Some time back I was having a conversation with a colleague of mine. Our discussion started touching on philosophical topics and it was clear on the surface, at least up to a point, that my colleague agreed with my points about foundational principles and the need to govern our reasoning by facts and to steer our inferences by rational principles. He expressed strong agreement with these points, but suddenly made the remark in passing, “Yes, the senses do distort, but…”
There I stopped him and asked him to explain this. He seemed taken aback by my challenge, as though it were self-evident that the senses “distort,” as though the recognition that the senses “distort” were unimpeachably true. After querying him on this assumption, it started to become clear that he really did not have an argument for this premise, but he also did not demonstrate any willingness to reconsider it.
Given what he had communicated up to this point in our conversation, it was strange how quickly he became defensive, as though a raw nerve had been exposed by challenging a statement he made in passing, a statement which, if true, would have significant implications for the entire body of our knowledge and the basic structure of human epistemology.
I explained that very often arguments to the effect that the senses are invalid or at any rate “distort” the objects of perception hinge on a stolen concept (e.g., they distort the “appearance” of objects, when in fact “appearance” is the form in which we perceive objects – cf. David Kelley’s The Evidence of the Senses) or in some manner or another miss the distinction between the objects we perceive and our identification of those objects. For example, I may briefly hear a squeaking sound and think initially that my neighbor is calling her dog when in fact, on closer inspection, it turns out to be the rusty hinge on a gate that I heard. In fact, I explained, the senses are remarkably accurate, and what’s critical is how we identify what we perceive.
These points just sailed right past my colleague’s head, as if he hadn’t even heard them; he gave no reaction to my points, clearly not taking the time to consider them. Instead, he insisted that the premise that the senses distort is incontestable, citing his own colorblindness as an example. But colorblindness is not a power of distorting objects, but rather the inability to make “certain discriminations” (cf. Harry Binswanger, How We Know, p. 78).
So I asked what he meant by the statement “the senses distort.” Presumably just by looking outward at the world, our senses do something to the objects of our perception which changes them in some way. How does this allegedly happen, and how would we know this? What exactly in our senses does the alleged distorting, what is distorted, and how do the senses perform this act of distortion? And, to what degree does whatever is thought to be distorted by the senses deviate from its true nature? Again, if this were truly happening, how would could we discover and validate this?
I don’t think the claim is that just by perceiving something, that our act of perceiving an object changes the object in some way. In other words, my colleague is not saying that when I look at a plate of rice, my looking at the plate of rice turns the rice into tortillas or transforms the plate into a water pitcher. But what is being claimed? It was hard to get details out of him on this.
I then explained the premise that the senses distort the objects of our awareness implicitly assumes the vantage of an omniscient observer. It is essentially the claim to know how something appears apart from our perceiving it and to have the ability to compare how something appears apart from perceiving it to how it appears when we perceive, and then to say “Aha! See, the object really is different from what we are perceiving!” It is the claim to know how things should appear via sense perception and since they do not appear this way when we perceive them, the senses are in some way responsible for this failure. This presumption of omniscience lies at the heart of what Ayn Rand called “the prior certainty of consciousness,” namely “the concept of consciousness as some faculty other than the faculty of perception—which means: the indiscriminate contents of one’s consciousness as the irreducible primary and absolute, to which reality has to conform” (For the New Intellectual, p. 23).
Of course, reality does not conform to the contents of our consciousness, indiscriminate or otherwise, but omniscient observer premise logically leads to the assumption that reality would need to do so, and when it fails to, the premise is not what’s wrong, but something in our perceptual faculties is. But by what means would we know how something should appear apart from sense perception? This part is never explained, but it’s hard to understand the premise without this component: we would have to know, independently of sense perception, how things appear to then say that the senses are distorting them in some way when we perceive them. Moreover, we would need to isolate what exactly is it in sense perception that does the alleged distorting, and my colleague did not identify this.
