Does One Need Evidence to Be an Atheist?

“[A]theism is just a statement of what an atheist doesn't believe rather than what he does believe” – Steve Hays

Over on Triablogue, Steve Hays posted an entry provocatively titled There’s no evidence for atheism. In it, he argues that atheists are essentially at a loss when it comes to producing a positive case for atheism, that the most they can do is raise objections to theism. One wonders if he has ever read George H. Smith’s book Atheism: The Case Against God. Of course, that raises the question of what constitutes a positive argument for a position. Then again, we should also not overlook the obvious fact that atheism is not a position to begin with; it is essentially a negation, a negation of theism. Sort of like a-Moonism: here “a-Moonist” would simply refer to someone who does not subscribe to the teachings of Sun Myung Moon. This does nothing to indicate which views to which an a-Moonist does subscribe. In fact, I’d wager that Steve Hays would consider himself an a-Moonist (in spite of Moonism’s Christian roots), just as I do given that I do not subscribe to the teachings of Sun Myung Moon.

So the question boils down to: Does one need a positive argument to support a negation of a belief system? Does one need evidence if he does not subscribe to a belief system? Do I need evidence to be an a-Moonist? If so, why?

Jet's Flimsy Denials

The apologist named “JET” is still sulking after I responded to his objections to my blog Virginia Tech. In particular, he resents the cartoon universe premise of Christianity being exposed.

Jet writes:

Bethrick simply assumes, rather than argues for, exactly what people like myself, Greg Bahnsen and John Frame straightforwardly deny: That God’s sovereignty renders humans puppets on a string.

Why would I need to argue this? It’s emphatically affirmed in statements like “God controls whatsoever comes to pass” (Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, p. 160) and “God controls all events and outcomes (even those that come about by human choice and activity)” (Bahnsen, Van Til’s Apologetic: Readings & Analysis, p. 489n.44). Since “human choice and activity” themselves could only qualify as “events and outcomes,” they would fall in the category of things that “God controls” on this view. Otherwise statements like “God controls whatsoever comes to pass” would be patently false, and the Christian god would be ruling over something it does not control. Christians want to claim total sovereignty for their god, but when this becomes problematic, they run behind “No, no! That’s not what we mean!”

Of course, theists are going to try to weasel out of the implications of such declarations, but this is to be expected given their worldview-wide habit of evasion. The theist needs to come clean on what he believes: either he believes that “God controls whatsoever comes to pass,” which could only mean human beings are analogous to characters in a cartoon acting precisely as the cartoonist intends (indeed, as cogs in a massive “plan” which was set in motion long before we even came to be), or he doesn’t (in which case his god is simply another entity among all the others of the universe, having no more significance than a rock). These are not my problems.

Jet writes:

This is a typical objection to a high view of God’s controlling of the world, and it’s been responded to again and again.

Sure. I’m quite familiar with all the “responses” that theists have presented in response to my points. I’ve already shown why they fail (see here, here, here, here and here for instance).

Jet writes:

Bethrick seems to have no desire to even acknowledge, let alone attempt to refute, the scores of responses to such an oversimplification and misrepresentation of the Bible’s stance on this issue.

“...scores of responses...,” none of which Jet reproduces for consideration. Jet alludes to what we’re apparently supposed to fear: endless volumes of proofs and refutations all confirming the reality of the god he worships while he keeps them hidden in his back pocket. He really wants to believe this stuff, so he wants to create a scare crow in our minds by claiming it’s looming overhead. I’m reminded of Butler’s fitting quotation of Kant:

If, therefore, we observe the dogmatist coming forward with ten proofs, we can be quite sure that he really has none. For had he one that yielded... apodictic proof, what need would he have of the others? (“The Transcendental Argument for God’s Existence,” The Standard-Bearer, p. 65)

So long as what specifically he has in mind (assuming he has something specific in mind) remains out of sight, he can take comfort in the belief that it’s not been “refuted.” But enough with all the qualifications, dichotomies, reservations and nuances; either Jet’s god “controls whatsoever comes to pass,” or it doesn’t. Choose a position and stick with it come hell or high water. Perhaps Jet has been in the fishers’ hands so long he forgot how to swim, so he’s trying to avoid the latter.

Jet writes:

Once again, to repeat something said in part 1 of this response, if you’re going to address Presuppositionalism, then address the presuppositionalist’s view of divine sovereignty, not a strawman.

If it is a strawman, why do presuppositionalists like John Frame (whom Jet mentions) and Vern Poythress stress the importance of analogies that are very close to the cartoon universe analogy that I have proposed?

John Frame confirms the appropriateness of the cartoon universe analogy when describing the relationship between his god and the universe as he likes to imagine it:

Perhaps the best illustration... is this: In a well-crafted novel, the author creates a world in which events take place in meaningful causal relationships to one another. Each event has an intelligible cause within the world of the novel. But of course each event also has a higher cause, in the author's mind. Normally, such an author will try to maintain the orderly causal structure of his created universe. He may, of course, also work "without, above, and against" that causal order when he is pleased to do so. (Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought, p. 82)

Frame explicitly likens the “created universe” to a novel written by an author, referring to this as “perhaps the best illustration.” I’ll give Frame one thing: he’s close. The author of a novel chooses every detail that characterizes the universe he wants to create in his novel. He creates the characters which populate it, and he chooses what parts they will play and what actions they will perform. Nothing in the novel appears or happens unless the author wants it and puts it there. This is especially true in the case of a skilled author. The characters do not make their own choices, the events in which they participate do not happen by themselves, and the outcomes are not a result of their intentions. Everything throughout the novel, from the first page to the last page, is precisely what the author intends. There is no exception to this, for the characters have no will of their own. Frame is right on, but behind the times. With the invention of cartoons, we now have an even stronger analogy for illustrating the relationship between the Christian god and the universe, as Christianity affirms it.

Then there's Poythress:

Dorothy Sayers acutely observes that the experience of a human author writing a book contains profound analogies to the Trinitarian character of God. An author’s act of creation in writing imitates the action of God in creating the world. (Why Scientists Must Believe in God: Divine Attributes of Scientific Law)

Like Frame, Poythress finds the analogy of story-writing quite illustrative of the relationship between his god and the universe he thinks it created. But a cartoon has the advantage of supplying details which the reader needs to supply in his own imagination as he reads a novel. So a cartoon delivers what the cartoonist has in mind on a perceptual level, where a novel still leaves much detail to the reader’s own inventions. Also, a cartoon proceeds at its own pace, not the reader’s. The reader of a novel can put the novel down at any time. But once a cartoon starts, it goes until the end, barring technical difficulties, loss of power or atheological review (which will bring the fantasy to a jarring halt – those atheistic spoilsports!).

Jet writes:

Man is not a mere puppet, he is a fallen creature created in God’s image

Of course man is not a puppet. But this is not because “he is a fallen creature created in God’s image” (which is a double absurdity), but because he is man and there are no invisible magic beings which are controlling his choices and actions.

Jet writes:

God does not work fresh evil in man’s heart, nor were any of those who fastened Christ to the cross innocent victims whose arms God twisted. No Christian believes this. To fairly represent those with whom he disagrees, Bethrick should not concoct or imply positions that nobody holds.

So, Van Til does not hold that his god “controls whatsoever comes to pass”? Bahnsen does not hold that his god “controls all events and outcomes”? If one affirms these statements, he can only hold man responsible for anything by secretly contradicting them. Just as the god of the universe chose that I would be born in the western hemisphere with two arms, a nose, blond hair and ten fingers and ten toes, so it is with anything else about man, on this view, including his actions – actions which he could not choose any more than where he was born. It’s “the accident of birth,” as Van Til would put it in his pamphlet Why I Believe in God.

Jet writes:

Second, if Bethrick is himself an atheist, the picture of reality that he proposes we adopt is truly silly. We are to believe that apart from the cartoonist, trees (that came about by undirected “happy” accidents) magically became paper (once again with no outside direction) and pencils also mysteriously formed out of primordial slop. Then this pencil began -through small micro-mutational adjustments-to pick itself up and draw a wonderfully harmonious world and likewise wrote and designed characters (without the help of a conscious mind directing it, now mind you) all with the same moral intuitions,
capacities for logical reasoning and verbal communication.

Jet attributes to me a view which, bearing the description he chooses for it, is quite absurd indeed. Does Jet cite even one statement by my hand to justify his attribution of such a view to me? No, he does not. His worldview is so intertwined in the cartoon universe premise of theism that he cannot disentangle himself from it even to catch a glimpse of what a non-theistic view of the universe is like. Jet’s problem is that he does not realize that there is an alternative to the metaphysical subjectivism which Christianity inherently assumes. I have already written on this in the following blogs:

Metaphysical Subjectivism and Christianity’s Cartoon Universe, Pt. 1

Metaphysical Subjectivism and Christianity’s Cartoon Universe, Pt. 2

Theism and Subjective Metaphysics

Does my view propose that “trees... magically became paper”? No, men produce paper from wood pulp through a causal process which he discovered and understands by means of reason. Does my view propose that “pencils... mysteriously formed out of primordial slop”? No, men produce pencils from materials they find on the earth. Does my view propose that the world was drawn by a pencil which picked itself up and started drawing spontaneously? No, existence exists, and only existence exists. The alternative to my worldview’s starting point is to start with non-existence as one’s fundamental primary (for only then would it be necessary to “explain” the fact that existence exists; see for instance Basic Contra-Theism). Theism attempts to broker a compromise between its starting point of consciousness conscious only of itself (a patent contradiction) and beginning with non-existence as such (for apologetic purposes). Why not simply start with existence, and move on from there?

Jet gets after me for critiquing a position which he claims no Christian affirms, even though I can cite numerous sources from the Christian camp which affirm precisely what I am critiquing. But then he critiques a position he attributes to me but which I have nowhere affirmed. He does not even go to the trouble – as I have in the case of what I have critiqued – of citing statements to authenticate his attribution of said positions to me.

Jet also wrote:

So, life came from non-life, logic from the irrational, morality from the amoral, and meaning from non-meaning.

In a single sentence, Jet displays his penchant for Tape-Loop Apologetics. If you follow the implications of what Jet presents here just a little further, it won’t belong until you find something along these lines:

Presupposer: "How can your chance-bound, relative-only materialistic worldview account for immaterial entities?"

Non-Believer: "I'm not sure what you're asking. But please, tell me, how does your Christian worldview account for the 'immaterial'?"

Presupposer: "By the self-attesting sovereignty of the Triune God of Christian theism."

Non-Beleiver: "Is this god material or immaterial?"

Presupposer: "God is wholly immaterial."

Non-Believer: "So let me get this straight: you 'account for' that which is 'immaterial' by appealing to that which you say is 'immaterial'? How does that explain anything?"

Presupposer: [blank out]

Jet will want to know where life came from according to my view. The answer is simple: life came from existence. Does my view hold that “logic [comes] from the irrational”? No, and Jet nowhere presents any quotation from something that I have written which affirms that as my position. Like life, logic, morality and meaning all come from existence. In Jet’s view, they come from an invisible magic being which he enshrines in his imagination.

by Dawson Bethrick

Theism and Subjective Metaphysics

Below I continue my examination of Paul Manata's lengthy diatribe against me. In this post I will survey some of Paul's "more substantive" points which were intended to exonerate Christianity from the charge of subjectivism. Those who are familiar with my criticisms of Christianity already know that one of my primary contentions against any religious worldview is that it assumes a subjective metaphysics, particularly in its assertion of a supernatural subject to which the objects of the universe conform. Here we will see that efforts to overcome this criticism are doomed to failure.

I wrote:

I've seen many Objectivist assemble arguments against theism, many of them pointing to the metaphysical subjectivism inherent in theism as its own defeater.

Paul responded:

Ah yes, Dawson’ (in)famous argument from metaphysical subjectivsm. Let’s address it. Bethrick wants to capitalize on the common undertsanding people have of “subjectivism.” Sometimes it’s taken to mean “relativism.” Now, if reality were dependant on multiple human minds, then we’d have relativism.

It is important to understand the distinction and relationship of the various types of subjectivism. In his lecture series The Primacy of Consciousness Versus the Objectivist Ethics, Bernstein identifies three general categories of primacy of consciousness. They are the personal, the social, and the cosmic or supernatural. The personal primacy of consciousness holds that reality conforms to one’s own conscious druthers. This is the orientation assumed by the solipsist. (But see also: Confessions of a Vantillian Subjectivist.)

The social primacy of consciousness is the subjectivism of the collectivist. He holds the view that reality conforms to the consciousnesses of a group of individuals, whether it is all human beings or some subset of them, such as a race, or those sharing a certain belief system (cf. “the elect,” etc.). The cosmic or supernatural primacy of consciousness is the subjectivism assumed by religious god-belief. On this view, man’s mind is essentially impotent, unable to do anything by itself. But a supernatural personality, which according to the believer’s imagination exists beyond the universe, is omnipotent, and reality conforms to its every whim (only the believer typically prefers to call it a “plan” or some other term to give it some implication of principle and structure). All three share the same basic essential: the primacy of consciousness. All three are invalid for the same reason, namely that they reverse the proper orientation between subject and object.

