Shining a Bright Light into Dave's Dark Cave

Dave McPhillips posted several comments responding to blog A Reply to Dave McPhillips on Bahnsen’s Treatment of the Problem of Evil. Dave is another wannabe presuppositionalist, trying his hand well beyond his skill and well beyond his knowledge of the topics that come up in debate. The darkness of ignorance encouraged by the Christian worldview is strong with Dave McPhillips: it has served to keep him from the light and has effectively reduced him to repeating apologetic slogans liked a well-trained presuppositionalist marionette.

For those who have been following my blog for several years now, do you notice a pattern? Every couple months another apologist comes by, often with some drive-by comment, speaking his nonsense and often not realizing how summarily he and his worldview have been refuted. Many disappear after the first round, but on occasion they return after a brief season only to wedge their feet deeper into their oral cavity. All too often this takes the form of simply asserting dismissive remarks like “that’s arbitrary,” “that’s subjective,” “that begs the question,” etc., without even attempting to explain why the tidbit in question commits the offense so charged. In fact, had my critics bothered to read more of my blog than just the brief passage that made them bristle to begin with, they would find that I have already anticipated their objections and have validated my position, even if they do not approve of it.

 

But after a few short rounds, they disappear for good and never come back, never the wiser, never the more enlightened. This is the effect of Christianity: it corrals the believer’s mind into a cave of ignorance where it seeks to enslave it to its mystical fantasies. Very few seem to find the courage it takes to question Christianity’s subjective premises and recognize them for what they are. To do this requires the choice to be determined in one’s honesty. Without this choice, the believer will be forever ensnared in Christianity’s tangled web of lies and deceits.

So here we go again.

Dave wrote:

I noticed in your reply to my comment you accuse me of using an ‘apologetical maneuver’, attempting to deflect attention away from what Christianity affirms and direct the spotlight on the non-believers worldview.

Yes, that’s right. And it’s true. We will see such deflection again in your own comments.

Dave wrote:

You say that this is done in order to evade the problem of evil. Such a conclusion could only be reached if one has completely failed to understand the nature of the presuppositional argument.

Ah yes, the old “You don’t understand!” part. Well, coming from presuppositionalists, perhaps there’s some plausibility to this since presuppers are in the habit of saying all sorts of things *about* their argument, but very rarely actually presenting it. Indeed, do you even present the argument? Perhaps you think you have. But it’s not clear that you’ve presented any argument. Observe:

Dave wrote:

Allow me to clarify. The presuppositional argument for the existence of God is a ‘transcendental’ argument; it seeks to determine what the preconditions to reality are given the espoused worldviews of opposing systems.

Stop right there. First, consider the notion of “the preconditions to reality.” If this is what a TA “seeks to determine,” it seems that it’s off to a doomed start. Wouldn’t those “preconditions to reality” themselves have to be real, and therefore part of reality? How does one go about determining that reality has any preconditions beyond itself to begin with? How is this guiding premise justified? It’s just assumed. What is meant by “reality” according to the TA? Well, presumably this would be informed by whatever worldview is generating the question to begin with. But a worldview which assumes that there are “preconditions to reality” to begin with seems to be saying that reality itself is not a primary, that something else is a primary. By what means of awareness do we come to know what this something else is? How do we distinguish this “something else” from something that is merely imaginary, and if it is supposed to be the “precondition to reality,” how do we qualify it as real?

Also, notice also this notion that the TA (as presuppers supposedly employ it) “*seeks* to determine” these alleged “preconditions to reality.” Well, when I listen to Bahnsen and other presuppers present their apologetic, I don’t find any “seeking” going on. In his debate with Stein, for example, Bahnsen presents his TA: “The transcendental proof for God's existence is that without Him it is impossible to prove anything.” I don’t see any “seeking” going on here. He’s simply asserting this. It’s not "seeking" that presuppers do with their “transcendental argument,” but rather stipulating.

Dave wrote:

It is an argument which attempts to evaluate opposing worldviews in order to distinguish which one is rationally coherent, that is, which worldview can adequately account for reality and make human experience intelligible.

Again, we have this notion that something other than reality must “adequately account for reality.” But if reality exists, it exists and it is what is independent of anyone’s wishes, preferences, likes, dislikes, feelings, imaginations, etc. In other words, the primacy of existence tells us that existence exists independent of consciousness. And yet, here we have the presuppers saying that they’re interested in what’s “rationally coherent.” Is it “rationally coherent” to say that wishing makes it so? I’m guessing (hoping?) Dave would say this is not rationally coherent. But yet, what does the Christian worldview give us? It gives us the notion that reality was created by an act of consciousness (cf. wishing) and that conscious activity “controls whatsoever comes to pass” (Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, p. 160). In short, the Christian worldview tells us that the “ultimate reality” is essentially a form of wishing makes it so. And the Christian imagines a conscious being whose wishes can make anything so.

Dave wrote:

This is the nature of the argument it is not an “appologetical [sic] maneuver.

Yes, the TA as presuppers employ it is an apologetic maneuver. It is saying one thing (e.g., we’re “seeking” something”) and doing something else (stipulating what must be, and based ultimately one something that is merely imaginary).

Also, what Dave offered in response to the problem of evil is also an apologetic maneuver. The problem of evil is an internal critique of Christianity. But in order to shift focus away from this fact, apologists redirect attention on how non-believer’s define evil, or whether or not they can in a manner consistent with their non-theistic premises. Dave made this maneuver plain as day when he stated: “The problem of evil is not a problem for the believer but rather a problem for the unbeliever.” No, it’s a problem for Christianity. Christianity affirms the existence of evil, and it affirms the existence of an all-good, all-powerful god which creates everything and controls everything. So the tension between these is all internal to Christianity, regardless of what some non-Christian happens to believe.

Dave wrote:

Instead of dealing with my statement that “one must first define what they mean by ‘evil’ given their espoused worldview and how that definition is meaningful” (i.e. have an epistemic basis for your assertion) before raising any moral complaint, you simply lay out the common form of the argument for the problem of evil.

Actually, no, that’s not what I did. What I did is lay out the relevant premises which Christianity affirms. Here they are again:

1. The god of Christianity is real and it is supposed to be all-good, all-powerful and wholly perfect;   

2. The universe (including everything within it) was created by the god of Christianity;   

3. Everything that happens in the universe is controlled by the god of Christianity;   

4. Evil and imperfection exist in the universe (i.e., in what the god of Christianity is said to have created).

The problem of evil is already evident right here in what Christianity affirms. This is not the non-believer’s problem. The non-believer may have other problems, but the non-believer (speaking for myself here) does not affirm the existence of a universe-creating, reality-controlling super-consciousness which calls all the shots and is supposedly capable of doing and creating only good. It is not the non-believer (again, speaking for myself here) who affirms the notion of “a morally sufficient reason for evil.” It is not my worldview which sanctions the use of evil to achieve desired ends. Christianity does this, not Objectivism. The problem of evil is certainly not a problem for the Objectivist worldview, since we do not grant metaphysical primacy to consciousness in the first place.

 

Dave wrote:

You do not interact at all with my challenge.

What exactly was Dave’s challenge? To provide a definition of ‘evil’? I did this. Was it to provide a context in which the concept of evil is meaningful? I have already done this. Was it to show how the problem of evil does not apply to my worldview? I have done this.

 

Dave wrote:

Now who’s making “apologetical manuvers”?

Answer: Dave is.

 

Dave wrote:

The form of the argument which you offer I have no quarrel with except of course, when you refer to the God of Christianity as an ‘It’. This is a blatant misrepresentation, Christian’s do not believe that God is an impersonal being but rather a ‘personal’ and ‘living’ God and although He does not possess reproductive organs, the Bible clearly defines God as male.

The word “it” is not a misrepresentation. In English, ‘it’ is the standard pronoun reserved for beings that are neither male nor female. The precondition for being either male or female is biological in nature. The Christian god is not supposed to be a biological organism. So it cannot be either male nor female. My reasons for using “it” to refer to the supernatural being which Dave and other Christians imagine may be offensive to them, but they will simply have to lump it. After all, Dave does not have to post his comments on my blog if he feels the god he imagines is being belittled somehow by the language he finds here.