Of course, reality does not conform to the contents of our consciousness, indiscriminate or otherwise, but omniscient observer premise logically leads to the assumption that reality would need to do so, and when it fails to, the premise is not what’s wrong, but something in our perceptual faculties is. But by what means would we know how something should appear apart from sense perception? This part is never explained, but it’s hard to understand the premise without this component: we would have to know, independently of sense perception, how things appear to then say that the senses are distorting them in some way when we perceive them. Moreover, we would need to isolate what exactly is it in sense perception that does the alleged distorting, and my colleague did not identify this.
I think what I found most disturbing in our exchange was my colleague’s unwillingness to question an assumption which he took for granted and could not defend. He’s a very intelligent person – I would say more intelligent than myself, with certificates and diplomas decorating his office wall. But I don’t think intelligence is the factor here, but rather a commitment to a notion picked up at some point in life, assumed to be true and cordoned off from inspection and challenge. It’s an attitude in spite of one’s intelligence which keeps us from reconsidering what we have learned along the way and prevents us from re-examining ideas which we have accepted as true, even though they might not in fact be true. Such an attitude will inhibit us from being the best that we can be.
by Dawson Bethrick
12 comments:
Interesting topic! I think some reluctance to question the popular notion of "senses distorting" is often tied to ideas about appropriate epistemic humility, something supposedly incompatible with an individual independently using his faculties to come to certain knowledge of reality. Could this be a concern of your colleague, subconsciously or otherwise?
J
Very thoughtful question, Jason. It’s possible that this is what’s behind my colleague’s devotion to the premise in question (we haven’t discussed the topic again). I’m skeptical that’s the case though. My suspicion is that he heard this from some source he considered authoritative and has run with it ever since, perhaps never encountering any challenge to it until our conversation. It’s almost as though he didn’t know what to do. Sometimes when we’ve accepted a position for so long and never submitted it to scrutiny, we’re essentially disarmed when we encounter objections to it. It’s easier just to dismiss challenges and try to ignore them. And considering them may require a courage we aren't willing to muster.
If he’s committed to the view that the senses distort out of epistemic humility, I would ask why he doesn’t apply the same epistemic humility to the premise itself, or to his commitment to it. Insisting on the truth of an assertion while neither (a) arguing for it nor (b) considering objections to the assertion, does not confirm the proposal that epistemic humility may be a prime driver for holding such a view. Moreover, I would think that honest epistemic humility, if it were principled, would refrain from shifting hesitancy in epistemological matters to inherent defects which presumably apply generally to all thinkers and are outside their control rather than recognizing the care needed in managing volitional aspects of knowledge acquisition and validation. Taken to its logical conclusion, it’s tantamount to a formula for giving up, and yet it’s supposedly impervious to its own implications.
Consider how this premise would play out in regard to skepticism toward induction. Skepticism is a big motivator in the history of philosophy, to the degree that many treat it as a kind of virtue. But notice how the affirmation “the senses distort” is supposed to apply generally - to everyone’s perceptual faculties. The proponent of the view is not saying, “I don’t know about you, but my senses distort. If yours don’t, I’m very happy for you!” Rather, they’re painting with the broadest brush possible – essentially saying “everyone’s senses distort!” Presumably no exceptions are allowed! But how would one know this, especially if he’s skeptical of inductive reasoning? The skeptic could not infer this generalization from limited samples, because he himself holds that such generalization is invalid or unreliable in some way. Rather, it seems to be one of those things the skeptic ‘just knows’, without any rational faculty needing to play a role in discovering and validating the premise. It’s very hard to distinguish in any real sense from an item of dogma.
Thoughts?
Regards,
Dawson
Hi Dawson,
Man, you are something else. This just blew me away:
"I then explained the premise that the senses distort the objects of our awareness implicitly assumes the vantage of an omniscient observer. It is essentially the claim to know how something appears apart from our perceiving it and to have the ability to compare how something appears apart from perceiving it to how it appears when we perceive, and then to say “Aha! See, the object really is different from what we are perceiving!” It is the claim to know how things should appear via sense perception and since they do not appear this way when we perceive them, the senses are in some way responsible for this failure."
