Anderson versus Materialism, Part II: The Problem of Personal Identity over Time

Back in February this year I posted an entry in which I interacted with the first of several “daunting philosophical problems for materialists” culled together by James Anderson in a blog entry of his own titled Materialism and Mysteries. Anderson himself cited statements made by New Testament scholar Bart Ehrman in a blog post of his own about his relationship to materialism, where Ehrman states that he has been “more-or-less a complete materialist for about twenty years.”

In my own entry, I examined what Anderson dubs “the problem of the unity of consciousness,” which consists of a single question (mind you, not an argument): “How could a material object like the brain, extended across space and composed of billions of discrete physical parts, serve as the basis for the unity of our conscious experience?” The way Anderson frames this “problem,” I get the impression that he thinks the elements of each brain are scattered all over the universe.

WSIBC: "God and Mind"

We come now to Anderson’s fifth case, “God and Mind,” presented in the fourth chapter of his book Why Should I Believe Christianity? (WSIBC). Here Anderson claims that the mere existence of human minds is evidence for the existence of a supernatural being which Christianity lovingly calls “God.” The basic strategy here has a familiar ring to it: take something we all can reasonably be expected to “take for granted,” probe it with a few open-ended questions to which the reader is supposed to shrug his shoulders and confess “Gee, I donno!” and then skewer an alternative point of view opposed to the Christian worldview. Christianity is thereby vindicated by default, pretty much by declaring what it asserts.

This basic approach, subject to wide variation, is characteristic of the strategy of assimilation that is the hallmark of the religious mind. This involves a predatory appropriation of this-worldly phenomena in an effort to recast them as projections sourced in alleged otherworldly forces, thereby presumably vindicating belief in the supernatural. And yet, the strands of inference from this world to a world essentially contradicting it are, to put it mildly, as fleeting and opaque as a forgotten dream. 

Existence and Perception

Fundamental principles are the most critical part of philosophy to get right since all inferences, deductions and applications of its principles depend on their truth, their defensibility, and their suitability as fundamentals. Unfortunately it is philosophy’s fundamentals that are often the most misunderstood or even the least developed, either because they have not been securely identified, their truth is taken for granted and therefore deemed unworthy of deeper attention, or they have been disfigured through filters foreign to that philosophy.

I suspect that one reason why Objectivism’s fundamentals are so frequently and persistently misconstrued, is the very fact that Objectivism actually has clearly stated fundamentals, affirmed in terms of conceptually irreducible primaries, while other philosophies typically have at best vague handling of fundamentals and essentially zero regard for conceptual irreducibility. For example, consider the question: What is the fundamental starting point of post-modernism? Or Dialectical Materialism? Or Existentialism? Or Hinduism? Or Christianity? Or Scientology? Etc. Are they truly fundamental, or do they take certain unstated premises for granted? Do their stated foundations consist in identifying general facts that are directly available to any thinker, or do they rest in authoritarian pronouncements, secret canons, or elements of stories passed down by prior generations? 

Do Gardens Imply the Existence of Invisible Magic Beings?

Christian apologist James Anderson has posted another fun little blog entry, this one titled On Fairies and Gardeners, over on his site Proginosko. In this entry Anderson objects to overt comparisons of the Christian god to fairies while implicitly comparing man’s cognitive faculties to a garden implying the existence of a gardener. Anderson opens his blog with the following announcement:

I’ve been revisiting Richard Dawkins’ best-seller The God Delusion in preparation for an apologetics class I’ll be teaching next week.

Anderson is writing this in July 2017. And yet, back in April 2009, more than eight years ago if I have my math right, Anderson announced his conclusion (referring specifically to The God Delusion, mind you) that “Dawkins’ case against theism is philosophically inept” (see here). With such a condemning assessment, I’m wondering if Anderson has changed his mind, or whether he prefers to spend his time sparring with low-hanging fruit before a captive audience in his classroom. Consider the impressionable young minds who have chosen to take on the burden of a heavy student debt at so early a time in life as to sit through such a course. Indeed, just what kind of living does one set out to achieve with an education in “apologetics”? Perhaps if one confuses a career with a living, it could be said that Anderson may be doing fairly well as a vested member of the professoriate.

Craig’s Eight Arguments for God, Part VI: “God is the best explanation of intentional states of consciousness”

We now come to the sixth installment in my series examining eight arguments for the existence of a god published by William Lane Craig in the Nov/Dec 2013 issue of Philosophy Now. The previous five installments in this series can be found here:

Part I: Introduction 

Part II: “God is the best explanation why anything at all exists”  

Part III: “God is the best explanation for the origin of the universe” 

Part IV: “God is the best explanation of the applicability of mathematics to the physical world”  

Part V: “God is the best explanation of the fine-tuning of the universe for intelligent life”

In the present installment, we will be looking at Craig’s defense of the claim that “God is the best explanation of intentional states of consciousness,” the fifth of his eight arguments. Craig’s previous arguments have all been shown to be utter failures. In spite of the dismal failures of Christian apologetics, Craig and other defenders of theism continue their futile efforts to argue from this world to a realm contradicting it while never coming to terms with the fact that, once we get to the conclusion of any of their arguments for the existence of a god, we still have no alternative but to imagine the god whose existence is said to be thereby proved.

But Craig thinks that his god is the “best explanation of intentional states of consciousness.” Will Craig finally be able to score a goal with this case? Let’s take a look and see.

Craig’s Eight Arguments for God, Part III: “God is the best explanation for the origin of the universe”

This is the third installment in a series of blog entries which I am posting in response to a set of theistic arguments published by Christian apologist William Lane Craig. The first two installments can be found here:

Part I: Introduction 

Part II: “God is the best explanation why anything at all exists”

See the Introduction for links to Craig's article (which can now be accessed only by subscribers to Philosophy Now).

