life being natural of unnatural, that cannot be assumed or determined directly. It must be deduced through evidence. I was not assuming anything. Just demonstrating the low probability of the universe coming into being spontaneously.

I hope you see the point of the objection I raised. If life is natural, then there's no reason to suppose that natural processes are insufficient to make life a reality. We see this all day long. But the argument you want to make needs to trade on the notion that life is somehow analogous to designed artifice (like a watch). I've given some indication as to why this is a very weak analogy. Doug Krueger gives more points to show why the design argument rests on a weak argument in his book What Is Atheism?

Pavielle wrote:

I would enjoy it if you would attempt to tear apart the rest of my arguemnt. Particularly about the Big Bang Theory.

Regarding the 'big bang' theory, see below. As to other parts of your piece, they will have to wait until another time. For now, I hope it is clear why the portions of your opening statement that I have reviewed are conclusively dismissable.

Pavielle wrote:

By trying to tear apart my arguments against evolution and biogensis, you merely rebuttled my intimations at the nature of God.

That's all I sought to do. In fact, I was hoping to find stronger indicators of the existence of a conscious entity behind it all (to account for the "guidance" that you have asserted), but your statement provided no justification for this that I could find.

Pavielle wrote:

The Big Bang Theory is the clicker.

If that's the case, then I don't think you have a case.

Pavielle wrote:

It is ulimately what decides if there is a God or not.

If that's the case, why doesn't the bible ever discuss the 'big bang' theory? Why the need for all the prophecies, an incarnation in first century Palestine, and other "signs" to demonstrate its existence?

Pavielle wrote:

Scientifically at least.

Ah, I see. You mean, as opposed to religious faith. Got it. Well, we can put the matter to rest then.

Pavielle wrote:

All you have proved in your arguemnts is that you disagree with me that God created life.

If that's what you think, I suggest you go back and review what I have presented. What I did is show how your reasons for supposing that a conscious entity was involved in the development of life on earth are dismissable. You've not shown that they can withstand my points of criticism. This is more than simply disagreeing with you. In fact, I could still agree that a god created life (for instance, I could wish that this were the case in spite of evidences to the contrary), so my agreement or disagreement are not a factor here.

Pavielle wrote:

You did not disprove His existence or His involvement in the Big Bang.

There is no need to prove that the non-existent does not exist. If X does not exist, why would anyone need to prove it doesn't exist? The onus is on you to prove that it does exist, if you want others to take your claim that it exists seriously.

Pavielle wrote:

In fact, unless you can come up with some specific evidence in favor of biogenesis and evolution (I plan to add more against it as the debate goes on), you have failed to disprove any of my points.

Wrong again. Your points, even if we accept them as you have presented them, would only show that abiogenesis is "astronomically improbable," based on what we know now. This would not prove that it is impossible, which is what you would need to prove in order to rule out naturalistic explanations. But then there's the quandary that I pointed out above: you want me to suppose that explanation X is so improbable as to dismiss it as virtually impossible, and yet embrace explanation Y as not only merely possible but absolute holy fact, and yet I would have to be utterly dishonest to do this.

Pavielle wrote:

Most of them you merely conveniently misinterperted to suggest that I was operating on and emotional level and therefore my argument was flawed.

I don't think I misineterpreted what you had presented. The portion of your argument that I reviewed reads quite strongly as one reducing ultimately to an argument from incredulity, disguised of course to look like something else, but an argument from incredulity in the end. Earlier in your opening statement, you affirmed absolute truth, in fact you affirmed views which reduce to the primacy of existence principle (since you affirmed that one's attitudes and beliefs do not alter the facts which inform our truths). But then you went on to say how improbable all these proposed solutions are, which is intended to mean we should think them too beyond the pale to be believeable. Hence, we ultimately have an argument from incredulity: if naturalistic explanations are deemed "astronomically improbable," then it would be ridiculous to believe them. Consequently, the explanation resides in something "beyond nature," and the believeability of this alternative explanation is not questioned or scrutinized. It might fly if I were confessionally committed to such an argument's intended conclusion and wanted to settled nagging doubts which are difficult if not impossible to fully quench. But is that an intellectually honest course to take?