Of course, either view is held by an individual, and as such, the personal primacy of consciousness is always implied to some degree. In the case of the social or cosmic primacy of consciousness, for instance, the view held by the individual essentially says that reality conforms to collective or supernatural will because he wants it to. This is why it is important to ask apologists who become frustrated with non-believers in the midst of debate, whether or not they think we should believer their religious claims on their say so. Typically they will deny that this is what they expect, and hasten to replace their own say so with what they say belongs to their god: “No, don’t believe because I say so, believe because God says so!” This simply removes the issue back one step as the believer tries to disguise his assumption of the personal primacy of consciousness with the authority of an imaginary deity.

Then Paul conceded that the theistic view of reality is ultimately subjective:

But in theism, there’s a sense in which reality is subjective - based on the divine mind

What more need I say? Paul has finally come to admit that the theistic view of reality is subjective in nature. Note how obvious an error it is to assume that “reality is... based on [a] mind.” Is that mind not also supposed to be real? If so, then how can reality be based on it? If not, then how can reality be based on it? Either way, the theist comes up all blanks.

In spite of this admission, Paul wants to add a qualification to dilute it:

but it’s still objective for us humans.

Qualifications like this simply demonstrate that theists have no consistent metaphysic to begin with. Paul is essentially saying that reality is both subjective and objective, as if the orientation between subject and object could be redirected by the flipping of a switch, or as if one could strike a compromise between the two and integrate them into a non-contradictory worldview. The problem is that the assumption that the orientation between subject and object can be redirected at will itself reduces to subjectivism, and that subjective and objective metaphysics cannot be integrated without contradiction. What happens when one tries to mix food with poison? One can still swallow it, but it will no longer be fit for human life.

According to theism (as Paul has clearly admitted), reality is ultimately subjective, and that’s all there is to say. It’s not “objective” for anyone, for everything must ultimately conform to the dictates of a consciousness. Theistic creationism essentially teaches that the universe came into being as a result of supernatural wishing. You cannot get any more subjective than this. Any “objectivity” that the theist wants to claim, is borrowed from a rival worldview, one which holds diametrically opposite foundations and principles. And even within the Christian worldview, to whatever extent it might ostensibly seem to “make sense” to claim objectivity in regard to some method or assessment, it is always subject to being overturned by the whims of the ruling consciousness. Every believer can be made a liar by the turn of the deity’s tail. Objectivity simply does not apply, for the preconditions of objectivity simply do not exist in such a universe. In theism, reality is comparable to silly putty: ever-pliant, conforming to whatever shape is desired. We should not forget the implications that metaphysical subjectivism has in epistemology. Knowledge on such a view ultimately reduces to sheer imagination. That is why tokens such as faith, prayer, belief unto salvation, et al., are so common in religious worldviews. They follow naturally from the subjective metaphysics of religious doctrines.

Paul writes:

There are some respects which reality is the product of human consciousness. For example, Dawson’s mind causes blog posts to appear in the world.

This is so wrong-headed it’s childish. My consciousness does not cause blog posts to appear in the world. My physical actions do. Without a functioning computer hooked up to the internet and without my fingers busily typing away and pointing and clicking hyperlinks, etc., I would not be able to post even one word on my blog. My mind does not put the blog on the internet, my actions, along with the electronic mechanics of my computer and www.blogger.com, do.

Just last week I was editing a post on blogger.com when a storm outside caused the power to fail temporarily. I lost the edits that I had been making. My wishing was not sufficient to prevent this, nor was my wishing able to restore those edits once the power came back on. If my consciousness causes posts to appear in the world, my wishing should have been sufficient to do all this. But reality does not conform to consciousness. On the contrary, to get the job done, I had to start over, physically going through each paragraph again to review what was written and make any edits that needed to be made.

Paul writes:

The meaning of these posts is dependant upon consciousness. No consciousness, no meaning. If meaning is real, then it is subject to the primacy of consciousness. If it’s not real, then Bethrick lives in a relativistic universe. We make up our own meaning and there is no meaning that is the meaning.

This is quite convoluted. Meaning is the domain of concepts, and concepts are formed from objective inputs according to an objective method. Concepts are not formed by consciousness in an input-free void, without the benefit of objects which supply them with content. On the contrary, concepts are informed by the data we gather from the objects of our awareness. Consequently the meaning of any post is dependent on the subject-object relationship. This is why the principle of objectivity (i.e., object primacy) is so important. Without it, meaning would not be possible. Objectivity is the principle application of the primacy of existence metaphysics to knowledge and the choices we make. So contrary to what Paul insinuates, if meaning is real, it must depend on the primacy of existence orientation in the subject-object relationship. If consciousness did not have an object to consider and use as a guide for knowledge, there could be no meaning. Meaningfulness is not possible without both a subject and an object. In a theistic realm, meaning is ultimately subject to an invisible magic being’s whims: its wants are the only standard, the only guide, the only criterion which generates and informs any meaning, to the degree that meaning is even possible at that point. This is quite ironic, for many Christian apologists often make the topic of "meaning" a debating point, insisting that there would be no meaning whatsoever if their invisible magic being did not exist. Ravi Zacharias, for instance, asserts that

In a world without God there is no essential meaning or sanctity to humanity. (No Meaning from Matter)

Unfortunately for the theist, he cannot say that the meaning that his god allegedly creates is objective in character, for the objects on which it would base any meaning would themselves be meaningless creations. Granting the Christian mythology for argument's sake, the objects that the Christian god creates would be merely empty vessels whose identity would be assigned according to its pleasure (cf. Ps. 115:3) and revisable at will (cf. doctrine of miracles). Van Til confirms this explicitly:

According to the doctrine of the Reformed faith all the facts of nature and of history are what they are, do what they do and undergo what they undergo, in accord with the one comprehensive counsel of God. All that may be known by man is already known by God. And it is already known by God because it is controlled by God.” (The Protestant Doctrine of Scripture, p. 57; quoted in Bahnsen, Van Til’s Apologetic: Readings & Analysis, p. 106)

So the things that the theist would claim as objects of his god's awareness, would not be objects as we know them. In the non-cartoon universe of atheism, the objects of our consciousness are what they are independent of consciousness, and the task of consciousness is to perceive them and identify their nature. But in the cartoon universe of theism, the objects of the Christian god's consciousness could not be said to be what they are independent of consciousness. Its consciousness creates its objects and assigns their nature by divine fiat (cf. Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, p. 26). So there is no objectivity in the theistic worldview after all. All is subjective whim, all is arbitrary. Indeed, to call theism arbitrary is a redundancy.

Paul wrote:

The Christian position is that an eternally existing and conscious God creates everything distinct from him (including you, the universe, and me).

This reduces to the fallacy of pure self-reference. For details, see here. Some apologists have suggested that the only way around this criticism is to compromise the doctrine of divine simplicity by asserting that the Christian god has "parts" which can serve as objects of its consciousness. Thus to overcome a fallacy, an arbitrary worldview will have to double cross some of its stated positions.

Paul wrote:

Note that this position entails that: [a] some existence is not the result of consciousness (since God does not create himself). Thus, the Christian position is not metaphysical subjectivism, the idea that all existence finds its source in a form of consciousness. [b] Our consciousness is a result of existence (God's existence), thus satisfying the central impulse of metaphysical objectivism.

Notice that Paul is trying (again!) to make Christianity square with the primacy of existence principle, while earlier he argued that it has no basis. Why would he now try to make his position cohere with something he earlier indicated to be baseless? At any rate, [a] simply concedes the whole shebang to Objectivism, for it acknowledges the inescapability of the primacy of existence. But [a] is not sufficient to rid a position of its metaphysical subjectivism. The metaphysical subjectivism is still there. According to Christianity, it’s here with us, in the universe of finite objects, the created reality made of pliant silly putty, the cartoon universe in which “God controls whatsoever comes to pass.” Christianity teaches that the whole universe was created by an act of divine will, i.e., that the entire universe finds its source in a form of consciousness, and that all the objects therein conform to its intentions. This teaching grants metaphysical primacy to the subject over its objects, and is thus sufficient to convict Christianity of metaphysical subjectivism. Contrary to what Paul insinuates here, a position does not need to affirm that "all existence finds its source in a form of consciousness" to commit itself to metaphysical subjectivism. A little leaven leaveneth the whole lump. The issue is the orientation between a subject and its objects. The assertion that any external object directly depends on and/or conforms to the will of a consciousness for its existence and or nature entails metaphysical subjectivism. This is all over Christianity. It can be found in Christian ontology (e.g., “creationism,” “miracles,” etc.), epistemology (e.g., faith in revelations), morality (e.g., divine commandments, pietism, self-denial and self-sacrifice, etc.), social theory (e.g., Christian collectivism, the “body of Christ,” etc.).

[b] gives Christian teachings the short shrift by downplaying the divine sovereignty of the Christian god. The objects that the Christian god are not, according to Christian teaching, a result of merely the existence of said god, as if their creation were automatic, unintentional or accidental. Rather, Christianity holds that they are a deliberate result of its will, i.e., its conscious activity.

God’s ‘thought content’ actively makes these things so (i.e., actively makes the truth). (Bahnsen, Van Til’s Apologetic: Readings & Analysis, p. 227n.152).

Accordingly, the Christian god wishes, and POOF! Whatever it wishes magically comes to pass. Then to make matters even worse, once the Christian god got around to creating human beings, Christianity’s doctrines can only mean that they are puppets, like characters in a cartoon, since “God controls whatsoever comes to pass.” This same god

controls all events and outcomes (even those that come about by human choice and activity) and is far more capable and powerful than modern machines. (Van Til's Apologetic, p. 489n.43)

So [b] takes for granted something that is not logically compatible with Christian teaching, namely the assumption that human beings are actually conscious. On the contrary, according to what Christianity teaches, human beings are nothing more than mere puppets dangling on a string and being moved about to and fro according to an all-sovereign plan instigated by an all-sovereign invisible magic being long before they even existed. Puppets are not alive. They are not conscious organisms. Ironically, given its commitment to sheer determinism (which follows naturally from the primacy of consciousness metaphysics), Christianity's view of man cannot break past the gravitational pull of mere Hobbesian mechanism.

Additionally, [b] would also imply:

1) a lack of consistent metaphysics (Paul wants to flip-flop back and forth between the subjective and the objective orientation),

2) the inability of the Christian god serving as the standard of man's knowledge - for man's standard needs to be consistent with the nature of his consciousness and the orientation it has with its objects (see here), and

3) fatal implications for the notion that man was created in the image of this god viz. rationality, for man's rationality is premised on the primacy of existence, while the Christian god enjoys the primacy of consciousness.

Needless to say, Paul's defenses are falling down pretty hard.Let's see what else he said.

Paul wrote:

Since Christianity does not claim that all existence is the result of consciousness - because God doesn’t create Himself, He’s not a “result” - then Christianity claims that some existence is the result of consciousness.

If the Christian god did not create itself, then its nature is not something it ever intended. Its nature is a mere cosmic accident, a fluke, a product of chance. This is the implication of presuppositionalism's own kind of reasoning:

If the mind of God does not sovereignly determine the relationship of every event to every other event according to His wise plan, then the way things are in the world and what happens there are random and indeterminate.(Bahnsen, Van Til's Apologetic: Readings & Analysis, p. 110n.64)

The gist of this kind of reasoning is clear enough: if something is not under the control of the Christian god, then it must be "random and indeterminate." Since, as Paul explicitly states, this same god did not create itself, its existence and the nature it has could not be a "result" of its own intentions. So it's "just by chance" that it is what it is. No overseeing consciousness can be said to have been responsible for ensuring the Christian god's nature is rational or coherent. The Christian doctrine of god falls by presuppositionalism's own sword.

Paul asked:

Now, does Bethrick hold to: (a) all existence is the result of a consciousness; (b) some existence is the result of consciousness, (c) no existence is the result of consciousness?

My view is that there is always a distinction between an object and the cognitive faculty by which one is aware of it. Cognition does not create the objects it perceives, nor does it dictate what their nature is. In other words, my worldview holds that the objects of cognition always hold metaphysical primacy over the subject of cognition. Hence "Objectivism." Christianity, however, gives us the notion of a god, “an isolation of actual characteristics of man combined with the projection of impossible, irrational characteristics which do not arise from reality – such as omnipotence and omniscience.” (ITOE, p. 148) This being allegedly possesses a consciousness which has the power to wish entire universes into existence and manipulate the identity of any object it chooses. The result is a blurring between subject and object, a reversal of metaphysical primacy, and a worldview built on stolen concepts and choking in floating abstractions.

Paul writes:

If he holds to (a) then he’s a metaphysical subjectivist. Christianity holds to (b) and since Bethrick thinks Christianity holds to metaphysical subjectivism Bethrick can’t hold to (b). That leaves (c}. Bethrick must maintain that no existence is the result of consciousness. So, since thoughts exist they must not be the result or creation of consciousness. So, we have eternally existing thoughts.

Again, my view is that the objects of consciousness are distinct from the process by which we are conscious of them, that the objects are what they are independent of consciousness, that our consciousness does not create its own objects but rather perceives and/or considers them. My position has been unflinchingly consistent on this: reality is not a creation of consciousness, nor does reality conform to the dictates of consciousness.

Paul somehow thinks that thoughts or ideas constitute a counter-example to this, but in fact they do not. Thinking is the action of a consciousness capable of conceptualized cognition. Since consciousness is an active faculty, no new existence is "created" when consciousness performs its functions. It is the nature of consciousness to act. When a man thinks, nothing new in the universe comes into existence. It simply doesn't work that way. His consciousness already existed, and he did not create his own consciousness by an act of his consciousness. Again, consciousness is axiomatic.

Paul asked:

Just how, exactly, does Bethrick’s position deny “invisible magic beings?”

