Concepts and Induction

Years ago I was in correspondence with a Christian apologist who presupposed that Christianity and only Christianity could solve the problem of induction. There were many Christians at one time who actually believed this. Perhaps some still do.

This apologist carefully demonstrated how a number of prominent academic treatments of the matter missed the mark, sometimes by wide margin, when it came to providing a justification for inductive presuppositions. The apologist of course claimed that the existence of a universe-creating deity which actively “ordains and sustains” the “created order” provides the rational justification which secular scholars could only miss due to their chronic “unbelief.”

Bahnsen’s “tremendous philosophical mistake”

Presuppositionalists love to tout the debate between Greg Bahnsen and Gordon Stein. In apologetic circles, it is commonly believed that Bahnsen got that evil atheist Stein real good, and no atheist thinker can really be capable of crawling back from that public whipping.

Of course, such evaluations are quite superficial and self-serving, and they willingly ignore many striking deficiencies in Bahnsen’s presentation (see for example here, here, here and here).

However, what’s curious is that apologists do not tend to point to Bahnsen’s discussion with George H. Smith, author of Atheism: The Case Against God.

Why Do Apologists Raise the Problem of Induction in Debate?

A visitor to my blog posting under the moniker Rageforthemachine (hereafter just Rage) recently left the following comment on my entry Same Old Song and Dance: Anderson on Induction… again:

I've never understood what presupps think they have over everyone else when it comes it inductive justification. Are they saying "because I have seen a thousand white swans I know all swans are white" which is false; or are they saying "because I have seen a thousand white swans I know the next one might be white or it might not" which of course renders inductive knowledge just as insure as they claim everyone else's is.

It's a good question, and I think that however it can be answered ties in closely with what motivates apologists who raise certain topics as a focal point for debate. Discerning other people’s motives often involves speculation and conjecture, but if we’re careful, we might just find a certain pattern of tells which suggest and confirm certain desired end goals. The key part of Rage’s question is stated upfront: apologists do in fact seem to think they have something “over everyone else when it comes to inductive justification,” otherwise I doubt they’d be so eager to raise such questions in the first place. Curiously, however, I’ve never found any evidence of such advantage on behalf of Christianity in the pages of the bible.

Stovetop Realizations

I’ve had yet another very busy month and in fact I had intended to post a couple entries this month, but life’s responsibilities have robbed me of the time needed to focus and work on them, so those drafts will have to continue incubating for some time.

But I did want to share some thoughts in response to a comment which was made on my previous blog. Before getting to that, I just want to express my gratitude to everyone who reads anything I post here and even more so to those who take the time to post such thoughtful comments. I started this blog back in 2005 and I didn’t know how long I’d be able to keep in running. It’s become something of a compendium at this point. I don’t know what the future holds, but I do intend to keep it going. Let’s see if I can make it to 20 years! That would be quite a milestone, no? In the meantime, please know that I do read all comments, and I almost always have something to say in response, if nothing more than “Thank you!” If I do not reply, it is not because I missed your comment (it’s possible, but probably not the case), but instead because I’m just a very busy workhorse. Writing is a love of mine, but sometimes it takes a lot of energy to get into the proper frame of mind to say something intelligent, and even then I can wildly miss the mark. 

Anyway, on to today’s post. 

Same Old Song and Dance: Anderson on Induction... again

Christian apologist James Anderson has published yet another article on the problem of induction, this time as others essentially repeating the same superficialities from two decades ago, as though he has learned little in the intervening years: David Hume is still the prevailing authority on the topic of induction, and the problem of induction is “solved” by imagining an invisible magic being which ensures the uniformity of nature by means of sheer will. Nothing else really needs to be considered. The fact that he can point to academics who continue to be confused on the nature and basis of induction, as though this were even relevant, only serves to reinforce his theistic prejudices.

My views on the problem of induction have indeed evolved over the years. More and more I have come to the assessment that the problem of induction commits the fallacy of the stolen concept: the very framing of the problem of induction in fact tacitly assumes the validity of induction, and yet the validity of induction is what the problem essentially aims to call into question.