Pavielle wrote:

As I have clarified, I am operating on natural and mathematical laws to determine probability.

Your argument's appeal to mathematics and probability is really just a cover, in order to give your faith claim an air of respectability. But look at how the views of absolute truth you presented in your opening statement presuppose the primacy of existence principle (which is the recognition that existence exists independent of consciousness), and yet what you want to conclude in your argument reduces to the primacy of consciousness view of metaphysics (which asserts that reality, existence, the universe, etc. depend on a form of consciousness - cf. your "guidance"). This is to say, you need to identify your starting point, show it to be conceptually irreducible, identify the means by which you are aware of it, and then explain how it is compatible with the position you are defending. Then, if you continue to insist that your god is real, you will need to explain how other thinkers can distinguish your god from something you're simply imagining. Until you can do all of this, your case will remain vulnerable to my criticism, for these issues are where the rubber hits the road.

Pavielle wrote:

Oh yeah... You can't say that life always existed unless the Universe was infinite. But since you did not dispute the Big Bang Theory, we must assume that the Universe is finite. Thus, since life was developed after the Universe, the existence of life must also be finete. In other words, life can not have always existed and evolved.

You're confusing the term 'infinite' with 'eternal', which I have found to be quite a common habit among theistic apologists. The two are not the same. My position holds that the universe is finite but also eternal. This is not a contradiction for the terms are not incompatible. Finitude in this respect has nothing to do with time, but with identity. To exist is to be something specific, i.e., to be finite. The concept 'infinity' can only refer to a potential (such as the potential to continue extending a series beyond any specific measurement), not to an actual. The actual is always finite. The concept 'eternal', on the other hand, indicates that temporal measures do not apply. This is the case with the universe. By 'universe' I mean the sum totality of all that exists. To posit that any thing exists, is to include it, by virtue of its actual or supposed existence, in the totality of what exists, which is the universe. Since time is a form of measuring motion, it requires a standard, such as the earth's orbit around the sun: one orbit equals one year. Thus temporal measurement is possible within the universe (i.e., within the totality of all that exists), since relative motion between bodies takes place within the universe. But when it gets to the universe as such, since there is by definition no such thing as something that exists outside the universe (the universe by definition includes everything that exists), temporal concepts do not apply for there is no relative motion between the universe and "something else" to provide those concepts with the fixed standard they require. Hence, the universe is literally eternal.

I did not comment on the 'big bang' theory, first because it does not counter my position that the universe is eternal (it serves more to explain the current inflationary distribution of what exists in the universe as opposed to offering an explanation for existence as such), and also because I tend to take such theories with a heaping grain of salt: I am not an advocate of the 'big bang' theory, but I'm open to accepting it as truth if the evidence for it is conclusive. Then again, it's like the issue of the origin of life: I don't think it's a very important issue, certainly not in philosophy. (I know, this tends to disturb many theists since they want people to take the question of origins so seriously; it's an area of inquiry where speculation and fantasy are quite difficult to distinguish from cogent assessments, thus providing ample opportunity for mystics to insert the hand of their invisible magic being.)

Pavielle wrote:

Gees, one last thing. If we are not to determine the origon of life by basing are deductions are life that currently exists, then we would be floating in the dark and using only blind faith. In that case, someone who said that all life arose from a pot of noodle soup would be just as locigally valid as the scientist or creationist. If we can't deduce the origon or development of life by looking at living things today, then evolutionists are way off base becuase that is exactly what they do.

I agree that we need to take the knowledge that we have already validated of the present as a point of departure. This would include our knowledge of the primacy of existence principle as well, especially given its fundamentality to cognition. But I also think that scientists should guard against arbitrarily ruling out what may actually be genuine possibilities, especially if new discoveries give them at least some objective footing. That's all I'm saying. Deeming something as astronomically improbable may be impressive to some, but if something that is thought to be astronomically improbable actually happened, then it happened, simple as that. (Again, truth is absolute, right?)