By consistently embracing the primacy of existence metaphysics and avoiding the fallacies inherent in believing that invisible magic beings and other constructs of the imagination are real.

We have seen time and time again that Paul's efforts to criticize my position continue to fail as he body-slams himself into the wall of rational philosophy. Full of self-inflicted cuts and bruises, he has been unable to cohere his god-belief with the primacy of existence, which we need as the basis of rationality. And he has been unable to undermine the primacy of existence as the foundation of a rational philosophy. Is this the best that presuppositionalism has to offer? If so, it's in big trouble.

by Dawson Bethrick

Chronic Manatism: Boy Wonder and His Invisible Magic Being

Readers will recall how offended Paul Manata has become whenever I use the word 'magic' in reference to his god-beliefs. He repeated over and over that my expression "invisible magic being" is "pejorative" while referring to me as a "monkey," "bafoon," "baboon," "hack," "joker," "fool," "goof ball," etc., which Paul apparently does not consider to be pejorative expressions. Beyond that, Paul did make some meager efforts to challenge the appropriateness of the expression "invisible magic being" when used to refer to his god, but these have proved to be, well, rather meager.

I had written:

This source [a dictionary] also acknowledges the association of magic with "the supernatural." Christians want us to believe in "the supernatural," so it seems they should welcome the use of the adjective 'magic' when speaking of their god and other invisible beings.

Paul responded:

There’s plenty of ways to understand “supernatural” and only one of them is “magical.”

Paul's statement here is sufficient to concede the whole point to me, for he acknowledges that there is a kinship between "the supernatural" and magic, which is what I have been maintaining all along. As I had showed, "magic is associated with that which is alleged to be supernatural." Since Paul acknowledges here that this is valid at least some of the time, then he's basically handed the issue to me in full, whether he likes it or not.

Regardless, I am only speaking for what I personally mean by 'magic' when I use the expression "invisible magic being" to refer to religious fixtures, like the Christian god, demons, devils, angels, etc. Magic essentially means of, relating to or possessing supernatural power. So in my view it is applicable to anything that is said to be "supernatural" or exemplified by what is said to be "supernatural" power.

Now the Christian god is certainly thought, by Christians anyway, to possess supernatural powers. So by my definition, 'magic' suitably applies to the Christian god, given how its own self-appointed spokesmen have described it. According to Christianity, it's clear that demons, devils and angels are also thought to have supernatural powers, though in lesser degree or capacity. Demons, for instance, can strike otherwise healthy people with disease by inhabiting their bodies or causing some other kind of mischief (which is never explained) which can in turn affect the human body adversely. Angels, too, have supernatural powers. According to the bible, they can visit men in their dreams (and yet they're not themselves supposed to be dreams). It all certainly seems very magical to me.

Paul also writes:

Bethrick totally fails to make any apology for equating “magic” with the “supernatural” in the sense that Christians and philosophers around the globe mean it.

If by 'apoplogy' here we mean a defense of my usage of the word 'magic' to apply to the Christian god, then I have more than met the challenge that has been brought against me. Magic is associated with the supernatural (indeed, I use it specifically to refer to supernatural power), and the Christian god is said to be supernatural. So the shoe fits. But Paul prefers to go around barefoot.

Besides, I was not attempting to speak on behalf of “Christians and philosophers around the globe” and what they might mean by ‘magic’ (as if they were monolithic in viewpoint or necessary to appease). I was asked to explain my use of the word ‘magic’, and I did just that. And it fits. I don’t need to run to “Christians and philosophers” for their approval for my use and meaning of the word ‘magic’.

Again, it is important to remember why I use the term that Paul finds so discomforting. As I had written:

I use the term 'invisible magic being' because it is open-ended. That is my primary purpose in using it: it is intended to cover any postulated mystical entity which is said to exist beyond the reach of our senses…

In response to this, Paul wrote:

No, you use it to make fun of theists.

No, I use it because it is open-ended, just as the concept 'man' includes all men who exist now, have existed in the past and will exist in the future. The fundamental difference is that the concept 'man' denotes actual things, and its basis is objective fact rather than projected imagination. But the open-ended range in reference is a trait that both share due to their conceptual nature. The expression "invisible magic being" can be used to refer to any allegedly supernatural being, whether Christian or otherwise.

But I take Paul’s statement here as evidence that his feelings are hurt when I use the expression ‘invisible magic being’. That’s why he’s so sore at me. Christians can’t stand it when non-believers do not take his god-beliefs as seriously as they do. At any rate, what would be wrong with making fun of people who believe in invisible magic beings? Does Paul think that I should respect them for their folly? It’s funny to me that grown adults carry on with their imaginations the way they do. It’s certainly sad, but it’s funny, too.

Besides, if my primary objective were "to make fun of theists," I'd just call them names, like Paul does to me.

Paul wrote:

Bethrick can’t debate, so he resorts to making fun.

What exactly am I supposed to debate about?

Then Paul shows that he really does want me to stop using the expression “invisible magic being” when referring to his god:

You can stop now Dawson;

Yes, I do have that option. I also have the option of continuing to use it. And since it performs the task that I want it to, I see no reason not to continue using it. Paul’s tender feelings are not sufficient to persuade me to change my mind on these things. I'm confident that, with effort, Paul can get over it if he wants to. Of course, it would help if he dissolved his emotional investment in Christianity. But then who would provide such entertainment?

Paul shows that he puts a lot of stock in the herd mentality when he writes:

we are definitely all laughing at you.

Again Paul speaks about himself and what he values when he makes statements like this, and projects them onto unidentified nobodies whom we're supposed to imagine standing behind him in unanimous agreement. He assumes that others put as much stock in the approval of others that he does. But Paul needs to understand something about me on this point: if a group of people who believe in invisible magic beings are laughing at me because I do not believe in invisible magic beings, I'm happy to consider the source. The group-giggle that Paul alludes to here is something he values, because he’s so desperate for the approval of others.

Now recall that Paul had also denied that there are any natural laws. Indeed, a person seeking to defend belief that reality is dominated by magic would need to find a way to discount the fact-based principles that scientific minds have formed to identify certain regularities and constants observed in reality. The reason for this is two-fold: for one, the affirmation of regularities and constants in nature makes it harder to defend the doctrine of miracles (i.e., magical incursions which defy and overturn those regularities and constants), and two, the affirmation of regularities and constants implies an autonomous universe, i.e., one which is not under the control of an invisible magic being. In order to justify his rejection of natural law, Paul quoted Bahnsen on the matter. (Paul did not identify where exactly he got the quote, but I'm very glad he quoted it!) In that quote, Bahnsen affirms the following:

God personally created and now personally directs all the affairs of the world.

This is the cartoon universe premise in a nutshell. As I had suspected, Paul rejects natural laws because he conceives of the world in a manner analogous to a cartoon whose every detail and action is controlled by a master cartoonist which exists independent of the cartoon world in which Paul exists. Paul is simply a cartoon character – Boy Wonder – doing what his cartoonist wants him to do.

by Dawson Bethrick

Metaphysical Subjectivism and Christianity's Cartoon Universe, Pt. 2

Steve Hays of Triablogue has repeatedly attempted to exonerate the Christian worldview of its cartoonish implications. In addition to outright denying the striking similarities between Christianity's conception of the world and the fictional realm of a cartoon, Steve has attempted to weaken the analogy by misconstruing the points which are being related by the analogy. I have shown both how this procedure fails, and how the analogy is in fact strengthened by Christianity's own affirmations and the declarations of its own defenders. In the meantime, Steve has admitted to viewing himself as a puppet in a made up world (he claims it is an honor to believe this about himself), and has in fact made use of a very similar analogy in distinguishing his view from the non-believer's view. In this posting I will respond to more of Hays' attempts to neutralize the cartoon universe analogy.

I wrote:

On my view, the frustration he projects does not exist; at least, not for me. I can, for instance, direct my own movements; my metaphysical viewpoint in no way contends against this fact. And through my physical movements, I can move other physical things. Steve cited the example of typing words out on a computer keyboard. I can direct my fingers to depress the buttons on my keyboard. If the keyboard and the computer to which it is connected are functioning properly, it is possible for me to type the words that I want to type by using the hardware to transmit my intentions.

To which Steve responded:

At the risk of stating the obvious, this is exactly how a cartoonist operates. He expresses his intentions through a physical medium, such as computer animation.

Now Steve says:

If a real live cartoonist does exactly what he described above, then, by Dawson’s own definition, he subscribes to a cartoon universe. Sorry if Dawson is unable to connect his own dots.

What I described in my own quote above is the non-cartoon universe of atheism, not the cartoon universe of theism. What Steve is missing here, is the point that an actual cartoonist in fact exists in the non-cartoon universe of atheism, not in the fictional realm that he creates. What distinguishes a cartoon universe from a non-cartoon universe is the former's dependence of all its contents and events on the will of some conscious determining agent that does not itself originate in that universe. This is the universe as Christians imagine it: all things and all events are “controlled” by a conscious being which designs everything which exists in the universe it creates and “controls whatsoever comes to pass” in it. The non-cartoon universe of atheism has no conscious determining agent originating from outside it which "controls whatsoever comes to pass" in it.

The cartoon universe analogy is not pointing out similarities between the universe as Christianity characterizes it and the non-cartoon universe of atheism. On the contrary, the cartoon universe analogy points out the similarities between the universe as Christianity characterizes it and the fictional realm of a cartoon. The cartoonist does in fact need to use materials to create his cartoons according to their nature, just as a carpenter uses wood to build cabinets according to wood's nature. But that is because both the cartoonist and the carpenter live in a universe where the objects of their awareness do not conform to wishes – i.e., a non-cartoon universe. In the non-cartoon universe, cartoonists and carpenters are autonomous agents - that is, they control themselves independently of each other, and they are not being controlled by some mystical personality which has choreographed all of history's events according to a mystical "plan."

In contrast to the non-cartoon universe of atheism, the universe that Christianity affirms is a universe where the things which constitute it conform to whatever a supernatural personality wishes. As John Frame puts it, "we are never free from divine control." (Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought, p. 80.) Similarly, the fictional realm of a cartoon is a realm where the images look and act just as the cartoonist who creates it wants them to look and act. Likewise to Christianity, a cartoon character is never free from the cartoonist's control. In a non-cartoon universe, the objects hold metaphysical primacy over the subject of awareness, while a cartoon universe presupposes that the subject holds metaphysical primacy over the objects of awareness.

Someone existing in a cartoon universe wouldn’t “have to” use a keyboard to write what he wants to write, for in a cartoon universe there is nothing beyond the control of the all-determining agent. The very concept of necessity is strictly a non-cartoon universe idea borrowed by the cartoon universe worldview and used without understanding of its genetic roots. In a cartoon universe, everything is a wild card; there are no constraints independent of the supreme determiner’s will which define the limits of possibility within the cartoon realm itself. In a cartoon universe, the supreme determiner could, for instance, send a giant detached hand writing on the side of a large wall with its index finger. If the supreme determiner wanted to do this in the realm it creates, nothing would be able to stop it. This is precisely the kind of universe that Christianity affirms.

The Calvinist notion of a distinction between primary and secondary causation, where primary causation refers to the all-controlling sovereignty of the Christian god, and secondary causation refers to the incidental causes within the universe, is illustrative of just how integral the cartoon universe premise is to the Christian worldview. In describing the relationship between these two types of causation, John Frame makes use of an analogy not unlike mine. He writes:

Perhaps the best illustration... is this: In a well-crafted novel, the author creates a world in which events take place in meaningful causal relationships to one another. Each event has an intelligible cause within the world of the novel. But of course each event also has a higher cause, in the author's mind. Normally, such an author will try to maintain the orderly causal structure of his created universe. He may, of course, also work "without, above, and against" that causal order when he is pleased to do so. Usually, however, when an author disrupts the causal order of his novel, the narrative becomes less satisfying. Critics acuse such an author of bringing things about by a deus ex machina. (Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought, p. 82)

Frame mentions that he got this analogy from his associate, Vern Poythress. So some of Christianity's own head honchos think such analogies offer wholesome representation of their worldview. In the analogy he offers Frame explicitly likens the universe as Christianity conceives of it to a work of fiction, pointing out that, as in a work of fiction, the players may appear to the reader to be acting autonomously on their own volition, but actually they are merely being pushed and pulled to and fro according to the intentions of the author. The author sets the rules, and breaks them when he wants. The author is in no way compelled to create his fictional realm one way as opposed to another. He could create a realm where gravity reverses its direction every seven minutes if he wanted to. The author can have his characters say magic prayers while objects alter themselves in immediate obedience, such as the parting of an inland sea when it suits their "needs." The author can choose to create a villain who savagely murders other characters. The author can even try to make himself feel better about creating such a character in his novel by saying he has "a morally sufficient reason to allow" this evil, as Bahnsen claims on behalf of his god.

Frame refers to his novel analogy as "perhaps the best illustration" of the "personalistic" determinism that lies at the foundation of his worldview. However, the advantage that a cartoon has over a novel is the graphic form in which a cartoon presents its invented realm. Where a novel leaves all the visuals and soundtracks up to the reader's imagination, a cartoon allows us to see and hear the invented realm. And while a novel can only be enjoyed at the pace of reader's reading rate, a cartoon proceeds on its own pace, since it actually portrays the action of the invented realm rather than merely describing it.

