Do Objectivists Try to "Define God out of Existence"?

In the comments section of my blog The Inherent Subjectivism of God-belief, David Parker made some interesting comments which provide me an opportunity to make some important points.

David wrote:

I really don't have a problem saying that if the Christian God exists, He does so with a subjective relationship to all of the objects He created.

At least David seems to get the argument which I presented in my blog. That’s good! Logically, then, David should have no problem with the assessment that his theism conceives of the world subjectively, for this is a direct outcome of theism. As Paul Manata once conceded, “reality is subjective” because it’s “based on the divine mind.” This statement invites problems of its own, of course, since it can only suggest that the “divine mind” on which “reality” is “based” could itself not be part of reality, which would mean that it’s not real.

Also, as I pointed out in the same blog, there are three principal expressions of the primacy of consciousness: the personal, the social and the cosmic (this latter category would include the theistic notion of a invisible supernatural über-consciousness). In the end, however, not only are all three variants of the same metaphysical perspective, the two latter variants (the social and the cosmic versions of the primacy of consciousness) ultimately reduce to the former – the personal version. That’s because the notion in question must originate somewhere, and we always find that it originates with human individuals, such as those who claim to have some means of knowledge other than reason by which they “know” what they claim. So while theists may affirm the cosmic version of the primacy of consciousness in the claims they make about their god, those claims are ultimately based on the presupposition, in one form or another, that one’s own consciousness holds metaphysical primacy over reality.

David wrote:

My problem is when Objectivists insist that what is true of human consciousness must necessarily be true of divine consciousness.

Just to be clear, this is not the Objectivist’s problem; it’s David’s problem. Also, another point of clarification is necessary here. Objectivists do not affirm the existence of “divine consciousness,” so they do not make the claim that “what is true of human consciousness must necessarily be true of divine consciousness.” Since the notion of “divine consciousness” represents a total departure from the realm of existence (as I pointed out above, even Paul Manata’s quoted statement indicates this), the concepts ‘true’ and ‘false’ do not legitimately apply. In the fake environment of the imagination, the believer can claim anything he wants is the case, for his imagination, which he enacts volitionally, calls the shots in that environment. For instance, in the case of theism, the theist can imagine a consciousness which creates its objects ex nihilo, assigns them their natures, revises them, causes them to act, etc., all at will. He can imagine a consciousness to whose intentions reality conforms itself. For the Objectivist, what the theist imagines is ultimately neither here nor there, since it’s all imaginary. Objectivists typically are not going to say, for example, that the theist needs to adhere to the primacy of existence in his imaginary scenarios.

When it comes to validating his god-belief claims, however, the theist himself cannot get around the primacy of existence, which he invokes, knowingly or not, any time he makes a truth claim. Truth necessarily presupposes the primacy of existence, for to say that some state of affairs is true is implicitly to say that it is the case whether anyone recognizes it or not, that it is the case independent of anyone’s consciousness. To claim otherwise is to say that truth has no objective basis. And to acknowledge the primacy of existence in one’s own relationship to reality while affirming the existence a consciousness which holds metaphysical primacy over reality, would only undercut any statement he makes about reality, since he is positing the existence of another consciousness, one presumably outside his own control, which could revise reality at will and without advance notice. At best, he could only make tentative assessments of reality, and these would only be as reliable as a game of chance. Typically, however, theists posture their claims with far more assuredness than their duplicitous metaphysical presuppositions could possibly allow. Either way, however, the theist makes use of a principle (the primacy of existence) while affirming the existence of something which allegedly operates on a contradictory notion (the primacy of consciousness). He is in effect borrowing from an objective orientation in order to affirm something imagined to enjoy a subjective orientation, which results in a contradiction at the most fundamental level of cognition. What justifies such contradiction? Blank out.

David quoted Ayn Rand:

… the basic metaphysical issue that lies at the root of any system of philosophy [is] the primacy of existence or the primacy of consciousness… The primacy of existence (of reality) is the axiom that existence exists, i.e., that the universe exists independent of consciousness (of any consciousness), that things are what they are, that they possess a specific nature, an identity. The epistemological corollary is the axiom that consciousness is the faculty of perceiving that which exists - and that man gains knowledge of reality by looking outward. The rejection of these axioms represents a reversal: the primacy of consciousness - the notion that the universe has no independent existence, that it is the product of a consciousness (either human or divine or both). The epistemological corollary is the notion that man gains knowledge of reality by looking inward (either at his own consciousness or at the revelations it [allegedly] receives from another, superior consciousness). Philosophy: Who Needs It, (New York: Signet, 1984), pp. 23-34.

David then quoted Eric Johnson’s review of chapter one of Leonard Peikoff’s book Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand:

Since the nature (identity) of consciousness is to be aware of reality, existence is prior to, necessary for, and not subject to the control of, consciousness. As a rephrasing of more basic axioms, the principle could be said as "It is....whether you want it to be or not.". In essence, the point is that consciousness, in and of itself (barring physical action) does not change existence.

David then stated:

Now we can both agree that with respect to humans, there is strong evidence that our consciousness cannot alter the identify of any of its objects without physical action.

Indeed, there is overwhelming evidence for this, and after studying the issue for over 16 years, I have yet to see any evidence to the contrary. I am wholly convinced that the primacy of existence is absolute, exceptionless, undefeatable. The theist may say that’s fine for me, but supposes that there are justifiable reasons for affirming the primacy of consciousness, even in the case of his god. Unfortunately, the very idea of a position having “justifiable reasons” itself assumes the primacy of existence, for it makes “an objective claim on our credence, and not as a truth created by him who utters it” (David Kelley, The Evidence of the Senses, p. 34). In essence, one would have to assume the truth of the primacy of existence in order to deny it or affirm something which allegedly defies it. The result would be a self-contradictory metaphysical viewpoint, a very poor basis for a worldview, a theory of truth, an understanding of logic, a system of values, etc.

Also, it should be pointed out that the primacy of existence does not apply only to human consciousness. The primacy of existence applies in the case of non-human animal consciousness as well. In fact, in every instance of consciousness we find in nature, the primacy of existence obtains. When a cat, a horse, a chipmunk or wolverine dies, for instance, thus no longer being conscious of the world, the world does not vanish out of existence; it goes on. Existence still exists. However, there’s nothing that will stop someone from imagining that a consciousness “outside of nature” enjoys the opposite relationship, if he’s so inclined. Unfortunately for such individuals, I have already shown how supernaturalism finds its basis in imagination and is consequently inherently subjective as well.

David continued:

But what evidence is there that this applies with respect to a divine consciousness?

Either this question is utterly irrelevant, or it’s both question-begging and fallaciously complex. First, if by “divine consciousness” one means what Rand understood by this term – essentially something imaginary (“an isolation of actual characteristics of man combined with the projection of impossible, irrational characteristics which do not arise from reality” – Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, p. 148) – then obviously the question of “what evidence is there that this applies with respect to divine consciousness” would be completely moot. If Rand is correct in her assessment of the notion of “a divine consciousness” (and I’m fully convinced she is), the Objectivist position that the universe is not the product of any consciousness – “either human or divine or both” – is unimpeachably secured.

On the other hand, if by “a divine consciousness” one has in mind something that he believes actually exists – as theists claim to believe – then David’s question is epistemically premature, for it assumes the truth of what is in question, namely the claim that “a divine consciousness” exists. In fact, David’s question seems to assume the existence of “a divine consciousness” without any attempt to establish it. In earlier discussions with David, he has pointed to arguments intended to establish the existence of such a thing (namely Alvin Plantinga’s Two Dozen (Or So) Theistic Arguments which is a set of “lecture notes” that are in places so rough that they are sometimes almost incoherent). Unfortunately, none of these arguments deal with the issue of metaphysical primacy, so they are fundamentally disadvantaged when it comes to Objectivist challenges to theism. For instance, none of Plantinga’s arguments make any attempt to reconcile the acceptance of two opposing (i.e., contradictory) metaphysical orientations, the objective (in the case of human consciousness) and the subjective (in the case of “a divine consciousness”). It’s quite possible, in fact, that theists may think there’s no need to reconcile such contradictions, even though for the theist they occur at the very foundation of his worldview. That’s probably because they haven’t given this issue much if any thought.

At any rate, before we can ask “what evidence is there that [the primacy of existence] applies with respect to a divine consciousness,” we must first ask: what evidence is there for such a thing in the first place? For if it is not possible to establish as an objective fact the existence of “a divine consciousness” in the first place, then the question of what orientation said consciousness has between itself as a subject and any objects of its awareness would be, again, completely moot. Thus David’s question is fallaciously complex, for it essentially requires us to assume that “a divine consciousness” exists in order to gather evidences pertaining to what its conscious orientation might possibly be.

Now, I know of no actually existing “divine consciousness.” I’ve heard claims about such things throughout my life, and for a while (in my misguided youth) I even tried to believe some of them. In the end, however, I made an explicit decision to be honest, and in so doing I had to confront the fact that my god-belief rested on the props of the imaginary through and through. I realized that religion captivates the believer unwittingly by invading his imagination and affecting his emotional life, thus seizing control his cognition. As a result, I eventually came to realize that theistic apologists seem wholly unable to explain how one can reliably distinguish between what they call “God” and what may really only be imaginary. This is because, as believers, their cognition has been hijacked by a series of mind-game devices which sabotage their ability to make such distinctions consistently in the first place. At one time this was my affliction, but the choice to be honest coupled with a worldview which is firmly grounded in the primacy of existence showed me the way back to reality. It’s no wonder to me why theists have such resentment for Objectivism.

Sadly, even when it is shown to theists that their god-belief is inherently subjective, they still insist that their imaginary deity exists all the same. But notice the conundrum in which the theist finds himself here. To affirm the existence of such a thing would performatively assume the truth of the primacy of existence. In effect, he is saying that his god exists whether or not anyone acknowledges its existence. I.e., he is saying that it exists independent of anyone’s conscious intensions. Thus he makes use of the primacy of existence. But then notice the nature of what he is claiming: that there exists a consciousness which enjoys precisely the opposite relationship with its objects as that which the theist’s own pronouncements performatively assume. He gives no indication of what could possibly justify such a move, but it’s clear that, to be consistent, any justification he could give would have to adhere to the primacy of existence, since he has already acknowledged that the primacy of existence applies in the case of his own conscious relationship to the world. Theists at this point typically throw their arms up and say, “Well, I have no problem with God having a subjective relationship to all the objects he’s created.” But that’s not an argument, nor is it a justification. It’s simply an autobiographical admission to intellectual default on the matter. He’s tacitly saying that, yes, there is an irresolvable contradiction here, but finds it acceptable.

