Preliminary Thoughts on Van Til’s “Argument from Unity of Knowledge”

In his paper If Knowledge Then God: The Epistemological Theistic Arguments of Plantinga and Van Til (hereafter IKTG), Christian apologist James Anderson develops a total of seven arguments, three from Alvin Plantinga and four from Cornelius Van Til, which are intended to draw conclusions affirming Christian theism. What unites Plantinga and Van Til for Anderson is that “both have argued that a successful epistemology… must appeal to God at some point” and also that “a thoroughgoing adherence to naturalism (roughly, the view that there are no supernatural beings) is a recipe for debilitating skepticism” (IKTG, p. 2).

This is all very fascinating to me since, back when I was a believer, one thing that did stand out to me in my study of the Christian bible, is that it had next to nothing to say on epistemology. My guess is that Plantinga and Van Til were going off of sources other than what we find between Genesis and Revelation.

WSIBC: “Competing Worldviews”

In setting the stage for making his case for Christianity, Christian apologist James Anderson makes it clear that he’s talking about Christianity as a “worldview.” On pages 32-33 of his book Why Should I Believe Christianity? (WSIBC), Anderson explains:

a worldview is a comprehensive view of the world. I don’t mean a physical view of the world, like the sight of planet earth you might get from an orbiting space station. A worldview is a philosophical view of the world – and not just of our planet, but of the entire universe, indeed all of reality. A worldview is an all-encompassing perspective on ourselves and everything else that exists, especially those things that matter most to us and have the greatest influence on our lives.

Since a worldview is “a philosophical view of the world… indeed all of reality” that is “all-encompassing,” a worldview should be expected to help us understand “things we take for granted in our everyday lives, such as the orderliness of the universe, the meaningfulness of human existence, and our ability to use reason to extend our knowledge of the world” (p. 45). Thus, if “Christianity is an all-compassing worldview" (p. 25), then I would expect Christianity to have something informative to say about some fundamental matters, such as the proper starting point of human cognition, the relationship between consciousness and its objects, the nature of concepts and how we form them, etc. For whether one realizes it or not, these are fundamental matters which “have the greatest influence on our lives.”

The Agony of Agnosticism or: Why Not Mature Thoughtfulness?

It’s common for apologists to market their theism in terms of dichotomies between two self-servingly construed hypotheticals, branding the undesired horn as degrading and deplorable and the option they prefer as though it were unquestionably virtuous and in touch with the secret answers to all of life’s mysteries, available just by signing on. 

This is the same kind of tactic a snake oil salesman would use: why suffer in your inevitable demise when, for the cost of a few pennies, you can unlock the powers of health by buying a bottle of this special elixir, a concoction whose ingredients could only be discovered after making the purchase and taking the substance to a lab (a la “we have to pass the bill in order to find out what’s in it”). 

With religious induction, it’s a never-ending booby-trap-laden spiral of “but wait, there’s more” as the initiate is led down the granddaddy of all rabbit trails, traveling the labyrinth of self-delusion managed by way of myriad distractions such that he is deliberately kept unaware of just how far he has been led from where it all started out. By the time he’s a mile in, he doesn’t realize how deep he’s sunk in his descent into the depths of what is the essentially a mind game.

Does Objectivism Deny the Reality of Change?

Most readers here have probably heard the charge that on “the atheist worldview” everything is “matter in motion,” that everything is “in flux,” and that the resulting constant change can only mean a persistence of chaos and absence of constancy. Such an assumption about reality supposedly follows as a result of not believing that an invisible magic being created the universe and calls all the shots. If apologists don’t actually believe this about non-believers and their outlook on reality, many nevertheless want to use such charges to put them on the defensive, regardless of what they in fact do say on behalf of their view on such matters.

Well, some time back, I had an exchange with a presuppositionalist who took a different approach. This individual actually argued precisely the opposite, namely that because of Objectivism’s conception of causality as identity applied to action, there’s no room for change in Objectivism. (I kid you not!)

Jason Petersen on the Fallacy of Pure Self-Reference

While Floyd FP was making efforts to raise objections against Objectivism and defend his subjecto-solipsistic position from the charge that it commits the fallacy of pure self-reference (see here), I found a Q&A article by none other than Jason Petersen in which the strapping young “Clarkian presuppositionalist” attempted to bring into question the legitimacy of there being such a thing as a the fallacy of pure self-reference. Petersen is apparently replying to a visitor to his website who raised questions about the fallacy of pure self-reference.

