Warden’s “Addenda” regarding the Nature of Truth

Note: The following is an elaboration on some comments which I recently posted here.

 

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Since I posted a vindication of my three-step case against theism in defense against Rick Warden’s ill-fated attempts to refute it, he has added a post-script to his attempted refutation regarding the nature of truth that my argument applies.

In this “Addenda” as he titles this section, Warden helps to make clear the stark contrast between the theistic view of truth and the view of truth which my case against theism incorporates. Warden mistakenly assumes that, since the conception of the nature of truth which my case incorporates has anti-theistic implications, my case therefore begs the question. On the contrary, what Warden fails to grasp is the fact that my case constitutes an application of the objective theory of truth to a particular area of inquiry, demonstrating those implications in that particular area of inquiry explicitly. Thus my case constitutes an application of a general truth to a specific matter. In classical logic this is known as deduction - the drawing of specific conclusions from at least one general premise.

The case against theism which I presented in my blog consists of three distinct syllogisms, the last of which drawing the conclusion “Therefore theism is incompatible with the primacy of existence metaphysics and consequently cannot be true.” At no point in any of the three syllogisms does the affirmation “theism is not true” figure as a premise. On the contrary, my conclusion is drawn as an implication from the premises which are stated in the three syllogisms respectively. Therefore, I emphatically deny the charge of begging the question given the standard deductive model which my case follows.

The Vindication of My Argument Against Theism from Rick Warden's Ill-fated Maneuvers

Rick Warden has attempted another refutation of my argument. He already tried once and failed (see here). Then, after seeing that his attempted refutation of my argument failed, Warden requested “a summary of the specific premises and logical syntax of the argument,” which can only serve as an admission that when he attempted his initial refutation, he did so without knowing what my argument’s premises are. I recommend that Warden adopt the policy of “look before you leap.” It might save him some skinned knees.

Three Steps Proving that Theism Cannot Be True

In the comments section of my previous blog entry, Christian apologist Rick Warden of Templestream Blog has requested that I produce “a summary of the specific premises and logical syntax of the argument” which I employ against theism.

Curiously, Warden’s request comes after he posted a blog of his own in which he attempted to refute my argument. Warden’s methodology seems logically reversed; one would hope that Warden would already be familiar with my argument’s premises before publishing his attempts to refute it. Perhaps Warden has simply “presupposed” that my argument is unsound and, eager to act on this presupposition, didn’t bother to check the facts from the beginning. Needless to say, this would explain a lot.

Below I present three steps sealing the conclusion that theism cannot be true. Step 1 is a proof that truth as such rests exclusively on the primacy of existence metaphysics (this is the reason why we often hear the undeniably true retort, “wishing doesn’t make it so”). Step 2 is a proof that theism assumes the primacy of consciousness metaphysics (think of the claim that a god created the universe by speaking, that it governs human history by its “counsel,” that it “controls whatsoever comes to pass,” etc.). Step 3, drawing from the previous two Steps, is a proof that theism therefore cannot be true.

Rick Warden’s Ill-fated Effort to Refute the Argument from Metaphysical Primacy

Precisely one year ago today, on November 25, 2012, Rick Warden of the Templestream blog posted a blog entry titled A Refutation of Dawson Bethrick's Central Argument Against Theism. In this blog entry, Warden set out to achieve what the title suggests: he attempted to refute the argument from metaphysical primacy.

You see, Warden really wants his god to be real, and he wants his god-beliefs to be true. And like every good Christian, he wants everyone else to believe likewise and submit. Unfortunately, his zeal to vindicate his god-beliefs has clouded his critical faculties to a devastating degree.

Examining Stefan's Presuppositionalism

StefanMach (to whom I shall again refer as Stefan going forward) has left a series of comments responding to my blog A Reply to Stefan on Induction and Deduction. Stefan is clearly sympathetic to presuppositionalism, though he seems to be wary of Greg Bahnsen, which is curious in itself.

Below I reply to Stefan’s comments.

For Jonathan

Over on my blog Before the Beginning: The Problem of Divine Lonesomeness, internet apologist Jonathan Bradford (whose expert execution of presuppositional apologetics can be observed here) left a comment recently in which he asked me for “a detailed explanation of what a ‘consciousness’ is.”

He claims to have had interactions with Objectivists and gave the following statement:

I've never really received a satisfactory, rigorous definition of the concept as used by Objectivists.

In response to this, I explained:

The concept ‘consciousness’ is an axiomatic concept. Part of what this means is that it is conceptually irreducible and thus cannot be defined in terms of more fundamental concepts. So if you’ve been talking with Objectivists and they are not giving you a definition of ‘consciousness’ in terms of more fundamental concepts, that’s why. The same is the case with the concept ‘existence’ and those denoting sensations. These concepts are defined ostensively – essentially by pointing to those things which they denote. Axiomatic concepts are the most fundamental concepts; there are no concepts that are more fundamental than these. They are conceptually irreducible.

A Reply to Stefan on Induction and Deduction

On my blog Sye Ten Bruggencate vs. the Absolute Laws of Logic which I posted back in July, a visitor posting under the moniker StefanMach (to whom I will refer as Stefan henceforth) recently left a comment about the relationship between induction and deduction and presuppositionalism.

Specifically Stefan inquired about the consequences induction has for deductive conclusions given the view that “inductive argument conclusions are classified as either strong or weak and can never be classified as true or false.”

This is topical given that deductive arguments attempt to draw conclusions from at least one premise which, as a generalization, must be the conclusion of an inductive inference. Thus if an inductive inference can only produce a conclusion that is at best “strong” (as opposed to “weak”), then any attempt to draw a conclusion by means of deduction from an inductive conclusion would necessarily inherit the tentativeness already present in the inductive conclusion. Consequently, how can any deductive conclusion be accepted as reliably true or certain?

The Moral Code of Life

In its most general sense, morality is a code which guides one’s choices and actions.

Consequently there are two basic codes available to man, both mutually opposed to one another.

They are:

the moral code of life vs. the code of death.

Let us explore what distinguishes these two mutually opposed codes.

An Examination of the Ontological Argument

In my previous entry, Twerking for Jesus, I mentioned that I would be posting a new entry examining the ontological argument for the existence of a god more closely. So here it is.

Twerking for Jesus

Just in time for Halloween, TUaD is at it again over on Theological Bullsushi, twerking for Jesus as he so lovingly does. This time TUaD posted a link to an article titled “Computer Scientists ‘Prove’ God Exists.” Presumably we are expected to be impressed by the titular statement, that is of course until we learn that it’s yet another version of the tired, outworn ontological argument.

In fact, one wonders how closely TUaD has read the article that he himself linked to in his own comment. TUaD does quote a section of the article in his comment, but he skipped over some key statements about the nature of the article and the significance of the accomplishment it showcases.

Reason vs. Faith

A favorite question which many Christian apologists like to pose to atheists is “How do you know?” When challenged by such apologists to identify any item of knowledge that the atheist knows with certainty, an atheist might say something such as “I know that the sky is blue,” “I know that turtles are reptiles,” or “I know that I got up this morning and had breakfast.” And as though the apologist really had no way of dealing with an atheist who does have full confidence in at least some items of his knowledge, the apologist retorts as if by trained reflex: “How do you know that?”

Now, we should understand that the apologist’s line of interrogation here is not motivated by some deep love of knowledge and how the mind works. Quite the opposite is the case: the apologist is on a mission to undermine any non-believer’s confidence in his own mental faculties. Such simple questions are thus intended to accomplish three things:

Behold How the Holy Ones Speak!