 

Dave wrote:

Moving on however, your statement, “Thus the universe is supposed to have been created by an all-good, all-powerful [G]od which controls everything, and yet the universe is clearly saturated with evil and imperfection,” Shows no attempt to deal with Bahnsen’s answer, namely, that “God has a morally sufficient reason for the evil He foreordains”. In fact, at this point it has not even been mentioned.

The statement of mine which Dave quotes here was not intended to “deal with Bahnsen’s answer.” As Dave notes, I hadn’t even mentioned it yet. But I do deal explicitly with “Bahnsen’s answer” in the section following this quote.

What’s noteworthy is that Dave himself never mentioned “Bahnsen’s answer” to the problem of evil in his original comment about the matter (found here). Had I not brought it up, Dave may never have drawn attention to what Bahnsen has stated.

Dave wrote:

You then reply to my statement that ‘the problem of evil is not a problem for the believer but rather a problem for the unbeliever’ by saying that there is clearly an internal tension within Christianity on the problem of evil. But I would like to know where the ‘internal tension’ is so conspicuous?

The statement Dave makes here in the form of a question is autobiographical in nature: it reveals the shallowness of his understanding on these matters. If the problem of evil were not evident in what Christianity affirms, why have apologists for millennia (going back to the apostle Paul and earlier) struggled so hard to come up with solutions to it? Why does presuppositional theologian John Frame throw his hands up in defeat and state the following regarding the problem of evil? He writes (Apologetics to the Glory of God, pp. 150-151):

Is there an answer to the problem? That depends on what you mean by an answer. If you are seeking an explanation that will vindicate God's providence in every instance of evil, I certainly cannot supply that, and I doubt if anyone else can, either. Nor, I think, can we supply a totally satisfying theoretical reconciliation between divine sovereignty, goodness, and evil. The mystery of God's relation to evil is one that will, I am convinced, never be completely dissolved in this life, and I am not sure whether it will be in the next.

Notice that Frame does not endorse Bahnsen's "answer" to the problem of evil here. In fact, I don't think Frame's admission here can be reconciled with Bahnsen's attempted solution.

 

The problem of evil is generated by Christianity's own confessional affirmations. Christianity affirms that everything was created by the Christian god, that this god "controls whatsoever comes to pass" (Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, p. 160), that this god is all-good, all-powerful, all-knowing. Moreover, Christianity itself affirms that evil exists in the world. Even Bahnsen’s own “answer” to the problem of evil acknowledges this. And yet, the world is supposed, according to Christianity, to have been created by a perfect creator-god which is supposed to be all-good – i.e., everything it does – including everything it creates – is supposed to be good and only good. And yet, it created a world which, according to Christianity itself, is broiling in evil. There was so much evil in the world that the Christian god had to drown almost everyone with a global flood. (A lot of good that did!) All of human history, according to the Christian god, is said to be guided by the Christian god’s “plan” – right down to the number of hairs on everyone’s head. If Dave does not grasp the problem of evil in all this, I can only guess he’s not reading what has been explained to him.

 

Dave wrote:

Given the added premise offered by Bahnsen in reply to the problem of evil I don’t see why the problem of evil is a problem.

Dave’s blindness to the problem is no better a solution to the problem of evil’s than “Bahnsen’s answer.” I have critiqued “Bahnsen’s answer” in my post replying to Dave.

Dave wrote:

Consider the argument (1.) God is all-good. (2.) God is all-powerful . (3.) Evil exists. On these premises alone I can see how this seems inconsistent. However, if we add, as Bahnsen did, another premise (4.) God has a morally sufficient reason for the evil He foreordains or allows, the tension immediately melts away.

How so? Dave acts like premise (4) has some magic power that does not require explanation. Bahnsen did the same thing. Bahnsen nowhere even attempted to validate the notion of “a morally sufficient reason for the evil He foreordains or allows.” How can a “reason” for allowing evil be justifiably accepted as a “moral” reason? This is the challenge I raised against “Bahnsen’s answer,” but Dave seems oblivious to the problem.

Dave wrote:

In no way is there any logical violation or ‘tension’ if all four points are taken into account.

Here Dave tells us about himself and his worldview. He’s essentially saying that the moral is perfectly compatible with the choice to allow (and even “foreordain”) evil. This speaks to Dave’s understanding of what morality is. It also speaks to how Christianity informs morality.

Let's examine a case in point. Christians like to champion the anti-abortion cause. But according to what Christianity teaches, abortion could only be part of the Christian god’s “plan”: the Christian god has chosen to make the practice of aborting human pregnancies a part of human history. This was the Christian god's own choice; no one forced the Christian god to include abortion in its "plan" for human history. And yet, Christians act as though abortion were evil. But the Christian god has the ability and every opportunity to stop abortion. It even had the ability and opportunity to prevent it before the first abortion was ever performed. But abortion nonetheless happens in this world which the all-good, all-powerful god of Christianity is said to have created and continues to control. But Christians proclaim that abortion is morally unjustifiable. And yet, it’s all part of their god’s “plan”. Christians vilify abortion doctors for doing something that they've been predestined by the Christian god to do all along. The Christian god’s “plan” includes things that its worshipers proclaim as morally unjustifiable, something that is evil according to believers. Then Bahnsen comes along and says that his god has “a morally justifiable reason” for all this evil.

It’s bewildering that anyone could accept this (let alone propose it) as a solution to the problem of evil, but the only way one could accept it is by embracing a view of morality which is not inherently opposed to evil.

I’m glad these aren’t my problems!

Dave wrote:

You may not be persuaded by this argument but whether you are psychologically persuaded or not is intellectually irrelevant and does nothing to ‘invalidate’ the argument.

My criticisms of “Bahnsen’s answer” are not “psychological” in nature, as Bahnsen himself projected in his own follow-up remarks to it in Always Ready. My points against it are philosophical in nature. I will summarize a few of the essentials (though there is a lot more).

For one, Bahnsen nowhere attempts even to validate the very notion of “a morally sufficient reason to allow evil” to begin with. He simply asserts this notion and gives no explanation for how it could be meaningfully accepted as a conceptually solvent notion on its own.

Second, Bahnsen nowhere produces this “reason” which he calls “morally sufficient.” So we don’t know what it is that he is calling “a morally sufficient reason” which he says his god has for allowing and foreordaining evil. Bahnsen asserts that his god has such a reason, but we never get to see the reason and determine whether in fact it is “morally sufficient” for the task in question. Bahnsen himself even acknowledges that he does not know what this reason is, which means he affirms his evaluation that it is “morally sufficient” sight unseen.

Third, the very notion of “a morally sufficient reason” for allowing (let alone “foreordaining”) evil is a contradiction in terms. The purpose of morality is to equip man with the principles necessary for identifying, pursuing and preserving the good. On a rational understanding of morality, there can be no such thing as “a morally sufficient reason” for allowing evil. But this is what we find in Christianity: the Christian god routinely allows evil to happen, and since everything that happens, happens according to its “plan,” it actively foreordained all evil that has happened, that is happening now, and that will happen. The Christian god is clearly on cozy terms with evil. It is not anti-evil. And since it is not anti-evil, it cannot be said to be pro-good. That which is pro-good does not allow evil to happen (let alone “foreordain” it).

None of these criticisms are “psychological” in nature. Bahnsen (and now Dave) wants to call them “psychological” in order to dismiss them out-of-hand without attempting to defend the very notion of “a morally sufficient reason” for allowing evil in the first place (which Bahnsen never does!).

Dave wrote:

Granted, Bahnsen does not explicate his statement but I don’t believe he has to.

See? I rest my case. Bahnsen doesn’t have to explicate his statements, but everyone else has to. Somehow, Bahnsen gets a free pass.

Dave wrote:

The challenge from the problem of evil is that it attempts to show that there is logical inconsistency within the nature of God and since Bahnsen solves this “problem” by adding a fourth premise there is no need for further discussion since the “tension” has been quashed.