An Examination of Van Til’s "Argument from the Uniformity of Nature"

A typical strategy of presuppositionalism is to focus on some area of philosophy which has historically been surrounded by controversy – a “problem” of philosophy in which consensus has historically been elusive and debate continuously ever-raging – and proclaim that the controversy is neutralized by adopting a specific brand of theism. It does not seem to matter to apologists that such a move does nothing to increase our understanding of the problem in question or that it invites yet new problems which apologists cannot resolve. This is because solving the problem was never their actual goal in the first place. On the contrary, their goal is to convince themselves of the alleged truth of their self-imposed delusion and to bamboozle as many unwitting sideliners as possible. This assessment is only confirmed by the fact that, even when the defects of their theistic “solution” to such philosophical quandaries are pointed out, apologists will continue on as though their defenses were entirely tenable. 

The appeal to ignorance underlying such a strategy should not be difficult to detect. Instead of pointing to empirical evidence demonstrating the existence of supernatural beings (e.g., prayer fulfillment, curing diseases by “laying on of hands,” restoration of amputated limbs, resuscitation of decedents, in-person meetings with angels – or the risen Jesus for that matter, etc.), apologists seek to put non-believers on the spot to “account for” some fundamental recognition about reality and articulate full-blown philosophical explanations solving some centuries-old debate found only in the hallowed chambers of academia. Wouldn’t it be most ironic if the ignorance which such apologetic strategies are purportedly aimed at exposing and exploiting actually haunts the proponents of those strategies in the first place? 

Presuppositionalism and Induction: Thoughts on the Uniformity of Nature

It is very common for presuppositionalists, when making the problem of induction a debating point, to center the issue on the uniformity of nature and demand that non-Christians explain their assumption that nature is uniform in a way that does not imply theism. Induction, it is said, presupposes the uniformity of nature, and if one cannot justify his presupposition that nature is in fact uniform, then he has no justification for his inductive inferences. 

In this way, the use of the problem of induction in debate gets stuck in a short-sighted rut, focusing all energy on a discussion of the uniformity of nature and how we can justify the uniformity that is observed in nature, an observation which in itself owes much to our powers of inductive reasoning. In essence, this is a set-up, and once one accepts this approach, his fallacies line up for the picking. 

Presuppositionalism and Induction: The Humean Condition

In my previous post, I raised the concern over the very real specter of the problem of induction falling prey to the fallacy of the stolen concept. The problem of induction is not postured as a single blade of grass one innocuously passes over unknowingly as he goes about his business, but rather as a massive jungle blocking one’s path entirely.

But that’s what gives away the game. The problem of induction offers the conclusion that our generalizations are unreliable, and yet we are to accept that conclusion as reliably applicable to all generalizing. It is as though one stated, “All generalizations are unreliable, and my generalizations prove that!” And yet, theists who deploy the problem of induction as an apologetic device apparently do not see how it falls on its own sword.

Presuppositionalism and Induction: Exhuming Hume

When apologists raise the problem of induction in their encounters with non-Christians, they apparently expect non-Christians to be freshly familiar with both David Hume and also his argument undermining the reliability of induction. Or at least, to be familiar with the conclusion of an argument which brings the reliability of induction into serious doubt. Either that, or they’re raising the problem of induction in the hopes that their non-Christian sparring partners are not at all versed on matters relating to Hume’s skeptical argument and thus will be easily ensnared by the apologist’s waiting trap.

The former expectation does not seem very realistic. Albeit anecdotally, in my experience, most people I’ve surveyed over the years (many of them very intelligent and well educated individuals) have little or no familiarity with David Hume, let alone with any particular argument he championed. Even among those who took an introductory philosophy course back in junior college, few seem to remember much of anything about Hume.

The latter expectation, or rather hope, strikes me as rather devious and scheming. The problem of induction neatly lends itself as a ready gateway to a god-of-the-gaps style apologetic.

Presuppositionalism and Induction: Apologists Courting Hume

As I mentioned in my previous entry, presuppositionalists routinely take Hume’s skeptical conclusion on the reliability of induction for granted, acting as though Hume’s position must be “answered” on Hume’s own terms. 

 Let’s survey a few poignant examples of this. 

