Presuppositionalism and the Argument from Ignorance

On whether or not the presuppositionalist "transcendental argument for the existence of God" (TAG) qualifies as a variation of the argument from design, Zachary Moore made the following comment:

I always thought it was just an argument from ignorance.

After examining numerous apologetic sources pontificating on TAG and presuppositionalism, I am inclined to agree fully with Zachary's statement here. Of course, presuppositionalists will resist and protest this recognition, but the evidence to support it is wide-ranging and substantial, and it's quite easy to spot in the presuppositional strategy integral to deploying TAG.

First, let's get a good understanding of what the fallacy known as argument from ignorance really is. In support of his assessment, Zachary offered the following description of what constitutes an argument from ignorance:

The argument from ignorance, also known as argumentum ad ignorantiam or argument by lack of imagination, is a logical fallacy asserting that if something is currently unexplained then it did not (or could not) happen, or that if evidence of something has not been proven to their satisfaction, then it cannot exist. (1)

Technically known as argumentum ad ignorantiam, an argument from ignorance essentially consists of resting a conclusion on the arguer's own lack of knowledge of or familiarity with some key point of central concern to the topic under consideration. The argument from ignorance can thus be reduced to the following formula:

I don't know how X could be the case, therefore it follows that X cannot be the case.

As such, the argument from ignorance can be considered to be a form of non sequitur, i.e., an argument in which the conclusion does not follow from the premises offered in support of it. Of course, in actual conversation or debate, instances of this fallacy are typically not so bald-faced. In fact, the arguer himself may not even be aware that he is resting his conclusion on gaping holes in his summary knowledge. On the contrary, arguments resting their conclusion on the arguer's own ignorance of relevant matters usually tend to bury the arguer's ignorance under a mass of verbiage which conveniently disguises the fallacy such that the arguer himself may not readily detect his own error. Discovering and recognizing the error becomes all the more unlikely if the arguer is emotionally committed to the conclusion which his ignorance is supposed to validate.

It is clear to me that TAG and its customary defense strategy make use of an argument from ignorance in the hopes of securing the claim that Christianity is true. And this is not at all difficult to spot. Generally speaking, whenever the presuppositionalist says something along the lines of "you cannot account for [fill in the blank]," he's essentially just telling us that he simply does not know how the person addressed in such charges might "account for" such phenomena. And despite his announcement of his own ignorance of such matters in such an explicit manner, presuppositional apologists routinely regurgitate the same pattern throughout their defense of god-belief. Christian apologist Greg Bahnsen, who can be credited with popularizing this very approach to apologetics, used precisely this very tactic in his opening statement when he debated atheist Dr. Gordon Stein. Bahnsen simply asserted that

The atheist world-view cannot allow for laws of logic, the uniformity of nature, the ability for the mind to understand the world, and moral absolutes. In that sense, the atheist world-view cannot account for our debate tonight. (2)

An examination of Bahnsen's opening statement does not prove fruitful in discovering just how the apologist might go about proving this negative claim, and yet presuppositionalists typically mimick Bahnsen's approach as if it had actual substance (often referred to as "thrust"). If the apologist has an actual proof that "the atheist world-view cannot account for" said phenomena, why doesn't he offer it? Such questions are frequently asked, but they remain unanswered. In spite of this, apologists persist in using this very same tactic, even though it only serves in telling the world that they are simply unfamiliar with what any particular atheist's views are on the topic at hand.

That the assertion of inability on the part of atheists to "account for" various aspects of cognition and experience is integral to TAG, is clear from statements such as the following:

TAG says that the atheist can't account for logic. (3)

Another apologist followed up this remark, saying:

I don't just think you can't 'account' for just logic and a some other things. The claim of TAG is that you cannot explain or account for ANYTHING. (4)

The apologists' dependence on their own ignorance here is not only uncontained, but brazen and belligerent. And this much is clear: Since TAG is supposed to be an argument proving the existence of the Christian god, and central to this argument is the charge that non-Christians (perhaps atheists especially) are unable to provide an "account for" various things (or "ANYTHING"), one can certainly be forgiven for supposing that TAG is supposed to derive the Christian god's existence from the non-Christian's alleged inability to satisfy such challenges. For it appears that the apologist is essentially arguing as follows:

Premise 1: If the non-Christian cannot "account for" the "laws of logic, the uniformity of nature, the ability for the mind to understand the world, and moral absolutes," then the Christian god exists (or: the Christian worldview is true).

Premise 2: The non-Christian cannot "account for" the "laws of logic, the uniformity of nature, the ability for the mind to understand the world, and moral absolutes."

Conclusion: Therefore, the Christian god exists (or: the Christian worldview is true).

And while this appears to be the basic procedure in defending TAG, the apologist tends not to approach the matter as a topic of inquiry in which a comprehensive survey is conducted to review proposed "accounts" for the various phenomena in question in order to assure us that those proposed accounts are in fact flawed or somehow insufficient to the task. On the contrary, the apologetic method consists of simply stipulating this to be the case, as if the apologist's own say so were sufficient to seal the case. But in spite of the obvious reliance on his own sustained and indulged ignorance, the apologist fails to show exactly how the existence of an invisible magic being follows from someone's inability to develop a thesis on induction or some other mental process. So the non sequitur at the core of the apologist's argument from ignorance is clearly observed.

Presuppositionalists themselves demonstrate that they need to rely on argument from ignorance (or, should we say, assertion from ignorance) when critiquing rival religious beliefs. For instance, when certain "truths" were asserted on the basis of what were called "the messages of phil," one presuppositionalist attempted to criticize this position with the following:

We could do a transcendental analysis of the "messages of phil." But all you have done is make a blanket statement that the messages of phil are divine. Nothing has not been stated or worked out as a worldview.

Aside from the hapless use of a double negative, the apologist, who is clearly speaking out of ignorance, nowhere shows that the worldview associated with "the message of phil" has not been "worked out." For all he knows, there could be a 30-volume codex that defines and develops such a worldview from its fundamentals on up.

Now, after examining my reasons for agreeing with Zachary on this point, I asked myself the following question:

Is my conclusion that presuppositional apologetics bases its conclusions on the arguer's own ignorance of rival positions, itself based on my own ignorance of the presuppositionalist method and the evidences it recruits in deploying its defensive strategy?

I don't think it is. And here's why: As I mentioned above, I have examined numerous defenses presented by presuppositionalists, both in published works either in print or posted on the internet (cf. Van Til, Bahnsen, Frame, Pratt, Butler, Jones, Wilson, et al.), as well as in firsthand encounters with scores of apologists attempting to use this method of defense. In virtually all cases, the approaches employed share a similar basic strategy: the non-believer cannot "account for" some aspect or feature of cognition or experience, presumably because only an appeal to the believer's god can satisfactorily accomplish such a task and the non-believer by definition rejects or disavows the existence of the believer's god. But in each case, the feature or aspect of cognition or experience which the non-believer is said to be unable to "account for," can in fact only be addressed and understood if one has a good understanding of how the mind forms concepts and integrates them into larger conceptual structures. But this element is completely lacking from every deployment of presuppositional apologetics that I have examined, many of which I learned about because Christian debaters cited them as a supporting resource. (5) Not only do presuppositional apologists seem utterly ignorant of the importance of a good theory of concepts to such considerations, the worldview which they seek to defend - Christian theism - does not seem to have a native theory of concepts. (Apologists have been unable to show where in the bible one might find any information about concepts.)

Take for instance James Anderson's Secular Responses to the Problem of Induction, a paper intended to support the presuppositionalist position that non-Christian philosophy must confess defeat when it comes to providing a rational justification for induction. I give Anderson credit for at least trying to support this charge without simply stipulating it to be the case, for he does survey at least a few secular treatments of the supposed problem. But absent from his survey is any consideration of the Objectivist response to Hume's problem of induction. Granted, it may not be well known in some academic circles, but it does in fact exist (David Kelley summarizes his response to Hume in "Universals and Induction"). This can only indicate that Anderson's survey is incomplete and that the conclusion that "there presently exists no satisfactory solution to the problem of induction from a secular perspective" (6) is premature, in fact unwarranted. Indeed, his conclusion in fact rests on a gap in his knowledge of available treatments of induction. And I know that he was not familiar with the distinctive approach to induction that Objectivism provides when he wrote his paper based on his reaction to a statement I had made in our correspondence.

Specifically, I had written:

I must say, however, I'm always surprised, when reading a paper that attempts to deal with induction, that there is no discussion of concepts, the nature of their forming, or their relationship to inductive generalization, as if these issues did not matter.

In response to this, Anderson replied:

Well, it's not immediately obvious to me how the nature of concept formation bears either on the description of the problem of induction or on the development of cogent solutions. Perhaps you can elaborate.

This statement, especially coming from an apologist who has emphasized the "atheists can't account for induction" version of TAG so heavily, simply suggests to me that presuppositionalists do not approach induction as a conceptual matter. This tells me that they're ignorant of how induction is an extension of conceptual integration, which can only lead me to the conclusion that their apologetic ploy concerning this issue is based ultimately on their own ignorance of at least some opposing positions.

