Hello my readers.
Happy 2555 to all!
Yes, here in Thailand, it’s not 2012. Thailand goes by a version of the Buddhist calendar, and it’s already the year 2555 here. Perhaps you could think of me as writing to you from the future.
As I predicted in earlier messages to you on my blog, I’ve been busier than Wall Street on a bull rally since getting back to Bangkok late November. The flood waters are for the most part gone, and life for most people is back to normal. But there’s a sense of urgency to make up for lost time, both in the private sector and also in public works. Schools are even going six days a week here, which means my daughter, who’s only in kindergarten, has a brutal schedule to keep.
Happy 2555 to all!
Yes, here in Thailand, it’s not 2012. Thailand goes by a version of the Buddhist calendar, and it’s already the year 2555 here. Perhaps you could think of me as writing to you from the future.
As I predicted in earlier messages to you on my blog, I’ve been busier than Wall Street on a bull rally since getting back to Bangkok late November. The flood waters are for the most part gone, and life for most people is back to normal. But there’s a sense of urgency to make up for lost time, both in the private sector and also in public works. Schools are even going six days a week here, which means my daughter, who’s only in kindergarten, has a brutal schedule to keep.
Unfortunately, that means I haven’t been able to keep up with my blog. I see that Nide is still going at it, and that Justin Hall and Ydemoc are continuing to engage him. They’re all welcome to continue doing so. I’m sure it will all make for some interesting reading one day, supposing I get the time.
In the meanwhile, I’ve been feasting – really, nibbling and grazing, when opportunity arises – on a paper recently published by James Anderson and Greg Welty called The Lord of Non-Contradiction: An Argument for God from Logic. In this paper, the authors set out to “argue for a substantive metaphysical relationship between the laws of logic and the existence of God” (p. 1). Specifically they aim to prove “that there are laws of logic because God exists,” that “there are laws of logic only because God exists” (Ibid.). Presumably this is the Christian god of the New Testament whose existence their argument will finally prove. They say of their own argument that it is “a fascinating and powerful but neglected argument for the existence of God.” Of course, this is not meant to be self-congratulatory, but rather a device intended to hook the reader’s interest so that he’ll continue on for the next twenty-plus pages of fun-filled reading. (I’m guessing that, for Sye Ten Bruggencate, 22 pages devoted to the development of a single argument does not constitute “argumentum ad verbosium,” since it’s intended to establish, once and for all, the existence of a deity.)
After an introduction, the paper is divided into the following sections which function essentially as steps to the paper’s desired conclusion, namely that a god exists:
1. The Laws of Logic are Truths2. The Laws of Logic are Truths about Truths3. The Laws of Logic are Necessary Truths4. The Laws of Logic Really Exist5. The Laws of Logic Necessarily Exist6. The Laws of Logic are Non-Physical7. The Laws of Logic are Thoughts8. The Laws of Logic are Divine Thoughts
While there’s nothing that I saw in Anderson and Welty’s presentation which challenges my own exploration of the question of whether or not logic presupposes the Christian god, it is gratifying to see an argument from logic to the existence of a god so nicely and systematically laid out. Anderson and Welty have been hard at work in their effort to prove that their god exists.
While I have not had the time I need to develop a full response to every point which Anderson and Welty raise in their piece, I did have some initial general concerns when I peruse their work. Of course, I have many, many objections to much of what I have read in their paper, but a more penetrating analysis of their paper will have to wait till another time.
For now, I just wanted to note some of the following concerns of mine, hopefully to get the discussion moving in the right direction.
1. Necessary vs. Contingent: Throughout their paper, Anderson and Welty clearly take the necessary-contingent dichotomy for granted. This distinction (dichotomy) plays a central role in the build-up to their desired conclusion (I found 20 instances of the word ‘necessary’ and 16 instance of the word ‘contingent’, most of which are used in the context of the necessary-contingent dichotomy, throughout their paper). So granting the truth of the necessary-contingent dichotomy appears to be vital to their conclusion. But if this dichotomy is rejected, how could one accept their paper’s conclusion as they have set out to draw it?
Objectivism rejects the necessary-contingent dichotomy, and for many good reasons. Leonard Peikoff, in his essay “The Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy,” spells out those reasons, fundamentally arguing that the dichotomy and all its variants (including the necessary-contingent dichotomy) rest on a false theory of concepts. Given this fact, it is not surprising to find Christians making use of the necessary-contingent dichotomy in their theistic arguments, for Christianity itself (as I’ve pointed out numerous times before; see for instance here) has no native theory of concepts, and thus as a worldview cannot account for conceptual awareness. This can only mean, with regard to the necessary-contingent dichotomy, that Christian thinkers are at a profound disadvantage when it comes to detecting the epistemological defects of this commonly accepted mechanism of analyzing knowledge.
What struck me specifically in Anderson and Welty’s paper is the fact that they seek to establish the laws of logic as “necessarily existent” on the one hand, and as “thoughts” on the other (see points 3 and 7 of their paper’s outline above). Assuming the necessary-contingent dichotomy which underwrites much of Anderson and Welty’s methodology, these two premises seem quite at odds with one another. Something that is “necessarily existent” is something that could not have failed to exist. Anderson and Welty make the first point explicitly when they say:
While I have not had the time I need to develop a full response to every point which Anderson and Welty raise in their piece, I did have some initial general concerns when I peruse their work. Of course, I have many, many objections to much of what I have read in their paper, but a more penetrating analysis of their paper will have to wait till another time.
For now, I just wanted to note some of the following concerns of mine, hopefully to get the discussion moving in the right direction.
1. Necessary vs. Contingent: Throughout their paper, Anderson and Welty clearly take the necessary-contingent dichotomy for granted. This distinction (dichotomy) plays a central role in the build-up to their desired conclusion (I found 20 instances of the word ‘necessary’ and 16 instance of the word ‘contingent’, most of which are used in the context of the necessary-contingent dichotomy, throughout their paper). So granting the truth of the necessary-contingent dichotomy appears to be vital to their conclusion. But if this dichotomy is rejected, how could one accept their paper’s conclusion as they have set out to draw it?
Objectivism rejects the necessary-contingent dichotomy, and for many good reasons. Leonard Peikoff, in his essay “The Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy,” spells out those reasons, fundamentally arguing that the dichotomy and all its variants (including the necessary-contingent dichotomy) rest on a false theory of concepts. Given this fact, it is not surprising to find Christians making use of the necessary-contingent dichotomy in their theistic arguments, for Christianity itself (as I’ve pointed out numerous times before; see for instance here) has no native theory of concepts, and thus as a worldview cannot account for conceptual awareness. This can only mean, with regard to the necessary-contingent dichotomy, that Christian thinkers are at a profound disadvantage when it comes to detecting the epistemological defects of this commonly accepted mechanism of analyzing knowledge.
What struck me specifically in Anderson and Welty’s paper is the fact that they seek to establish the laws of logic as “necessarily existent” on the one hand, and as “thoughts” on the other (see points 3 and 7 of their paper’s outline above). Assuming the necessary-contingent dichotomy which underwrites much of Anderson and Welty’s methodology, these two premises seem quite at odds with one another. Something that is “necessarily existent” is something that could not have failed to exist. Anderson and Welty make the first point explicitly when they say:
The Law of Non-Contradiction… could not have failed to exist—otherwise it could have failed to be true. (p. 19)
So the Law of Non-Contradiction must be something that is “necessarily existent.”
They proceed to argue that “If the laws of logic are necessarily existent thoughts, they can only be the thoughts of a necessarily existent mind” (Ibid.). Anderson and Welty argue, in their characteristic way, that the laws of logic are “necessarily existent” and also that they are also “thoughts,” but arguing that something is a “necessarily existent thought” seems to go beyond even the most generous charitableness. Thoughts cannot come into being unless a thinker thinks them, which means: thoughts are dependent on thinking. Also, thinking is volitional in nature: a thinker - especially a thinker that is a free agent, as the Christian god is supposed to be – must choose to think what it thinks. Given the fact that thinking is volitional in nature, any specific thought that a free thinking agent thinks cannot be “necessary” in the sense that it “could not have failed to exist,” for supposing this would deny volition to said thinker. It would render said thinker to a mere automaton, a robot performing actions that it “needs” to perform given some extraneous constraints which hold it in check.
The result is that Anderson and Welty’s argument, so far as I understand it, results in one of two very difficult binds: either the laws of logic are “necessarily existent thoughts” (in which case the thinker responsible for thinking them is not a free agent), or the deity which supposedly thinks the thoughts which we call “the laws of logic” is a free thinking agent (in which case its thoughts are volitional and consequently could have been different, which would mean that no thought it thinks could qualify as a “necessarily existent thought”). Neither alternative seems to jive well for Anderson and Welty’s Christian position (since Christianity affirms the existence of a deity which can do whatever it pleases – cf. Ps. 115:3). Perhaps Anderson and Welty have built some prophylactic into their argument which safeguards against such uncomfortable outcomes, but from what I can tell in my reading, none is necessarily existent.
2. “Intuitions”: Also throughout the paper, there are several vague references to “intuitions,” not only treating them as apparently unquestionable (maybe even infallible), but also suggesting a uniformity of intuitions among all thinkers which they nowhere establish. These “intuitions,” which are never specified, appear to have a certain significance for the overall goal of their paper. For instance, on page 1, Anderson and Welty write:
They proceed to argue that “If the laws of logic are necessarily existent thoughts, they can only be the thoughts of a necessarily existent mind” (Ibid.). Anderson and Welty argue, in their characteristic way, that the laws of logic are “necessarily existent” and also that they are also “thoughts,” but arguing that something is a “necessarily existent thought” seems to go beyond even the most generous charitableness. Thoughts cannot come into being unless a thinker thinks them, which means: thoughts are dependent on thinking. Also, thinking is volitional in nature: a thinker - especially a thinker that is a free agent, as the Christian god is supposed to be – must choose to think what it thinks. Given the fact that thinking is volitional in nature, any specific thought that a free thinking agent thinks cannot be “necessary” in the sense that it “could not have failed to exist,” for supposing this would deny volition to said thinker. It would render said thinker to a mere automaton, a robot performing actions that it “needs” to perform given some extraneous constraints which hold it in check.
The result is that Anderson and Welty’s argument, so far as I understand it, results in one of two very difficult binds: either the laws of logic are “necessarily existent thoughts” (in which case the thinker responsible for thinking them is not a free agent), or the deity which supposedly thinks the thoughts which we call “the laws of logic” is a free thinking agent (in which case its thoughts are volitional and consequently could have been different, which would mean that no thought it thinks could qualify as a “necessarily existent thought”). Neither alternative seems to jive well for Anderson and Welty’s Christian position (since Christianity affirms the existence of a deity which can do whatever it pleases – cf. Ps. 115:3). Perhaps Anderson and Welty have built some prophylactic into their argument which safeguards against such uncomfortable outcomes, but from what I can tell in my reading, none is necessarily existent.
2. “Intuitions”: Also throughout the paper, there are several vague references to “intuitions,” not only treating them as apparently unquestionable (maybe even infallible), but also suggesting a uniformity of intuitions among all thinkers which they nowhere establish. These “intuitions,” which are never specified, appear to have a certain significance for the overall goal of their paper. For instance, on page 1, Anderson and Welty write:
The bulk of the paper will be concerned with establishing what kind of things the laws of logic must be for our most natural intuitions about them to be correct and for them to play the role in our intellectual activities that we take them to play.
I’m taking the “our” here in “our most natural intuitions” as intended to refer to human beings in general – to all of us; if it referred only to Anderson and Welty, readers might find their exercise to be of little interest: why care if Anderson’s and Welty’s most natural intuitions about the laws of logic are correct? On the other hand, if “our most natural intuitions” means everyone’s “intuitions,” then anyone reading this paper has a stake in its outcome. This latter interpretation seems to be what our authors have in mind.
Of course, what is meant by “intuition” as Anderson and Welty understand it, is of great significance here. They do not offer a definition, but I’m guessing that’s because the notion is used as a matter of routine in the philosophical literature they prefer to read. Perhaps they are so accustomed to seeing the word used and granted casual legitimacy that it would seem silly to explain it. But even philosophers who invest the notion of intuition with philosophical validity are not monolithic in their view of what it is or how it operates. So if “our most natural intuitions” about logical principles have any bearing on the argument which Anderson and Welty are presenting, it might help readers like me to clarify their understanding on the matter.
