Bahnsen’s “tremendous philosophical mistake”

Presuppositionalists love to tout the debate between Greg Bahnsen and Gordon Stein. In apologetic circles, it is commonly believed that Bahnsen got that evil atheist Stein real good, and no atheist thinker can really be capable of crawling back from that public whipping.

Of course, such evaluations are quite superficial and self-serving, and they willingly ignore many striking deficiencies in Bahnsen’s presentation (see for example here, here, here and here).

However, what’s curious is that apologists do not tend to point to Bahnsen’s discussion with George H. Smith, author of Atheism: The Case Against God.

My Refutation of STB: Ten Years On

Here at Incinerating Presuppositionalism, I like to recognize special anniversaries, milestones and achievements which mark the highlights of my blog. That’s not easy because, in my humble opinion, there are a lot of candidates for this kind of celebration. As frequent visitors likely already know, every year on the anniversary of this blog (first post dated March 26, 2005), I post an anniversary entry listing out all the posts I have published since the previous anniversary. Back in March of this year I posted the fifteenth such anniversary entry. 

Today I would like to mark the anniversary of an entry which rivals only a handful of others for most view counts on my blog – yes, the interest here persists after all these years! – namely an entry which I posted on this date in 2010. That is my Critique of Sye Ten Bruggencate’s www.proofthatgodexists.org. Feels more like eight and a half years ago, but in fact it’s been a full decade now. 

Jason Petersen on Objectivism and the Laws of Logic

A visitor to my blog recently asked me to comment on an article by Jason Petersen titled 28. Q and A: Objectivism and the Laws of Logic. As with virtually everything else I’ve read by Jason Petersen, this article has the dubious propensity to cause informed readers involuntarily to perform a double face-palm while trying to maintain the resolve to read on to the second paragraph.

In his article, Petersen presents a question – purportedly from a visitor to his site Answers for Hope - and proceeds as though he had something positively instructive to say in response to it. But since there’s always the possibility that some readers will find themselves more baffled after reading Petersen’s article than before they even knew of its existence,

The questioner, Jay, writes:

I have a question about how objectivsts account for Laws of Logic.

Now, the first question that flashed through my mind when I read this, was: Why would anyone go to Jason Petersen with a question about how “objectivists account for Laws of Logic”? Why suppose that Jason Petersen knows anything about the laws of logic, let alone Objectivism’s view of logic, in the first place? Perhaps Jay was feeling hopeless and figured that Jason Petersen could provide some “answers for hope.” We may never know whether or not Jay found Petersen’s responses to be satisfying, but we will take a look at them and determine their worthiness for ourselves.

A Logical God?

Christian apologists are continually telling us that their god is logical, that its own nature is the standard of logic, and that everything that it does is impeccably logical. Now of course we do not learn this from the bible itself; rather, we hear it from Christians who have taken courses at some bible college or seminary, or from other believers who are simply repeating what they’ve heard such Christians say. As such, it represents an attempt by apologists to acquire “rights” to logic, as if there could be no logic if their god did not exist.

But if the actions ascribed to the Christian god as they are characterized throughout the bible are supposed to be “logical,” I can only suppose that Christians mean something other than what I learned about when I took courses on logic back in my college days.

Jason Lisle on Axioms

The topic of axioms was raised in Jason Lisle’s comment exchange with Tony and other visitors over on Lisle’s blog It’s not “Human Reason vs. God’s Word”!. Coming to this discussion from the perspective of a worldview which provides no “epistemologically self-conscious” understanding of axioms, Lisle is clearly unprepared to interact with this area of inquiry with any credibility. Instead of raising important issues that need to be addressed or even showing a willingness to learn from his interlocutors, Lisle can be seen flailing his arms around groping for anything that might stick in the heat of debate. Clearly his only ambition is to protect his god-belief. What does he want to protect it from? That’s obvious, he wants to protect it from reason.

Before getting started, I want to point readers to several posts on the topic of axioms that are available for readers to peruse on my blog:

The Axioms and the Primacy of Existence 

RazorsKiss on the Christian God as the Basis of Knowledge – Part 2: RK’s Axioms 

A Reply to Matthias on Philosophical Starting Points

I have also written about the validity of the senses, another topic that comes up in these exchanges, in the following:

On the Validity of the Senses 

Answering Jason Lisle on the Reliability of the Senses

I will not address everything stated in the comments of Lisle’s blog (there are 1,180 comments!), but will instead focus primarily on some of Lisle’s questions and statements about axioms that can be found on page 3 of his comments pages.

Jason Lisle on Logic

One of the visitors commenting on my blog Is Jason Lisle Epistemologically Self-Conscious? provided a link to a section of comments on Jason Lisle’s blog entry titled It’s not “Human Reason vs. God’s Word”!. In the discussion found there Lisle gave an uninformed reaction to the recognition that the validity of the senses is axiomatic, which is what the visitor on my blog wanted to highlight.

I took a look at some of the other comments found on that page and saw an exchange between a commenter named Tony and Lisle on the topic of logic. I have some thoughts of my own on what Lisle has stated there.

A Reply to Stefan on Induction and Deduction

On my blog Sye Ten Bruggencate vs. the Absolute Laws of Logic which I posted back in July, a visitor posting under the moniker StefanMach (to whom I will refer as Stefan henceforth) recently left a comment about the relationship between induction and deduction and presuppositionalism.

Specifically Stefan inquired about the consequences induction has for deductive conclusions given the view that “inductive argument conclusions are classified as either strong or weak and can never be classified as true or false.”

This is topical given that deductive arguments attempt to draw conclusions from at least one premise which, as a generalization, must be the conclusion of an inductive inference. Thus if an inductive inference can only produce a conclusion that is at best “strong” (as opposed to “weak”), then any attempt to draw a conclusion by means of deduction from an inductive conclusion would necessarily inherit the tentativeness already present in the inductive conclusion. Consequently, how can any deductive conclusion be accepted as reliably true or certain?

STB: Three Years and Counting

Has it really been three whole years since I posted my critique the argument which presuppositional apologist Sye Ten Bruggencate has showcased on his website?

Indeed it has.

Has it really been three whole years without an attempt by Sye Ten Bruggencate, or any other presuppositionalist for that matter, to vindicate his argument?

Indeed it has.

Sye Ten Bruggencate vs. the Absolute Laws of Logic

In an exchange with David Smalley (here, at 7:27-29), internet apologist Sye Ten Bruggencate asks the following question:

“How do you account for absolute laws of logic?”

Sye loves to pose questions like this and others about knowledge, reasoning, certainty, etc., but this is part of his rue: he’s not at all interested in what anyone might say in response to his questions. He has already presupposed that whatever any non-Christian is going to say is defective in some way which he never pins down or demonstrates.

STB: Two Years and Counting

It has now been two years to the day since I posted my refutation of the argument showcased on Sye Ten Bruggencate’s website “proof that god exists dot org.” While the argument on his site remains unchanged, Bruggencate has so far failed to vindicate the defense of his worldview which he has presented to the world against my critique.

Answering Dustin Segers’ Presuppositionalism, Part II: The Nature of Logic

In this second installment of my series answering Dustin Segers’ apologetic questions for atheists, I focus on Segers’ question about logic. (My initial blog entry responding to Segers can be found here).

This one’s a biggie, so buckle up and hold on tight. You’re in for a wild ride!

Reaction to My Critique of Anderson and Welty’s “The Lord of Non-Contradiction”

It’s not very common to find Christian apologists acknowledging my critiques of theistic apologetics (let alone actually interacting with them). So when it does happen, and I learn about it, my interest is piqued. Typically theistic apologists ignore my writings, suggesting that even if they are aware of them and have taken some time to examine any of them, they are left only with a blank stare and perhaps some sneering reaction against me personally. There are occasions when apologists confronted with my critiques of theistic defenses will indicate that they’ll examine the matter more deeply at some unspecified future time, but fail to deliver on such promises. I’m reminded of several occasions when Chris Bolt, for example, would promise to look further into the matter at some unspecified future time.

Are the Laws of Logic "Thoughts" of the Christian God?

Hello my readers.

Happy 2555 to all!

Yes, here in Thailand, it’s not 2012. Thailand goes by a version of the Buddhist calendar, and it’s already the year 2555 here. Perhaps you could think of me as writing to you from the future.

As I predicted in earlier messages to you on my blog, I’ve been busier than Wall Street on a bull rally since getting back to Bangkok late November. The flood waters are for the most part gone, and life for most people is back to normal. But there’s a sense of urgency to make up for lost time, both in the private sector and also in public works. Schools are even going six days a week here, which means my daughter, who’s only in kindergarten, has a brutal schedule to keep.

Unfortunately, that means I haven’t been able to keep up with my blog. I see that Nide is still going at it, and that Justin Hall and Ydemoc are continuing to engage him. They’re all welcome to continue doing so. I’m sure it will all make for some interesting reading one day, supposing I get the time.

In the meanwhile, I’ve been feasting – really, nibbling and grazing, when opportunity arises – on a paper recently published by James Anderson and Greg Welty called The Lord of Non-Contradiction: An Argument for God from Logic. In this paper, the authors set out to “argue for a substantive metaphysical relationship between the laws of logic and the existence of God” (p. 1). Specifically they aim to prove “that there are laws of logic because God exists,” that “there are laws of logic only because God exists” (Ibid.). Presumably this is the Christian god of the New Testament whose existence their argument will finally prove. They say of their own argument that it is “a fascinating and powerful but neglected argument for the existence of God.” Of course, this is not meant to be self-congratulatory, but rather a device intended to hook the reader’s interest so that he’ll continue on for the next twenty-plus pages of fun-filled reading. (I’m guessing that, for Sye Ten Bruggencate, 22 pages devoted to the development of a single argument does not constitute “argumentum ad verbosium,” since it’s intended to establish, once and for all, the existence of a deity.)

Rick Warden's Critique of Objectivism

A Christian named Rick Warden who has attempted to commandeer the comments section of my blog refuting Sye Ten Bruggencate’s “proof” for the existence of a god, posted his objections to the philosophy of Objectivism.