Take a look at this Christian who posts under the moniker “Truth Unites… and Divides” (TUaD hereafter) over on theology served undercooked. Here’s what TUaD wrote recently in response to our very own NAL:

Hey MALformed, another laughably stupid atheist who's spending so much time on this blog thread when considering your atheistic convictions and worldview. You only have a limited time on earth before you die. Why spend those precious moments debating Hodge and other Christians?  

LOL, the MALformed atheist! That's a good one!

There, there. Feel better now, TUaD?

Mike Licona says: “I want it to be true”

I would really like to know how Christians react to this candid admission by a rather high-profile Christian apologist, Mike Licona. (His website is RisenJesus.com, and he even has an entry on Wikipedia.org.)

In a discussion between Licona, Gary Habermas and Robert Price, Licona makes a fascinating autobiographical revelation – really a confession.The discussion is available on YouTube and has been sliced rather sloppily into four sections. Those who are interested in the debate over what if anything is historically reliable in the New Testament might enjoy listening to this discussion, so here are the links to the different installments:

The Historical Jesus: Scholars Debate - Part 1  

The Historical Jesus: Scholars Debate - Part 2  

The Historical Jesus: Scholars Debate - Part 3  

The Historical Jesus: Scholars Debate - Part 4

The Primacy of the Inner over the Outer

A regular visitor to my blog who comments under the moniker NAL brought my attention to some continuing discussions over on B.C. Hodge’s blog Theological Sushi, and although he specifically noted that a fellow commenting there under the name “Rian” has been raking Hodge over the coals, the first blog entry that I looked at when I visited TS did not feature any discussion between Rian and Hodge himself. Rather, what I found – in the entry titled Christianity Doesn't Require Omniscience from Its Adherents - is a discussion between Rian and none other than Steve Hays of Triablogue.

(I don’t think this was the thread that NAL had in mind, since Hodge does not interact with Rian in it. Rather, I’m guessing that NAL had in mind this blog entry, in the comments of which Hodge does interact with Rian, and which I have yet to enjoy reading. All in good time!)

Now I have not occasioned myself to read through the entire discussion between Rian and Hays, though I do intend to as time allows. But what I have read so far was more than enough to get me typing – something I haven’t been doing much of lately. While there’s much to say in response to the small portion I’ve read so far, I did manage to get the following reactions of mine written out, and I decided to post them in a new entry on my blog here on IP.

So let’s get to it, shall we?

My August Comments to B.C. Hodge

I have had a most busy September, leaving me with no time whatsoever to devote to blogging. My schedule should hopefully loosen up some in October, and to whatever extent it does, I’m looking forward to it. Since I haven’t posted anything so far this month, I am posting the comments that I left on B.C. Hodge’s blog back in late August. I’m supposing that most regular visitors of my blog have already read these comments, but if not, here they are. If so, then obviously there’s nothing new here for you.

I know that Hodge reacted to some of what I have stated below and that some of the regulars here (Robert, Ydemoc, Photosynthesis, NAL, etc.) have continued interacting directly with Hodge on his blog. Unfortunately I’ve been able to read up on small portions of those conversations, but what I have seen so far is quite familiar: rational individuals trying their best to reach someone whose mind has turned its back on reason. There’s clearly more to say, but that will have to wait until later.

So here they are in their entirety, my last bout of comments to B.C. Hodge.

Subjectivism in Hodge's View of Reality and Knowledge

B.C. Hodge has posted a response to my blog Hodge’s Hedgings.

In a much more protracted blog entry, Hodge seeks to defend the idea that perception of reality is somehow epistemologically insufficient for knowledge, and that what really is vital for knowledge is some kind of faith in what he calls “subjective apprehensions.”

In telling his readers of his awareness of my responses (in my comments here and my main blog entry here) to his initial blog entry and follow-up comments, Hodge states that my efforts to rebut him “fail miserably to understand the argument and address the problem” which he apparently believes he has successfully laid forth. Hodge suggests that my intention is “to merely exhaust readers by lengthy posts that give the impression that [I have] actually said something relevant” to his argument. That I interact directly with Hodge’s statements is apparently not sufficient for my reaction to be relevant to what he has argued.

Referring to what I have written as a “sort of sophistry,” Hodge claims that such licentious discourse “is evident in these long posts when they attempt to nitpick everything about my argument, but the argument itself.” So interacting directly with a Hodge’s statements as I have constitutes “nitpicking” which is focused on “everything about [his] argument” somehow misses “the argument itself,” and word count is supposedly an indication of this. Hodge huffs:

”Hey, if you’re going to bluff, make sure you do it with a lot of words so it seems like you’ve got something to back up your claims.”

I noticed that Hodge’s own blog entry was itself quite lengthy, so I compared the length of mine with the length of his. I found that, while my blog had a total of 5,197 words, Hodge’s new blog entry exceeds this, with a total of 6,124 words, nearly a thousand words and over 15% longer than mine. I must say I feel quite humbled to be out-worded like this! But if word count is any indication, it seems that Hodge’s “theology served raw” is a bit over-cooked.

Now, I am happy to examine the entirety of Hodge’s reply to me, but in the present entry I want to focus on the very first paragraph he writes in his newest entry.

STB: Three Years and Counting

Has it really been three whole years since I posted my critique the argument which presuppositional apologist Sye Ten Bruggencate has showcased on his website?

Indeed it has.

Has it really been three whole years without an attempt by Sye Ten Bruggencate, or any other presuppositionalist for that matter, to vindicate his argument?

Indeed it has.

Hodge's Hedgings

In the comments section of my blog Presuppositionalist Pseudolosophy, NAL, a frequent visitor, posted in its entirety the blog entry of a Christian blogger named C.B. Hodge. Hodge runs the blog Theological Sushi and the blog entry in question can be found here: Objectivism Refuted

I read through Hodge’s brief entry and posted my own reaction to it in two comments on my own blog, where NAL had originally drew attention to it.

A little later, Ydemoc, another frequent visitor to my blog, posted a comment over at Hodge’s blog entry informing him of my critique of his refutation of objectivism (note the small ‘o’ here – it appears that Hodge has some generic understanding of objectivism in mind here; he makes no reference to Rand, Peikoff or other Objectivist author, and he does not interact directly with any of Objectivism’s own stated positions; moreover, he apparently expects his readers to “just know” what he’s addressing, since he provides essentially no explanation of what he’s trying to refute; in his blog entry, Hodge confines his refutation to an attack on the senses, and he presumably expects his readers to learn of his position by perceiving and interpreting the little marks he’s created on his webpage).

So my initial response to Hodge can be found there, in my comment on my blog.

Now Hodge has replied to me, in the comments of his own blog, in reply to Ydemoc’s comments drawing attention to my interaction with Hodge’s piece. So here is my interaction with his response to my criticisms of his “refutation.”

Presuppositionalist Pseudolosophy

The Exploitation of Ignorance

As an example of how theistic apologetics gorges itself on ignorance, consider the ready eagerness of apologists to treat things that are abstract as though one could “account for” them only by appealing to the supernatural. Lacking a good understanding of the nature of concepts and the process by which the human mind forms them from perceptual input, theists assume that abstract ideas have no dependence on the facts we observe in reality around us. How we have knowledge of abstract ideas is supposedly mysterious (it is indeed mysterious to those unacquainted with rational philosophy), so the supernatural must be involved behind the scenes somehow. The world is an ever-changing collection of matter in motion, so – it is presumed – general principles which are static and absolute could not possibly “arise from” our awareness of the things in the world. The essence of the theist’s thinking on these matters amounts to: “I don’t know how man can get unchanging, absolute and universal laws from the ever-changing realm of particulars, so they must come from God.” In precisely this way, ignorance of the nature of knowledge provides an open doorway to mysticism.