I had written:

What has broken down here is Steve's own confused analysis. Essentially, Steve has confused the ink, paper, celluloid, or other technology with which a cartoonist works, with the imaginary realm that he uses these materials to create, a fake environment that is analogous to a universe created by a supernatural consciousness which determines its contents and events. The cartoon universe analogy in no way requires that cartoonists ‘merely wish cartoon characters into existence,’ nor is this what it is intended to illustrate. And Steve nowhere provides an argument to validate the supposition that the analogy requires this.

Steve responded:

I don’t have to provide my own argument since I’m playing off of Dawson’s argument. He is using the cartoon analogy to illustrate metaphysical subjectivism. But on that thesis, the ink, paper, celluloid, or software/hardware would be as much of a psychological projection as the imaginary realm of the cartoon itself.

I had pointed out that Steve’s earlier attempt to rebut the cartoon universe analogy traded on a confusion between the physical materials with which the cartoonist works and the fictional realm which he uses those materials to create. We saw above that this confusion still persists, and after repeated attempts to correct him, he remains unteachable on this point. In response to his contention, I pointed out this confusion on his part and explained that “the cartoon universe analogy in no way requires that cartoonists 'merely wish cartoon characters into existence',” and that the analogy is in no way intended to illustrate this. But Steve’s contention against the cartoon universe analogy does in fact require the analogy to mean that cartoonists, who exist in the non-cartoon universe of atheism, actually wish their cartoons into place. He nowhere provided an argument to validate his assumption that the analogy does in fact mean this, and now he comes back with a roundabout admission to the fact that he does not actually have an argument to support it, or that he needs one. He says he's simply "playing off" my argument. But is he? No, he's distorting it expressly to make it appear weak, even after he has been corrected. But as we have seen, even John Frame makes use of a very similar analogy himself, as have other Christians, including Steve himself.

The cartoon universe analogy illustrates Christianity’s personalistic determinism, which is an expression of metaphysical subjectivism. By determinism in this sense I mean the view that everything that happens in the universe has been determined according to a “plan” scheme set in motion by a conscious agent which oversees and directs its events. Just as a cartoonist determines whatever happens in the fictional realm he creates in his cartoon, the Christian god is said to determine “whatsoever comes to pass” in the universe it allegedly created.

I recommend that Steve think a little more carefully about his own worldview’s affirmations, and what Christians are telling non-believers about the universe they live in. Does he accept the view that his god “controls whatsoever comes to pass,” or not? If he does, then whether he wants to admit it or not, he affirms a worldview which characterizes the universe in a manner that is analogous to a cartoon, so therefore the cartoon universe analogy applies to his conception of the world. If he does not think that there is some conscious agent which “controls whatsoever comes to pass,” then he’s probably not a very conscientious Christian after all. That is not my fault.

I wrote:

Steve is making the same mistake that Tim Hudgins made in response to the cartoon universe analogy over a year ago. He was expecting the analogy to model ‘exact similarities’ between cartoonists and the god he imagines, even though a strong analogy in no way requires such pervasive exactitude.

Steve responded:

Although an analogy does not need to be (and cannot be) identical at every point, it does need to be identical at the salient point of comparison—otherwise the parallel breaks down.

Actually, an analogy need not be “identical at the salient point of comparison,” it only needs to be similar at the point of comparison. Here I’m simply going by what a standard dictionary indicates. Merriam-Webster gives the following definition:

resemblance in some particulars between things otherwise unlike : SIMILARITY b : comparison based on such resemblance

From dictionary.com we have:

Similarity in some respects between things that are otherwise dissimilar. A comparison based on such similarity.

The similarity between a cartoon and the Christian view of the universe should be obvious to any thinker. Does not a cartoonist determine what happens in his cartoon realm according to an overarching plan from beginning to end? Does not the Christian god, according to Christianity, determine what happens in its creation according to an overarching plan from beginning to end? To deny the applicability of the cartoon universe analogy to Christianity, is to deny the sovereignty of the Christian god, and with it all of Christianity's essential teachings.

I wrote:

…while now he catches onto the actual point of the analogy, namely that in the cartoon realm that the cartoonist creates, he calls the shots (just as in the realm that the Christian god is said to have created, the Christian god is thought to call all the shots). Is Steve really unable to see the parallel here?

Steve responded:

The problem lies with the way in which the parallel is deployed. What is it intended to illustrate?

i) If this is parallel to divine creativity, it is also parallel to human creativity. It is parallel to what Dawson does on his keyboard. So does Dawson inhabit a cartoon universe?

As I have pointed out numerous times, the parallel is the determinative sovereignty enjoyed by the cartoonist over the fictional realm his cartoon vis-à-vis the sovereignty that Christians claim on behalf of their god over the contents of the universe and the events in which they act. A cartoonist can make whatever he wants happen in his fictional cartoon realm, just as the Christian god is said to be able to make whatever it wants happen in the universe it allegedly created. The events we see in a cartoon are determined by the cartoonist who creates it, just as Christianity affirms the view that the events which take place in it are determined by the Christian god which allegedly created it.

Does my own creativity imply that I inhabit a cartoon universe? As I pointed out, no, it does not. For the universe, according to my view, is not analogous to a cartoon because its contents and the events which take place within it are not being controlled by a supreme determiner calling all the shots. My creativity in the universe which I actually inhabit is limited by external constraints which inherently exist in the universe, but which do not inherently exist in a cartoon world. Neither is the Christian god supposed to be limited by such constraints. A cartoon world is constantly subject to revision per the cartoonist's choices. Similarly, on the Christian view,

God may at any time take one fact and set it into a new relation to created law. That is, there is no inherent reason in the facts or laws themselves why this should not be done. It is this sort of conception of the relation of facts and laws, of the temporal one and many, imbedded as it is in that idea of God in which we profess to believe, that we need in order to make room for miracles. And miracles are at the heart of the Christian position. (The Defense of the Faith, 3rd ed., p. 27)

That "there is no inherent reason in the facts or laws themselves" is not the only reason why the Christian god can "at any time take one fact and set it into a new relation to created law" on the Christian view. On the Christian view, the Christian god has complete sovereignty, giving it carte blanche over the universe it allegedly created. Not only are the "facts" of the universe creations which can be revised by the Christian god at will, so are the "laws" which are otherwise thought to govern (as "proximate" or "secondary causation") those "facts." Animals speaking in human language and men walking on water are not contradictions in the Christian worldview any more than they are in a cartoon realm.

Steve continued:

ii) And, as I’ve said more than once, now, Dawson uses the cartooning analogy because cartoon characters are imaginary characters. And he trades on this invidious connotation to insinuate that if the Christian worldview is analogous to cartooning, then the Christian worldview is, itself, fictitious.

Steve repeats his earlier complaint, even though he announced at the beginning of his post that he does not intend to repeat himself. I use the cartoon analogy because a cartoon models the determinative sovereignty of an all-controlling agent over its creation in graphic form. It is not my fault that the imaginary realm of a cartoon resembles the Christian conception of the universe. And yet, the resemblance is tremendous. Both the Christian god as creator of the universe, and the cartoonist as the creator of his fictional cartoon realm, enjoy similar determinative sovereignty and freedom from constraint in relation to their respective creations. The Christian god, for instance, “controls whatsoever comes to pass” in the Christian universe, just as the cartoonist “controls whatsoever comes to pass” in his cartoon universe. "God's decree," says John Frame quoting his master Van Til, "'is the final and exclusive determining power of whatsoever comes to pass'." (Op. cit., p. 80.) Likewise the cartoonist's decisions are "the final and exclusive determining power of whatsoever comes to pass" in the fictional realm of his cartoons. The Christian god can choose to create man with 16 arms instead of two, and likewise so can the cartoonist. The Christian god can populate the universe it creates with talking snakes and donkeys, ax heads which float on water, men who walk on water and through solid walls, water which turns into wine, etc., all under its overseeing direction. Similarly, the cartoonist can create a realm where these same things can happen. His cartoon universe is as pliant and malleable and responsive to his imagination as the Christian universe is said to be with respect to the Christian god’s intentions.

It is not my fault that there are profound similarities between the Christian conception of the universe and the imaginary realm conceived by a cartoonist. Steve will not accomplish anything by getting sore at me for this.

I wrote:

What is essentially similar to both the cartoon realm created by the cartoonist and the ‘created realm’ of the Christian universe, is the predominating, determining will of the agent responsible for creating each. The objects and events which take place in each are determined by a conscious being outside it.

Steve responded:

The problem with this comparison, as I’ve said before, is that it’s trivially true of almost a creative process. In typing and posting on his blog, the product is determined by a conscious, external agent—Dawson Bethrick. He is responsible for the content. His analogy fails to illustrate metaphysical subjectivism, which is a more radical thesis. And he seizes upon the cartoon analogy because cartoon characters are imaginary. But cartooning is merely one example out of countless others of the creative process.

I have not denied that there are inchoate similarities in other creative formats. However, my composing of a blog article in no way presents a graphic representation of a realm where natural law can be abandoned or revised at will, as Van Til describes, while a cartoon does. While I am responsible for the sentences and paragraphs that I write in an article, I cannot make a donkey speak in human language. Now, I can compose a dialogue between two agents, and assign one of them the role of a talking ass. But it would be up to the reader at this point to imagine it. Of course, this is exactly what the believer does when he reads the story of Balaam and his talking ass in the biblical book of Numbers, or any other story in the bible: as he invests himself in the story as he imagines it, it becomes more and more real to him. We would not expect Steve to trash his $85.00 theological commentaries given the steep investment he's made in them, and likewise we wouldn't expect an individual who has invested himself in an imaginative worldview like Christianity to allow it to be tarnished by critical thinking. Indeed, Christianity assumes the cartoon universe premise because the bible is a compendium of cartoonish accounts.

The cartoonist, however, can present a graphic representation of a realm where such things happen. His image-making is not bound to the constraints of their actual models, supposing he's using actual things as his models; on the contrary, his imagination can override the constraints we meet in our day to day lives in the context of his cartoon universe, and he can put that imagination into visual, active form. The images he creates in fact conform to his imagination. In this way the fictional realm of a cartoon resembles the universe as it is characterized by Christianity in its obedience to the cartoonist's wishes.

I wrote:

But the Christian god is fundamentally analogous to a cartoonist inasmuch as, like a cartoonist with respect to the contents and events that take place in the realms he creates, the Christian god is said to 'control whatsoever comes to pass'. What exists in the Christian god's universe is what the Christian god wanted to exist in it. What we see in a cartoon is what the cartoonist wants us to see.

Steve responded:

Bethrick is also a creative agent. We see on his blog whatever he wants us to see. He’s responsible for the content.

See above. It should not surprise Steve to learn that I think that his god is an invention of the human imagination as well.

I wrote:

This is the analogy. The analogy was never ‘cartoonists create ex nihilo the physical medium which they use in making their cartoons, just as the Christian god created the universe ex nihilo.’ So this is a most abtuse objection.

Steve responded:

Bethrick is now rewriting his own thesis. This is what he originally said in one of those earlier posts with which he thinks I should be “intimately familiar”:

Quoting me:

So here are some questions readers might ask themselves to determine whether or not they really do ascribe to the cartoon universe premise of theism. Any "yes" answer to one of these questions affirms endorsement of the cartoon universe premise; a "no" answer affirms either that one is an atheist, or, if he thinks he is a theist, that he thinks his god is impotent.

- Can your god create something ex nihilo (i.e., without using materials that already exist)?

Here Steve thinks he's finally got me. But where do I say that the cartoon universe analogy subsists on the view that "cartoonists create ex nihilo the physical medium which they use in making their cartoons"? For me to be rewriting my own thesis, there’d have to be at least some alteration of that thesis. (And since when is revising a thesis “wrong”?) Above I simply pointed out that affirmation of Christianity’s doctrine of creation ex nihilo affirms a conception of the universe which is analogous to a cartoon. A cartoonist creates a cartoon realm where it did not exist before, just as Frame's novelist writes a novel where it did not exist before. In effect, this is like creating a whole universe. The cartoonist sets the rules of his universe, revises them when it suits him, determines which characters and objects to insert into his cartoon realm, and controls everything that happens in that cartoon realm. The cartoon realm is thus analogous to the universe as Christians conceive of it. Indeed, many Christians have referred to their god as the greatest of all artists.

A cartoon’s parallel to Christianity’s creation ex nihilo is not difficult to see. As I pointed out, the analogy does not claim that actual cartoonists can or do wish into existence the materials they use to make cartoons. After all, the cartoon universe analogy itself does not assume that the actual universe is analogous to a cartoon, since atheism does not affirm the notion that the universe was created by an act of will. Rather, it points out the similarity between the universe as Christianity conceives of it and the realm which a cartoonist creates. In both cases, the creative agent responsible for creating the realm “controls whatsoever comes to pass” in their respective creations. The cartoon world that a cartoonist illustrates in his cartoons does find its source in the cartoonist’s consciousness, namely his imagination. The graphic representation in a cartoon is the cartoonist’s bringing into existence a fictitious realm which did not previously exist, and in this way it parallels the creation ex nihilo attributed by Christians to their god. There was a time when the cartoon character Bugs Bunny and the Looney Tune world he inhabits did not exist in graphic form. Bugs Bunny is not eternal; according to Christians, neither is the universe. Both are creations of consciousness.