While the objections which Rick raises against Objectivism are superficial and reflect a profound unfamiliarity with what Objectivism actually teaches, his mistakes are common among theistic apologists attempting to debate non-believers on the topic of logic.

Rick openly admits that he is “still in the learning mode regarding Objectivism” – i.e., he acknowledges his own unfamiliarity with what Objectivism teaches. But this does not stop him from running roughshod into battle even though he’s completely unarmed. In spite of acknowledging his ignorance of Objectivism, he thinks he’s already found a bunch of fallacies in Objectivism.

I will examine Rick’s criticisms below. We will find that, as with so many critics of “non-Christian thought,” Rick has a talent for making a lot of errors in the space of just a few statements.

Rick writes:

I would be interested to know your criticisms on this response to your premise from an article:

Okay. Bring it on.

Quoting from my blog How Theism Violates the Primacy of Existence:

It is an undeniable fact that a subject is distinct from the objects of its awareness: a subject and its objects are not one and the same – the two are engaged in a relationship.

Rick asked:

Is it really ‘an undeniable fact’?

Rationally speaking, yes, it is. Whenever an individual perceives and/or consider any object, his action of perceiving and/or considering that object is distinct from the object he’s perceiving and/or considering. On what rational basis could anyone deny this? Even in denying it, he would be instantiating the very distinction he’s denying.

Rick wrote:

As far as we may surmise, pure, unadulterated logic does not submit into an absolute metaphysical subject/object dualism explanation.

It’s not clear what Rick is trying to say here. He introduces the notion of dualism, which has many meanings and connotations in the history of philosophy. Greater precision of expression is recommended here if Rick has a point he wants to get across.

At any rate, logic does have a metaphysical basis, and it is not consciousness in isolation from any object it’s conscious of. Rather, the metaphysical basis of logic is the subject-object relationship – i.e., the subject of consciousness engaged in awareness of some object(s). A subject’s awareness of some object(s) is a metaphysical fact – i.e., objective, since this awareness itself is not the product of conscious intentions. When we sense things, we have no choice over the fact that we sense or what it is we are sensing. Anyone who has experienced pain realizes this, at least implicitly: when one feels pain, he cannot choose not to feel it. If we could, we wouldn’t need painkillers or anesthesia, nor would we be so reluctant to go to the dentist.

Rick wrote:

Ask an objectivist: “In terms of human perception, is logic considered a subject or an object?”

The question, as I understand it, seems rather incoherent. Why specifically “in terms of human perception” here? We do not perceive logic; logic is conceptual. Also, logic itself is not the subject of consciousness: the concept ‘logic’ does not denote a conscious being. Subjects (in the sense that I use it in the passage quoted from my blog above) are conscious beings. I, Dawson Bethrick, am a subject; the reader who is reading this is a subject. Logic, on the other hand, is a set of abstract principles which regulate identification; identification is an activity performed by a conscious subject.

But without doubt, logic can be an object of awareness, but I would not say of perceptual awareness. We don’t see, feel or touch logic. Logic does not make noises, nor does it produce an odor. But we can think about logic, we can examine logic, we can write about logic, we can talk about logic, we can marvel at logic. When we do any of these things, logic is the object of our awareness. So logic can be an object of our awareness, just as it is in this very sentence – since I’m talking about logic.

Rick wrote:

If the objectivist says logic is a ‘subject’, then it is considered a part of the mind.

Actually, if one were to say that logic is a subject, he’d be saying (as I have used the terms) that logic is a conscious being in its own right. I don’t think this is the case, and I don’t see why anyone would think this. This would be an instance of personifying an inanimate object.

Rick continued:

Logic, from a utilitarian view, is a tool, an aspect of reasoning. Without a mind, logic would have no use whatsoever. This implies, from a materialist perspective, it should be a cart the horse of reason pulls. But objectivists have a problem here. While Logic is used personally, as a tool for subjective reasoning, it is not ONLY personal, it consists of universal laws, it endures from one generation to the next, as do known ‘external’ natural laws.

Let’s keep in mind what specifically it is we’re talking about when we talk about logic. “Logic is the art or skill of non-contradictory identification” (Ayn Rand, “Philosophical Detection,” Philosophy: Who Needs It, p. 15). Logic’s very purpose is to guide man’s ability to identify and integrate what he perceives. This is entirely in keeping with the proper understanding of the nature of reason:

Reason is the faculty that identifies and integrates the material provided by man’s senses. (Ayn Rand, “The Objectivist Ethics,” The Virtue of Selfishness, p. 20)

Reason integrates man’s perceptions by means of forming abstractions or conceptions, thus raising man’s knowledge from the perceptual level, which he shares with animals, to the conceptual level, which he alone can reach. The method which reason employs in this process is logic—and logic is the art of non-contradictory identification. (Ayn Rand, “Faith and Force: Destroyers of the Modern World,” Philosophy: Who Needs It, p. 62)

Only biological organisms (specifically human beings) identify and integrate what they perceive conceptually, and since logic is the method which regulates this process, it is man who needs logic (as he does not automatically identify and integrate what he perceives). Essentially, logic is to epistemology what a code of values is to morality. Since the process of identifying and integrating what we perceive is a volitional operation, we need a structured set of guidelines to guide our cognitive choices. Only where a conceptual consciousness is concerned, is logic even going to be a consideration.

Rocks do not need logic; rivers do not need logic; a pile of leaves does not need logic; shooting stars do not need logic. Given this context, then, it is definitely true that “without a mind, logic would [be of] no use whatsoever.”

Now it is true that logic as a set of principles guiding human thought endures from one generation to the next. To put it short, logic is the same for everyone. But this fact does not undermine the Objectivist position or its understanding of logic. “Logic has a single law, the Law of Identity, and its various corollaries” (“Philosophical Detection,” Philosophy: Who Needs It, p. 15). The law of identity does not change, either from place to place, or person to person, or generation to generation. It is rooted directly on the one fact that everything in the universe has in common, namely the fact of existence: if something exists, it is what it is.

Moreover, on the Objectivist view, logic is conceptual in nature (see here), and human beings possess consciousnesses capable of the conceptual level of cognition. It is the open-endedness or “universality” of concepts, given their the process by which they are formed (i.e., by abstraction, specifically the operation known as measurement-omission), which gives logic its universal applicability. This is why a good theory of concepts is indispensable to understanding the issues which Rick has raised. Logic certainly does in fact depend on human minds, but not on their whims, rather on their essential nature as conscious subjects in a relationship with the objects of their awareness, i.e., the primacy of existence. Logic owes its stability, immutability and universality of applicability to its conceptual nature and its foundation on the law of identity.

That the nature of concepts is the key here can be demonstrated with a simple example, the concept ‘man’. We form the concept ‘man’ on the basis of just a few perceptual inputs - in fact, only two are really required. “ A concept is a mental integration of two or more units possessing the same distinguishing characteristic(s), with their particular measurements omitted” (Ayn Rand, Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, p. 13). Based on those few perceptually given samples, say Jones and Smith, we omit the specific measurements of each – Jones is 6’2” tall, portly, bearded, wears glasses, dressed in a white coat, is a doctor, is 53 years old, speaks four languages, etc., while Smith is 5’8” tall, slender, clean-shaven, wears a three-piece suit, is a company CEO, is 48 years old, speaks English and a little pig Latin, etc. – and integrate them into a single mental unit – the concept ‘man’. Because of measurement-omission, we can integrate more “units” – i.e., other men – into the same concept, as we discover them. There is no quantitative limit to integration; the concept ‘man’ is open-ended – i.e., “universal” – in that it includes every man who exists, who has existed and who will ever exist. It is a universal classification.

Notice how this allows for us to communicate with each other. You have formed the concept ‘man’ based on specific individuals whom you have encountered over your life, and I have formed the concept ‘man’ based on the specific individuals whom I have encountered over my life. Unless we grow up in the same small town, the specific individuals in your encounter set are going to be entirely different from those in my encounter set. However, since we have both formed the concept ‘man’ by essentially the same process – i.e., by a process of abstraction, we can each have an idea of what the other is talking about when we speak of men.

The same is the case with the concepts which inform the principles of logic. Since they too are concepts formed by the same process, they have their analogues in every mind which has performed that process to form them, just as you and I both had sufficiently similar concepts of ‘man’ already formed in our knowledge base. Of course, it can get tricky as we form abstractions on the basis of previously formed abstractions, as we now start developing a hierarchical structure, and the need for uniform definitions becomes crucial. This is where the objective theory of concepts proves its worth. “The final step in concept-formation is definition. This step is essential to every concept except axiomatic concepts and concepts denoting sensations” (Leonard Peikoff, Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, p. 96) In other words, until we’ve secured our concepts with proper definitions, our work in forming them is not finished. “A definition is a statement that identifies the nature of the units subsumed under a concept” (Ayn Rand, Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, p. 40). It is often in the realm of definitions where thinkers encounter their greatest point of conflict with each other. This is why I urge my theistic interlocutors to make their definitions clear. They frequently have a hard time doing this, and I think a major reason why is that they simply do not have a good grasp of concepts.

Let me re-emphasize the broader point: Since existence holds metaphysical primacy, logic will always have its proper anchor: the law of identity , regardless of who is using it. Since existence exists independent of consciousness, and consciousness is consciousness of objects, there is a proper orientation between the subject of consciousness (the human thinker) and its objects (anything he perceives and/or considers). That orientation is identified by the primacy of existence: the objects of consciousness are what they are independent of the conscious activity by which the subject is aware of them.

So the answer to the supposed conundrum which Rick raises here, is supplied by Objectivism’s axioms, the primacy of existence, and its theory of concepts.

Also, a couple of other cautionary corrections for Rick here:

1. Objectivism is not a form of Utilitarianism.

2. Objectivism is not materialism.

Rick wrote:

If the objectivist says logic is an ‘object’, then it is presumed to be a part of the ‘external’ world and they have another problem.

This is a non sequitur. Logic indeed can be an object of consciousness (just as it is in the case of this discussion – it is one of the objects under our consideration), but it does not follow from this that logic is “part of the ‘external’ world” exclusively. We do have the capacity for introspection, in which case our own consciousness can become an object to itself. When I introspect, I am aware of my own conscious activity, and that conscious activity of which I am aware, is the object of my introspective awareness. When I see a ball (an object in “external reality”), I am perceiving it; when I think about my perceiving the ball, my perception of the ball becomes what is properly understood as a secondary object of my consciousness (since I had to perceive the ball first in order for my perception of the ball to be an object of my awareness).