Here we have more proof that Petersen is content to make pronouncements about things of which he has little if any understanding. Why anyone would go to Jason Petersen in an effort to become better informed on anything falling under the purview of philosophy is beyond me. But he’s set himself up in a “ministry” and apparently that is all it takes, within Christianity, to become some sort of “expert” on philosophy.

Today’s [sic]-fest comes from Petersen’s 28. Q + A: The Fallacy of Pure-Self Reference [sic] (right – he doesn’t even get the hyphen correct!). In this “Q + A,” Petersen feigns to have the acumen to address a question about the fallacy of pure self-reference (notice where the hyphen goes).

Jason Lisle on Axioms

The topic of axioms was raised in Jason Lisle’s comment exchange with Tony and other visitors over on Lisle’s blog It’s not “Human Reason vs. God’s Word”!. Coming to this discussion from the perspective of a worldview which provides no “epistemologically self-conscious” understanding of axioms, Lisle is clearly unprepared to interact with this area of inquiry with any credibility. Instead of raising important issues that need to be addressed or even showing a willingness to learn from his interlocutors, Lisle can be seen flailing his arms around groping for anything that might stick in the heat of debate. Clearly his only ambition is to protect his god-belief. What does he want to protect it from? That’s obvious, he wants to protect it from reason.

Before getting started, I want to point readers to several posts on the topic of axioms that are available for readers to peruse on my blog:

The Axioms and the Primacy of Existence 

RazorsKiss on the Christian God as the Basis of Knowledge – Part 2: RK’s Axioms 

A Reply to Matthias on Philosophical Starting Points

I have also written about the validity of the senses, another topic that comes up in these exchanges, in the following:

On the Validity of the Senses 

Answering Jason Lisle on the Reliability of the Senses

I will not address everything stated in the comments of Lisle’s blog (there are 1,180 comments!), but will instead focus primarily on some of Lisle’s questions and statements about axioms that can be found on page 3 of his comments pages.

At a Loss for Words: Rick Warden's Latest Comment

On occasion some of my readers have criticized my blog entries for being too lengthy, that I am too wordy, that I apparently have too much to say. It is true, I do have a lot to say, and I can’t sit on it. I cannot stand still and just watch what’s happening to the world I’m living in and do nothing. The old adage has it that the pen is mightier than the sword, and much of history supports this view. I'm doing my best to do my small part.

So it might come as a surprise to my readers when I am struck with a loss for words. This does not happen often for me, but it did happen this evening, at least temporarily, when I opened my e-mail and saw a comment posting from Rick Warden on his own blog entry saying something that was so bizarrely false that I really did lose my voice for a few moments.

How Theism Violates the Primacy of Existence

Introduction

Recognizing the antithesis between the primacy of existence and the primacy of consciousness is a virtue for which only Objectivism seems prepared to equip a person, while other philosophies tend to ignore or evade the matter. Objectivism is the only philosophy that I know of which not only identifies the primacy of existence explicitly as a fundamental philosophical concern, but which also purposefully develops its metaphysics, epistemology, morality and politics in a manner consistent with the primacy of existence as an ultimate guiding principle.

Occasionally I am asked, by atheists and theists alike, why I would say that theism violates the primacy of existence. That theism does in fact violate the primacy of existence is so obvious to me that it is puzzling that anyone would need to have it explained. But then I realize that, for many years now, I’ve understood the issue of metaphysical primacy and its implications for theism and every other position under the sun, and not everyone else benefits from this understanding. It is this understanding that I wish to share with my readers.

To understand why theism violates the primacy of existence, we must first understand what is meant by the primacy of existence. And in order to appreciate fully what the primacy of existence means, we must understand the issue of metaphysical primacy.

The Issue of Metaphysical Primacy

The issue of metaphysical primacy has to do with the relationship between consciousness and its objects. Since all philosophy involves consciousness relating to objects (either real or imagined), the issue of metaphysical primacy bears on all philosophical principles, viewpoints and initiatives. Because consciousness is involved throughout the establishment and development of philosophical principles, the relationship between consciousness and its objects is not some sidebar distraction or marginal curiosity of trivial interest. Ignoring the relationship between consciousness is not an option for serious thinkers, especially once the question of the proper orientation of this relationship has been raised.