Sye Ten Bruggencate vs. the Absolute Laws of Logic

In an exchange with David Smalley (here, at 7:27-29), internet apologist Sye Ten Bruggencate asks the following question:

“How do you account for absolute laws of logic?”

Sye loves to pose questions like this and others about knowledge, reasoning, certainty, etc., but this is part of his rue: he’s not at all interested in what anyone might say in response to his questions. He has already presupposed that whatever any non-Christian is going to say is defective in some way which he never pins down or demonstrates.

John Frame's Empty-Handed Epistemology

Presuppositionalists often tell us things like “only the Christian worldview can account for human knowledge.” Also, presuppositionalists often use confrontational interrogative tactics which consist of repeating the question “How do you know that?” over and over in response to virtually anything a non-believer states. The claim to having a fully worked out epistemology which exclusively “accounts for” knowledge and the implication that non-believers cannot explain how they know things in a manner consistent with their non-belief in the Christian god, are hallmarks of this approach to defending the Christian faith.

I find both of these features of presuppositionalism richly ironic, for not only do presuppositionalists reject whatever non-believers say about their knowing process out-of-hand, they themselves show up conspicuously empty-handed when it comes to discussing the nature of knowledge and the means of discovering and validating it. Presuppositionalists seem uniquely unprepared to answer their own favorite badgering question, “How do you know that?” when it comes to their religious claims.

In this entry I will explore an excellent example of this empty-handedness from one of presuppositionalism’s highest-profile “thinkers,” John M. Frame.

TAG Defeated in One Fell Swoop

Proponents of TAG paint themselves into an unavoidable corner. They say that their god is an “absolute God” which can only be proved by means of a “transcendental argument.” For example, Cornelius Van Til proclaimed:

Now the only argument for an absolute God that holds water is a transcendental argument.

Also, as a central tenet of their apologetic scheme, presuppositionalists claim that one cannot “make sense” of anything apart from “presupposing” the existence of the Christian god. Or as Greg Bahnsen baldly asserted in his debate with Dr. Gordon Stein: “without Him it is impossible to prove anything.”

The acronym “TAG” refers to what apologists call the “transcendental argument for God’s existence.” So it is intended to denote a specific argument. Broadly speaking, an argument is the attempt to infer a conclusion from a set of premises. But there’s a significant problem here, and it’s insurmountable:

Klouda-ing the Issue

Posting under the name Bryan Klouda, a visitor to my blog A Proof that the Christian God Does Not Exist recently left the following comment:

Haven't read the comments or the entire post, but got to the square circles part.  

Out side of the context in which the argument is being made, square circles do exist. A shape with 250 sides can be considered a circle, just like a shape with 4 sides can be said to be a circle. Since a circle is defined as something like every point on the circle is equidistant from its center, it can be said that no circle even exists because you can never have a perfect circle, and if the shape doesn't fit the criteria of the definition, it follows that it must be something else.

Some Thoughts on Pope Francis’ Recent Condemnation of Capitalism

A news story I read this morning reports that Pope Francis thinks that money is a form of “tyranny.” This is coming from the head of one of the wealthiest institutions in the history of mankind, the Catholic Church.

The story can be found here:

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/religion/the-pope/10061700/Pope-Francis-urges-global-leaders-to-end-tyranny-of-money.html.

I actually think it is a good thing that the pope came out and made this position of his explicitly clear. The usual M.O. for authoritarians is to obscure their true colors in a cloud of euphemisms, feel-good slogans, apologetic platitudes and contentless bromides which are designed to engender sympathetic sentiments. Coming out and stating openly that one believes that money is a form of “tyranny” is far too candid to be misconstrued. So while I do not applaud anything the pope has stated, it is good that he comes out and shows the world what he’s all about in such unmistakable terms.

Dear Apologist: Can You Demonstrate that You’re the Real McCoy?

And now a quote from "Scripture":

Beloved, do not believe every spirit, but test the spirits to see whether they are from God, for many false prophets have gone out into the world. - I John 4:1

Christian apologists are always looking for ways to turn the tables on the non-believer. They resent the very idea that they might have any burden of proof when they’re out campaigning for their god-belief, and they only seem willing to engage a non-believer apologetically if they are confident that they have some advantage over him right from the start. Of course, many apologists would prefer that the non-believer simply surrender his mind upon their arrival and soak up everything they have to say on their mere say so. If this does not happen, the apologists resort to tactics borrowed from one of their closest cousins, the skeptics. Examples of presuppositionalist strategy infused with attacks inspired by skepticism can be found here and here.

One of the things that Christian apologists resent the most about non-believers is their certainty. Granted, many secularists are uncomfortable with the concept of certainty, and oftentimes that is because they themselves have accepted premises endorsed by the skeptical school of philosophy. This is not to say that Christian apologists are disturbed by a non-believer’s acceptance of skepticist premises; presuppositionalists are eagerly hoping for this. On the contrary, it is the fact that, as someone whose mind is not trapped in the labyrinth of holy terror like themselves, the non-believer may be enjoying what the believers fear most: a full and wonderful life lived without their approval. And the non-believer’s non-belief itself, which is a precondition to enjoying life without Christianity’s approval, is viewed as the highest form of arrogance possible to man. And the only way to bring this perceived arrogance into check, is to undermine the non-believer’s sense of certainty – beginning with any certainty he may have, such as the certainty that the earth revolves around the sun. Christian apologists realize, at least implicitly, that if their campaign to spread their religious program is to be successful, they must undermine the human mind at its roots, at the level of “presuppositions.” And the mere potential that the non-believer holds any truth with certainty is enough to heap hot coals on the Christian’s unquenchable envy (for, like the jealous god they worship, Christians are endemically vulnerable to the vice of coveting another person’s liberty to enjoy pleasures). It sure must be tough being a fisher of men these days.

Now here’s an idea on how we can make things even more difficult for apologists.

A Lesson on Presuppositional Gimmickry

Okay, over on his blog, presuppositional apologist D.A.N. proves that I called it right in my blog On the Validity of the Senses when I stated in my 4 April comment on that blog that

D.A.N. really does not care about knowledge, how we acquire it, how we can rationally put to rest skepticism’s gimmicks, etc.

D.A.N. is out there spewing the same thing that has already been answered here. Observe:

On the Validity of the Senses

D.A.N. of Debunking Atheists recently posted some comments on my blog Incinerating Presuppositionalism: Year Eight. In his 28 March reaction to the entry marking the anniversary of my blog’s inception, D.A.N. wrote:

I am cheering the day you abandon this blog to renounce your current autonomous and fallible reasoning as faulty, and worship the God you know exists. That is worth celebrating.

In part of my response to this statement, I wrote:

you insinuate that “my reasoning is faulty,” but you cite no example from my writings as evidence to support this. Is this because you have no example to support this? Or, is it because you think there is so much evidence that it should be self-apparent to anyone reading your comment?

Then D.A.N. in turn replied:

Well, you tell me, is it viciously circular to employ your senses and reasoning to validate your senses and reasoning?

Now, D.A.N. made the insinuation that my reasoning is faulty, and I noted that he produced no evidence to support that insinuation. And even after I point out the fact that he provided no support for his charge, he still fails even to make an attempt to provide support in his response. Instead of substantiating his claim, he asks me whether or not it is “viciously circular to employ your senses and reasoning to validate your senses and reasoning,” which does not strike me as relevantly supporting the characterization of my reasoning which he published on my blog. But in spite of this, I am willing to explore the matter.

Incinerating Presuppositionalism: Year Eight

Today is March 26, 2013, which means: Incinerating Presuppositionalism is another year older! So I invite everyone to join me in singing “Happy Birthday!” to my blog!