Similarly with logic. Logic is a set of principles, informed by concepts, which regulates proper identification of objects, and it too can be an object of our awareness. An object, mind you, as I use it in the passage which Rick quoted from my blog, is anything one perceives and/or considers. It can be an extramental entity (such as a ball), or some conscious activity (such as my awareness of the ball).

So, the problem which Rick raises here does not afflict Objectivism.

Rick wrote:

No one has ever perceived logic, or its effects, with his or her senses and thus cannot ‘objectively’ account for its existence.

This is another non sequitur. It’s likely a consequence ignoring not only the conceptual nature of logic, but also our capacity for introspection.

Since, as I pointed out above, we can introspect, we do have the capacity to identify the process by which we form concepts. And here’s why: since this process of forming concepts does have identity (e.g., it works one way and not others), and we can become aware of it (by means of introspection), we can objectively identify it (by adhering to the primacy of existence). So yes, we can objectively account for it, but only if we maintain fidelity to the primacy of existence and have a good understanding of concepts. (Christianity provides for neither, which is why you think these are problems for non-Christians.)

Rick: “If the objectivist says gravity is similar because it is not seen but known by its effects, it seems to be a weak corollary.”

But the Objectivist did not say this. Next?

Rick: “What does this imply metaphysically?”

The Objectivist is beyond implications at this point, because he as the primacy of existence – i.e., he has explicitly identified the proper relationship between a consciousness and its objects.

Rick: “Therefore, if there is a question of which has primacy metaphysically, logic does.”

The issue of metaphysical primacy has to do with the proper relationship between a consciousness (i.e., a subject) and its objects. I already explained why logic is not the subject – it’s not a conscious entity. And yes, we saw how logic can be an object. But it’s only one of many objects, and it could only be a secondary object at best (since we need to introspect to become aware of it). So it would not do to say that logic specifically has metaphysical primacy; this would be too narrow, and it would fail to identify the proper relationship between consciousness and its objects in terms of essentials - i.e., consciousness and existence. Indeed, the concept ‘logic’ is not conceptually irreducible, and since the issue of metaphysical primacy must be settled at the axiomatic level of cognition, we must address it in terms of axiomatic concepts.

Rick: “If the existence of logic refutes the assumed metaphysical subject/object duality and logic metaphysically predominates over reason, then an absolute subject/object duality, strictly based on human reasoning, should not be considered a metaphysically reliable premise.”

The existence of logic does not refute the primacy of existence. On the contrary, the primacy of existence makes it possible (since the primacy of existence is its fundamental basis) and necessary (since the human mind in the effort to identify its objects is fallible).

Rick raised another criticism:

The Primacy of Existence theory supposedly disproves Theism because it assumes a single world view cannot entertain both a primacy of existence example (man) and a primacy of consciousness example (God). But there is a third possibility, based on the existence of logic, that something may, in fact, be independent of- and indefinable by the apparent subjective and object duality.

Let’s see if any of this this successfully applies to Objectivism.

Essentially, Rick’s objection amounts to the view that the primacy of existence and the primacy of consciousness are not jointly exhaustive, that “there is a third possibility” that is allegedly an alternative to the primacy of existence and the primacy of consciousness.

An argument has already been developed in anticipation of this kind of claim, and can be found here: Are the Primacy of Existence and Primacy of Consciousness Exhaustive Metaphysics? While I would phrase certain statements in this essay differently if I were writing it myself, the overall gist of this paper brings the point home rather well. The following point is noteworthy when considering Rick’s speculative proposal:

Of course, if you're a believer in the Primacy of Consciousness, you might think that there are things other than consciousness and existence, because your consciousness could create [i.e., imagine] them. In this case, you could advocate the Primacy of Something Else, although this would be highly illogical, in that you've already presupposed that your consciousness has created these new things, and that, presumably, they are existents. But besides, the Primacy of Consciousness is false.

Notice that, not only does Rick propose his alternative to the primacy of existence and the primacy of consciousness in a tentative manner (he casts it as a “possibility… that something may…” rather than an actually existing and defensible alternative), but also that he does not present any argument for his claim. In fact, his whole effort to evade the choice between the primacy of existence and the primacy of consciousness indicates that he does not understand the issue of metaphysical primacy to begin with. This is extremely common among theistic critics of Objectivism.

Also notice that, after reading my argument, Rick does not come out and endorse the primacy of consciousness, which I argue to be the underlying premise of theism. This is not unexpected. Theists typically try to distance themselves from explicitly endorsing the primacy of consciousness metaphysics once its failings have been pointed out to them. And yet, like other theistic critics of Objectivism who are reluctant to admit the subjective underpinnings of their worldview, Rick does not explain how his theism could survive without it; he does not explain how one could believe in a universe-creating, reality-ruling god without assuming the primacy of consciousness.

Given what he does write in response to my argument (Rick interacts with very little of it), it’s clear that Rick’s reading of it is faulty. This is evidenced by the fact that he wants to introduce a “third alternative” to the jointly exhaustive orientations identified by the issue of metaphysical primacy. For one thing, Rick does not seem to grasp that the issue of metaphysical primacy pertains to the relationship between a consciousness (the subject) and its objects (what the subject is conscious of). This is why there are only two perspectives to consider in weighing the issue of metaphysical primacy: the primacy of the objects of consciousness (i.e., the primacy of existence, the objective position) vs. the primacy of the subject (i.e., the primacy of consciousness, the subjective position). We are limited to these two alternatives because a consciousness and its objects are the only parties to the relationship.

Also, since the relationship between a subject and its objects is not a relationship between equals (an object and the activity by which the subject has awareness of it are not the same; the actions which produce awareness are performed by the subject, even those actions which are involuntary), it cannot be the case that both the subject and its objects jointly share metaphysical primacy. This would ignore the nature of consciousness as a faculty which must discover the nature of its objects as it seeks to identify them. Man is not omniscient, nor does he begin his awareness of the world with exhaustive knowledge of the objects which he will eventually encounter in his conscious experience.

So there can be no “third option,” as Rick would like to believe.

Another tragic mistake of Rick’s is his attempt to base the possibility of a “third possibility” on “the existence of logic.” Recall that logic is “the art or skill of non-contradictory identification.” If logic in fact exists, it can only imply that those consciousnesses which make use of it, do so because knowledge of the identity of the objects they encounter is not an automatically given, but a goal which they must pursue by incorporating logic as a method which regulates identification. In other words, logic necessarily presupposes the primacy of existence by virtue of its role in the cognitive process: to ensure the conformity of man’s mind to reality as he develops his knowledge beyond the level of perceptually self-evident facts.

That Rick thinks this “third possibility” (alternative) to the primacy of existence and the primacy of consciousness “may, in fact, be independent of- and indefinable by the apparent subjective and object duality,” could only signify its irrelevance to the subject-object relationship, if in fact such an animal were accepted as a reality. Indeed, Rick offers no reason to suppose that his “third possibility” would at all be relevant, let alone tell us what exactly it is he has in mind. Perhaps he has his god in mind here, but this would be most odd since he characterizes it as a “possibility” which is “based on the existence of logic,” which would make logic’s existence prior to and independent of his god’s existence. It is hard to see how such a view could avoid the charge of heresy within the Christian religion.

In conclusion, Rick’s criticisms of Objectivism fall flat on their face. In presenting them he demonstrates that he is not sufficiently familiar with Objectivism to critique it intelligently, and makes numerous blunders as a result. Given Rick’s lack of familiarity with Objectivism, he is in no position to raise defensible objections against its view of logic, the primacy of existence, or its arguments against theism. And as I have shown above, it is his own mistakes which supply the thrust to his criticisms.

by Dawson Bethrick

A Critique of Sye Ten Bruggencate’s www.proofthatgodexists.org

A visitor to my website recently informed me about a debate he had on Premier Christian Radio with a presuppositional apologists named Sye Ten Bruggencate.

I’ve seen Sye’s website before (it is located here: http://www.proofthatgodexists.org/). On this site, Sye seeks to prove the existence of his god by leading visitors through a series of pages which present various alternatives regarding the laws of logic, mathematics, science and morality. The first four steps ask the visitor to affirm whether or not the laws of logic, mathematics, science and morality even exist. If at any point the visitor disaffirms the existence of one of these features, he is taken to a page which reminds him that he makes use of what he has denied on a daily basis. So the visitor is compelled to affirm the existence of the laws of logic, mathematics, science and morality.

At Step Five the visitor is asked to decide whether those laws, whose existence he has just affirmed, are “immaterial” or “material.” It is at this point that I think Sye’s proof begins to suffer its most profound problems. The alternative “immaterial” versus “material” strikes me as a false dichotomy, since “immaterial” only tells us what something is not, not what it is. This negative term is contrasted with its positive counterpart, namely “material,” suggesting that these are the only two options available. The descriptor “immaterial” has no positive meaning of its own and could refer to just about anything one imagines (for according to Christian apologist Peter Pike, imaginary things are “immaterial” – see here). Sye’s case might raise fewer suspicions if his question at Step Five asked whether the laws of logic, mathematics, science and morality were material or not material. This correction would improve things two-fold: first it would undo the mistake of treating “immaterial” as if it had a positive meaning; also, it would generate a question which Sye seems unprepared to ask: If the laws of logic, mathematics, science and morality are not material, then what are they? It would be erroneous to suppose that calling them “immaterial” satisfies this question.

By framing the alternatives in the manner which he chooses, Sye seeks to tip the scales artificially in favor of his desired conclusion. But we will find that, even though he does this to give his position an advantage, it does not work. Let’s explore the two alternatives as Sye understands them.

If we click the box in Step Five which says “Laws of logic, Mathematics, Science, and Absolute Morality are Material,” we are scolded with the following statement:

If you believe that laws of logic, mathematics, science, or morality are made of matter, please show me where in nature these laws are. Can you touch them, see them, smell them, hear them, or taste them? Rather than have you produce a material, physical law I will narrow down the field for you... just show me the number '3' somewhere in nature. Not 'three things,' not a written representation of the number 3 but the real physical, material number 3.