David asked:

Do Objectivists just assume this and move on?

Objectivists do not believe there is such a thing in reality as “a divine consciousness” in the first place. So I doubt any of them would assume that the primacy of existence applies to “a divine consciousness,” since there is no such thing.

David then stated:

If so, then this still looks like defining God out of existence to me. Especially when one argues that God's existence is metaphysically impossible precisely because of violating said axiom.

Well, since (as I pointed out above) Objectivists are not assuming that the primacy of existence applies to “a divine consciousness” (they recognize that theism is committed to the primacy of consciousness, which is why they reject it), then the condition on which David’s conclusion here depends, does not obtain. Objectivists do not “define God out of existence,” nor are they “setting out” to do so. It’s not the case that Objectivists start out with the assumption that there is a god and then try to gerrymander their terms so that denial of its existence is plausible or justified. To accuse Objectivists of “defining God out of existence” not only construes (uncharitably, I might add) Objectivists as ungrateful housekeepers shooing a fly out of their home, it also mischaracterizes Objectivist epistemology. Objectivists see no good reason to suppose a god does exist, and they also see many reasons why the notion of a god is contrary to objective reality (such as the inherent subjectivism of theism, which I have soundly established and which David seems to accept, given his initial statement above).

I suspect David’s charge also hinges on an unfamiliarity with the Objectivist conception of possibility. While some worldviews adopt the ‘conceivability model’ of possibility (which essentially equates “possible” with “imaginable”), Objectivism holds to the objective model of possibility. (For details, see Peikoff, Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, pp. 175-179.) Quite simply, on the objective view, there is no justification for the claim that “a divine consciousness” is metaphysically possible. It’s already been shown that theism is inherently subjective, which means theism rules itself out of any objective consideration. So it’s not an act of “defining God out of existence,” but rather a consistently rational integration of the relevant data, an impeccably logical conclusion, which tells us that “a divine consciousness” is metaphysically impossible. Our conclusion is fully consistent with the primacy of existence, which we know to be true (as David concedes, “with respect to humans”), in both content (facts gleaned from reality) and methodology (by an objective process).

Meanwhile, the theist is unable to produce any validation for affirming the primacy of consciousness in his god-belief which is compatible with the primacy of existence as the proper orientation of his own consciousness. Notice, for instance, that David acknowledges the truth of the primacy of existence “with respect to humans,” which would presumably include David himself. So if it’s the case that the objects of David’s consciousness do not conform to his conscious intensions, then we can reasonably suppose that truth does not conform to David’s conscious intensions either (unless of course David is willing to admit that, on his worldview, truth has no objective basis, which would be impossible to reconcile with his admission that the primacy of existence applies “with respect to humans”). Consequently, David’s epistemology, if it is to produce reliable results, would itself have to adhere to the primacy of existence every step of the way in all his thinking. For instance, he would not be able reasonably to say his god-belief claims are true because he wants them to be true any more than he could reasonably say that reality conforms to his wishing. So how does he infer the existence of a consciousness which holds metaphysical primacy over its objects? Or does he infer it at all? This is unclear to me. When asked to identify his starting point, David responded with the statement “The Bible is the Word of God,” which could only mean that he assumes his god’s existence from the very outset. Where David objects to Objectivists for allegedly “defining God out of existence,” one could quite consider the attempt to bundle one’s god-belief into his starting point as, to quote Justin Hall, “a case of defining god into existence.” (Emphasis added)

An even greater irony which lurks behind David’s charge that Objectivists aim to “define God out of existence,” has to do with the pervasiveness of the primacy of existence in human cognition. Suppose for a moment that Objectivists do try to “define God out of existence.” What would David have against this? Could it be that it would violate the primacy of existence? Think about it: the objection that one may be “defining God out of existence” charges the accused with presuming that reality will conform to his conscious intensions. Essentially, he’s saying that the accused doesn’t want to acknowledge the existence of something and is consequently trying to “define it out of existence” on an ad hoc basis, as if reality would somehow snap into obedience and adjust itself accordingly. Now obviously, if one were to proceed on such a basis, as if reality conformed to one’s consciousness, he would be defying the primacy of existence. But what could someone who worships a consciousness which defies the primacy of existence possibly have against defiance of the primacy of existence?

For theists, the question boils down to: on what basis can we affirm a position which, like theism, assumes the metaphysical primacy of consciousness? Can we affirm this on the basis of the primacy of existence? While it is the case that we need the primacy of existence to affirm any statement as true of reality, the problem here is that the primacy of existence and the primacy of consciousness are contradictory to each other. The presence of assumptions granting metaphysical primacy to consciousness would cancel out any thoughts attempting to ground themselves on the primacy of existence. In attempting such a compromise, one would short-circuit his own thinking by undercutting any claim to objectivity. So this wouldn’t work. Could we affirm such a position on the basis of the primacy of consciousness? But we already know that the primacy of existence applies in human cognition. Unfortunately, the theist is stuck here. There is no escape.

by Dawson Bethrick

How Theism Violates the Primacy of Existence

Introduction

Recognizing the antithesis between the primacy of existence and the primacy of consciousness is a virtue for which only Objectivism seems prepared to equip a person, while other philosophies tend to ignore or evade the matter. Objectivism is the only philosophy that I know of which not only identifies the primacy of existence explicitly as a fundamental philosophical concern, but which also purposefully develops its metaphysics, epistemology, morality and politics in a manner consistent with the primacy of existence as an ultimate guiding principle.

Occasionally I am asked, by atheists and theists alike, why I would say that theism violates the primacy of existence. That theism does in fact violate the primacy of existence is so obvious to me that it is puzzling that anyone would need to have it explained. But then I realize that, for many years now, I’ve understood the issue of metaphysical primacy and its implications for theism and every other position under the sun, and not everyone else benefits from this understanding. It is this understanding that I wish to share with my readers.

To understand why theism violates the primacy of existence, we must first understand what is meant by the primacy of existence. And in order to appreciate fully what the primacy of existence means, we must understand the issue of metaphysical primacy.

The Issue of Metaphysical Primacy

The issue of metaphysical primacy has to do with the relationship between consciousness and its objects. Since all philosophy involves consciousness relating to objects (either real or imagined), the issue of metaphysical primacy bears on all philosophical principles, viewpoints and initiatives. Because consciousness is involved throughout the establishment and development of philosophical principles, the relationship between consciousness and its objects is not some sidebar distraction or marginal curiosity of trivial interest. Ignoring the relationship between consciousness is not an option for serious thinkers, especially once the question of the proper orientation of this relationship has been raised.

Essentially, the issue of metaphysical primacy asks:

What holds metaphysical primacy in the relationship between a consciousness and its objects: the subject of consciousness, or the objects of consciousness?

For a moment, some may entertain the notion that this question is fallaciously complex, perhaps supposing that it assumes a false dichotomy. Why suppose that either the subject of consciousness or its objects must hold metaphysical primacy? Can’t both be metaphysical equals? Can’t both the subject of consciousness and its objects enjoy metaphysical primacy, just as two individuals taking a test can both score 100% on it?

Such questions may imply that the subject of consciousness and its objects are locked in some sort of contest, with one side vying against the other, and that the issue of metaphysical primacy is an attempt to pick a winner among the two contestants arbitrarily. Either that, or they simply ignore the root of the matter that the issue of metaphysical primacy is getting at, namely identifying the proper relationship between a subject and its objects.

It is an undeniable fact that a subject is distinct from the objects of its awareness: a subject and its objects are not one and the same – the two are engaged in a relationship. Consciousness is consciousness of an object. Also, a subject does not switch sides with the objects of its awareness, as if they could trade places at will and reverse the natural orientation between the one and the other. When you perceive a rock, a chair, or the Golden Gate Bridge, you cannot suddenly become that rock or chair or bridge and look back at yourself as a perceiver. Consciousness is consciousness of an object(s), and the orientation between consciousness and its object(s) is uni-directional, and there’s no reversing this orientation. A person cannot transfer his consciousness to his objects, such that he becomes the object of his consciousness, and the subject of his consciousness is now what used to be its object. The relationship between a subject and its objects is contextually static.

Additionally, the relationship between a subject and its objects is not a relationship of equals. The subject is distinct from its objects, and the subject has certain abilities and capacities which its objects qua objects do not have in the context of their relationship together, even if some of those objects happen to be other conscious individuals (i.e., other persons). When you perceive a mountain or pair of scissors, it is you as the subject who is perceiving these objects. In the context of this relationship, the subject attends to its objects.

Another option, chosen (albeit implicitly) by most philosophies, is to suppose that the subject of consciousness holds metaphysical primacy over its objects. This is known as the primacy of consciousness, or as the primacy of the subject metaphysics, since it grants metaphysical primacy to the subject of consciousness over its objects. This is the view that the objects of consciousness conform to the subject of consciousness, that the subject of consciousness holds the “upper hand” in its relationship with the objects of its awareness. The primacy of consciousness entails that the objects of one’s awareness depend in some way on the subject of awareness, either for their very existence (e.g., the subject of consciousness creates them, either from existing material or “ex nihilo”), for their identity (e.g., the subject of consciousness makes its objects of its awareness what they are), and/or for their capacity to act (e.g., the subject of consciousness controls what its objects do or can do). An attempt to apply the primacy of consciousness consistently would involve all three aspects, holding that objects are created by an act of consciousness, that their identities are assigned to them based on choices made by the creating consciousness, and that the abilities or “potentialities” possessed by objects are given to those objects by a ruling consciousness. (Sound familar?)

The final option (as if it were avertible) is the primacy of existence. Where the primacy of consciousness holds that the subject of consciousness calls all the shots with respect to the existence, identity and/or causal potentiality of its objects, the primacy of existence is the recognition that existence exists independent of consciousness, that the objects of one’s consciousness are what they are independent of conscious activity, that the task of consciousness is neither to create the objects of its awareness, assign identities to them, nor dictate what they can or cannot do, but to perceive and identify its objects. While the primacy of consciousness holds that the objects conform to consciousness, the primacy of existence is the recognition that objects do not conform to consciousness. The primacy of existence is the recognition that the objects of one’s awareness exist independent of one’s awareness of them, that the things one perceives are what they are regardless of what he would prefer or wish them to be.