The logical inconsistency is internal to the entire Christian worldview. It stems from Christianity’s claims about a supernatural being which (a) we can only imagine, (b) is supposed to be all-good and all-powerful, (c) is supposed to have created the universe and everything within it, (d) govern all events that take place within the universe, and (e) condemns certain things and actions within the universe it allegedly created as utterly evil. Stating that this god then has “a morally sufficient reason” for evil can only mean that moral action is compatible with actions that allow and foreordain evil. By affirming such a notion as their “solution” to the problem of evil, Christians simply announce that their morality is not pro-good, not pro-value, not pro-human. But we know that already.

Ironically, what Bahnsen offers as his “solution” to the problem of evil can rightly be called “psychological” in nature, since (a) it provides no rational content in answer to the problem, and (b) it is geared toward putting the believer’s own anxieties about the problem of evil to rest.

Dave quoted Bahnsen:

"The problem of evil amounts to the charge that there is logical incoherence within the Christian outlook – regardless of how much evil there is in the universe, compared to how much goodness can be found. If Christianity is logically incoherent, no amount of positive, factual evidence can save its truth. The internal inconsistency would itself render Christian faith intellectually unacceptable, even granting there might be a great deal of indicators or evidence in our experience for the existence of goodness or for God, otherwise considered." (Always Ready. p.166.)

Of course, there is no “positive, factual evidence” on behalf of Christianity in the first place, so let’s get that out of the way. It’s like saying that I have “positive, factual evidence” for an invisible magic dragon which I imagine in my mind. What “positive, factual evidence” do I have for the existence of this thing that I imagine? Well, I could concoct all sorts of arguments for it, and like those proposed on behalf of the existence of the Christian god, one would have no alternative but to imagine the invisible magic being whose existence my arguments are supposed to prove. I could say that the invisible magic dragon explains everything in the world in a most tidy way. Hey, that works for William Lane Craig and the Christian god, why can’t it work for me and the invisible magic dragon that I imagine? Indeed, I still have no alternative but to imagine the god that William Lane Craig talks about.

But the problem of evil should not be difficult to understand. Christianity insists that everything that exists and happens finds its origin in the Christian god: it created everything that exists, and it “controls whatsoever comes to pass.” Nothing is exempt from the Christian god’s initiative in all this. And yet evil exists. So on this view the Christian god could be the only source of evil just as much as it could be the only source of rocks and dust. So given this, what could it possibly mean to call this god “all-good”? What does the concept “good” come to mean when it is applied to the source of evil? It’s cataclysmically worse than stepping on a piece of gum on a sidewalk and posting the sole of the shoe it got stuck on in an art gallery next to the Mona Lisa and calling it “a historical achievement in art.”

Dave quoted Bahnsen:

"Accordingly, it is crucial to the unbeliever’s case against Christianity to be in a position to assert that there is evil in the world"

This kind of maneuver (and yes, it is a maneuver) misses the point of the problem of evil, and only shows that Christianity’s defenders again fail to grasp fully the fact that the problem of evil is an internal critique. Christianity itself asserts that there is evil in the world. Christianity itself says its god is the source of everything in the world. Christianity itself says that its god is wholly good. One could suppose that, so far as he’s concerned, there is no such thing as evil, and yet observe the contradictions nestled deeply within Christianity’s own claims about its god and the world. This only suggests that Bahnsen is a very poor defender of Christianity. But how do you defend something that’s so wrong in the first place? Blank out.

Bahnsen continues:

“to point to something and have the right to evaluate it as an instance of evil.”

This is precisely what Christianity wants to deny men: the right to call evil what it is. But it requires men to accept the claim that its god is good. But how can one do this without having grasped the concept ‘good’ in the first place? And if one must be able to grasp the concept ‘good’ in order to accept the claim that something (e.g., the Christian god) is good, how can one do this without grasping what the good is distinguished from, i.e., evil?

This simply reveals the shallowness of the presuppositional apologetic. With its mind-numbing habit of continually dropping relevant contexts, it requires to both know and not know at the same time. One must know what good and evil are in order to know that the Christian god is good, and yet one is not supposed to know what good and evil are in order to recognize the obvious contradictions which result from the conjunction of Christianity’s own claims about its god and the world it is said to have created in its all-good, all-knowing, and all-powerful wisdom.

Bahnsen continues:

“If it should be the case that nothing evil exists or ever happens – that is, what people initially believe to be evil cannot reasonably be deemed “evil” – then there is nothing inconsistent with Christian theology which requires an answer.” (Ibid. p.167-168).

But if that were the case, we could not make sense of the claim that the Christian god is “good.” So Bahnsen dumps the baby out with the bath water in order to excuse his worldview’s contradictions.

Dave wrote:

Therefore in order for the Problem of evil to be a workable argument against Christianity, the onus is on the unbeliever to validate his belief in the existence of evil, that is he must show that his conception of evil is rationally coherent given his espoused worldview.

Again, Dave misses the fact that the problem of evil is an internal critique of the Christian worldview. It matters not what the non-believer’s worldview may affirm; his worldview might be wrong too. But inability to do something in one’s own worldview would not undo the contradictions in another. And yet, this is precisely the angle taken by apologists here. Again, Christianity itself affirms that evil exists. That’s sufficient for the problem of evil to plague Christianity internally.

Dave wrote:

what he considers to be ‘evil’ must be universally recognisable as evil and to do so requires a rationally coherent standard for morality.

Why does one need that whatever he considers to be evil to be “universally recognisable as evil”? This is an appeal to collective agreement, and as such is a symptom of the primacy of consciousness: “if everyone agrees that X is evil, then and only then can we say we have a rationally coherent standard of morality.” But rational morality is not premised on the primacy of consciousness. Of course, Christians have yet to grasp this fact.

Dave wrote:

However, you might say that whether the unbeliever can validate the existence of evil or not, the Christian certainly has a conception of evil and believes in the reality of evil in this world. Therefore the Christian still faces an inconsistency.

Give the man a cigar! It matters not what the non-believer can or cannot do, or what his worldview provides or fails to provide. The problem is internal to Christianity, flat and simple. It is good that Dave has finally come around on this. That’s progress.

 

It's very simple: if a worldview contains a contradiction within itself, that contradiction obtains regardless of what some other world does or does not do. What another worldview does or does not do is irrelevant; nothing that another worldview does will alter the fact that the contradiction obtains in the first one. This is what presuppositionalists seem to have a most difficult time grasping.

Dave wrote:

As we have noted already this inconsistency is immediately vanquished once we add the fourth premise: ‘God has a morally sufficient reason for the evil and suffering He ordains’.

This is false. The problem is not solved by such assertions. All we have here in Bahnsen’s “answer” is an evaluation without content: we are told that a reason is “good,” but we are not allowed to see what that reason is in order to confirm whether or not it is indeed good. It’s like piling up a rent bill for years and saying, “Yeah, I can pay it, don’t worry.” What Gertrude Stein said of Oakland fits here as well: “There’s no there there.” Moreover, as I have already point out above, Bahnsen’s “answer” simply means that whatever it is the Christian worldview means by “moral,” is on amiable terms with evil. This takes all the wind out of any expression of Christian outrage. Indeed, all that Bahnsen offers in his “answer” is a psychological palliative which is intended to put the believer’s own anxieties to rest.

Bahnsen himself confirms this when he writes:

We can find it emotionally very hard to have faith in God and trust His goodness and power when we are not give the reason why bad things happen to us and others. We instinctively think to ourselves, “Why did such a terrible thing occur?” Unbelievers internally cry out for an answer to such questions also. But God does not (indeed rarely) provide an explanation to human beings for the evil which they experience or observe. (Always Ready, p. 173)

This is what Bahnsen is seeking to put to rest: the anxiety in those believers who find Christianity’s answers to such questions as “Why did such a terrible thing occur?” unsatisfactory. Bahnsen’s concern is not to offer answers which enlighten the mind on a given matter, but to stop the mind from considering the matter any further. Reading between the lines, we might find something along the lines of the following:

“Don’t worry what the reason for this terrible thing might be; just rest assured that whatever reason God has, it is a morally sufficient reason for allowing and foreordaining evil. So don’t inquire any further. God does not owe you an explanation. You’re just supposed to obey and worship regardless of what you can and cannot understand.”