Statements like this strongly suggest that Sye has something *conceptual* in mind when he speaks of “the immaterial.” This is because his example of something “immaterial” is the number ‘3’, which in fact is a concept (Sye disqualifies objects in the quantity of three and symbolic representations). This raises yet a further question about the terms in which Sye chooses to inform his proof:

Why doesn’t he frame his question about the ontology of the laws of logic, mathematics, science and absolute morality in terms of conceptual versus material instead of “immaterial” versus material?

The reason why Sye does not cast the alternatives in these terms is most likely because (a) he probably has no conceptual understanding of logic, mathematics, science and morality, and (b) doing so would jeopardize his case for theism. Not only does Christianity not have a theory of concepts (which would explain why Sye does not treat these issues as conceptual phenomena), his god is not supposed to be merely a concept, but an independently existing being.

The problem is even worse for Sye. As noted above, at Step Five Sye contrasts “material” with “immaterial.” Another expression which he uses to designate “the immaterial” is the term “abstract entities.” Does Sye really want to say that his god is “abstract” in nature, like the number 3 or any other abstraction? I wouldn’t think so. Abstractions are not living entities, they have no consciousness of their own, and they are not independently existing entities: they require minds to form and make use of them. But the Christian god is supposed to be an independently existing entity possessing its own consciousness, not needing a mind which forms it (such as in the believer’s imagination).

So just by citing a concept as an example of something “immaterial,” Sye is letting on that “God” refers to something psychological rather than existential, to something in his mind rather than an independently existing entity. Concepts are products of a mental process. By characterizing both “God” and concepts as “immaterial,” Sye is saying that his god is analogous to products of a mental process. Only instead of constituting genuine knowledge about the world (as in the case of concepts formed on the basis of perceptual input), Sye’s god-belief finds its residence in his imagination.

If at Step Five we click the box which says “Laws of Logic, Mathematics, Science and Absolute Morality are Immaterial,” we are taken to Step Six, which has us decide whether these laws “are universal or up to the individual.” Again we seem to have a false dichotomy on our hands. Sye asks: “Does 2 + 2 = 4 only where you are, and only because you say it does, or is this a universal law?” Sye implies that something must be universal in order to be what it is independent of our personal dictates and circumstances. But I’m sure that Sye would agree that this is not the case. In contrast to universal laws and truths, particular objects exist independent of our conscious intentions, and our actions in regard to them show that we recognize this, albeit perhaps only implicitly.

At any rate, most will likely agree (and rightly so) that the equation 2 + 2 = 4 (assuming equivalent units) applies everywhere and not just in one specific location and not just because we might happen to say it does. If this is what is meant by universality in this context, then one can agree that the laws of logic, mathematics, science and morality apply everywhere and are thus universal in this sense. (I have presented the proper understanding of universality in my blog Demystifying Universality.)

Before proceeding with Sye’s proof, however, it should be noted that Sye contrasts “universal law” with something being the case because someone says so. This is noteworthy for it is in the theistic worldview where we find the view that a consciousness has the power to speak things into existence and alter them according to its will. Sye keeps this aspect of his theism safely out of view while suggesting that such a position is antithetical to universality as such in the dichotomy he introduces at this point.

If we take the option at Step Six which affirms that the laws of logic, mathematics, science and morality are indeed universal, we are then asked at Step Seven to affirm whether or not those same laws unchanging. Sye summarizes how far we’ve come once we’ve made it this far in his proof:

You have acknowledged that laws of logic, mathematics, science, and absolute morality exist, that they are not made of matter, and that they are universal. The next question is whether you believe they are changing or unchanging.

We are asked to decide whether or not, on our own view, the law of identity, for instance, or 2 + 2 = 4, man’s need for values, etc., can be altered in some way or another, either on its own or by means of some external force. Of course, there’s no good reason to suppose that these laws will do this, we do not experience them changing, and the idea that they could or would change seems entirely self-refuting. Indeed, what would cause the laws to change? But causality is one of those laws. To expect a cause to change the laws invokes the laws. But couldn’t they change without a cause? No, because causality is the identity of change; if there’s change, that change – because it exists – would have identity, and thus the law of causality would be in play.

Apologists like Sye, however, think that this state of affairs implies or entails the existence of a god which makes this state of affairs – namely the immutability of the laws in question – obtain, or at any rate that this would not be the case unless their god were real. Of course, with reasoning such as this, we are still left with imagining the god in question, and projecting it as the solution to what may in fact not be a problem at all in the first place (I say this because we have The Axioms and the Primacy of Existence). Besides, presuppositionalists do not make a very clear case for why their god is a necessary precondition for the existence, universality and immutability of the laws of logic, mathematics, science and morality. In fact, it seems that these laws imply the very opposite: that the very notion of a god is completely arbitrary, even antithetical to them.

At this point, we come to the ”preproof” page in Sye’s case, where he announces:

To reach this page you had to acknowledge that immaterial, universal, unchanging laws of logic, mathematics, science, and absolute morality exist. Universal, immaterial, unchanging laws are necessary for rational thinking to be possible. Universal, immaterial, unchanging laws cannot be accounted for if the universe was random or only material in nature.

We saw above that characterizing the laws in question as conceptual in nature – i.e., as generalized identifications composed of concepts – is vastly preferable to characterizing them as “immaterial,” which ignores their conceptual nature and leaves them subject to whatever arbitrary investment one’s imagination may ascribe to them. In fact, recognizing that these laws are conceptual in nature explains the remaining two attributes: universal and unchanging. Universality is essentially the open-endedness of conceptual reference. For instance, the concept ‘man’ includes not just one man or five men, but all men who exist, who have existed and who will ever exist. It is because of this open-endedness that we can speak of men in the past and in the future as well as in the present, and still have the same essential features in mind – i.e., a biological organism possessing the faculty of reason. Concept’s owe their open-endedness of reference to the process of measurement-omission which is a key aspect of concept-formation, an action performed by the mind. There’s no mystery here, so there’s no reason to attribute universality to something beyond man’s own mental abilities.

Similarly with the attribute of immutability: conceptual reference rests on the proper orientation of the subject-object relationship and the process by which concepts are formed. The orientation between consciousness (the subject) and its objects does not change; the subject and its objects do not and cannot switch places. Moreover, the truth of the axiomatic concepts ‘existence’, ‘consciousness’ and ‘identity’ do not change. For instance, the fact that there is a reality (“existence exists”) does not change. The immutability of conceptual reference is thus grounded in facts, facts which do not conform to conscious intentions, facts which obtain regardless of the actions of any consciousness (whether real or imagined).

So in a sense, just by preferring to characterize these laws as “immaterial” instead of conceptual, Sye has stacked the deck against their real nature in order to underwrite them with theistic presuppositions which have no basis in reality whatsoever, and which in fact violate the very axioms which ground those laws in the first place.

Sye says that these laws “cannot be accounted for if the universe was random or only material in nature.” But they can be accounted for if the universe exists independent of consciousness (the primacy of existence ensures this), if the axiom of consciousness is true (there are organisms which possess the faculty of consciousness), and if one has a theory of concepts which explains how conceptualization is possible. And we have all three of these in the philosophy of Objectivism.

Meanwhile, Christianity defaults on all three of these points. For one thing, it holds that the universe does not exist independent of consciousness. It holds to the primacy of consciousness, claiming that the universe was created by an act of consciousness, and that its contents conform to the dictates of that consciousness (to its “will”). Moreover, Christianity in essence denies the axiom of consciousness, for it must assume that consciousness can exist without an independent object (see my blog Before the Beginning: The Problem of Divine Lonesomeness). Lastly, Christianity has no theory of concepts, which means its adherents have no philosophically native means of understanding the nature of concepts or the processes by which the human mind forms them.

It is because of these fundamental problems that I wager that Sye’s proof ultimately relies on an argumentum ad ignorantium - an argument from ignorance. It is primarily because one lacks knowledge of the axioms, the issue of metaphysical primacy and concept theory that one would seek to exploit the resulting mysteriousness of the nature of the laws of logic, mathematics, science and morality and attribute them to the “supernatural”.

Sye continues, saying:

The Bible teaches us that there are 2 types of people in this world, those who profess the truth of God's existence and those who suppress the truth of God's existence. The options of 'seeking' God, or not believing in God are unavailable. The Bible never attempts to prove the existence of God as it declares that the existence of God is so obvious that we are without excuse for not believing in Him.

Sye must appeal to the contents of a storybook in order to affirm the antithetical categories into which he wants to fit all men. In doing so, he seeks to wipe out the sheer honesty of many non-believers: those who honestly do not believe any mystical claims, including the claim that a “God” exists. It is honesty which is the casualty of such pronouncements, and this is what we need to understand. If Sye’s proof were built on honesty, why does it seek to exploit ignorance in such a predatory manner? Blank out. Again, he appeals to the storybook, acknowledging that it presents no arguments for the existence of its god, but rather “declares” – i.e., merely asserts, without argument – its existence, claiming (with blatant contradiction at Romans 1:20) that its existence is “so obvious that we are without excuse for not believing in Him.”

What the bible offers, and what Sye repeats here, is essentially an accusation against non-believers. This is one of the oldest tricks in the book: if someone doesn’t believe your claims, accuse them of some moral shortcoming. In this case, we’re accused, given our non-belief in Sye’s god, of purposely “suppressing the truth.” The allegation here is that we are willfully and deliberately denying something that we really know to be true. But again, neither Sye nor any other apologist has any rational basis for making such a charge. He cites no facts or evidence to support his claim; rather, he simply repeats what the sacred storybook already says. The passage where he gets this comes from the apostle Paul. Paul wrote this passage some 1900 years ago, long before anyone reading this was even born. In other words, we were accused of this moral breach before we even existed, without trial, without a hearing, without weighing any evidence, without any investigation into any of our souls.