I agree entirely with Porter when he states:

I think the primacy of existence is the most important issue in philosophy. I think it’s the real axiom of Objectivism. (Ayn Rand’s Theory of Knowledge, p. 198)

The difference between the primacy of existence and the primacy of consciousness, is the difference between objectivity and subjectivism. The primacy of existence is the recognition that the objects of consciousness exist and are what they are independent of the conscious activity by which the subject is aware of them, and thus represents the objective orientation between a subject and its objects. The primacy of consciousness is essentially a fantasy which seeks to reverse the proper orientation between a subject and its objects, attributing to the subject the power to conform its objects to its intentions, either for their very existence (the subject “creates” its own objects), for their natures (the subject “assigns” its objects their identity), and/or for their activity (the subject “controls” what its objects do). This represents the subjective orientation between a subject and its objects.

Theism and Metaphysical Primacy

One of my readers asked the following:

I understand the primacy of existence as objects of consciousness hold primacy over the subjects and the primacy of consciousness affirming the opposite. But I do not see the problem in affirming that existence exists, existence has metaphysical primacy and that God exists. Where lies the violation in asserting that existence exists and so does God?

Questions such as this suggest to me that the one posing it either does not really grasp what the issue of metaphysical primacy deals with, or that he is not integrating what the issue of metaphysical primacy addresses with what theism entails.

Even though many theists do not explicitly identify consciousness as one of the primary characteristics which they attribute to their god (many defenders of theism gravitate to higher abstractions when speaking of their god, such as aseity, cotermineity of their god’s being with its self-consciousness, immutability, infinity, unity, etc.), it is clear from what they say about their god that they do in fact hold it to be a conscious being. In fact, they typically tend to take the assumption that their god is conscious completely for granted, for it is vital to just about everything else they claim about their god. According to what theists say, their god knows, sees, judges, gets angry, expresses joy, loves, commands, plans, determines, experiences pleasure, wishes, etc. All these actions are actions requiring consciousness. Indeed, it would be quite unusual if a theist were to affirm a god which performs all these actions but which is not at the same time conscious of anything. Christian apologists of the Vantillian tradition emphatically dismiss rival religions for not consistently embracing what they call a “personal” deity, i.e., a deity which is self-aware. A non-conscious deity would be what they call an “impersonal” being (cf. John Frame, Apologetics to the Glory of God, p. 34f).

Since theism entails belief in a deity which is conscious, the question raised by the issue of metaphysical primacy has us focus on the relationship between the deity as a conscious subject, and any objects it is said to be conscious of (either by perception or by some other means). When we consider the orientation which theism attributes to the relationship between its god as a conscious subject and any objects it is said to be conscious of, the question becomes:

Does this relationship resemble the primacy of existence, or the primacy of consciousness?

Simply stating that the deity in question possesses consciousness, is not enough to answer this question. We need more information. We need to know more about what theists say about their god. Statements like the following indicate in no uncertain way the orientation which theists have in mind for their god in its relationship as a subject of consciousness to any objects it is supposedly aware of:

Christianity holds that God is the creator of every fact... God’s thought is placed back of every fact. (Cornelius Van Til, Christian Theistic-Evidences, p. 88; quoted in Bahnsen, Van Til’s Apologetic: Readings & Analysis, p. 378)

God wills, that is, creates the universe. God wills, that is, by his providence controls the course of development of the created universe and brings it to its climax. (Cornelius Van Til, “Apologetics,” 1959)

We now know that the world exists simply because God wills it. (Cornelius Van Til, “The Election of All Men in Christ,” The Great Debate Today, 1970)

Fact: God willed the universe into being. Fact: He willed the universe into being by simply speaking it into existence instantaneously. References: Psalm 33:6,9 Psalm 148:5 Hebrews 11:3 Thought: He did not have to speak in order to create, but He did. God could have just thought the universe into being. Instead, He spoke it into being. He used His word to create. (Lesson 6: The Seven Days of Creation: A Deeper Study of Gen. 1:1 to 2:3)

God is Creator of everything, this vast universe. All was created by His Word. He spoke it into being. It is written: (Genesis 1:3) And God said... and it was so. His Word is powerful... God's Word spoke the universe into being. His Word is powerful beyond our comprehension. (Terrell Smith, What Do Christians Believe?)

All things came into being through the will of God. It was God's pleasure that the universe and everything in it be created. (Mike Scott, Can you explain why God created the universe?)

God's will is the final and exclusively determinative power of whatsoever comes to pass. The nature of any created thing is what it is because of an act of determination in relation to it on the part of God. (Jack Cottrell, Sovereignty and Free Will)

God is active in history by definition of who He is, He has created everything and is present with it, controls it, and exercises authority over it to reveal Himself to the praise of His glorious grace. Every fact, and therefore every fact of history, is a fact created by Christ for Christ. (Chris Bolt, “Redemption in Apologetics,” The Portable Presuppositionalist, p. 180)

Every fact is what it is because God has said it is what it is. (Ibid., p. 162)

Clearly, not only is the “God” characterized by these and similar statements supposed to be a conscious being (possessing a will, capable of thought, able to speak, etc.), these descriptions unmistakably grant metaphysical primacy to the consciousness of “God” over any objects it is said to be aware of. It “creates” its objects by simply willing them into existence, its “thought” is “placed back of every fact,” its intentions “control” everything it is conscious of, etc.

"Dude, Where’s the Violation?"

I'll show you.

Since any claim about reality implicitly affirms the primacy of existence (the recognition that existence exists independent of consciousness), any assertion that a god exists performatively contradicts itself by virtue of its implicit affirmation of the primacy of existence on the one hand (as a precondition for intelligibly making any statement about reality) and the primacy of consciousness on the other (as the fundamental orientation entailed by theism in the subject-object relationship).

In response to the question “Where lies the violation in asserting that existence exists and so does God?”, recall the the point I made in my blog The Axioms and the Primacy of Existence, namely that the axiom of existence ("existence exists") is "not the only axiom, that it is not a recognition that remains isolated from other recognitions." To say "existence exists" implies the axiom of consciousness, for one would have to be conscious in order to say this. Affirming both the axiom of existence and the axiom of consciousness in turn implicitly affirms the primacy of existence: Existence exists independent of consciousness.

So in making the statement “existence exists and so does God,” one is in fact declaring “existence exists independent of consciousness, and so does this consciousness upon which existence depends,” which is a direct self-contradiction. It affirms on the one hand, explicitly, that existence exists independent of consciousness (of any consciousness), and on the other – in the very same breath – it affirms the existence of a consciousness on which existence depends. For as we saw in the quotes above, “God” is characterized as a consciousness which creates all existence distinct from itself by an act of will. Thus not only does this position affirm a contradiction at the level of metaphysical primacy, it also leads to the irresolvable problem of divine lonesomeness.

Theists who resist this criticism can test it for themselves. Let them ask themselves the following question:

When you affirm that your god exists, are you presupposing that your god exists independent of your own consciousness? Or, are you saying that your god exists only as a feature of your own psychology, as a figment of your imagination, that the existence of “God” ultimately depends on your own consciousness?

Typically theists can be expected to affirm the former of the two: that their god is an independently existing being, that its existence does not depend on the theist’s or any other “creature’s” awareness, knowledge, feelings, imagination, that it has its own will and makes its own choices, etc. In this way, theists are making use of the primacy of existence in the very affirmation of their god’s existence: they are attempting to make a statement about reality which supposedly obtains independent of their own conscious activity. Thus they implicitly assume the primacy of existence by simply affirming the alleged truth of their god-belief.

But what is it that they are affirming? They are affirming the existence of a consciousness upon which existence depends. In other words, in the very content of the god-belief claims which they assert, they are affirming the primacy of consciousness – the very opposite of the primacy of existence, a principle which they need in order to make their god-belief claims sensible by any measure.

In this way, theists are directly contradicting themselves whenever they affirm their god’s existence. They implicitly affirm the primacy of existence in the very act of asserting their god-belief claims, and they expressly affirm the primacy of consciousness in the very content of their god-belief claims.

The Book of Evasions

In an exchange between myself and presuppositionalist Chris Bolt (see the comments section of my blog Can the Water in My Drinking Glass Turn into Merlot?), I had asked him if he disputes the truth of the Objectivist axioms, which I listed specifically for him to see.

In contemplating the axiom of existence, Bolt stated:

Do I believe that something exists? Yes, God exists, for example.

When I wrote in my blog Chris Bolt on Hume and Induction in response to Bolt’s statement, pointing out that

just by saying ‘God exists,’ Bolt performatively contradicts himself. He makes use of the primacy of existence while affirming a claim which denies the primacy of existence.

Bolt responded in a comment accusing me of “begging the question with respect to the truth of the Objectivist worldview.”

But Bolt is mistaken here. As I explained, I am simply being consistent with the Objectivist worldview, noting that “the only alternative to Objectivism, is some sort of subjectivism.” I cited presuppositionalism’s own champion, Greg Bahnsen, to help him understand. Bahnsen states:

”Circularity” in one’s philosophical system is just another name for “consistency” in outlook throughout one’s system. That is, one’s starting point and final conclusion cohere with each other. (Van Til’s Apologetic: Readings & Analysis, p. 170n.42)

I do not expect that Bolt would disagree here, and in his comments, he expressed no disagreement with this so far as I could see. Certainly I don’t think he would think that I should be inconsistent with my position. Indeed, if I had stated that Bolt was not performatively contradicting himself when he says “God exists,” he could then legitimately accuse me of being inconsistent with my worldview’s fundamentals. But in stating this recognition, I am in no way “begging the question,” as should be clear from the points which I have presented above.

Bolt did give a reason why he thinks I am wrong to point out the self-contradiction in the claim “God exists.” Indeed, he stated that my objection

takes the ‘primacy of existence’ and attempts to apply it to a foreign worldview.