Craig’s second argument is intended to support his claim that “God is the best explanation for the origin of the universe.” Although they have similarities, this argument is distinct from his first argument in that, in the present case, Craig seeks to draw on research from a group of secular scientists in order to support his theistic position. Craig’s first argument has already been shown to be a complete failure. Let’s see if Craig’s second argument does any better.

Jason Petersen on the Fallacy of Pure Self-Reference

While Floyd FP was making efforts to raise objections against Objectivism and defend his subjecto-solipsistic position from the charge that it commits the fallacy of pure self-reference (see here), I found a Q&A article by none other than Jason Petersen in which the strapping young “Clarkian presuppositionalist” attempted to bring into question the legitimacy of there being such a thing as a the fallacy of pure self-reference. Petersen is apparently replying to a visitor to his website who raised questions about the fallacy of pure self-reference.

Here we have more proof that Petersen is content to make pronouncements about things of which he has little if any understanding. Why anyone would go to Jason Petersen in an effort to become better informed on anything falling under the purview of philosophy is beyond me. But he’s set himself up in a “ministry” and apparently that is all it takes, within Christianity, to become some sort of “expert” on philosophy.

Today’s [sic]-fest comes from Petersen’s 28. Q + A: The Fallacy of Pure-Self Reference [sic] (right – he doesn’t even get the hyphen correct!). In this “Q + A,” Petersen feigns to have the acumen to address a question about the fallacy of pure self-reference (notice where the hyphen goes).

The Primacy of Existence vs. the Prior Certainty of Consciousness

Recently I posted a lengthy blog entry comprehensively analyzing a Youtube video titled Why The Primacy of Existence Is No Problem For Any Presuppositionalist by someone calling himself “Ozymandias Ramses II” – or simply “Ozy” – who apparently has a number of videos discussing presuppositionalism.

In my examination of what Ozy states in that video, I found a number of outstanding errors, errors which bring into question Ozy’s familiarity with Objectivism, and I set out to correct them in that examination.

Yesterday I received two comments responding to my blog entry by one or more anonymous visitors to my blog. Both comments are posted by “Unknown,” and the commenter did not sign his or her posts with a name. The second comment appears to be an elaboration on the initial one, and it came before the first one was published on my blog for visitors to read. So all indicators are that both comments were submitted by the same author.

Answering Jason Lisle on the Reliability of the Senses

On page two of the comments section of his blog entry Are You Epistemologically Self-Conscious? Christian apologist Jason Lisle has challenged non-Christian visitors to his blog to explain how they know that the senses are reliable. This is a theme which appears in the main entry itself, where Lisle wrote:

Some people might suppose that our sensory organs are reliable because they have survival value. But this does not follow logically. Chlorophyll has survival value in plants; but this does not imply that chlorophyll reliably informs the plant about the outside world.

In response to this, commenter Zilch asked (September 18, 2013):

I don’t know anyone, naturalist or theist, who supposes that our sensory organs have survival value because they provide us with energy from sunlight- do you?

Replying to Zilch, Jason Lisle embedded the following insertion:

You seem to have misunderstood. The question is: "How do we know that our senses are basically reliable[?]"

Apologists for Christianity raise this question in their exchanges with non-Christians quite frequently, and I have previously addressed the matter on my blog: see my entry On the Validity of the Senses in which I answer Dan Marvin’s attempts to make apologetic use of this matter. In that blog, I address the predictable example of a stick dunked in a glass of water appearing to be bent as an attack on the senses, which is actually a testament to their reliability. Doubting the validity of the senses goes back to ancient skeptics such as Pyrrho, who advocated that since we cannot know anything, we should retreat into “noncommittal silence, with respect to all things” (W.L. Reese, Dictionary of Philosophy and Religion, sv. ‘Pyrrho’, p. 622).

A Reply to Matthias on Subjectivism and the Believer

This is the sixth and final installment in my interaction with a comment which Matthias McMahon of Choosing Hats posted on my blog Confessions of a Vantillian Subjectivist. In this entry, I explore the question of how subjectivism may express itself in the believer’s worldview affirmations. My original blog entry explains how subjectivism in metaphysics is indispensable to the Christian worldview: it affirms the existence of a conscious subject which creates its own objects, zaps physical things into being, alters their identity, controls their actions, etc., all by an act of will. Thus in terms of the subject-object relationship according to such teachings, the subject of consciousness holds metaphysical primacy over its objects. In previous interactions with Matthias’ comment in this series of blog entries, I have explored this matter further and cited additional evidence to confirm this observation of Christian metaphysics.

Of course, subjectivism in metaphysics leads to subjectivism in epistemology. Man’s knowledge needs a source of inputs informing it. How does he acquire these inputs? The objective approach is the epistemological model by which man looks outward at the facts of reality which exist and are what they are independent of his conscious activity. The task of consciousness in this case is to perceive, identify and integrate the facts he discovers by looking outward. This approach is called objective because it rests explicitly on and is guided by the recognition that the objects of consciousness exist and are what they are independent of conscious activity. In terms of the subject-object relationship, then, the objects of consciousness hold metaphysical primacy.

But, as has been indicated so far, and as we shall see confirmed below, the believer does not acquire input for his god-beliefs by looking outward at the world. When we look outward at the world, we do not find any gods or consciousnesses which can zap physical things into existence or alter the identity of objects by an act of will. On the contrary, to find these things, the believer must look inward, consulting the contents of his imagination, his preferences, his wishing, his emotions, etc., and calling it “revelation.” In such a way we find that subjectivism in metaphysics necessitates subjectivism in epistemology.

Below I will explore how subjectivism can manifest itself in the believer’s worldview claims, survey various expressions of subjectivism, and highlight examples from the Christian bible which both model and encourage subjectivism in the believer’s own interaction with reality.