Essentially, we have the theist saying, “Well, if you do not confess that my God exists, then I’m going to accuse of denying what you really know!” This is somehow supposed to compel us. Who would want people to believe his claims on such a basis? Wouldn’t that make one’s own confidence in said belief all the more shaky? It is noteworthy that apologists want to make the issue a moral matter. Are they not tipping their own cards by doing so? Are they not tacitly admitting that their god-belief is ultimately a matter of choice by telling us that we’re immoral for essentially choosing not to believe? Should we just up and choose to believe that Sye’s god exists, with no reason other than that we do not want to be guilty of his charge of “suppressing the truth”? Should we just retreat into our imaginations on Sye’s say so, on the basis of fear of the imaginary consequences of the alternative, and agree with his claim that his god is needed for any proof in the first place?

I trow not.

So it appears, upon inspection, that what Christians really mean by “believe in Him” is nothing more than “imagine Him.” For no matter what the apologist offers in defense of his god-belief, we still have no alternative to imagining his god which he insists exists.

This conclusion bears out in the claim which Sye presents as his “proof”:

The Proof that God exists is that without Him you couldn't prove anything.

This hardly constitutes any kind of proof. Indeed, it seems merely to be the opinion of someone who already believes the claim that said god exists in the first place. In fact, I see no reason why someone who believes in the Muslim god could not make essentially the same claim about his god:

The Proof that Allah exists is that without Him you couldn’t prove anything.

To bring the point home, we could imagine any god in place of Sye’s “God” and wonder why it would not stick for that god for the kinds of reasons Sye supposes it works for his god:

The Proof that Blarko exists is that without Blarko, you couldn’t prove anything.

I’m guessing that Sye would not find these latter two variations on his own them very compelling.

Finally, after all the steps in Sye’s presentation are exhausted, we come to the question what do you believe? We are given only two options at this point:

“I believe that God exists”

and

“I do not believe that God exists”

If we choose the first option, Sye finally rewards us by taking us to his site’s main page, where he asks visitors who have not gone through his eight-step program to go to his proof’s first step. For those who made it here by following the desired alternatives of Sye’s proof and choosing the “I believe that God exists” path, Sye writes:

For those who have gone through the proof to get here, it may have been a huge step to finally admit that God exists. While it may be a relief to finally make such an admission, it is just the first step, not the last.

He apparently thinks it requires a lot of courage to “admit that God exists,” even though after going through Sye’s proof we still have no alternative but to imagine the god whose existence he’s been trying to prove. Nothing has changed in this regard: before Sye’s proof, we could only imagine his god, and now that he’s presented his 8-step proof, we can still only imagine it. We cannot perceive this god, we cannot conduct a conversation with it, we cannot verify its existence by asking it to reveal itself in some unmistakable, demonstrative manner (such as levitating a book from the book shelf – something that should be easy for the creator of the universe to do). True to presuppositional form, Sye’s god remains marooned in our imagination, even after all his gyrations about absolute truth, the laws of logic and universality. Indeed, while I went through the steps of Sye’s proof, I never experienced any compulsion to “admit that God exists.” Rather, I sensed only that our leg was being pulled.

But Sye makes it sound like “admit[ting] that God exists” lifts some terrible burden off our shoulders. But there was no burden there in the first place. There is no strain in recognizing the fact that there is a fundamental distinction between what is real and what is merely imaginary. In fact, if there’s any “relief” to be achieved, it is in grasping the nature of this fundamental distinction and “admitting” that the imaginary is not real, even if Sye’s god doesn’t like it. But surely even Sye Ten Bruggencate recognizes the fact that there is a fundamental distinction between what is real and what is imaginary, does he not? If so, why then does his proof show no concern for this fact? Why does Sye not tell us how we can distinguish between his god and what is merely imaginary? Why does he not build any safeguard into his proof which ensures that the god whose existence he wants to prove is not something we set up in our imagination as we go through its several steps? And if he were to build such a safeguard into his proof, how would it integrate with the terms of his proof, and how would it affect its intended conclusion? We may never know.

If we go through Sye’s eight-step proof and choose the latter option, namely “I do not believe that God exists,” Sye will naturally be disappointed. Only stubbornness and hardheartedness could lead one to choosing this option. It is by choosing this option that we are lead to a new page where Sye scolds us yet again. There he writes:

Denying the existence of God is not unbelief but an exercise in self-deception. You may know things, but you cannot account for anything you know.

Is it truly an instance of “self-deception” when one recognizes the fact that there is a fundamental distinction between what is real and what is imaginary? Indeed, it seems that ignoring this distinction is a telltale indication of self-deception, and I have yet to see how god-belief is possible without downplaying this distinction. If something does not exist, then how can denying its existence when someone insists that it does exist, constitute an instance of self-deception?

Sye betrays the inherent argumentum ad ignorantium nature to presuppositionalism when he tells us “you may know things, but you cannot account for anything you know.” He grants that his visitors can know things, but essentially says that they don’t know how they know what they know. How does he know this about those who visit his website? Is he omniscient? Does he confuse himself with the god he claims he worships? He may have never made their acquaintance before, and yet he professes to know that they can’t know how they know what we know. He apparently takes his website’s visitors for fools.

Perhaps Sye is expressing a hope here, namely the hope that his visitors are unable to “account for anything” they might happen to know. But why would he hope this? Or perhaps he’s projecting his own ignorance here. Either way, he seems to think he’s on safe grounds here, since he provides no support at all for his claim about people who may very well be complete strangers to him. He talks about being able to “account” for one’s knowledge, but presents no basis to “account” for the knowledge he claims for himself about people he’s never met. Sye is telling us that the basis for his visitors’ knowledge is a mystery to them. And yet isn’t this precisely what Christianity ends up teaching about the “knowledge” believers are supposed to claim for themselves when push comes to shove? Look at what presuppositional apologist John Frame tells us when he wrestles with the question of how the believer can “account for” the “knowledge” he is supposed to claim for himself:

I cannot explain the psychology here to the satisfaction of very many. In this case as in others (for we walk by faith, not by sight!) we may have to accept the fact even without an explanation of the fact. Somehow, God manages to get his Word across to us, despite the logical and psychological barriers. Without explaining how it works, Scripture describes in various ways a “supernatural factor” in divine-human communication. (a) It speaks of the power of the Word. The Word created all things (Gen. 1:3, etc.; Ps. 33:3-6; John 1:3) and directs the course of nature and history (Pss. 46:6; 148:5-8). What God says will surely come to pass (Isa. 55:11; Gen. 18:149; Deut. 18:21ff.). The gospel is “the power of God unto salvation” (Rom. 1:16; cf. Isa. 6:9-10; Luke 7:7ff.; Heb. 4:12). (b) Scripture also speaks of the personal power of the Holy Spirit operating with the Word (John 3:5; 1 Cor. 2:4,12ff.; 2 Cor. 3:15-18; 1 Thess. 1:5)10. Mysterious though the process may be, somehow God illumines the human mind to discern the divine source of the Word. We know without knowing how we know. (Presuppositional Apologetics: An Introduction - Part 1 of 2: Introduction and Creation)

Frame construes the problem as a matter of psychology, but what we’re really after here (and what Sye is presumably interested in) is a matter of epistemology, not psychology. For what we’re supposed to be concerned with is giving an “account for” the knowledge we claim to have, right? So this in itself is quite an admission on Frame’s part: it tells us that he has no epistemological “account for” the “knowledge” he claims to have acquired from a supernatural source. And that would be accurate: knowledge that is dispensed from a supernatural source would have no epistemological basis, since it would not be knowledge which one infers from previously validated knowledge, but which would have been forcibly inserted into his mind by means of irresistible magic.

And this analysis is not at all uncalled for: Frame admits that the bible fails to “explain… how it works,” but mentions that it involves some kind of “power,” a power which is powerful enough to “direct… the course of nature and history” (so how could puny little man resist it?). This “power” is something which “operat[es] with the Word” which the believer reads in the sacred storybook, so just by reading the storybook the believer is supposedly giving this power access to his mind to do whatever it chooses to do. Frame himself concedes that he does not understand how this all works, calling the “process” by which this power inserts knowledge into the believer’s mind “mysterious,” insisting that “somehow” his god “illumines the human mind to discern the divine source of the Word,” while failing to explain how this supposed illumination is any different from the believer’s own imagination. It is at this point that Frame throws up his arms in utter cognitive resignation to make the damning admission “We know without knowing how we know.”

This is the philosophical heritage of presuppositional apologetics. And yet, given this concession of defeat on a most important epistemological matter (indeed, the most important matter for the believer if there were any!), Sye wants to exploit the non-believer’s supposed inability to “account for” what he knows. Presuppositionalists have always told us that non-believers cannot “account for” their knowledge, so Sye tells us nothing we haven’t already heard. But if accounting for knowledge were in fact so important to Sye, why doesn’t he make up for Frame’s admitted defeat and get down to the business of accounting for his own so-called knowledge, beginning with explaining how we can reliably distinguish between what he calls “God” and what he may merely be imagining?

The silence on these points is indeed deafening!

But if Christians can give themselves a pass when it comes to giving an “account for” their knowledge and ultimately appeal to “mystery,” why is it an issue of the non-believer is unable to articulate the epistemological grounding of his own knowledge?

Perhaps it is because – and this is what we should expect if Christianity were in fact false – Christianity has no genuine epistemology, and non-believers – who claim no supernatural source for the knowledge they have – should have an epistemological basis for the knowledge they have, since they acquire their knowledge through processes governed by the nature of their consciousness and its perceptual contact with reality. In other words, while believers should not be expected to provide any epistemological accounting for the knowledge they claim to have about “the supernatural” (since such “knowledge” is summarily arbitrary in nature), non-believers do not claim to acquire their knowledge from some “supernatural” source, but instead rely on their own faculties to discover facts, formulate general principles and infer higher-level truths through some understandable process. So the Christian is right on schedule in giving himself a pass, since he has no “account for” the knowledge he claims, and he is clever in challenging non-believers to explain how he acquires the knowledge he has.

But this does not in any way justify the believer’s appeal to “mystery” or some “supernatural power.” By taking this route, the believer announces that his god-belief rests ultimately on his own ignorance: he has no idea how to “account for” knowledge at all, and yet it is on the basis of this ignorance that he hopes to establish the validity of his god-belief. The circular tail-spin of crash-and-burn presuppositionalism leaves its practitioners stranded on a deserted island, unable to fend for themselves, unable to do nothing more than rest on the futile hope that some unsuspecting victim will come along and fall for his pretenses.