So unless presuppositionalists can do better than what they have done to date, the charge that TAG relies - at least in part - on an argument from ignorance, appears to be amply justified.

by Dawson Bethrick

Notes:

(1) Quoting this online source.

(2) The Great Debate

(3) TAG as Teleological Argument

(4) Ibid.

(5) For instance, section 7.4 "The Transcendental Nature of Presuppositional Argument," in Bahnsen's Van Til's Apologetic: Readings & Analysis, pp. 496-529.

(6) Secular Responses to the Problem of Induction

Dear Sal

Recently an individual who goes by the moniker Sal_et_Lucis, apparently a Christian, kindly stopped by my blog and posted a brief comment in which he asked me a question. In this blog entry, I will attempt to provide him with a comprehensive answer.

Sal asked: "Just how much of Van Til and Bahnsen have you actually sat down and read?"

My first reaction to this question was to wonder how much of either author one needs to read before he's allowed to have an opinion on something either one of them has written. My next reaction was to wonder how much those who ask me such questions have read my own writings. And though I think these are relevant questions, I doubt I'll get much of an answer to either in return.

Nevertheless, in response to Sal's question, I must admit that I have read quite a bit of both Van Til and Bahnsen, focusing primarily on their apologetic works. For example, VT's The Defense of the Faith, Christian Apologetics, various articles available on the net such as "Why I Believe in God," etc.; Bahnsen's Always Ready, Van Til's Analysis: Readings & Analysis (which contains lengthy quotations from many of Van Til's publications), and numerous articles available on the net, not to mention the writings of other presuppositionalists such as John Frame, Richard Pratt, James Anderson, David Byron, Greg Welty, Michael Warren, Massimo Lorenzini, Matt Slick, etc., etc. I have found much of these writings tiresomely repetitive (there seems to be no end to the list of woes that they attribute to non-belief in their invisible magic beings), and yet I've taken it upon myself to wade through their tortured prose in the hopes of finding anything that resembles an argument for their god-belief.

Now, I'm not so naïve as to suppose that, even if I have read everything written by these and other authors, that this would eliminate all detractors who would want to charge me with not reading enough. I have found that the easy-chair routine of dismissing Christianity's critics by saying they don't understand or haven't read enough is overused by self-styled apologists, many of whom consider their defense of the faith a kind of "ministry" commissioned by their god. I want to believe that the fact that so few apologists attempt to answer my challenges is explained by the possibility that they're simply not aware of my blog; and I would prefer not to think that presuppositional apologists, with all the fire-power they claim to have in their "transcendental arguments," are choosing to shy away from my criticisms. Then again, I don't find that the criticisms I present in my blog and on my personal page can be found elsewhere that I know of, so it may simply be the case that those apologists who are aware of my writings currently have no answer to my challenges, or that they would prefer to simply dismiss me as someone who hasn't read enough (such as one Jeff Downs tends to do on occasion). That's fine with me, as I know the word is getting out.

But since Sal has inquired, I am always willing to read more Van Til, Bahnsen, et al., for I know there is much literature on the topic of presuppositionalism which I have yet to digest. I would be very eager, for instance, to find any passage in either Van Til or Bahnsen where they deal with the issue of metaphysical primacy. I take this to be the make-all/break-all issue in all philosophy, since it is inescapable to all cognition. And even though Van Til, Bahnsen et al. pay ample lipservice to "the necessary preconditions of intelligibility," this issue never seems to come up in their writings. I find this astounding. I have my own suppositions for why this is the case, but I'd like to know what Sal and other Christians might think on this. I'm inclined to suppose they will want to rescue Van Til by saying the issue of metaphysical primacy is unimportant, or they may say Van Til addresses it and yet will not provide any citations or quotes to support this.

And while we're on it, where do either Van Til or Bahnsen spec out a theory of concepts? Indeed, to what source would the Christian go for an understanding of concepts? The bible doesn't provide such a theory (and yet we're told over and over that "only the Christian worldview provides the necessary preconditions for the intelligibility of human experience"), so to find a theory of concepts, it seems that believers would have to either invent their own theory as they go or consult some extra-biblical source which does provide such a theory (thus putting the believer at risk of succumbing to "the wisdom of the world"). My suspicion is that Christianity has no native theory of concepts. I've asked believers who say I'm wrong on this to come forward and show me where the bible presents its own theory of concepts, but none have done this (many retort by saying that the bible is not a philosophical lexicon, but this only confirms my suspicion). And even though a good theory of concepts will go a long way in correcting a large number of presuppositionalism's mistakes and in answering most of presuppositionalism's characterizations of and challenges to "non-believing worldviews," it is precisely a theory of concepts which they seem to lack.

Ever anxious to find some way to turn a philosophical issue into an apologetic debating point, Van Til gives us some indication of his understanding of concepts in the following passage:

We seem to get our unity by generalizing, by abstracting from the particulars in order to include them into larger unities. If we keep up this process of generalizing till we exclude all particulars, granted they can all be excluded, have we then not stripped these particulars of their particularity? Have we then obtained anything but an abstract universal?" (The Defense of the Faith, 3rd ed., p. 26.)

If summaries like this are at all any indication of the presuppositionalist understanding of concepts (James Anderson, in his paper If Knowledge, Then God, cites pp. 23-28 of Van Til's The Defense of the Faith as "the most direct discussion of the problem [of the one and the many]" in Van Til's writings), then non-believers needn't worry whatsoever about what this camp has to say. Van Til errs by supposing that the process of abstraction involves "excluding particulars," when in fact this is not at all the case. The process of abstraction involves, among other operations, the omission of specific measurements precisely so that particulars can be included in the scope of reference subsumed by a concept. My suspicion is not only that Van Til did not understand this, but also that such facts would not be very welcome news to someone like Van Til for they do not avail themselves to the conclusions he hoped to draw, namely that "the problem of the one and the many" requires a supernatural solution (cf. the "concrete universal" which Van Til equated with the Christian trinity).

Sal listed three options to explain his impression of my understanding:

"You either are a poor reader, have a short term memory, or you haven't read them at all."

I can name two more possibilities which Sal overlooks. One is that I have misunderstood these authors. Consider the following admission which one presuppositionalist found necessary to make in order to highlight Bahnsen's contributions to presuppositionalism:

One of the major obstacles in the way of promoting presuppositionalism has been Van Til's own writing style. Friends and critics alike have expressed chagrin at his 'torturous English', his redundant and unclear style, his penchant for sloganeering, and his disorganization of themes. Though he considered these criticisms overstated, Bahnsen likewise recognized these shortcomings in Van Til. (Michael Butler, "The Transcendental Argument for God's Existence," ed. S. M. Schlissel, The Standard Bearer: A Festschift for Greg L. Bahnsen, p. 70.)

Even those who are sympathetic to Van Til's program have complained about the warbling mentor's muddled handling of the issues central to his primary thesis. And while many would point to Bahnsen one of the prime movers in clarifying Van Til's apologetic, he often turns out to be little more than a cheerleader who is content to cloak those same issues in similar vague jargon and "penchant for sloganeering." So if I have misunderstood Van Til, some apologists have already provided a good explanation for this.

The other possibility which Sal overlooks is that I have read and understood these authors, and that my detractors simply want to dismiss my writings out of hand by tarnishing their source (i.e., me). This of course only serves to attack me personally, and allows my criticisms to go unchallenged. This means that, if my understanding and criticism of these authors are in error, we will not learn of my faults from these detractors. Indeed, it's not unusual for my detractors to do a "drive-by comment," saying I don't understand, I've misrepresented, or that I'm simply dishonest, and yet provide no substantiation whatsoever to these charges when my own writings are right there, available for examination.

There are numerous examples in my writings where I examine and interact with the authors Sal mentions which provide opportunity for my detractors to cite when casting their character slurs against me. One such example is Bahnsen's opening statement in his debate with Gordon Stein. To my utter amazement, many Christians seem to think Bahnsen's performance in this debate was somehow impressive. For instance, John Frame recently wrote that "it was evident as the debate progressed that the audience became convinced that Bahsnen won the debate," and that "Bahnsen's transcendental argument was carefully put together and eloquently stated." I wonder if he attended the same debate whose transcript I read and examined. I've made my interaction with Bahnsen's opening statement available to my detractors for quite a while now, and even though many of them have, as Frame characterizes Stein, "huffed and puffled and sputtered away" in defiance of my conclusion that Bahnsen offered a poof rather than a proof, none have come forward to piece together an actual argument which validly infers the existence of the Christian or any other god from anything Bahnsen claims in his opening statement. I'm willing to entertain the possibility that I've missed something, but unless one of Bahnsen's defenders takes the time to point it out to me, I'll rest with my analysis.