Essentially, the issue of metaphysical primacy asks:

What holds metaphysical primacy in the relationship between a consciousness and its objects: the subject of consciousness, or the objects of consciousness?

For a moment, some may entertain the notion that this question is fallaciously complex, perhaps supposing that it assumes a false dichotomy. Why suppose that either the subject of consciousness or its objects must hold metaphysical primacy? Can’t both be metaphysical equals? Can’t both the subject of consciousness and its objects enjoy metaphysical primacy, just as two individuals taking a test can both score 100% on it?

Such questions may imply that the subject of consciousness and its objects are locked in some sort of contest, with one side vying against the other, and that the issue of metaphysical primacy is an attempt to pick a winner among the two contestants arbitrarily. Either that, or they simply ignore the root of the matter that the issue of metaphysical primacy is getting at, namely identifying the proper relationship between a subject and its objects.

It is an undeniable fact that a subject is distinct from the objects of its awareness: a subject and its objects are not one and the same – the two are engaged in a relationship. Consciousness is consciousness of an object. Also, a subject does not switch sides with the objects of its awareness, as if they could trade places at will and reverse the natural orientation between the one and the other. When you perceive a rock, a chair, or the Golden Gate Bridge, you cannot suddenly become that rock or chair or bridge and look back at yourself as a perceiver. Consciousness is consciousness of an object(s), and the orientation between consciousness and its object(s) is uni-directional, and there’s no reversing this orientation. A person cannot transfer his consciousness to his objects, such that he becomes the object of his consciousness, and the subject of his consciousness is now what used to be its object. The relationship between a subject and its objects is contextually static.

Additionally, the relationship between a subject and its objects is not a relationship of equals. The subject is distinct from its objects, and the subject has certain abilities and capacities which its objects qua objects do not have in the context of their relationship together, even if some of those objects happen to be other conscious individuals (i.e., other persons). When you perceive a mountain or pair of scissors, it is you as the subject who is perceiving these objects. In the context of this relationship, the subject attends to its objects.

Another option, chosen (albeit implicitly) by most philosophies, is to suppose that the subject of consciousness holds metaphysical primacy over its objects. This is known as the primacy of consciousness, or as the primacy of the subject metaphysics, since it grants metaphysical primacy to the subject of consciousness over its objects. This is the view that the objects of consciousness conform to the subject of consciousness, that the subject of consciousness holds the “upper hand” in its relationship with the objects of its awareness. The primacy of consciousness entails that the objects of one’s awareness depend in some way on the subject of awareness, either for their very existence (e.g., the subject of consciousness creates them, either from existing material or “ex nihilo”), for their identity (e.g., the subject of consciousness makes its objects of its awareness what they are), and/or for their capacity to act (e.g., the subject of consciousness controls what its objects do or can do). An attempt to apply the primacy of consciousness consistently would involve all three aspects, holding that objects are created by an act of consciousness, that their identities are assigned to them based on choices made by the creating consciousness, and that the abilities or “potentialities” possessed by objects are given to those objects by a ruling consciousness. (Sound familar?)

The final option (as if it were avertible) is the primacy of existence. Where the primacy of consciousness holds that the subject of consciousness calls all the shots with respect to the existence, identity and/or causal potentiality of its objects, the primacy of existence is the recognition that existence exists independent of consciousness, that the objects of one’s consciousness are what they are independent of conscious activity, that the task of consciousness is neither to create the objects of its awareness, assign identities to them, nor dictate what they can or cannot do, but to perceive and identify its objects. While the primacy of consciousness holds that the objects conform to consciousness, the primacy of existence is the recognition that objects do not conform to consciousness. The primacy of existence is the recognition that the objects of one’s awareness exist independent of one’s awareness of them, that the things one perceives are what they are regardless of what he would prefer or wish them to be.

I agree entirely with Porter when he states:

I think the primacy of existence is the most important issue in philosophy. I think it’s the real axiom of Objectivism. (Ayn Rand’s Theory of Knowledge, p. 198)

The difference between the primacy of existence and the primacy of consciousness, is the difference between objectivity and subjectivism. The primacy of existence is the recognition that the objects of consciousness exist and are what they are independent of the conscious activity by which the subject is aware of them, and thus represents the objective orientation between a subject and its objects. The primacy of consciousness is essentially a fantasy which seeks to reverse the proper orientation between a subject and its objects, attributing to the subject the power to conform its objects to its intentions, either for their very existence (the subject “creates” its own objects), for their natures (the subject “assigns” its objects their identity), and/or for their activity (the subject “controls” what its objects do). This represents the subjective orientation between a subject and its objects.