That being said, it is true that many non-believers do find it difficult to wrestle with presuppositionalism’s devises and challenges. There are, among others, two fundamental reasons why this may be the case. For one, while individual thinkers do have a great store of knowledge in their minds, they typically do not learn the processes by which they acquire knowledge in an explicit, systematic manner. They started learning knowledge when they were toddlers, and just continued with the processes that they naturally developed over time, never really understanding how their knowledge relates to what they perceive, never exploring how they form a concept, never identifying the process by which they can infer general truths from what they are aware of directly. Since their childhood, the processes by which they acquire their knowledge has been automatized, something they do without fully understanding how they do it. In this way, many non-believing thinkers’ orientation to their own knowledge is no different from what Frame indicates about the religious knowledge he claims when he concedes that “we know without knowing how we know.”

The solution to this is not what the presuppositionalist offers, which is to retreat further into the cave of his religion’s darkness, but to recognize the fact that since consciousness and knowledge both have identity, they can both be understood, since knowledge is essentially a process of identifying that which has identity. This is where Objectivist epistemology, the objective theory of concepts, sheds light where presuppositionalism can only prey on ignorance. (For details, see Ayn Rand’s Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology.) I contend that, without a theory of concepts, one will be unable to answer presuppositionalism’s challenges in any definitely resolute manner.

Sye’s next statement is noteworthy:

Arguing against God's existence would be on par with arguing against the existence of air, breathing it all the while.

It’s curious that Sye would compare “arguing against God’s existence” with “arguing against the existence of air,” for his proof makes it clear that his god is supposed to be immaterial while air is undeniably material in manner. We do in fact breathe air, and can feel it rushing into our lungs and out our noses as we breathe. We can directly sense air, since our air channels are equipped with nerve endings which register the passage of air as it moves across them. But the Christian god is supposed to be immaterial, invisible, and beyond the reach of our senses. It’s said to be “out there” some place, but without any ability on our part to perceive. All we can do is imagine it (which we aren’t supposed to talk about). So Sye’s comparison of his god with the air that we breathe, is at the very least highly questionable. If Sye could say this about his god, couldn’t we say this about anything we imagine?

Sye then says:

You use the universal, immaterial, unchanging laws of logic, mathematics, science, and absolute morality in order to come to rational decisions, but you cannot account for them.

How does Sye know that we “cannot account for them”? If we have the objective theory of concepts, we surely can “account for” logic, mathematics, science and morality, since these are conceptual in nature. Indeed, how could these endeavors be possible to any consciousness lacking the ability to form concepts? Blank out! Sye certainly does not explain this. He does not even consider this question. I have already discussed the proper understanding of universality (see here). Universality is essentially nothing more than the human mind’s ability to form open-ended classifications of reference (namely mental integrations) into which new units can be integrated when they are discovered or considered. There is nothing mysterious about universality when it is understood as an aspect of conceptual awareness. But notice that presuppositional apologetics does not encourage an *understanding* of universality, but instead seeks to utilize universality as a point of ignorance against the non-believer.

Similarly with the quality of being “immaterial”: since Sye is talking about universality, he’s clearly talking about the mind’s ability to formulate open-ended classifications of reference. But the mind does not experience its own activity in the same manner that it experiences the concrete entities which it perceives in the world. The mind acts according to its own nature, and this activity is certainly different from the nature of the objects of which one is aware by means of sense perception. A tree which one perceives is different from the concept ‘tree’ which one forms in his mind to integrate and identify the many trees he perceives.

Sye continues:

These laws are not the only way God has revealed himself to you, but they are sufficient to show the irrationality of your thinking, and expose your guilt for denying Him.

The “laws” to which Sye refers here, if they have any objective basis, are not the means by which an invisible magic being “reveals” itself to human beings, but in fact the conceptual form in which human minds identify and integrate general truths which they discover about the world in which they exist. There’s nothing otherworldly about these laws. In fact, they pertain in this world precisely because they are formed on the basis of what is discovered in this world. The reason why religious thinkers treat them as indications of a supernatural dimension is precisely because they do not understand their inherent relation to this world, which again implicates the argumentum ad ignorantium nature of presuppositional apologetics: the apologists do not know how the laws of logic, mathematics, science and morality can be derived by the human mind from their awareness of the world around us, therefore they couldn’t possibly be derived from awareness of the world around us. Consequently, they must derive from some awareness alien to this world, they must derive from a supernatural mind. After all, goes the reasoning, this world is nothing but matter in constant flux, particulars that are ever-changing. So how could these laws, which are “immaterial,” unchanging and universal find their basis in this world? If such reasoning were true, how could these laws have any applicability in this world if they didn’t have any basis in it? Again, to address such questions, apologists appeal to the supernatural: because the laws reflect the nature of a supernatural being, and the supernatural being created this world (this world which is a chaos of particulars constantly undergoing change). Still we are left with imagining something beyond what we perceive, beyond what we can infer from an objective basis, beyond what we can reach by means of reason. You just have to have faith in the apologist’s claims that the defense he gives for his god-belief is true, for it will never make sense on the basis of reason.

Sye’s presumptuousness seems to know no bounds when he writes (again, he’s writing this to whoever happens to visit his website and finds his way to this page):

There is a reason that you deny the existence of God and it has nothing to do with proof. I can show this to you. Examine what your initial reaction was to the proof of God's existence offered on this website. Did you think that you could continue to deny God because you are not a scientist, or philosopher but 'Surely somewhere, sometime, a philosopher or scientist will come up with an explanation for universal, immaterial, unchanging laws apart from God?' Did you try to come up with an alternate explanation on your own? OR Did you even consider that the proof was valid?

The problem with Sye’s proof is not whether it is valid or invalid. Validity is a formal concern in logic; one can produce a valid argument that the earth rests on the back of a giant tortoise swimming through space. The question is whether or not Sye’s argument is sound, and this should be his concern. It should be our concern as well, for even if we object that Sye’s argument is invalid, it would not take a lot of effort to make it valid, and then what? The concern should be whether the premises in Sye’s argument are true as well as whether or not they in fact support his intended conclusion. On this note, Sye’s argument does not make it clear how the conclusion that his god exists follows from the premises that the laws of logic, mathematics, science and morality are “immaterial,” unchanging and universal. He insists that such laws “cannot be accounted for if the universe was random or only material in nature” (Sye makes this claim on the pre-proof page). But it does not follow from this that his god therefore exists. Nor does Sye’s claiming that these laws “reflect the very nature of God” given their so-called “immaterial,” universal and unchanging nature (as he does here). It is one thing merely to claim that these laws “reflect the very nature of God,” another thing entirely to prove (a) that said god exists and (b) that the laws in question actually do reflect its nature. Sye has merely presented the claim that they do (thus assuming the existence of his god, which is what he was supposed to prove in the first place); he has not at all come close to accomplishing the latter tasks.

Notice Sye’s glaring presumptuousness in speaking on behalf of his visitors, most of whom he will never personally meet. How does Sye know that any given reader’s reason for rejecting the claim that his god exists has nothing to do with proof? Presuppositionalists are constantly asking non-believers to “account for” their knowledge; why doesn’t Sye “account for” what he claims to know here? It could be that readers find Sye’s “proof” deficient (they’d be right to do so), and this would be sufficient to reject its conclusion. Sye says that he can show that his readers’ rejection of the claim that his god exists by examining their initial reaction to his website. But even Sye does not know what his readers’ initial reaction to his website may be. That he does not know this is given away by the fact that he must ask his readers questions in order to probe for those reasons. Sye notes several possible initial reactions, but hardly provides an exhaustive list. It could be that his readers came to his website with a willingness to let Sye make his case, and upon examining his case found it to be insufficient to the task he put before himself. It may be the case that some readers are simply being honest when they examine Sye’s case and find it surreptitious or deceptive. Would Sye fault any of his site’s visitors for being honest?

Sye clearly wants to forestall any alternative to his god-belief:

Hoping that an alternate explanation for universal, immaterial, unchanging laws can someday be found apart from God, is a blind leap of faith, or wishful thinking. Isn't it interesting that this is exactly what professed unbelievers accuse Christians of?

In other words, Sye chides putting hope in what merely be imaginary as an alternative to putting hope in what believers can only imagine. A leap of faith in favor of some mystical concoction of human imagination which starkly departs from the realm in which we exist is to be preferred over man’s potential when it comes to what he may produce in the future (human beings have quite a track record, from the Empire State Building to the Declaration of Independence).

But all of this is for naught, for we already have a rational explanation for the universal, unchanging and objective laws which Sye has in mind. And that explanation is found in the philosophy of Objectivism. (If what he presents to us on his site is any indication, it appears that Sye has no familiarity with this philosophy; he certainly does not interact with it.) So there is no need to “hope” that “someday” an “alternative explanation” can be “found apart from God” (as if positing “God” explains these things to begin with!). No “leap of faith” is required, either for some imagined future explanation or for some supernatural deity which one can only imagine. No “wishful thinking” is needed.

And yes, hoping, leaps of faith, and wishful thinking, are indeed the kinds of things non-believers observe Christians indulging in when it comes to their god-belief. And no, non-believers are not constrained to doing the same, so long as they choose rational philosophy.

But rational philosophy, the philosophy of Objectivism, is precisely what believers do not want to consider. Indeed, does Sye consider the possibility that there is a rational alternative to his god-belief? Not that I can see.

Does Sye Ten Bruggencate present a genuine proof for the existence of “God”? Not if what is imaginary is distinct from what is real. If his god were real, why would Sye rely on the usual tactics of presuppositionalism to demonstrate its reality? I submit that he relies on these tactics precisely because his god is not real, and yet wants it to be real.

by Dawson Bethrick

RazorsKiss on the Christian God as the Basis of Knowledge – Part 5: Exodus 3:14

In his interrogation of Mitch LeBlanc, presuppositional apologist RazorsKiss (“RK” hereafter) immediately drew attention to a statement found in Exodus 3:14:

God said to Moses, “I AM WHO I AM”; and He said, “Thus you shall say to the sons of Israel, ‘I AM has sent me to you’.”