So, to address Sal's question, the answer is yes, I have read these authors, and no, I don't think I'm a poor reader. But, I will also answer by saying again that I am always willing to read more, and if my detractors want to specify a passage in either Van Til's, Bahnsen's or someone else's writings which is supposed to present the knock-down, drag-'em-out argument that presuppositionalists think they have, I'm certainly willing to examine it.

by Dawson Bethrick

With Minds of Children

I have often asked Christian apologists if they expect non-believers to accept their god-belief claims on their say so, as if their voice carried the cosmic authority they attribute to the god they enshrine in their imagination. I ask this question because religious believers who set out to defend their beliefs from the threat of non-belief offer precious little in clearly explaining why they believe what they claim to believe, and why others should believe what they claim. In my experience apologists typically seem to think this not a serious question, for few have offered a sincere answer. In encounters with apologists, even if their claims are given the attention they apparently think they deserve, questions about why they should be believed or why one should think they are true are either ignored or ridiculed, or effort is made to discredit the character of those who posed them in the first place. Such behavior simply indicates that those who would defend the religious view of the world have little or no confidence in any answers they might provide in response to questions posed about their beliefs and the claim that those beliefs are true.

But this no doubt does not put a stop to apologists seeking to rationalize their mystical beliefs (often by vilifying alternative positions) even while evading questions that sometimes strike at the very core of those beliefs or the motivation to carry on the pretense that they are true. And what is it that they are saying is true? Stories of magical personae and events, tales of conscious beings existing beyond our perception and beyond our ability to discover and know rationally, claims of an invisible magic being which created the universe by wishing it into existence and which "controls whatsoever comes to pass" (1), etc. All this strikes a reasonable thinker as legends and tales which are no more true than Alice in Wonderland or The Wizard of Oz.

Some apologists are quite open about the fact that it requires the mind of a child to take such stories seriously and accept them as truth. This is quite refreshing in fact, since it serves to confirm a basic point that I have observed in religious believers who on the whole otherwise seem at least somewhat intelligent. And that point is that god-belief will take its root best when the believer, like a naïve child, is philosophically defenseless against the false premises which lurk under theism's pre-packaged exterior of anecdotes, pretended authority, fake promises of vindication and the like. It is, in the case of Christianity for instance, the absurd and nonsensical which distinguish its teachings from other worldviews most dramatically, insisting that adults lower their minds to the level of a 6-year-old, prone to trusting persons in postions of authority and intellectually unable to recognize any abuse of that trust. It is the recognition of religion's predatory defrauding of the human mind and spirit that prompted Rand to point out to us that "faith in the supernatural always begins with faith in the superiority of others," that "A mystic is a man who surrendered his mind at its first encounter with the minds of others." (2)

Various passages in the bible make it clear that one must have the mind of a child rather than an adult to qualify as an approved believer. For instance, consider the following:

"Except ye be converted, and become as little children, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven. Whosoever therefore shall humble himself as this little child, the same is greatest in the kingdom of heaven." (Matthew 18:3-4)

"Whosoever shall not receive the kingdom of God as a little child, he shall not enter therein." (Mark 10:15)

Presuppositional apologist John Frame tells us that

Scripture never rebukes childlike faith; indeed, Jesus makes such faith a model to be followed by adults (Luke 18:16). One who requires proof may be doing it out of ungodly arrogance, or he may thereby be admitting that he has not lived in a godly environment and has taken counsel from fools. God’s norm for us is that we live and raise our children in such a way that proof will be unnecessary. (3)

Luke 18:16, which Frame cites above, says:

"But Jesus called them unto him, and said, Suffer little children to come unto me, and forbid them not: for of such is the kingdom of God."

Christianity needs the believer to lower his mind to the level of a child because it can only survive by exploiting his ignorance, and exploiting an individual's ignorance will be more difficult if that individual thinks as an honest adult, is intellectually informed, does not indiscriminately give his trust to just anyone or automatically presume that other minds are superior to his. Apologists recognize that the only way to goad adult thinkers into renouncing their adult minds is by coaxing them into questioning their certainty. It is for this reason that the deployment of many apologetic schemes are so unpersuasive: not only do they fail to draw on objectively verifiable facts which can be examined impartially by all viewers, they also fail to apply concepts in a self-consciously meaningful and consistent manner (which can work against a child's mind, but many adults tend to sense that their leg is being pulled).

For instance, when apologists say things like "[t]he ground of rationality must be the living and triune God" (4), it is entirely unclear what they might be trying to say since the term 'rationality' is not a Christian concept. And we know that 'rationality' is not a Christian concept because a) it is not a biblical concept, and b) the very basis of the concept of rationality, which is the primacy of existence principle, is wholly antithetical to the fundamental metaphysical orientation underpinning Christianity (which is the primacy of consciousness view of reality). Moreover, apologists tend to use such terms while ignoring the need to clarify any working definitions they may assume in the context of their claims and characterizations.

In the interest of undermining the non-believer's certainty (which is rightly perceived as an obstacle that must be removed for there to be any hope of vindicating Christianity from criticism), a favorite tactic of Christian apologists is to barrage a non-believer with numerous questions, questions which they apparently picked up in an introduction to philosophy course or from some apologetics primer. The immediate aim is to uncover some area of ignorance on the non-believer’s part while the underlying strategy is to focus on any hint of ignorance on virtually any issue and exaggerate its proportions by driving a wedge of uncertainty deep into its core. This uncertainty is then used to manipulate the non-believer into doubting the efficacy of his mind and the truth of his verdicts, and Christianity - like a bully who takes pleasure in kicking a guy when he's down - waits in the wings to fill the void.

This tactic can be seen in action in these illustrative examples of questions posed by Christian apologists:

"how does the atheist account for non-material logical laws?" (5)

"Now, how does the atheistic worldview account for morality? ...how can one account
for laws of logic? How can the atheist account for any abstract, universal law?" (6)

"assuming that non-theism were true, on what basis could we assume the validity of the inductive principle (or, in simple terms, the continual uniformity of nature)?" (7)

Such questions are supposed by apologists to have no "cogent" answer on the basis of "the atheist worldview," an expression which implies a uniformity in the thinking of atheists which does not exist.

Statements from apologists repeating the affirmation that "the atheist worldview" or non-believers in general "cannot account for" some feature of cognition read like indistinct widgets rolling off an assembly line, as if those making the affirmations were as robotic as the machines manufacturing the widgets. The uniformity of mindlessly repeated utterances indicates uniform mindlessness on the part of those who make them. Some choice examples include the following:

The atheist world view is irrational and cannot consistently provide the preconditions of intelligible experience, science, logic, or morality. The atheist world view cannot allow for laws of logic, the uniformity of nature, the ability for the mind to understand the world, and moral absolutes. In that sense the atheist world view cannot account for our debate tonight. (8)

The atheistic world view is inadequate… [it] cannot adequately explain the existence of the world… is unable to provide the necessary preconditions to account for the laws of science, the universal laws of logic — and, of course, absolute moral standards… cannot account for the meaningful realities of life. (9)

The atheistic worldview is irrational and cannot provide an adequate basis for intelligible experience. An atheistic world is ultimately random, disorderly, transitory, and volatile. It is therefore incapable of providing the necessary preconditions to account for the laws of science and the universal laws of logic. In short, it cannot account for the meaningful realities people encounter in life. (10)

On an unbelieving basis, however, there is no particular reason to believe that there are laws that actually describe facts. Who is to know that reality is regular at all? If the world is ultimately the result of chance (or ‘ultimate matter’, which is the same thing), surely it is equally likely that the world will become random or chaotic; and if our senses and reason seem to be telling us differently, why should we believe that in a world of chaos they would be telling us the truth? And if chance is king, where do laws come from? They do not exist in the objective world, because that world is the result of chance, not the product of a designer who gives it a structure of regularity. (11)

In the atheist worldview, rationality and ethics are the anomalies that require explanation. In the Christian worldview, irrationalism and evil are the anomalies. At the very least, atheism, not Christianity, has the up-hill battle in explaining how the existence of human rationality makes sense in their worldview. But the atheist’s ultimate explanation for anything can be only one thing, the irrational. Therefore, in terms of the atheist worldview there can never really be a rational explanation for anything." (12)

The anti-theist worldview can not account for the uniformity of nature on which to base the scientific process. (13)

The non-Christian's presuppositions cannot account for any area of human experience. (14)

The essence of the presuppositional strategy is to lampoon non-belief as such, typically by charging it with crippling intellectual disabilities through a variety of vilifying caricatures, presumptuous generalizations and uncharitable translations of certain positions affirmed by certain individuals, thereby making Christian god-belief somehow seem superior, more empowering, more philosophically informed. This tactic and other trademark elements of typical apologetic maneuvers suggest that apologists are really hoping that non-believers respond to their line of interrogation by throwing up their arms and saying "I donno, must be God did it!" After all, apologists give us nothing to suppose that this is not what they did themselves when it came to the task of using their minds.