You are the master of philosophical detection. I never picked up on this. How do you do it? You make it look easy.
And thank you for this:
"This presumption of omniscience lies at the heart of what Ayn Rand called “the prior certainty of consciousness,” namely “the concept of consciousness as some faculty other than the faculty of perception—which means: the indiscriminate contents of one’s consciousness as the irreducible primary and absolute, to which reality has to conform” (For the New Intellectual, p. 23)."
I've struggled to understand this fallacy and I didn't see the assumption of the primacy of existence in connection to it. This helps a lot. I still feel like I'm reading Peikoff's essay on the analytic-synthetic dichotomy for the first time but some lights just came on in my brain.
If I could put it in everyday language would it be right to say that the prior certainty of consciousness is like a test of consciousness but one would have to know the answers to the test in order to do the grading?
I have to go now and find a quiet place before I lose the toehold I have on this.
Thank you again,
Robert Kidd
Edit: I said primacy of existence when I meant primacy of consciousness. I did not see the connection of the primacy of consciousness to the prior certainty of consciousness. Wow, that's a lot of consciousnesses.
Robert Kidd
Hi Dawson,
I was up much of the night thinking about your post. I have a question about the prior certainty of consciousness. I understand it better after reading your post but I'm having trouble and I really want to understand this.
I'm dealing with a pressuper right now and he is claiming that the Christian worldview is the only worldview that can justify logic. I explained that the laws of logic do not need to be proved because the law of identity is axiomatic. I explained that logic presupposes the axioms and the primacy of existence and that the notion of God is a rejection of these principles. He just keeps asserting that I can not justify "my axioms" absent revelation from the Christian god.
I he assuming the prior certainty of consciousness?
I know you are busy and if you don't have the time to respond, I understand.
I'll eventually get it.
Thanks,
Robert Kidd
it was strange how quickly he became defensive, as though a raw nerve had been exposed by challenging a statement he made in passing.”
I’m convinced that his psychological state resulting from your simple question represents a phenomenon most of humanity chronically experiences owing to the absence of an objective, explicit philosophy. He very likely had epistemological trauma by the implications of being mistaken on that point - implications, as you rightly point out, would affect the entire body of our knowledge and the basic structure of human epistemology.
Since reality is an interconnected whole, the sum total of our knowledge should reflect that interconnectedness and structure. The presence of any error - especially a fundamental error like questioning perception - will eventually derail a man cognitively as he teases out its implications. Like pulling on a thread that undoes an entire garment, he likely sensed the epistemic danger of entertaining your question.
Thank you for your very kind words, Robert. I really do appreciate any time someone reads my little blog!
You asked how I do this. I don’t think I’m doing anything all that remarkable. Of course, I’ve given these matters a lot of thought over the years, and interacting with them in writing has been very helpful. But in cases like this, basically I just try to put what’s asserted or proposed into practice and see how well it holds up. If I am to suppose that the senses distort, what does this mean? Well, to know that my senses are distorting the glass of water before me, I’d have to discover this somehow. So there’s an alledged distinction here, and somehow I would need to have awareness of this distinction. I would have to know what the glass of water looks like apart from the distortion in question to know that what I’m seeing has been distorted, so how would I know what a glass of water looks like apart from being distorted? Obviously I could not know this by looking at it, because looking at it engages my senses, and the senses are alleged here to distort the objects of my awareness. So I must “know” how a glass of water really looks like by some other modality of awareness. But what is that modality of awareness? This is never explained. Rather, it’s just a background assumption that would need to be in play but is not acknowledged. I suspect that those who hold this view haven’t even considered it deeply enough to recognize that some other modality of awareness would need to be involved in order to know what they’re claiming. But they repeat it anyway.