So there you have it. We see that the cartoon universe analogy has more than sufficient backing, both by the striking similarities cartoons share with Christianity's conception of the universe, and by analogies which Christians themselves have used to illustrate their god's determinative sovereignty over the universe they claim it created. It is, as one commenter recently stated, a "perfect" analogy.

by Dawson Bethrick

Metaphysical Subjectivism and Christianity's Cartoon Universe, Pt. 1

Steve Hays continues to nitpick at the cartoon universe analogy in an attempt to exonerate Christianity and even to impute it to an atheistic conception of the world. In a recent response on this topic, Steve sought to raise controversy by setting my words against those of Anton Thorn, who has also shone a light on Christianity's subjectivist foundations. He writes:

This is how Anton Thorn, Dawson’s fellow Randian, defines metaphysical subjectivism:

Metaphysical subjectivism, which is the view that the knowing subject creates its objects by an act of consciousness, essentially that existence finds its source in a form of consciousness.

http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Sparta/1019/AFE/Metaphysical_Primacy.htm

And this is how Bethrick redefines metaphysical subjectivism:

Metaphysical subjectivism - the view that reality conforms to someone's intentions.

Why does Bethrick redefine and radically scale back the definition of Thorn? Because Bethrick finds himself in a quandary. For he is attempting to impute to Christianity two contradictory descriptions. On the one hand, he wants to say that Christianity espouses a cartoonish worldview. But the problem with this analogy is that even if Christian theism were analogous to a cartoonish worldview, a cartoonish worldview is disanalogous to metaphysical subjectivism. And that is because, as defined by Thorn, metaphysical subjectivism is an ontological thesis according to which reality is constituted by mental acts—by acts of consciousness. But, needless to say, a cartoon is not constituted by mental acts. A cartoonist lacks the power to create a cartoon by a mental fiat. Instead, a cartoonist must employ a physical medium of some sort to create a cartoon. So Bethrick is confronted with a choice: he can either try to salvage his cartoon analogy by sacrificing the imputation of metaphysical subjectivism, or else he can try to salvage the imputation of metaphysical realism by sacrificing his cartoon analogy. Clinging to his cartoon analogy, he chooses to jettison the imputation of metaphysical subjectivism to Christian theism. This he does through a face-saving redefinition. He swamps out an ontological theory for an epistemic theory. This involves the far weaker thesis that the artifact corresponds to the subjective intent of the agent, rather than the far more ambitious claim that the artifact is instantiated by the subjective intent of the agent.

Yes, that very well may be the definition of ‘metaphysical subjectivism’ that Thorn gives in the article that Steve cited. But we should note that it is not at all unusual for a term to have more than one definition, even ones that are closely related. In fact, elsewhere Thorn presents a conception of metaphysical subjectivism which is right in line with how I have used the term:

All of these notions tell us that the Christian view of reality is essentially that reality is a creation of consciousness, that reality conforms to conscious intentions. This is a view of reality which is called metaphysical subjectivism, and it springs directly from the primacy of consciousness view of reality. (TAG and the Fallacy of the Stolen Concept)

Since it's common for a term to have more than one definition, and Thorn himself uses this term in a manner that is directly in line with how I have used it, I see no problem here. But even if that were not sufficient, I gave my own definition of ‘metaphysical subjectivism’ as follows:

Metaphysical subjectivism is the genus of various versions of the fundamental orientation to reality which affirms that the objects of consciousness conform to the dictates of consciousness. This orientation is properly called “subjectivism” because it grants to the subject power over its object(s). (In the case of Christian teaching, this power is said to be absolute in the case of the Christian god.) It essentially holds that the world of objects (e.g., the universe) finds its source in a form of consciousness, or that they obey the dictates that originate in consciousness. (The Argument from Metaphysical Primacy: A Debate)

On the conception that I offered here, metaphysical subjectivism is a genus or broader category distinguished from metaphysical objectivism by virtue of its assumption of the primacy of consciousness in the subject-object relationship, while specific positions which grant metaphysical primacy, such as the view that consciousness creates its own objects or can revise their nature at will, etc., are species thereof. What unites these specific positions is their allegiance to the primacy of consciousness – i.e., the primacy of the subject over the object. There's no "radical scaling back," no "backing away," no "shell game" or other synonym for "face-saving" retreat going on here at all as Steve has alleged. As I pointed out before, Steve is simply broadcasting the fact that he has ventured into an area of is own ignorance. There's nothing wrong with being ignorant per se, but Steve is trying to speak as if he had familiarity where in fact it is painfully obvious he does not. This explains why he frequently finds himself confused.

The two definitions which are confusing Steve are the following:

“the view that the knowing subject creates its objects by an act of consciousness, essentially that existence finds its source in a form of consciousness.”

“the view that reality conforms to someone’s intentions”

It should be obvious to anyone who gives this some careful thought, that the common denominator to both of these definitions is the primacy of the subject metaphysics, a fundamental platform which characterizes worldviews such as Christianity. My statement above, that “metaphysical subjectivism is the genus of various versions of the fundamental orientation to reality which affirms that the objects of consciousness conform to the dictates of consciousness,” adequately applies to both statements. Both grant primacy to the subject in the subject-object relationship (subjectivism), and both pertain to the metaphysical relationship between subject and object, where the object either has its origin in consciousness, or is at any rate obedient to the dictates of consciousness. Thus, whether the view in question holds that an object first needs to be created by a super consciousness that one imagines in order to be controlled by it, or that the object already exists but can in any event be controlled by such a consciousness, the term metaphysical subjectivism still applies since both views back out to the primacy of consciousness, which is the essential fundamental of subjectivism. A subject which creates its objects is typically thought to have the power to conform those objects to its intentions. That is the power that Christianity claims on behalf of its god. Quite a fantasy, I must say.

Steve says that “a cartoonish worldview is disanalogous to metaphysical subjectivism.” However, I don’t think I ever said that the cartoon universe premise is analogous to metaphysical subjectivism. Rather, I hold that the cartoon universe premise is an expression of metaphysical subjectivism. That is, the view that the universe and its objects owe their existence, nature, form, shape, activity and relationship to other objects to the dictates of a personal will, clearly assumes the primacy of the subject in the subject-object relationship. That Christianity asserts that the universe was created by a conscious agent through an act of its will, only confirms that Christianity grants metaphysical primacy to the will of that conscious entity over any object it is said to have created. The affirmation of such a view is a sufficient condition to suspect that the cartoon universe premise may be in operation, for a universe so created may also be thought to be under its control, just as the fictional realm of a cartoon is under the control of the cartoonist who creates it. In the case of Christianity, both conditions exist: it teaches that the Christian god created the universe by an act of will, and it teaches that this god "controls whatsoever comes to pass" within it by will. Does not the Christian god determine what exists and happens in the universe it allegedly created? Does not the cartoonist similarly determine what appears and happens in the fake realm of his cartoon? Are cartoons not creations? Does not Christianity affirm that the universe is a creation?

Steve’s contention against the cartoon universe analogy trades on an equivocation at this point. He says that “a cartoon is not constituted by mental acts.” But this of course depends on what specifically we mean by ‘cartoon’ here. If, on one hand, by ‘cartoon’ we mean the physical materials that the cartoonist uses to create the images he imagines, then of course, it’s already been agreed that the cartoonist did not wish these into existence. And at no point does the cartoon universe analogy claim or require that they were. But if, on the other hand, by ‘cartoon’ we mean the fictional realm which the cartoonist conceives and puts into graphic form which others can perceive, then obviously the cartoonist’s own will and imagination ("forms of consciousness") play a determinative role here: what exists and happens in that created realm is determined by the cartoonist. Indeed, contrary to what Steve has stated, the things compared in an analogy need not be identical, and the fact that cartoonists do not wish the materials they use to create cartoons into existence in no way cancels out the similarities between the fictional realm of a cartoon and the universe as Christianity characterizes it, the very similarities which the analogy exposes.

A cartoon in this sense – i.e., the fictitious world which a cartoonist creates - is analogous to the universe as Christianity characterizes it in two aspects:

One: the fictional realm of a cartoon (corresponding to Christianity’s created universe) is a creation of the cartoonist’s imagination (a form of consciousness): he conceives the setting (it could be in a factory, in a desert, in outer space, etc. – it’s his choice) and the participants (they could look like humans, they could be walking and talking animals, aliens, etc. – it’s his choice).

Two: the images which make up the fictional realm of the cartoon (corresponding to the objects which exist in Christianity’s created universe) behave just as the cartoonist wants them to behave. Like a master puppeteer able to control many puppets at once, the cartoonist can have his characters do whatever he wants them to do as he moves his story according to his plan. They can walk through walls, leap over tall buildings, bend railroad tracks in their bare hands, walk on water, defy gravity, produce large objects (such as automobiles or school busses) from trouser pockets, etc. – it’s his choice.

Notice the following similarities:

Just as the cartoonist chooses to create the fictional realm of his cartoon, so the Christian god is said to have chosen to create the universe. The fictional realm of the cartoon is there because of someone's choosing, and the universe is said to be here because of the Christian god's choosing. In both cases, personal volition got everything started.

Just as the cartoonist chooses what images will appear in the fictional realm he creates in his cartoon, the Christian god is said to have chosen which objects will exist in the universe it creates. In both cases, the content of the created realm follows as a result of the choices of the agent doing the creating.

Just as the cartoonist chooses which events will take place in the fictional realm of the cartoon he creates, the Christian god chooses which events will take place in the universe. In both cases, the events and the sequence in which they unfold follow as a result of the agent doing the choosing.

Just as the cartoonist “controls whatsoever comes to pass” in the fictional realm of his cartoons, the Christian god “controls whatsoever comes to pass” in the universe it allegedly created. In both cases, everything that exists and happens is under the guiding control of the agent doing the choosing.

The similarities between the fictional realm of a cartoon and the universe as Christianity characterizes it, are striking. And since an analogy is a “resemblance in some particulars between things otherwise unlike: SIMILARITY” (Merriam-Webster), we have unmistakably an analogy which connects at several levels. At each level the analogy highlights the similarities between the fictional realm of a cartoon on the one hand, and the universe as Christianity characterizes it on the other, in terms of their being sourced in a form of consciousness which authors the nature of their respective content and “controls whatsoever comes to pass” in their respective realms. Consequently, the dilemma that Steve says I face in defending the cartoon universe analogy, is merely a figment of his imagination, and the fact that he affirms what he has imagined as reality simply confirms his allegiance to a cartoonish conception of the universe. The only real difference is that the Christian typically recognizes that the fictional realm of a cartoon is in fact fictional, while failing to acknowledge that his worldview is also built on a fiction.

Now the Christian may object, saying that metaphysical subjectivism does not apply to Christianity because the objects of his consciousness do not obey his own wishes. I have seen Christians attempt to raise so weak an objection before. And of course, it is true that the objects they perceive do not obey his wishes. But on the Christian view, this is only the case because the Christian god has wished it to be, for on the Christian view “God controls whatsoever comes to pass.” So in the end, what is, is what the supreme being wants it to be, according to Christianity. Why? Because on the Christian worldview, the universe is analogous to a cartoon: its contents do whatever the master determiner wants them to do.

So on both counts, Christianity clearly and unashamedly endorses metaphysical subjectivism. It holds that the universe finds its source in a personal will, and it holds that the objects in the universe conform to what that personal will desires. The things that exist in the universe exist because someone wanted them to exist; they have the nature that they have only because that someone wanted them to have the nature they have; and they act in the way they act only because that someone wanted them to act the way they act.

Out of all human artifacts, a cartoon comes closest to modeling such a bizarre view of reality, far closer than the clay that a potter molds in his hands. The objects that appear in the cartoon appear only because the cartoonist wants them to appear there. The objects in the cartoon have the form and characteristics they have only because the cartoonist wanted them to have the form and characteristics they have. And the objects in the cartoon act the way they do only because the cartoonist wanted them to act the way they do. Where the Christian worldview affirms the primacy of wanting as the primary determinant in the universe as a truth, a cartoon graphically models the primacy of wanting as the primary determinant as a spectacle of entertainment.

If 'metaphysical subjectivism' is to be reserved exclusively to "the view that the knowing subject creates its objects by an act of consciousness," then it obviously applies to Christianity, for it affirms that the universe was created by an act of consciousness. But this is only part of the Christian picture of things. Christianity does not affirm the general view of deism, namely that a divine consciousness created the universe and then moved on, allowing the universe to operate in an autonomous manner on its own built-in principles. On the contrary, Christianity affirms that its god "controls whatsoever comes to pass" in the universe, that every event, from molecular activity to worldwide movements, from every baby's first words to the landing of a spacecraft on the surface of the moon, from the dislodging of a grain of sand from a riverbed to the shifting of the tectonic plates, is being personally directed by this supernatural conscious being. This god sets the rules, determining when they apply and when they do not apply, according to its will. Thus if metaphyiscal subjectivism includes the view that the objects of consciousness conform to the knowing subject, it again applies to the Christian view in its cartoonish view of the universe.

by Dawson Bethrick

See, I told you so!

In contrasting himself from the "evil unbeliever" John Loftus of Debunking Christianity fame, Triabooger Steve Hays drew a remarkable analogy. He wrote:

You’re like a man who steps into a painting and then denies the existence of the painter because you can’t find the painter in the painting. From within the painting, you can’t see anything outside the painting. I’m like a man who steps into a painting and cannot deny the existence of the painter since he is evident in every brushstroke.