A Reply to Matthias on "Analogous Knowledge"

I continue now with my reply to Matthias McMahon. In the present installment, I explore some of the premises and implications of the Christian view that man’s knowledge is somehow “analogous” to the “knowledge” which the Christian god is said to have. Drawing on some points which I have made in previous responses to Matthias (see here and here for example), I focus on two major areas: namely the issue of metaphysical primacy (i.e., as it pertains to the relationship between the subject of consciousness and its objects) and the nature of conceptual identification.

In my blog Confessions of a Vantillian Subjectivst, I noted that “there are fundamental qualitative differences between man’s knowledge and the Christian god’s so-called ‘knowledge,’” focusing on the antithetical nature of their respective subject-object relationships (namely the primacy of existence in the case of man, and the primacy of consciousness in the case of the Christian god, given Christianity’s descriptions of it).

In essence, I argued that

(a) since man is neither omniscient nor infallible, he needs a means of gathering and validating his knowledge, and since the objects of his knowledge are not creations of his conscious activity or conform to his conscious intensions, he need to look outward at the world to acquire knowledge of these objects, which means that the method by which he acquires and validates his knowledge must be objective in nature (e.g., not based on his emotions, preferences, likes or dislikes, wishes, commands, imagination, dreams, etc.), and 

(b) since the Christian god is supposed to be both omniscient and infallible, it would not need any means of gathering and validating knowledge, and since the objects of its “knowledge” are supposed to be creations of its conscious activity and conform to its conscious intensions, it would not need to look outward for the content of its “knowledge”

there is therefore no analogous relationship between human knowers and the objects of their knowledge of them on the one hand, and the Christian god and the objects of its “knowledge” of them.

On the Validity of the Senses

D.A.N. of Debunking Atheists recently posted some comments on my blog Incinerating Presuppositionalism: Year Eight. In his 28 March reaction to the entry marking the anniversary of my blog’s inception, D.A.N. wrote:

I am cheering the day you abandon this blog to renounce your current autonomous and fallible reasoning as faulty, and worship the God you know exists. That is worth celebrating.

In part of my response to this statement, I wrote:

you insinuate that “my reasoning is faulty,” but you cite no example from my writings as evidence to support this. Is this because you have no example to support this? Or, is it because you think there is so much evidence that it should be self-apparent to anyone reading your comment?

Then D.A.N. in turn replied:

Well, you tell me, is it viciously circular to employ your senses and reasoning to validate your senses and reasoning?

Now, D.A.N. made the insinuation that my reasoning is faulty, and I noted that he produced no evidence to support that insinuation. And even after I point out the fact that he provided no support for his charge, he still fails even to make an attempt to provide support in his response. Instead of substantiating his claim, he asks me whether or not it is “viciously circular to employ your senses and reasoning to validate your senses and reasoning,” which does not strike me as relevantly supporting the characterization of my reasoning which he published on my blog. But in spite of this, I am willing to explore the matter.

A Reply to Dustin Segers’ Dismantled Blog Entry on Objectivism

Dustin Segers, who attempted to refute the primacy of existence in a podcast with Sye Ten Bruggencate and the folks at Fundamentally Flawed, also posted an entry on his blog restating and to some extent elaborating on the refutations he gave in that podcast. Unfortunately Segers has subsequently decided to remove his blog entry after I brought to his attention that he had made a fundamental error (namely confusing the principle of the secondary objectivity of consciousness with the primacy of existence). This was not what I had expected or even desired, for it is always good to have examples of failed critiques of Objectivism on the web to learn from.

Luckily I was able to save a copy of Segers’ post before he removed it from his blog. I have reposted it on my personal website here: Dustin Segers’ Failed Attempt to Refute the Primacy of Existence. My repost of Segers’ blog entry includes all the comments which I know were submitted to his blog, including his own final comment announcing his decision to take it down.

Has the Primacy of Existence Been Refuted?

Theists who are aware of Objectivism are right to be concerned with the devastating implications which the principle of the primacy of existence has for their religious worldview. So it should come as no surprise when Christian apologists try to find some way of destroying the primacy of existence.

Once such attempt was recently executed by Christian apologist Dustin Segers, who posts under the moniker “Dusman” on various blogs. Segers’ comments can be found in this episode of a podcast program called Fundamentally Flawed. In this blog I will examine Segers’ four-point attempt to refute the primacy of existence.

Another Reply to Andrew Louis

This is in response to Andrew Louis’ recent blog entry responding to my blog.

Andrew wrote, quoting me:

”Again, not [a correspondence] between concepts and reality as in ‘the thing in itself’ (Kant’s ‘Ding an sich’), but between concepts and the things which we perceive.” That couples nicely with “There is reality, and there is our consciousness of reality, and there is the relationship between the two.” Couple that with “whereas according to representationalism we perceive ‘appearances’ of things, i.e., not the things themselves.

In response to these points, Andrew wrote:

If I gather you correctly then, what you call ‘the thing itself’, is that which exists (mabye a bad word there) in perception, not reality.

Andrew, what makes you think that this is what I’m saying? Where have I dichotomized objects of perception from reality in this manner? On the contrary: if the objects did not exist (in reality), we wouldn’t be able to perceive them in the first place. As I have maintained consistently throughout the discussion: perception gives us direct awareness of objects – of things which exist, of things that are in reality.

Andrew:

You grant (as I would as well) that there's a world out there, but that we do not (in speaking of truth and facts) mirror the way the world is in itself.

There’s a world out there, and we’re part of it, we perceive it, and we identify it (if we choose to). I already spoke to the “mirror” analogy in my blog. Did you see that part?

Andrew:

Furthermore, if I gather you properly, you're stating [e.g.] that there are rocks in reality, however the truths that we speak about them relate not to them as they are in themselves, but to them as they relate to the relationship between us and reality, i.e. in perception.