So when a jumbo jet crashes and kills all 224 people aboard; when a tsunami strikes a string of fishing villages dotting the coast of some Southeast Asian country and wipes out some 15,000 families; when evil men rise to political office; when a gunman takes out 22 high school students; when a suicide bomber blows up a city bus and kills 29 people along with himself, etc.: the believer is not supposed to question why these things happened any further than he can satisfy his anxieties about such expressions of evil in the world he is expected to believe was created by an all-good, all-powerful supernatural being which he can only imagine, with the notion that it has “a morally sufficient reason” for allowing such evil to obtain in its own creation. For all that the believer knows, the Christian god just might find that it “has a morally sufficient reason” to deny the believer entrance into heaven and thus condemn him to an eternity in hell. Indeed, how can the believer argue with “a morally sufficient reason” to do so?

Of course, it never seems to occur to Bahnsen and those suckered by his subterfuge that his “answer” implies that the Christian god has no morally sufficient reason to prevent all forms and expressions of evil. So the Christian god, in all its wisdom, can have “a morally sufficient reason to allow and foreordain evil,” but in all that wisdom it cannot find a morally sufficient reason to oppose and prevent all evil absolutely. That’s an “all-good, all-wise, all-powerful god,” Christian style. Some “absolute god” there!

Thus Bahnsen’s “answer” has no rational value whatsoever. On the contrary, given the importance of morality, it is philosophically corrosive at its very root.

Dave wrote:

Now as Bahnsen did not explain as to what possible ‘reason’ God would have for evil that is morally sufficient,

Actually, Bahnsen goes even farther than this. He tells us that we will never know what this “reason” is that he calls “morally sufficient.” Here Bahnsen quotes Deuteronomy 29:29, which states: “The secret things belong to the Lord our God.” But of course, if the “reason” which the Christian god supposedly has for allowing and foreordaining evil is a “secret,” then on what basis can one rightly say it is a “morally sufficient reason”? This is what Bahnsen ignores, and that’s no accident. Indeed, he nowhere even attempts to validate the notion of “a morally sufficient reason for allowing and foreordaining evil.”

Dave gave his own speculations on the matter:

I will offer a brief explination. The claim of Christianity is that God is a "personal" God, a God who determines to enter into fellowship with His creation in order that we may gain a greater knowledge of our Creator (Jn.17:3).

I.e., of a god which chooses to keep secrets from us (vis. Deut. 29:29), so that “we may gain a greater knowledge” of it? Yes, in fact, that tells us quite a bit about the Christian god: it will not explain its actions, and it insists that everyone blindly call whatever it does “morally justified,” even if it causes us to ask “Why did such a terrible thing occur?”

If its intention is “that we may gain a greater knowledge” of it, why not show itself to begin with and stop with the hide-and-seek games? Why not distinguish itself from something that believers have been imagining all along?

Dave wrote:

To do this God must reveal Himself to us, that is, His divine nature and holy character must be made manifest to man if he is to achieve this knowledge.

This of course has not happened. Instead of the Christian god revealing itself to us, we find human beings claiming that it has. There’s quite a difference there. Christianity and its defenses always reduce to claims made to us by human beings, many of whom being unwilling to acknowledge their own fallibility on such matters.

Dave wrote:

All of God’s divine attributes are therefore revealed.

Dave’s use of “therefore” here suggests that he thinks this logically follows from the previous statements. It doesn’t. It’s a non sequitur. If Dave’s god is merely imaginary, then it hasn’t revealed anything to anyone.

Also, by appealing to revelation, Dave is signifying that reason is not involved in discovering and validating any of this. Rather, reason is replaced by faith in revelations. Faith is hope in the imaginary. Revelation itself is imaginary. So faith in revelations is essentially hope in imaginary revelations. That can only mean that his worldview is necessarily irrational, since rationality is the commitment to reason as one's only source of knowledge, one's only standard of judgment and one's only guide to action. Appeal to revelations constitutes a rejection of reason.

Dave wrote:

Man would know nothing of mercy if all men were innocent creatures.

Why? How does Dave know this? He provides no basis for this whatsoever.

Dave wrote:

He wouldn’t know God’s wrath if God didn’t exercise it upon sinful and rebellious creatures, he would [not?] have knowledge of justice if there were no injustice.

Actually, I don’t accept this either. One can imagine the wrath of an invisible magic being that he imagines just as easily as he imagines the invisible magic being itself. Also, such an individual can interpret the world according to such imaginations, calling the downing of a passenger jet or the destruction of a tsunami an expression of that invisible magic being’s “wrath.”

But it is interesting that Dave resorts to this kind of reasoning here, when earlier he completely ignored it. Here he seems to be saying that man “would [not] have knowledge of justice if there were no injustice.” And yet above, we saw how presuppositionalism wants to say non-believers cannot raise the problem of evil against Christianity since we cannot define the concept of evil. Yet at the same time, we are supposed to accept the claim that the Christian god is “good.” But if we cannot know what justice is if we don’t know what injustice is, how can we know what good is if we don’t know what evil is?

Of course, all these concepts – justice, injustice, good, evil, etc. – lose all meaning once they are underwritten by Christianity’s irrational premises. Just as the concept ‘morality’ loses meaning when one proposes the notion of “a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil.”

Dave wrote:

The apostle Paul gives a more in depth presentation of this fact in his epistle to the Romans (Rom.9:19-23).

Here’s what Romans 9:19-23 states:

Thou wilt say then unto me, Why doth he yet find fault? For who hath resisted his will? Nay but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why hast thou made me thus? Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honour, and another unto dishonour? What if God, willing to shew his wrath, and to make his power known, endured with much longsuffering the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction: And that he might make known the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy, which he had afore prepared unto glory

Here we have an appeal to the cartoon universe premise of Christianity. This simply means that we’re all puppets performing according to the dictates of the master puppeteer. Thus Christianity’s talk of good vs. evil, justice vs. injustice, moral vs. immoral, is all a charade, nothing more.

Dave wrote:

Allow me to offer the following hypothesis. If for argument sake, the God of Christianity exists and all men are rebels against Him and spurn His every gracious will and desire and are therefore liable to divine justice. Would the substitutionary sacrifice of His only begotten Son on the cross be an evil act that had no morally sufficient purpose on God’s part?

If one accepts the premise that an invisible magic being to whose wishes reality automatically conforms, he could argue anything, including the notion that it impregnated its own mother and died in order to appease its own arbitrary rules concerning blood sacrifice. Accepting the arbitrary in premise opens the door to the arbitrary in practice.

Dave wrote:

No doubt that the act of crucifying a man who had committed no crime would be evil (2.Cor.5:21, Lk.23:4, 14) but what was God’s reason for ordaining this event? The Christian claim is that through this act God would save those who deserve His eternal wrath and instead give them eternal life by offering Christ to pay the penalty due unto them.

In other words, the end justifies the means.

Here we have a parent turning its back on its own child while he is being tortured and readied for execution. The parent knows that its child is guiltless, and yet it does nothing to intervene and rescue its own child from suffering and death. And we’re told that this parent is a “loving God.” This is a “love” that sacrifices its own ideals to the corruption of vicious persons. And what was the express purpose of this? Indeed, the purpose was to make possible the withholding of justice as such! As Dave puts it, to “save those who deserve His eternal wrath.” On the Christian view, people deserve death, but justice is gagged and thus has no say. Those who deserve death are allowed to live by making someone else pay the penalty. This is Christianity’s formula for the pursuit of the unearned. It has nothing to do with rational morality.

Dave wrote:

Now given your Objectivist theory on morality salvation and the means thereof, must be the ultimate expression moral good because it is conducive to a person’s life not just temporally but eternally!

I’m not sure what Dave was trying to say here for it is garbled beyond coherent comprehension. But if he is trying to make a commentary on the Objectivist ethics, he needs to do his homework.

I had written:

They must also concede that, according to their worldview, the Christian god provides the necessary preconditions for evil as well.

Dave concedes my point:

I agree, God must be the precondition for evil inasmuch as without the God of the bible evil could not be defined.

Which can only mean that there is no Christian answer to the problem of evil. The Christian god, which is said to be all-good, is the ultimate source of evil. Thus Bahnsen’s “answer” that his god “has a morally sufficient reason” for allowing and foreordaining evil, is merely a distraction – not for non-believers, but for believers who cannot psychologically cope with the implications of the Christian worldview’s teachings.