But this, too, is mistaken. Bolt seeks to evade my critique of theism from the primacy of existence by arguing that the concept of the primacy of existence is “foreign” to Christianity. While it is true that the primacy of existence is “foreign” to Christian thought (indeed, this is a significant admission on Bolt's part), this fact by itself does nothing to diminish the pertinence of my critique. Even Bolt must realize that consciousness is real and that there is a relationship between consciousness and its objects, regardless of the specifics of one’s particular belief system. A belief system is something one holds in his consciousness. So just by acknowledging that one has a belief system, he is admitting to the fact that he possesses the faculty of consciousness.

As we saw above, the issue of metaphysical primacy seeks to identify the proper orientation between the subject of consciousness and its objects. Unless Bolt denies the reality of consciousness, he must surely recognize that there is a relationship between consciousness and its objects, since consciousness is consciousness of some thing, whether he believes in a god or not. Belief in the Christian god – since it requires consciousness (belief being an activity performed by consciousness) – does not exempt one’s consciousness from its need for an object, nor does it provide an escape from the fact that consciousness implies a relationship between itself and its objects.

So the “you’re arguing from a foreign worldview” objection fails, since there is no such thing as a consciousness without anything to be conscious of. As Ayn Rand pointed out:

a consciousness with nothing to be conscious of is a contradiction in terms. (Atlas Shrugged, Galt’s Speech)

Unless Mr. Bolt wants to embrace a contradiction in terms, he must acknowledge that consciousness naturally has an object. And if he acknowledges that consciousness has an object, then he must acknowledge that there is a relationship between consciousness and its object – that consciousness is consciousness of an object. And if he acknowledges this, he must acknowledge that there is a proper orientation between consciousness and its objects, that since consciousness is consciousness of an object, the object of consciousness holds metaphysical primacy over consciousness: it is what it is independent of conscious activity. A rock is what it is independent of one’s knowledge of it; an event occurred even if someone does not know about it; a person is who he is regardless of how others judge him. Even a Christian would say that his god exists even if no one believes in it, wouldn’t he?

That’s the primacy of existence. By supposing that something exists and is what it is even if people don’t believe it, an individual is informing his supposition with the primacy of existence.

There is no escape from this, because there is no escape in human cognition from the facts that consciousness is consciousness of an object and that there is a relationship between consciousness and its objects. The “foreign worldview” retort is a dodge that simply does not and cannot succeed. To invoke it is to assume the truth of the primacy of existence: it is an attempt to identify the state of affairs as they are supposed to exist independent of anyone’s wishing, emotions, protestations, errors in judgment, evasions, etc. The retort itself makes use of the very principle it is trying to dismiss.

Bolt also stated:

Perhaps more importantly, there is no explanation here of how affirming that God exists denies the primacy of existence.

Apparently Bolt had not availed himself to any of the items in the reading list which I provide below (all of which had been written and posted either to my blog or to my website well before he made his comment). He also now has the points which I made above to help him understand.

Related reading:

The Primacy of Existence: A Validation

The Axioms and the Primacy of Existence

Theism and Subjective Metaphysics

The Inherent Subjectivism of God-Belief

A Reply to Tenant on Theistic Foundationalism vs. the Objectivist Axioms

Dodging the Subject-Object Relationship

Confessions of a Vantillian Subjectivist

God and Square Circles

Bahnsen on “Knowing the Supernatural”

The Cartoon Universe of Christianity

The Argument from Metaphysical Primacy: A Debate

by Dawson Bethrick

Presuppositionalism, Atheism, and Confusion over the Primacy of Existence

It is not uncommon for me to find even intelligent adult thinkers confused over the primacy of existence. In fact, confusion over this fundamental principle is a norm among those who are not familiar with Objectivism. It’s even worse for those who have heard about the primacy of existence from sources other than Objectivists who know what they’re talking about, sources which may in fact be hostile toward Objectivism for whatever reason. Sometimes this confusion is occasioned in thinkers who are otherwise well-meaning but have learned the expression “primacy of existence” from non-Objectivists who themselves do not understand what it means or its implications for knowledge.

Anyone who examines the entries I have published on my blog over the years, going back to March 2005 – nearly 10 years ago now – will find many posts that deal directly with the primacy of existence, how it is fundamental to human cognition, and how it is incompatible with theism.

In a Youtube video titled Why the Primacy of Existence is No Problem for Any Presuppositionalist, video blogger Ozymandias Ramses II (to whom I shall refer as simply “Ozy” from here on out) makes some startling statements intended to support what the title of his video affirms.

Dawson's Razor

I think it may be beneficial for readers to have a specific blog post on what I have come to call “Dawson’s razor.” So in this entry I cull together some pointers to help make clear what exactly this principle means, why it is important, and how it can be used.

In philosophy, a “razor” is “a principle or premise that allows one to eliminate unlikely explanations for a phenomenon” (per Wikipedia.org).

The most famous example is Occam’s razor, the principle which states “that among competing hypotheses, the hypothesis with the fewest assumptions should be selected.”

The Axioms and the Primacy of Existence

As I mentioned in my previous post, I have much to say in response to many of the points that Paul Manata raised in his 4 Nov. diatribe against me. In this post, I focus on Paul's misunderstanding of the relationship between the axioms and the primacy of existence principle.

A Failure to Integrate

One of Paul's attempts to argue against Objectivism's affirmation of the primacy of existence principle is that the axiom of existence is not sufficent to support it. He presents this argument early on in the second section of his blog (point 5 under the heading "The More Substantive"), and must think it's very effective because he comes back to it over and over throughout the rest of his post.

He writes:

“Things exist” does not tell us that “things exist independent of any consciousness.” There’s no logical rule by which that inference can be made. Indeed, Piekoff [sic] tells us that “things exist” does not tell us anything about the nature of the things that exist.” Therefore, if “things exist” does not tell us ANYTHING about the nature of the things that exist it cannot; therefore, tell us that they are the kind of things that “exist independent of consciousness.” Same goes with his claim that thiese “axioms” tell us that “consciousness did not create reality.”

To those who are not very familiar with Objectivism, Paul's inference here may seem pretty devastating in that he seems to have found the exception to Objectivism's absolutism that theism needs to squeeze its gangrenous way into a rational worldview. To the untutored, it very well may appear that Paul has found Objectivism's Achilles' heel.

However, contrary to his apologetic intentions, the argument that Paul offers here does not refute anything that Objectivism teaches, or any criticism that I have raised against theism. As an attempt to criticize Objectivism, it commits the fallacy of context-dropping and serves as a prime example of what happens when one fails to integrate. It must be remembered that the axiom of existence, about which Paul is attempting to make his point, is only one of several axioms, and that Objectivism does not affirm the axiom of existence in the contextual vacuum that Paul’s concern here assumes. The axioms are our most fundamental recognitions made explicit. However, Objectivism nowhere proposes that the mind stops with any one of these recognitions, or that the axioms serve as a substitute for further knowledge that we may acquire about the world. On the contrary, they provide an anchor for knowledge, a foundation upon which to build our knowledge, not an escape from knowledge.

Now it is important to keep in mind that the axiom of existence is not the only axiom, that it is not a recognition that remains isolated from other recognitions. The act of recognizing the fact that existence exists begins a series of recognitions; it does not bring the mind to a halt. The recognition that “things exist” does not by itself indicate the relationship between what is perceived and the means by which it is perceived, because the mind that is doing the recognizing hasn’t gotten there yet; the discovery of consciousness is still to come. Once the mind recognizes both facts - that there are things and that it is aware of those things - then there’s a relationship to be grasped. This is the point that Paul’s argument fails to factor in, namely the axiom of consciousness. There is also the axiom of identity, which is implicit in both recognitions, that things exist and that one is aware of things that exist; it tells us that there is a distinction between what we perceive and the means by which we perceive it. Together the axioms of existence, identity and consciousness set the stage that subsequent knowledge requires by identifying the constants which apply throughout all knowledge and providing the mind with an explicit recognition of the fact that there is a fundamental distinction between what is perceived and the action of perceiving it, between what is known and the process by which it is known, between the object of cognition and the subject of cognition. Throughout the history of philosophy, there are many persisting errors which have resulted from a failure to grasp the nature of this distinction and understand its implications for knowledge and epistemology. Many still persist to this day, and the religious view of the world is definitely one of the more obvious ones.

The Initial Recognition Inaugurates Cognition

In the above statement, Paul alluded to a statement by Dr. Leonard Peikoff. Let’s look at what he writes. He writes:

The axiom [of existence] does not tell us anything about the nature of existents; it merely underscores the fact that they exist. (OPAR, p. 4)

This statement comes at the end of a primary point that Peikoff is establishing early in his discussion of philosophy:

We start with the irreducible fact and concept of existence – that which is. The first thing to say about that which is is simply: it is. As Parmenides in ancient Greece formulated the principle: what is, is. Or, in Ayn Rand’s words: existence exists. (“Existence” here is a collective noun, denoting the sum of existents.) This axiom does not tell us anything about the nature of existents; it merely underscores the fact that they exist. (Ibid)

Peikoff begins by addressing our need for a cognitive starting point: where do we begin? Objectivism holds that the fact that existence exists – the fact that there are things that exist – is irreducible, both metaphysically and conceptually. Theists who try to square their theism with Objectivist principles by qualifying their creationism with the footnote that their god is not supposed to have created itself, are in effect simply trying to assimilate this fact into their worldview, even though their worldview nowhere comes to grips with the issue of metaphysical primacy. However, they rightly sense that the fact that existence exists is undeniable and absolute. But even if they try to assimilate select Objectivist principles into their mystical concoctions, theists are still typically reluctant to identify the Objectivist axioms as their fundamental starting point. They want to have their cake, and they want to eat it, too. They want the respectability and dignity of affirming absolute reality, but they want the fantasy of their imaginations to be taken seriously as well. This never works because there is a fundamental distinction between reality and fantasy; the two will never be on the same par.

Paul’s argument here, however, is part of an effort to defang Objectivism’s ability to criticize theism. His concern is not to come to grips with the subject-object relationship and its implications for philosophy and knowledge, but to save an uninhabitable shack that has already burned to the ground (as well as a little face). He argues that, if the axiom of existence does not make any statement about the nature of what exists, then one cannot draw from this one axiom the conclusion that whatever does exist, exists independent of consciousness. But no one is suggesting that such a conclusion follows from this single axiom. (Indeed, where did he get the concept ‘consciousness’ if this axiom has not been reached yet?) So far as I know, he is not criticizing anything that has actually been endorsed. As I pointed out above, the axiom of existence is only the first of several axioms, it begins a series of recognitions, and it does not remain isolated in some contextual vacuum; to grasp the relationship between what exists and the means by which one is aware of it (consciousness), you need both concepts. But Paul's argument ignores this need. No Objectivist has suggested that we affirm the axiom of existence and then halt our knowledge-gathering there and try to wring all kinds of conclusions from this single, isolated recognition.