I say this because I tend to be rather suspicious of the term ‘intuition’ to begin with. A standard dictionary definition of ‘intuition’ is “direct perception of truth,” which might strike most readers as rather innocuous. But I’m an Objectivist, and as such, I recognize that what human beings perceive are concrete objects, while truth is an aspect of identification, which is a function of conceptual cognition and thus post-perceptual. In other words, on the Objectivist view, we do not perceive truths; rather, we perceive objects (specifically, primary-type objects – objects of which our senses give us perceptual awareness), and subsequently identify those objects using a conceptual method resulting in identifications which may be true or not true. To the extent that this analysis of what “direct perception of truth” means is correct (and without further clarification of the notion which endows the notion with better chances for philosophical solvency, I’d say it is correct), I’d say that appeals to “intuitions” need to be reconsidered in light of rational philosophy.
But thinkers who invoke “intuitions” might not have this definition in mind. Some hold “intuition” to denote some kind of a priori knowledge – knowledge that is supposedly known without any firsthand experiential participation of the knower in the knowing process. This is essentially the view that one “just knows” something, in which case questions like “How do you know?” simply do not apply, since there’s really no epistemology to speak of in assessing (or accessing) such “knowledge.” I’m quite persuaded that there is no such thing as “a priori knowledge,” and tend to view appeals to “a priori knowledge” essentially as an admission on the part of the one making such appeals that he really doesn’t know how he knows what he claims to know. (Sort of like John Frame, such as when he announces: “We know without knowing how we know” - Presuppositional Apologetics: An Introduction (Part I).)
Still others hold that “intuition” refers to some kind of a posteriori knowledge, though don’t be surprised when explanations of how one supposedly goes about collecting this kind of knowledge wax murky. Defenders of this understanding of “intuition” may have in mind some automatized item of knowledge; for in fact, the human mind does automatize many epistemological processes (consider your knowledge of how to tie your own shoes, or how you know not to touch a hot stove with your bare hands). But it does not follow from the mere fact that one has automatized the path to some ideational content that he holds as knowledge, that what he holds as knowledge is therefore true, or that the process which he has automatized in arriving at such ideational content is rational. Rationality has not only to do with the logic of the process, but also the objectivity of the inputs which are integrated by that process. The process by which we automatize a certain item of knowledge, is not automatically rational.
But maybe I’m wrong on all this. Perhaps I’m just some dunderheaded Neanderthal who in his contemptible naïveté has the annoying habit of wincing when thinkers treat some unspecified mass of assumptions which they style “intuitions” as some kind of sacred bull that must be preserved and protected, as though their dismantling would mean the entire artifice of human thought will come crumbling down into a worthless heap.
Perhaps my detractors would find this view comforting. But I don’t think so.
3. Presuppositionalist Reaction: My attention was first brought to Anderson and Welty’s paper when I visited the blog Choosing Hats, where Chris Bolt had posted an entry about the paper. What I found most interesting here is a comment posted on the blog entry by Brian Knapp. In his comment, Knapp was responding to Mitch LeBlanc. LeBlanc had expressed pleasure with and enthusiasm for the paper in a previous comment. In his response to LeBlanc, Knapp announced that he “shall be the presupper who will criticize [Anderson and Welty’s] argument,” which I would like to read when it’s finally available.
In response to LeBlanc’s statement that Anderson and Welty’s paper is “a refreshing read,” Knapp commented:
Of course, what is meant by “intuition” as Anderson and Welty understand it, is of great significance here. They do not offer a definition, but I’m guessing that’s because the notion is used as a matter of routine in the philosophical literature they prefer to read. Perhaps they are so accustomed to seeing the word used and granted casual legitimacy that it would seem silly to explain it. But even philosophers who invest the notion of intuition with philosophical validity are not monolithic in their view of what it is or how it operates. So if “our most natural intuitions” about logical principles have any bearing on the argument which Anderson and Welty are presenting, it might help readers like me to clarify their understanding on the matter.
I say this because I tend to be rather suspicious of the term ‘intuition’ to begin with. A standard dictionary definition of ‘intuition’ is “direct perception of truth,” which might strike most readers as rather innocuous. But I’m an Objectivist, and as such, I recognize that what human beings perceive are concrete objects, while truth is an aspect of identification, which is a function of conceptual cognition and thus post-perceptual. In other words, on the Objectivist view, we do not perceive truths; rather, we perceive objects (specifically, primary-type objects – objects of which our senses give us perceptual awareness), and subsequently identify those objects using a conceptual method resulting in identifications which may be true or not true. To the extent that this analysis of what “direct perception of truth” means is correct (and without further clarification of the notion which endows the notion with better chances for philosophical solvency, I’d say it is correct), I’d say that appeals to “intuitions” need to be reconsidered in light of rational philosophy.
But thinkers who invoke “intuitions” might not have this definition in mind. Some hold “intuition” to denote some kind of a priori knowledge – knowledge that is supposedly known without any firsthand experiential participation of the knower in the knowing process. This is essentially the view that one “just knows” something, in which case questions like “How do you know?” simply do not apply, since there’s really no epistemology to speak of in assessing (or accessing) such “knowledge.” I’m quite persuaded that there is no such thing as “a priori knowledge,” and tend to view appeals to “a priori knowledge” essentially as an admission on the part of the one making such appeals that he really doesn’t know how he knows what he claims to know. (Sort of like John Frame, such as when he announces: “We know without knowing how we know” - Presuppositional Apologetics: An Introduction (Part I).)
Still others hold that “intuition” refers to some kind of a posteriori knowledge, though don’t be surprised when explanations of how one supposedly goes about collecting this kind of knowledge wax murky. Defenders of this understanding of “intuition” may have in mind some automatized item of knowledge; for in fact, the human mind does automatize many epistemological processes (consider your knowledge of how to tie your own shoes, or how you know not to touch a hot stove with your bare hands). But it does not follow from the mere fact that one has automatized the path to some ideational content that he holds as knowledge, that what he holds as knowledge is therefore true, or that the process which he has automatized in arriving at such ideational content is rational. Rationality has not only to do with the logic of the process, but also the objectivity of the inputs which are integrated by that process. The process by which we automatize a certain item of knowledge, is not automatically rational.
But maybe I’m wrong on all this. Perhaps I’m just some dunderheaded Neanderthal who in his contemptible naïveté has the annoying habit of wincing when thinkers treat some unspecified mass of assumptions which they style “intuitions” as some kind of sacred bull that must be preserved and protected, as though their dismantling would mean the entire artifice of human thought will come crumbling down into a worthless heap.
Perhaps my detractors would find this view comforting. But I don’t think so.
3. Presuppositionalist Reaction: My attention was first brought to Anderson and Welty’s paper when I visited the blog Choosing Hats, where Chris Bolt had posted an entry about the paper. What I found most interesting here is a comment posted on the blog entry by Brian Knapp. In his comment, Knapp was responding to Mitch LeBlanc. LeBlanc had expressed pleasure with and enthusiasm for the paper in a previous comment. In his response to LeBlanc, Knapp announced that he “shall be the presupper who will criticize [Anderson and Welty’s] argument,” which I would like to read when it’s finally available.
In response to LeBlanc’s statement that Anderson and Welty’s paper is “a refreshing read,” Knapp commented:
I will say you find this refreshing because it doesn’t challenge your autonomy. Just because the argument is not transcendental in nature, there is no requirement for you (at least as far as the argument goes) to give up yourself as the standard of what is rational. That means you can evaluate the argument and toss it aside (or even accept it), and nothing will really change, as the argument doesn’t prove the Triune God of the Bible exists – even if the argument is sound.
I find this curious in part because the under-title to Anderson’s blog (where he posted a link to the paper) reads: “Faltering Attempts to Think God’s Thoughts After Him.” “Autonomy” in presup-speak is typically contrasted with “analogical thinking,” which John Frame defines as “Thinking in subjection to God’s revelation and therefore thinking God’s thoughts after him” (per his A Van Til Glossary). Presumably the “analogical thinker” is still actually thinking, but apparently he’s not allowed to think his own thoughts; or, rather, he is to make “God’s thoughts” his own by accessing them somehow and giving them primacy in his overall cognitive activity (without question, according to Bahnsen). And even though Anderson’s blog indicates that he’s doing his best to accomplish this, Knapp is essentially saying he’s failed to do so in the paper he’s put together with Welty. One wonders what Van Til would think of all this. But as Knapp indicates, hardcore V’illains will likely take abundant exception to the methodology employed by Anderson and Welty in their joint effort to prove the existence of their god. Knapp assures us that Anderson and Welty’s “argument doesn’t prove the Triune God of the Bible exists – even if the argument is sound.” Having some familiarity with Anderson’s background in apologetics, I’d think he’d have a lot to say in response to this. But this wouldn’t be the first time that we saw more believer vs. believer conflict erupt with the Choosing Hats crowd. A feud between Jamin Hubner (to whose book The Portable Presuppositionalist several of Choosing Hats’ “staff” have contributed writings) and Triablogue’s Steve Hays (see specifically here) and TurretinFan has been heating up in recent months.
Depending on what ‘autonomy’ specifically means (the notion of “yourself as the standard of what is rational” is more vague than helpful), I’d have to agree with Knapp’s point that Anderson and Welty’s paper offers nothing to challenge my “autonomy” (which I take to denote my ability and willingness to think for myself). But then again, nothing that Knapp or any member of the clan at Choosing Hats has written does either. Or, for that matter, any presuppositionalist paper that I’ve read or argument that I’ve examined. Perhaps Knapp would say that my “autonomy” has been challenged and I just don’t realize it. That would be the easy path to take.
While I am still examining Anderson and Welty’s paper, and surely there are many other things to say in response to it, I have to say already that I’m quite sure I won’t be persuaded by their argument. After all, the argument and its conclusion still leave us with no alternative but to imagine the god whose existence they are attempting to prove. While theists who delight in indulging in fantasies about “the supernatural” will no doubt have no problem with this, it signifies that the argument is a non-starter so far as rational philosophy is concerned. One can imagine all kinds of things in some realm “beyond” the one which actually exists. But at the end of the day the fact remains: what we imagine is merely imaginary.
Although my time in the ensuing months is going to be very constrained (to put it mildly), if I do get a chance, I would like to post some further reactions of mine to specific aspects of Anderson and Welty’s argument. I have many thoughts in response to every paragraph in the paper, but insufficient time to prepare them for my blog. So it will have to wait until some future date that I cannot specify now.
by Dawson Bethrick
Depending on what ‘autonomy’ specifically means (the notion of “yourself as the standard of what is rational” is more vague than helpful), I’d have to agree with Knapp’s point that Anderson and Welty’s paper offers nothing to challenge my “autonomy” (which I take to denote my ability and willingness to think for myself). But then again, nothing that Knapp or any member of the clan at Choosing Hats has written does either. Or, for that matter, any presuppositionalist paper that I’ve read or argument that I’ve examined. Perhaps Knapp would say that my “autonomy” has been challenged and I just don’t realize it. That would be the easy path to take.
While I am still examining Anderson and Welty’s paper, and surely there are many other things to say in response to it, I have to say already that I’m quite sure I won’t be persuaded by their argument. After all, the argument and its conclusion still leave us with no alternative but to imagine the god whose existence they are attempting to prove. While theists who delight in indulging in fantasies about “the supernatural” will no doubt have no problem with this, it signifies that the argument is a non-starter so far as rational philosophy is concerned. One can imagine all kinds of things in some realm “beyond” the one which actually exists. But at the end of the day the fact remains: what we imagine is merely imaginary.
Although my time in the ensuing months is going to be very constrained (to put it mildly), if I do get a chance, I would like to post some further reactions of mine to specific aspects of Anderson and Welty’s argument. I have many thoughts in response to every paragraph in the paper, but insufficient time to prepare them for my blog. So it will have to wait until some future date that I cannot specify now.
by Dawson Bethrick
766 comments:
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man.... we have gone over 600 posts. We are going to break the server hosting Dawson's blog:)
Justin let's try not to make things up.
I was asking you why you charged me Appeal to ignorance.
The thing is you are evading.
Your claims are based on induction.
You perceived and concluded that "that's just the way it".
We know why you argue for it because it begs the question in your case.
As you said induction pressupose regularity which you can't account for.
"As you said induction presuppose regularity which you can't account for."
that is right, I am not even trying too, that is why we call the concept identity an axiom. Further more the concept "account for" implicitly presupposed the concept identity therefore any accounting of identity would commit the stolen concept fallacy. I realize it is really difficult for you to get this but we are not asking the same questions as you are. You can ask a million times and I will answer a million times that I do not ask questions that commit the stolen concept fallacy. If you wish to ask them fine, but I am not, and I am not interested in your answers. God is a solution to a problem I don't have.