Dave wrote:

God is absolutely holy and righteous, “in Him there is no darkness at all” (1 Jn.1:5).

So the believer is to accept the view that a parent which chooses to stand idly by while its own child is being savagely tortured and executed, is “absolutely holy and righteous.” This can only be accepted on the premise of sacrificial ethics: the view of morality which holds that the sacrifice of values – not their achievement and preservation – is moral. Only on the basis of such a conception of morality could one come along and affirm the notion of “a morally sufficient reason” for allowing and foreordaining evil.

Dave wrote:

This is His fundamental character and evil is the very contradiction of that character.

And yet, Bahnsen (along with Dave) is telling us that this god’s character is such that it “has a morally sufficient reason for allowing and foreordaining evil.” In other words, going by what Dave states here, this god’s character is such that it “has a morally sufficient reason” for allowing and foreordaining that which is “the very contradiction” of its nature. Thus the Christian god, in terms of “moral character,” is on very cozy terms with that which is “the very contradiction of [its] character.” This is like saying one has a morally sufficient reason to replace food with poison when feeding people.

Folks like Dave really make it easy for me to remember how wonderful it is that Christianity is not my worldview!

Dave wrote:

If there was no absolute moral standard evil could not be defined or known, so in this sense God is the precondition for evil but not its creator.

The purpose of an absolute moral standard is not simply to define or know what evil is, but to teach man how to oppose and prevent evil absolutely. But if they worship a being which is said to have “a morally sufficient reason for allowing and foreordaining evil,” then they worship a being which is not prepared to oppose and prevent evil absolutely in terms of principle. And this is the key that’s missing from Christianity. Why is it missing? Because it attempts to build morality on an arbitrary basis: the whims of an invisible magic being imagined to be above the law and whose every action is supposed to be deemed “purely good” even if it results in the same kind of destruction that would result from wanton evil.

Dave wrote:

But how does the unbeliever understand evil? What standard does he use to distinguish between right and wrong? When posing an ethical judgment against another person what authority is the unbeliever appealing to which could justly validate his complaint? Surely the unbeliever believes that evil exists based upon his challenge to Christianity, but according to his worldview how can he account for the reality of evil?

These are all good questions. But Dave should understand that answers to these questions will vary from non-believer to non-believer (just as “answers” to the problem of evil have varied from believer to believer throughout history; not all defenders of Christianity would sign on with what Bahnsen has proposed). And this is because the answers to these questions have their genesis in philosophy, and there is a wide variety of philosophies out there, and most people have an implicit mix of various philosophies without any set of unifying principles. Of course, premising our understanding of moral concepts on the notion of things which are merely imaginary, will only render our moral concepts arbitrary. But this is what we find in Christianity, and it is true that many non-Christians have implicitly borrowed from Christianity’s model.

Dave wrote:

You then say that with regards to the problem of evil, “Any non-Christian’s view or lack of ability is irrelevant to the matter.” Wow, this is possibly the greatest example of an “apologetical maneuver” to date. By saying that the unbeliever’s views or lack of ability is irrelevant to the matter is purely an absurd statement. If you are raising a moral complaint against someone it is implicitly relevant for you to define your terms, what do you mean by the term “evil” and how do you define “existence?” If these terms cannot be made meaningful or intelligible then there is no more rational force to the argument. Given the same liberty the Christian could just as easily say “Any Christian’s view or lack of ability is irrelevant to the matter of the problem of evil.” So what if the Christian cannot account for God being both all-good and all-powerful and yet evil existing, if the atheist doesn’t need to account for his worldview why should the Christian? This is clearly prejudicial.

Here Dave errs (as so many Christians do) here by failing to properly understanding the nature of the problem of evil as it serves to undermine the Christian worldview. The problem of evil, at root, is not a “moral complaint” raised against Christianity on the basis of non-Christian premises. The problem of evil is an internal critique. Dave himself acknowledged the factors framing it as such above. Christianity affirms both horns of the contradiction identified by the problem of evil; the problem of evil merely identifies the contradiction.

Dave wrote:

You Finally begin to engage with Bahnsen’s answer to the problem of evil (i.e. “God has a morally sufficient reason for the suffering and evil that He foreordains”). You then comment that such a statement is not one which you have read in the bible. I’m not surprised there are possibly a lot of statements in the bible which you have not read.

The proper response to my observation that I have not read Bahnsen’s proposed “answer” to the problem of evil in the bible, is not to speculate on what else I might not have read in the bible (I haven’t found any passages on concept-formation, logic, the nature of induction, the square of opposition, the rules of inference, music theory, aerodynamics, etc., either), but to correct me if I’ve missed something that is in fact contained there. In other words, if the bible itself states that its god “has a morally sufficient reason” for evil, and Dave knows where it states this, he should provide a reference. That Dave does not, does not surprise me. In fact, it only confirms my observation.

Dave wrote:

Nevertheless, Bahnsen in no way shape or form contends that he is quoting from the bible when he says “God has a morally sufficient reason for the suffering and evil He foreordains.” This is rather an inference draw from the bible’s pervasive testimony of God’s righteous will. To take one example we have (Rom.8:28) “And we know that God causes all things to work together for good.”

Bahnsen claims to be giving a biblical defense against the problem of evil. And yet Bahnsen cannot find any passage in the bible suggesting that any reason for allowing and foreordaining evil can be “morally sufficient.” The notion of “morally sufficient” is absent from the bible. The passage which Dave cites here (Rom. 8:28) is just another psychological palliative intended to comfort the faithful. To the extent that it has any content, its only use is in citing the end to justify the means, nothing more.

Dave continued:

You then define your perspective or rather that of Ayn Rand, namely the “Objectivist” view of morality. You assert that “morality is a code of values which guides man’s choices and actions.” That “Objective morality is a moral code whose values are based on facts pertaining to man’s nature as a living organism that we discover by looking outward at reality.” So according to your view morality is a code of values which guides man’s choices and actions, as to why man is in need of such a code and to where he is being guided we are not told, it’s just asserted arbitrarily.

No, man’s need for morality is not “just asserted arbitrarily.” Consider the statement I made in my post responding to Dave:

Man faces a fundamental alternative – life vs. death – and life itself is conditional in nature: man must meet those requirements his life has in order to continue living. Since these requirements are factual in nature, an objective theory of morality must take them into account since morality as such is about guiding one’s choices and actions.

The fact that man faces a fundamental alternative – life vs. death – is a fact; citing this fact as a relevant concern to guiding man’s choices and actions is not arbitrary. “Arbitrary” means having no evidential basis and affirmed on the basis of one’s preferences. Man does not face a fundamental alternative because I prefer this. This is a fact that we observe about our nature and need to take into consideration if we want to live. We must act in order to live. We can choose to act, or we can choose not to act. If we choose to act, we can choose what actions we will take: to take those actions which promote our life, or to take those actions which work against our life. So our choices and actions have direct relevance to whether we live or die. Also, we need values to live. Because we face a fundamental alternative, our lives are conditional, and we must meet those conditions dictated by our nature as biological organism as to what those conditions are and how we should meet them. These are considerations for objective morality. That Christianity ignores these concerns only means that its “morality” is no objective.

Thus, because man faces a fundamental alternative, because his life is conditional, because he needs values in order to live, because he must act in order to achieve those values which his life needs, and because he must choose to act, he needs a code of values which guides his choices and actions. If Dave thinks this is “arbitrary,” no wonder he’s a Christian!

Dave wrote:

Moreover, how do we know that the codes of values are in themselves moral ones?

What is meant by “moral” here if it does not refer to a code of values? Dave apparently thinks the concept ‘moral’ can be applied as an evaluative descriptor without reference to values. But that’s Christianity: Christianity ignores values, their importance to life, and man’s need for them.

But to speak more generally to Dave’s question “How do we know?” Objectivism recommends that we always go with reason: we know these things by means of reason. Contrast this with what Christianity recommends in place of reason: faith in revelations – i.e., hoping in the imaginary. I’ll go with reason. Dave has apparently made his choice in favor of something else.