In such a way, this interrogative style of apologetics is intended to get the heat off the believer and his task of providing reasons for believing what he claims while trying to undermine the non-believer's confidence in reason and his own mind (ironically characterized as a fault-ridden faculty which was allegedly created by a perfect creator). Since the apologist likely knows deep down that his god-belief claims have no rational defense, his concern is to hide them behind a blanket of challenges posed to those who have not surrendered their minds in similar fashion, not because their philosophical orientation is truly faulty, but because they are perceived to be a threat. All the while, the apologist seems completely oblivious to the need to provide a reason for believing the claims he apparently wants us to accept.

This whole approach to apologetics smacks of the behavior of an incorrigible child hoping to entrap adults in his midst whom he resents for being right. Children are not only often overly trusting, suggestible, imprudently credulous and intellectually vulnerable, they are also often prone to lacking self-restraint, social crudeness, and depth of intellect. And it is common knowledge that a child who is reluctant to grow up is sometimes given to petty nitpicking, emotional outbursts, temper tantrums. Non-believers who are willing to engage Christian apologists should not be surprised that such tendencies may show in their opponents since, as we saw above, this childishness is actually encouraged by the Christian worldview. As Van Til confessed unabashedly,

My whole point [is] that there is perfect harmony between my belief as a child and my belief as a man… My unity is that of a child who walks with its father through the woods. (15)

And of course, this is because Van Til never grew up. Which just underscores the $64,000.00 question:

Why be born again when you can just grow up?

by Dawson Bethrick

References:

(1) Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, p. 160.
(2) Atlas Shrugged
(3) John Frame, Apologetics to the Glory of God, p. 66.
(4) Douglas Wilson, Second Rebuttal to Theodore Drange
(5) Michael Butler, TAG vs. TANG

(6) Dennis Nenadov, The Existence of the Triune God

(7) Sycamore, Reply to An Atheists perspective of God

(8) Greg Bahnsen, Opening Statement

(9) Hank Hanegraaff, Is Atheism Logical?

(10) Rolaant McKenzie, Why Christianity?

(11) John Frame, Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought, p. 77.

(12) Mike Warren, Christian Civilization Is the Only Civilization

(13) Justin S. Holcomb, Knowledge Falsely So-Called: The Theological Case Against Scientific Realism

(14) Harry Callahan, Opening Statement

(15) Van Til, Why I Believe in God

Bahnsen's Poof Revisited

BJ of Men of Athens recently sent the following comment in response to one of my earliest blogs, Bahnsen's Poof:

Hi, I just read your blog and I think you are misreading or not hearing the argument that Bahnsen is making...so let me help you...the thrust of the argument (TAG) says that without the truth of the christian God being presupposed nothing can be proven at all. Now how should an atheist understand this? Easy. Given the most fundamental assumptions about reality that the atheist "HAS" he now should reflect on those basic presuppositions and he will realize that given his presuppositions science, logic, and morality would be "impossible". In the correspondence that followed the debate between Stein and Bahnsen, Bahnsen again showed Stein that his atheistic worldview could not even allow him to make since out of balancing his checkbook. As in the debate Stein kept appealing to the notion that atheist do have morality, science, and logic. Bahnsen rightly would point out to Stein that he could not use such tools for human experience to be intelligible if his worldview were "true". POOF....Christianity is true because of the impossibilty of the contrary. In its technical form it is an "reductio ad absurbdum" argument. If P then Q, P therefore Q or If morality, science, and logic are the case (P) then Q (Christianity) has to be affirmed as logically necessary "because" ("because" clause is vital here)Q is the precondition of P. That is the indirect argument. Now, how is that bold assertion proved? Assume not Q (in this case non-christianity)and then look for internal contrsdictions within a particualr worldview for it to refute itself. If you do not understand Kant then the odds are you will not understand what Van Til was up to. Basically atheism can not provide the preconditions for logic, science, or morality to have any "meaning" to our human experience. [sic]

In this blog entry I will interact with BJ's statements.

BJ: "Hi, I just read your blog and I think you are misreading or not hearing the argument that Bahnsen is making...so let me help you..."

BJ apparently wants to say that the conclusion of my analysis of Bahnsen's opening statement in his debate with Stein is wrong. My conclusion was that Bahnsen failed to present an argument in his opening statement. This conclusion was established as the result of a line-by-line analysis of the last paragraphs of Bahnsen's statement, for which - as an opening statement in a debate on the existence of the Christian god - Bahnsen should have been most prepared to present. In fact, since he begins these last few paragraphs with the statement "And so I come thirdly then to the transcendental proof of God's existence," we would naturally expect Bahnsen to use this opportunity to present any argument he might have. But instead of presenting an argument for his claim that his god exists, Bahnsen launches right into accusing Stein of two fallacies, even though Stein hasn't even had a chance to speak yet! (Did Bahnsen feel a need to poison the well at this early point in the debate?) He then tells us that his god-belief "is not tested in any ordinary way like other factual claims." So there are all these reasons why we should not expect to validate Bahnsen's theistic claims in ways that other claims can be validated. And yet in spite of such limitations he still wants to say it's a fact that his god exists. Does Bahnsen explain how his theistic claims can be confirmed and verified? No, he doesn't do this - he just tells us how they can't be verified. He then tells us that "we can prove the existence of God from the impossibility of the contrary," which he nowhere establishes, and which conflicts with teachings which are explicitly laid out in the New Testament (see below). Bahnsen asserts that "without Him, it is impossible to prove anything." But upon what this statement is based is never explained. It sounds like a conclusion, but no argument is given to support it. In fact, the statement assumes that Bahnsen's god exists, which is precisely what Bahnsen is called to prove. Does he offer a proof? No, he doesn't. Rather, he goes on to charge "the atheist world-view" with all kinds of failings, as if this served as a proof of the Christian god's existence.

Given that the conclusion of my analysis is that Bahnsen did not present an actual argument for the existence of his god in his opening statement, to show that my conclusion is wrong BJ would have to identify an argument present in Bahnsen's opening statement. Does BJ do this? No, he does not. Instead of identifying any traceable argument in Bahnsen's opening statement, BJ says that he thinks I am "misreading or not hearing the argument that Bahnsen is making." (So it’s my fault!) But if there's no argument presented, then obviously I cannot "misread" or "hear" something that's not there. What specifically am I "misreading or not hearing"? I reviewed Bahnsen's own comments from his opening statement - the statement for which he would have been most prepared to present. In my analysis, I showed that there is no argument since the apparent conclusion (which, in the case of an argument for the existence of a god should be something along the lines of "therefore god exists") has no inferential support to be found in Bahnsen's opening statement. Nothing in BJ’s comment to me overcomes this. One cannot insert an inference into Bahnsen's statement when there's no inference there as that would simply constitute tampering with the evidence.

BJ: "the thrust of the argument (TAG) says that without the truth of the christian God being presupposed nothing can be proven at all."

That's the "thrust of the argument"? Exactly what is meant by the term "thrust" here? My concern is not to find out how Bahnsen blasted himself into orbit, but to uncover any inferential support that Bahnsen might have given for the claim that the Christian god exists in the first place. The "thrust" of his non-argument may consist of the claim that the Christian god exists. But a claim is not an argument. What I'm looking for is the argument which Bahnsen might have presented. His conclusion is clear enough, but what were his premises? For instance, what premises support the claim that "without the truth of the christian God being presupposed nothing can be proven at all"? Since this claim itself assumes what Bahnsen is called to prove, all that such claims accomplish is to multiply the apologist's burden of proof while failing to meet any burdens already sitting in his cart.

BJ: "Now how should an atheist understand this? Easy. Given the most fundamental assumptions about reality that the atheist 'HAS' he now should reflect on those basic presuppositions and he will realize that given his presuppositions science, logic, and morality would be 'impossible'."

Before addressing the points here, it should be pointed out that, had Bahnsen presented a clear argument for his god's existence, BJ's statements here would not be necessary. Also, it should be pointed out that BJ's statement here does nothing to rescue Bahnsen from the verdicts of my analysis. All that BJ succeeds in doing here is to give his own interpretation of TAG. But this does not get Bahnsen off the hook. Moreover, any problems which any particular atheist's "presuppositions" might have, whether actual or hypothetical, are irrelevant to the matter, for it does not follow from an instance of error in a non-believer's view of the world that the Christian god therefore exists. This would make said god's existence contingent on someone's intellectual error, and typically theists claim that their god's existence is absolute rather than contingent. So we have here already an instance in which the presuppositional apologetic is incompatible with the theism which it purports to defend (since presuppositionalism depends on the discovery of errors in rival worldviews). In spite of this, the typical habit of presuppositional apologists is to dwell on their resentment of what they call "the atheist world-view" rather than identify in clear terms why they believe what they claim to believe.

Turning now to BJ's own points, I offer the following points in return.

BJ seems to think that, as an atheist, I should consider my "most fundamental assumptions about reality" and subject them to scrutiny. I have no objection to this recommendation. In fact, it is a challenge which my "most fundamental assumptions about reality" are quite prepared to satisfy fully. That is because my "most fundamental assumptions about reality" are made explicit by the axioms as opposed to hiding in some dark cave of mysticism. (I respond to criticism of my worldview's axioms in my blog post Probing Mr. Manata's Poor Understanding of the Axioms.)