I am really getting tired of repeating this Nide so please read this and let it sink in. I am not going to give an “accounting for”, an argument for, or any sort of justification for the following concepts.
existence
identity
consciousness
I am not going to do it. I am not going to do it no matter how you ask or how often you ask. If you find this less then satisfactory, deal with it, I owe you nothing. I do owe it to my self to avoid logical fallacies such as the stolen concept. So if your argument for god involves arguing for the necessary preconditions that would make them possible forget it. I should like to note that all of the concepts used in my post presuppose those very 3 axioms. The only justification I need is that they are axiomatic.
Justin you have to see the smile on my face.
Of course you won't argue for them because the "axioms" beg the question.
Why do you think Rand made them up and the "stolen concept fallacy" that's because she had no answer to the "problem of induction".
"objectivism" is philosophically preposterous.
I was thinking today Jhall about how useless syllogisms are what say you?
so a conclusion that invalidates or calls into question one of its premises is not fallacious?
It is fallacious.
I was thinking more about syllogisms in this context where both sides reject each others premises and conclusions.
Justin,
Something is wrong with my high-speed modem or my internet connection. I'm not even sure if my post right now will go through (I'm sure Trinity is delighted to hear that). Hopefully, I'll be back on tomorrow afternoon.
Ydemoc
Justin,
Something is wrong with my high-speed modem or my internet connection. I'm not even sure if my post right now will go through (I'm sure Trinity is delighted to hear that). Hopefully, I'll be back on tomorrow afternoon.
Ydemoc
I can't help but crack a smile at Ydemoc's little woes.
Justin,
I see that Trinity is again taking pleasure again in my earthly woes. Well, I will say at least that's a step in the right direction -- at least (tonight) he didn't mention the pleasure he takes in imagining or hoping that I am banished to the deepest depths of his Storybook's fictional place of eternal torment.
Too bad for him that my modem is suddenly working again, although it is at a snail's pace.
Anway, let's see if Dawson can put to bed any notions Trinity has raised about what problems (or non-problems) induction may or may not pose for Objectivism. I post this, not for him, but for myself and any rationally minded fence-sitters looking on.
This is from the comments section of one of his blog entries. You'll find the date and time stamp at the end of the quoted material.
"...understanding induction properly is identifying the causality behind the phenomenon in question (e.g., touching a hot stove top and your finger feeling the pain of a burn). In my response to David I deliberately played to his implicit assumptions about induction, such as that repetition plays an essential role in inductive generalization, by speaking of ten occurrences of touching a hot stove and extrapolating from those ten occurrences to an eleventh which has not yet taken place. I did this to see if David would catch on. He didn’t. Thus I’m pretty confident that he is unfamiliar with the Objectivist view of induction (at least as explicated by David Kelley in his lecture Universals and Induction) (still apparently available only on audio cassette – for instance on Amazon.com; I burned mine long ago to CD and uploaded it to my iPod – great listening pleasure!). Kelley explains how Mill’s methods of induction were a major contribution on the topic, in spite of Mill himself being an empiricist in Hume’s tradition, particularly in establishing the causality behind a particular kind of phenomenon (such as touching a hot stove top and burning your finger). Kelley focuses on the first three of Mill’s methods, and notes that
in all three methods we had to examine more than one case. These cases differ, however, and the differences between them… are crucial to the conclusions that we draw. So we are not simply gathering confirming instances, as in Hume’s approach. We are looking at a very structured way at a single set of instances. Now remember Hume’s argument… that if there were a necessary connection between cause and effect, we could generalize from a single instance. We wouldn’t need to repeat the observation or the experiment. Well that’s true. There is a necessary connection between cause and effect, and since the cases that we compare in any of the methods, constitute a single set of connected observations, we do in a sense generalize from a single instance. At any rate, we do not rely on repetition. We don’t have to collect identical confirming instances…. Repetition plays no essential role in knowledge at all: not in induction, not in concept-formation, not in any reasoning process. Whenever we reach certain conclusions about a given phenomenon – by observation, or by inference – the occurrence of an exact repetition of that phenomenon does not allow us to draw any *new* conclusions, except the obvious conclusion that this has happened before. Repetition as such, the sheer fact of repetition, is epistemologically barren."
(continued)
"In concept-formation, for example, we could not form the concept ‘red’ by observing two identical shades of red. We form the concept by omitting measurements. But in order to do that we have to have some measurements to omit. So we have to have shades that differ quantitatively so that we can grasp the measurement relationship between them. And once we have two different shades that differ quantitatively, and we notice that quantitative relationship, we have all that we need to form the concept. Further instances add nothing essential (although they may facilitate the process psychologically). And the same is true of induction. Observing the same action occurring in two or more identical situations would not allow us to isolate the relevant causal factor. We need some variation among cases in order to use any of Mill’s methods. But once we have the kind of variation required by a given method, we have all we need in order to generalize. Further experiments that simply reproduce the cases, add nothing essential.
Overall, Kelley presents a radical departure from the mainstream (i.e., Hume-influenced) view of induction, which takes for granted many of Hume’s more fundamental errors. Notice though that it is not Mill’s methods alone which overcome Hume’s errors. Also notice that any time Bahnsen (or his ilk) raises the problem of induction, he does not question any of Hume's premises which led him to an impasse on the issue in the first place. That alone should raise one's eyebrows I'd think.
My view is that induction is actually an extension of concept-formation. Where concept-formation allows us to form integrations of entity-classes, for instance, induction takes this process as a model and allows us to form integrations of causal connections by applying the law of causality to entity classes so formed. For some further background on induction, see my responses to a commenter calling himself “Apologia4JC19” in my blog Presuppositionalism and the Argument from Ignorance.
Regards,
Dawson
March 25, 2009 1:35 PM"
--------end quoted material---------
Ydemoc
"In concept-formation, for example, we could not form the concept ‘red’ by observing two identical shades of red. We form the concept by omitting measurements. But in order to do that we have to have some measurements to omit. So we have to have shades that differ quantitatively so that we can grasp the measurement relationship between them. And once we have two different shades that differ quantitatively, and we notice that quantitative relationship, we have all that we need to form the concept. Further instances add nothing essential (although they may facilitate the process psychologically). And the same is true of induction. Observing the same action occurring in two or more identical situations would not allow us to isolate the relevant causal factor. We need some variation among cases in order to use any of Mill’s methods. But once we have the kind of variation required by a given method, we have all we need in order to generalize. Further experiments that simply reproduce the cases, add nothing essential.
Overall, Kelley presents a radical departure from the mainstream (i.e., Hume-influenced) view of induction, which takes for granted many of Hume’s more fundamental errors. Notice though that it is not Mill’s methods alone which overcome Hume’s errors. Also notice that any time Bahnsen (or his ilk) raises the problem of induction, he does not question any of Hume's premises which led him to an impasse on the issue in the first place. That alone should raise one's eyebrows I'd think.
My view is that induction is actually an extension of concept-formation. Where concept-formation allows us to form integrations of entity-classes, for instance, induction takes this process as a model and allows us to form integrations of causal connections by applying the law of causality to entity classes so formed. For some further background on induction, see my responses to a commenter calling himself “Apologia4JC19” in my blog Presuppositionalism and the Argument from Ignorance.
Regards,
Dawson
March 25, 2009 1:35 PM"
--------end quoted material---------
Ydemoc
Justin,
And lest we forget, Dawson addressed Trinity on this specific issue, just a few months ago as a matter of fact. Let's revisit the smackdown, shall we:
I believe Trinity wrote: "...induction without begging the question or avoiding a circle. Well, Dawson you can't and this is something you keep trying to get around."
Dawson replied: "I've stated this before, and I have no problem stating again because it is my position. To the extent that I "need" to "justify" induction, I do so on the basis of the axioms, the primacy of existence and the objective theory of concepts. If you think this begs the question, you need to show how it does. You'll note in that case that I'm not trying to "prove" the validity of induction by means of a syllogism drawn from prior inductive inferences. So where's the circularity? Where's the fallacy? Where's the begging of the question?
The key that you're not seeing here is that the objective theory of concepts shows that, and why, time and place are omitted measurements, and this answers the common presuppositionlist charge of question-begging against non-Christians, since they tend (erroneously) to conceive of induction exclusively in terms of guestimating future outcomes based on present facts. But if time is an omitted measurement, then where's the problem?????? No theist has shown me that he can contend with this and preserve his apologetic. My prediction is that you, Nide, will fare no better than anyone else. But go ahead and try. Show me where the fallacy in my "account for" induction is." (Dawson Bethrick, Incinerating Presuppositionalism, September 7, 2011)
-------------------
There's much more Dawson has written on the subject of induction, that Trinity probably won't bother to read nor understand. But I may post excerpts from such pieces anyway, because I think rationally minded fence-sitters might enjoy more smackdowns of Trinity and the bad ideas he clings to. And all for the sake of silly Storybook notions.
Ydemoc
@Ydemoc
sorry to hear about your troubles. A lot of ISP's today where having DNS and MTU issues, yours might be one so effected.
"
Dawson replied: "I've stated this before, and I have no problem stating again because it is my position. To the extent that I "need" to "justify" induction, I do so on the basis of the axioms, the primacy of existence and the objective theory of concepts. If you think this begs the question, you need to show how it does. You'll note in that case that I'm not trying to "prove" the validity of induction by means of a syllogism drawn from prior inductive inferences. So where's the circularity? Where's the fallacy? Where's the begging of the question?"
pretty much what I said to Nide only said better. I really wish my writing skills were better>
Justin,
Thanks for your concern. I called Time-Warner, and they reported no current issues. They ran a test and said my modem wasn't getting a signal. But now, like I said, I am getting a signal, but everything is really, really slow. I was planning to go exchange my modem for a new one tomorrow. But if it's a problem with Time-Warner, perhaps I won't need to as it might be all cleared up in the morning.
We'll see.
Ydemoc
Justin,
Even though I haven't had a chance to thoroughly read comments posted this evening, I did notice that you said basically the same thing as Dawson, a little earlier in the comments. I figured a double-dose of Dawson can never hurt.
Ydemoc
Justin,
Suddenly, everything seems to running much faster now. If Trinity said any prayers in hopes that I would be delayed for a longer period of time, I'm afraid those prayers weren't answered.
Ydemoc
@Ydemoc
glad to hear it. You have one of the better ISP's. If I had to guess they did what is called re-provisioning of the modem from their end, think of the electronic equivalent of smacking the modem up side the head:)
Justin,
Trinity is trying so hard to make his Storybook's arbitrary notions come true. What do you suppose motivates him this time? Faith, belief, wanting, wishing, fear -- when he writes: "Of course you won't argue for them because the "axioms" beg the question."
Translated, this reads: "Of course, as someone whom I am aware of, (Justin), a conscious being who exists independent of me (Trinity), also a conscious being existing independent of you, you (Justin) won't give a proof to me for the axioms existence, consciousness, and identity.
And even though I, Trinity, have just demonstrated with my words and actions that the axioms that I want proof for do not require proof, but obtain prior to and are the foundation for anything I write or think about, as well as any arguments, proof, or question begging, and anything else, I still (wish, hope, believe, have faith, demand, etc.) that you (Justin) need to prove this.
Because if you don't try to prove the axioms, then I cannot say a question has been begged; and that would mean there is no room whatsoever in reality for what I imagine and have been brainwashed to believe.
But even if you don't try to prove the axioms, and even if I have just just demonstrated by my own actions that the axioms obtain without proof or question begging, I am still going to accuse you (Justin) of question begging, because I so badly (want, wish, believe, hope, imagine) this to be the case -- even though, as I, Trinity, have clearly demonstrated but refuse to explicitly acknowledge -- it is not the case."
Ydemoc
It's interesting that even after 600 comments Ydemoc is still lost in the conversation.
The perpetual smile on my face.
Justin,
As Dawson sums up Trinity's latest efforts to make the arbitrary come true, with the following: "...the apologist fails to show exactly how the existence of an invisible magic being follows from someone's inability to develop a thesis on induction or some other mental process. So the non sequitur at the core of the apologist's argument from ignorance is clearly observed.
Is my conclusion that presuppositional apologetics bases its conclusions on the arguer's own ignorance of rival positions, itself based on my own ignorance of the presuppositionalist method and the evidences it recruits in deploying its defensive strategy?
I don't think it is. And here's why: As I mentioned above, I have examined numerous defenses presented by presuppositionalists, both in published works either in print or posted on the internet (cf. Van Til, Bahnsen, Frame, Pratt, Butler, Jones, Wilson, et al.), as well as in firsthand encounters with scores of apologists attempting to use this method of defense. In virtually all cases, the approaches employed share a similar basic strategy: the non-believer cannot "account for" some aspect or feature of cognition or experience, presumably because only an appeal to the believer's god can satisfactorily accomplish such a task and the non-believer by definition rejects or disavows the existence of the believer's god. But in each case, the feature or aspect of cognition or experience which the non-believer is said to be unable to "account for," can in fact only be addressed and understood if one has a good understanding of how the mind forms concepts and integrates them into larger conceptual structures. But this element is completely lacking from every deployment of presuppositional apologetics that I have examined, many of which I learned about because Christian debaters cited them as a supporting resource. (5) Not only do presuppositional apologists seem utterly ignorant of the importance of a good theory of concepts to such considerations, the worldview which they seek to defend - Christian theism - does not seem to have a native theory of concepts. (Apologists have been unable to show where in the bible one might find any information about concepts.)