In fact, Paul is way off when he complains not to have found a "logical rule by which that inference can be made." That is, he wants to see a formal proof of the primacy of existence principle. But if that's what he's looking for, then he obviously hasn't been paying attention. The primacy of existence is a fundamental precondition of proof. Proof is a cognitive exercise, and so involves a subject and an object, and therefore requires both to already be enjoined in the proper relationship with each other. The primacy of existence is the proper relationship between subject and object that rational operations assume and require, and is thus preconditional to logical inference and formal proof.

But in spite of these facts, Paul still misconstrues what Peikoff (and I) have been saying. Observe:

If we don’t know ANYTHING (per Piekoff [sic] and Bethrick) about the nature of the existents then we don’t know that their nature is such that it is necessarily uncreated.

But we do know many things about the nature of the existents we encounter, because we discover things about them. Again, the mind does not stop with the axiom of existence, nor does this axiom say that we never learn more about the objects of our awareness than merely that they exist. Peikoff is not alleging that “we don’t know ANYTHING... about the nature of the existents” we encounter; he's just saying that our initial recognition of their existence does not tell us all the details about the nature of what exists. This discovery is subsequent to the initial recognition. There is nothing inconsistent between the facts that we recognize that there are objects on the one hand, and on the other that we discover data about those objects as we investigate them. Again, Paul fails to integrate the various points belonging to the position he’s trying to criticize. But it is interesting to note that Paul's statement here indicates that he realizes that the Christian worldview assumes the primacy of consciousness metaphysics, for he's obviously looking for a way to side-step the primacy of existence. It's true - the primacy of consciousness is the lifeline of Christianity.

The Axioms Work Together

Now consider: if a consciousness’s first act is to recognize that things exists, it makes no more sense to suppose that this initial recognition would provide it with total knowledge of the nature of the things it perceives than it does to suppose that the act of being aware of those things brings them into existence in the first place. That’s why Peikoff states what I quoted above. However, a mind does not need to know all the specific details about an object that it perceives in order for it to recognize that it exists and that it exists independent of the process by which it is aware of it. On the contrary, it would recognize that it exists before continuing on to discover what it is, should it choose to investigate further. Together the axioms of existence and identity and consciousness underscore the independent existence of objects by making the distinction between the objects of cognition and the processes of cognition explicit. Hence there is a distinction, there is a relationship, and since this relationship is involved in every act of consciousness (since every act of consciousness involves a consciousness conscious of some object), understanding the nature of that relationship, specifically the orientation between subject and object, is vital to an understanding of knowledge (though many philosophers throughout history have ignored it). Without this understanding, we would have at best a haphazard, unsure footing providing a hit-and-miss epistemology which would be ever prone to confusing fact with sheer imagination. And that is precisely what religion provides; it fails to deliver a rational epistemology because it confuses the relationship between subject and object at the fundamental level of knowledge and elevates imagination above reality, reason and man’s epistemological needs.

Now consider: for us to acquire any knowledge about the nature of any thing that exists, that thing would at the very minimum have to exist. And for us to acquire awareness of it, it would already have to exist. In other words, its existence would have to precede our awareness of it for awareness to be possible. How can you be aware of something that does not exist? Blank out. Additionally, since cognition is a process by which data is gathered from what we perceive (where what we perceive is the object), cognition does not add anything to the nature of an object. We can think anything we want about an object, and it will remain what it is. For instance, if I see a bottle that was manufactured in Atlanta, Georgia, my supposing that it was manufactured in Montréal, Canada will not alter the fact that it was actually manufactured in Atlanta, Georgia. Why? Because of the primacy of existence: the task of cognition is to identify reality, not to create or alter it. Objectivism recognizes all these facts in one sweeping principle: the primacy of existence - the fact that existence exists independent of consciousness.

The Primacy of Existence as the Foundation to Knowledge

Notice how this principle is integral to the concepts 'true', 'false', 'error', 'correct', 'incorrect', etc. Because cognition requires some object(s), and the data which informs cognition about an object must be gathered from the object by some process performed by the subject, and because it is possible to misidentify the nature of an object, we need a set of principles which guide the mind through the process by which it identifies what exists. The primacy of existence is the front line in the struggle for correct identification of objects, and therefore the fundamental principle of knowledge. Since our efforts to acquire knowledge of the world can result in error, we need a set of principles to guide us toward error-free results. Obviously a principle which states "reality is whatever one wishes it to be" will not suffice, for reality does not conform to wishing. Why? Because existence holds metaphysical primacy over conscious intentions. Should not a theory of knowledge recognize why reality does not conform to wishing? Objectivism holds that a theory of knowledge should do this. Other theories hold what amounts to "Who cares? Such truths are so obvious they do not interest us!" And those who have been paying attention have seen the results.

Above I gave an example of how the primacy of existence principle provides the foundation to truth and knowledge. The bottle in my example was in fact manufactured in Atlanta, Georgia. This is a fact. It does not depend on my knowing it. Nor does it require my consent, my approval, even my discovery. It was a fact before I discovered it. It would be a fact even if I never discovered it. I could even deny it once I did discover it, but it will still be a fact that the bottle was manufactured in Atlanta and not somewhere else. Essentially speaking, the fact obtains independent of my consciousness. My consciousness does not have the power to alter this fact. I cannot, for instance, wish that it were not the case that the bottle was manufactured in Atlanta and revise reality by so wishing. Due to the nature of my consciousness and the orientation between it and its objects, facts do not conform to my consciousness. On the contrary, my consciousness works properly only if it conforms to the facts, specifically by acknowledging them as facts which obtain independent of my conscious functions. Facts are the data we gather from the objects we perceive, and the objects are what they are independent of our perception of them. According to the primacy of existence principle, our perception of them does not alter the objects which we perceive. Nor do other conscious functions. Since my consciousness cannot alter the objects of my awareness, my consciousness does not originate the data which I gather from those objects. They are, therefore, absolute. And this is where truth gets the surety of its content - from the absolutism of facts, which is a corollary of the primacy of existence.

Christianity vs. the Primacy of Existence

Now, Christians tell me that they have awareness of a being which has a conscious ability not only to alter facts in a way that I cannot, but also create them out of nothing as well. It can do this, they claim, because its consciousness - quite unlike my consciousness - has the power to conform reality to its will. Essentially, they are claiming that this consciousness enjoys the exact opposite relationship that my consciousness has in respect to its objects. Where my consciousness can only perceive and identify the objects which I discover and which exist independent of my consciousness, this being that Christians tell me about essentially has the power to wish its objects into existence from nothing - "ex nihilo" in their words. Their god wished that the universe exists, and POOF! - it exists, just like that. It's a neat trick I'd love to witness sometime.

Paul's concern is to protect his belief in such a being, and thus seems to resist Objectivism precisely for making these distinctions explicit and incorporating them into a system-wide, fundamental principle. Does Paul not realize that there is a distinction between a thing that exists and the cognitive process by which we acquire knowledge of that thing's nature? Does Paul deny that there is such a distinction? Or, does he think it's not philosophically important? In other words, does he think knowledge can still have an objective basis if one ignores any distinction between the object of knowledge and the processes by which that knowledge is obtained? On occasion, he has suggested that such recognitions are not "interesting," as if this were supposed to constitute an argument challenging their truth, importance or fundamentality. But if knowledge is the product of a cognitive process, and there is a fundamental, absolute distinction between the object of knowledge and the cognitive process by which we acquire knowledge of it, then how could this distinction be untrue, unimportant or non-fundamental? Paul does not say. Instead, his protestations suggest that he wants to defy their implications in order to protect something. What does he want to protect? Indeed, he wants to protect the blurring of this distinction which is central to his worldview from being exposed. This is one of the primary reasons why Paul resents Objectivism: it spoils his fantasy.

Validating the Primacy of Existence

So what does tell us that the primacy of existence is true? Objectivism’s answer to this is that our conscious interaction with the objects of our awareness tells us this on a constant basis; we merely need to attend to it if we are going to grasp it. A simple experiment is sufficient to settle any disputes on the matter. If the objects of consciousness depended on consciousness, then one should be able to alter the objects of his awareness at will. That is what the primacy of consciousness holds: that the objects of consciousness depend on the functions of consciousness in order to exist, in order to be what they are, in order to be anything at all. It holds that consciousness has the final say on what exists and what is true. (Sound familiar?) The objects of such a consciousness would conform to whatever that consciousness desired, expected, or commanded of them. A simple experiment is sufficient to show whether or not this is the case, and anyone can try it.

In this experiment, just find any object in your immediate awareness and focus your attention on it. Any object will do. Right now I’m looking at an ordinary paperclip that’s sitting on my desk. It is a single continuous wire bent round three times into its pristine manufactured shape, about one and a half inches long, steel-colored, and by all accounts a normal paperclip. This is the object that I see. But now I begin to exercise my consciousness in regard to the paperclip, to see what effect it will have on it. First I begin imagining the wire of the paperclip to unfold itself, straightening itself out. In my imagination I can "see" this happening, but the paperclip sitting on my desk remains in the shape it had when I first looked at it. My imagining had no effect on it. Now I make a wish: that the wire of the paperclip straighten itself out. It remains motionless, still folded into its paperclip shape. My wishing had no effect on it. (Perhaps I didn't wish hard enough?) Now I command it: “I command thee to unfold thyself!” I say in a loud booming voice. The paperclip stubbornly defies my command, which has no effect on the paperclip whatsoever. Then I simply deny that the paperclip is not simply a straight piece of wire, without any curves from end to end. This too, has no effect. The paperclip remains just as it was when I first looked at it. I can do this all day long, varying my imagination, wishing, commands and other conscious functions. But what will remain constant throughout? What remains constant is the relationship my consciousness has with the paperclip: the primacy of existence. The object of my consciousness does not conform to the dictates of my consciousness. This is inescapable, and Objectivism holds that this inescapable, constant fact is philosophically important, since it pertains to all instances of man’s consciousness, and therefore also to his knowledge.