It is not clear from his own statements why RK deemed it important to bicker with LeBlanc over the significance of this passage, unless it was to demonstrate LeBlanc’s own supposed ignorance of the historical meaning of the “I AM” clause, which by itself would have no relevance to the thesis which RK has elected to defend.

Now some Christian apologists claim that this passage contains biblical affirmation of the law of identity, a fundamental law of logic, in the clause “I AM WHO I AM.” Gary Crampton, for instance, makes the following statement:

Also fixed in Scripture are the two other principle laws of logic: the law of indentity (A is A) and the law of the excluded middle (A is either B or non-B). The former is taught in Exodus 3:14, in the name of God itself: “I AM WHO I AM.” And the latter is found, for example, in the words of Christ: “He who is not with Me is against Me” (Luke 11:23). [SIC] (The Westminster Confession of Faith and Logic)

I do not know whether or not RK holds the view which Crampton expresses here regarding Exodus 3:14, but there are some points to be made against it.

First of all, the passage in which the “I AM” clause is found does not identify what it states as a fundamental law of logic. (I’m assuming that Crampton means the law of identity, for I have never heard of a logical law known as “indentity” – perhaps this is a principle which copyists used in reproducing ancient manuscripts.) For that matter, the bible nowhere speaks intelligibly of logic as an epistemological method. The claim that this passage conveys a divinely inspired statement of a fundamental principle of logic, is a blatant case of trying to assimilate legitimate philosophical principles into a Christian context and back-fill them with Christian presuppositions. The law of identity is axiomatic, so it’s not as if we need an invisible magic being to communicate it to us, or to “make it true” (which would simply abrogate the objectivity of the law in the first place).

Moreover, logic as a method of inferring and validating new knowledge is anathema to what the bible does promote as the believer’s source of knowledge. RK himself pointed to what he calls the “sensus divinitatus” as the faculty by which the believer presumably acquires knowledge. Transmission of “knowledge” from the beyond into one’s mind by supernatural means is not a function of logic; reception of “knowledge” via the “sensus divinitatus” is characterized as a passive process, while scrutinizing the logical integrity of knowledge claims is an active process. Also, to suppose that one must submit the deliverances of the “sensus divinitatus” to the tribunal of logical evaluation in order to determine their validity or truth value, would only suggest that logic is higher than the source of such deliverances. This would be an expression of “autonomous reasoning,” i.e., taking something other than the revelation of the Christian god as “the ultimate reference point” in one’s development of his knowledge, and presuppositionalism scorns “autonomous reasoning” as the fount of all sin. As presuppositionalist Richard Pratt puts it:

This, then, is the essence of sin: man’s rebellion against recognizing his dependence on God in everything and the assumption of his ability to be independent of God. (Every Thought Captive, p. 29)

Logic, of course, requires intellectual liberty. It requires that the mind be free to follow logic wherever it leads him, regardless of who disapproves. This means that logic is not possible apart from the precondition of independence, the very value which the presuppositionalist notion of “autonomous reasoning” is intended to vilify. Ayn Rand put this principle succinctly when she wrote:

These two—reason and freedom—are corollaries, and their relationship is reciprocal: when men are rational, freedom wins; when men are free, reason wins. (“Faith and Force: The Destroyers of the Modern World,” Philosophy: Who Needs It, p. 66)

Those who scorn the value of independence, scorn reason, scorn logic, and scorn man as a rational animal. This attitude is not difficult to find in the Christian worldview by any means. In Christianity, the disposition desired of the believer is that he take whatever his god tells him unquestioningly. The believer is not to question what he believes his god has told him, regardless of how his god has presumably communicated to him. Greg Bahnsen himself makes point this clear when he tells us that his god’s “word and character are not questionable” (Van Til’s “Presuppositionalism”).

Submitting statements which are said to have proceeded from the mouth of one’s god to tests intended to determine whether or not they are logical, is not an action indicative of the position which rejects independent thought. So if the believer gets his knowledge of the truth from an allegedly divine source, such as the so-called “sensus divinitatus,” then on what basis can he affirm logic as an arbiter of true knowledge, except he compartmentalize his god-beliefs and borrows from an epistemology which assumes the independence, or “autonomy,” of the human mind as the proper standard for man?

But some will nonetheless insist that this is the bible teaching a fundamental law of logic, in spite of the obvious conflict between logic as a means of testing knowledge claims and presuppositionalism’s overt rejection of “autonomous reasoning,” i.e., the position which does not accept assertions attributed by Christianity to the Christian god unquestioningly. The problem with this, however, is that the statement “I AM WHO I AM” could, at best, be an application of the law of identity, not an explicit statement of the law of identity as such. Certainly the statement assumes the law of identity, but all intelligible statements in fact do this, not just the clause found in Exodus 3:14. Exodus 3:14 is nothing unique.

Even worse for Crampton, the statement “I AM WHO I AM” could not be a statement isolating the law of identity, for it is restricted to a specific unit (one which is specified by the personal pronoun “I”), while the law of identity is open-ended (i.e., universal), and thus not restricted to a specific unit, but applicable to any and all units, whether persons, places, or things. The clause “I AM WHAT I AM” is, to put it mildly, far too narrow in its scope of reference to constitute a statement of the law of identity as such. It is because the law of identity is universal in its scope of reference that it is is customarily stated in the form of an equation using an open-ended term, e.g., A is A. For this reason, the clause in Exodus 3:14 cannot legitimately be taken an explicit statement of the law of identity as such, for the universality of the law is not entailed by “I AM WHO I AM.” And while the statement “I AM WHO I AM” can by rightly and logically uttered by anyone who can speak, such as actually existing persons (such as human beings), the law of identity applies not only to animate objects, but also to inanimate objects.

Lastly, in the case of the biblical passage, the statement “I AM WHO I AM” has simply been inserted by an author into the mouth of a storybook character, so ascribing the origin of the law of identity to a person who proclaims it a law (as if the law of identity could be legislated by an act of will) simply reduces to subjectivism.

by Dawson Bethrick

RazorsKiss on the Christian God as the Basis of Knowledge – Part 4: RK on Man’s “Warrant” for Using Logic

In his Rebuttal to Mitch LeBlanc, RK raised some issues regarding logic. Presuppositionalists commonly assert that the Christian god is the foundation of logic, and I have devoted a series of blogs investigating this claim already (see here, here, here, here and here).

Man's "Warrant" for Using Logic

Instead of arguing outright that logic presupposes the Christian god, RK attempted to take LeBlanc to task on the question of having “warrant” for using logic. In this section I will answer RK’s questions and objections from my own position.

RK writes:

Having success in using the laws of logic is not the same as saying that you have a warrant to be using it.

A man’s “warrant” for using logic is his ability to think, specifically his ability to identify and integrate what he perceives in conceptual form. Essentially, man’s nature as a rational animal is all the warrant he needs for using logic. He does not need to seek approval from anyone, either real or imaginary, before using his mind and governing his thoughts by means of logical principles.

The question is about whether we have warrant for considering logic as axiomatic.

Logic itself is not axiomatic. Logic is a set of principles which guides an individual’s reasoning about the facts he discovers in reality, and is composed of a wide assortment of concepts. So as a method of knowledge it is not conceptually irreducible (which is one of the criteria qualifying a position as axiomatic; see here). Moreover, logic is only applicable once one has formed a number of concepts, both from perceptual inputs as well as on the basis of concepts so formed (cf. abstraction from abstractions), which are formed in essentially the same manner as concepts formed directly from perceptual inputs. Even if one wants to say that logic is implicit in the formation of these baseline concepts in that some of its principles guide the process of forming concepts, it would not be something that could be identified until those concepts have been formed and thus be something which could be identified. Now this does not erase the fact that the foundations of logic are axiomatic concepts. As an objective method which teaches man to think rationally, logic presupposes the truth of the axioms which I discussed in my previous blog. If RK thinks that logic is axiomatic, he needs to explain this. But I do not see where he attempted to do so in his debate with LeBlanc. Quite the opposite, RK says very little about logic in his opening statement. In fact, his only statement about logic worth noting is his assertion that “an unbelieving man… has no basis for his use of logical laws,” a statement for which he provides no informed defense.

It seems apparent to me that Mitch is not providing a justification for using the law that he is using - nor did I see a case that did anything to disprove mine.

Keep in mind that LeBlanc had only presented his opening statement by this point in the debate. Contrary to what he apparently believes, RK is not reacting to LeBlanc’s rebuttal to RK’s opening statement. Moreover, had the topic of the debate been specifically about “providing a justification for using” logic, then RK could fault LeBlanc for failing to address this, if in fact he did fail to address it. Then again, I did not see where RK had provided a justification for using logic. In his opening statement, all RK essentially did was describe his position, affirm its exclusivity and assert that any other basis is insufficient. With regards to logic specifically, recall that RK had stated:

That any worldview asserting some sort of “objective” basis for the laws of logic specifically, but for nature and morality as well - is pure subjectivism wrapped up in an objective shell consisting of concepts stolen from their Creator.

Why does RK suppose that a worldview which affirms an objective basis for the laws of logic “is pure subjective wrapped up in an objective shell consisting of concepts stolen from their Creator”? Does RK think that Christianity affirms an objective basis for the laws of logic? If so, does he think he’s affirming “pure subjectivism wrapped up in an objective shell consisting of concepts stolen from their Creator”? If the “Creator” which RK has in mind here is the Christian god, he’s in for a surprise. RK claims that his god is “omniscient.” I have already made the case that an omniscient mind would not have its knowledge in conceptual form (see here), and a presuppositional apologist has expressed agreement with this conclusion (see here).

Moving on:

He is simply saying that it is usable - the same problem Martin falls into, in his TANG

Why is saying that logic is usable is a problem? Does RK not think it is usable?

That is not the question. On what grounds can it be considered warranted to be using abstract universals which apply to all (created) thinking beings? I have a proper ground to be doing so.