(5) For instance, section 7.4 "The Transcendental Nature of Presuppositional Argument," in Bahnsen's Van Til's Apologetic: Readings & Analysis, pp. 496-529."
------------------------------------
(Presuppositionalism and the Argument from Ignorance, February 03, 2006, http://bahnsenburner.blogspot.com/2006_02_01_archive.html)
------------------------------------
More to come!
Ydemoc
Gees, everyone, what do you make of this?
Student Dies In Class On 21st Birthday After Thanking God For 'Another Year Of Life'
Perhaps upon reaching the Pearly Gates, she might say: "Gosh! All I did was say 'thank you!'"
It's a god of love, they say.
Regards,
Dawson
@Dawson
Hey there, long time no hear. I think they will say it was that person's time and god works in strange and mysterious way etc....
"...strange and mysterious..." - great for building trust.
Yes, things are fine here, just very busy. I see lots of activity going on in the comments, but I haven't been able to read any of it unfortunately. It's something to look forward to one of these days when I might actually get some R&R.
Keep on keepin' on!
Regards,
Dawson
Hi Dawson,
I hope everything is going well.
You wrote: "Perhaps upon reaching the Pearly Gates, she might say: "Gosh! All I did was say 'thank you!'"
I'm sure this probably puts a smile on Trinity's face, unless of course here faith was merely a "said faith," in which case she is perhaps burning in hell, in which case... that too would put a smile on Trinity's face.
Ydemoc
Suddenly Dawson drops in and poisons the waters just a little.
Nice.
Justin,
I see in his earlier comments, Trinity has again made several baseless claims and assertions about our position as it pertains to induction. He provides no justification for his claims and assertions, just as he provided no justification for his claims and assertions regarding his Storybook's fictional characters and places.
Anyway, as promised, here's a little more from Dawson, not necessarily for Trinity, but for rationally minded fence-sitters' reading and learning pleasure. This exchange (with someone named "Apologia4JC19) is from the comments section of his blog entry, "Presuppositionalism and the Argument from Ignorance," February 03, 2006, and here is the direct link to those comments, (http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=11714522&postID=113898211105388445&isPopup=true):
Apologia4JC19: “you are forced to say that, for example, since we have observed cats giving birth to cats in the past and this occurs in the present as well (and there exists nothing in the “sum total of validated knowledge” that contradicts this), then we can generalize and say that it is in the nature of the cat to give birth to other cats. And, since we’ve never observed instances of a cat giving birth to an elephant, we can generalize and say that it is not in the cat’s nature to do so. But, one is permitted to generalize from observed cases to unobserved cases only when the inductive principle is already assumed”
You seem to have missed everything I said about concepts. We only need to observe two cats to form our initial concept ‘cat’, and this gives the mind enough to work with. So we are not, as you say, “forced” into the position you say we are, for we can form the concept on the basis of present observations; we do not need induction in order to form our concepts of concretes. Abstraction precedes induction. Once the concept is formed, we retain it in memory. What can contradict the facts that we included in our initial formation of the concept ‘cat’?"
(continued)
"If, for instance, I observed a cat giving birth to kittens, what in reality would contradict this? Also, given what we have learned from science about genetics and other forms of biological causality, what error has been made in recognizing that the offspring of cats is not elephantine, but feline? You apparently want to deny the way the human mind works in order to make room for a need for an invisible magic being which does nothing specific here (cf. appeal to ignorance). Meanwhile, you seem to ignore, perhaps for purposes of expedience, the fact that, if we allow for an invisible magic being which controls all things, and this invisible magic being is known for its ability to conform reality to its whims and wishes (cf. Christian doctrine), then there would be no way whatsoever to rule out the notion that a cat might give birth (or has given birth) to an elephant. In the cartoon universe of theism, anything can happen. Mt. 19:26 says “with God all things are possible.” You wouldn’t deny your god’s ability to create a cat which gives birth to elephants, would you? In order for you to say that cats cannot give birth to elephants, you are actually denying your own worldview’s legacy of destroying the mind, and then borrowing from my this-worldly worldview to boot. When you’re serious about how the mind works, be willing to drop the fantasy of your god-beliefs and come back with an intent to learn on the basis of objective inputs rather than to stipulate on the basis of faith-based dogma.
Apologia4JC19: “(since the cases so far observed can only serve as a reliable guide for interpreting future unobserved cases if it is assumed that the future will resemble the past).”
Just by making the distinction between past and future, you have already granted what is necessary for generally reliable projections. If your concern here is to press the charge of circular reasoning, then you have, on your own conception of the problem, committed this very error yourself in the way that you have framed it. Concepts of time assume the truth of the axioms, and it is the truth of the axioms which gives our concepts the basis they need for identifying the world around us. And since the truth of the axioms is implicit in any instance of perception (since perception is the action of a subject which exists in distinction to an object which also exists), their truth does not depend on inductive generalization. Objective inputs provide a reliable guide to projecting possible outcomes. To deny this is to deny objectivity. They are all we have and they are all we need. Appealing to an invisible magic being does not solve anything, for it does not seriously address the issues involved. Pointing to a god, for instance, does not bring us any further understanding of how the process of abstraction works. Nor does it give us a genuine understanding of nature; pointing to something that contradicts nature in no way brings us more knowledge of nature. Mysticism can only keep men in the dark on these and other matters.
(continued)
"Apologia4JC19: “So you see, objectivism doesn’t *justify* belief in the uniformity of nature at all. It simply *assumes* this to be the case. But, perhaps I have missed something. I look forward to your reply.”
See above. Another point that skeptics tend to miss about induction is its implicitly hypothetical nature. Those who want to press skeptical conclusions against induction seem to think that, if induction does not provide 100% reliable results, then it is a faulty tool. Those same persons also tend to disregard the fact that we are born ignorant and need to learn about the world by interacting with it. We do not begin with the assumption that nature is uniform; no one does. We begin by perceiving. But already implicit in our perception are certain key constants which will later serve as the units which are integrated by the concept ‘uniformity’, such as the constancy of the subject-object relationship, whose orientation obtains without change throughout one’s experience. So we can see that the concept ‘uniformity’ does have objective inputs, and we do not need to secure these inputs via induction; they are already implicit in any firsthand perceptual experience. Couple this with the primacy of existence principle (entities exist independent of consciousness), and the metaphysical basis for the concept ‘uniformity’ is identifiable. All that’s needed now is the ability to form concepts and, later, the ability to understand the process by which they are formed, for induction is an extension of the process of conceptual integration.
These are just some of the basic points that skeptics tend to miss, largely probably because they accept Hume’s understanding of the issues involved uncritically. I see Bahnsen do this repeatedly throughout his writings, and if I were a Christian it would really make me cringe. But I also recognize that if Bahnsen himself had a better understanding of induction, he would not be able to bluff his pupils with his so-called transcendental argument, which is really nothing more than the snow-job of an appeal to ignorance."
------------end quoted material-----
Ydemoc
It's interesting that after 600 comments Ydemoc is still lost in the conversation.
Justin,
Trinity doesn't seem to realize that I enjoy answering his nonsense with substance, while he enjoys answering substance with nonsense.
Ydemoc
No matter how Dawson puts it, slices it, chops it objectivism is philosophically insane.
Justin,
Trinity has no sense of irony. No big surprise, right? He writes: "No matter how Dawson puts it, slices it, chops it objectivism is philosophically insane."
First, he is obviously just baiting us, since he's probably quite lonely and counts us and his invisible magic buddies as his only true friends.
Secondly, and as usual, as it pertains to Objectivism, he displays for all to see that he has absolutely no idea what he's talking about. I could ask him why he thinks objectivism is insane, but I'm sure I wouldn't get anything of substance back, especially from someone who is so devoted to making the arbitrary come true.
Thirdly, this coming from an individual who professes to believe there was once a conversational donkey, the walking dead, and a chit-chatty snake. And he has the effrontery (though maybe even this is too kind) to call Objectivism, or any non-theistic worldview or philosophy, insane?
And lest I be accused of a tu quoque fallacy, I am not making a "you too" argument, for I think his worldview is batsh*t crazy, independent of the worldview I hold. I am just pointing out how crazy he is not to see this.
This again just affirms what I said before: I answer his nonsense with substance; he answers substance with nonsense.
Ydemoc
Notice What Ydemoc has to to avoid being slapped with a fallacy. He has to deny his own position pretty amazing.
Ayn Rand's lunatics.
How did Rand know her senses were reliable?
By faith. That's right I remember the intro to her book.
"Forget about all the times your senses have fooled you and giving you false information just make believe they work and read my book"
Makes me crack a smile everytime.
Justin,
I wrote, about Trinity: "And lest I be accused of a tu quoque fallacy, I am not making a "you too" argument, for I think his worldview is batsh*t crazy, independent of the worldview I hold. I am just pointing out how crazy he is not to see this."
Trinity responded: "Notice What Ydemoc has to to avoid being slapped with a fallacy. He has to deny his own position pretty amazing."
Hmmm. I really don't think I did what Trinity is accusing me of. But if I wasn't clear or if I muddled things a bit, giving anyone the impression that I was somehow undermining my own position; or if Trinity is too thick to understand my position after all months, let me make myself absolutely clear: Trinity's worldview is bats*it crazy. How's that?
Trinity writes: "How did Rand know her senses were reliable?"
"Since knowing in Objectivism is essentially a process of identification (and also integration), we know this implicitly just by perceiving and attempting to identify and interact with what we perceive. If I perceive an object, my senses are reliable – they are doing what senses do by virtue of their nature: responding to external stimuli, transmitting sensations to the brain, and automatically integrating those senses into percepts.
... sense perception is non-volitional, autonomic, on the same level as digestion and photosynthesis. It is the primary mode of awareness (in human beings). Also, since proof is essentially a process of showing the logical connection between that which is not perceptually self-evident to that which is perceptually self-evident, which means: the very concept of proof presupposes the validity of the senses. To demand a proof for the validity of the senses ultimately leads to a series of stolen concepts." (Dawson Bethrick)
Trinity writes: "By faith."
No, that's not it. Not even close.
Trinity continues: "That's right I remember the intro to her book."
Trinity supplies us with a fabricated quote, doing his best to mangle what Objectivism says: "Forget about all the times your senses have fooled you..."
The senses don't fool us. Perception provides man with the full context of data. "Bent" pencils in water? As Dawson has pointed out, how do we know the pencil is actually straight in the first place? "The fact that we perceive what appears to be a distortion in the pencil's shape only testifies that perception provides a "full context" of data, including light refraction, of the objects we perceive. The context of our perception, however, once we get to the conceptual level of consciousness, can be accepted or rejected in the formation of our ideas and concepts." (Dawson Bethrick)
Trinity continues: "...and giving you false information just make believe they work and read my book"
Make-believe they work? Does Trinity accuse me of making believe that digestion works? That hearing works? Belief or non-belief has nothing whatsoever to do with it.
But it is interesting to note that Trinity is counting on the senses to work, even in the construction of the very sentence he wrote, while trying to undermine their validity. He plays make-believe as he counts on the senses while trying to make the arbitrary come true.
Trinity writes: "Makes me crack a smile everytime."
That's nice. But how does he know this? How does he know he cracks a smile every time? Will he tell us how he knows?
Ydemoc
It's interesting that Gadget said what he said because that's exactly what I knew he would say the boy has never anything new to say.
Suddenly he wants to become a PA and ask how do I know my sense are reliable that's easy God's senses are reliable.
But let's turn it back on him:
Since we know in the past that your senses have fooled you and giving you fakes information how do you know that they are not fooling you and giving you false information right now?
Justin,
Trinity is really sounding loopy now: "God's senses"?
Can Trinity please identify for us the referents for the concept "senses." Once he does, I will ask him by what means a non-biological, imperceptible, immaterial, invisible, undetectable being can in any way, shape or form be said to have senses?
Trinity also writes: "Since we know in the past that your senses have fooled..."
The senses provide us with the information they provide us with. What we do with that information, identifying and integrating, is where mistakes can be made.
I had asked Trinity: "How does he know he cracks a smile every time? Will he tell us how he knows?"
He responded: "Suddenly he wants to become a PA and ask how do I know my sense are reliable that's easy God's senses are reliable."