Theism and Metaphysical Primacy

One of my readers asked the following:

I understand the primacy of existence as objects of consciousness hold primacy over the subjects and the primacy of consciousness affirming the opposite. But I do not see the problem in affirming that existence exists, existence has metaphysical primacy and that God exists. Where lies the violation in asserting that existence exists and so does God?

Questions such as this suggest to me that the one posing it either does not really grasp what the issue of metaphysical primacy deals with, or that he is not integrating what the issue of metaphysical primacy addresses with what theism entails.

Even though many theists do not explicitly identify consciousness as one of the primary characteristics which they attribute to their god (many defenders of theism gravitate to higher abstractions when speaking of their god, such as aseity, cotermineity of their god’s being with its self-consciousness, immutability, infinity, unity, etc.), it is clear from what they say about their god that they do in fact hold it to be a conscious being. In fact, they typically tend to take the assumption that their god is conscious completely for granted, for it is vital to just about everything else they claim about their god. According to what theists say, their god knows, sees, judges, gets angry, expresses joy, loves, commands, plans, determines, experiences pleasure, wishes, etc. All these actions are actions requiring consciousness. Indeed, it would be quite unusual if a theist were to affirm a god which performs all these actions but which is not at the same time conscious of anything. Christian apologists of the Vantillian tradition emphatically dismiss rival religions for not consistently embracing what they call a “personal” deity, i.e., a deity which is self-aware. A non-conscious deity would be what they call an “impersonal” being (cf. John Frame, Apologetics to the Glory of God, p. 34f).

Since theism entails belief in a deity which is conscious, the question raised by the issue of metaphysical primacy has us focus on the relationship between the deity as a conscious subject, and any objects it is said to be conscious of (either by perception or by some other means). When we consider the orientation which theism attributes to the relationship between its god as a conscious subject and any objects it is said to be conscious of, the question becomes:

Does this relationship resemble the primacy of existence, or the primacy of consciousness?

Simply stating that the deity in question possesses consciousness, is not enough to answer this question. We need more information. We need to know more about what theists say about their god. Statements like the following indicate in no uncertain way the orientation which theists have in mind for their god in its relationship as a subject of consciousness to any objects it is supposedly aware of:

Christianity holds that God is the creator of every fact... God’s thought is placed back of every fact. (Cornelius Van Til, Christian Theistic-Evidences, p. 88; quoted in Bahnsen, Van Til’s Apologetic: Readings & Analysis, p. 378)

God wills, that is, creates the universe. God wills, that is, by his providence controls the course of development of the created universe and brings it to its climax. (Cornelius Van Til, “Apologetics,” 1959)

We now know that the world exists simply because God wills it. (Cornelius Van Til, “The Election of All Men in Christ,” The Great Debate Today, 1970)

Fact: God willed the universe into being. Fact: He willed the universe into being by simply speaking it into existence instantaneously. References: Psalm 33:6,9 Psalm 148:5 Hebrews 11:3 Thought: He did not have to speak in order to create, but He did. God could have just thought the universe into being. Instead, He spoke it into being. He used His word to create. (Lesson 6: The Seven Days of Creation: A Deeper Study of Gen. 1:1 to 2:3)

God is Creator of everything, this vast universe. All was created by His Word. He spoke it into being. It is written: (Genesis 1:3) And God said... and it was so. His Word is powerful... God's Word spoke the universe into being. His Word is powerful beyond our comprehension. (Terrell Smith, What Do Christians Believe?)

All things came into being through the will of God. It was God's pleasure that the universe and everything in it be created. (Mike Scott, Can you explain why God created the universe?)