Similar experiments can be performed by anyone at any time. But if the primacy of consciousness were true, we would not expect these results in this type of experiment. We would not have found that consciousness is so ineffectual in merely altering its objects. On the contrary, we would have found that the objects would conform to our imagination, wishing, commands and other conscious functions, if consciousness held metaphysical primacy over its objects. But the objects of consciousness are not so easily pushed around after all. Reality has its terms, and it is up to us either to accept them or live in denial, protesting what we cannot change, imagining a fantasy world beyond it and pretending that a super-dooper-double-whammy consciousness somewhere out there or nowhere out there can change what we cannot change. Meanwhile, reality remains what it is, independent of our preferences, likes, dislikes, temper tantrums, etc.

Do theists offer any experimental evidence to confirm the opposite of the primacy of existence? If not, what do they offer? "Arguments"? Well, what is their starting point? What orientation between subject and object do their premises assume? What orientation between subject and object do their conclusions affirm? Do their premises and conclusions assume the same orientation? It would not bode well for theism if their arguments' premises and conclusions pointed to opposite metaphysical orientations between subject and object. It should already be clear that, whatever their premises, their conclusion (to whatever degree they offer arguments for it) that a god exists and created the universe unmistakably points to the primacy of consciousness. But they nowhere validate this assumption, and they nowhere show how it can live side by side the primacy of existence principle, which they use any time they make a truth claim (even if it is false). They don't because they can't.

An Attempt to Evade the Primacy of Existence

The theist, still recognizing the need to salvage the primacy of consciousness in some way, may pull back at this point and suggest that, even though the primacy of existence may be true in the case of human consciousness, this is no indication of the relationship enjoyed by a divine consciousness with respect to its objects. According to this approach, assuming that the universal, absolute truth of the primacy of existence principle applies to all forms of consciousness, even those which are not human, is simply a grand over-generalization.

What this approach represents is a failure to recognize and integrate the profound implications that the primacy of existence principle has for epistemology. Like any human being, the theist initially formed his concept of consciousness implicitly through his own conscious interaction with the world. As pointed out above, Objectivism holds that our own interaction with the objects of our consciousness constantly confirms the primacy of existence principle. The actions of his own consciousness serve as the units which he isolates and integrates to form the concept. They are the initial inputs which give his understanding of consciousness its content.

So what inputs inform the theist's concept of consciousness beyond his own firsthand experience such that he thinks it is meaningful to suppose that there exists a consciousness possessing the exact opposite relationship that his consciousness has with its own objects? What gives his concept of consciousness such latitude? What units has he discovered and integrated into his concept of consciousness which allows him to affirm two contradictory metaphysics? We know already that the method by which he informs his concept of consciousness must be consistent with the nature of his consciousness, for he has no alternative to using his own consciousness in developing and securing the knowledge he seeks to hold. So this rules out his own use of the primacy of consciousness as a means of arriving at a point where he can reasonably affirm the primacy of consciousness. For instance, since the primacy of existence applies to his own conscious interaction with the world around him, he cannot reasonably adopt a method of affirming the primacy of consciousness which reduces to the assumption that reality conforms to his conscious operations. Not only would this be fallaciously circular, it would short-circuit the nature of his own consciousness and invalidate any conclusion he wants to draw. He cannot, for instance, rationally say that the primacy of consciousness is valid because he wants it to be valid, for his consciousness does not have the power to alter reality; his wants and wishes are ineffectual. We already know from experimental evidence that his consciousness simply does not have such authority over reality. The facts of reality do not conform to his imagination, wishing or commands, so if he wants to claim that the primacy of consciousness orientation obtains in the form of consciousness other than his own, he will need to show how this is the case by means of a methodology that is consistent with his own consciousness' orientation to its objects. In essence, he needs to use a primacy of existence methodology in order to show that the primacy of consciousness is true. Such a procedure would amount to using a principle (thus affirming its truth by using it) to prove what contradicts it, thereby denying the truth of the principle which he used to arrive at his goal, which is: self-contradiction as such.

Additionally, we have already seen how concepts of truth necessarily assume the primacy of existence metaphysics. It would contradict the nature of our consciousness to say that some state of affairs obtains merely because we want it to. The bottle manufactured in Atlanta was not suddenly manufactured in Montréal because we wanted it to be, and the paperclip did not unfold itself because we wanted it to. So already it appears that the theist's project is doomed from the very beginning, precisely because what he wants to defend denies the truth of a principle that he needs to use in defending it. Thus he cannot avoid the fallacy of the stolen concept.

So again we should ask: what inputs does the theist factor into his conception of consciousness that allows him to recognize (if only implicitly) the truth of the primacy of existence on some occasions, and on other occasions affirm the primacy of consciousness? All examples of consciousness that we have found so far in nature are examples of consciousness possessing the same fundamental orientation to the world that our consciousness has - i.e., the primacy of existence. But theists are quick to call the consciousness of their deity "supernatural," and thus caution that we should not expect to find evidence of such a consciousness in nature. In other words, we're looking in the wrong place. So, they tell us where not to look for their god. But to give their claims any hope of credibility, they need to tell us where we should look. Without this, their god-belief claims dangle helplessly in the chill void of a conceptual vacuum.

Imagination: The Source of Mystical "Knowledge"

Let us try another approach. Let us ask: where do they get this idea of a supernatural consciousness to which reality conforms? Christians make no attempt to hide the source where they get this idea. They get it from a storybook - "the Bible" is what they call it. And this storybook provides the inputs which they factor into their understanding of consciousness which allows them to affirm two contradictory metaphysical orientations between subject and object. The storybook was inspired by the imagination of its ancient authors, and today it inspires the imagination of its readers. But as we saw above, there is a fundamental distinction between reality and imagination. We can certainly imagine Jesus feeding the 5,000, or walking on the waters of the sea, or raising Lazarus. And we can also imagine Dorothy in the land of Oz, Alice in Wonderland, Bilbo Baggins hobbling through Middle-earth, etc. Stories like those found in the bible did for the ancients what cartoons do for us today: they put one's imagination into concrete, perceptible and communicable form. They can certainly entertain, but they are not true. The primacy of existence guarantees this.

In a primacy of existence universe, a man will not grow a third arm simply because someone wanted him to. But in a primacy of consciousness universe, whatever consciousness wants dictates whatever happens. Just as in a cartoon, a man could grow a third arm just because the cartoonist wanted it to. And in the cartoon universe of theism, if the ruling deity wants a man to grow a third arm, what would stop this from happening? In such a universe, the ruling consciousness’ wants and pleasures are the final court of appeal.

The Primacy of Existence is Important to Knowledge

Now that it is clear that the primacy of existence principle is undeniably true, let us look at a couple reasons why it is important.

One reason why the primacy of existence principle is important, is that it serves as the mind’s most basic safeguard against error. It is not sufficient to prevent all errors, but it is necessary to avoid any error. If it is observed consistently throughout one’s reasoning, it will keep him from making the most fundamental error, namely reversing the orientation between himself as subject and the objects of his awareness. The primacy of existence allows a mind to avoid such errors by making the distinction between the an object and the subject with its cognitive operations explicit and by recognizing the proper relationship between them. Errors are misidentifications of something. The very idea of error assumes that a mind is not always right in its identifications. Any act of identifying something requires a standard to give that act an objective basis. And the standard is the object being identified, to which consciousness must conform in order to identify it accurately.

By recognizing that the task of consciousness is to perceive and identify the objects of awareness (rather than create or alter them at will), the primacy of existence principle equips a mind with the fundamental context in which concepts like ‘true’, ‘false’, ‘right’, ‘wrong’, ‘accurate’, ‘inaccurate’, ‘correct’, ‘incorrect’, etc., are rationally meaningful. It would not make sense in a cartoon universe, for instance, to say that something is “wrong,” for “wrong” presupposes an objective standard to which cognition must conform. A consciousness to which the facts of reality conform could never be either wrong or right. "Right" is when a consciousness accurately identifies an object that exists independent of itself, and "wrong" is when it misidentifies an object that exists independent of itself.

Another way which the primacy of existence is important is related to the one above. This principle is important to man because it teaches him not to confuse what he imagines with what is real. If there is a distinction between the subject of knowledge and the object of knowledge, then there must be a distinction between what a subject knows and the cognitive process by which he knows it. And if this is the case, then there must be a distinction between what actually exists in reality and what one merely imagines. Mistaking what one imagines for reality would hardly be beneficial to man's life, and it could easily prove fatal if he acts on such confusion. I can imagine, for instance, that a T-shirt will keep me warm in the winter, but if I walk out into a blizzard without appropriate clothing, I may very well be overcome with hypothermia and die. Reality does not conform to my imaginations (my imagining will not make a T-shirt sufficient to protect me from the cold in a wintry blizzard), so I need to conform my choices and actions to this fact if I want to live. So there is a practical as well as rational advantage to recognizing and respecting the distinction between reality and imagination.

Even the theist recognizes the distinction between what he wants to say is real and what he is willing to admit to be imaginary at some point. He will, for instance, object when a rival theist’s imagination of deity conflicts with his own. We see this inside Christianity all the time. One group of Christians will develop their imagination of their deity in one direction, while another group of Christians develop their imagination in another direction, each claiming the same source for inspiration and authority. But when the two conflict, each side accuses the other of “vain imaginations” which, if unchecked by the “authorized” imagination, will lead to "heresy," i.e., the unapproved imagination. So even theists will sooner or later admit that there is a difference between reality and imagination when it suits their position to do so. Unfortunately for them, it is too late at that point, for they have already sacrificed the concept of objectivity on the altar of faith in invisible magic beings.

Excuses and Ridicule to Be Expected

When I ask for evidence to support their claims, Christians typically give me a string of excuses. If I am to accept excuses as evidence for anything, I can only accept them as evidence for the likely fact that they cannot provide evidential support for their claims about this being they allegedly have awareness of. When I point out the various problems that I see in their claims - for instance, they have no objective starting point (cf. Prov. 1:7), they affirm metaphysical subjectivism, they do not clearly identify the means by which they are allegedly aware of their deity, they confuse the imaginary with the real, they endorse faith over reason, etc. - Christians scramble in a panic to turn the tables, find counter-examples, hoping to trap me in some kind of quandary which usually turns out to be more casuistry on the apologist's part. He is threatened by my certainty, and this is what he wants to undermine more than anything: my confidence in my own mind.