Over the decades I’ve been involved a lot in music making. And one category of things I’ve fiddled with thousands of times is guitar pedals, including of course distortion pedals. A distortion pedal takes the input signal and subjects it to some kind of electronic manipulation – e.g., increasing its gain, clipping it, essentially modifying the sound wave. With the click of a switch, you can go from a clean, direct sound to a distorted sound. The pedals these days have all kind of knobs and settings that allow you to get some really wild sounds. But whether the distortion is very mild or full-blown overdrive, there’s an obvious difference between the clean sound and the distorted sound.
If the senses distort, however, there is no comparable mechanism to a foot switch which allows you to go from clean, direct sensory input to a distorted input, or from a distorted input back to a clean input. We’re permanently stuck in distortion mode, never having access to the clean input; we’d never even get to hear a clean input. So how would we know that a clean input even exists, let alone how it sounds? Distortion would be all that we could know.
So this is an analogue of sorts that came to mind when I considered the claim that the senses distort. I’ve worked with guitar pedals so much throughout my life, since my teenage years, that the words ‘distort’ and ‘distortion’ automatically raise associations to effect pedals in my mind at the ready. Back when I was 16 and blaring my Van Halen records, I would never have imagined the implications any of this might have for epistemology. Now I’ve lived to see the day!
Continued…
Regarding the presupper you’ve encountered…
Without knowing more about what’s behind his claims, it’s hard to know with much precision what he may be assuming. My initial guess is that he’s just mouthing something he’s picked up from other apologetic hacks (who themselves heard it from someone else). Simply stating as a matter of fact “you can’t justify logic” is not a presentation of an argument. He’s welcome to believe as he chooses. I question whether he truly believes it, or simply wants to take out his aggressions in the form of an internet debate. There are worse ways to do that. But it seems rather presumptuous to tell strangers one meets on the internet what they can or cannot do. But if he wants to play ball, here are some options.
If he says that “only Christianity can justify logic,” have him present it. Lay it all out from A to Z and let’s take a look at it. Put it on the examination table and perform a postmortem. Call his bluff. He’s given Christianity the burden, so let’s see how well it shoulders it. Don’t be surprised if he’s a bit reluctant or cagey here, because doing so will expose a lot of things that he’s probably going to want to protect.
You could acknowledge that a justification of logic is in fact a responsibility of philosophy and then ask as point of consensus whether or not he agrees that a justification of logic should have its basis in the imaginary. If he believes that appeals to something imaginary can qualify as part of a justification of logic, how would he justify this belief? If he concedes that appeals to the imaginary have no role in justifying logic, then his puffery about “the Christian worldview” instantly deflate.
Or, ask him if he believes that wishing makes it so. It’s important to get fundamentals clear in a way that most people will understand. Most people won’t have the foggiest idea what “primacy of existence” or “primacy of consciousness” means when it’s first introduced into a conversation; a survey of many attempts by apologists to interact with my writings will reveal that even when they’ve had occasion to give the matter some thought, they’ll reach for anything to distort what it means. But wishing makes it so? It’s pretty hard to wriggle out of that: either a person thinks wishing does make it so, which we can then test, or he acknowledges that wishing in fact does not make it so, in which case you can say this is a big reason why you don’t subscribe to Christianity. It’s like going for the jugular. How does he know wishing doesn’t make it so? How is the recognition that wishing doesn’t make it so at all compatible with a worldview which asserts the existence of supernatural beings whose wishing makes it so?
You can also ask where a justification of logic can be found in either the Old or New Testaments of the Christian bible, as a model of what the Christian worldview presents as a justification of logic. Where, for example, does the bible define the concept ‘logic’? What does the bible identify as its fundamental principles? If logic provides the formal structure for guiding an inference from initial premises to conclusions, where does the bible lay out this structure? If the bible does not lay this out, then what does an authentically Christian explication of logic look like, and where can it be found? Nowhere do the logic texts that I’m familiar with cite the Christian bible as an authoritative source for logic’s fundamentals, and I would be hard-pressed to know where in the Christian bible I’d need to look to settle some aspect of logic.
You can also direct the presupper to this page: Does Logic Presuppose the Christian God?.