No, you haven’t understood me correctly. What you’re describing is Kantianism. Kant distinguishes between the world out there (the “noumenal realm”) and what we perceive (the “phenomenal realm”). Your clause “as they are in themselves” (and have tried twice now to correct this) as well as the disjunction you apparently think I’ve affirmed, give this away. Objectivism rejects this view. On the contrary: objects exist, we perceive them, and we perceive them directly. The view you’re describing is as silly as saying that we can enter New York City on I-80, but we can’t enter New York City as it is “in itself.”

There are rocks in reality, and the statements we make about those rocks can only be true if we follow an objective process of identifying them. If we use some subjective method (i.e., some procedure which ignores the fact that existence exists independent of consciousness), then we won’t be identifying the rocks we perceive. Rather, we will essentially be fantasizing. At root, this is the problem which plagues Christianity.

Andrew:

I have no overwhelming issue with that either

With what you described? You should.

Andrew:

The volitional/active portion of cognition is what supplies the reasons for believing the things we do

Not on my view. On my view, the facts of reality supply the reasons for believing the things that I believe. As a volitional consciousness, I have to make the choice to go with the facts, or to ignore them.

Andrew:

Let me throw this out there; I'm with Richard Rorty when he says that beliefs are not representations, but rather habits of action;

Does he say this about all beliefs of all men? How could he know this? (I’m not saying he can’t; just wondering how he does.) I think people do generally automatize many of their belief patterns, but they were not originally habitual. We had to learn them at some point. And even then, one must have capacity to form concepts and subsume new units into their content.

For instance, if I have developed a habit of fearing loose dogs – i.e., the belief that a loose dog can be dangerous – when I encounter a loose dog I’ve never seen before, I can identify it as a dog and integrate into the sum of my knowledge (including, relevantly, my belief that it could be dangerous) only if my beliefs have a conceptual basis.

I’m not an expert on Rorty, but I’m sure even he would grant at least some of what I’m saying here.

Mind you, I tend to see belief as a degree of confidence in a claim, namely a degree falling short of certainty. If my co-worker asks, for instance, where the boss is, I might reply that I *believe* he went to lunch. By stating it this way, I’m tacitly communicating to my co-worker that I think this, but also that I’m not sure.

Similarly, if I encounter a loose dog, I believe it may be dangerous, but I’m not certain. It may be a really dopey, friendly dog who comes running up to me to make friends. It’s happened before, and such counter-examples are integrated into my beliefs.

Andrew:

and that words are not representations, but tools.

On Rorty’s view, what’s the relationship between words and concepts? Or would he say there’s no relationship there to begin with?

Andrew:

Furthermore I'd add that the manner with which we define things to be (or talk about things, the nature of our discourse) is related not to the way the world is in itself, but according to how things best suit our current needs and interests.

Actually, we do not define things – i.e., the particulars that exist in the world. We define the concepts we form to identify and integrate those things.

Andrew:

To say that the world causes us to have beliefs is simply to recognize that there is a world out there that's ultimately going to push us around in ways that are not under our control.

The world does not push us around to believe certain things. The diversity of thought throughout mankind’s history shows at least this.

But causality is a strict taskmaster. So is the pleasure/pain mechanism built into our biology. A person will feel pain when he touches a hot stove. If he doesn’t want to feel the pain again, he would do well to identify its cause. Nevertheless, he’s still free to concoct the belief that the pain he experiences was caused by a group of invisible gremlins hiding behind the pot. There’s nothing in reality that’s going to come into his mind and stop him from confusing what he imagines with what is real. That’s why religion can persist so apparently unchecked.

Andrew:

I think where there would ultimately be a hang up between you and I is your idea of an objective process of identification as a means of ascribing truth, and how far that stretches.

Fine. I’ll go the way of objective identification, you go the way of… whatever. Deal? Just understand that the way of objective identification is not Platonic, nor is it “on par” with anything involved in Sye’s worldview when I affirm that truth is absolute.

Andrew:

Secondly, I don't see the need (as a pragmatist) to hold to the axioms you do.

In addition to telling us where knowledge begins, the axioms demarcate the relationship between consciousness and its objects, and thus explain why, for instance, the imaginary is not real. You don’t see the need for this? Neither does Sye.

In the comments section of my blog, visitor OpenlyAtheist wrote the following:

As for the axiomatic nature of the senses; whenever an apologist pulls some such Plantinga-type move, I simply point out that anyone attempting to convince me my senses aren't reliable makes use of those very senses in presenting their argument to me.

Andrew responded:

This all hangs upon what one means by the senses and consciousness.. If one defines consciousness and the senses as on par with a mental state which aligns itself with (say) a “feeling” (as in, I feel that I'm conscious as I'm perceiving) as opposed to a more behaviorist/objective approach that simply says consciousness is “what we observe” [simply] in other people as they interact with their environment, then you're begging the question and/or presupposing that someone else has such feelings.

Consciousness is the faculty of awareness. It is essentially active in nature. Perception is man’s means of acquiring awareness of the world. Knowledge is knowledge of objects, of reality, of things that exist. In order to acquire knowledge of things that exist, a subject must have awareness of those things. Man has awareness of the things in his environment by means of perception. Perception thus precedes knowledge.

Is a man “begging the question” just by perceiving an object? Of course not. His perception of the object is not an argument, nor is it an inference from some prior non-sensory (or nonsensical) knowledge. Is he begging the question by grasping the fact that he’s perceiving an object? No, he’s not. He did not need to argue his way to this awareness. All he needed to do was recognize the fact that he’s perceiving something, which – like perception – is itself a form of direct awareness called introspection. Nor is he begging the question by identifying the faculty which he has observed in himself. Moreover, he is not begging the question when he observes other human beings possessing sensory organs and actions analogous to his own in response to how those sense organs are stimulated, and inferring from this that those other human beings must therefore possess a faculty of awareness analogous to his own. What premise would he be affirming in such an argument that assumes the truth of its own conclusion? Blank out.