Presuppositionalism and Induction

Presuppositionalists who raise the problem of induction as a debating point in their encounters with non-theists, typically point to the uniformity of nature as the key issue to unlocking and solving the problem. After all, say the presuppositionalists, if nature were not uniform, then we’d have no basis for supposing that the future will resemble the past, which would throw induction under the bus.

In fact, the uniformity of nature is only one of several key issues, and, I’d argue, not the critical one. Even if nature is uniform, this alone would not explain how we know it’s uniform, nor would it explain what the human mind does when drawing inductive generalizations. Indeed, the Objectivist view is that nature is uniform regardless of what anyone thinks, believes, knows, prefers, hopes, etc. It’s something we discover, but this is only the beginning, not the end of explaining induction. After all, if nature is uniform, it’s not uniform only in my experience, but also in my cat’s experience. However, my cat will never draw the general conclusion that touching hot stovetops will result in a painful burn. But I can. Surely there’s more to the issue than merely “here’s why the assumption that nature is uniform is justified.”

Does Objectivism Deny the Reality of Change?

Most readers here have probably heard the charge that on “the atheist worldview” everything is “matter in motion,” that everything is “in flux,” and that the resulting constant change can only mean a persistence of chaos and absence of constancy. Such an assumption about reality supposedly follows as a result of not believing that an invisible magic being created the universe and calls all the shots. If apologists don’t actually believe this about non-believers and their outlook on reality, many nevertheless want to use such charges to put them on the defensive, regardless of what they in fact do say on behalf of their view on such matters.

Well, some time back, I had an exchange with a presuppositionalist who took a different approach. This individual actually argued precisely the opposite, namely that because of Objectivism’s conception of causality as identity applied to action, there’s no room for change in Objectivism. (I kid you not!)

Petersen’s Failed Attempts to Refute Leonard Peikoff: Objection 4 and Conclusion

This is the fifth and final entry in a series examining attempts by Christian apologist Jason Petersen to discredit anti-theistic statements by Objectivist philosopher Dr. Leonard Peikoff.

The first entry in this series can be found here.

The second entry in this series (Objection 1) can be found here.

The third entry in this series (Objection 2) can be found here.

The fourth entry in this series (Objection 3) can be found here.

Dr. Peikoff’s statements in question can be found here.

Jason Petersen’s response to Peikoff can be found here.

In this entry I will examine Petersen’s attempts to refute Peikoff’s “Objection 4” against theism as well as Petersen’s concluding remarks. We will examine certain claims about “God’s nature” as Petersen would have us imagine it. Petersen raises a series of point-missing objections to one of Peikoff’s statements. Along with this, we will find just what a catastrophe Petersen's "Christian epistemology" really is.

Examining Stefan's Presuppositionalism

StefanMach (to whom I shall again refer as Stefan going forward) has left a series of comments responding to my blog A Reply to Stefan on Induction and Deduction. Stefan is clearly sympathetic to presuppositionalism, though he seems to be wary of Greg Bahnsen, which is curious in itself.

Below I reply to Stefan’s comments.

A Reply to Stefan on Induction and Deduction

On my blog Sye Ten Bruggencate vs. the Absolute Laws of Logic which I posted back in July, a visitor posting under the moniker StefanMach (to whom I will refer as Stefan henceforth) recently left a comment about the relationship between induction and deduction and presuppositionalism.

Specifically Stefan inquired about the consequences induction has for deductive conclusions given the view that “inductive argument conclusions are classified as either strong or weak and can never be classified as true or false.”

This is topical given that deductive arguments attempt to draw conclusions from at least one premise which, as a generalization, must be the conclusion of an inductive inference. Thus if an inductive inference can only produce a conclusion that is at best “strong” (as opposed to “weak”), then any attempt to draw a conclusion by means of deduction from an inductive conclusion would necessarily inherit the tentativeness already present in the inductive conclusion. Consequently, how can any deductive conclusion be accepted as reliably true or certain?

Is Math Christian?

Two weeks ago, on October 4, I submitted a comment to the blog “MATH IS CHRISTIAN, on an entry titled THE FUTILITY OF ALL NON-CHRISTIAN APPROACHES TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS (pardon the caps - perhaps the author figured that caps would ensure the truth of what he claims).