Give the man a cigar! Steve is finally starting to see the light! All he's missing now is a little action (perhaps he's not been getting enough lately). A painting is static. But a cartoon is animated and full of activity. With his blogging activity clocking at about 13.2 postings per day, Steve is a busy boy, not at all like the immobile figures in a painting. On the contrary, he's Superboy, trying to save the universe from the latest blitz of the evil atheist conspiracy. His painting analogy is lagging far behind the brimming liveliness of the cartoon universe analogy.

But it is a vast improvement over his earlier obduracy. For here Steve signs on the dotted line of his own worldview's commitment to the cartoon universe premise, cashing in on the legal tender of its vivid connotations. With scripture verses tucked under his arm like a security blanket, Steve is like a cartoon character who's pushed and pulled around a fabricated cartoon world, unable deny the existence of the cartoonist because the cartoonist has determined it to be. The cartoonist even makes him say that it's because of evidence that he knows of the cartoonist's existence. But even on his own worldview's terms, it's not really a matter of evidence. Evidence is decidedly trumped by foreordination. He's just a lump of clay in the potter's hands, a puppet dangling at the end of some strings. He has no idea who's manipulating the strings.

Steve writes:

What is more, the painter painted himself into his own painting 2000 years ago.

Exactly what I myself had stated. Observe:

Can the cartoonist be part of the cartoon? According to Christianity, the answer is YES: the cartoonist can and did play a role in his own cartoon universe. This is the role of Jesus, the god of the heavens who "took on flesh" (i.e., assumed a form like other characters in his cartoon) and intermingled with its creations.

The biblical figure of Jesus is precisely that: the Christian god-cartoonist inserting itself into its own cartoon. And ever since, the cartoon has been on auto-repeat as we see each generation of believers trying to validate their creeds and raise their own apostles. The cartoonist exited the cartoon long ago, but vowed to come back, saying "Behold, I come quickly" (Rev. 3:11). I guess in the cartoon universe of theism, 2,000 years and counting constitutes "quickly."

Stay tuned! There's more to come!

by Dawson Bethrick

Steve's Persisting Haysiness

I want to begin by thanking Steve and every other Christian out there who has attempted to challenge the cartoon universe analogy. The more they battle against it, the more apparent it is that they can't knock a dent in it. But few have given me the pleasure that Steve Hays has given me in his botchy attempts to undermine it. Here we have Christian apologetics in its most entertaining form.

I had written:

Nice try, but no cigar. Steve finds that he needs to caricaturize my position in order to wriggle out of the cartoonish implications of his professed worldview, and in so doing he not only misses the essence of the analogy (not only of the cartoon analogy, but also Paul's own potter-clay analogy), he also misses the nature of Christianity's metaphysical position. In order to do this, Steve has to ignore the fact that, on my worldview, man is an integrated being of matter and consciousness. Had he more familiarity with my position, he'd know that his rebuttal only makes him look ignorant rather than successfully discrediting my position.

Steve fumbles:

Once again, Dawson has to run away from his own words and come stumbling back with an armload of caveats which were distinctly absent from his original reply I respond to what people say when the say it.

Here Steve admits his own hastiness. But in what way did I "run away from [my] own words"? In no way have I changed my position. My position has always been that man is an integrated being of matter and consciousness, and that he needs reason in order to learn how to work within the constraints of the universe in which he lives. These are not "caveats" by any measure of the term. All we have here is exposure of Steve's ignorance of my overall position and his own attempt to excuse himself. Steve then comes out and admits his ignorance while trying to trivialize it in his characteristic condescending manner:

It's true, though, that I've not chosen to immerse myself in all things Bethrickian—just as I don’t own The Essential Barry Manilow album, or a velvet painting of Elvis. Due to the brevity of life, we have to make many tragic choices with our limited time and resources.

I tend to prefer the term Dawsonian. And if this is a valid excuse for one's lack of intimate familiarity with a particular position, then it's available for my use as well. Like Steve, I too have time constraints crowded with far greater priorities than explaining where mystics go wrong. But as a form of entertainment, it does have its place in my life. This is precisely why I had stated the following in the very blog that he attempted to answer:

part of Steve's problem is that he's been working himself too hard, nervously posting hasty reactions to criticisms of his cartoon universe worldview without giving his own position the critical consideration it so sorely needs. I suggest he slow down, consider what he's responding to more carefully, and be willing to subject his own position to the same level of critical scrutiny he wants to have applied to rival positions.

Moving on…

I wrote:

On my view, the frustration he projects does not exist; at least, not for me. I can, for instance, direct my own movements; my metaphysical viewpoint in no way contends against this fact. And through my physical movements, I can move other physical things. Steve cited the example of typing words out on a computer keyboard. I can direct my fingers to depress the buttons on my keyboard. If the keyboard and the computer to which it is connected are functioning properly, it is possible for me to type the words that I want to type by using the hardware to transmit my intentions.

Steve responds:

At the risk of stating the obvious, this is exactly how a cartoonist operates. He expresses his intentions through a physical medium, such as computer animation.

The humanity and existence within the non-cartoon universe of atheism have never been denied from actual cartoonists. Nor does the cartoon universe analogy require it. But it does not at all follow from this point that

all that Bethrick has succeeded in doing is to illustrate his ontological commitment to a cartoonish worldview.

How does the fact that actual cartoonists themselves are human beings like me living in the non-cartoon universe of atheism suggest "ontological commitment to a cartoonish worldview"? Steve does not explain this. It appears that, in his efforts to sidestep the analogy, he has misconstrued it beyond recognition at some point while hoping to find some way to launch a counter-charge. This does not succeed because my worldview does not affirm the view that the universe is a product of someone's consciousness. Since my worldview does not take theism's imaginary super-consciousness itself seriously, and offers no like counterpart in its place, there is nothing in my worldview analogous to a master cartoonist calling all the shots in the world's state of affairs. Nor does my worldview affirm the view that the objects of consciousness are creations of someone's wishing, or that they conform to someone's wishing in the manner imagined by theists on behalf of their god. Again, it seems that in his persisting haste, Steve is dropping key contextual points that I have already made explicit. As I had stated,

Steve needs to understand (I thought it was apparent already) that I am not a theist.

Had Steve grasped this point, he would see how wrongheaded his statement above is.

I had written:

This, however, is not the same thing as conforming reality directly to my intentions in the manner that the cartoon universe of theism models. For instance, while I can wish that the buttons on my keyboard turn into hundred dollar bills all I want, no amount of wishing on my part will turn the buttons on my keyboards into something they are not. If I were the omnipotent deity that Christians imagine, then I could turn the buttons on my keyboard into anything I wanted them to be. After all, were I the Christian god, they would be buttons only because I intended them to be such in the first place.

Steve responded:

Notice how his cartoon analogy instantly breaks down. A cartoonist does not conform reality “directly” to his intentions. A cartoonist doesn’t merely wish cartoon characters into existence.

What has broken down here is Steve's own confused analysis. Essentially, Steve has confused the ink, paper, celluloid, or other technology with which a cartoonist works, with the imaginary realm that he uses these materials to create, a fake environment that is analogous to a universe created by a supernatural consciousness which determines its contents and events. The cartoon universe analogy in no way requires that cartoonists "merely wish cartoon characters into existence," nor is this what it is intended to illustrate. And Steve nowhere provides an argument to validate the supposition that the analogy requires this. Indeed, the analogy is perfectly compatible with the fact that an actual cartoonist himself does not exist in a cartoon universe similar to the one imagined by Christians. On the contrary, it is only because the cartoonist lives in the non-cartoon universe of atheism that such points can be raised to begin with, so Steve's objection here completely fails as it completely misses the point. Steve is making the same mistake that Tim Hudgins made in response to the cartoon universe analogy over a year ago. He was expecting the analogy to model "exact similarities" between cartoonists and the god he imagines, even though a strong analogy in no way requires such pervasive exactitude. I corrected this misguided assumption when I stated the following:

As for finding "exact similarities" between these things, I don't think there is anything in reality that can serve as an exact analogy to what Christians and other mystics call "the supernatural," simply because it bears no objective reference to reality.

Again, if Steve took the time to familiarize himself with the sources that I had cited in my post, he would see that he's merely raising issues that have already put to eternal rest.

Steve affirmed:

Yes, an omnipotent God can wish things into existence by sheer willpower

Note that Steve explicitly affirms a view which reduces to the metaphysical primacy of consciousness. Just by saying that this is true, he contradicts himself, for the very concept of truth presupposes the metaphysical primacy of existence. Consider: does Steve think that it's true that his god "can wish things into existence by sheer willpower" because he wants that to be the case? No, of course not. When he offers a truth claim, he tries to make use of the primacy of existence in that the state of affairs he purports to be identifying is thought to obtain independent of his or anyone else's wishing. The concept of truth is only meaningful on the primacy of existence. On the primacy of consciousness, there would only be what we in a primacy of existence universe call 'absurdity'. There would be not 'truth' as we know it.

He then hastened to add:

but this distinguishes God from a cartoonist.

And likewise, this also distinguishes the Christian god from the potter in Paul's potter-clay analogy. But this does not disrupt the usefulness of this analogy for the purposes it is intended to illustrate, namely the apostle's theodicy. Same with the cartoon universe analogy: although actual cartoonists are human beings who exist in the non-cartoon universe of atheism, and thus do not have the subjective primacy over their objects that Christianity attributes to its god, this is in no way sufficient to undercut the usefulness of the analogy for the purposes it is intended to illustrate. Steve is attempting to shift contexts. As I already pointed out, the cartoon universe analogy in no way requires that actual cartoonists have the subjective powers that Christianity claims on behalf of its god, and Steve has offered no argument to show that the analogy does need this. Rather, it exemplifies the primacy of the creative will of the Christian god over the realm it allegedly created by noting the same primacy of the will of the cartoonist over the realm he creates in his cartoons. Steve is probably too deeply mired in the swirling and chaotic confusion of the cartoon universe assumptions inherent in his worldview to see the unreasonableness of his objections. I'm reminded of a wise point that Francois Tremblay raised for the benefit of those who might have the pleasure of engaging theists in debate when he wrote:

The disadvantage of following reality is that you also need to follow its complexity. Fictional positions are not bound to this restriction.

In other words, fictional positions are not bound to the constraints of an objective universe. On the cartoon universe preimse of theism, imagination, not reason, is the means of validation.

I had written:

No, the objects of awareness do not obey wishes. I can wish that pizza, potato chips and apple fritters are not fattening when consumed in mass quantities. But the objects of the universe will not obey my wishes; pizza, potato chips and apple fritters will remain as fattening as they are no matter what I wish, no matter how hard I wish it. Because I am an integrated being of both matter and consciousness, I am able to direct my own movements. But even this has its limitations. No matter how much I wish, I cannot fly like a bird does, nor will I ever be able to run a mile in 60 seconds. If reality conformed to my intentions, however, there would be no such obstacles to such endeavors. In the non-cartoon universe of atheism, I must govern my actions according to nature's constraints. My wishing will not override them.

Now watch how Steve recycles the same objection over and over again, even though the premise needed to raise it is not vital to the analogy itself in the manner that his objection requires it to be, and in spite of the fact that such objections have already been answered by anticipation.

Steve responded:

Once again, a cartoonist cannot make things happen by a sheer act of the will. So Dawson’s precious analogy is a systematic failure.

Consider the implications for Romans 9 here: a potter cannot make things happen by a sheer act of the will. So Paul's potter-clay analogy is a systematic failure. Thus we have failure in the bible.

I wrote:

Now, notice that the cartoon universe analogy does not rely on a caricature of Christianity. After all, Christianity asserts the existence of a creator-god whose intentions directly control the objects which make up the universe. According to this view, nature's constraints do not impede the ruling consciousness' ability to control the objects of the universe, just as in a cartoon the images we see act according to the intentions of the cartoon's illustrator.

Steve responded:

A cartoonist does not exercise direct control over the animated images. A cartoonist is constrained by the limits of the physical medium.

Likewise, a potter does not exercise direct control over the clay from which he forms household objects, any more than a cartoonist does not exercise such direct control over the images he creates in his cartoons. Like a cartoonist, a potter is constrained by the limits of the physical medium. Again, such points do no damage to the points that these analogies are respectively intended to illustrate, so such objections can safely be filed in the round "So what?" bin.

I wrote:

According to Christianity, if a man has two arms, it is only because the Christian god wanted it that way. If a slice of pizza has 600 calories, it is only because the Christian god wanted it that way. Nothing in the universe is the way it is without the Christian god's consent and decree. The Christian worldview is emphatic about the ‘all-controlling sovereignty’ it claims on behalf of its god.

Steve responded:

Bethrick, in his gimboid confusion, is repeatedly conflating two quite distinct propositions: (i) Correspondence between object and intent (ii) Causal immediacy These are not interchangeable or mutually inclusive propositions.

As is typical with many apologists, Steve is here attempting to obfuscate the issue by multiplying concepts beyond necessity (which is commonplace in theology) and then charging his opponent with failing to make similar (albeit arbitrary or irrelevant) distinctions. Steve needs to decide for himself whether or not he believes the slice of pizza has 600 calories because his god ultimately wanted it that way. That is, is he or is he not willing to commit himself to the view that the objects of the universe obey his god's will ("intent") regardless of whatever immediate causes he may agree exist as a means of transmitting that will from its source to the object in its final state? What holds primacy here - the obedience of created objects to the creating will, or "immediate causes" which we find in nature? Is it, or is it not the case, that "God controls whatsoever comes to pass," as Van Til tells us?