Dave wrote:

That is to say, upon what authority or by what standard to we distinguish between “good” codes and values and “evil” codes and values?

Objectivism answers this as follows: we distinguish good codes from evil codes on the basis of the axioms, the primacy of existence and the objective theory of concepts. In short, we go by facts, not by fantasy. I realize Christians find this quite unsettling.

Dave wrote:

Just asserting things with no validation is the same complaint you raised against Bahnsen and yet you hypocritically do the same thing.

How have I affirmed something without validation? I pointed explicitly to the conditional nature of man’s existence, the fact that he faces a fundamental alternative between life and death, the fact that he needs values in order to live, etc.

Dave wrote:

You say that moral codes and values are based on “facts” pertaining to man’s nature as a living organism that we discover looking outwardly at reality. I believe you are suggesting that moral values are a part of man’s nature which we deduce by looking outwardly at reality.

Man’s nature as a biological organism possessing the conceptual level of consciousness determines what he needs in order to live, i.e., the values he must pursue in order to satisfy his requirements for living. We discover what values we need, not by looking inward, consulting our feelings, imagination, wishes, preferences, etc., and calling them “revelations” from the beyond, but by looking outward at reality, including at ourselves as biological organisms and recognizing the conditionality of our natures.

Dave wrote:

Does everyone have the same codes and values?

Generally speaking, yes: we all need to eat, we all need to drink water, we all need to shelter ourselves against the elements, we all need an incentive to continue living, etc. And everyone I have met everywhere I have traveled on the globe, people pursue these values.

Dave asked:

If so, how do you know this?

By means of reason, of course.

Dave wrote:

Or are they relative to each individual’s interpretation of reality?

Suppose two people are hungry. Both of them need food in order to live. One of them finds an apple tree and eats a couple apples. His hunger is satisfied. But the other finds a bush with poisonous berries. If he eats that, what will happen? Will the consequences of his action depend on his interpretation of reality? The primacy of existence says no: the poison will be introduced into his system and take its effect regardless of what he thinks, believes, prefers, imagines, wishes, hopes, etc. That’s the primacy of existence. Why is it so difficult for theists to grasp this fundamental principle?

Dave asked:

And what exactly is reality?

Reality is the realm of existence. It exists and is what it is independent of anyone’s conscious activity (cf. the primacy of existence). Contrast this with the Christian view: reality is a creation whipped into being by the whims of an invisible magic being which the believer can only imagine (i.e., he can only “know” it by looking inward; he does not discover his god by looking outward).

Dave asked:

What method (i.e. epistemology) “ought” one adopt to know what is real and why?

Reason, of course.

Dave wrote:

Should we use empiricism, rationalism, existantionalism or pragmatism?

All these “isms” that Dave lists here have been defined in a variety of ways by different thinkers, so I do not suggest that we use them as though they had stable denotations. By reason, I mean the faculty which identifies and integrates the material provided by the senses. We do this (identify and integrate what we perceive) by means of concepts.

Dave wrote:

These questions haven’t been honestly considered.

I can only suppose that Dave is speaking for himself here; in that case, I suggest he start considering them honestly.

Dave wrote:

People do not interpret the world in the same way; their interpretation of reality is determined by their underlying pressuppositions.

That’s why we need the primacy of existence. If one approaches questions about the nature of reality with the “presupposition” that wishing makes it so, for example, his “interpretation” of reality will differ fundamentally from the “interpretation” of someone who explicitly recognizes the fact that existence exists independent of conscious activity (cf. Objectivism).

Dave wrote:

Everybody has presuppositions;

So, in terms of metaphysical primacy, what are Dave’s “presuppositions”? Does he explicitly recognize the primacy of existence, or does he grant metaphysical primacy to some form of consciousness to whose whims and dictates reality allegedly conforms? Does Dave’s worldview provide a fundamental principle by which he can reliably distinguish between the real and the imaginary? Or, on his view, is the imaginary just as real as the real? If he has such a principle, what is it and where did he get it?

Dave wrote:

in fact in order to study the “outward reality” one must rely solely upon the fundamental assumption that there is uniformity and regularity in nature.

How could we have this “assumption” about nature if we did not discover it by looking outward? Does Dave think that nature conforms to his “presuppositions”? Or, does he think that his “presuppositions” should be based on and should correspond to nature?

Dave wrote:

Without order in the universe one would have no basis or grounds for projecting past experiences into future experiences.

Is this something Dave discovered by looking outward at reality, or by looking inward and consulting his imagination, his feelings, his wishes, his preferences, etc.? Or, does he not know how he discovered this in the first place? How exactly does his worldview address questions pertaining to the relationship between reality and consciousness? On his view, does reality conform to consciousness? Or does reality exist independent of consciousness? Or, has he never considered these fundamental matters in such explicit terms before?

Dave wrote:

But how exactly can you account for the uniformity in nature?

I suppose how one should answer this depends on what is meant by “account for” here. In my view, nature is not caused by something beyond itself; I reject the view that nature is the result of some form of conscious activity. Also, I do not hold that nature’s uniformity with itself is the product of conscious activity either. If nature is uniform, it is uniform independent of anyone’s conscious activity (whether that activity is wishing, preferring, emoting, hoping, praying, imagining, etc.). Since to exist is to be something specific, the uniformity of nature is essentially the concurrence of identity with existence: wherever things exist, those things have identity, they are themselves, and they are so independent of conscious activity. The task of consciousness is not to create and alter reality according to its internal content, but to perceive and identify reality and assemble contents based on what is discovered in reality by looking outward. If Dave is honestly interested in my views on these matters, I have already addressed these matters here.

Dave asked:

Is it just that way, in which case will it be just that way tomorrow?

The future is nothing more than the continuation of existence from the present. Concepts of time – including the concepts ‘past’, ‘present’ and ‘future’ – presuppose the fact that existence exists. Thus to entertain questions about future activity, necessarily presuppose existence and identity, including the identity of action.

Dave asked:

And if so, on what basis do you believe that?

On the basis of the axioms, the primacy of existence and the objective theory of concepts.

Dave wrote:

Since no one has experienced the future empirically and since empirical observation is said to be the ultimate standard for truth as proposed by Ayn Rand, you have no way of verifying or even having confidence that order in the universe will be present in the future, in which case you have no rational grounds to engage in scientific investigation given your view of reality..

This is a most naïve understanding of what Objectivism affirms on these matters. Where does Rand say that “empirical observation is said to be the ultimate standard for truth,” and what exactly does that mean? Objectivism has a theory of concepts. This means that our knowledge is not bound to the perceptual level of awareness. We are able to form concepts on the basis of what we perceive and draw implications from those concepts. That’s called logic.

The notion that the universe will not be present in the future is incoherent. As pointed out above, the concept ‘future’ presupposes existence and identity. The universe is the sum total of that which exists. Existence does not presuppose time; on the contrary, time presupposes existence.

How does the Christian know that the universe will be present in the future? Indeed, his worldview teaches that the god which created it will wipe it out one day. They even have a name for it – the apocalypse. You can read about it in the drug-induced hysteria known as the Book of Revelation. It’s all visions and imaginings penned as though it were from the mouth of an invisible magic being (which has no mouth or other body parts to begin with). So this is a Christian problem. It’s certainly not my problem.

Dave asked:

You use the term “objective morality” and of course I agree morality is objective, it does not depend on man for its existence but how do you validate an objective standard of morality in an atheist world?

Well, for one thing, I do not validate objective morality by appealing to an invisible magic being which I can only imagine and saying that it “revealed” its moral code for man in a series of “thou shalts” and “thou shalt nots,” which do nothing to teach people to think for themselves in terms of moral principles.

Rather, I use reason to validate things like morality. What does “objective” mean? Objective does not mean “does not depend on man for its existence.” Rather, it means guided by the primacy of existence. Remember the view that wishing doesn’t make it so?

Dave asked:

Do you mean that morality is a product of the natural world?