Pavielle wrote:

And, of course if bio-genisis is true then it will always be true, regardless of what I think. But it is a double edged sword. If God exists, He will always exist, regardless of what you may or may not believe Dawson.

Again, you appeal to the primacy of existence principle to undergird your view of truth, which is rational. But I suggest you examine this issue deeper so that you can see just why it is the case that the notion of a god contradicts this very necessary basis of truth as such.

Pavielle wrote:

Sorry, I keep noticing little inconsistencies in the rebuttal and have to keep going back to adress them.

Do you think there was an inconsistency in what I wrote? If so, can you pinpoint it for me?

by Dawson Bethrick

Incinerating Presuppositionalism: Year One

Today marks the one year anniversary of Incinerating Presuppositionalism, the blog dedicated to scorching the scarecrows and strawmen of Vantillian apologetics.

For those who may be new to my blog, or who simply want to have a listing of all my entries for the first year in one handy source, I am listing them all below, beginning with the earliest post.

1. Presuppositionalism vs. Causality - 3/26/05
2. John Frame vs. the Human Thinker - 3/27/05
3. Bahnsen's Poof - 3/28/05
4. Christianity vs. Objective Morality - 3/29/05
5. The Cartoon Universe of Theism - 3/30/05
6. Thus Saith the Lord and His Spokesmen: Shut Down Thy Mind! - 4/1/05
7. Paul's Empty Sling - 4/1/05
8. The "God's Good Pleasure" Principle and the Cartoon Universe of Theism - 4/2/05
9. Omnipotence and Sovereignty in the Cartoon Universe - 4/4/05
10. Do I Borrow My Morality from the Christian Worldview? - 4/14/05
11. Putting Paul's TAG to the Geusha Test - 4/15/05
12. From the Horse's Mouth: Apologists - 4/20/05
13. Paul's Argument from Desperation - 4/21/05
14. Difficulty Keeping the Party Line Straight - 5/2/05
15. The Real Genesis Account - 5/6/05
16. Five Hundred Anonymous Witnesses - 5/8/05
17. I Don't Believe It - 5/9/05
18. Arbitrary Presupposition vs. Reasoned Conclusion - 5/20/05
19. Cooking with Gene's Abritrary Presuppositions - 5/22/05
20. Is Man "Created in the Image of God"? - 5/31/05
21. No "Might Be" About It: I AM an Atheist - 6/2/05
22. Is Human Experience Evidence of the Christian God? - 6/6/05
23. Can Reformed Christians Count? - 6/7/05
24. Is the Assumption of the Christian God Axiomatic? - 6/26/05
25. Only Two Worldviews? - 7/24/05
26. Christianity as the Worship of Self-Contradiction - 8/4/05
27. Christ Jesus: Still a Jumble of Contradictions - 8/18/05
28. Is the Contrary to Christianity Truly Impossible? 9/18/05
29. Reckless Apologetic Presumptuousness - 9/24/05
30. Probing Mr. Manata's Poor Understanding of the Axioms - 10/4/05
31. Tape-Loop Apologetics - 11/1/05
32. What Happened to Paul? 11/14/05
33. Bahnsen's Three Charges of Prejudice - 11/23/05
34. Bahnsen's Poof Revisited - 11/28/05
35. With Minds of Children - 12/28/05
36. Dear Sal - 1/10/06
37. Presuppositionalism and the Argument from Ignorance - 2/3/06
38. In the Beginning... - 2/23/06
39. Will the Real TAG Please Stand Up? - 3/1/06
40. Rational Morality vs. Presuppositional Apologetics - 3/9/06
41. CalvinDude's Defense of Christianity's Moral Bankruptcy - 3/16/06
42. Confessions of a Vantillian Subjectivist - 3/23/06

My searing indictment against Christianity in general, and presuppositionalism in particular, will proceed. So get ready for another year of blazing fun!