Even if one wants to argue that OpenlyAtheist’s point here begs the question, his statement can easily be modified to bypass this objection completely and still accomplish its intended end. He could simply point out that anyone attempting to convince him that his senses aren’t reliable requires him (OpenlyAtheist himself) to make use of those very senses in learning what that argument may be, thus performatively defeating itself. OpenlyAtheist would have either to look at some text and read it (thus requiring him to use his eyes – the sense organs associated with sight), or listen to some speech and comprehend it (thus requiring him to use his ears – the sense organs associated with hearing). (Similarly, if he were blind and had to discover the nature of the argument through Braille, he would still be relying on his sense of touch.) Thus the argument could be coming from a robot which has no consciousness of its own, and yet OpenlyAtheist still needs to rely on those very senses which the argument is trying to undermine. Thus even to have awareness of the argument, means that his senses had to be functioning.

As Peikoff points out:

The validity of the senses is not an independent axiom; it is a corollary of the fact of consciousness. (As we have seen, it is only by grasping the action of his senses that a child is able to reach the implicit concept of consciousness.) If man is conscious of that which is, then his means of awareness are means of awareness, i.e., are valid. One cannot affirm consciousness while denying its primary form, which makes all the others possible. Just as any attack on consciousness negates itself, so does any attack on the senses. If the senses are not valid, neither are any concepts, including the ones used in the attack. (Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, p. 39)

Andrew continued:

This runs along the lines of a comment I made earlier in that, you cannot prove with certainty that someone else loves you, you cannot prove they're experiencing a certain mental state.

A person can prove his or her love for someone else. Love is not an isolated emotion locked away in the chambers of some remote mental sphere with no external manifestation. Love is devotion to one’s values, and this can be proven beyond any and all doubt through one’s actions in relation to those values he loves.

Andrew:

The only thing we can say is that “behaviors” we associate with love are reflected in a certain person, and from that infer certain behavioral patterns from them in the future.

I don’t think we’d need to “infer certain behavioral patterns… in the future” to know that someone loves something or someone in the present. Love is not merely some fleeting emotion, but in fact a response to one’s own values. Human beings need values in order to live, and one’s loyalty to his own values is observable in his actions regarding those values. The connection between love and “behavior” (or, more broadly, one’s choices and actions) is found in the fact that he values and in what he values.

Andrew:

In other words I'm making a distinction between consciousness as an internal state, and consciousness as an observed behavior.

Why restrict yourself to these two options? Why not think of consciousness as an active faculty of awareness? Why not recognize that consciousness requires means of consciousness, namely perception?

If we are distinguishing things in our awareness, then we are perceiving. In other words, simply distinguishing one object from another is all the “evidence” one needs to vouchsafe the reliability of his senses. Because that’s their job: to give us awareness of objects as entities distinct from one another.

As for Andrew’s thought experiments regarding artificial intelligence, I think it would be premature to wade into such issues, since there’s obviously so much that needs correcting and clarification on more fundamental matters. Besides, given what he did provide, I’d say there’s still far too little information to formulate the kinds of judgments he’s asking for.

by Dawson Bethrick

The Biological Nature of Consciousness

In May of this year, I got into a discussion with a Christian who posts under the moniker “danielj” over on Choosing Hats regarding the biological nature of consciousness. Throughout the discussion danielj, a Christian, was trying to find ways to challenge my view that consciousness is biological, but he never was able to demonstrate that consciousness is something other than biological.

In this post, I have pasted my contributions to this discussion, since numerous issues were raised that are of significance to the proper understanding of the nature of consciousness. Since the nature of consciousness is of central concern to my anti-apologetic critique of the Christian worldview, this post will make available in one source many ideas pertaining to the nature of consciousness which inform a significant concern in the overall critique of theistic worldviews.

It all started with a question posed by danielj on 10 May 2010:

Does consciousness not exist?

My response to this was:

Yes, consciousness does exist. You need to be conscious just in order for you to ask the question. None of the points which I have raised is incompatible with this fact.

However, consciousness does *not* hold metaphysical primacy.

danielj apparently did not understand what the issue of metaphysical primacy is, for he then asked:

If consciousness exists how is it that it is exempted from the primacy extended to every other existing thing?

When did consciousness start existing if not with every other existing thing?

My responses to danielj thus follow:

Consciousness exists only in relationship to some object. Consciousness is consciousness of something, of some object. Hence we have the subject-object relationship. To affirm the primacy of consciousness is to affirm the primacy of the subject in the subject-object relationship, which is to affirm subjectivism.

There is no evidence which suggests that consciousness has always existed with every other existing thing. Consciousness is an attribute only of a certain class of existents, namely living organisms. Rocks, for instance, do not possess consciousness. Planets do not possess consciousness, nor do asteroids, quasars, protons, etc.

If you think consciousness holds metaphysical primacy, can you explain why, and point to some evidence which supports your view (especially without committing the fallacy of the stolen concept)?

Danielj wrote: “How exactly did things without any sort of proto consciousness (rocks, protons, etc.) combine to form consciousness and where does this ‘consciousness’ reside?”

Generally speaking, they did this by means of causality. What is the specific process? That is a scientific question. I am not a scientist, and I do not profess to know. I don’t see what relevance it has to the issue. Regardless of how some biological organisms developed the attribute of consciousness, consciousness is still consciousness of something and therefore still exists in a relationship with an object (or many objects, as the case may be). Do you suppose there’s such a thing as consciousness of nothing? How could it qualify as consciousness?

Danielj: “It must reside outside the bounds of ‘existence’ since the things that human beings are made of have no consciousness in and of themselves.”