But notice, I did not ask him how he knows his senses are reliable. Besides, if mind was not so fogged in with faith to truly comprehend what was presented to him above, he might have been a little more careful in attributing to me something I did not ask. I simply asked him how he knows that, as he said, he cracks a smile every time.
But let's make it a little easier for him: By what faculty does Trinity know what is in front of him right now on his computer screen?
Ydemoc
Psalm 94: "7 They say, “The LORD does not see;
the God of Jacob takes no notice.”
8 Take notice, you senseless ones among the people;
you fools, when will you become wise?
9 Does he who fashioned the ear not hear?
Does he who formed the eye not see?
10 Does he who disciplines nations not punish?
Does he who teaches mankind lack knowledge?
11 The LORD knows all human plans;
he knows that they are futile."
How devastating!!!!!!
I know this phone is in front of me because God knows its in front of me.
But let's turn in back on you:
Since in the past you have made mistakes how do you know that you are not making one now?
Justin,
Trinity made the claim: "God's senses are reliable."
I asked him to identify for us by what means a non-biological, imperceptible, immaterial, invisible, undetectable being can in any way, shape or form be said to have senses?
Trinity points to a Storybook passage that is supposed to provide us with information as to the way, shape, or form that such a being can be said to have senses. But this passages is woefully insufficient. This would've been quite sufficient if I had asked him to tell me what mystics imagined and wrote down long ago, and/or what he believes is the case.
And even in the passage Trinity provides tells us nothing at all about the means such a being could be said to have "senses." It is just asserts that this is the case. So the author of this passage fares no better than Trinity does in answering the question for us on this matter.
And citing from his Storybook only underscores for us the Primacy of Consciousness inputs that drives Trinity's in his futile attempts to make the arbitrary come true. A bunch of mystics imagined it, wrote it down, and believed it -- so Trinity also believes it. For Trinity, believing makes it so. Case in point: He believes that the passage answers my question, when in fact it does not.
Seeking to make things a little simpler for Trinity, I asked: "By what faculty does Trinity know what is in front of him right now on his computer screen?"
Trinity responded: "I know this phone is in front of me because God knows its in front of me."
Trinity would have better off if he had stopped with, "I know this phone is in front of me," because the information contained within this admission is sufficient. He is basically telling us he perceives his phone. So why posit something extra, an imperceptible, undetectable, invisible magic being necessary for Trinity to perceive something that is "in front" of him? Blank out.
But his response doesn't answer my question. I asked him by what *faculty* does he know what is on his screen; not what Storybook character does he imagines is responsible for the reliability of his senses. Besides, is his Storybook's main character a faculty? I don't think Trinity would say this. Or maybe he would. Who knows.
In any event, for Trinity to say "god knows," be it anything at all, is nothing but stolen concept after stolen concept. This statement by Trinity, no matter what comes after "god knows," denies that which makes consciousness, knowledge, and concepts possible. By what means is this Storybook character aware of anything? The passage Trinity quotes from his bible won't rescue him here, for it too is just a series of assertions and stolen concepts. Are we to presume, based upon this passage that his Storybook's main character has an eardrum or a retina? The passage does not say, it just seems to me like a poetic appeal to ignorance.
What justifies such claims and assertions by Trinity and those mystics? We never get any answers for this, except to look to the very source, the Storybook, whose notions are the very ones in question.
(continued)
Trinity then asks: "Since in the past you have made mistakes how do you know that you are not making one now?"
What mistake does he have in mind? Can he be more specific? I'm trying to think of a mistake I'm making right now. I guess I could say I've made a few typing mistakes while writing this. How do I know I'm not making a typing mistake right now? I see the the red underline, and then I check my spelling -- spell-checkers and dictionaries are tremendously helpful when it comes to spelling.
Other mistakes? The Christian relative I've mentioned before, a Calvinist, made a mistake tonight. He failed to identify and integrate all relevant facts and accidentally tossed his iPhone in the washing machine with his clothes. That's a mistake.
But perhaps Trinity is thinking of other mistakes? Perhaps he wonders if I am making a mistake as to my non-belief in an invisible magic being? Mistakes presume that something exists to be mistaken about. Mistakes are only possible if the axioms and the Primacy of Existence obtain. And they do.
So, no, I'm not making a mistake. If the the Primacy of Consciousness obtained, nothing could be called a mistake. Mistake as opposed to what? If my Christian relative dropped his phone in the washing machine, he could just say "Presto!" and he'd have a brand new one. Or if he prayed hard enough, it wouldn't have happened in the firs place. In fact, phones? Why would we even need such devices in such a cartoon universe?
But that's all imaginary and make-believe. And not believing that the imaginary is real is never a mistake; nor is refusing to waste time trying to make the arbitrary come true.
Ydemoc
Just for the record:
How do you know God doesn't exist?
Nide asked: "How do you know God doesn't exist?"
Because of the impossibility of the contrary.
Regards,
Dawson
Now dawson wants to beg the question.
By the way Dawson:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-FcyJ07s20g&feature=fvst
Just wanted to see what you think.
Justin,
Trinity writes to me: "How do you know God doesn't exist?"
There are a lot of assumptions in Trinity's question. To expose these hidden assumptions, let me translate the question:
By what method have used to accurately identify and integrate facts of reality, such that the notion of a being, as described by Christians (i.e., imperceptible, invisible, undetectable, all-knowing, all-loving, all-powerful, creator and manager of all that is), or a similar being as posited by other faiths, is an arbitrary notion, and cannot even be considered or evaluated as knowledge?
Why, by means of reason, concepts, perceptual data, and reference to the inescapable fact that all knowledge is hierarchical in nature and grounded in the axioms and the Primacy of Existence Principle.
Any notion which attempts to violate, bypass, undermine, deny or otherwise contradict the axioms and the Primacy of Existence Principle, can be dismissed outright, without further consideration.
Basically, that which doesn't exist, doesn't exist. And if someone comes along and says that which doesn't exist, does exist; and that claim violates the axioms and the Primacy of Existence, such a claim or assertion can and should be summarily dismissed.
One could also say that such a notion is internally incoherent. As Dawson writes: " This is like asking me "Why is it that you have no faith in square circles?" I don't have faith in square circles, and yet Christians typically do not have a problem with this. In my view, however, having faith in what theists call a god is philosophically analogous to having faith in square circles. The traditional notion of "God" is internally incoherent, just as is the notion of a two-dimensional shape that is both square and circular at the same time." (Gods and Square Circles, http://katholon.com/squarecircles.htm)
Meanwhile, what justifies the Primacy of Consciousness claims and assertions made by Trinity and the YouTube preacher? Will Trinity point to his Storybook for justification? What good will that do if it, too, is just a very long, mystical appeal to that which does not exist?
Ydemoc
Nide: "Now dawson wants to beg the question."
You've shown no fallacy in my response. And linking to a YouTube video (of all things) featuring Sye Ten Bruggencate (of all personalities!), is as self-defeating as it gets. You're appealing to a guy who says that evil is morally justifiable, and whose argument has been blown to smithereens (see here in case you're behind the times).
I see, Nide, that you still have no grasp of substance. Just one-liners and waves of the hand.
At any rate, you've been answered.
Regards,
Dawson
In other words ydemoc doesn't know.
or better he knows because he knows.
By the way That's a false analogy comparing God to shapes.
My response and the clip of sye have nothing to with each other.
"Nide asked: "How do you know God doesn't exist?"
Because of the impossibility of the contrary.
Regards,
Dawson"
That looks like a one liner and wave of hand to me.
A sly you too.
Nice.
Nide had asked: "How do you know God doesn't exist?"
I responded: "Because of the impossibility of the contrary."
Nide now says: "That looks like a one liner and wave of hand to me."
I see. So, whenever Greg Bahnsen and other presuppositionalists reply to inquiries into their religious beliefs with "Because of the impossibility of the contrary," they're using a one-liner and waving their hand.
Got it.
Regards,
Dawson
Justin:
I answer Trinity's nonsense with substance; he answers my substance with nonsense.
He writes: "In other words ydemoc doesn't know."
What is he claiming that I don't know?
He writes: "or better he knows because he knows."
What is he referring to?
He writes: "By the way That's a false analogy comparing God to shapes."
Yes, one should never compare a shape, which exists, to that which doesn't exist. Trinity shows an inability to comprehend the quote. Maybe he should read the whole article to see if that was what Dawson was really doing.
Ydemoc
Not really.
They have a lot more to say.
The problem is it's not what you wanna hear.
Wake up and smell and the coffee.
Ydemoc when ever you are ready to give a non-fallacious answer in regards to God's "non existence" feel free I'll be around.
Nide wrote: "Not really."
But you said the very phrase that Greg Bahnsen is famous for "looks like a one liner and wave of hand to me."
So which is it? You keep doubling back on yourself.
Nide: "They have a lot more to say."
Do they really?
Nide: "The problem is it's not what you wanna hear."
I'm glad that's not my problem.
Nide: "Wake up and smell and the coffee."
In fact, it's 4:21 am here, I'm fully awake, and I just made myself some coffee. And it smells great! And I notice that you didn't bring it to me, as you once promised to do. Again, you doubled back on yourself. Quite a habit.
I'm glad these aren't my problems.
Regards,
Dawson
Justin,
No matter how hard Trinity tries, he will never be able to make the arbitrary come true.
Ydemoc
Nide, doesn't it irk you just a little that I ended up posting the 666th comment to this thread, and in that comment I laid you to rest probably for the 666th time?
Gotta love it.
Regards,
Dawson
I have a question to the objectivists about the stolen concept fallacy which is not about religion.
I had a bizarre philosophical argument with a person, who argues a philosophy that death is better then life. Now if you ask him why not just commit suicide if death is better then he also believes suicide is morally wrong.
Would you agree that since life is what makes moral values possible an anti-life philosophy that says nonexistence is better is using the stolen concept fallacy when making any moral claims.
For example freedom and happiness only exist in life so the moral value of freedom or happiness is a stolen concept in an anti-life philosophy. Only a life-affirming philosophy that accepts the value of life can argue that freedom is morally valuable and should be protected.
"I see. So, whenever Greg Bahnsen and other presuppositionalists reply to inquiries into their religious beliefs with "Because of the impossibility of the contrary," they're using a one-liner and waving their hand."
Dawson your counters are so sharp sometimes they make me laugh. very nice! Good to see you again...
Hez, I mentioned Dawson and his blog on that video, that should help any atheists who aren't educated in this type of debate become educated and get Dawson more of the recognition and visibility he deserves, so thanks for that!
Also now everyone will be able to see what a coward Sye is when they read his very brief exchange with Dawson.
Good day everyone.
AJ,
Sye's challenge is still open since Dawson is too chicken how about you?
Dawson,
If it wasn't for me there wouldn't 600 plus comments on here so how about a thank you that's the least you can do?
Not at all the proof for God it's summed up in Bahsen's brilliant phrase
Which suddenly you wanna steal that only confirms my position:
That atheist have to steal from Christians in order to "argue".
Thanks.
Justin,
Notice below how Trinity counts on the Primacy of Existence in making his truth claim, yet he seeks to deny the Primacy of Existence by virtue of the arbitrary notion that he's peddling.
Trinity writes: "That atheist have to steal from Christians in order to "argue".
Perhaps Trinity should come back when he stops trying to make the arbitrary come true, and when he's ready to unveil something that is perceptible, detectable, or coherent.
Ydemoc
Instead of dealing with what I presented Ydemoc does his usual:
tell us about the old useless slogans
Justin,
Trinity complains that I didn't deal with what he presented. But what is there to deal with? His claims and assertions have very little substance. Most of the time they are just nonsense and incoherent. Garbage in, garbage out, as they say. Such is the peril of enshrouding one's mind in a fog of faith.
But he certainly seems to enjoy using his nonsense to prod, pester, and poke. And I thoroughly enjoy replying to his nonsense with substance, while he replies to my substance with nonsense.
And on down the road we go.
Ydemoc
"As I think about it, this person's positions don't surprise me at all. It doesn't sound too far removed from what many Christians essentially subscribe to. Though Christians may try to deny it, they put little or no value on this life and this world, especially when compared to the life to come (an arbitrary claim), yet they, too, typically hold to the idea that suicide is morally wrong."
Let me put "Ydemoc" to the test so Dawson can see the impossibility of the contrary in action.
In a Godless universe what makes your values any better than mine?
It's simple if you don't agree with me I can simply wipe you out really who cares what one animal does to the other.
Now what is the function of man is it to be rational if so how do you know?
Hey Hez, if everyone who posts here denies or blasphemes the holy spirit, we are automatically doomed to hell...if we did that...would you go away?! Because if you didn't, wouldn't you just be wasting your time?
hehe : ]
Justin,
I write a response to "pattern recognition" and Trinity responds. Is Trinity seeing things? Is Trinity hearing voices? Is this what the imaginary does to a mind that tries to make the arbitrary come true? Was I speaking to him? I don't think I was.