Specifically, my axioms are:

1) that existence exists (i.e., there is a reality),
2) that to exist is to be something (A is A, the law of identity), and
3) that consciousness is consciousness of something (the axiom of consciousness).

These axioms would have to be true even to deny them. In order to deny these axioms, there would have to be a reality which serves as a point of reference, the axioms would have to have identity (so that there is something that is being denied), and there would have to be someone who is conscious to do the denying (since denial is a conscious activity). Together these axioms imply a general, inescapable principle known as the primacy of existence - that is, that existence exists independent of consciousness, which means: the object(s) of consciousness holds metaphysical primacy over the subject of consciousness. This is the objective orientation of the subject-object relationship. The only alternative to this is the opposite view - that the subject of consciousness holds metaphysical primacy over its objects (such as when the Christian god creates the universe ex nihilo by an act of will, or causes an entity to behave in a manner that is contradictory to its nature by an act of will - cf. the doctrine of miracles).

Now, let's do as BJ recommends, namely "reflect on those basic presuppositions," and see if "given [these] presuppositions science, logic, and morality would be 'impossible'." First let's look at science. (By science I generally mean the systematic application of reason to specific areas of study based on controlled observations.) Does science presuppose that existence exists, i.e., that there is a reality? Sure it does. Without something that exists, there would be nothing for science to study. Does science presuppose that a thing has identity? Sure it does. If things existed but did not have identity, scientific study would be futile for it could yield no reliable conclusions. If the things that exist had no identity, then there would be nothing specific to observe. Does science presuppose that consciousness is consciousness of something? Sure it does. If consciousness were consciousness of nothing, then what faculty would make scientific inquiry possible? Non-consciousness? And if there were no consciousness at all, what would do the observing? Clearly scientific inquiry requires consciousness of things that exist, for science inherently involves observation of objects. So science requires the truth of the axioms.

Now let's look at logic. (By logic I generally mean a set of principles that guide the mind in forming non-contradictory identifications.) Does logic presuppose that existence exists, that there is a reality? Sure it does. If nothing exists, then logic doesn't exist, either. And if nothing existed, there'd be nothing to be logical about, and there'd be no one to think logically. So logic undeniably presupposes the first axiom. Does logic presuppose that things have identity? Sure it does. The very foundation of logic is the law of identity, that things are what they are, that to exist is to be something specific, that a thing is itself, that A is A. It is because things are what they are that the principles of logic can be applied in the first place. Does logic presuppose that consciousness is consciousness of something? Sure it does. It would be illogical to say that consciousness can be consciousness of nothing. The alternative to consciousness of something is consciousness of nothing. This would mean that there is no object to consider. But without an object to consider, what would be considered? Obviously nothing. And if nothing were considered, there would be nothing to think about logically. Thus there would be nothing to which logical principles could be applied. So like science, logic clearly requires the truth of the axioms.

Now let's look at morality. (By morality I generally mean a code of values which guides one's choices and actions.) Does morality presuppose that existence exists, that there is a reality? Sure it does. If nothing exists, then man does not exist, and consequently the fundamental alternative between life and death which he faces and which makes morality a necessity for him does not exist. This would mean that there would be no basis or need for morality. Does morality presuppose that a thing has identity? Sure it does. Specifically it presupposes that man and his environment have identity, and with this that man's identity is such that he faces a fundamental alternative, namely between life and death. If man did not face this alternative, he would not need a code of values which guides his choices and actions. Does morality presuppose consciousness? Sure it does. Since man's moral actions are chosen, he could not make choices if he did not have a conscious faculty which could identify alternatives and make selections among them in the first place. Clearly, morality presupposes the truth of the axioms.

So in the case of science, logic and morality, it should be clear: my "most fundamental assumptions about reality" would have to be true for these endeavors to be possible in the first place. By retortion (presumably a technique championed by presuppositionalists), let's deny these fundamentals and see if science, logic and morality can survive. Let's deny the first fundamental, the axiom of existence. Let's say there's no existence. Well, just by saying "there's no existence," we've already contradicted ourselves, for we would have to exist in order to say this. Since science does not stand on contradictions, this could not be true. Thus the axiom of existence would have to be true in order for science to be possible. The same outcome would be the case for logic as well: logic does not rest on self-contradiction. Nor does morality. Indeed, if existence did not exist, there would be no science, no logic and no morality. So by retortion the axiom of existence must be true for science, logic and morality to be legitimate human concerns.

Let's try denying the second fundamental, the axiom of identity. Let's say that to exist is not to be something. If this were the case, then what would do science? We could not say that man will do science, for this presupposes that man is man, that a thing that exists is something specific and has specific attributes (such as a conscious faculty). And what would be observed and studied, if to exist is not to be something? We could not say that we would observe and study things that exist, for this presupposes that things are what they are, that they have a nature. What would do any logical thinking if things that exist had no identity? We could not say that man does the logical thinking, for this assumes that man is something specific, namely an entity capable of performing logical thought. And what use would morality serve? Morality is only useful to man because of his specific nature: he faces a fundamental alternative and his life is not automatically guaranteed to him - he must act in accordance with his nature in order to live because of his nature. So by retortion the axiom of identity must be true for science, logic and morality to be legitimate human concerns.

Now let's try denying the third fundamental, the axiom of consciousness. Let's say that consciousness is consciousness of nothing. That would mean that consciousness is irrelevant. (For to say that consciousness is consciousness of nothing is to assert consciousness without a relationship to any object to perceive and/or consider.) If consciousness were irrelevant, what would do the observing and studying that science requires? Obviously nothing, for on this view consciousness has been denied. So science presupposes consciousness of objects. What about logic? Could there be any use for logic if consciousness had no objects? This would mean that there is nothing for a consciousness to be logical about. Since logic requires objects to provide content to our identifications, inferences, deductions, etc., logic presupposes consciousness of objects. What about morality? Could there be any morality if we were not conscious of objects? If it were the case that we were not conscious of objects, we would not be able to identify either values or potential threats. Thus we would not be able to identify the kinds of actions we need to take in order to obtain and protect our values and avoid destructive threats. Consequently morality, too, presupposes consciousness of objects. So by retortion the axiom of consciousness must be true for science, logic and morality to be legitimate human concerns.

So by the presuppositionalist's own standard, the argument by retortion, the axioms obtain, and their denial would constitute their very validation at the same time (which means: denial of the axioms results in absurdity). Contrary to what the presuppositionalist would like to see, "the most fundamental assumptions about reality" made by my worldview are validated by the presuppositionalist's own preferred form of testing.

BJ: "In the correspondence that followed the debate between Stein and Bahnsen, Bahnsen again showed Stein that his atheistic worldview could not even allow him to make since out of balancing his checkbook."

This point is not relevant to my post, since my post was concerned with whether or not Bahnsen presented a proof for his god's existence in his opening statement, or if he simply offered a poof - i.e., a series of assertions which are presented on the pretense that they offer an argument when in fact the speaker offers no argument whatsoever. As for the claim that "Bahnsen again showed Stein that his atheistic worldview could not even allow him to make [sense] out of balancing his checkbook," yes, Bahnsen did make claims like this throughout the debate, but simply claiming this to be the case does not constitute a demonstration of the truth of that claim, nor does it constitute a proof of the existence of Bahnsen's god. Keep in mind that Stein was not a philosopher; rather, he was an expert in the special sciences, specifically biology if I'm not mistaken. So I would not expect Stein to have been prepared to give a play-by-play analysis of how the mind works (e.g., on how concepts are formed on the basis of perception and integrated into statements of recognition, inductive generalizations, deductive conclusions, etc.) since this was not the area of his specialty. At best, all Bahnsen may have shown is that Stein specifically did not have detailed knowledge of these things. It would be embarrassingly fallacious to try to draw from Stein's ignorance the conclusion that a god must therefore exist. But this is principally what Bahnsen seemed eager to do, which is simply an admission that his god-belief ultimately stands on ignorance as such. In this way TAG is just another tired god-of-the-gaps strategy (notice I did not say 'argument' here, since Bahnsen did not present an argument). The apologist is supposed to be able to ask vague and open-ended questions like "How do you account for logic?" and the non-believer is apparently supposed to throw up his hands and say "Duh, I donno! Must be God did it!" What else does the apologist offer?

BJ: "As in the debate Stein kept appealing to the notion that atheist do have morality, science, and logic. Bahnsen rightly would point out to Stein that he could not use such tools for human experience to be intelligible if his worldview were 'true'. POOF...."

Yes, Bahnsen did claim this. But that's not the same as proving this to be the case. And we already know that he didn't offer an argument in his opening statement, the very statement which he would have been able to prepare in advance. Furthermore, I just showed how the axioms of my worldview are necessary "for human experience to be intelligible" since they identify the preconditions of experience to begin with.