While I am delighted to see that IP is still going strong, I cannot say that I’m exactly “surprised” that it is. When I started this blog back in 2005, I had every intention of sticking with it and developing my critiques against presuppositionalism in particular and Christian apologetics in general as long as I could go. I have not set any kind of sunset date for IP, but in the last couple years I have not been able to keep my focus on my writing for IP at the top of my list of priorities. Many responsibilities compete for my time and energy, but my passion for what I do here has not waned at all.

As I have done since the first anniversary of my blog, here is a listing of the entries I published over the past year:

276. Incinerating Presuppositionalism: Year Seven - March 26, 2012

277. Answering Dustin Segers’ Presuppositionalism, Part I: Intro and the Nature of Truth - April 7, 2012

278. Answering Dustin Segers’ Presuppositionalism, Part II: The Nature of Logic - April 8, 2012

279. Answering Dustin Segers’ Presuppositionalism, Part IIIa: The Uniformity of Nature - April 12, 2012

280. Answering Dustin Segers’ Presuppositionalism, Part IIIb: The Problem of Induction - April 15, 2012

281. Answering Dustin Segers’ Presuppositionalism, Part IVa: Objective Morality - May 12, 2012

282. Answering Dustin Segers’ Presuppositionalism, Part IVb: Collectivism, Evil and Slavery - May 19, 2012

283. Greg Bahnsen on the Problem of Evil - May 21, 2012

284. Christian Anti-Morality: A Response to Nide - May 22, 2012

285. In Shambles: Nide's Crumbling Worldview - May 23, 2012

286. Presuppositionalism’s Finest? - May 24, 2012

287. Craig Keener on Miracles - June 17, 2012

288. Chris Bolt vs. the Evils of Demanding Evidence in Support of Truth Claims - July 22, 2012

289. Is Anyone Truly a Christian? - August 4, 2012

290. STB: Two Years and Counting - August 27, 2012

291. Answers to “50 Important Philosophical Questions” - September 15, 2012

292. Christianity vs. Happiness - October 8, 2012

293. Hell is for Believers - October 11, 2012

294. Is Math Christian? - October 18, 2012

295. My Discussion with Michael Rawlings - November 16, 2012

296. Michael David Rawlings and the Primacy of a Bad Attitude - December 9, 2012

297. Rawlings' Bawlings - January 3, 2013

298. Prayson Daniel vs. the Imaginative Nature of Christian Theism - January 29, 2013

299. Debate between Objectivist Andrew Bernstein and Dinesh D’Souza Now on YouTube - February 18, 2013

300. A Case in Point, Part I - March 5, 2013

301. A Case in Point, Part II - March 13, 2013

Year Eight saw some wonderful additions to my growing list of body-blows against the Christian worldview. I began the new season with a six-part series providing a comprehensive answer to Christian apologist Dustin Segers’ presuppositionalist apologetic. So far as I have seen, Segers has never acknowledged or replied to my interaction with his list of questions for atheists. In fact, I haven’t seen hide nor hair of the guy anywhere on the internet, nothing new from him anyway, since I posted my responses to him back in April and May last year. Perhaps he’s been busy with other things. Maybe he’s focusing his efforts on “street preaching,” preferring to bamboozle passersby minding their own business and having other things on their minds, and not having the time or resources to examine what he preaches at them carefully. Who knows. Until we hear from Segers, it appears he’s been put to rest.

Back in May last year, we saw everyone’s favorite court jester “Nide” – now affectionately known as Nidiot – make a couple appearances on the Fundamentally Flawed podcast circuit. I must say that never prior to this time had I felt so embarrassed for another human being. Then again, perhaps I’m in error for indulging Nidiot’s delusion of being human. Regardless, there’s some real entertainment value to enjoyed there.

To might delight, much of the juicy stuff from the past year can be found in the comments of several of my blog entries. So I offer my gratitude to those readers who contributed to the discussion.

In early November last year, a Christian apologist by the name of Michael David Rawlings initiated a discussion which escalated into repeated hysterical meltdowns publicly suffered by a believer the likes of which I have never witnessed before. This of course encouraged Nidiot to up the ante on his own obnoxiousness as he gave himself up for adoption to the swashbuckling Rawlings. The fireworks can be enjoyed in the comments of entries 294, 295, 296 and 297.

Unfortunately, because of the horrendous abuse of my blog by these two self-effacing characters, one difficult decision that I had to make during Year Eight was to turn on comment moderation. I tolerated Nidiot for roughly a year and half; I allowed him to post his comments at will on my blog, and readers were free to respond. Most of his comments were one-liners that proved over and over again that he had no original substance whatsoever to share, but at least his participation did offer some entertainment value. An unwitting court jester, Nidiot was clearly unaware of the degrees to which he could embarrass himself. But Rawlings was a different matter. Rawlings would post sizable comments, sometimes several in a row, and even though his comments would be answered, either by myself or by others, or as in many cases by both myself and others, he would simply repost previously submitted (and previously rebutted) comments as if they still needed answering or as though they raised some new point that no one had yet considered. It was clear that Rawlings was not interested in a mature, honest discussion, and his unrelenting abuse required me to take action.

While I am still holding out hope that I can eventually turn off comment moderation, I’m glad to say that turning it on has not brought the discussions on my blog to a halt. Interest in my Proof that the Christian God Does Not Exist was rekindled when a Christian apologist sought to challenged my proof’s premises. Amazingly enough, this brought out several believers who actually challenged Premise 1 of my proof – i.e., the basic recognition that the imaginary is not real – in order to defend their Christian theism. This in turn led to me providing even more support on behalf of my argument, which has proved to be more effective than I had originally expected. Thank you, Christian apologists!

So here’s to Year Nine! There's lots more to come. Hoist the steins, folks, and drink to another fun-filled year of anti-apologetic detection!

by Dawson Bethrick

A Case in Point, Part II

We continue now with the second and final installment of my interaction with a comment reacting to my blog Proof that the Christian God Does Not Exist posted by a Christian over on Prayson Daniel’s blog.

The initial installment of my interaction with the Christian author’s objections can be found here. In that installment, we saw that the author rejected Premise 1 of my argument, which affirms the recognition that “that which is imaginary is not real.” To affirm his rejection of Premise 1, the author used the example of a leprechaun that he imagined, saying:

…since our leprechaun can be imagined, it has been given reality. So to say that God, Who can be imagined, is not real based on the premise that He is imaginary begs the question.

Thus the author has already essentially admitted that the Christian god is something he has imagined, just as he imagined the leprechaun in his example. Why else would he find it necessary to say that my argument’s Premise 1 (“that which is imaginary is not real”) “isn’t even accurate on its face”? Why else would he state that the leprechaun he admits to imagining “has been given reality” in the context of defending his god from an argument that sets out to prove that it is not real?

But the author does not stop here. Oddly, he was not content attacking just one premise of my argument. Instead, he found it necessary to attack every premise of my argument.

A Case in Point, Part I

Recent controversy concerning my proof that the Christian god does not exist has brought a few of Christianity’s more daring defenders out of their comfort zones. We have already seen Prayson Daniel’s unsuccessful attempts to attack my argument (see his blog entries here and here).

I have already interacted with Prayson’s feeble efforts to discredit my argument in a blog entry of my own: see Prayson Daniel vs. the Imaginative Nature of Christian Theism. The discussion in the comments of this entry is particularly fascinating given the fact that Christians are taking issue with my argument’s Premise 1, namely the recognition that the imaginary is not real. Believers are preferring to challenge the premise that the imaginary is not real over seeking to topple my argument’s fourth premise, which affirms outright that the Christian god is imaginary (and not without supporting evidence; see here). The choice to attack my argument’s Premise 1 instead of its Premise 4 suggests, quite strongly I might add, that the believers who take this route are admitting through their actions that they know the god they worship is in fact imaginary. Their concern is not to prove that their god is not imaginary, but to challenge the view that the imaginary is not real.