God's will is the final and exclusively determinative power of whatsoever comes to pass. The nature of any created thing is what it is because of an act of determination in relation to it on the part of God. (Jack Cottrell, Sovereignty and Free Will)

God is active in history by definition of who He is, He has created everything and is present with it, controls it, and exercises authority over it to reveal Himself to the praise of His glorious grace. Every fact, and therefore every fact of history, is a fact created by Christ for Christ. (Chris Bolt, “Redemption in Apologetics,” The Portable Presuppositionalist, p. 180)

Every fact is what it is because God has said it is what it is. (Ibid., p. 162)

Clearly, not only is the “God” characterized by these and similar statements supposed to be a conscious being (possessing a will, capable of thought, able to speak, etc.), these descriptions unmistakably grant metaphysical primacy to the consciousness of “God” over any objects it is said to be aware of. It “creates” its objects by simply willing them into existence, its “thought” is “placed back of every fact,” its intentions “control” everything it is conscious of, etc.

"Dude, Where’s the Violation?"

I'll show you.

Since any claim about reality implicitly affirms the primacy of existence (the recognition that existence exists independent of consciousness), any assertion that a god exists performatively contradicts itself by virtue of its implicit affirmation of the primacy of existence on the one hand (as a precondition for intelligibly making any statement about reality) and the primacy of consciousness on the other (as the fundamental orientation entailed by theism in the subject-object relationship).

In response to the question “Where lies the violation in asserting that existence exists and so does God?”, recall the the point I made in my blog The Axioms and the Primacy of Existence, namely that the axiom of existence ("existence exists") is "not the only axiom, that it is not a recognition that remains isolated from other recognitions." To say "existence exists" implies the axiom of consciousness, for one would have to be conscious in order to say this. Affirming both the axiom of existence and the axiom of consciousness in turn implicitly affirms the primacy of existence: Existence exists independent of consciousness.

So in making the statement “existence exists and so does God,” one is in fact declaring “existence exists independent of consciousness, and so does this consciousness upon which existence depends,” which is a direct self-contradiction. It affirms on the one hand, explicitly, that existence exists independent of consciousness (of any consciousness), and on the other – in the very same breath – it affirms the existence of a consciousness on which existence depends. For as we saw in the quotes above, “God” is characterized as a consciousness which creates all existence distinct from itself by an act of will. Thus not only does this position affirm a contradiction at the level of metaphysical primacy, it also leads to the irresolvable problem of divine lonesomeness.

Theists who resist this criticism can test it for themselves. Let them ask themselves the following question:

When you affirm that your god exists, are you presupposing that your god exists independent of your own consciousness? Or, are you saying that your god exists only as a feature of your own psychology, as a figment of your imagination, that the existence of “God” ultimately depends on your own consciousness?

Typically theists can be expected to affirm the former of the two: that their god is an independently existing being, that its existence does not depend on the theist’s or any other “creature’s” awareness, knowledge, feelings, imagination, that it has its own will and makes its own choices, etc. In this way, theists are making use of the primacy of existence in the very affirmation of their god’s existence: they are attempting to make a statement about reality which supposedly obtains independent of their own conscious activity. Thus they implicitly assume the primacy of existence by simply affirming the alleged truth of their god-belief.

But what is it that they are affirming? They are affirming the existence of a consciousness upon which existence depends. In other words, in the very content of the god-belief claims which they assert, they are affirming the primacy of consciousness – the very opposite of the primacy of existence, a principle which they need in order to make their god-belief claims sensible by any measure.

In this way, theists are directly contradicting themselves whenever they affirm their god’s existence. They implicitly affirm the primacy of existence in the very act of asserting their god-belief claims, and they expressly affirm the primacy of consciousness in the very content of their god-belief claims.

The Book of Evasions

In an exchange between myself and presuppositionalist Chris Bolt (see the comments section of my blog Can the Water in My Drinking Glass Turn into Merlot?), I had asked him if he disputes the truth of the Objectivist axioms, which I listed specifically for him to see.

In contemplating the axiom of existence, Bolt stated:

Do I believe that something exists? Yes, God exists, for example.

When I wrote in my blog Chris Bolt on Hume and Induction in response to Bolt’s statement, pointing out that

just by saying ‘God exists,’ Bolt performatively contradicts himself. He makes use of the primacy of existence while affirming a claim which denies the primacy of existence.

Bolt responded in a comment accusing me of “begging the question with respect to the truth of the Objectivist worldview.”