The author of the blog, a Charles Jackson who, according to his personal info page, holds an MS in mathematics from Cal State Long Beach, claims in his blog that “the Christian God, being, as He is, infinite, personal, all-knowing, all-powerful, all-controlling, self-attesting, and self-revelatory, provides what is necessary for a successful philosophy of anything.” Given this “presupposition,” Jackson reasons, “the sufficiency of the concept of the Christian God for the intelligibility of human mathematical experience follows directly from the sufficiency of the concept of the Christian God for the intelligibility of human experience, simpliciter.” Consequently, he continues, “the concept of the Christian God is a sufficient condition for the intelligibility of human mathematical experience: mathematical knowledge, mathematical practice, etc.”

From these premises Jackson concludes that “all non-Christian approaches to the philosophy of mathematics” are therefore necessarily futile. They would have to be, goes Jakson’s reasoning, since the “concept” of the Christian god is so necessary to “mathematical experience” and “mathematical knowledge.”

For those lounging in the choir, such “reasoning” probably seems both air-tight and bullet-proof. But is it? Does such reasoning have any objective basis in reality? Or, does it only seem so unassailable from within the fake environment of the Christian worldview which elevates imagination over reality?

I suspect it is the latter rather than the former.

Chris Bolt vs. the Evils of Demanding Evidence in Support of Truth Claims

In his blog Answering the Evidentialist Objection, Chris Bolt makes it clear that does not like the idea, attributed to W.K. Clifford, that

It is wrong always, everywhere and for everyone to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.

He calls this a “marvelously strong claim” (perhaps stronger than the claim that a first century Palestinian Jew was resurrected by a supernatural consciousness after dying by means of crucifixion) and asks, “What reason does one have for thinking it true?”

Bolt’s reply to this question is “Probably none,” which strikes me as somewhat deficient in confidence. Perhaps this is the reason why he has turned off the commenting option for this blog entry.

Answering Dustin Segers’ Presuppositionalism, Part IIIb: The Problem of Induction

Here is Part IIIb of my response to Dustin Segers’ four questions for atheists.

Previous responses to Segers can be found here:

Answering Dustin Segers’ Presuppositionalism, Part I: Intro and the Nature of Truth

Answering Dustin Segers’ Presuppositionalism, Part II: The Nature of Logic

Answering Dustin Segers’ Presuppositionalism, Part IIIa: The Uniformity of Nature

In this entry, I continue my response to Segers’ third question, which is:

3. Science - "How do you answer the problem of induction from a secular perspective?"

In my previous blog entry, I provided the first part of my answer to this question. In that previous entry, I addressed an area of concern which typically accompanies the presuppositionalist’s questions about induction, namely the uniformity of nature. I explained that, on the objective view, the uniformity we observe in nature is inherent in nature and obtains independently of conscious activity, while on the subjective view, any uniformity which we observe in nature is thought to be the product of some act of consciousness. Given the stark antithesis of these two contrasting positions, I recommend that rational individuals who encounter presuppositionalists raising the issue of the uniformity of nature as a debating point, ask the apologists to state explicitly whether or not they think the uniformity we observe in nature is a product of conscious activity, or if it is inherent in nature and obtains independent of any conscious activity. Watch for any reluctance to answer this question; watch for consistency with the apologists’ professed worldview in any answer that is given.

Now let’s turn our attention to induction and see if Objectivism, the Philosophy of Reason, can shed even further light in answering the presuppositionalist.

Answering Dustin Segers’ Presuppositionalism, Part IIIa: The Uniformity of Nature

I now continue with my series of responses to several questions Christian apologist and “church-planter” Dustin Segers poses to atheists. This will be the third installment in this series. The first two included my responses to Segers’ first two questions, which can be found here:

Answering Dustin Segers’ Presuppositionalism, Part I: Intro and the Nature of Truth

Answering Dustin Segers’ Presuppositionalism, Part II: The Nature of Logic

Let us now consider his third question:

3. Science - "How do you answer the problem of induction from a secular perspective?"

Ah, now this one’s juicy!

Answering Nide's Questions about the Uniformity of Nature

A visitor to my blog named Nide who posts comments under the pseudonym “Hezekiah Ahaz” has asked a series of questions relating to one of my favorite topics, the uniformity of nature.