Thanks again for the comments!
Regards,
Dawson
Hello James,
You wrote: “He very likely had epistemological trauma by the implications of being mistaken on that point…”
I actually burst out laughing when I read this… And while I would hope not, I can’t help but suspect you’re correct here. I really don’t want to alienate my colleagues. What’s curious is that we have had disagreements before, but on business matters, and we’ve never had problems settling them consensually. But since this occasion, he’s kept things very cool when I get involved. It seems that anything other than ready, uncritical agreement on the matter would have caught him off-guard, as though he just presumed that it would be inconceivable to contest the point.
You also wrote: “I’m convinced that his psychological state resulting from your simple question represents a phenomenon most of humanity chronically experiences owing to the absence of an objective, explicit philosophy.”
Again regrettably, I think this is true. Regrettably because it does seem to be the norm across all strata of society. From what I’ve observed, many people will insist on the highest quality when it comes to handbags, automobiles, sports competitions, film editing, balance sheets, software, online order fulfillment, a good day’s work, medication, packaging, olive oil, postal deliveries, etc. And they’re right to do this. But when it comes to the hygiene of their own mental habits, this concern for high quality seems to go by the wayside. Is this more of an unwitting consequence of the primacy of the outer over the inner, where quality and defects of things outside us are just easier to recognize and identify than those within our mental activity, or is it more an outcome of a morality that insists on self-sacrifice? A consistent adherence to self-sacrifice would entail an abandonment of quality in all things, not just our minds. A quality mental life just seems not to rate very high on many people’s scale of values, or its furnishing is outsourced to “experts” who apparently are entrusted to make things better with little pills. Maybe it’s partly due to parenting, since typically our parents and other family members are often our strongest role models. Or is it due in part to personality types? We all have the capacity to focus, but we also must choose what we focus on. It should be no surprise that the vast majority of people will allow themselves to be distracted by all kinds of things in their lives. Introspection, then, is likely a pursuit undertaken by a minority of persons.
Regards,
Dawson
Hi Dawson,
You had written:
“ But when it comes to the hygiene of their own mental habits, this concern for high quality seems to go by the wayside. Is this more of an unwitting consequence of the primacy of the outer over the inner, where quality and defects of things outside us are just easier to recognize and identify than those within our mental activity.”
I believe you’ve identified the issue. Short of having a systematic philosophy, one with an objective starting point that directs the mind where to begin its operations, with principles rooted in absolute facts governed by meticulous logic, etc., mental activity - even for the brightest of people - remains a blur, a
willy-nilly manipulation of whatever one happens to remember on a given topic. And since people keep their contradictions apart, they are blind to their own unprincipled reasoning.
In my business I have the pleasure of sharing ideas with highly educated people - doctors, lawyers, psychologists, therapists, entrepreneurs. But there isn’t a minute that goes by that I don’t marvel at the incoherence of their thinking. For example, a therapist client of mine will share with me how she insists that her anorexic clients question their feelings of being overweight and square them with the fact that they are slowly dying of starvation. But in the next breath she’ll defend being “gender affirmative” since these people feel at odds with their biological nature.
Another client of mine is a political wonk who reads five newspapers a day. He is a child of the 60s and graduated with a political science degree from Boston University. This man is an incredibly successful restauranteur. One day he was carrying on about some perceived injustice, so I asked him what a “right” is and from what it derives. He drew a complete blank and muttered that there are all sorts of views on that topic. The conversation ended abruptly.
He was using words as mere sounds without any concrete meaning or referent. His cognitive starting point was wholly arbitrary and mostly driven by emotions that he conflated with moral arguments. I’m convinced most adults largely use words as sounds with highly vague meanings. The primacy of emotion strikes me as the operating principle in most people. These conclusions may seem uncharitable, but they reflect my observations of the last 17 years.
Hello James,
I intended to reply to you last weekend, but my schedule has been utterly chaotic lately. I did manage to get another post staged – it will publish tomorrow.