The notion that something “reside[s] outside the bounds of existence” is incoherent. This is saying that something exists but yet is not included in the sum total of what exists. Also, that consciousness “must reside outside the bounds of ‘existence’” does not follow from the fact that the various parts which make up human beings are not themselves conscious. My spleen, for instance, does not have its own consciousness, and neither does my elbow. These are attributes of me as an entity, just as consciousness is. Consciousness, mind you, is not an entity in itself, but an attribute of some entity (namely biological organisms).

Danielj wrote: “How does the combination of biology and causality produce consciousness?”

The question essentially answers itself: The process by which an organism develops consciousness of objects is both biological and causal. You have flat out denied that consciousness develops, but did not provide an argument for this. When a fetus develops in the womb, it develops from a fertilized egg. At the stage of a fertilized egg, there is no heartbeat, but eventually it develops a heart. At the stage of a fertilized egg, it has no sensory organs, so it has no means of perceiving anything, and thus has no capacity for consciousness. But it does develop these organs, and these organs are what give it the capacity to perceive, to be conscious of objects. Why would you think that a biological organism does not develop consciousness? Do you think that an organism was conscious before it existed?

Danielj: “If consciousness is indeed reducible to biology…”

I don’t think consciousness “reduces” to biology; to say this would imply that consciousness is non-biological. Consciousness *is* biological. How could it be otherwise? All organisms which possess consciousness have in common the fact that they have sensory organs which give the organism the capacity to be conscious of objects.

Danielj: “and it is merely a scientific question then we are just plants.”

Human beings are not plants. But both human beings and plants are biological organisms. I don’t think there are any plants that possess the attribute of consciousness. But many species in the animal kingdom do.

Danielj: “Concept formation is photosynthesis and free will is an illusion.”

Incorrect. Concept-formation is not photosynthesis. Anyone who understands both would know this. Concept-formation is volitional and requires a consciousness capable of selectively isolating specific objects and integrating them into mental units. This is not the task of photosynthesis.

Danielj: “You’ve denied proto consciousness and proto intentionality as well."

Hmmm… I don’t recall doing so. Where do you think I “denied proto consciousness and proto intentionality”?

Danielj: “There is no 1/2 consciousness or self-consciousness by your own method.”

Specifically, what do you know of my method? What makes you suppose that there’s no self-consciousness “by my own method”? With higher organisms (such as human beings), consciousness can be a secondary object – i.e., consciousness of itself. We are exhibiting this ability right here in our discussion. What makes you think my position denies this? Or do you find it expedient to put words into my mouth for some reason?

Danielj: “It does not follow from the intentionality of consciousness that existence has metaphysical primacy no matter how many times and in how many ways you repeat it.”

The primacy of existence is not a conclusion of prior inference. It does not “follow” from some prior set of affirmations. Rather, it is implicit in any affirmation (which is part of the reason why theism is self-contradictory at the fundamental level.) I’ve written much on axioms. Apparently you’ve not examined what I’ve said, or you did not read it very carefully.

Danielj: “Consciousness is not a sufficient condition for existence? So what?”

Existence is not borne on conditions. Those conditions would have to exist. To say that certain conditions had to be met for existence to exist, would be to say that those conditions had to exist in order for existence to exist. The idea commits the fallacy of the stolen concept.

Danielj: “Existence isn’t a sufficient condition for consciousness either.”

So, you think something other than existence needs to exist in order for consciousness to exist? Please elaborate.

Danielj: “If existence isn’t a sufficient condition for consciousness than [sic] consciousness simply could not have sprung into existence since no thing can ‘begin’ to exist according to your own philosophy.”

Consciousness begins the same way that other types of activity begin. When an organism senses an object, this is an action which begins at a certain point in time. The same for when an organism perceives. The same for when a man thinks. These are all species of a type of action. Consciousness is inherently active.

Danielj: “If you refuse to attribute eternal existence to consciousness you render your own system incoherent,”

How so? What would justify attributing eternal existence to consciousness? I know consciousness only as an attribute of some biological organisms, including but not restricted to man. Where do we find an eternally existing consciousness? Biological organisms procreate and die. Find one that is eternally conscious.

Danielj: “but, if you do attribute it, then you’ve admitted its ‘co-primacy’ at the very least.”

Even if you assume that consciousness is eternal, this would not validate the notion that the subject and object share metaphysical “co-primacy.” I suspect that you do not fully understand the issue of metaphysical primacy. Perhaps you could explain what “co-primacy’ between consciousness and its objects would be like.

Danielj: “Please correct any errors in my thinkin’ here.”

I’ve pointed out quite a few already.

I wrote: “Consciousness, mind you, is not an entity in itself, but an attribute of some entity (namely biological organisms).”

Danielj: “In light of the above – should you let it stand unrefuted – I consider this begging the question.”

How so? How is consciousness not an attribute of the entity which possesses it? Also, what conclusion am I assuming in the premises of any argument that I have presented?

Danielj: “Either consciousness exists or it doesn’t. If it does, than [sic] it has always existed like everything else in existence.”

Can you explain how you think this is supposed to follow?

Danielj: “How is it that only the ‘universe’ is eternal? What exactly do you even mean by ‘existence’ exists if things like biology and consciousness are allowed to simply spring into existence out of non-existence?”

I’ve written on many of these topics on my blog. You might want to check it out as you’ve stumbled quite severely if you think your statements have been representative of my position.

I wrote: “You have flat out denied that consciousness develops, but did not provide an argument for this.”

Danielj responded: “You denied it. There is nothing in between consciousness and unconsciousness so there can be nothing that leads up to consciousness.”

Where did I deny that consciousness develops? Didn’t you read what I wrote?

I wrote: “When a fetus develops in the womb, it develops from a fertilized egg. …. Why would you think that a biological organism does not develop consciousness?”

Danielj responded: “You’re missing the point.”

Which point am I missing? Please be specific, especially if you’re going to level accusations like this.

Danielj asked: “Does consciousness equal sensation like you appear to be saying here?”