I wrote:

Similarly, in the context of a cartoon, the cartoonist controls whatsoever comes to pass. Nothing in the cartoon will appear unless the cartoonist willingly permits it to be there. The cartoon universe premise is particularly evident in the biblical notion of miracles. Take for example the miracle that the gospel of John has Jesus perform at the wedding of Cana. When it is discovered that there is no wine for the wedding guests, Jesus wishes the water in the six waterpots to turn into wine, something we would only see in cartoons. What the cartoon universe analogy serves to illustrate to a far greater degree than Paul's potter-clay analogy can hope to show, is the pervasive will-based sovereignty that Christians imagine their god has over the contents of the universe. Just as the universe is said to be dependent on the Christian god's intended designs for its origin and existence, the cartoon is dependent on the cartoonist's intended designs for its origin and existence. The contents of the universe, on Christianity's own premises, are what they are because the Christian god wants them that way. Similarly with the contents of a cartoon: they are what the cartoonist wants them to be.

Steve responded:

Observe the shifting definition.

Which definition does Steve think I'm "shifting"? It's not clear, but from the foregoing it's apparent that, while earlier he seems to have been (erroneously) assuming that the cartoon universe analogy supposes that the cartoonist can wish his cartoons into existence (which I nowhere affirmed), while now he catches onto the actual point of the analogy, namely that in the cartoon realm that the cartoonist creates, he calls the shots (just as in the realm that the Christian god is said to have created, the Christian god is thought to call all the shots). Is Steve really unable to see the parallel here? Consider the irony here: I'm expected to believe in an invisible magic being which created the universe ex nihilo and plans all of human history according to some preordained design scheme, but at the same time I'm expected not to see the obvious parallels between a cartoonist and the cartoon realms he creates, and the Christian god and the universe it is said to have created? This is simply amazing!

Now, recall that Steve had asked:

Does Bethrick believe that his computer keyboard can talk back to him and challenge his intentions?

To this question, I responded:

Of course not, because I do not believe that the universe is analogous to a cartoon. A cartoon can portray a talking computer keyboard, one which dialogues with its user. And according to Christianity and the powers it attributes to its god, this is in the realm of possibility, for it endorses the view that reality is dependent on its god's conscious intentions. The serpent in the garden, for instance, holds a conversation with Eve, the woman that was produced when the Christian god commanded Adam's rib to become "an help meet for him" (Gen. 2:18).

Steve then responded:

Bethrick is now committing a level-confusion. This is no longer a relation of causal immediacy between a cartoonist and the cartoon, but a relation between animated objects within the cartoon. Yes, all sorts of things can happen “in” a cartoon. But that is not analogous to the ontological relationship between a cartoonist and a cartoon. The cartoonist is not, himself, a cartoon character who directly interacts with other cartoon characters or animated scenery. A cartoonist exists outside the cartoon, and creates the cartoon through the manipulation of a physical medium.

The confusion here is all Steve's. Even the point he raises here supports the analogy rather than undermines it. For in the case of relations between animated objects within the cartoon, they do what the cartoonist wants them to do, just as according to Christianity, the objects in the "created universe" do what its god wants them to do. The parallel situations here are, by definition, analogous to one another. The differences which Steve has tried to amplify in his objections are trivial. What is essentially similar to both the cartoon realm created by the cartoonist and the "created realm" of the Christian universe, is the predominating, determining will of the agent responsible for creating each. The objects and events which take place in each are determined by a conscious being outside it. In Christianity's cartoon universe, "God controls whatsoever comes to pass," and in the realm of the cartoonist, the cartoonist controls whatsoever comes to pass.

I wrote:

I can only ‘impose my will’ on my own being, which is an integration of both matter and consciousness. My will does not directly manipulate the keys on my keyboard. If it did, I would not need to use my fingers to type them. Even in the case of volitionally directing the movements of my fingers, this only occurs within certain constraints within which I must work if I am to achieve my aims. I cannot, for instance, type 5,000 words per minute, or make the words flash in five different colors when they are read by someone named Hank or Judy. If all my fingers are broken or my hands are cut off, I'm not going to be able to type in the first place.

Steve responded:

Exactly the same thing applies to a cartoonist or computer animator.

Right - in the non-cartoon universe of atheism. Also, exactly the same thing applies to a potter working his clay into a pot. Why? Because he exists in the non-cartoon universe of atheism. Again, Steve needs to realize that I don't think the cartoon universe of theism is true.

I wrote:

Non sequitur. The keystrokes conform to the physical interaction of my fingers. If I did not have fingers, or if I forewent their use, the keys on my keyboard would not type out my thoughts as I think them. And in using my fingers to type, they do not conform exactly to what I wish, as I pointed out above. Nature requires me to practice my typing to develop my ability, and check my accuracy as I go. That's the non-cartoon universe of atheism in which I live.

Steve responded:

And in a non-cartoon universe, a cartoonist must also use his fingers to depress the buttons on his computer keyboard.

Perhaps now Steve will realize why I am an atheist: I realize that I do not live in the cartoon universe that Christianity affirms.

Steve wrote:

By contrast, God is fundamentally disanalogous to a cartoonist inasmuch as God does not require a physical medium to make things happen. Indeed, he creates the physical medium itself.

But the Christian god is fundamentally analogous to a cartoonist inasmuch as, like a cartoonist with respect to the contents and events that take place in the realms he creates, the Christian god is said to "control whatsoever comes to pass." What exists in the Christian god's universe is what the Christian god wanted to exist in it. What we see in a cartoon is what the cartoonist wants us to see. This is the analogy. The analogy was never "cartoonists create ex nihilo the physical medium which they use in making their cartoons, just as the Christian god created the universe ex nihilo." So this is a most abtuse objection.

Of course, if the Christian god did "not require a physical medium to make things happen," then why did it create the physical medium in the first place?

Again, as I pointed out to Tim Hudgins,

I don't think there is anything in reality that can serve as an exact analogy to what Christians and other mystics call "the supernatural," simply because it bears no objective reference to reality.

I wrote:

Steve views my analogy as an argument proving that Christianity is false.

He now says:

No, it doesn’t prove anything since the analogy is systematically bungled.

Steve doesn’t seem to know whether he’s coming or going, but is trying to play all positions so that he can cover himself. For below we will see him conclude that my “analogy either proves too much or too little.” Perhaps while responding to my points he changed his mind. And yet, why does he think the cartoon universe analogy is “systematically bungled”? Essentially, because the cartoonist does not create his cartoons ex nihilo, as the Christian god is said to have created the universe. He's objecting to something other than the cartoon universe analogy. Indeed, this objection is so trivial with respect to the parallels that have been pointed out that one might entertain possibility that Steve may very well be deliberately trying to be tongue in cheek. Indeed, if the cartoon universe analogy is “systematically bungled” because human cartoonists do not wish into existence the physical medium which they use to draw cartoons, then what can be said of Paul’s potter-clay analogy? The apostle himself gives us a precedent for analogizing the Christian god by comparison to a potter who fashions useful items out of clay. But do human potters create the clay they work with ex nihilo? No. Does this damage the point that the apostle was trying to illustrate by means of analogy? I don't think so.

I wrote:

Again, characteristic of Christians, Steve seeks to put a burden on my shoulders, albeit rather clumsily, even though he's made absolutely no progress in dispelling the cartoon universe analogy. Christianity's analogues to a cartoonist and the cartoons he creates are the Christian god and the universe as Christians imagine it. They imagine that the universe was created by an act of consciousness (according to their mythology, the Christian god willed the universe into being), and that the objects populating it conform to the creator's wishing.

Steve responds:

Observe, once more, how he merges two distinct propositions: (i) created by an act of consciousness; (ii) corresponding to the creator’s intentions.

It's not a "merge" in the sense of blurring such distinctions, but a point where the two overlap with one another. In fact, my analogy is compatible with a careful mindfulness of such distinctions, as should be clear. For while a cartoonist does not create the physical media which he uses to create his cartoons (an affirmation which my analogy nowhere affirmed in the first place), the cartoonist does create the realm that informs his cartoons. He determines everything that takes place in his cartoon, just as the Christian god is said to determine everything that takes place in the universe. Steve continually fumbles on this point. For instance, observe the same point that he keeps repeating over and over:

A cartoonist does not create a cartoon by a sheer act of consciousness.

And again I point out: the analogy in no way requires that the cartoonist create his cartoons by "a sheer act of consciousness," if by this expression we mean something along the lines of a creation ex nihilo materialization of physical media. And Steve nowhere argues that a cartoonist needs to do this in order for the cartoon universe analogy to be valid for its intended purpose. It is in the realm that he portrays in the cartoons that he creates that the cartoonist calls all the shots: just as the Christian god, so we are told, determines the course of human history, the cartoonist determines the course of events that take place in the imaginary realm of his cartoons. The cartoonist need not have the ability to wish his cartoons into existence in order for this parallel to obtain, and it is this all-determinative aspect of the cartoon universe premise of theism that Steve continually overlooks, or perhaps deliberately ignores. Just as Christianity teaches that “God controls whatsoever comes to pass” in the context of the universe it allegedly created, the cartoonist controls whatsoever comes to pass in the realm of his cartoon. There is nothing analogous to this subject-dominant determinism affirmed by Christian theism in an atheistic worldview.

Steve writes:

A cartoon may well conform to his intentions, but if what is what Bethrick means by a cartoonish worldview, then this is descriptive of his own worldview—in which agents, through the use of a physical medium, regularly make objects conforming to their designs.

Again, Steve has carelessly dropped the defining context of a cartoon. It may be the case, and in a specifically constrained, naturalistic sense, that human beings, either individually or jointly, conform certain material substances and objects to our designs. But this is in no way analogous to what Christianity portrays, nor is it analogous to what a cartoon realm portrays. In the non-cartoon universe of atheism, a plumber, for instance, may bend a pipe to direct the flow of water around a corner. But the plumber did not also create the house, the city street on which it is situated, the other people in the city, the trees, blades of grass, birds, clouds, blowing wind, barking dogs, buzzing bees, etc., etc., etc. A plumber bending a pipe to fit the needs of his project has no control over these things; they all exist and take place independent of the his intentions. The plumber is not determining the entire course of human history by doing this. In a cartoon universe, however, all things are being controlled and determined by a single conscious being. In the context of the earth, for instance, the Christian god decides if there should be a river and where it should be located. Similarly, in the realm of a cartoon, the cartoonist decides if there should be a river and where it should be located. The Christian god determines how many bends the river will have; likewise, the cartoonist determines how many bends his cartoon river should have. Similarly, the Christian god determines who the winners of a war that takes place on earth should be. And likewise, the cartoonist determines who the winners of a war that takes place in his cartoon realm should be.

Steve sought to summarize the problems with the cartoon universe worldview as he has sought to characterize it. Let’s see how well they stack up:

i) It is disanalogous with the Christian worldview vis-à-vis creation ex nihilo

This has already been answered above. As I pointed out, the analogy does not subsist on paralleling the abilities of a cartoonist with those attributed to the Christian god by believers in terms of being able to create his cartoons by an act of sheer consciousness (e.g., creation ex nihilo). Rather, the parallel involved in the analogy is the "all-controlling sovereignty" which the Christian god is said to enjoy over its creation vis-à-vis the “all-controlling sovereignty” which the cartoonist wages over the realm he creates in his cartoons.

ii) It is analogous to his secular worldview vis-à-vis the relation between intent and its extramental objects.

This too has already been answered above. Since this point requires us to put the analogy as it is originally conceived completely out of focus, it can only be foisted on the basis of misconceptions like those that Steve is peddling. By doing this, Steve denies himself the benefit of understanding just how his worldview's conception of the universe is acutely analogous to a cartoon. As I pointed out above, since my worldview does not affirm that human history is being determined by an omnipotent agent which calls all the shots, the cartoon universe analogy cannot apply to my worldview. There is, in the non-cartoon universe of atheism, no conscious being which enjoys “all-controlling sovereignty” over all the objects which exist in that universe, nothing which "controls whatsoever comes to pass," as a cartoonist does in his cartoons. The Christian god’s control over the events which take place in the universe is said to be total, and likewise the cartoonist’s control over the events which take place in his cartoons is also total.

iii) With respect to (ii), this is also analogous with the Christian worldview, vis-à-vis the creature/Creator relation.

Christianity’s so-called creator-creature distinction is really just another way of affirming the master-puppet relation. Recall what Greg Bahnsen affirmed:

God controls all events and outcomes (even those that come about by human choice and activity) and is far more capable and powerful than modern machines. (Van Til's Apologetic, p. 489n.43)

On Christianity’s view, Steve is just a puppet, Paul’s lump of clay in someone else’s hands, manipulated to do whatever pleases the universal cartoonist.

But if (ii) picks out the Christian worldview as cartoonish, then by the same token it also picks out the secular worldview as cartoonish. So the analogy either proves too much or too little.

Well, it's good that Steve is here conceding that the analogy at least proves something; above he said that “it doesn’t prove anything.” And yet below, he went on to claim that I've provided no argument in the first place, and yet it seems pretty difficult to prove something unless one has presented an argument. But as I pointed out, since the non-cartoon universe of atheism lacks the all-controlling dictator that Christians imagine, (ii) is wholly misguided. Besides, as I had pointed out before, whether or not I myself affirm a cartoon universe worldview is irrelevant to the fact that Christianity surely does.