One comment submitted to Prayson’s blog was particularly noteworthy for the abundance of blunders one can find in its author’s attempts to refute my argument. Posted under the moniker “bethelbaptistchurchblog,” its author does not provide his name (which seems customary for many Christians these days – they apparently want to keep their identities concealed). Trying to remain anonymous might be the only wise move the author made in posting his comment. Throughout his comment, the author incorrectly refers to me as “Beckwith.” This was not his only error, nor was it his biggest. In fact, his comment is so full of fundamental blunders that it is hard to know which one should win an Oscar.

Debate between Objectivist Andrew Bernstein and Dinesh D’Souza Now on YouTube

The topic of the debate is: Christianity: Good or Bad for Mankind? The debate was held at the University of Texas, Austin, on February 8, 2013. Details on the YouTube page are as follows:

DEBATE: Christianity: Good or Bad for Mankind? 

Dinesh D'Souza vs. Andrew Bernstein  

Is Christianity the source of important truths, moral law, and man's rights and thus profoundly good for mankind—or is it antithetical to all such values and thus profoundly bad? In this debate, Christian conservative Dinesh D'Souza argues that Christianity is good; Objectivist atheist Andrew Bernstein argues the alternative.  

Brought to you by the UT Objectivism Society and The Objective Standard  

For more information on Ayn Rand's philosophy of Objectivism and its application to cultural and political issues, visit: http://www.TheObjectiveStandard.com

Prayson Daniel vs. the Imaginative Nature of Christian Theism

A Christian blogger by the name of Prayson Daniel has responded to my blog A Proof that the Christian God Does Not Exist. Prayson’s blog entry can be found here: Bethrick: A Proof that the Christian God Does Not Exist? The basic syllogism of my argument is as follows:

Premise 1: That which is imaginary is not real.  

Premise 2: If something is not real, it does not actually exist.  

Premise 3: If the god of Christianity is imaginary, then it is not real and therefore does not actually exist.  

Premise 4: The god of Christianity is imaginary.  

Conclusion: Therefore, the god of Christianity is not real and therefore does not actually exist.

Prayson grants that my argument is formally valid, adding “and thus if premise 1-4 are true, Bethrick would have succeeded in showing that God, as believed by Christians, does not exist.” But of course, given his allegiance to the Christian worldview, Prayson can be expected not to accept that my argument is sound.

Rawlings' Bawlings

In the comments sections of the previous three entries on my blog (beginning with the most recent: Michael David Rawlings and the Primacy of a Bad Attitude, My Discussion with Michael Rawlings, and Is Math Christian?), we have had the opportunity to observe the spectacle of a most pompous individual.

From the beginning, Rawlings has come to us wielding multi-syllabic jargon and point-missing braggadocio in a most characteristic fashion. But according to Rawlings and the defenses he’s provided, what does the Christian worldview have to offer in terms of philosophical value? Let the reader decide, but the reader should be informed before settling his opinion prematurely. So here is an overview (but I caution the reader: this is by no means an exhaustive catalogue of Rawlings’ indiscretions and deficiencies – not by a long shot!):

Michael David Rawlings and the Primacy of a Bad Attitude

Christians are notorious for having hurt feelings when their god-belief claims are not accepted as the truths they affirm on their mere say so. Their feelings are hurt even more when their “arguments” are exposed as the silly collections of incoherence that they are. But in spite of their hurt feelings, some Christians keep coming back for more punishment, pushing the same nonsense like a dog coming back to its own vomit, apparently expecting that his next iteration of the same nonsense, perhaps in a new guise, will somehow slide under the radar of philosophical detection. I have bad news for the believer: it won’t.

Christian apologist Michael David Rawlings is no exception to this frequently encountered quagmire. He has come posting on my blog under the guise of wanting to learn about Objectivism and peddling a highfalutin perspective on Christianity backed up by “credentials” which he never specifies. His pockets are loaded to bear with reality-denying assumptions and ten-cent theological jargon to give the impression that he has the answer to the age-old question, “Where’s the beef?” In practice, Michael Rawlings doesn’t even really try to back up his assertions. On the contrary, he simply gets furiously angry when others don’t accept what he says on his mere say so. And this is a guy who says that Christianity does not affirm the primacy of consciousness when human consciousness is involved.

My Discussion with Michael Rawlings

In the comments section of my previous blog entry, Is Math Christian?, a visitor to my blog named Michael Rawlings has engaged me in a fascinating and, I’m happy to say, very civil discussion about Christianity.

Michael does not strike me as the typical apologist for Christianity. His tone is mature and he exhibits a refreshing willingness to examine ideas and take them seriously. He has also expressed admiration for Objectivism, which I find encouraging.

Still, Michael seems to have a persisting hesitancy to address direct questions responding to his statements. To his credit in this regard, he has expressed caution for taking things slowly and addressing issues in a sequential manner. However, the list of outstanding questions has been growing since the discussion first began.

Is Math Christian?

Two weeks ago, on October 4, I submitted a comment to the blog “MATH IS CHRISTIAN, on an entry titled THE FUTILITY OF ALL NON-CHRISTIAN APPROACHES TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS (pardon the caps - perhaps the author figured that caps would ensure the truth of what he claims).

The author of the blog, a Charles Jackson who, according to his personal info page, holds an MS in mathematics from Cal State Long Beach, claims in his blog that “the Christian God, being, as He is, infinite, personal, all-knowing, all-powerful, all-controlling, self-attesting, and self-revelatory, provides what is necessary for a successful philosophy of anything.” Given this “presupposition,” Jackson reasons, “the sufficiency of the concept of the Christian God for the intelligibility of human mathematical experience follows directly from the sufficiency of the concept of the Christian God for the intelligibility of human experience, simpliciter.” Consequently, he continues, “the concept of the Christian God is a sufficient condition for the intelligibility of human mathematical experience: mathematical knowledge, mathematical practice, etc.”

From these premises Jackson concludes that “all non-Christian approaches to the philosophy of mathematics” are therefore necessarily futile. They would have to be, goes Jakson’s reasoning, since the “concept” of the Christian god is so necessary to “mathematical experience” and “mathematical knowledge.”

For those lounging in the choir, such “reasoning” probably seems both air-tight and bullet-proof. But is it? Does such reasoning have any objective basis in reality? Or, does it only seem so unassailable from within the fake environment of the Christian worldview which elevates imagination over reality?

I suspect it is the latter rather than the former.

Hell is for Believers

There are many unintended ironies in Christianity and Christian apologetics. For instance, Christian apologists claim that their worldview is the only worldview which can consistently “account for” objective moral absolutes, but at the same time they claim that there exists such a thing as a “morally justifiable reason” for allowing evil and that their god has this (cf. Greg Bahnsen, Always Ready, p. 171; see also here). So much for the Christian god being “absolutely good.”

Or consider the claim that only Christianity “provides” the necessary preconditions for knowledge, but at the same time Christianity has no theory of concepts to inform a theory of knowledge. So in spite of all the “How do you know?” questions that presuppositionalists discharge in their debates, their worldview has no answer to how one can know anything and can offer nothing more than “We know without knowing how we know,” as John Frame has affirmed (see here).

Another example is the claim that the Christian god is a perfect creator and that it created everything in the universe, including human beings, but at the same time they say that human beings are inherently flawed and depraved creations in need of redemption (see here). According to this view, a creator that is perfect created creatures which are not perfect. This is like saying that “invisible things” are “clearly seen” (cf. Romans 1:20).