Since to be objective, morality must have its basis in facts which we discover by looking outward (as opposed to fantasies, emotions, hopes, preferences, etc., which we find by looking inward). Thus nature determines what kinds of actions are moral and which kinds are not. There is no is-ought dichotomy here since value is a type of fact. Objective morality is not informed by categorical imperatives (e.g., “thou shalt” and “thou shalt not”) but by hypothetical imperatives – e.g., if you want to live, you should take those actions which make living possible. The purpose of objective morality is to teach man, not to suffer and die (like a Jesus), but to live and enjoy life. Do you want to live and enjoy life? Then Objectivism is for you. Do you want to suffer and die like Jesus? Then Christianity’s subectivist ethics of sacrifice is for you.

Dave asked:

If so, shouldn’t we then based of the evolutionary model, expect morality to change over time just like nature?

Evolution is not a philosophy. Nor is the theory of evolution the basis of morality. Man’s nature, his requirements for living, the facts pertaining to his life’s conditions, are the metaphysical basis of morality. If man somehow evolved such that he did not need values in order to exist – just as a rock does not need to do anything in order to continue being a rock – he would no longer need morality. But this hasn’t happened. We deal with facts, not fantasized alternatives to facts.

Dave asked:

How could anything be considered absolutely immoral based on this proposition?

Based on the god proposition, nothing could be considered absolutely immoral, for on such a view everything that happens, happens according to a god’s “plan,” and that god is said to have “a morally sufficient reason for allowing and foreordaining evil.”

But if morality is based on facts relevant to man’s life requirements, then we have a standard on which to apply moral judgment.

Dave wrote:

What’s evil today may be good tomorrow right?

This statement describes Christianity, not Objectivism. I wrote:

The good is that which furthers a rational individuals life by meeting his life needs and providing an incentive for continuing the effort living requires of him.

Dave reacted:

What you are advocating is that “good” is that which achieves a certain end, in this case the end achieved if the furtherance of a rational individuals life.

Something good can be that which moves one towards and end, or an end in itself. Pleasure, for example, is a good as an end in itself since it provides incentive for continuing life. What I am advocating is a morality based on facts relevant to man’s life needs, a morality that is pro-values, not anti-values, a morality which teaches man to pursue and achieve those values which further his life as opposed to a morality which insists that man sacrifice his values on command (cf. Abraham and Isaac, Jesus Christ, etc.).

Dave wrote:

However when you say “good” is that which is conducive to the furtherance of life you are already assuming that the furtherance of life is itself good. How do you know that the furtherance of life is an end worth achieving?

Since the basis of objective morality is factual in nature, and the facts which inform objective morality are facts pertaining to man’s life needs, life is the standard of value. The alternative to life is death. For worldviews which urge men to sacrifice their values on command (e.g., Abraham and Isaac, Jesus Christ), the standard is not life, but death. Death was the end that Jesus came to earth for. He came expressly to suffer and die, not to live and enjoy life.

Dave asked:

How do you validate the end which you have proposed?

Well, certainly not by appealing to an invisible magic being which I can only imagine. That’s for sure. How do I validate life as the proper end of moral action? That should not be so difficult to figure out. Remember that morality is a code of values which guides man’s actions. Values are those things which man requires to live. Thus values are distinguished by their pro-life orientation to human nature. Since man must act in order to live (he will not continue living if he takes no action whatsoever), he must act in a manner that results in pro-life consequences. Thus life is the proper end of such action – i.e., of moral action. Again, these are all facts. Death is the end of inaction or irrational action.

Dave interjected:

This is a completely arbitrary assertion; it would be just as plausible to say that good is that which destroys a rational individual’s life.

Thus saith the Christian in our midst: Life is arbitrary, facts are arbitrary, values are arbitrary, the good is arbitrary, etc. This is Christianity speaking.

Dave wrote:

Unless you can make your asserted end meaningful all you do is you posit an irrational basis for morality.

Meaning is a property of concepts and symbols. My life is an actual concrete. If my moral code is successful in teaching me to live and enjoy my life, how is it irrational? What possibly could a Christian even mean by “irrational”? Rationality is the chosen commitment to reason as one’s only source of knowledge, his only standard of judgment, his only guide to action. Thus a rational form of morality must be one that is based on reason – i.e., on the facts which we discover in the world by looking outward. Dave seems anxious simply to dismiss any alternative to Christianity as “irrational” without being very concerned about the content he is condemning. How is a morality based on facts as they are discovered by means of reason “irrational”? Dave does not explain. He simply throws it out there in a most typical Christian unthinking way.

Dave wrote:

You say “man faces a fundamental alternative- life vs. death, if so, “how ought man make his decision? On what basis does he choose life over death or is it merely assumed that man should choose life?

No, it is not assumed that man should choose life. But morality does not apply at this point: morality only applies once one has made the choice to live. If one chooses to die, then he does not need morality. Morality is for the living, not for the dead. Morality is for those who choose to live, not for those who choose to die. As for why choose to live? Each individual must make this choice for himself. No one can for this choice on another.

Now consider, if I supposed that there were an invisible magic being and I worshiped it, and I wanted to spend all eternity with it, and I thought that this is what would happen once I died, why would I choose to live? This life, according to Christians, is but a vapor. Here one minute, gone the next, and its only importance is in reference to the eternity fated to everyone according to the whims of the ruling consciousness. But seriously, why would anyone who truly believes what the Christian worldview teaches, go to all the trouble of trying to live, when the alternative to life – i.e., death – is counted as “gain” according to the apostle Paul and “paradise” according to what Jesus supposedly promised one of the malefactors crucified with him? Why not just die and go to your maker, and you’ll exist in bliss for all eternity? However Christians answer this, it always amounts to some kind of point-missing rationalization. E.g., they might say that their god has “work” for them to do while on earth. But this does not explain why they choose to live. It only tells us what they will do while they live (and it doesn’t say much on that score, either). Besides, the Christian god can always find someone else to do its work, or it could do its own work itself. Moreover, the notion that “there’s still work to do” suggests a present state of imperfection. But we’re told that the Christian god is a perfect creator. But if it does not create things already perfect, then it’s not a perfect creator. If there’s still work to be done, then a state of perfection does not obtain. On the contrary, we have a state of incompletion. That’s not perfect.

Dave wrote:

But if man is nothing more than a bag of chemical biological stuff subject to the laws of nature, then what “right” does he have to live?

I can always tell when a Christian is on the ropes when he pulls out the bag-of-chemicals locution. It’s all he has going for him. It’s as though he does not know what man is. Even worse, he does not know what an entity is. He does not know what identity is. A is A. Which means: Man is man. He is everything that he is, nothing less, nothing more. Man is an integration of matter and consciousness. The notion of a “bag of chemicals” ignores the fact that man is a conscious organism. My worldview does not teach that we do not have consciousness, nor does my worldview mischaracterize the nature of man’s consciousness. But Christianity does. My worldview denies nothing about the nature of man, but Christianity urges its followers to deny themselves.

Dave asked:

Where does man get his sense of dignity from if he is no different than any other chemical which we might find in the chemistry lab for example?

Is this supposed to be a serious question? Who thinks that man is a chemical to begin with?

Dave wrote:

Based on this arbitrary assertion you begin to say that man’s “life needs” are “independent of any conscious activity on man’s part, which means that he must discover them by means of an objective method of acquiring and validating knowledge – i.e., by means of reason.” But if man has to first choose between life and death, life being arbitrarily essential on your view, then is his decision a conscious one?

I notice several characterizations of “arbitrary” here, but without any clarity as to what those references are intended to correspond to. Moreover, it appears that Dave thinks merely choosing something renders it arbitrary. But this would render everything in Christianity arbitrary, for everything according to Christianity is supposed to be a result of the Christian god’s unconstrained “will.”

As for what specifically Dave is asking here, it’s simply unclear. It seems he’s simply trying to camouflage his unargued accusations of arbitrariness in the form of a question.

Dave wrote:

And What exactly is a “life need?”

Is this really so hard? Food is an example of a life need. Life needs are those things needed in order to live. Does Dave take the same magnifying glass to what he reads in the bible?

Dave wrote:

does every one have the same life needs?

Generally speaking, yes, we all do, since we’re all biological organisms. We all need food, for example. Does Dave know of any exceptions to this?

Dave asked:

If so, how do you know this?

Easy, by means of reason.