by Dawson Bethrick

Confessions of a Vantillian Subjectivist

I. THEORY

We've all heard the expression "wishing doesn't make it so" and its many variations. Christians have told me things like "Just because you don't believe in God doesn't mean he doesn't exist!" and "Saying there's no god doesn't mean that God is not real!" Statements of this nature are, whether their speakers realize it or not, expressions of the primacy of existence principle, which is the philosophical recognition of the fact that reality exists independent of consciousness. Wishing, believing, affirming, denying, ignoring, evading, etc., are all acts of consciousness, and the primacy of existence principle holds that these conscious actions will not alter the facts which obtain. For instance, if I choose to ignore the oncoming traffic on a busy street, this will not reduce my risk of getting clobbered by a speeding vehicle if I try to cross it. My act of ignoring the state of affairs will not alter the state of affairs. Nor will my wishing, and this is because the primacy of existence principle is true.

It is this principle which is the basis of the concept of objectivity - the active commitment to the principle that existence exists independent of consciousness - that the task of consciousness is to perceive and identify objects, not create and revise them according to will. We call this 'objectivity' because it is the recognition that the objects of awareness hold metaphysical primacy over the subject of awareness, that the subject does not create its objects, bring them into existence, or assign them their natures.

The opposite notion, which we call subjectivism, constitutes a reversal of the primacy of existence principle, affirming either implicitly or explicitly that the subject of awareness holds metaphysical primacy over its objects, that the objects find their source in the knowing subject, that the subject creates the objects which exist and assigns them their identity. The reversal of the orientation between subject and object which is the defining essence of subjectivism, is the root error behind the belief that wishing does make it so, which most adult thinkers implicitly recognize to be false. When someone tells you that "wishing doesn't make it so," he's essentially saying that subjectivism is not true. This is correct, and this recognition has the backing of the primacy of existence.

It is my conviction that Christianity is lethal to human life because of its commitment to subjectivism at the most fundamental worldview level. And even though expressions of subjectivism can be found throughout Christianity's metaphysical, epistemological and moral doctrines, its defenders stubbornly resist acknowledging this fact in so many words. But soon as they start telling us about what they believe, it's like an 800 lb. gorilla in a dining room: you just can't hide it. Thus when someone treats wishing as if it were the final arbiter of truth, he may very well be borrowing from the Christian worldview.

II. DETECTION

By now my readers know that I have no qualms considering apologetic defenses of Christianity in the words of those who seek to vindicate its teachings. A bountiful source of specifically presuppositionalist discourse, arguments and musings can be found in the Van Til Discussion Lists, which unfortunately are no longer active. I enjoy paging through these archives because not only is there no end to the many ways apologists attempt to hold their god-belief together with their elaborate rationalizations, there are also some very telling confessions to be found as well.

Take for example this February 26, 2004 posting by apologist Mike Warren in which we find the following ripe statement regarding the fundamental differences between the orientation between man's consciousness and the objects of his awareness, and that allegedly belonging to the Christian god. Warren writes:

In knowing a flower, for example, God knows everything about the flower. Humans can have that flower as an object of their knowledge as well, so there is a similarity in the knowledge; but a difference is that humans cannot know the flower exhaustively. Not only is there a quantitative difference between divine and human knowledge of the flower, but there are qualitative differences. God knows the flower originally. Everything about the flower originates from His own consciousness. Indeed, God's thinking about the flower makes it so. In contrast, humans know the flower as something originating external to them. Their thinking about the flower does not make it so. Human knowledge claims about the flower can be incorrect, unlike God's perfect knowledge. These are similarities and differences that characterize a biblical view of human knowledge as analogical of God's knowledge.

When I first read this statement two years ago, I was impressed with its open admission of crucial points which many apologists have been reluctant to acknowledge. I was impressed because I found myself, in a sense, agreeing with just about everything Warren was saying here. In light of the clarification I made above regarding the concept of objectivity and the error rooting subjectivism, let's examine Warren's statement bit by bit to see once and for all just how deeply Christianity is committed to subjectivism. As we go through the various points of Warren's confession, observe the contradictory metaphysical orientations between subject and object which the believer accepts and will seek to rationalize in his defensive ploys.