BJ: "Christianity is true because of the impossibilty of the contrary." [sic]

While Bahnsen does make a similar claim in his opening statement, he nowhere substantiated it. At any rate, I answer this mindlessly repeated slogan in my blog article Is the Contrary to Christianity Truly Impossible?

In that post I show how the presuppositionalist's claim that "Christianity is true because of the [impossibility] of the contrary" violates one of presuppositionalism's own feigned standards, namely that of internal consistency. Since the bible is clear in explicitly affirming that "all things are possible" (Matt. 19:26), a defense strategy which contradicts this (by affirming that there is something that is impossible) is unfit for what it's intended to defend, namely a worldview which clearly and explicitly affirms that "all things are possible." I've yet to see a good response to my point. Additionally, my worldview is clearly contrary to what Christianity teaches, and yet it is a reality. So on this point the claim that the contrary to Christianity is impossible is clearly false.

BJ: "In its technical form it is an 'reductio ad absurbdum' argument."

To the extent that TAG is a reductio ad absurdum, it is unsuitable as a defense of Christianity, for the reason I just gave above. Moreover, since Christianity assumes the primacy of consciousness view of reality (I prove this here), the very claim that Christianity is true contradicts itself, since the concept 'truth' assumes the opposite principle, the primacy of existence.

BJ: "If P then Q, P therefore Q"

If only Bahnsen could have developed his opening statement in such a logical fashion. Then (and only then) would there be an argument to dissect in that statement. Of course, he would have to validate the inputs plugged in for the variables here, had he presented an argument in the first place. However, not only did he not present an argument, he nowhere validated the inputs he plugged into any of his assertions. Essentially, he showed up DOA - defeated on arrival. No matter what faults can be found in what Stein presented, Bahnsen failed to prove that his god exists.

BJ: "or If morality, science, and logic are the case (P) then Q (Christianity) has to be affirmed as logically necessary ‘because’ (‘because’ clause is vital here) Q is the precondition of P."

On the contrary, since Christianity assumes the primacy of consciousness view of reality, it necessarily disqualifies itself as a viable precondition for any fundamental anchoring morality, science and logic since morality, science and logic, as I showed above, require the axioms and the primacy of existence principle. In fact, my analysis of the axioms and their relationship to science, logic and morality above demonstrate an opposite conclusion, to wit: If science, logic and morality are the case (P), then O (Objectivism) has to be affirmed as logically necessary because the truth of Objectivism is the precondition to P. Christianity falls as one casualty among a whole host of mystical worldviews which stand on the primacy of consciousness view of the world, which is anathema to science, logic and morality (since the primacy of consciousness violates the axioms while science, logic and morality would not be possible without the axioms).

BJ: "That is the indirect argument."

And as such, it shows that its defenders are not very aware of the nature of the fundamentals of either science, logic or morality. These areas of concern simply offer apologists an occasion for bamboozling unprepared non-believers. What is telling is that presuppositionalism fails to make any relationship between either science, logic or morality and the teachings of Christianity clear and traceable. All in all, presuppositionalism essentially consists of nothing more than a claim to magic (which is a consequence of enshrining ignorance).

BJ: "Now, how is that bold assertion proved? Assume not Q (in this case non-christianity)and then look for internal contrsdictions within a particualr worldview for it to refute itself." [sic]

Okay, I offer my non-Christian worldview. Where are the contradictions within it? Please, show me. Don't forget that the concept 'contradiction' assumes the primacy of existence principle, for only if the objects of awareness hold metaphysical primacy over the subject of awareness would contradictions be objectionable. To say that contradictions are objectionable, then, the theist must borrow from my worldview which is the only proper philosophical custodian of the concept of objectivity.

BJ: "If you do not understand Kant then the odds are you will not understand what Van Til was up to."

Even though Van Til sought to replace Kant's categories and antimonies with Christian theism and "apparent contradictions," both thinkers erred in granting validity to the primacy of consciousness view of reality, which is self-defeating.

BJ: "Basically atheism can not provide the preconditions for logic, science, or morality to have any 'meaning' to our human experience."

It is not the task of atheism to "provide the preconditions for logic, science, or morality" any more than the task of music theory is to provide men with the aural nerves they need for listening music. If music theory could do this, Beethoven would not have died such a frustrated man. Atheism is simply the absence of god-belief. As such, it tells us only what someone does not believe, not what one does believe. Therefore it constitutes a fundamental misunderstanding to hold atheism accountable for failing to "provide the preconditions for logic, science, or morality." Besides, I do not think it is at all accurate to say that a worldview "provides" these things; these preconditions are metaphysical and exist in nature, and they are competently identified by the axioms. To say that a worldview must "provide the preconditions for logic, science, [and] morality" is incoherent; those preconditions would need to be in place for the worldview in question to be possible in the first place. What a worldview enables one to do is to identify those preconditions in explicit terms (here's where the axioms come in) and integrate them into a coherent whole in accordance with those preconditions which in turn enables him to identify the values his life requires and the actions he needs to take in order to achieve those values. Writes Ayn Rand:

The task of philosophy is to provide man with a comprehensive view of life. This view serves as a base, a frame of reference, for all his actions, mental or physical, psychological or existential. This view tells him the nature of the universe with which he has to deal (metaphysics); the means by which he is to deal with it, i.e., the means of acquiring knowledge (epistemology); the standards by which he is to choose his goals and values, in regard to his own life and character (ethics) - and in regard to society (politics); the means of concretizing this view is given to him by esthetics. ("The Chickens' Homecoming," The New Left, p. 107.)

As for bickering over how many angels can dance on the head of a pin, the theologians are free to waste their time with such arbitrary and worthless matters.

by Dawson Bethrick

Bahnsen's Three Charges of Prejudice

On pages 135-138 of his book Always Ready (page numbers in this blog entry refer to this publication), presuppositional apologist Greg Bahnsen seeks to indoctrinate his readers with the presumption that criticism of Christianity is necessarily borne on "prejudicial conjecture," that

unbelievers, both educated and uneducated, take the offensive against Christianity before they have become familiar with what they're talking about. In the place of research and honest assessment of available evidence concerning some aspect of the Bible, many unbelievers have substituted personal conjecture about what "seems likely" to them. (p. 135)

Apparently "unbelievers" are not supposed to put much stock in what "seems likely" to them, but why they shouldn't remains unexplained. Regardless, we should not let ourselves be fooled by Bahnsen's use of "many unbelievers" as if he meant only a portion of those who do not number themselves among Christendom. It's clear from the context of his statements that he wants to give his devotees the impression that all non-believers are uninformed about the teachings of Christianity (even though a great number of non-believers in the west are themselves former Christians or have at least been widely exposed to Christian zealots), and therefore their criticism of Chistianity couldn't possibly have any bearing on the matter. For instance, on p. 137, Bahnsen writes: When we defend our Christian faith, then, we must constantly be on the lookout for the way in which the reasoing of unbelievers rests on prejudicial conjecture. When stated in this fashion, the impression is that one is supposed to that "the reasoning of unbelievers" will be the product of "prejudicial conjecture," even before this has been established. Apparently Bahnsen thinks this is responsible advice.

At any rate, Bahnsen goes on to cite three indications of prejudice which budding apologists should expect to detect in "the reasoning of unbelievers." Let's review them.

1) Prejudice vs. Impartiality: "The first [indication of] prejudice is the assumption that the Biblical text is no different from any other written document which we find in our natural experience throughout history - which of course begs the fundamental question over which the believer and unbeliever are arguing!" (p. 136)

If it is the case that "the assumption that the Biblical text is no different from any other written document...begs the fundamental question over which the believer and unbeliever are arguing," wouldn't the opposite assumption - namely the assumption that the biblical text is significantly "different from any other document which we find in our natural experience throughout history" - also "beg the fundamental question over which the believer and unbeliever are arguing"? Bahnsen's rebuttal to reasonable impartiality regarding texts presented for review to non-believers requires him to take for granted the premise that the bible is singularly different from other texts without the need to first establish this premise. In other words, he takes the bible's utter uniqueness as a self-sufficient primary which does not need to be validated. If he could validate this premise, why would he need to do this? Also, we might ask whether Bahnsen would be able to validate his god-belief if he did not take such a premise for granted. In essence, he seems eager to reserve for himself the privilege of "beg[ging] the fundamental question over which the believer and unbeliever are arguing" while simultaneously denying this privilege to non-believers. The anxious defender of a weak case would need such an advantage.