Dave asked:

how do you know that life needs are independent of any conscious activity?

Again, I know this by means of reason. Our life needs are facts about our nature. I can wish that I don’t need food in order to live, but reality does not conform to my wishing. Nor does reality conform to other types of conscious activity, such as hoping, prayer, imagining, prayer, dreaming, etc. So again, I go with the primacy of existence.

Dave asked:

Is reason a life need?

Of course!

Dave asked:

And if so, is reason devoid of conscious activity?

The concept ‘reason’ does not denote a living organism. Rather, it denotes a faculty available to men. And no, its nature does not conform to anyone’s wishes, imagination, preferences, prayers, hopes, dreams, etc. The nature of reason is entirely consistent and compatible with the primacy of existence.

Dave wrote:

These statements are just asserted without any rational basis.

Dave’s statement is just asserted without any rational basis.

Dave wrote:

You say that man “must” discover his life needs, but this is only the case if again, man first chooses to live instead of die but on what rational grounds should man make his choice without being arbitrary?

“Arbitrary” does not mean “chosen.” One can choose to live without his choice to live itself being arbitrary. Arbitrariness is abandonment of the primacy of existence. The choice to live is compatible with the primacy of existence.

Dave wrote:

You then claim that an objective method for discovering truth is by means of reason. “objectivism affirms the only objective standard for this: rationality.” I take it then that you believe in logical absolutes. But what is the nature of logic?

Logic is the application of the law of identity to the task of identification. As Rand put it, logic is the art of non-contradictory identification. Identification is a conceptual task. Also, logic is conceptual in nature – i.e., it is applied conceptually. I have explained this on my blog and my website – it should not be difficult to find this if you’re truly interested. We could not have logic – nor would we need it – if we did not have the ability to form concepts.

Dave wrote:

Is it material or immaterial?

Logic is conceptual. Is the invisible magic dragon I imagine in my backyard material or immaterial? Will Dave answer this?

Dave wrote:

Are logical absolutes universal and law like or simply conventions?

Universality is a property of concepts, as I explain in my blog Demystifying Universality. It is because logic is conceptual in nature that logic applies universally. But I realize that all this is presently beyond Dave’s understanding.

Dave wrote:

If they are absolute truths then they are transcendent if they are conventions they are relative and non-law like.

If by “transcendent” Dave really means some association with “the supernatural,” then no, I’m afraid he’s completely wrong. The laws of logic denote general truths whose basis are facts that obtain in this world. There are facts in this world which do not change, for example: the fact that existence exists. This fact does not change. The fact that there is a fundamental distinction between the subject of consciousness and the object of consciousness does not change. The fact that to exist is to be something does not change. These are the axioms. The laws of logic find their basis in the axioms. Why not recognize these facts at the very basis of one’s worldview explicitly, and allow them to shape one’s worldview going forward? Why start with something that is merely imaginary and then try to finagle everything in one’s worldview to appear as though everything stemmed from there? Why not be honest to reality instead of embracing what is merely a fantasy? Dave has a lot of thinking to do.

Dave wrote:

To say that they are objective truths compels one to account for their objectivity, how does one know that they will be objective truths tomorrow?

Objectivity is the application of the primacy of existence to discovering, validating and applying knowledge. Does Dave understand what the primacy of existence is? I’m guessing this is new to him. He should do some more research and discover what it means. I have explained it countless times in my writings. Consider the question: Does wishing make it so? The primacy of consciousness says yes: reality conforms to conscious activity. The primacy of existence says no: existence exists and is what it is independent of conscious activity. If Dave understands that wishing does not make it so, then he has the beginnings of the necessary basis to understand why Christianity is not only false, but irrational and subjective. The problem is that he is confessionally invested in his Christian faith, lost in the imaginary, and enshrining a fantasy as the standard for his life. It is entirely irrational. Dave, it’s time to come out of the cave.

Dave wrote:

You simply assume their objectiveness in order to argue for their objectiveness, a clear case of begging the question.

If Dave can show where in my writings that I have sought to establish a truth using a viciously circular argument, he needs to restate the offending passage and explain why it is fallacious. But clearly Dave has not read very much of my writings, but is rather reacting emotionally and reaching for anything that might stick. It doesn’t work.

Dave wrote:

What “rational” argument could you have to validate “reason” without first assuming the reality of reason as your staring point?

Validation is broader than proof. Validating an observation, for example, might not require one to produce an argument, but rather simply point to the facts which inform the observation in question. At that point, other observers can respond: “Oh, I see it now. Now I understand.” We begin with the fact that existence exists. Do you perceive anything? If you do, you’re perceiving existence. Do you identify anything you are perceiving? Such as a table, a chair, a dog, a feather, a pen, a coffee cup, a book? Then you’re using reason. Reason is validated with the formation of the first concept, for reason is the faculty which identifies and integrates the material provided by the senses. See, there’s no question-begging or other fallacies going on here. Of course, we should remember that we will not learn about reason and its mechanics from the bible. The bible requires the believer to blur the fundamental distinction between reality and imagination.

Dave wrote:

In the end, you have not demonstrated a rational ground for your philosophy, you have only demonstrated classic cases of arbitrariness, subjectivism, and logically fallacious argumentation.

So says Dave, a Christian, who has yet to prove the existence of his god, who has yet to explain how we can reliably distinguish between what he calls “God” and what he may merely be imagining, who has yet to tell us whether the imaginary is material or immaterial. The basis of my worldview is the fact that existence exists. If existence exists, then my worldview is off to a good start. If Dave does not grasp this, the deficiency is all his. I encourage him to seek enlightenment. He’s come to the right place for that.

Dave wrote:

The problem of evil for the unbeliever is not seriously considered in your reply; you seem to throw out a lot of challenges but are unprepared to evaluate the conspicuous inconsistencies in your own world view.

I have already addressed the problem of evil from my own perspective. Dave has yet to bring forth a worthy challenge to The Moral Code of Life (which I cited in my reply to Dave, but with which he has not directly interacted).

Dave wrote:

You borrow presuppositions from the Christian worldview e.g. logical absolutes and objective morality, which can only make rational sense in a Christian worldview and apply them to your own demonstrating that your worldview cannot account for such presuppositions rendering your world view as logically inconsistent.

Actually, Christianity has borrowed the notions of “logical absolutes” and “objective morality” from secular philosophies; you will find no mention of these things in the bible – such concepts are foreign to what the bible has to say, not only in terms of its underlying narrative, but also in terms of its underlying philosophical spirit. The bible is clear that the believer is not to guide himself either by logic or a clearly laid-out moral code which he can apply using his own understanding. On the contrary, the bible is clear in that it requires believers simply to lay down their lives, to sacrifice themselves (including most importantly their intellect) and pretend that what they are told is true (i.e., “just believe”). They are to obey, not to think. If you want to govern your life simply by obeying someone you believe is in authority because he can harm you, then Christianity is all for you. If you want to think for yourself, then obeying authority figures unquestioningly is anathema to what you should have as your philosophical model.

Christianity’s ultimate “presupposition” is the primacy of consciousness – cf. “wishing makes it so.” There’s nothing objective about this, since the subject of consciousness holds metaphysical primacy over its objects, hence subjectivism. A supernatural consciousness can say “Rain today,” and voilá, today it’s raining, all because the supernatural consciousness wishes that it rain. There can be nothing objective in a worldview when its basis is overtly subjective in nature, as it is in Christianity. Moreover, there is nothing beyond the subject-object relationship that could be called “absolute” under such a “presupposition,” for any object you find in reality can be one thing one moment, and something entirely different the next, simply because the ruling consciousness wishes it – for on Christianity’s ultimate “presupposition,” all objects originate in and conform to the ruling consciousness’ wishing. The substance in the waterpots might be water one moment, but magically turned into wine the next, all because the ruling consciousness made a wise (cf. John ch. 2). Christianity is all about wish-making. Consider prayer: you are unhappy, your friend is sick, your mother needs extra cash, etc. Just pray to the ruling consciousness – i.e., make a wish. That’s what Dave’s worldview is all about. And he says my worldview is “subjective”? Truly he needs to come out of his cave and re-think a lot of things.

by Dawson Bethrick