I wrote:

For instance, man has two legs and two arms, not because of biological causes, but because the creator-god wanted him to have two arms and two legs. The Christian god could just as easily have created man with 22 arms and 14 legs. Since Christians believe that their god created the universe, they claim that their god is ‘bigger’ than the universe, and that nothing in the universe is exempt from its ‘all-controlling sovereignty.’ Similarly, a cartoonist can choose to draw images with two arms and two legs, and he can also choose to draw them with 22 arms and 14 legs if he so pleases. The cartoonist is ‘bigger’ than his cartoons in the sense that he calls the shots in dictating what takes place in them. To the extent that Christians claim that the universe was created by the Christian god and possesses the nature that it allegedly gave to it, Christians are affirming the cartoon universe premise that is integral to its form of theism.

Steve responded:

As we’ve seen several times now, this comparison falls far short of metaphysical subjectivism. For the ontology of creation ex nihilo is essentially disanalogous to the causal process of cartooning.

As we've seen several times now, Steve's attempt to dismiss the cartoon universe premise of the Christian worldview because actual cartoonists do not create their cartoons ex nihilo is based on a misunderstanding of what the analogy parallels. The analogy never claimed that "the causal process of cartooning" is analogous to the Christian god creating the universe ex nihilo. The analogy shows the parallels between a god determining everything that happens in the universe it created and a cartoonist determining everything that happens in the cartoon he creates.

I wrote:

That having been said, however, it is unlikely that someone who wants to believe in a cartoon universe is going to accept any demonstration of the inherent falsehood of such a model.

Steve retorted:

It is especially unlikely that someone will accept Dawson’s demonstration when his demonstration is so thoroughly inept.

I strongly doubt that it would be due to any ineptness on my part that someone would fail to acknowledge the validity of the analogy I have presented. As I pointed out in the statement that Steve responded to here, if someone wants to believe in a cartoon universe, it's unlikely that he will accept any course of reasoning which shows such a model to be flawed. I understand this quite well myself, being a former believer. There was a time when I was much like Steve, anxious to validate the Christian worldview in my mind. Like Steve, I was not inclined to take such criticism lying down. But in my case, the unlikely happened and I eventually woke up. Now, having distanced myself a ways from what had compelled me emotionally, I have a clearer understanding of all this.

I wrote:

Not at all. Both cartoonists and the cartoons they create are very real, just as a potter and the clay he works with are real. If cartoons were not real, how would people watch them on their TV screens? The validity of the analogy does
not in any way depend on its Christian analogues being actual.

Steve responded:

Now he’s equivocating. Cartoons are entities. So they are ontologically real. But the world they depict is fictitious.

Good grief! I just pointed out that “both cartoonists and the cartoons they create are very real,” and while expressing agreement with me, he accuses me of equivocating. The question is whether cartoons are real or not. In fact, my statement was in response to one that he had made: “the cartoon is real, but the cartoonist is fictitious.” Steve's Hays grows thick which each trial.

Steve wrote:

And Bethrick trades on that connotation when he says that Christianity has a cartoonish worldview. And in so doing he commits a level-confusion. Once again, his analogy falls apart.

So, is it not the case that the Christian god "controls whatsoever comes to pass"? We know that a cartoonist "controls whatsoever comes to pass" in his cartoons. Is Steve admitting that his god is just a chimera after all?

I wrote:

Wrong again. If Paul's potter and clay are analogous to his deity and its creations, then so are a cartoonist and the cartoons he creates, for the same essential reasons. In fact, as I have shown, the cartoon universe analogy is even stronger than Paul's analogy of the potter and clay. In the case of Paul's analogy in Romans, the potter is working with a pre-existing substance - namely the clay he uses to mold artifacts. Here's a point of disanalogy with what Christianity claims about its deity and its creation which the cartoon universe analogy symbolically overcomes: the universe, claims Christianity, was created ex nihilo. In other words, the deity did not take some pre-existing material and then reshape it, as a potter does with clay. In the case of a cartoon, however, the cartoonist approximates the ex nihilo creation of the universe claimed by Christianity by starting with a blank slate and drawing whatever he wants, where he wants and when he wants, just as the Christian god is alleged to have started with no pre-existing materials and proceeded to create what it wanted, where it wanted and when it wanted by wishing them into existence. For instance, cartoonist can give his cartoon a horizon with 27 moons instead of our one moon. Similarly, the Christian god can create a planet with 27 moons (Christians think that their god created Uranus too, don't they?). The cartoonist could decide to give his cartoon horizon 27 moons "just because," as he faces no constraints on his blank slate that will limit his creativity to a number less than this. Similarly, the Christian god, when creating a planet, can give it 27 moons "just because," since no constraints will limit its creative abilities. It just wishes, and the planet and its moons will magically appear.

Steve bucks:

No, the cartoon analogy does not “approximate” creation ex nihilo. That confuses the fictitious world of the cartoon with the real world of the cartoonist. The difference could not be more elementary or elemental. And it thereby fails to distinguish the Christian worldview from his own worldview.

I did not say that the cartoon analogy itself approximates creation ex nihilo, but rather that the cartoonist can approximate such a phenomenon in his cartoons. That is, the cartoonist can illustrate a realm in which a character comes upon an open field and commands a tower to exist, and as if by magic the tower appears where before there was just an open field. In so doing, he gives us a portrait of what wishing something into existence might look like.

I had quoted a few of the bible’s promises regarding the power of prayer:

Mt. 7:7-8 states: "Ask, and it shall be given you; seek, and ye shall find; knock, and it shall be opened unto you: For every one that asketh receiveth; and he that seeketh findeth; and to him that knocketh it shall be opened."

Mt. 18:19 states: "Again I say unto you, That if two of you shall agree on earth as touching any thing that they shall ask, it shall be done for them of my Father which is in heaven."

Mt. 21:22 states: "And all things, whatsoever ye shall ask in prayer, believing, ye shall receive."

Jn. 14:13-14 states: "And whatsoever ye shall ask in my name, that will I do, that the Father may be glorified in the Son. If ye shall ask any thing in my name, I will do it."

Jn. 15:7 states: "If ye abide in me, and my words abide in you, ye shall ask what ye will, and it shall be done unto you."

Jn. 16:23-24 states: "Verily, verily, I say unto you, Whatsoever ye shall ask the Father in my name, he will give it you. Hitherto have ye asked nothing in my name: ask, and ye shall receive, that your joy may be full."

I then wrote:

I welcome Steve's and any other Christian's efforts to downplay promises such as these, for I do not believe them either. They are, however, just a few of the verses that one can find in the New Testament which explicitly promise wish fulfillment. In terms of Christianity's cartoon universe, the believer is like Bugs Bunny having acquired self-awareness and being told by his illustrator (in whose "image" he was illustrated) that he can have whatever he wants just by asking for it. "Ask, and ye shall receive," says the promise of the divine cartoonist. The promise does not say, "Ask, and I might grant it." It clearly states "ye shall receive." But it is interesting to see Christians backpedaling from the bible's explicit promises, giving us the image of Bugs Bunny asking his cartoonist to give him a parka when he's drawn in an arctic setting, the cartoonist saying, "No, not just yet... You're going to have to freeze your little tail off first." All too often the bible models the divine cartoonist playing with its creations.

Steve responded to this, saying simply:

We don’t downplay these promises. We also don’t quote them out of context, detaching them from a theology of prayer.

The over-arching context of these promises on the Christian view is that they are issued by an agent which has the power to deliver on them. Also integral to the Christian context of these verses is that the god which issued them is trustworthy, that it will not lie, that it will not leave the believer in the cold, that it loves the believer and hears his prayers. Now, it needs to be borne in mind that these promises are not my statements; I did not author them - they came from the bible, which Christians tell me is true (indeed, many Christians like to ridicule me for not believing it). It also needs to be borne in mind that much theology is driven by the private recognition on the part of the theologian that he does not live in the cartoon universe that his confession affirms. This is why the more explicit teachings of the bible, such as the promises I itemized above, are frequently downplayed by drowning them in a context fabricated by amplifying surrounding statements beyond their scope and at the expense of the "harder sayings" against which those surrounding statements are pitted. Of course, we should expect believers to deny that such promises are being downplayed. We should never be so naïve as to expect honesty from people who want to defend a faith scheme.

I wrote:

But the universe as Christianity essentially conceives of it operates according to the cartoon dictim: ‘Nature, to be commanded, must be willed.’ According to the myth, what the Christian god wills, immediately becomes reality. The Christian god wills the universe to be, and it is. No fussing with natural laws here. What Christian would say that the objects of the universe do not directly obey his god's will? The Christian god will say to this rib, ‘Become thou Eve!’ magically the rib turns into Eve upon command. The Christian god will say to the rain clouds, ‘Flood ye the earth!’ and the rain clouds will obey, letting loose their waters to flood the earth, just as the divine cartoonist has commanded. The Christian god says to the flora and fauna of the earth, ‘Go now to Noah and get your sorry butts into his waiting barge!’ and in the cartoon universe of theism, they obey as commanded. We are not told how koalas and kangaroos find their way to Noah's ark from the Australian landmass, but according to the myth they did so, just as they were commanded. For in the cartoon universe of theism, there is no exception to the primacy of divine wishing, no exception to the obedience that this wishing brings about in the objects which populate the universe. The ‘how’ does not matter, for the lessons that the bible is intended to impart are not meant to have practical applicability in the non-cartoon universe of atheism where questions like ‘How did that happen?’ make sense. What's important here is obedience to the ruling will, the all-controlling subject, on the part of any object. This will has the power to command any object in the cartooniverse, and any object so commanded shall obey without exception, just as the actions of Bugs Bunny obey the wishes of an illustrator.

Steve then responded:

i) Bethrick never advances the argument.

I "never" advance an argument? Is this consistent with other statements he has made? See above.

Steve wrote:

ii) And if that were not bad enough, he is also confusing creation, providence, and miracle. The flood is not the effect of creation ex nihilo. Gathering the animals into the ark is not the effect of creation ex nihilo.

Well, I nowhere affirmed that the Noachian flood or that the "gathering of animals into the ark" was an "effect of creation ex nihilo." But on Christianity's premises, all of these things that took place on earth were willed by the supernatural cartoonist.


Steve confirms explicitly:

There is no “how” to creation ex nihilo.

There we have it: the alleged creation of the universe happened no how - and yet we're supposed to accept the claim that the universe was caused. How? Well, no how. How's that? No how. The overboiling of the Christian Zen pot makes a veritable Master Po of any internet apologist. Just as I pointed out: the 'how' is unimportant, so might as well deny all applicability of the term when it suits expedience.

Steve wrote:

BTW, Genesis doesn’t say that there were koalas and kangaroos in Australia before the flood. It doesn’t say Australia was there before the flood. It doesn’t say the current species or subspecies of koalas or kangaroos existed before the flood, or—if they did exist—where they were.

Indeed, in a cartoon universe, Australia could have been formed from a summit in the Andes (like Eve being formed from one of Adam's ribs), while the South American landmass could have been formed from the hip of the African continent after Noah's floating menagerie landed, thus providing a progressive land bridge on which some survivors (but not others) could have traveled to their final destination. Or, once Noah's ark landed, the divine cartoonist could have simply rearranged the continents and the distribution of the animal survivors, wishing Australia into place and magically teleporting the koalas and kangaroos into place. After all, in a cartoon universe, anything can happen, and the 'how' really doesn't matter, for in the end it all happens "no how" anyway.

Steve wrote:

Unbelievers try to make the flood account looks artificially problematic by interpolating a number of extra-narrative assumptions into the narrative.

And the ever-ready ad hoc plasticity of the cartoon universe of theism, which ultimately reduces to "it happened no how," sees to this. The cartoon universe premise inherent to Christian theism allows the believer to piggyback on the arbitrariness of his imagined god: the sky's the limit when it comes to supposing what "accounts" for the current state of affairs.

I wrote:

Now, I certainly do not think the universe is analogous to a cartoon. Either Steve agrees with me that the universe is not analogous to a cartoon (and thus implicitly agrees that a worldview which likens the universe to a cartoon misconstrues the nature of the universe), or he disagrees with me, thus affirming that the universe is analogous to a cartoon.

Steve responded:

What I don’t agree with is a maladroit confusion between two distinct modes of subsistence. What would be mean to say that the universe is analogous to a cartoon? Does that mean that the cartoonist is a part of the cartoon? That he’s a cartoon character? Or that he is apart from the cartoon?

As I expected, Steve does not come out and say whether or not he agrees with Christianity that the universe has a cartoonish nature. At this point, he should understand what this means if he had been considering what I've been saying rather than merely reacting. His mind is aswirl in a persisting haze.

But Steve does ask some juicy questions here. Can the cartoonist be part of the cartoon? According to Christianity, the answer is YES: the cartoonist can and did play a role in his own cartoon universe. This is the role of Jesus, the god of the heavens who "took on flesh" (i.e., assumed a form like other characters in his cartoon) and intermingled with its creations. In such a case, the cartoonist is of course initially distinct from the cartoon he creates. But as with any piece of art work, a cartoon is full of autobiographical elements which are sourced in the agent who creates it. Same with the Christian universe, according to Christians. We are told that "there is a rational God who has created a rational universe" (The Christian Professor), and that the supposed 'rationality' of the universe is a "reflection" of this "rational God" which allegedly created it. And since this god is all-powerful and "does whatever pleases him" (Ps. 115:3), nothing could stop the super-cartoonist from penciling himself into his own cartoon. And according to the Christian myth, this is precisely what the super-cartoonist did. Development of these points can wait for another occasion.

by Dawson Bethrick