But is it really so inappropriate to view the books of the bible as "no different from any other written document"? Bahnsen gives no reason against this other than that it allegedly "begs the fundamental question over which the believer and unbeliever are arguing." The Muslim could deploy the same tactic with respect to the Koran. In actuality, there are overriding general features of the bible that it shares with all other written documents which put the bible on the same level. For example, like other written documents, the bible itself is a written document. Like other written documents, the bible consists of words written on pages which can be read by readers who can read the language in which those words are written. Also, like other written documents, the bible consists of written statements which readers can examine and relate to the broader sum of knowledge which they have acquired throughout their lives, and thus form judgments about the quality of its content, whether it is true or false, useful or useless, meaningful or meaningless, etc. This is the case with the bible just as it is with a play by Shakespeare, a poem by Pushkin, a play by Molliere, an essay by Jefferson, or a book by Greg Bahnsen. In the case of Shakespeare's play, Pushkin's poem, Molliere's play, Jefferson's essay and Bahnsen's book, each can be judged by its content. Is Bahnsen saying that we should do this in the case of every written document except the biblical text? Is Bahnsen worried about what outcome may transpire if someone does judge the bible by its content? If he were so confident that everything in the biblical text is true, would we expect him to fear the outcome of people independently judging it by its content, just as we do in the case of an essay by Russell or a newspaper article?

Bahnsen goes on to say:

If the Bible is, as it claims, the inspired word of Almighty God, then the history of its textual transmission may very well be quite different than other human documents since God would have ordained that its text be preserved with greater integrity than that of ordinary books. (p. 136)

This is a common refrain coming from apologists, but the special pleading and appeal to unseen magical forces are simply embarrassing. In actuality, with the invention of the printing press and the print technology available today, the accurate replication of texts does not present the great potential for error that dogged the copyists of past centuries. Today one can go into any bookstore and pull a Mario Puzo novel off the shelf, and the same title sitting right next to it is precisely the same, right down to a typo on page 172, since they were replicated from the same print master by the same automated technology. Modern technology has at the very least significantly reduced the enormous potential for error that plagues copying texts by hand. No doubt the bible's copyists would have been green with envy had they known about the ease with which their precious bibles could be mass produced today. So ironically, Bahnsen is correct, in a way he did not intend, when he supposes that "the history of [the bible's] textual transmission" is "different than other human documents," since there is no shortage of "other human documents" whose textual reproduction is far more faithful to their respective originals than one could ever hope for in the case of the biblical text, since the automated print technology in use today was not used in the preservation of the biblical text.

But Bahnsen seems oblivious to another point which we would be wrong to ignore when considering his statement here. And that point is the fact that, when we attempt to justify a position by asserting the existence of an invisible magic being, one can argue anything. On the premise that there's an invisible magic being that can intervene in human affairs and actualize its wishes such that reality conforms precisely to its will (cf. metaphysical subjectivism), one could even argue that there is no need for a biblical text that must be read in the first place. On such a premise, one could simply argue that "divine knowledge" was zapped into the his mind by "the hand of God," thereby implying that the biblical text is completely superfluous. After all, if there were a magic being that could do this, why wouldn't it, and why would we need to rely on our own reasoned interpretation of "the Scriptures" to come fallibly to the "knowledge of God" which Christians claim to possess? The point is that, if we make allowance for the arbitrary, the arbitrary becomes the standard and reason becomes the first casualty. And when reason has been rejected in this fashion, the human mind has no way to recover itself.

2) Prejudice vs. Consistency: "The second indication of prejudice is that the unbeliever does not offer any concrete evidence that (say) some medieval monk tampered with the text before us today." (p. 136)

While above Bahnsen was happy to proceed on the premise that "God would have ordained that [the biblical] text be preserved with greater integrity than that of ordinary books," for which he supplied no supporting evidence, he now expects "the unbeliever" to offer "concrete evidence" to substantiate what is prima facie a reasonable possibility. Does Bahnsen really expect people to believe that it is impossible that some medieval monk deliberately tampered with the text? Is he expecting us to suppose that it is impossible that some medieval monk made a mistake in copying the biblical text? Indeed, it seems that one would have to be quite conflicted psychologically to expect people to accept on the one hand the possibility that an invisible magic being works through human hosts down through the centuries to preserve a religious text which would be superfluous anyway, while on the other hand denying the possibility of deliberate mischief or human error. Perhaps this is akin to the kind of skewed thinking one author of the gospel had in mind when he had his Jesus scold the "blind guides, which strain at a gnat, and swallow a camel" (Matt. 23:24). Indeed, the biblical text itself, in Romans 3:4, tells us "let God be true, but every man a liar," which explicitly endorses the assumption that human beings are by nature deceivers. Unless Bahnsen can show that the medieval monks who were responsible for the duplication and preservation of the biblical text were something other than human beings, it seems that the biblical text itself clearly supports the presumption that those same monks were just as prone to deception and vice as everyone else is supposed to be. So on biblical assumptions, we would be wrong to suppose that the medieval monks who took on the task of copying the biblical text were above deliberate tampering with that text as they copied it. But perhaps consistency was not one of Bahnsen's stronger points.

Nevertheless, in considering Bahnsen's claim that "the unbeliever does not offer any concrete evidence that (say) some medieval monk tampered with the text," we should ask: is he expecting his readers to take this claim at face value, without any supporting argument? Does he suppose - and/or does he expect his readers to assume - that critics of the Christian worldview are completely ignorant of what it teaches, in spite of the facts that Christianity is the dominant religion in the west and that former Christians typically make the most informed critics of Christianity? Do Bahnsen's gratuitous assumptions comport with the awareness he is trying to raise against prejudice? It seems that, if Bahnsen were genuinely concerned about prejudice, he would not answer alleged prejudice with just more prejudice.

In fact, there is concrete evidence that someone tampered with the text, in some cases even before the monastic orders were instituted by the church and commissioned with copying it. For instance, the oldest known manuscripts of the gospel of Mark end at 16:8, while today's bible's have Mark end at 16:20. At some point, probably still very early, these latter 12 verses were tacked on, and I doubt a talking snake did this. The same is the case with the final chapter of the gospel of John, often referred to by scholars as the Appendix. The gospel most sensibly ends at chapter 20, but the version we find in our modern bibles includes a 21st chapter. One article on the topic describes it as follows:

The text of the Gospel of John appears to reach a conclusion at the end of chapter 20, as the text summarises the many signs that Jesus performed for his followers, not all of which could be recorded in the Gospel. John 21 begins simply with After these things... (Greek: Μετὰ ταῦτα) and nonchalently recounts another appearance of Jesus, as if the conclusion at the end of the prior chapter hadn't been there - as if the text was going "...and they all lived happily ever after. The end. Anyway, back in galilee they ...".

Who tacked on these endings on these gospels? In the case of the gospel of Mark, this is especially significant since without the added ending, Mark would end (and originally ended) without any post-resurrection sightings. And if believers insist that the last 12 verses of Mark's gospel are authentic scripture, then I have a jar of dark liquid for them to drink.

3) Prejudice vs. Informed Criticism: "The third indication of prejudice in the criticism of the unbeliever is that he or she has not taken account of the actual evidence which is publicly available regarding the text of Scripture. If the critic had taken time to look into this subject, he or she would not have offered the outlandish evaluation that the Biblical text is unreliable." (p. 136)

This is the same tired and over-used generalization that critics couldn't possibly know what they're talking about, and as such constitutes a prejudice on Bahnsen's part which he is more than happy to promulgate among his devotees. Bahnsen tries to bring his point home with the following autobiographical anecdote:

This came home to me with great force after taking an advanced course on Plato in graduate school, a course which took account of the textual criticism of the literary corpus of Plato's works. Our earliest extant manuscript of a work by Plato dates from right before 900 A.D…. and we must remember that Plato is thought to have lived roughly 350 years before Christ - thus leaving us with a gap of over twelve centuries. By contrast, the earliest fragments of the New Testament date less than fifty years after the original writing; the bulk of our most important extant manuscripts dates from 200-300 years after original composition." (pp. 136-137)

It is unclear what exactly Bahnsen thinks this contrast, which non-believers should have no problem acknowledging, is supposed to prove. Presumably Bahnsen's concern is to prove that Christianity is true, not that the earliest copies we have of the text of the New Testament are closer in time to their original writing than Plato's works. Even if we found a copy of Baum's The Wizard of Oz that was produced two weeks after he had completed it, what would this prove? Would this prove that there was actually an Emerald City populated with horses which perpetually changed colors and witches who could fly on broomsticks? Of course not. Perhaps Bahnsen is saying that, if we accept the existence of a man named Plato on the basis of his writings whose earliest manuscripts date some twelve or so centuries after the time when he is supposed to have lived, then we should accept the existence of a god-man named Jesus whose extant biographical documents date to within decades of their supposed original composition. But this is a non sequitur which relies on blurring certain key distinctions. For one thing, in the case of Plato's writings, someone had to compose them. Whether they were originally written by Plato himself, or by his pupils, is really irrelevant. The teachings in those writings are attributed to a man, and whether this man's name was Plato or something else, is not really that big a deal. Since non-believers are not people who worship a god, they aren't going to deify Plato either. If it turned out to be the case that the ideas we attribute to Plato were actually conceived and developed by a small band of Scythians, would it cause us to change our lives? Let's not forget also that none of the texts in the New Testament purport to have come from Jesus' own hand. Many of the texts are anonymous, some are clearly pseudonymous, and contrary to what Bahnsen claims, the New Testament record is far from "remarkably uniform." (p. 137; see my blog Reckless Apologetic Presumptuousness.)