Then come the name-calling, the insults, the condescension. Like the 9 Powell bus, right on schedule. This is typically an indication that the apologist really has no defense for his position at all, and he's trying to cover it up with bluster and loud barking. Apologists get frustrated when people do not accept their religious assertions on their say so, for they know they have nothing else to back them up.

I can certainly imagine some of the things Christians tell me. But what I imagine is not real. When I ask how I can distinguish between what they claim and what they may be merely imagining, I get flack in return. This is another indication of a problem. Why else would this be what they give me when I try to learn more about their position?

I do not indulge in the name-calling and personal insults because I know what I teach is true, and I enjoy teaching what I know. Do they want a dialogue? Then why the attitude, condescension and ridicule? Do they think that they are all-knowing? If so, then why the impatience with those who are so willing to acknowledge that they themselves are not all-knowing? If they don't think they're all-knowing, then perhaps they're willing to admit that there are things they still have to learn. If that's the case, why aren't they more eager to learn and more grateful for the effort others put into helping them learn? They claim to be thankful to a being which can help them without effort, but unthankful to those who have no choice but to apply effort if they choose to help them. Don't they to learn? don't they want to know? Don't they want to understand?

by Dawson Bethrick

A Reply to Dustin Segers’ Dismantled Blog Entry on Objectivism

Dustin Segers, who attempted to refute the primacy of existence in a podcast with Sye Ten Bruggencate and the folks at Fundamentally Flawed, also posted an entry on his blog restating and to some extent elaborating on the refutations he gave in that podcast. Unfortunately Segers has subsequently decided to remove his blog entry after I brought to his attention that he had made a fundamental error (namely confusing the principle of the secondary objectivity of consciousness with the primacy of existence). This was not what I had expected or even desired, for it is always good to have examples of failed critiques of Objectivism on the web to learn from.

Luckily I was able to save a copy of Segers’ post before he removed it from his blog. I have reposted it on my personal website here: Dustin Segers’ Failed Attempt to Refute the Primacy of Existence. My repost of Segers’ blog entry includes all the comments which I know were submitted to his blog, including his own final comment announcing his decision to take it down.

Rick Warden's Critique of Objectivism

A Christian named Rick Warden who has attempted to commandeer the comments section of my blog refuting Sye Ten Bruggencate’s “proof” for the existence of a god, posted his objections to the philosophy of Objectivism.

While the objections which Rick raises against Objectivism are superficial and reflect a profound unfamiliarity with what Objectivism actually teaches, his mistakes are common among theistic apologists attempting to debate non-believers on the topic of logic.

Rick openly admits that he is “still in the learning mode regarding Objectivism” – i.e., he acknowledges his own unfamiliarity with what Objectivism teaches. But this does not stop him from running roughshod into battle even though he’s completely unarmed. In spite of acknowledging his ignorance of Objectivism, he thinks he’s already found a bunch of fallacies in Objectivism.

I will examine Rick’s criticisms below. We will find that, as with so many critics of “non-Christian thought,” Rick has a talent for making a lot of errors in the space of just a few statements.

Rick writes:

I would be interested to know your criticisms on this response to your premise from an article:

Okay. Bring it on.

Quoting from my blog How Theism Violates the Primacy of Existence:

It is an undeniable fact that a subject is distinct from the objects of its awareness: a subject and its objects are not one and the same – the two are engaged in a relationship.

Rick asked:

Is it really ‘an undeniable fact’?

Rationally speaking, yes, it is. Whenever an individual perceives and/or consider any object, his action of perceiving and/or considering that object is distinct from the object he’s perceiving and/or considering. On what rational basis could anyone deny this? Even in denying it, he would be instantiating the very distinction he’s denying.

Rick wrote:

As far as we may surmise, pure, unadulterated logic does not submit into an absolute metaphysical subject/object dualism explanation.

It’s not clear what Rick is trying to say here. He introduces the notion of dualism, which has many meanings and connotations in the history of philosophy. Greater precision of expression is recommended here if Rick has a point he wants to get across.

At any rate, logic does have a metaphysical basis, and it is not consciousness in isolation from any object it’s conscious of. Rather, the metaphysical basis of logic is the subject-object relationship – i.e., the subject of consciousness engaged in awareness of some object(s). A subject’s awareness of some object(s) is a metaphysical fact – i.e., objective, since this awareness itself is not the product of conscious intentions. When we sense things, we have no choice over the fact that we sense or what it is we are sensing. Anyone who has experienced pain realizes this, at least implicitly: when one feels pain, he cannot choose not to feel it. If we could, we wouldn’t need painkillers or anesthesia, nor would we be so reluctant to go to the dentist.

Rick wrote:

Ask an objectivist: “In terms of human perception, is logic considered a subject or an object?”

The question, as I understand it, seems rather incoherent. Why specifically “in terms of human perception” here? We do not perceive logic; logic is conceptual. Also, logic itself is not the subject of consciousness: the concept ‘logic’ does not denote a conscious being. Subjects (in the sense that I use it in the passage quoted from my blog above) are conscious beings. I, Dawson Bethrick, am a subject; the reader who is reading this is a subject. Logic, on the other hand, is a set of abstract principles which regulate identification; identification is an activity performed by a conscious subject.

But without doubt, logic can be an object of awareness, but I would not say of perceptual awareness. We don’t see, feel or touch logic. Logic does not make noises, nor does it produce an odor. But we can think about logic, we can examine logic, we can write about logic, we can talk about logic, we can marvel at logic. When we do any of these things, logic is the object of our awareness. So logic can be an object of our awareness, just as it is in this very sentence – since I’m talking about logic.

Rick wrote:

If the objectivist says logic is a ‘subject’, then it is considered a part of the mind.

Actually, if one were to say that logic is a subject, he’d be saying (as I have used the terms) that logic is a conscious being in its own right. I don’t think this is the case, and I don’t see why anyone would think this. This would be an instance of personifying an inanimate object.

Rick continued:

Logic, from a utilitarian view, is a tool, an aspect of reasoning. Without a mind, logic would have no use whatsoever. This implies, from a materialist perspective, it should be a cart the horse of reason pulls. But objectivists have a problem here. While Logic is used personally, as a tool for subjective reasoning, it is not ONLY personal, it consists of universal laws, it endures from one generation to the next, as do known ‘external’ natural laws.

Let’s keep in mind what specifically it is we’re talking about when we talk about logic. “Logic is the art or skill of non-contradictory identification” (Ayn Rand, “Philosophical Detection,” Philosophy: Who Needs It, p. 15). Logic’s very purpose is to guide man’s ability to identify and integrate what he perceives. This is entirely in keeping with the proper understanding of the nature of reason:

Reason is the faculty that identifies and integrates the material provided by man’s senses. (Ayn Rand, “The Objectivist Ethics,” The Virtue of Selfishness, p. 20)

Reason integrates man’s perceptions by means of forming abstractions or conceptions, thus raising man’s knowledge from the perceptual level, which he shares with animals, to the conceptual level, which he alone can reach. The method which reason employs in this process is logic—and logic is the art of non-contradictory identification. (Ayn Rand, “Faith and Force: Destroyers of the Modern World,” Philosophy: Who Needs It, p. 62)

Only biological organisms (specifically human beings) identify and integrate what they perceive conceptually, and since logic is the method which regulates this process, it is man who needs logic (as he does not automatically identify and integrate what he perceives). Essentially, logic is to epistemology what a code of values is to morality. Since the process of identifying and integrating what we perceive is a volitional operation, we need a structured set of guidelines to guide our cognitive choices. Only where a conceptual consciousness is concerned, is logic even going to be a consideration.

Rocks do not need logic; rivers do not need logic; a pile of leaves does not need logic; shooting stars do not need logic. Given this context, then, it is definitely true that “without a mind, logic would [be of] no use whatsoever.”

Now it is true that logic as a set of principles guiding human thought endures from one generation to the next. To put it short, logic is the same for everyone. But this fact does not undermine the Objectivist position or its understanding of logic. “Logic has a single law, the Law of Identity, and its various corollaries” (“Philosophical Detection,” Philosophy: Who Needs It, p. 15). The law of identity does not change, either from place to place, or person to person, or generation to generation. It is rooted directly on the one fact that everything in the universe has in common, namely the fact of existence: if something exists, it is what it is.

Moreover, on the Objectivist view, logic is conceptual in nature (see here), and human beings possess consciousnesses capable of the conceptual level of cognition. It is the open-endedness or “universality” of concepts, given their the process by which they are formed (i.e., by abstraction, specifically the operation known as measurement-omission), which gives logic its universal applicability. This is why a good theory of concepts is indispensable to understanding the issues which Rick has raised. Logic certainly does in fact depend on human minds, but not on their whims, rather on their essential nature as conscious subjects in a relationship with the objects of their awareness, i.e., the primacy of existence. Logic owes its stability, immutability and universality of applicability to its conceptual nature and its foundation on the law of identity.

That the nature of concepts is the key here can be demonstrated with a simple example, the concept ‘man’. We form the concept ‘man’ on the basis of just a few perceptual inputs - in fact, only two are really required. “ A concept is a mental integration of two or more units possessing the same distinguishing characteristic(s), with their particular measurements omitted” (Ayn Rand, Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, p. 13). Based on those few perceptually given samples, say Jones and Smith, we omit the specific measurements of each – Jones is 6’2” tall, portly, bearded, wears glasses, dressed in a white coat, is a doctor, is 53 years old, speaks four languages, etc., while Smith is 5’8” tall, slender, clean-shaven, wears a three-piece suit, is a company CEO, is 48 years old, speaks English and a little pig Latin, etc. – and integrate them into a single mental unit – the concept ‘man’. Because of measurement-omission, we can integrate more “units” – i.e., other men – into the same concept, as we discover them. There is no quantitative limit to integration; the concept ‘man’ is open-ended – i.e., “universal” – in that it includes every man who exists, who has existed and who will ever exist. It is a universal classification.

Notice how this allows for us to communicate with each other. You have formed the concept ‘man’ based on specific individuals whom you have encountered over your life, and I have formed the concept ‘man’ based on the specific individuals whom I have encountered over my life. Unless we grow up in the same small town, the specific individuals in your encounter set are going to be entirely different from those in my encounter set. However, since we have both formed the concept ‘man’ by essentially the same process – i.e., by a process of abstraction, we can each have an idea of what the other is talking about when we speak of men.