Warren writes:

In knowing a flower, for example, God knows everything about the flower. Humans can have that flower as an object of their knowledge as well, so there is a similarity in the knowledge; but a difference is that humans cannot know the flower exhaustively.

Actually, given the dogmatic stipulations of Christian god-belief, the two positions that "God knows everything about the flower" and "humans cannot know the flower exhaustively" are outcomes of difference that is even more fundamental than Warren acknowledges which erases any impression of "similarity" the believer wants to claim between his own knowledge and the "knowledge" he attributes to his god. It is an outcome of a two-fold, internal antithesis within the Christian worldview:

1) The Christian god's relation to the flower in terms of the subject-object relationship vs. man's relation to the flower in terms of the subject-object relationship: In the case of man, the object holds primacy over the subject of consciousness (this is the primacy of existence, i.e., objectivism); and in the case of the Christian god this orientation is reversed: the subject holds primacy over any objects of which it is allegedly conscious (this is the primacy of consciousness, i.e., subjectivism). For the Christian god, the identity of the objects of its awareness conforms to consciousness; for man, however, consciousness conforms to identity of the objects which he perceives.

2) Man's need for a means of knowledge acquisition and validation (reason) vs. the Christian god's lack of such a need (the Christian god "just knows" and does not need to acquire and validate knowledge): For man, knowledge is only possible by discovering facts of reality and integrating them by means of concepts, which he forms, initially on the basis of perceptual inputs, and subsequently on the basis of concepts so formed. That is, man needs a process for acquiring and validating his knowledge, for his knowledge is not automatic. This is in keeping with the primacy of existence principle as noted above: the task of consciousness is to perceive and identify objects, not create and revise them according to will. The opposite is the case for the Christian god, as Warren points out: it has no need to discover and validate its "knowledge," for it "knows" automatically, that is, without any process of acquisition and validation. The task of its consciousness is to create its objects and assign them their identity, revising them when it suits its pleasure, all at will. It could not be stated clearer: for man, the primacy of the objects of consciousness (cf. the concept of objectivity) characterizes the fundamental orientation which roots his knowledge, and for the Christian god the primacyof the subject of consciousness (cf. subjectivism) characterizes its orientation to knowledge. While for man wishing does not make it so, for the Christian god wishing does make it so.

So when Warren claims, as he does in the opening statement of his message, that "Van Til's philosophy is wholly based on the problem of the one and the many," he is actually camouflaging the real problem that lies at the heart of the religious worldview, which is its contradictory metaphysical orientations. Man knows, and can only know, that which he discovers and validates by reason (that is, somehow), and the Christian god "knows" apart from reason (that is, no how). The only correlativity between man's knowledge and the Christian god's alleged "knowledge," is that, in the case of the believer as it is supposed to be in the case of his god, the subject holds primacy over the objects of consciousness: the Christian god wishes its objects into existence, and the believer wishes his god-belief into "the Truth."

Warren continues:

Not only is there a quantitative difference between divine and human knowledge of the flower, but there are qualitative differences.

Right, according to reasonable inferences from the mythology, the Christian god will always be said to have more "knowledge" than man ever will; specifically, the Christian god will always be said to "know" everything that is possible to be known about the flower, while man will know no more than a mere portion of that alleged sum of "knowledge," that portion being whatever he can discover and validate by means of reason. The purpose of claiming such "knowledge" on the part of the Christian god is not to explain some legitimate philosophical quandary, for, unlike man who needs some (but by no means all) knowledge, the Christian god, which is characterized as an eternally indestructible entity, would have no need for knowledge whatsoever. The real purpose is to equip the priestly class with a ready means of usurping unearned authority over others: if an individual buys the faith-based premise that there's an invisible magic being who "knows and sees all," he will likely make an effort to please it in word and deed, and this ambition typically takes practical expression in accepting the authority of the priestly class, even though its members have already abandoned reason in preference for mysticism.