The use of “abstract universals” is “warranted” on the grounds of the primacy of existence and the objective theory of concepts, two vital philosophical components which are antithetical to the Christian worldview. The Christian worldview assumes the primacy of consciousness, and has no theory of concepts. So RK is deluding himself if he thinks Christianity provides “warrant” for “using abstract universals which apply” to anything at all. By endorsing the Christian worldview, he has rejected the two very things which make “abstract universals” possible and applicable in the first place.

Obviously, an atheist is able to /operate/ with success using the logical laws which his brain operates according to. In fact, they MUST do so.

An individual applies logic in his thinking volitionally, because he chooses to, not because he’s been forced or compelled to. This is the moral element to rational thinking which many thinkers (including presuppositionalists, who prefer to see morality as a matter of obeying the commands of an invisible magic being) tend to miss. Morality is involved where there is a choice to be made, and applicable only when there is a choice to be made.

As for the mechanics of the laws of logic, however, one will eventually encounter insurmountable difficulty when trying to understand and explain how logic works if his worldview does not equip him with an objective theory of concepts. It is because many individuals lack a worldview with an objective understanding of the nature of concepts that they give up on trying to understand logic and point to something which they can only imagine as the “basis” of logic, as we see in the case of presuppositionalists like RK. Since they have virtually no understanding of concepts, and have no idea how volition can be reconciled with objectivity, they give up and surrender their minds to mysticism. And this very act of giving up is understood, “interpreted,” as giving oneself over to the supernatural, as sacrificing oneself to his god, following the Christian model, as a devotional act garnering the approval of a divine being, as “pleasing” one’s god. The believer here imagines that he hears a voice from heaven, saying: “This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased.” This auto-suggestive con which the believer invokes upon himself, can be powerful in its persuasion, where persuasion at this point is merely a form of positive reinforcement of a vicious psychological habit.

It is no surprise, then, that RK presents no conceptual understanding of logic, and in place of such informed understanding seeks to associate logic with his storybook-based worldview.

Now it should be pointed out that, even if one does not understand concept theory, it would not follow from this that his use of logic is “unwarranted.” I may not understand how my microwave oven heats food, but this does not mean that my use of microwave ovens to heat food is unwarranted. The microwave heats food, whether I understand its behind-the-scenes functionality or not, so long as I can get it to run. One’s use of logic is analogous to this situation. In fact, one would need to use logic in order to understand both how a microwave oven works as well as how logic allows a thinker to scale the hierarchical structure of his knowledge. On the other hand, claiming that a worldview can "account for" the preconditions of knowledge, when in fact that worldview lacks a theory of concepts in the first place, simply undermines the credibility of those who champion such a position. This is the position in which we find presuppositionalists like RK, who claims that the Christian god is the basis of knowledge. Since Christianity does not have a theory of concepts, how could defenders of the view which RK seeks to defend going to produce an intelligible case for such a position?

Continuing, RK states:

The question at hand is not whether - but /why/ he is using them.

A thinker uses the laws of logic because his consciousness operates on the conceptual level of cognition. RK thinks that an appeal to a supernatural creator of logic is needed to justify man’s use of logic, but this does not address the issue informatively. It does not tell us why logic applies to man’s thinking, fails to take into account the nature of man’s consciousness, and is preoccupied with validating the contents of an ancient storybook which are irrelevant to logic and man’s need for it. RK’s view of logic teaches us nothing about the nature of logic or the nature of its relevance to human thought. It only seeks to wedge his god-belief into any conversation about logic, as if it had any relevance in the first place, a relevance which RK has not succeeded in establishing.


Are the Laws of Logic “created” by the Christian god?

Beyond these points, which have been answered, RK said very little about logic. But there was one other claim which RK made about logic which I found noteworthy due to the tension it generates in relation to claims about logic made by other presuppositionalists. RK made the following statement:

I am going to argue that God is not only the ordainer, but creator of the logical laws we use.

I really wish presuppositionalists would get on the same page. In Pushing the Antithesis: The Apologetic Methodology of Greg L. Bahnsen, it is stated:

We are not saying God created the laws of logic by His volitional self-determination. Were this so, then He could alter or discard them as well... (p. 210)

Bahnsen says that his god did not create the laws of logic, while RK says that his god is their "creator." The two are in direct conflict. Which is it? Are we to understand the presuppositionalist position as advocating the view that the Christian god did create the laws of logic, or that it did not create the laws of logic? Is the presuppositionalist’s view of logic so radically different from an objective understanding of logic, that the law of contradiction either does not apply, or its violations can still be called “logical”? Or, if one or the other position were true, how could two Christian apologists differ so dramatically on this point?

The real story behind this kind of disagreement between two presuppositionalists who want to claim some kind of fundamental relationship between their god and the laws of logic, is that there really is no fundamental relationship between the Christian god and the laws of logic at all, and defenders of Christianity are attempting to shoplift logic as if its principles were underwritten by the Christian god's alleged nature. This is why RK, Bahnsen and other apologists really don't provide an actual argument to support their claim that the laws of logic "reflect" their god's nature, rather they simply assert it and call their assertion an argument, which is what we see in RK's case (it's definitely what we find in Bahnsen). If there were genuinely an objective rationale for associating logic with the Christian god, I strongly doubt that we would find this kind of disagreement between Christian apologists essentially cut from the same cloth.

On the other hand, if presuppositionalists do have an argument for there being a fundamental association between the Christian god and the laws of logic, it seems that the first order of business would be to agree on whether that association is creative in nature (as RK affirms), or merely “reflective” (as Bahnsen affirms elsewhere). Of course, we would want to know what the premises of such an argument might be, but we can reasonably expect the argument’s premises to vary fundamentally on which of these two disparate positions is being defended. An argument for the view that the Christian god is the creator of logical laws would presumably look quite different from an argument which merely seeks to establish that the laws of logic “reflect” the Christian god’s nature.

Then again, an even more fundamental order of business would be to establish the existence of said god in the first place, for without this it would be nonsensical to claim a relationship between the two. Once this has been achieved (and so far as I’ve seen – and I’ve seen a lot – it has not been achieved), presuppositionalists would be advised to get their playbook in order. Did their god create the laws of logic, or not? There are certain risks with either position which could understandably make presuppositionalists uncomfortable.

If, on the one hand, it is held that the Christian god created the laws of logic, as RK wants us to believe, then – as Bahnsen warns – that god “could alter or discard them as well.” I’m confident that the religious mind could find a way to live with this, but it would be sufficient to repudiate the claim that said god is “rational,” a claim which can be found throughout the presuppositionalist literature.


Do the Laws of Logic “Reflect” the Character of the Christian god?

On the other hand, if the laws of logic merely “reflect” the character of the Christian god, it could be inferred from this that the laws of logic essentially exist independent of the Christian god, in spite of its alleged “reflection” of the Christian god’s character. The claim that the laws of logic “reflect” the character of the Christian god seems to have been devised specifically to avoid the pitfall of portraying logic as merely another the Christian god’s creations, which it can alter and discard at will, while still maintaining a sense of dependence of logic on the Christian god. So, given the above noted tension, presuppositionalists need to decide that whether or not their created the laws of logic. If it did create the laws of logic, then I see no reason why the warning which Bahnsen gives – that the Christian god “could alter or discard them” at will – would not apply. If the Christian god did not create the laws of logic, and yet it is acknowledged that the laws of logic do in fact exist, then it must be admitted that the laws of logic exist independent of the Christian god’s creative activity. In this case, the laws of logic are not created. Whether or not they “reflect” the Christian god’s character is a side issue which I will address below. For the present case, the question is whether or not the laws of logic exist as a result of its creative activity, or independent of its creative will. Given RK’s affirmation above, presuppositionalists seem torn on this matter, and I wager that this is due to the fact that there is no objective support for any relationship between the laws of logic and the Christian god.

As for the claim that the laws of logic “reflect” the character of the Christian god, such a view can only be endorsed if one fails to recognize the profound differences between the nature of logic on the one hand, and the characteristics which Christianity ascribes to its god on the other. Specifically, logic is conceptual in nature. Not only does logic as a method which guides rational thinking consist of principles which take conceptual form, but its very application as a method of non-contradictory identification is inherently tied to the universality (i.e., the open-endedness) of conceptualization. Specifically, it is because logical principles are conceptual in nature, and therefore open-ended, that they are available to any individual to apply to any object or set of objects he perceives or considers, whether it be location of a house, the rate of flow of a river, a bank account balance, cooking an omelet, or deciding which political candidate to vote for. Thus, if the laws of logic reflect anything, they reflect the conceptual nature of human thought, where the objective theory of concepts identifies the proper norms implied by the conceptual nature of human thought.

Moreover, the laws of logic presume the primacy of existence, i.e., the recognition that the objects of consciousness are what they are independent of conscious activity. It would make no sense to attempt to apply logic to objects which can vary according to a thinkers will. If one sought to balance his bank account, for instance, and could alter the amount stated on his payment receipts according to his wishes (for instance, instead of having paid $2800.00 for transmission work, he decided that it cost him only $4.00), why would he need logic for such a task? If the nature of the objects of one’s awareness conformed to one’s conscious activity, he wouldn’t need to draw inferences about the way things are; rather, he could just reset everything according to his wishes, according to “His good pleasure,” as RK puts it. Psalms 115:3 makes this point explicitly clear: “our God is in the heavens; He does whatever He pleases.”

Unfortunately for the presuppositionalist, however, this disqualifies the Christian god as the object which the laws of logic reflect. For, as I have argued here (and with agreement from a presuppositionalist here), the Christian god would not have its knowledge in conceptual form. In other words, its knowledge would not be conceptual in nature. So if logic is in fact conceptual in nature, and man’s knowledge is also conceptual in nature, there is no reason to suppose that logic “reflects” the character of the Christian god, when in fact logic reflects the conceptual nature of human thought. Also, since logic presupposes the primacy of existence, and the very notion of the Christian god entails the contradiction of this principle, namely the primacy of consciousness, then we have all the more reason to reject the view that the laws of logic “reflect” the character of the Christian god. Presuppositionalists who make such a claim are in fact exposing their hapless ignorance of the conceptual nature of logic, as well as their failure to integrate the attributes which their worldview ascribes to their god into such claims.

by Dawson Bethrick