Christianity vs. Happiness

Presuppositional apologists are continually focusing the philosophical debate on issues such as which worldview can account for logic, which worldview can solve the problem of induction, which worldview provides the necessary preconditions for intelligibility, etc. And while presuppositionalism has been answered on each of these points (for logic, see here; for induction, see here; for knowledge, see here), one thing that presuppositionalists tend to overlook in their worldview analysis is man’s need for happiness. Indeed, one may even get the impression that according to their worldview, man does not need happiness or should not even try for happiness. Happiness does not at all seem important to the apologist, for he never draws attention to its importance, and apologists in general do not come across as very happy persons.

This oversight, to the degree that it is merely an oversight, is most fitting. For the Christian worldview cannot provide the necessary preconditions for human happiness. Happiness is not possible to a mind haunted by Christianity’s fear and guilt.

Answers to “50 Important Philosophical Questions”

I recently saw a blog entry on Thoughts On The Line (TOTL) titled 50 IMPORTANT PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTIONS (no, that’s not me shouting), and after reading some of the questions I thought I’d take some time and answer all fifty questions. So here they are, in the order in which they appear on the TOTL blog entry:

STB: Two Years and Counting

It has now been two years to the day since I posted my refutation of the argument showcased on Sye Ten Bruggencate’s website “proof that god exists dot org.” While the argument on his site remains unchanged, Bruggencate has so far failed to vindicate the defense of his worldview which he has presented to the world against my critique.

Is Anyone Truly a Christian?

Non-Christians generally accept a person’s claim to be a Christian without hesitation. If a person claims that he or she is a Christian, non-believers typically take their word for it. And rational individuals usually grant that other adults are mature enough to identify themselves accurately and honestly upon first meeting them. And generally speaking, Christian believers themselves are happy with this situation: they typically expect non-Christians to accept their self-identification as Christians at face value.

Christians themselves, however, are not nearly so accepting. To be sure, they expect others to accept their own self-identification as Christians. But they are not always so accepting of the claims of other individuals to be Christians as well. Internal squabbles among Christians, complete with accusations of heresy and denunciations of deviant practice, are commonplace and have colored the landscape of Christendom since its earliest days. Even in his letters to the churches he had planted, the apostle Paul warned Christians of imposters, contributing from Christianity’s first moments to the “who can you trust?” atmosphere of Christian “fellowship.”

Chris Bolt vs. the Evils of Demanding Evidence in Support of Truth Claims

In his blog Answering the Evidentialist Objection, Chris Bolt makes it clear that does not like the idea, attributed to W.K. Clifford, that

It is wrong always, everywhere and for everyone to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.

He calls this a “marvelously strong claim” (perhaps stronger than the claim that a first century Palestinian Jew was resurrected by a supernatural consciousness after dying by means of crucifixion) and asks, “What reason does one have for thinking it true?”

Bolt’s reply to this question is “Probably none,” which strikes me as somewhat deficient in confidence. Perhaps this is the reason why he has turned off the commenting option for this blog entry.

Craig Keener on Miracles

To date I have not devoted a specific entry on my blog to a discussion of miracles. This is partly due simply to more important priorities, lack of time, and the fact that I’d expect anyone familiar with my worldview could surmise why I reject miracle claims. But it’s very simple: the notion of ‘miracle’ presupposes a universe governed by the primacy of consciousness metaphysics, and we can know this because it denotes an event in which some or all entities involved are under the direct control of a supernatural will - i.e., a form of consciousness. Since I reject any version or expression of the primacy of consciousness, I consequently reject the notion of miracles since the notion of miracles is an expression of the primacy of consciousness.

Presuppositionalism’s Finest?

Below is my transcription of two excerpts from Fundamentally Flawed’s Episode 47: Hezekiah Ahaz, Round Two.

In Shambles: Nide's Crumbling Worldview

Nide has posted some comments replying to my previous blog entry responding to him here: Christian Anti-Morality: A Response to Nide. While it does not appear that Nide has finished his response to what I stated to him in that blog entry (he left his last comment with an indication that there was yet more to come), I am moving on with a response to what he stated in his reaction to what I wrote.

Christian Anti-Morality: A Response to Nide

The following is a reply to comments made on this blog by Nide (aka “Hezekiah Ahaz”).

Greg Bahnsen on the Problem of Evil

Greg Bahnsen (1948 – 1995) was the most high-profile popularizer of presuppositional apologetics of his day. He remains today one of the foremost interpreters of Cornelius Van Til’s apologetic works, his lengthy Van Til’s Apologetic: Readings & Analysis being published posthumously from Bahnsen’s own manuscript, which he completed shortly before his death (p.xv). The result is 764 pages, including a bibliography and three indices (for bible verses, names and topics) of excessively repetitive droning about how the “unbeliever” can’t account for this, can’t account for that, doesn’t know how to put on his pants in the morning, doesn’t know how to put his shirt on, etc. Throughout all this Bahnsen nowhere lays out an actual epistemological method for one to apply and come to the same “knowledge” Bahnsen and other Christians claim for themselves. Truly, it is a most ironic spectacle.

What some may find surprising is the fact that, in the space of 764 pages, there is in the topical index only one reference to the problem of evil, and that is to a footnote straddling pages 525 and 526 of Bahnsen’s thick tome.

And while it is rather lengthy in itself so far as footnotes go, Bahnsen states in that footnote that the problem of evil is, in his experience, “the most popular argument urged against Christianity.” So while his book is over 700 pages, he spends just one paragraph, relegated to a passing footnote, on addressing what he says is “the most popular argument urged against Christianity.”

Answering Dustin Segers’ Presuppositionalism, Part IVb: Collectivism, Evil and Slavery

This will be the final installment of my extended reply to Dustin Segers’ questions for atheists. My previous responses to Segers can be found here:

Answering Dustin Segers’ Presuppositionalism, Part I: Intro and the Nature of Truth
Answering Dustin Segers’ Presuppositionalism, Part II: The Nature of Logic 

Answering Dustin Segers’ Presuppositionalism, Part IIIa: The Uniformity of Nature 

Answering Dustin Segers’ Presuppositionalism, Part IIIb: The Problem of Induction 

Answering Dustin Segers’ Presuppositionalism, Part IVa: Objective Morality

In the present entry, I continue my exploration of Segers’ final question, namely:

”How do you account for objective morality without God?"

I have already provided a direct response to this question in my previous blog entry. In this entry, I explore some of the political implications of the moral system found in Christianity, focusing on Christianity’s proclivity towards collectivism, its affinity with Nazism and communism, the problem of evil, and the issue of slavery.

Answering Dustin Segers’ Presuppositionalism, Part IVa: Objective Morality

I am back! I had originally intended to post my response to Segers’ question about morality back in April, but I had several conferences to attend and I also moved into a new house on the outskirts of Bangkok. There’s still much to do and I’m extremely busy, but I have managed to devote some snippets of time here and there to my writing. Not ideal, but I’ll take what I can get!

So many issues came up as I was writing about the contrasts between (genuinely) objective morality and what passes for morality in Christianity, that I have decided to split this portion of my reaction to Segers into two different blog entries. In the present entry I answer Segers’ question about morality, provide definitions for important terms relevant to his question (e.g., what is morality? What is objectivity? Etc.), emphasize the importance of focusing on the individual when discussing morality, examine the 10 commandments, explore the topic of how one determines his own values, and make some points about the abortion debate.

In the follow-up entry (IVb), I will highlight the collectivistic implications of Christian morality and explore Christianity’s permissive view of slavery.

Throughout all of my discussion I draw attention to the stark contrasts between objective morality and Christian morality, leaving no question that Christian morality is entirely unfit for human life and certainly not to be confused with a moral code which is in fact objective in nature. To serve this end I make use of some dazzling quotations from defenders of Christianity themselves.