Actually, I don't mind if he responds to me with more inquiries into morality. At least these particular questions have a little more substance to them than the nonsense he usually posts.
But just in case he forgot, I would like to remind him that he was the person who claimed that I had expertise in matters of morality, especially with regard to torture and beatings. And lest he forget, he consulted me on these matters.
As the expert consultant he has labeled me to be, and using my expertise which he claims I have, I outlined a process for him to complete. All indications are that he has failed to complete the first step in that process. And it was such a simple first step, too!
All he had to do was excise certain bible passages or just toss the bible in the trash. That's it!
So let me just say, as the expert he labeled me as, I am highly disappointed in his failure to complete his first step towards finally learning about a morality that isn't based upon mystical imagination.
Ydemoc
Justin,
I just had to jump on this little gem from Trinity: "In a Godless universe what makes your values any better than mine?"
It is a godless universe, and my values are better than yours, because I don't value that which is not real!
Ydempc
AJ,
What's wrong can't handle the hard questions?
Ydemoc thanks for showing the impossibility of the contrary.
Justin,
More nonsense, more assertions and claims by Trinity, without him telling us what justifies these claims and assertions -- and, without him telling us what the referents are for the concept "impossibility."
Ydemoc
Justin,
I wonder how Trinity squares "the impossibility of the contrary" with Mathew 19:26 which states "with God all things are possible."
As Dawson points out:
"...if the believer claims that some particular thing is impossible, then he is blatantly disagreeing with what is explicitly stated in the bible. Since the presuppositionalist wants to defend his Christian faith-beliefs on the basis of what he calls “the impossibility of the contrary,” he’s clearly assuming that something is impossible, and this does not square with what the bible explicitly teaches. So this aspect of the “presuppositional method” of apologetics is in its entirety inconsistent with the worldview that it is intended to defend. For this apologetic strategy to have any force, it must borrow from a rival worldview which does not teach that “all things are possible,” and yet it is precisely such a worldview which the “presuppositional method” claims is impossible. Thus, such a strategy is, within the context of the worldview it hopes to protect, completely self-refuting.
The problem gets even worse for the presuppositionalist. Given what is clearly and unmistakably affirmed in Matt. 19:26, the believer must accept as a possibility any worldview which rejects primitive worldviews like Christianity. If one accepts the view that “with God all things are possible,” then he would have to accept along with this the supposition that it is possible that this god has created viable worldviews which do not acknowledge his existence. Indeed, if this god is both omnipotent and infallible, who’s to say it could not create in such a manner? All this is to say that, on Christianity's premises, there is no such thing as an "impossibility of the contrary." Thus for the presuppositionalist to want to "argue from the impossibility of the contrary," he must abandon his Christian presuppositions and seek a compatible theory of possibility in some worldview which he has already said is impossible." ("Is the Contrary to Christianity Truly Impossible?" by Dawson Bethrick, September 18, 2005, http://bahnsenburner.blogspot.com/2005/09/is-contrary-to-christianity-truly.html)
A great blog entry with plenty of fascinating follow-up exchanges with those lost in the fog of faith, all trying as hard as they can to make the arbitrary come true.
Ydemoc
Nide: “Sye's challenge is still open since Dawson is too chicken how about you?”
What “challenge”? Sye’s challenges have all been met. It is Sye who ran away from debate when and where it was happening. Remember? If you don’t, I’m sure someone could help you understand – if you want to understand. Indeed, when is he going to interact with my critique of his argument? So far, Sye hasn’t done so. Why do you suppose that is?
Nide: “Dawson, If it wasn't for me there wouldn't 600 plus comments on here so how about a thank you that's the least you can do?”
Apparently you want to take credit for something that you could not have done without certain conditions – conditions over which you have no control – being in place. For instance, you could not post any comments on my blog if my blog did not exist. Also, you could not post on my blog unless I allowed you to. Moreover, there would not be over 600 comments on this blog alone unless all parties who contributed comments chose to do so. So if I thank you, I need to thank myself (twice over, for making the first two conditions a reality) and also Ydemoc, Justin, and anyone else who contributed comments to my blog.
But that’s fine. I’m happy to thank people who come to my blog – I always have been. So, my thanks first go to myself, and then again to myself, and then to all the visitors who took the time to comment.
Satisfied now?
Nide: “Not at all the proof for God it's summed up in Bahsen's brilliant phrase”
You mean the phrase that “looks like a one liner and wave of hand to” you? That one? If that’s what you call a “proof for God,” I’d say you’re pretty desperate. Like Bahnsen. He really wanted to convince himself that his imaginary god was real. What a sad case.
Nide: “Which suddenly you wanna steal that only confirms my position:”
“steal”? That’s quite a charge. In fact, I have given the phrase a rational context that Bahnsen’s worldview could not provide. You should be thanking me for finally giving it some legitimacy. But you would have to give away too much for it to have any legitimacy in the context of your understanding, so I’m guessing you won’t.
Nide: “That atheist have to steal from Christians in order to ‘argue’.”
You’d be hard-pressed to find any *argument* of mine which “steals” from the Christian worldview in order to seal its conclusion. Hint: simply stating a phrase is not the same as presenting an argument. But you wouldn’t know this.
Regards,
Dawson
Nide wrote: “Let me put ‘Ydemoc’ to the test so Dawson can see the impossibility of the contrary in action.”
Okay, I’m watching.
Nide: “In a Godless universe what makes your values any better than mine?”
Nide asks a question, and presents no argument. He seems to have confused a question with an argument.
The answer to Nide's question is simple, but beyond his comprehension. He asks because he doesn't know, and he doesn't know because his worldview doesn't teach about values. But the answer is clear: what makes one set of values better than another is an objective standard - something that is not available on theism’s subjective premises.
Nide: “It's simple if you don't agree with me I can simply wipe you out really who cares what one animal does to the other.”
Okay, I’m waiting: go ahead and “wipe you out really”. Let me know when you’ve done it.
Nide: “Now what is the function of man is it to be rational if so how do you know?”
The function of *which* man? What do you mean by “function”?
Regards,
Dawson
Nide: “Instead of dealing with what I presented Ydemoc does his usual: tell us about the old useless slogans”
Instead of dealing with what Ydemoc presented, Nide does his usual: tell us how vacuous and contentless his position really is.
Regards,
Dawson
That's the beauty of it all you see in a Godless universe I can say what ever I want and do what ever I want regardless of what you or anybody else thinks really so what if you don't like it so what.
That's my challenge to you Dawson:
So what?
It's not that hard.
But that's why I know deep down inside Dawson your a Christian.
You see wanting to be moral, rational etc. only lines up with Christianity.
I'm surprised though I thought you would join me in my fight for human freedom.
Suddenly I'm the atheist and you are the Christian how hilarious.
I'll be waiting for you to meet my challenge "Daddy" Dawson aka come to save the day:
So what?
So what?
Trinity writes: "... in a Godless universe I can say what ever I want and do what ever I want"
Well, notwithstanding the fact that it *is* a godless universe whether Trinity suppresses this fact or not, I wonder if he might share with us some of those things that he might say or do if he didn't hold belief in an invisible magic being.
Trinity continues: "...regardless of what you or anybody else thinks really so what if you don't like it so what."
I think you would find out quickly enough if you ventured down such a road. You see, some folks have identified why man needs a code of values, and this discovery and the answer to such a question has nothing whatsoever to do with any imaginary beings.
Trinity asks: "So what?"
Reality will answer this for you should you decide to act in such a manner.
Trinity writes: "It's not that hard."
What's "not that hard"?
Trinity writes: "But that's why I know deep down inside Dawson your a Christian."
How does this claim correspond to reality?
Trinity writes: "You see wanting to be moral, rational etc. only lines up with Christianity."
How so? And before one wants to do something, doesn't one have to identify what it is one wants?
Trinity writes: "I'm surprised though I thought you would join me in my fight for human freedom."
What is Trinity talking about?
Trinity writes: "Suddenly I'm the atheist and you are the Christian how hilarious."
How does this statement correspond to reality?
Trinity writes: "I'll be waiting for you to meet my challenge"
What challenge?
Trinity writes: "Daddy" Dawson aka come to save the day:"
Huh?
Trinity writes: "So what?"
"So what" what?
Dawson answers Trinity's nonsense with substance; Trinity answers Dawson's substance with nonsense.
Ydemoc
You're fighting a lost battle here boy.
By the way
SO WHAT????????
Trinity responds: "So what?"
By choosing to type and use concepts in response to me, Trinity has, in effect, just undercut the very points he was attempting to make; and, at the same time, he has, by his actions, unwittingly yet inevitably, granted that man's code of values has nothing whatsoever to do with invisible magic beings.
Does he understand why this is? Will he even try to understand where his misstep occurred? Or will he keep trying to make the arbitrary come true.
Ydemoc
ok.
so what
so what
so what
will you join me in the fight for human freedom?
Trinity expressed concern that, without an invisible magic being to lay down rules, he would have no reason for a code of values. But the fact is, there is no invisible magic being calling the shots, and we do have a code of values! So what's the problem?
What is really hanging Trinity up here is, quite simply, his fog of faith and his belief in an invisible magic being.
In any event, in an attempt to secure his non-position, Trinity asks, "So what?" with regards to man acting on a code of values.
I then pointed out to him: "By choosing to type and use concepts in response to me, Trinity has, in effect, just undercut the very points he was attempting to make; and, at the same time, he has, by his actions, unwittingly yet inevitably, granted that man's code of values has nothing whatsoever to do with invisible magic beings.
Does he understand why this is? Will he even try to understand where his misstep occurred? Or will he keep trying to make the arbitrary come true."
In response to this, Trinity decides to repeat his question "so what" over and over. But each time he does this, he is, in effect, re-affirming my worldview and undercutting his.
And that's not so bad now, is it?
Ydemoc
"It's a Godless universe!!!!!!!"
Screams out the deluded boy.
I don't care about your values I have my own.
I couldn't care less about anything you or anybody else has to say.
Will you join me in the fight for human freedom?
Trinity responds: "It's a Godless universe!!!!!!! Screams out the deluded boy."
Are you referring to me, here? If you are, your first sentence is correct, but I didn't scream it.
And since I'm not holding to the notion of a god, which would be maintaining an irrational and false belief in something despite evidence to the contrary, I think we can rule out my non-belief in imperceptible, undetectable, and invisible magic beings as something I'm deluded about.
I'm also not deluded about the fact that I'm a man, not a boy.
Anyway, go on...
Trinity continues: "I don't care about your values I have my own."
Who doesn't care? In any event, this utterance, in effect, not only undercuts the notion that a god is required for morality, but it also assumes an objective code of values, even though it attempts do deny it.
Trinity writes: "I couldn't care less about anything you or anybody else has to say."
Who "couldn't care less"? In any event, this too, in effect, not only undercuts the notion that a god is required for morality, but it also assumes an objective code of values, even though it attempts to deny it.
Ydemoc
Wadda you gonna do send me to hell?
hahaha.
Ydemoc aka the idiot.
Trinity responds to my latest comment with more of his nonsense.
Trinity writes: "Wadda you gonna do send me to hell?"
People don't get sent to, nor do they go to fictional places. Your question is incoherent.
Trinity then writes: "Ydemoc aka the idiot."
Trinity takes fiction seriously, pretends that it actually exists, bases and runs his entire life on make-believe, and then calls me "the idiot"? Yes, the fog of faith shows once again how it can prevent one from identifying and integrating, in this case, irony.
I again answer his nonsense with substance; he answers my substance with nonsense.
Ydemoc
Nide wrote: “That's the beauty of it all you see in a Godless universe I can say what ever I want and do what ever I want regardless of what you or anybody else thinks really so what if you don't like it so what. That's my challenge to you Dawson: So what?”
The crass nihilism that you express here in your latest fit of hysteria, lines up perfectly well with the fatalism inherent in the Christian worldview. On the Christian worldview, nothing really matters, for nothing can matter: you are just a pawn in the “big plan” of some supernatural consciousness which calls all the shots according to its whims; nothing you do will ever make any difference (and anything you do has been predetermined anyway, so whatever you do is just part of the plan anyway); and there’s nothing to lose in anything you do, since you imagine that death is merely some kind of transition to a magic kingdom, like the Heavens Gate folks chasing a space ship hiding behind a comet by committing suicide. Anything the Christian does is "justifiable" on the basis of the view that it's all just part of some big divine plan. You're not in control anyway, so ultimately there's no culpability - there's just your god's whims. In Christianity, you decapitate your own conscience. I know, I was in your shoes once. Your own belligerent behavior in your comments validates this analysis to a T.