But still, Bahnsen claims that there is "actual evidence which is publicly available regarding the text of Scripture." Evidence which supports specifically what? That the New Testament was written almost 2,000 years ago? Who disputes this? Is Bahnsen saying that there's "actual evidence which is publicly available" which supports the view that the events it records actually happened? In regard to "Scripture," Bahnsen says that "its truth has a public nature, open to inspection" (p. 127), but complains that teachings such as those about a "[c]onscious life following physical death, everlasting damnation, and a future resurrection are not readily accepted." (p. 126) But what evidence does Bahnsen or any other Christian apologist present to support its teachings? For instance, "the text of Scripture" claims that there is a heaven. What "publicly available" evidence can Bahnsen or other Christians supply to support this claim? Where is this heaven, and how can its existence be verified? Can such a claim be scientifically tested? If not, why not? The existence of extraterrestrial places, such as planets, moons, asteroids, comets, nebulae, galaxies, etc., can be scientifically verified, so why can't heaven? "Scripture" also claims that there is a hell, presumably a place where souls are flame-broiled without reprieve for all eternity. (I thought souls were immaterial - how is it that they can burn? If God has a soul, is it flame-retardant?) What "publicly available" evidence do Christians supply to support these claims? Do they accept them because they know of concrete evidence for their existence, but choose to keep that evidence to themselves? Or, do they accept these teachings as truth without evidence, perhaps in the fear that it might be true?

Let's consider another example. In Matthew 27:52-53, the following event is said to have occurred when Jesus died on the cross:

52 And the graves were opened; and many bodies of the saints which slept arose,
53 And came out of the graves after his resurrection, and went into the holy city, and appeared unto many.

Now, this is quite a remarkable event indeed. Either that, or it's a complete fabrication. Since Christians want to say that the entirety of the bible is wholly true, inerrant and infallible, they consequently would defend the claim that this event really happened. But what evidence do we have for this that is "publicly available"? No other New Testament document corroborates this alleged event - perhaps that's what Bahnsen meant by the "The word of the Lord is self-attestingly true and authoritative"? (p. 25) But if such an event did occur, it would be astonishing to find that no one other than the author of Matthew would have thought to make a note of it. Indeed, no extrabiblical source supports it. Imagine a crowd of reanimated corpses walking throughout a city who "appeared unto many" of its inhabitants, and yet no witness had the presence of mind to write about it! Apologists may claim that the author of Matthew was an eyewitness, but even the book of Matthew does not claim this; indeed, it records other things that its author could not have been an eyewitness (such as the virgin birth, the temptation in the wilderness, etc.). Perhaps we're supposed to believe this story on the basis of the supposed fact that the earliest manuscripts date to within 200-300 years of its original writing? I trow not.

For that matter, what "publicly available" evidence supports the claim that Jesus rose from the dead? The bible cannot serve as proof of this since it is where this claim is found in the first place. A claim does not double as its own proof. It is the claim which needs to be proven in the first place. Showing that the copies of the writings in which the claim is found date to within 200-300 years of their original composition does not prove that the claim contained in those writings is true. A proof needs support relating to the details of the claim which is being proved. (Of course, there's no way to prevent apologists from delivering a Poof!)

So it seems that Bahnsen's charge that non-believers operate on the basis of prejudice is itself an instance of the pot calling the kettle black. In fact, it's rather easy to see through. What's sad is that Bahnsen's devotees lap up his contempt for non-believers as if it were water at the height of drought season. Whatever makes them feel better, I guess.

by Dawson Bethrick

What Happened to Paul?

Does anyone know what happened to Paul Manata? He seems to have departed the scene completely, and without even saying goodbye! There's been no activity on his blog Pressing the Antithesis since Oct. 14, and the last I saw of him in any comments section was when he tried to tackle one of my arguments in this post of Goosing the Antithesis. And while I've been described by Aaron Kinney as "a proverbial Navy SEAL in the war of ideas," Paul typically displayed a formidable tough-guy persona when interacting with non-believers. Could it be that his bad-boy image was just that, an image fabricated for purposes of intimidation? Where oh where has Paul run off to?

Will we be seeing milk cartons with Paul's picture on it with the caption "Have you seen me?" or "Missing since 10/14/05"? Perhaps it would include details that might give a clue as to how to locate him. For instance, it could say "Ht. 6'1", Wt. 190 lbs. Last seen embarrassing himself on non-Christian blogs trying to defend belief in invisible magic beings," or something along these lines.

Come to think of it, it seems that Paul's retreat is not a sole instance, for other apologists seem to have given up as well. Perhaps they all decided to take a vow of silence? Of course, that would mean that they couldn't tell us lest they break their vow silence.

by Dawson Bethrick

Tape-Loop Apologetics

If you find yourself confronted with an apologist - especially one steeped in the mystical casuistry of presuppositional apologetics - it won't be long before he brandishes one or more of his shiny terms of endearing negation before you and challenges you to "account for" some philosophical issue covered in some apologetics handbook. One such term is the word 'immaterial', an elusive notion which is integral to modern apologetic discourse, but which apologists typically do not define in positive terms. As Rand so poignantly noted, "their definitions are not acts of defining, but of wiping out." (Atlas Shrugged, p. 951) The concept 'immaterial' supposedly refers to something (which presumably exists) that is "not material." Of course, this only tells us what it is not, not what it is, so whatever it is remains unidentified. This is most ironic of course, since Christian apologists tend to make "meaning" an important element in how they characterize the antithesis between believers and non-believers, frequently intimating that "meaning" is only possible if there's a god, and yet here they are often hard-pressed to provide meaning to their key terms.

As an example of what they mean by 'immaterial', apologists often like to point to "the laws of logic," just as Greg Bahnsen did in his debate with Gordon Stein. Yes, that's right, it is strange to see people who enshrine invisible magic beings and other religious notions carry on as if they were concerned for logic. And it's not surprising that a religionist would seize on the laws of logic as an example of what they mean by "immaterial" since religionists in general typically have little or no understanding of concepts. Indeed, I've never found any book in the bible that teaches a theory of concepts. And how exactly does one prove that the laws of logic are in fact "immaterial"?

The presuppositional playbook stipulates that the apologist keep control of the conversation (which he quickly wants to characterize as a debate) by focusing the discussion on the non-believer's view of the world while the apologist hides his own faith-based worldview behind his back, keeping its nonsensical teachings conveniently out of sight. This is the real purpose behind the apologist's attempt to challenge the non-believer to "account for" some item that is usually topical to the mind and its operation, such as the assumption that nature is uniform, logical inference, scientific inquiry, moral judgment, etc., as if his religion had anything important to say on these matters whatsoever. The apologist doesn't really care about the issues that he challenges the non-believer on; if he did, he'd have already adopted an honest-to-reality philosophy. On the contrary, the apologist hopes to keep the non-believer busy explaining his own non-believing position while hoping to spring his Christian dogmas on the non-believer to "clean up" after the non-believer's worldview has been "destroyed" by the apologist's shallow grasp of philosophical matters.

Again the apologist exhibits a most pungent irony here, for in spite of all the feigned importance that the he places on being able to "account for" such things, we should not be surprised when the apologist shows himself unable to "account for" the totems of his worldview. The following brief dialogue shows how the apologist loses at his own game:

Presupposer: "How can your chance-bound, relative-only materialistic worldview account for immaterial entities?"

Non-Believer: "I'm not sure what you're asking. But please, tell me, how does your Christian worldview account for the 'immaterial'?"

Presupposer: "By the self-attesting sovereignty of the Triune God of Christian theism."

Non-Beleiver: "Is this god material or immaterial?"

Presupposer: "God is wholly immaterial."

Non-Believer: "So let me get this straight: you 'account for' that which is 'immaterial' by appealing to that which you say is 'immaterial'? How does that explain anything?"

Presupposer: [blank out]

Notice how the apologist's challenge is so easily shown to loop around and bite him in his nether regions. For if he appeals to the very thing that's being called to be explained, then he simply makes no progress in providing an explanation, for in the end he simply winds up with what he's called to explain. And indeed, if the apologist is challenged to "account for" the "immaterial," what options does he have? If he points to something material to "account for" that which he calls "immaterial," then he's basically admitting that matter is "ultimate" (a favorite presuperstitionalist term). But if he points to something allegedly "immaterial" to "account for" that which he characterizes as "immaterial," has he really explained anything?

The same kind of problem arises when apologists claim pretend that pointing to their god will somehow explain the origin of life. But their god is said to be alive already, so pointing to somethat that's alive does not help explain the origin of life. They're just pointing to what needs to be explained. In the final analysis, it is shown that the apologist is guilty of the very charge he levels against non-believers: the failure to "account for" something important in his own worldview.

Such muddlemindedness is what we can expect to find when we examine the tape-loop antics of presuppositional apologetics. Like a dog chasing its tail, presuppositionalists simply make no progress except in digging their own intellectual graves.

by Dawson Bethrick