The previous four entries in my response to Segers can be found here:

Answering Dustin Segers’ Presuppositionalism, Part I: Intro and the Nature of Truth
Answering Dustin Segers’ Presuppositionalism, Part II: The Nature of Logic 

Answering Dustin Segers’ Presuppositionalism, Part IIIa: The Uniformity of Nature 

Answering Dustin Segers’ Presuppositionalism, Part IIIb: The Problem of Induction

Answering Dustin Segers’ Presuppositionalism, Part IIIb: The Problem of Induction

Here is Part IIIb of my response to Dustin Segers’ four questions for atheists.

Previous responses to Segers can be found here:

Answering Dustin Segers’ Presuppositionalism, Part I: Intro and the Nature of Truth 

Answering Dustin Segers’ Presuppositionalism, Part II: The Nature of Logic 

Answering Dustin Segers’ Presuppositionalism, Part IIIa: The Uniformity of Nature

In this entry, I continue my response to Segers’ third question, which is:

3. Science - "How do you answer the problem of induction from a secular perspective?"

In my previous blog entry, I provided the first part of my answer to this question. In that previous entry, I addressed an area of concern which typically accompanies the presuppositionalist’s questions about induction, namely the uniformity of nature. I explained that, on the objective view, the uniformity we observe in nature is inherent in nature and obtains independently of conscious activity, while on the subjective view, any uniformity which we observe in nature is thought to be the product of some act of consciousness. Given the stark antithesis of these two contrasting positions, I recommend that rational individuals who encounter presuppositionalists raising the issue of the uniformity of nature as a debating point, ask the apologists to state explicitly whether or not they think the uniformity we observe in nature is a product of conscious activity, or if it is inherent in nature and obtains independent of any conscious activity. Watch for any reluctance to answer this question; watch for consistency with the apologists’ professed worldview in any answer that is given.

Now let’s turn our attention to induction and see if Objectivism, the Philosophy of Reason, can shed even further light in answering the presuppositionalist.

Answering Dustin Segers’ Presuppositionalism, Part IIIa: The Uniformity of Nature

I now continue with my series of responses to several questions Christian apologist and “church-planter” Dustin Segers poses to atheists. This will be the third installment in this series. The first two included my responses to Segers’ first two questions, which can be found here:

Answering Dustin Segers’ Presuppositionalism, Part I: Intro and the Nature of Truth

Answering Dustin Segers’ Presuppositionalism, Part II: The Nature of Logic

Let us now consider his third question:

3. Science - "How do you answer the problem of induction from a secular perspective?"

Ah, now this one’s juicy!

Answering Dustin Segers’ Presuppositionalism, Part II: The Nature of Logic

In this second installment of my series answering Dustin Segers’ apologetic questions for atheists, I focus on Segers’ question about logic. (My initial blog entry responding to Segers can be found here).

This one’s a biggie, so buckle up and hold on tight. You’re in for a wild ride!

Answering Dustin Segers’ Presuppositionalism, Part I: Intro and the Nature of Truth

Christian apologist Dustin Segers (remember him?) recently posted an entry on his blog in which he tells about his experiences at something called the “Reason Rally.” Segers used the words ‘sophisticated’ and ‘blasphemous’ to describe what he witnessed at the event, which he calls “an opportunity to trash religion in general and Christianity specifically.” I’m guessing any non-religious assembly must by its very nature be guilty of this particularly nefarious misdeed. Believers gather on a weekly basis to condemn non-believers and fancy themselves as numbering among “the chosen,” but when non-believers gather at an annual meet open to all comers, it’s specifically intended to “trash” Christianity.

Incinerating Presuppositionalism: Year Seven

Today is March 26, 2012, which means: another anniversary of Incinerating Presuppositionalism has been reached. That’s right, another milestone has been achieved.

The past year has signaled a most momentous transition for me. I moved with my then three-year-old daughter to Thailand from the United States in May 2011, started a new position, and have sought to live as a functionally single parent in a foreign country (where I do not speak the language). It’s been the experience and challenge of a lifetime. My lasting as long as I have – with my daughter reaching her fourth birthday, completing her first year of kindergarten, and developing as an exceptionally gifted child (albeit, with my special help) – is not a miracle, but a testament to my dedication and perseverance as a civilized human being and my ability as a father. Indeed, I’m not the kind of parent who’s about to stand idly by and let his child be abducted, tortured and executed by a bunch of lawbreakers and miscreants. Nope, unlike the Christian god, I’ll protect my child till my last breath!

In the meantime, I have continued with my blog, and have published the following entries since my blog’s last anniversary, the same time last year:

250. Incinerating Presuppositionalism: Year Six – March 26, 2011

251. Imagine There’s a Heaven - April 29, 2011

252. The Argument from the Unity of Knowledge - May 25, 2011

253. Considering Tony’s Offerings - June 2, 2011

254. A Proof that the Christian God Does Not Exist - July 15, 2011

255. Nide’s Snide - July 22, 2011

256. Presuppositionalism vs. Objectivism: How Objectivism Prevails - August 2, 2011

257. Five Years and Still Waiting… - August 12, 2011

258. STB: One Year and Still Waiting… - August 27, 2011

259. Answering Nide’s Questions about the Uniformity of Nature - September 6, 2011

260. Strange Bedfellows? - October 3, 2011

261. George H. Smith’s “Atheism: The Case Against God” – Online – Free PDF - October 16, 2011

262. Has the Primacy of Existence Been Refuted? - October 27, 2011

263. A Reply to Dustin Seger’s Dismantled Blog Entry on Objectivism - November 1, 2011

264. Cognitive Reliability vs. Supernatural Deception - November 21, 2011

265. Christianity’s Sanction of Evil - December 1, 2011

266. Christianity’s Psychological Price Tag - December 4, 2011

267. Some Thoughts on the “Sensus Divinitatis” - December 6, 2011

268. A Reply to Michael: Further Thoughts on the Issue of Supernatural Deception - December 10, 2011

269. Are the Laws of Logic “Thoughts” of the Christian God? - January 1, 2012

270. Reaction to My Critique of Anderson and Welty’s “The Lord of Non-Contradiction” - February 25, 2012

271. Nide’s 15 - March 6, 2012

272. Can a Worldview “Provide” the “Preconditions of Intelligibility”? - Part I - March 16, 2012

273. Can a Worldview “Provide” the “Preconditions of Intelligibility”? - Part II - March 17, 2012

274. Can a Worldview “Provide” the “Preconditions of Intelligibility”? - Part III - March 20, 2012

275. The Self-Attesting Absurdity of the Christian Worldview - March 22, 2012

Highlights from the past year include (not to mention being evacuated from a flooded Bangkok in the fall of 2011!):

- A Proof that the Christian God Does Not Exist;

- the one year anniversary of the publication of my refutation of Sye Ten Bruggencate’s argument for the existence of his god (which is still unrefuted);

- a most historic pwning of Dustin Segers in his fault-ridden attempt to refute the primacy of existence;

- two posts interacting with James Anderson and Greg Welty’s paper The Lord of Non-Contradiction, found here and here;

- and a three-part analysis of the presuppositionalist claim that the Christian worldview “provides” the necessary preconditions for intelligibility, found here, here, and here.

So there’s a lot here to sink your teeth into. So get busy – start reading, start digesting, start thinking. Consider the points I raise, and formulate your own view. Perhaps I’m wrong. If so, discover why. Perhaps I’m right. If so, understand why. In the meantime, I will do my best, given my haphazard and very full schedule, to keep up with my blog and carry it to its eighth anniversary.

by Dawson Bethrick

The Self-Attesting Absurdity of the Christian Worldview

Over the past week, I presented a three-part series exploring the common presuppositionalist claim that the “Christian worldview” is the “only worldview” which “provides” the necessary preconditions for intelligibility. My investigation of this claim, which can be found here, here and here, demonstrates why this claim simply cannot be true.