Sensation is one form of consciousness. Do you think that sensation is not a form of consciousness?

I wrote: “Consciousness *is* biological.”

Danielj responded: “Then the will is not free.”

What do you mean by “free,” and how does your claim follow from the fact that consciousness is biological? It’s not self-evident.

I asked: “How could it be otherwise?”

Danielj responded: “Well, gee…. Think about that for a second. How could the universe possibly be otherwise? Does ANYBODY here have any theories?”

Do you have any arguments to back up your claims? Or just questions? If you do not think consciousness is biological, what is it? Do you think it’s supernatural? If so, just say so. Let’s see how well you understand the matter. It’s clear that you do not accept the primacy of existence. Why not go all the way?

I wrote: “All organisms which possess consciousness have in common the fact that they have sensory organs which give the organism the capacity to be conscious of objects.”

Danielj asked: “So? How do you know that consciousness follows sensation?”

Sensation is a form of consciousness. If an organism is sensing something, it is conscious of that something in sensory form. It’s not a matter of consciousness “following” sensation.

Danielj asked: “Or are you equating the two?”

Again, sensation is a form of consciousness. So is perception. So is conceptualization. There are many forms of consciousness. This is basic stuff. Ask yourself this, Danielj: Are you conscious of your surroundings? By what means are you conscious of them? In what form are your conscious of them? How are you conscious of them? Do you perceive them? When you are perceiving, are you still unconscious? What is your understanding of consciousness? Get it out in the open. Quit hiding.

Danielj wrote: “Even if it does, it doesn’t mean that is the only possible way that it could.”

What else do you have in mind? Again, please be specific. Inform your point.

Danielj continued: “One does not necessarily follow from the other.”

And as you can see, now that you’re learning a little more about my position (perhaps for the first time), I am not arguing that.

I wrote: “Anyone who understands both would know this. Concept-formation is volitional and requires a consciousness capable of selectively isolating specific objects and integrating them into mental units. This is not the task of photosynthesis.”

Danielj asserted: “If it is simply biology it cannot be volitional.”

Why not? What is your argument for this? What assumptions of yours are driving conclusions like this? I’m biological, and I have a volitional form of consciousness. Why can’t it be biological? Is it just that your conception of biological is so narrow that it arbitrarily excludes volition? Or do you think there’s a legitimate reason for this? If so, please state it.

Danielj asked: “How do the fetus’ organs add up to volition?”

I don’t understand the question. I don’t think I said that “organs *add up* to volition.” The sensory organs are the means by which an organism senses an object. This activity – sensation – is a form of consciousness.

Danielj asked: “How does biology give rise to volition?”

Are you asking for a blow by blow explanation of all the causal activity which allows a consciousness to regulate itself? If so, that’s well beyond the scope of a comments section discussion. You might start with Binswanger’s The Metaphysics of Consciousness at least to clear up some profound misunderstandings about consciousness. Once that’s done, there are other sources available for you to start investigating. But until you’ve corrected some of your more fundamental misunderstandings, you’re not ready for that.

Danielj asked: “Were there ever non-volitional humans?”

I don’t think so, given my definition of man. But on a broader definition, perhaps. But you’re asking about something which written history has not recorded, so this would require a lot of input from the sciences which I do not have at my disposal.

Danielj asserted: “Biology isn’t a sufficient condition for consciousness.”

Got any argument for this? Oh wait, take a look at what you wrote next:

Danielj wrote: “Do you understand this? Biology isn’t a sufficient condition for consciousness. Biology isn’t a sufficient condition for consciousness. Let it sink in…”

I guess you’re a student of the Sunday School understanding of reality: repeat a claim long enough until it “sinks in” and you *believe* it. You’re showing us your preferred method. No wonder you have so many misunderstandings.

Since you know so much about the necessary conditions for consciousness, can you identify them for us? If biology is not a sufficient condition for consciousness, can you tell us what is? Watch the stolen concepts!

I asked: “Specifically, what do you know of my method? What makes you suppose that there’s no self-consciousness ‘by my own method’?”

Danielj responded: “From what I read on your blog and in objectivist ‘literature’.”

Where did anything I write or that you found in the Objectivist literature deny man’s capacity for self-consciousness? That is the view you attributed to me. Where did you read this? Please, show me. I want to see.

Danielj wrote: “From henceforth, I shall refrain from attributing anything to you. It was hasty and wrong of me and bordering on a violation of the 9th.”

You’re showing that you’re at least a little teachable. But seriously, where did I deny man’s capacity for self-consciousness? If you did not read this in something that I wrote or that some other Objectivist wrote, why did you attribute this position to me? If you’re having difficulty being honest in our discussion, please say so. I see no reason to continue on with someone who will not be honest.

I wrote: “With higher organisms (such as human beings), consciousness can be a secondary object – i.e., consciousness of itself.”

Danielj: “Now you are defining into existence ‘secondary’ objects.”

You seem to have a real difficulty understanding my position. Do you understand what I mean by “secondary object” in the context of what I stated? I’m not “defining into existence ‘secondary’ objects.” My point is that consciousness must first be conscious of objects other than itself in order for it to be possible for consciousness to have itself as an object. This again is basic Objectivist 101 stuff. I don’t think you’ve read much Objectivist literature. Perhaps you’ve read criticisms of Objectivism; I have too: it’s not a good way to learn about what Objectivism really teaches.

Danielj asked: “Do these secondary objects exist?”

Consciousness exists. In the context of what I stated, consciousness would be the secondary object – an object of itself, consciousness turned inward on itself, just as we do when we contemplate how we became aware of something. But first we had to become aware of that something before we could contemplate how we became aware of it. There’s a hierarchical sequence of activity here. I didn’t realize that you needed such rudimentary information about what Objectivism teaches. What specifically have you read on Objectivism? (You intimated above that you’ve read Objectivist literature. Is that true?)