Still makes me wonder how you personally react to the news about the girl who died on her 21st birthday just after thanking “God” for another year of life. I notice you steered clear of that one.
Nide: “But that's why I know deep down inside Dawson your a Christian. You see wanting to be moral, rational etc. only lines up with Christianity.”
No, I was terrible at being a Christian, because I could never follow Christianity’s models. For instance, I would never stand by while my child is being beaten and maimed. And if someone commanded me to prepare my child as a “burnt offering” to some imaginary being, I would not do it - I would outright disobey. According to Christianity, morality has to do with obeying divine whims, regardless of what they might be, regardless of how they might impact one's own values. But on a rational worldview (i.e., Objectivism), morality has to do with acquiring and securing one's own values, which is inherently selfish in nature. Christianity is about sacrificing values. Objectivism is about protecting them. The difference couldn't be more plain. So Christianity cannot line up with a rational conception of morality, since it is based on the enshrinement of whims and opposed to values. I recognized that in order to live a moral life, I had to abandon Christianity. And here I am. And all you can say is "so what?" Indeed. That's all you can say.
Nide: “I'm surprised though I thought you would join me in my fight for human freedom.”
There is no freedom for individual human beings in the Christian worldview. According to Christianity, everyone’s a groveling pawn lead around by fear and acting according to someone else’s purposes. That’s not freedom. That’s enslavement.
Nide: “Suddenly I'm the atheist and you are the Christian how hilarious.”
You may be an atheist – that’s hard to determine with you. But you are definitely not rational. That’s easy to see with you.
Nide: “I'll be waiting for you to meet my challenge ‘Daddy’ Dawson aka come to save the day: So what?”
What specifically are you challenging here? You don’t offer a challenge, but rather overt intellectual resignation. You just confirm my position (for the 666th time).
Regards,
Dawson
Is that it Dawson?
Really?
A smart guy like you who claims to know so much.
Is that all you really have to say?
"Your not rational"
So what!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Your fighting a lost war boys.
Repent and live.
Nide: "Your fighting a lost war boys."
If you're saying the war has been lost, and we're still fighting, it must be the case then that we won the war, for our position still stands and we're still able to defend it. Meanwhile, you've gone off the deep end yet again, spiraling out of control in your own never-ending spin cycle, explicitly throwing up your hands in resignation saying "So what?" For you, nothing really matters, because on your worldview's premises, nothing can matter.
Meanwhile, I still wonder how you reacted to the news about the girl who died on her 21st birthday after thanking her god for another year of life.
Did you thank your god for another year of life today, Nide? Or, are you ungrateful?
Regards,
Dawson
I thank God for salvation and Christ.
This "life" is no life at all.
The world is passing away Dawson.
Repent and live.
Nide: "This 'life' is no life at all."
This tells us all we need to know about Nide's worldview: life is not life. You must be really miserable.
You have stated several times (and in fact ended your last post with) "repent and live." Presumably you have done this "repenting" yourself, no? If so, it seems that the consequence of "repenting" is a complete devaluing of "this life" - i.e., life as a human being, as a biological organism, right here on little ol' earth. Again you confirm my analysis (not that it needs more confirmation): on your view, "morality" consists of abandoning values. The result is that life becomes meaningless for you.
I'm glad these aren't my problems.
Regards,
Dawson
Dawson,
So what.
Blessings
Thank you for your answer Ydemoc, but how does Objectivism answer to a philosophical rejection of life?
If somebody insists that you have to "prove" that life has value or "objective meaning of life" or otherwise life has no value then how should the people who value life answer to that?
Well I asked him to define "objective meaning of life" and he couldnt define what this term actually means. I said that life is what makes consciousness and achieving anything possible and whatever "objective Goodness", "better" or "meaning" refer to they cant be properties of nonexistence, since nonexistence has no properties.
But what does objectivism has to say to people who claim that death or nonexistence is better then life.
The problem is PR objectivism has no answer. In a Godless universe anything goes. It's simple you don't agree with me
I can simply wipe you out. It's the might makes right universe what one animal does to other is irrelevant.
Christianity alone has the answer:
It's simple repent and live or the fires of hell await you.
Life is Good.
To reject life is to attack the very nature of God.
God is life.
For all those that love death the furnace patiently waits.
Hell is Good PR all the atrocities and wrongs commited in this world will be finally made right.
Repent and turn to Christ in faith.
Live!!!!! why die its irrational.
Bleasings.
Hi Pattern Recognition,
I think you know by now that Trinity should not be trusted in anything he says. He has proven himself to be dishonest, misrepresenting not only objectivism, but also his very own worldview.
Ydemoc
PR just reverse what Ydemoc said and apply to him.
Hi pattern recognition,
You wrote: "Thank you for your answer Ydemoc,"
You're welcome, pr! I'm sure it goes without saying, but I should point out that I have come to my understanding of objectivism through various sources (Rand, Peikoff, Dawson Bethrick, Anton Thorn, Objectivist Answers, Objectivism Online, etc.), and any answers I give that are clearly of my own hand, should not in any way, shape or form be construed as a substitute for Objectivism or a "speaking on behalf" of the sources I've mentioned or learned from.
And may I say, Dawson is much more knowledgeable than I am, on the issue you've raised.
That being said, let's see if I can shed a little light on the questions you have.
You wrote: "but how does Objectivism answer to a philosophical rejection of life?"
You could point that this person is actually counting on the "Standard of Value" (life) in an effort to destroy it or advocate its destruction. They might then ask you to explain to them why life has value. If they ask this, you could take them through the process of what the concept "value" depends on. "...the concept 'value' is genetically dependent upon and derived from the antecedent concept of 'life.' To speak of 'value' as apart from 'life' is worse than a contradiction in terms [it would be a stolen concept]" (OPAR p. 212) For more details on this, see Objectisim: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, by Leonard Peikoff, p. 207 - 220.
(continued)
You wrote: "If somebody insists that you have to "prove" that life has value."
"Ayn Rand defines 'value' as 'that which one acts go gain and/or keep.' 'Value' denotes the object of an action: it is that which some entity's action is directed to acquiring or preserving." (Ibid., p. 208)
As a short response to such a demand, I might just ask such a person if they care about what they are saying or if they value what they are saying.
I might also ask them why they eat food. If they say they do, then they have just demonstrated with words (or if they are eating, actions) that life has value, is the ultimate value, otherwise why are they eating?
Or I might try asking them if they maintain that a rock can value. Or if the moon can value. Or a robot.
Here is something Dawson wrote which, although he is addressing valuing as it pertains (or more accurately, doesn't pertain) to such a notion as god, you might find it helpful in the issue you raised:
"Value is that which one acts to gain and/or keep. It should be easy to understand why human beings are capable of valuing things (including their own experiences in life). Human beings are biological organisms, and as such they face a fundamental alternative: to live or die. The life of any biological organism (including human beings) is conditional: they are not immortal, indestructible, eternally existing phenomena. In order to live, for instance, a man must act in order to acquire those values which his life, by virtue of its delicate conditionality, requires. His values are not automatically given to him. He needs to act in order to acquire things like food, water, shelter, happiness (which, as an incentive to continue living, is a most profound value), etc. If he does not act, he will not have food to eat, water to drink, shelter to protect him from the elements, etc., and he will die. I’ve never met a living Christian who does not act in order to procure those values which make his life possible. So even Christians should recognize this basic nature of the concept ‘value’. The point here is that we are capable of valuing things because we consciously face a fundamental alternative. If we did not face this fundamental alternative, we would be like rocks in the earth: having no need to act in order to achieve values."
(continued)
So if it is granted that the non-believer is in fact a human being, then it is granted that he is a biological organism consciously facing a fundamental alternative, namely life vs. death. And if this is granted, then it is also granted that, if the non-believer wants to live (a choice he alone can make for himself), then he has no choice about the facts that he needs certain values in order to live, and that he must take those actions necessary to achieve those values. This all means, and incontestably so, that the non-believer is capable of valuing his own experience in life, for it is through his experience in life that he learns how to hone his abilities to achieve those values which his life requires, given its conditional nature." ("Theistic Misuse of the Concepts of Meaning, Value and Purpose," June 19, 2009 http://bahnsenburner.blogspot.com/2009/06/theistic-misuse-of-concepts-of-meaning.html)
You write: "...or "objective meaning of life" or otherwise life has no value then how should the people who value life answer to that?"
See above. According to Objectivism, an organism's life is *the standard of value*. "It is only the concept of 'Life' that makes the concept of 'Value' possible." (Atlas Shrugged) And as Peikoff notes in OPAR: "...remaining alive is the goal of values and of all proper action."
You wrote: "Well I asked him to define "objective meaning of life" and he couldnt define what this term actually means."
I might ask him to define and point out the referents for the concepts "life" and "value."
You wrote: "I said that life is what makes consciousness and achieving anything possible and whatever "objective Goodness", "better" or "meaning" refer to they cant be properties of nonexistence, since nonexistence has no properties."
(continued)
You touch upon something here that I came across while researching answers for your question.
In OPAR p. 211 - 212, Peikoff writes: "Only an entity capable of being desroyed and able to prevent it [versus say a robot or a rock] has a need, an interest (if the entity is conscious), a reason to act. The reason is precisely: to prevent its destruction, i.e., to remain in the realm of reality. It is this ultimate goal that makes all other goals possible.
Goal-directed entities do not exist to pursue values. They pursue values in order to exist.
Only self-preservation can be an ultimate goal, which serves no end beyond itself. This follows from the unique nature of the goal. Philosophically speaking, the essence of self-preservation is: accepting the realm of reality.
The 'realm of non-existenc,' if one wants to use such a term, is not a competitor to reality... with some kind of advantages to be considered and weighed. The 'realm of non-existence' is nothing; IT ISN'T. [caps mine]
Metaphysically, one cannot go outside the realm of existence -- e.g., by asking for its cause.
Epistemologically, one cannot employ the faculty of reason in such a quest -- e.g., by asking for the 'reason' why, in coming to conclusions, one should accept the realm of reality.
... reality is the starting point, and one cannot engage in debates about why one should prefer it -- to nothing. Nor can one ask for some more basic value the pursuit of which validates the decision to remain in reality. The commitment to remain in the realm of that which is is precisely what cannot be debated; because all debate (and all validation) takes place within that realm and rests on that commitment."
You wrote: "But what does objectivism has to say to people who claim that death or nonexistence is better then life."
"A man who would throw away his life without cause, who would reject the universe on principle and embrace a zero for its own sake... His action would indicate so profound a hatred -- of himself, of values, of reality, that he would have to be condemned by any human being as a monster... One cannot argue with or about a walking corpse, who has just consigned himself to the void -- the void of the non-conscious, the nonethical, the non-anything." (OPAR, p. 248)
I hope I have been of some help to you in this matter, pr.
Until next time,
Ydemoc
The problem is PR Ydemoc just wasted about 5 minutes of your life.
Ayn Rand had no values or morals one need only to look at the way she lead her "life" especially the way she ended her "life".
To use Dawson's lingo she was a walking contradiction she preached values but didn't have any at all the evidence and proof is there for all to see.
Wolves in sheeps clothing watch out.
Hi pattern recognition,
Trinity is just being a pest, using dishonesty and misrepresentation to do so. But since I enjoy responding to his nonsense, here goes:
Trinity wrote: "The problem is PR Ydemoc just wasted about 5 minutes of your life."
This coming from someone who is currently devoting (therefore, wasting) his entire life believing in a conversational donkey, a chit-chatty snake, and city-strolling corpses, just because a Storybook tells him to. Because if he doesn't buy into everything his Storybook tells him, he runs the risk of going to a fictional place called hell.
Trinity wrote: "Ayn Rand had no values or morals one need only to look at the way she lead her "life" especially the way she ended her "life".
Is the evidence for this allegation higher in quantity and quality than is the evidence he accepts and cites for such things as chit-chatty snakes, city-strolling corpses, and a conversational donkey? Is the evidence for the existence of his god stronger or weaker than the evidence he has for the allegation he makes above?
Trinity wrote: "To use Dawson's lingo she was a walking contradiction she preached values but didn't have any at all the evidence and proof is there for all to see."
How interesting that Trinity admits relying upon (i.e., it's reliable) his sense of sight to come to a conclusion about something that he asserts is a fact. Why can't he do the same as it pertains to the imperceptible, undetectable, invisible magic being that he claims is also a fact? Funny how the senses receive a demotion on the scale of importance whenever this issue comes up.
Ydemoc
Everyone,
I just gave another look at something Trinity had posted earlier, and it's quite interesting. It was his response to what I had written to Pattern Recognition.