But in spite of giving the matter more careful and systematic attention than presuppositionalists themselves typically devote to their own talking points, this demonstration – and more importantly, just the idea of taking a critical look at such a claim – will likely be ignored by apologists.

Can a Worldview “Provide” the “Preconditions of Intelligibility”? - Part III

What Are the Preconditions of Intelligibility?

If intelligibility is the capacity of some thing to be an object of awareness and be identified and integrated into the sum of one’s knowledge without contradiction, then what can we say about the preconditions of this ability?

I would wager that we can say quite a bit, and everything we can say about them – it will be seen – vies against the presuppositionalist claim that the Christian worldview “provides the necessary preconditions for intelligibility.”

But let’s ask the question: what is needed for a thing to be an object of awareness and be identified and integrated into the sum of one’s knowledge without contradiction?

Can a *Worldview* “Provide” the “Preconditions of Intelligibility”? - Part II

What is “Intelligibility”?

In my initial post in this series, we saw that it is common for presuppositionalists to assume that a worldview is what “provides the necessary preconditions for intelligibility.” By ‘worldview’ presuppositionalists explicitly mean “a network... of beliefs,” and it has even been stated that “beliefs are preconditions for intelligible experience” (see here).

This is not an isolated example. Indeed, I gave several other examples in my previous entry on this topic, and here are yet two more:

TAG [i.e., the “transcendental argument for the existence of God”] asserts that only the Christian worldview provides the necessary preconditions for the intelligibility of human experience. (Michael Butler, TAG vs. TANG)

Van Til contended that the Christian worldview supplies the preconditions of intelligibility. (Steve Hays, Theonomy under fire-2)

Logically this all means that “a network.. of beliefs” – i.e., a worldview - is the source of the necessary preconditions of intelligibility.

Can a *Worldview* "Provide" the "Preconditions of Intelligibility"? - Part I

One of the more commonly met elements of presuppositionalism is the assumption that a worldview can “provide the necessary preconditions of intelligibility.” From what I have seen, this assumption in itself is never defended. Presuppositionalists typically do not present arguments for why one should expect that a worldview as such (regardless of the particulars of that worldview) “provides the necessary preconditions of intelligibility.” The assumption that “the necessary preconditions of intelligibility” are “provided” by a worldview is generally taken completely for granted by presuppositionalists, and I’ve never seen an argument which establishes this premise.

Rather, it is typically embedded into the presuppositionalist characterization of the antithesis between Christian theism and any acknowledged contenders, as though it required no substantiation whatsoever. This in itself is noteworthy since presuppositional apologists commonly seek to make a worldview’s ability to “provide the preconditions of intelligibility” the fulcrum upon which the debate between Christianity and any non-Christian position hinges.

In this series, I will argue that at least some (indeed, the most fundamental) preconditions of intelligibility are actually not provided by any worldview. The position which I will defend is the view that those preconditions in question would already need to be in place for any worldview to exist in the first place. Moreover, I will argue that in the case of those preconditions for intelligibility which a worldview should supply, Christianity as a worldview comes up far too short to be seriously considered as their source.

Nide's 15

Christian apologist in-the-making Nide Corniell, who blogs and comments under the pseudonym “Hezekiah Ahaz,” continues to insist on playing the court jester. I recently posed 15 questions for Nide to consider (in the comments section of this blog), and he addressed them in his usual evasive and tirelessly adolescent manner (see here.)

Most of these are questions that I had posed to Nide earlier in our comment discussion but which he had resisted answering. Now we have his answers. Let’s take a look and see what he says.

Reaction to My Critique of Anderson and Welty’s “The Lord of Non-Contradiction”

It’s not very common to find Christian apologists acknowledging my critiques of theistic apologetics (let alone actually interacting with them). So when it does happen, and I learn about it, my interest is piqued. Typically theistic apologists ignore my writings, suggesting that even if they are aware of them and have taken some time to examine any of them, they are left only with a blank stare and perhaps some sneering reaction against me personally. There are occasions when apologists confronted with my critiques of theistic defenses will indicate that they’ll examine the matter more deeply at some unspecified future time, but fail to deliver on such promises. I’m reminded of several occasions when Chris Bolt, for example, would promise to look further into the matter at some unspecified future time.

Are the Laws of Logic "Thoughts" of the Christian God?

Hello my readers.

Happy 2555 to all!

Yes, here in Thailand, it’s not 2012. Thailand goes by a version of the Buddhist calendar, and it’s already the year 2555 here. Perhaps you could think of me as writing to you from the future.

As I predicted in earlier messages to you on my blog, I’ve been busier than Wall Street on a bull rally since getting back to Bangkok late November. The flood waters are for the most part gone, and life for most people is back to normal. But there’s a sense of urgency to make up for lost time, both in the private sector and also in public works. Schools are even going six days a week here, which means my daughter, who’s only in kindergarten, has a brutal schedule to keep.

Unfortunately, that means I haven’t been able to keep up with my blog. I see that Nide is still going at it, and that Justin Hall and Ydemoc are continuing to engage him. They’re all welcome to continue doing so. I’m sure it will all make for some interesting reading one day, supposing I get the time.

In the meanwhile, I’ve been feasting – really, nibbling and grazing, when opportunity arises – on a paper recently published by James Anderson and Greg Welty called The Lord of Non-Contradiction: An Argument for God from Logic. In this paper, the authors set out to “argue for a substantive metaphysical relationship between the laws of logic and the existence of God” (p. 1). Specifically they aim to prove “that there are laws of logic because God exists,” that “there are laws of logic only because God exists” (Ibid.). Presumably this is the Christian god of the New Testament whose existence their argument will finally prove. They say of their own argument that it is “a fascinating and powerful but neglected argument for the existence of God.” Of course, this is not meant to be self-congratulatory, but rather a device intended to hook the reader’s interest so that he’ll continue on for the next twenty-plus pages of fun-filled reading. (I’m guessing that, for Sye Ten Bruggencate, 22 pages devoted to the development of a single argument does not constitute “argumentum ad verbosium,” since it’s intended to establish, once and for all, the existence of a deity.)

A Reply to Michael: Further Thoughts on the Issue of Supernatural Deception

In the comments section of a previous blog entry of mine, Cognitive Reliability vs. Supernatural Deception, Christian blogger Michael Russell has offered numerous points of reaction. His last two comments, dated 7 December, were so loaded with topical material that I decided to post my response to him in a new blog entry here on Incinerating Presuppositionalism.

Some Thoughts on the "Sensus Divinitatis"

In the comments section of my blog Cognitive Reliability vs. Supernatural Deception, a Christian blogger by the name of Michael Russell (whose blog Something to say has some interesting posts) challenged my view that Christianity’s supernaturalism undercuts any assumed cognitive reliability on the part of the believer given the possibility, implied by its supernaturalism, that malevolent spirits may be deceiving them undetectably.

Christianity's Psychological Price Tag

Alex Botten recently commented on my blog. He wrote:

I find it slightly disturbing that the Christians are complaining that they can't deal with anything other than bite sized points.

At a guess, their religion's absolute failure to account for knowledge causes them to run from any situation where they might learn something.

Christianity's Sanction of Evil

Prologue

Over the past two weeks or so, while I’ve been living temporarily in the seaside resort town of Cha’am, Thailand (since the part of Bangkok where I live has been flooded and unreachable), I’ve been party to several discussions with presuppositional apologist Sye Ten Bruggencate. Readers of my blog will remember my critique of Sye’s website where he’s published his version of a presuppositional argument for the existence of his version of the Christian god.

Well, we’ve butted heads again, and the results have been, shall I say, historic.