The same is the case with the concepts which inform the principles of logic. Since they too are concepts formed by the same process, they have their analogues in every mind which has performed that process to form them, just as you and I both had sufficiently similar concepts of ‘man’ already formed in our knowledge base. Of course, it can get tricky as we form abstractions on the basis of previously formed abstractions, as we now start developing a hierarchical structure, and the need for uniform definitions becomes crucial. This is where the objective theory of concepts proves its worth. “The final step in concept-formation is definition. This step is essential to every concept except axiomatic concepts and concepts denoting sensations” (Leonard Peikoff, Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, p. 96) In other words, until we’ve secured our concepts with proper definitions, our work in forming them is not finished. “A definition is a statement that identifies the nature of the units subsumed under a concept” (Ayn Rand, Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, p. 40). It is often in the realm of definitions where thinkers encounter their greatest point of conflict with each other. This is why I urge my theistic interlocutors to make their definitions clear. They frequently have a hard time doing this, and I think a major reason why is that they simply do not have a good grasp of concepts.

Let me re-emphasize the broader point: Since existence holds metaphysical primacy, logic will always have its proper anchor: the law of identity , regardless of who is using it. Since existence exists independent of consciousness, and consciousness is consciousness of objects, there is a proper orientation between the subject of consciousness (the human thinker) and its objects (anything he perceives and/or considers). That orientation is identified by the primacy of existence: the objects of consciousness are what they are independent of the conscious activity by which the subject is aware of them.

So the answer to the supposed conundrum which Rick raises here, is supplied by Objectivism’s axioms, the primacy of existence, and its theory of concepts.

Also, a couple of other cautionary corrections for Rick here:

1. Objectivism is not a form of Utilitarianism.

2. Objectivism is not materialism.

Rick wrote:

If the objectivist says logic is an ‘object’, then it is presumed to be a part of the ‘external’ world and they have another problem.

This is a non sequitur. Logic indeed can be an object of consciousness (just as it is in the case of this discussion – it is one of the objects under our consideration), but it does not follow from this that logic is “part of the ‘external’ world” exclusively. We do have the capacity for introspection, in which case our own consciousness can become an object to itself. When I introspect, I am aware of my own conscious activity, and that conscious activity of which I am aware, is the object of my introspective awareness. When I see a ball (an object in “external reality”), I am perceiving it; when I think about my perceiving the ball, my perception of the ball becomes what is properly understood as a secondary object of my consciousness (since I had to perceive the ball first in order for my perception of the ball to be an object of my awareness).

Similarly with logic. Logic is a set of principles, informed by concepts, which regulates proper identification of objects, and it too can be an object of our awareness. An object, mind you, as I use it in the passage which Rick quoted from my blog, is anything one perceives and/or considers. It can be an extramental entity (such as a ball), or some conscious activity (such as my awareness of the ball).

So, the problem which Rick raises here does not afflict Objectivism.

Rick wrote:

No one has ever perceived logic, or its effects, with his or her senses and thus cannot ‘objectively’ account for its existence.

This is another non sequitur. It’s likely a consequence ignoring not only the conceptual nature of logic, but also our capacity for introspection.

Since, as I pointed out above, we can introspect, we do have the capacity to identify the process by which we form concepts. And here’s why: since this process of forming concepts does have identity (e.g., it works one way and not others), and we can become aware of it (by means of introspection), we can objectively identify it (by adhering to the primacy of existence). So yes, we can objectively account for it, but only if we maintain fidelity to the primacy of existence and have a good understanding of concepts. (Christianity provides for neither, which is why you think these are problems for non-Christians.)

Rick: “If the objectivist says gravity is similar because it is not seen but known by its effects, it seems to be a weak corollary.”

But the Objectivist did not say this. Next?

Rick: “What does this imply metaphysically?”

The Objectivist is beyond implications at this point, because he as the primacy of existence – i.e., he has explicitly identified the proper relationship between a consciousness and its objects.

Rick: “Therefore, if there is a question of which has primacy metaphysically, logic does.”

The issue of metaphysical primacy has to do with the proper relationship between a consciousness (i.e., a subject) and its objects. I already explained why logic is not the subject – it’s not a conscious entity. And yes, we saw how logic can be an object. But it’s only one of many objects, and it could only be a secondary object at best (since we need to introspect to become aware of it). So it would not do to say that logic specifically has metaphysical primacy; this would be too narrow, and it would fail to identify the proper relationship between consciousness and its objects in terms of essentials - i.e., consciousness and existence. Indeed, the concept ‘logic’ is not conceptually irreducible, and since the issue of metaphysical primacy must be settled at the axiomatic level of cognition, we must address it in terms of axiomatic concepts.

Rick: “If the existence of logic refutes the assumed metaphysical subject/object duality and logic metaphysically predominates over reason, then an absolute subject/object duality, strictly based on human reasoning, should not be considered a metaphysically reliable premise.”

The existence of logic does not refute the primacy of existence. On the contrary, the primacy of existence makes it possible (since the primacy of existence is its fundamental basis) and necessary (since the human mind in the effort to identify its objects is fallible).

Rick raised another criticism:

The Primacy of Existence theory supposedly disproves Theism because it assumes a single world view cannot entertain both a primacy of existence example (man) and a primacy of consciousness example (God). But there is a third possibility, based on the existence of logic, that something may, in fact, be independent of- and indefinable by the apparent subjective and object duality.

Let’s see if any of this this successfully applies to Objectivism.

Essentially, Rick’s objection amounts to the view that the primacy of existence and the primacy of consciousness are not jointly exhaustive, that “there is a third possibility” that is allegedly an alternative to the primacy of existence and the primacy of consciousness.

An argument has already been developed in anticipation of this kind of claim, and can be found here: Are the Primacy of Existence and Primacy of Consciousness Exhaustive Metaphysics? While I would phrase certain statements in this essay differently if I were writing it myself, the overall gist of this paper brings the point home rather well. The following point is noteworthy when considering Rick’s speculative proposal:

Of course, if you're a believer in the Primacy of Consciousness, you might think that there are things other than consciousness and existence, because your consciousness could create [i.e., imagine] them. In this case, you could advocate the Primacy of Something Else, although this would be highly illogical, in that you've already presupposed that your consciousness has created these new things, and that, presumably, they are existents. But besides, the Primacy of Consciousness is false.

Notice that, not only does Rick propose his alternative to the primacy of existence and the primacy of consciousness in a tentative manner (he casts it as a “possibility… that something may…” rather than an actually existing and defensible alternative), but also that he does not present any argument for his claim. In fact, his whole effort to evade the choice between the primacy of existence and the primacy of consciousness indicates that he does not understand the issue of metaphysical primacy to begin with. This is extremely common among theistic critics of Objectivism.

Also notice that, after reading my argument, Rick does not come out and endorse the primacy of consciousness, which I argue to be the underlying premise of theism. This is not unexpected. Theists typically try to distance themselves from explicitly endorsing the primacy of consciousness metaphysics once its failings have been pointed out to them. And yet, like other theistic critics of Objectivism who are reluctant to admit the subjective underpinnings of their worldview, Rick does not explain how his theism could survive without it; he does not explain how one could believe in a universe-creating, reality-ruling god without assuming the primacy of consciousness.

Given what he does write in response to my argument (Rick interacts with very little of it), it’s clear that Rick’s reading of it is faulty. This is evidenced by the fact that he wants to introduce a “third alternative” to the jointly exhaustive orientations identified by the issue of metaphysical primacy. For one thing, Rick does not seem to grasp that the issue of metaphysical primacy pertains to the relationship between a consciousness (the subject) and its objects (what the subject is conscious of). This is why there are only two perspectives to consider in weighing the issue of metaphysical primacy: the primacy of the objects of consciousness (i.e., the primacy of existence, the objective position) vs. the primacy of the subject (i.e., the primacy of consciousness, the subjective position). We are limited to these two alternatives because a consciousness and its objects are the only parties to the relationship.

Also, since the relationship between a subject and its objects is not a relationship between equals (an object and the activity by which the subject has awareness of it are not the same; the actions which produce awareness are performed by the subject, even those actions which are involuntary), it cannot be the case that both the subject and its objects jointly share metaphysical primacy. This would ignore the nature of consciousness as a faculty which must discover the nature of its objects as it seeks to identify them. Man is not omniscient, nor does he begin his awareness of the world with exhaustive knowledge of the objects which he will eventually encounter in his conscious experience.

So there can be no “third option,” as Rick would like to believe.

Another tragic mistake of Rick’s is his attempt to base the possibility of a “third possibility” on “the existence of logic.” Recall that logic is “the art or skill of non-contradictory identification.” If logic in fact exists, it can only imply that those consciousnesses which make use of it, do so because knowledge of the identity of the objects they encounter is not an automatically given, but a goal which they must pursue by incorporating logic as a method which regulates identification. In other words, logic necessarily presupposes the primacy of existence by virtue of its role in the cognitive process: to ensure the conformity of man’s mind to reality as he develops his knowledge beyond the level of perceptually self-evident facts.

That Rick thinks this “third possibility” (alternative) to the primacy of existence and the primacy of consciousness “may, in fact, be independent of- and indefinable by the apparent subjective and object duality,” could only signify its irrelevance to the subject-object relationship, if in fact such an animal were accepted as a reality. Indeed, Rick offers no reason to suppose that his “third possibility” would at all be relevant, let alone tell us what exactly it is he has in mind. Perhaps he has his god in mind here, but this would be most odd since he characterizes it as a “possibility” which is “based on the existence of logic,” which would make logic’s existence prior to and independent of his god’s existence. It is hard to see how such a view could avoid the charge of heresy within the Christian religion.

In conclusion, Rick’s criticisms of Objectivism fall flat on their face. In presenting them he demonstrates that he is not sufficiently familiar with Objectivism to critique it intelligently, and makes numerous blunders as a result. Given Rick’s lack of familiarity with Objectivism, he is in no position to raise defensible objections against its view of logic, the primacy of existence, or its arguments against theism. And as I have shown above, it is his own mistakes which supply the thrust to his criticisms.

by Dawson Bethrick