I wanted to thank you for sharing some of your experience. Much of what you report is comparable to what I’ve observed as well.
You wrote: “Short of having a systematic philosophy, one with an objective starting point that directs the mind where to begin its operations, with principles rooted in absolute facts governed by meticulous logic, etc., mental activity - even for the brightest of people - remains a blur…”
Of course, I agree entirely with this. And as you note, I too have observed many highly intelligent, or at any rate highly educated, persons to whom the idea of an integrated philosophy is quite alien. The prevailing view, if it could be expressed in words, seems to be that philosophy is for a select group of elites, and that should satisfy it for everyone else, who are free to ignore the structures of their mental activity and their bases. Why study philosophy when you can watch Dancing with the Stars? Then again, such a view is likely unavoidable for most people, even intelligent people, given what passes for philosophy. I think many have the impression that philosophy is basically mental gibberish, and depending on what they’ve been exposed to, it may be hard to blame them for this.
A burning question for me is: what (if anything) predisposes a person to taking his own mind seriously enough to explore its content and its functions with the aim of securing in place those fundamental principles which ensure grounding in reality? I’ve known people with Ph.D’s who express practically zero interest in such an endeavor, and yet they’ve been exposed to all kinds of higher learning.
I have a family member, for instance, very intelligent and has two Ph.D’s in science, of which she’s very proud. But she’s nearly unresponsive to efforts I’ve made over the years to engage her in discussions on primary philosophy. It’s almost as though she thought philosophy is a waste of time or practically taboo subject. I don’t know what experiences may have helped generate these reactions, but I can guess. She’s adamant that psychology is more important than philosophy and this I think plays deeply in her overall deterministic view of things.
You wrote: “For example, a therapist client of mine will share with me how she insists that her anorexic clients question their feelings of being overweight and square them with the fact that they are slowly dying of starvation. But in the next breath she’ll defend being “gender affirmative” since these people feel at odds with their biological nature.”
This is just incredible, but unfortunately it’s not at all surprising. I just wonder how someone gets to such a point to begin with and how they either aren’t aware of the blatant tensions here, or how they can just block them out. I’m far too conscientious to relate. I can speculate on what motivates this kind of deep compartmentalization, but that would be just my speculation. Sometimes I think: had I not made certain critical decisions earlier in my life, that could be me. What were those critical decisions, and why did I make the decisions I made? What predisposed me to making the decisions I made? I continually come back to my recognition that the presence of contradictions vied fundamentally against my happiness, and my desire for genuine happiness in life compelled me to face important choices. Happiness is not possible without honesty.
Regards,
Dawson
Hi Dawson,
Thank you very much for your thoughts on my last post to you. I apologize that it has taken me so long to respond. I've been extraordinarily busy with work. But I see that you have a new entry up so bonus!
I ended the discussion with that presupper. In case you don't remember, his argument was that reason and logic are only justified if based on a belief in the Christian God. He was just unwilling to listen to anything I said. I worked really hard explaining why logic does not presuppose the Christian God. I explained patiently and provided arguments that he would not deal with at all. He kept asking me to justify logic. He denies anything is self-evident and that only by appealing to the Christian God could one justify anything without resorting to circular reasoning. I demonstrated that the axioms are self-evident. I patiently explained that the laws of logic are not the conclusion of a deductive argument and that their truth is known by just looking at reality so there is no chance of circularity but he would have none of it. I explained that using one's senses to perceive that there is a reality is not circular reasoning. In his view, we can't even accept what our senses bring in without "God" I did link to your essay on why the laws of logic don't presuppose God. I don't think he even read it. He was extremely evasive and I concluded that it was a waste of my valuable time.
I told him that I was happy with how things stood, that I'd met my burden of proof, and that if he denied the evidence of the senses there was nothing left to say or do but to end the discussion.
It's just amazing to me that one could believe that just by believing in a God one's arguments are magically justified where they weren't before even though nothing about them has changed.
But I wanted to thank you for taking the time to respond.
Happy writing,
Robert Kidd
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