What I wrote to Pattern Recognition was: "I think you know by now that Trinity should not be trusted in anything he says. He has proven himself to be dishonest, misrepresenting not only objectivism, but also his very own worldview."
So Trinity, trying to slight me and make a big, huge point, responded with:
"PR just reverse what Ydemoc said and apply to him."
Hmmm. Okay, let's try this with what I wrote, shall we, and let's see how it comes out. Remember now, Trinity asks Pattern Recognition to reverse what I wrote and apply it to me. Here we go, per Trinity's request:
"I don't know if you know by now, but Ydemoc should be trusted in everything he says. He has proven himself to be honest in representing worldviews other than his own, including Christianity, as well as his own worldview, Objectivism.
Let's see, have I reversed what I wrote and applied it to me?
It sure looks like I have. Wow.
See the "POOF!"
Ydemoc
It's evident "Ydemoc" is a sad lonely man.
Trinity writes: "It's evident "Ydemoc" is a sad lonely man."
Is the evidence Trinity has for this allegation higher in quantity and quality than the evidence he accepts and cites for such things as chit-chatty snakes, city-strolling corpses, and a conversational donkey? Is the evidence for the existence of his god stronger or weaker than the evidence he has for the allegation he makes above?
Ydemoc
Hi again, "pattern recognition,"
I found something else that may assist you in answering some of the questions you've asked. It is a piece by David Kelly called, "Choosing Life," and is available here:
http://www.atlassociety.org/choosing-life
I haven't had a chance to study all of it yet, but from what I have read so far, it does expand on some of the points I made (or tried to make) in my response to you.
Ydemoc
Well I like this quote
"A man who would throw away his life without cause, who would reject the universe on principle and embrace a zero for its own sake... His action would indicate so profound a hatred -- of himself, of values, of reality, that he would have to be condemned by any human being as a monster... One cannot argue with or about a walking corpse, who has just consigned himself to the void -- the void of the non-conscious, the nonethical, the non-anything." (OPAR, p. 248)
Yes its probably pointless to argue with a "walking corpse" who desires nonexistence, but apparently people like this exist.
Glad to see posting works again, what happened anyway Dawson, do you know?
Dawson,
I'm just writing something here to test whether or not I will be able to see all the comments after I post it.
Ydemoc
Dawson,
Only after I posted my test comment was I able to see all the comments. Unless I post something, I'm still unable to access any comments beyond 200.
Ydemoc
test comment
same here, I have to post something then I can see past the 200th post, damn annoying. I thought it was working earlier
Justin,
Yep. Annoying. I've done some searches on Google, using the search string "200 comments," "can't access," etc. and there are a few places that have talked about this problem with Blogger ever since they introduced "Threaded Comments." A few web sites I've come across have posted "code" to insert that they say might solve this problem (from Dawson's end). Even though these sites step you through it and it seems easy enough to do (basically search, cut and paste), I'm not completely confident that even if Dawson did that it would solve this problem. D
Justin, do you have familiarity with the kind of "code" that they might be referring to? Would you be able to tell by examining it if it would work if I gave you the link?
Ydemoc
What are you 2 geniuses doing?
Trinity wrote: "What are you 2 geniuses doing?"
Not hanging out at "Debunking Muslims" and having discussions about what imaginary being is most likely to exist.
Ydemoc
Ydemoc continues to stalk me.
Ran into one of your people you can read all about it here:
http://hezekiahahaz.blogspot.com/
Justin,
It's all a dream.
@Ydemoc
this "genius" will see what he can do about the comments issue:)
Justin,
Do you want me to send you a link to one of the sites I came across?
Ydemoc
yes thanks
Here's the link, Justin.
http://www.ravisaive.in/2012/02/fix-200-comments-pagination-problem-in.html
Justin,
Prove to me that this is not dream. That's my challenge to you.
By the way Ydemoc has decided to keep stalking me every blog I go to he's watching through his peep hole. What a sick an individual.
@Ydemoc
I have tested in firefox 5.0, chromium, opera and lynx and all of these browsers have the issue.
@Nide
are you having this problem, you use Safari right? that is one I cant test. As to your challenge, your question or statement of fact however you wish to word it is essentially self refuting and I needn't take it seriously. I don't care if you believe "all of this" is a dream or not quite frankly so if you wish to do so, bully for you, I don't care.
Justin,
But that's a dream too.
I can only see 200 comments for some reason...leaving comment to see if this fixes it...
yep...fixed it..weird
AJ your a genius.
You didn't fix it.
This is a dream.
Trinity asked Justin: "Prove to me that this is not dream. That's my challenge to you."
Trinity, in his silly quest to make the arbitrary come true, poses questions that attempt to undermine a rational worldview. That ain't gonna happen, no matter how hard he tries.
That he would, once again, issue such an empty "challenge" -- that one needs to "prove" such a thing, especially since this was explained to him before -- is a clear indication that it is Trinity who is "dreaming."
But just in any fence-sitters out there would like to investigate the matter for themselves, here is a link:
"How does one refute the idea that life is possibly a dream?"
http://objectivistanswers.com/questions/2683/how-does-one-refute-the-idea-that-life-is-possibly-a-dream
Ydemoc
Peeping Tom(Ydemoc) can't prove to me that he's not dreaming.
How funny.
Trinity wrote: "Peeping Tom(Ydemoc) can't prove to me that he's not dreaming."
"Can't" doesn't apply, for it is not a question of the ability or inability to "prove" that which is self-evident. If Trinity were a little brighter and not fogged in by faith, he'd recognize that his use of the concepts "can't" "dream" and "proof" belie the idea that "it's all a dream."
Trinity is essentially asserting that I am unable to show that which is self-evident to be that which is self-evident. The perceptually self-evident is not subject to proof because it is perceptually self-evident! What motivates these kinds of questions from him? I think we know: Invisible-magic- being belief.
Trinity wrote: "How funny."
Actually, what's really funny is that in his futile effort to prop up the arbitrary and make it come true, Trinity resorts to skepticism, an inevitable outcome of his primacy of consciousness metaphysics. But his fog of faith keeps him from recognizing this.
From Harry Binswanger: "To "identify itself as consciousness" requires making the distinction between subject and object, between self and the world, which presupposes that there is a world.
The opposite view, the primacy of consciousness, was injected into post-Renaissance philosophy by Descartes. He recognized that consciousness must have an object, but raised the possibility that this object might itself be mental, not external. "What if," he asked, in effect, "all that I am ever aware of are experiences inside my own mind, not external reality? How do I even know that there is an external reality?" He considered the existence of his consciousness to be axiomatic, but the existence of existence to be non-axiomatic, problematical.
But to identify something as "an experience in my mind," I have to contrast my mental experiences with something else. Without the contrast between the internal and the external, "internal" loses its meaning. "Everything is internal" is an incoherent statement, one that contains an implicit contradiction. "Everything is in my mind" likewise renders "my mind" meaningless. It is only the contrast between existence and consciousness that makes the concept "consciousness" possible." (http://maverickphilosopher.typepad.com/maverick_philosopher/2009/01/is-ayn-rand-a-good-philosopher-rand-on-the-primacy-of-existence.html; Timestamp: Sunday, February 08, 2009 at 12:38 PM)
(continued)
And this: "Stolen Concept Fallacy":
Observe that Descartes starts his system by using “error” and its synonyms or derivatives as “stolen concepts.”
Men have been wrong, and therefore, he implies, they can never know what is right. But if they cannot, how did they ever discover that they were wrong? How can one form such concepts as “mistake” or “error” while wholly ignorant of what is correct? “Error” signifies a departure from truth; the concept of “error” logically presupposes that one has already grasped some truth. If truth were unknowable, as Descartes implies, the idea of a departure from it would be meaningless.
The same point applies to concepts denoting specific forms of error. If we cannot ever be certain that an argument is logically valid, if validity is unknowable, then the concept of “invalid” reasoning is impossible to reach or apply. If we cannot ever know that a man is sane, then the concept of “insanity” is impossible to form or define. If we cannot recognize the state of being awake, then we cannot recognize or conceptualize a state of not being awake (such as dreaming). If man cannot grasp X, then “non-X” stands for nothing.
Fallibility does not make knowledge impossible. Knowledge is what makes possible the discovery of fallibility."
(Leonard Peikoff, “‘Maybe You’re Wrong,’” The Objectivist Forum, April 1981, 9.)
Ydemoc
Peeping Tom ,Yea, that's a dream too.
Trinity wrote: "Peeping Tom ,Yea, that's a dream too."
Would you care to define "dream" for us? If you do, be sure to tell us which definition you are using.
Ydemoc
Ydemoc you've been refuted over a 1,000 times. Leave it alone dude. You're wasting time.
I'm really enjoying this dream.
Trinity avoids defining "dream" for us. Why?
He states that I have "been refuted over 1,000 times," and tells me I should "[l]eave it alone" and that I'm "wasting my time." But he cites no instances of doing so.
Is the evidence he has for my having been "refuted" stronger or weaker than the evidence he relies upon for his belief that there are Conversational Donkeys, Chit-Chatty Snakes, and City-Strolling Corpses? Why doesn't he answer this question? Why does he run away from supplying us with definition of "dream"?
Given Trinity's unwillingness to supply us with a definition of "dream," and taking into account past mad scrambles to redirect discussions when faced with such simple questions, the answers to which would expose the game he's playing, I think its safe to say that his most recent reply can be securely categorized as nothing more than an auto-biographical statement, (i.e., it is he who has been refuted).
A little bit of scratching, once again, exposes him for all to see: That he is fogged in by faith in his quest to make the arbitrary come true.
Ydemoc
Peeping Tom,
A dream is a dream and I'm dreaming about a dream that I dreamed in this dream.
what are the conceptual roots of the concept dream. What ideas have to be understood and validated before one could conceive of a dream?
Justin,
When you are dreaming do you think that it's real? Do you know that you are dreaming?
All you do is wake up from one dream and into another dream.
The concept dream came from a dream that's the real world Justin.
"When you are dreaming do you think that it's real?"
No, I can not ever recall having a dream where I was not aware that I was in fact dreaming. Even terrifying nightmares that I stopped having about age 11, even in those in the back of my mind I was aware that I was not experiencing anything that was real.
"Do you know that you are dreaming?"
Yes, on the rare occasions that I dream or recall them, I am aware at the time that I am dreaming.
"All you do is wake up from one dream and into another dream."
what are the conceptual roots to waking up? what ideas have to be validated before one could conceive of the concept waking up?
"The concept dream came from a dream that's the real world Justin."
That is a contradiction in terms. You wish to establish a fact that contradicts one of your supposed fact's required premises.
test post
This is a test post. Doing this is the only way I can see the most recent comments.
Ydemoc
OK, I cant even see my posts if I post any longer, I am going to bow out of this discussion as this is just too annoying. Nide if you wish to continue, you know my email and blog
test post
Justin why won't you be honest man?
Concepts couldn't possibly mean anything to you.
Concepts aren't extend in time and space.
Your a robot a Justin a product of biochemistry.
one last post to see if I can get past the first 200, so disregard this post everyone.
@Ydemoc
do you know what in the sam hill he means by this
"Concepts aren't extend in time and space."
concepts are methods, ways of integrating knowledge. Methods employed by this bag of biochemistry called Justin:)
Justin I posted on your blog
We can continue there.
Fix your blog dude so we can see any follow up comments
Another test comment.
Ydemoc
Now, upon posting a comment, I am taken to the very last page of the comment form, which shows no comments at all. At that point, to get to the most recently posted comment(s), I need to click on the "Older" button.
Another odd thing is that on this pop-up comment window, it shows that there are 765 total comments. But on the main page, it shows 822 total comments.
I think that's the reason when anyone posts a comment, the blog sends them to a comment form with no comments -- the blog is showing a higher number of comments than it actually has, and is acting accordingly.
Ydemoc
Im digging out Anton's Thorn:
http://hezekiahahaz.blogspot.com/
test post
Dawson:
The result is that Anderson and Welty’s argument, so far as I understand it, results in one of two very difficult binds: either the laws of logic are “necessarily existent thoughts” (in which case the thinker responsible for thinking them is not a free agent), or the deity which supposedly thinks the thoughts which we call “the laws of logic” is a free thinking agent (in which case its thoughts are volitional and consequently could have been different, which would mean that no thought it thinks could qualify as a “necessarily existent thought”).
To avoid the arbitrariness of thoughts, the presuppers, who seem to have no problem with God not being a free agent, would argue that “necessarily existent thoughts” are a reflection of God's “necessarily existent" nature, in which case there's not benefit from using "thoughts" to describe the laws of logic. The "thoughts" claim adds subjectiveness to their laws of logic.
How does the presupper "account" for the nature of God?
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