But Bolt is mistaken here. As I explained, I am simply being consistent with the Objectivist worldview, noting that “the only alternative to Objectivism, is some sort of subjectivism.” I cited presuppositionalism’s own champion, Greg Bahnsen, to help him understand. Bahnsen states:

”Circularity” in one’s philosophical system is just another name for “consistency” in outlook throughout one’s system. That is, one’s starting point and final conclusion cohere with each other. (Van Til’s Apologetic: Readings & Analysis, p. 170n.42)

I do not expect that Bolt would disagree here, and in his comments, he expressed no disagreement with this so far as I could see. Certainly I don’t think he would think that I should be inconsistent with my position. Indeed, if I had stated that Bolt was not performatively contradicting himself when he says “God exists,” he could then legitimately accuse me of being inconsistent with my worldview’s fundamentals. But in stating this recognition, I am in no way “begging the question,” as should be clear from the points which I have presented above.

Bolt did give a reason why he thinks I am wrong to point out the self-contradiction in the claim “God exists.” Indeed, he stated that my objection

takes the ‘primacy of existence’ and attempts to apply it to a foreign worldview.

But this, too, is mistaken. Bolt seeks to evade my critique of theism from the primacy of existence by arguing that the concept of the primacy of existence is “foreign” to Christianity. While it is true that the primacy of existence is “foreign” to Christian thought (indeed, this is a significant admission on Bolt's part), this fact by itself does nothing to diminish the pertinence of my critique. Even Bolt must realize that consciousness is real and that there is a relationship between consciousness and its objects, regardless of the specifics of one’s particular belief system. A belief system is something one holds in his consciousness. So just by acknowledging that one has a belief system, he is admitting to the fact that he possesses the faculty of consciousness.

As we saw above, the issue of metaphysical primacy seeks to identify the proper orientation between the subject of consciousness and its objects. Unless Bolt denies the reality of consciousness, he must surely recognize that there is a relationship between consciousness and its objects, since consciousness is consciousness of some thing, whether he believes in a god or not. Belief in the Christian god – since it requires consciousness (belief being an activity performed by consciousness) – does not exempt one’s consciousness from its need for an object, nor does it provide an escape from the fact that consciousness implies a relationship between itself and its objects.

So the “you’re arguing from a foreign worldview” objection fails, since there is no such thing as a consciousness without anything to be conscious of. As Ayn Rand pointed out:

a consciousness with nothing to be conscious of is a contradiction in terms. (Atlas Shrugged, Galt’s Speech)

Unless Mr. Bolt wants to embrace a contradiction in terms, he must acknowledge that consciousness naturally has an object. And if he acknowledges that consciousness has an object, then he must acknowledge that there is a relationship between consciousness and its object – that consciousness is consciousness of an object. And if he acknowledges this, he must acknowledge that there is a proper orientation between consciousness and its objects, that since consciousness is consciousness of an object, the object of consciousness holds metaphysical primacy over consciousness: it is what it is independent of conscious activity. A rock is what it is independent of one’s knowledge of it; an event occurred even if someone does not know about it; a person is who he is regardless of how others judge him. Even a Christian would say that his god exists even if no one believes in it, wouldn’t he?

That’s the primacy of existence. By supposing that something exists and is what it is even if people don’t believe it, an individual is informing his supposition with the primacy of existence.

There is no escape from this, because there is no escape in human cognition from the facts that consciousness is consciousness of an object and that there is a relationship between consciousness and its objects. The “foreign worldview” retort is a dodge that simply does not and cannot succeed. To invoke it is to assume the truth of the primacy of existence: it is an attempt to identify the state of affairs as they are supposed to exist independent of anyone’s wishing, emotions, protestations, errors in judgment, evasions, etc. The retort itself makes use of the very principle it is trying to dismiss.

Bolt also stated:

Perhaps more importantly, there is no explanation here of how affirming that God exists denies the primacy of existence.

Apparently Bolt had not availed himself to any of the items in the reading list which I provide below (all of which had been written and posted either to my blog or to my website well before he made his comment). He also now has the points which I made above to help him understand.