And yes, there are fundamental qualitative differences between man's knowledge and the Christian god's so-called "knowledge," as I have indicated above. It's not simply a matter of degrees of knowledge (one possessing more than the other), but the relative subject-object orientations of the two kinds of consciousness involved in Warren's working model: the Christian god's consciousness (the subject holds primacy over the object) vs. man's consciousness (the objects hold primacy over the subject). Two wholly contradictory standards are thus endorsed at the heart of Christian theism.

Warren continues:

God knows the flower originally.

Of course, and this is because the flower's identity came from and conforms to the Christian god's will, i.e., a form consciousness.

Warren makes it explicit:

Everything about the flower originates from His own consciousness.

Bingo. That's called subjectivism.

Warren makes it even more explicit:

Indeed, God's thinking about the flower makes it so.

Here we have it stated explicitly: the object conforms to the subject in the same sense that "wishing makes it so!" That's subjectivism to a T.

Warren then states:

In contrast, humans know the flower as something originating external to them.

Right. That's the primacy of existence, which affirms the opposite of the primacy of consciousness.

Warren states:

Their thinking about the flower does not make it so.

Right. We must look outward (sense perception) in order to discover (not "create") and validate (not stipulate) the identify of the objects which exist. By contrast, the Christian god need not look outward (for before it creates anything "out there," nothing existed "out there"); rather, it looks inward, into its subjective states where its wishing and imagination provide all the standards.

Warren points out:

Human knowledge claims about the flower can be incorrect,

Right, because human beings start out tabula rasa, and must discover and validate their knowledge by means of a process which they must learn before they can master it. (Of course, many theists like to exempt themselves from having to do this.)

Warren states:

unlike God's perfect knowledge.

Exactly: Reason has nothing to do with the Christian god's alleged "knowledge," and could only be characterized as knowledge from nowhere. This is the "perfect" ideal for the believer: the claim to knowledge which is to be accepted unquestioningly without validation.

Warren concludes:

These are similarities and differences that characterize a biblical view of human knowledge as analogical of God's knowledge.

Differences? Yes! Off the map, in fact. Similarities? Not at all. Indeed, Warren points to nothing similar between man's knowledge of the objects he perceives and identifies, and the so-called "knowledge" Christians attribute to their god. And he cannot because their basic orientation is, respectively, wholly antithetical to one another. It will not do for the Christian to say that man's knowledge is "analogous" to the Christian god's supposed "knowledge" by pointing to similarities that simply aren't there. Nor will it do to say that "man's knowledge of the facts is then a reinterpretation of God's interpretation" (Van Til, A Survey of Christian Epistemology, 203f), for the process of discovery and validation is not equivalent to reinterpretation of another mind's wishing. Men do not read minds, nor is wishing - as we have seen - a means of validation.

III. CONCLUSION

As can be seen, however, there is no basis to the claim that man’s knowledge is in any way like the knowledge Christianity claims for its god. Man discovers and validates his knowledge, and the Christian god whips its “knowledge” out of nowhere, declaring its self-authored content “truth” by fiat. The fundamental distinctions outlined here can only mean that Christians should probably use a completely different term to refer to whatever it is they think their god has in its consciousness, for it surely could not be knowledge as man has it. Because the content that allegedly resides in the Christian god’s “mind” is not put through any validation process, referring to that alleged content as “knowledge” constitutes a stolen concept (hence my use of quotations when using the term in this manner).

In Christianity, we have a worldview which is terminally conflicted with itself given this deep internal antithesis between subject and object. The implication for apologetics is clear: any argument for the existence of god is an argument for the validity subjectivism, essentially the view that wishing makes it so constitutes the final criterion for all knowledge and truth. Because of his worldview’s fundamental commitment to subjectivism, the Christian has no uncompromised basis on which to tell non-believers that “wishing doesn’t make it so”; he has no choice but to borrow from Objectivism to make such statements. In the final analysis, this is the ultimate reality for the believer: not only does his worldview teach that wishing in fact makes it so, it essentially teaches that only wishing makes it so.

by Dawson Bethrick