Related reading:

The Primacy of Existence: A Validation

The Axioms and the Primacy of Existence

Theism and Subjective Metaphysics

The Inherent Subjectivism of God-Belief

A Reply to Tenant on Theistic Foundationalism vs. the Objectivist Axioms

Dodging the Subject-Object Relationship

Confessions of a Vantillian Subjectivist

God and Square Circles

Bahnsen on “Knowing the Supernatural”

The Cartoon Universe of Christianity

The Argument from Metaphysical Primacy: A Debate

by Dawson Bethrick

"Ultimate Questions"

Back in March, I saw a post by Chris Bolt on a blog called Choosing Hats, a blog dedicated to the presuppositional method of defending the Christian faith. The post was titled Your Thoughts Welcome.... In this blog Chris posted an illustration of the antithesis between Christianity and “Non-Christianity” as Christians are supposedly expected to understand it.

Given the title of this post, I thought I’d submit my comments in response to this. In my comments, I had raised the criticism that, according to the illustration which Bolt published, non-Christian philosophies were being grouped together by a trivial, non-essential characteristic, namely “ultimate commitment to human [independence] from God.” In fact, I dispute the claim that non-Christian worldviews could reasonably be characterized as founded upon or motivated by an “ultimate commitment to human [independence] from God.” I gave my reasons for this in my exchange with Chris Bolt, which spilled into subsequent blogs which he posted in response to my comments (see here and here). Chris of course sought to defend the division which his illustration portrays, but seems to have had difficulty answering the points I raised against it.

In his post Bahnsen Burner’s Presuppositional Apologetic for Objectivism, Part 1, Chris made the following comment:

There are only so many ultimate questions available to any worldview with a finite number of “possible” answers.

While I am happy to entertain this proposal, I was looking forward to seeing the questions which Chris thinks are “ultimate” and for any reasons why he would characterize them as such. Unfortunately, Chris has not identified those questions which he considers “ultimate.”

So to encourage further interaction between ourselves, I proposed a few of my own “ultimate questions” for Chris to consider in a comment which I posted on April 1. The first two questions are:

1) What is your starting point? and

2) What is the proper orientation between the subject of consciousness and its objects?

Now my first question – What is your starting point? – should be easy to understand for anyone who has given his worldview a significant amount of thought. If he does not know what his starting point is, I’d say he has some unfinished business and is defending his position prematurely.

With respect to my second question, many thinkers (perhaps most?) do not seem to understand what it is asking right off the bat. My question is intended to allow a thinker to reveal his position with regards to metaphysical primacy, i.e., the relationship between consciousness and its objects. In fact, however, this is such a fundamental concern that most thinkers do not even recognize it as an issue, let alone explore it, and pass it over in their haste to pontificate on higher-level matters. So I proposed three additional questions to help Chris and anyone else who might want to consider them:

3) Are you conscious? (yes or no)

4) If you are conscious, are you conscious of any objects? (yes or no)

5) If you are conscious of any objects, what is the relationship between yourself as a subject of consciousness, and any object(s) of which you are conscious?

Questions 3) and 4) should not need any explanation. They are quite basic, they use common terms, and they seek simple yes-no answers. The answer to question 3) of course should be yes. If one were not conscious, he could not consider the question in the first place, since consciousness of the question is a precondition to considering it. The answer to question 4) should also be yes: in considering a question, one is obviously conscious of that question. A question can be an object of one’s consciousness. He is likely conscious of many other things as well, such as the computer monitor on which he’s pulled up the page bearing the question, things on the desk around him, the seat he is sitting in, noises that may be sounding during the time he’s considering the question, such as the whirring of his computer hard drive, a ticking clock on the wall, a car passing by on the street in front of his house, birds chirping in trees outside his window, etc. All of these things would be objects of his consciousness if in fact he is aware of such things.

Now with respect to question 5), I can understand that this may be new territory for many thinkers. But it focuses on the most fundamental issue in all philosophy. The answer which a worldview gives to this question determines whether it is objective or subjective, rational or irrational, suitable for man’s life on earth, or unsuitable. Of course, once one does answer this question when he finally does consider it, it remains to be seen whether or not the views he endorses are consistent with the answer that he gives.

Perhaps I’m just naïve, but I was really hoping that Chris would take a few moments and consider these questions, and post his answers to them. After all, as he himself points out, there are only so many ultimate questions one can ask, and only a finite number of possible answers. My questions are intended to penetrate to the very core of one’s worldview, to the most fundamental level of one’s “presuppositions.” I would think that presuppositionalist apologists would relish questions of this nature. It’s been nearly a month now since I posed my questions to Chris. Perhaps he’s still thinking about them.

by Dawson Bethrick