Danielj asked: “Is consciousness an object?”

It can be. Just as it is in our discussion. Do you understand what Objectivism means by ‘object’? Or, are you again trying to interpret Objectivism on your own unstated assumptions? What will that profit you?

I wrote: “We are exhibiting this ability right here in our discussion. What makes you think my position denies this? Or do you find it expedient to put words into my mouth for some reason?”

Danielj wrote: “Of course putting words into your mouth would be expedient (and I’ve got some very choice words for you) and funny, but I’ll refrain.”

Now that you’ve been caught red-handed, you’ve decided to refrain from this bad habit. Let’s see how long you can control it.

I wrote: “The primacy of existence is not a conclusion of prior inference.”

Danielj wrote: “It isn’t a valid conclusion”

It’s not a conclusion to begin with, Danielj. Do you not understand such basic issues?

Danielj wrote: “and is certainly, at the very most, a trivial ‘axiom’ as I pointed out in my last comment.”

Do you not recognize that you’re assuming the primacy of existence right here in this statement? Do you understand what the primacy of existence is?

Danielj wrote: “It is a stolen concept.”

Actually, the very charge that the primacy of existence is a stolen concept itself commits the fallacy of the stolen concept.

I suspect that you really don’t understand what you’re talking about, otherwise you’d not make such blunders.

Danielj had written: “If you refuse to attribute eternal existence to consciousness you render your own system incoherent,”

I asked: “How so?”

Danielj responded: “Then it wouldn’t be an object, wouldn’t fall under the ‘existence exists’ axiom and it wouldn’t exist.”

Are you assuming that something must be eternal to be an object? I’m not sure how else to understand where you’re coming from here. It’s certainly not what Objectivism teaches. So again I suspect you’ve not really ever read any Objectivist literature, at least on the present topic.

I wrote: “Even if you assume that consciousness is eternal, this would not validate the notion that the subject and object share metaphysical ‘co-primacy’. I suspect that you do not fully understand the issue of metaphysical primacy. Perhaps you could explain what ‘co-primacy’ between consciousness and its objects would be like.”

Danielj wrote: “Consciousness either exists or it doesn’t.”

It does.

Danielj wrote: “If it exists then it is just as ‘prime’ as existence. If it isn’t an object than it doesn’t exist.”

Danielj, you clearly do not understand the issue of metaphysical primacy. It’s important for you to recognize this now before you go on making such blunders like this.

Danielj wrote: “Consciousness is not a sufficient condition for existence and neither is existence a sufficient condition for consciousness, therefore, they are co-prime.”

Again, you’re not addressing metaphysical primacy here. None of this is. The issue of metaphysical primacy pertains to the proper orientation between a subject and its objects in the subject-object relationship. What you’re talking about here has nothing to do with this. You’re not even in the ball park, let alone on the playing field.

I asked: “How is consciousness not an attribute of the entity which possesses it?”

Danielj asked: “What kind of attribute is it?”

A kind which belongs to the entity which possesses it. Consciousness is its own type of attribute.

Danielj wrote: “I already brought this up and you chose not to address it.”

I’ve addressed everything you’ve stated that seem to bear on the topic at hand. Much of what you have stated suggests very strongly that you’re unfamiliar with even the basic tenets of Objectivism on the topic at hand. It’s unclear even what your position is, if it were laid out explicitly. For instance, when asked how consciousness is not an attribute of the entity which possesses it, you fail to deliver any kind of reasoning for your view, and instead just ask a question (“What kind of attribute is it?”).

Danielj wrote: “It isn’t observable in anyway [sic]”

Do you mean that consciousness is not observable “in *any* way”? Why do you suppose this? I’m observing my own consciousness introspectively. If I were not able to do this, I’d never be able to form concepts of consciousness. But clearly I have.

Danielj wrote: “and does not exist by that standard.”

Well, that just blew your position out of the water.

Danielj asked: “Does it smell funny? Is it orange? Is it hot?”

You seem to be assuming that only concepts which pertain to the level of sensation should be allowed to apply. But why? Are you stuck at that level of consciousness? Have you not explored your own consciousness beyond the level of sensations? I almost feel sorry for you.

Danielj : “Either consciousness exists or it doesn’t. If it does, than [sic] it has always existed like everything else in existence.”

I asked: “Can you explain how you think this is supposed to follow?”

Danielj wrote: “Firstly, please don’t pull that [sic] crap unless it is truly essential to your argument.”

I’ll do whatever the hell I want, even if you disapprove. Don’t get sore at me if you don’t understand the difference between “then” and “than.”

Danielj wrote: “It follows from your axiom Dawson. Existence exists. The universe exists and has always existed. Nothing can ‘begin’ to exist, come into existence, or ‘develop’. Maybe you need to better explain what you mean by existence exists instead of just sweeping your arms around in a grand gesture?”

I’ve explained this in numerous places on my blog. It’s in the Objectivist literature that you said you’ve read. And still you make some very boneheaded blunders. I thought you said you had read up on this stuff. Your statements clearly show otherwise.

I wrote: “I’ve written on many of these topics on my blog. You might want to check it out as you’ve stumbled quite severely if you think your statements have been representative of my position.”

Danielj wrote: “Well, maybe they aren’t then. I certainly don’t wanna misrepresent you and I’m sorry if I did.”

What is that you thought you were doing? What is that you want to do, if not misrepresent my position? I would accept your apology if you showed some genuine interest in avoiding this bad habit. But I’ve not seen it yet. You haven’t got any of the basics down, and flail away at straw men.

Danielj: “I’d prefer to watch objectivists struggle for dear life over at the Maverick Philosphers page.”

Yes, I remember that guy. He had a lot of trouble getting the basics of Objectivism correct. See for instance here: http://katholon.com/Vallicella.htm

You’ll see that even Vallicella is prone to misrepresenting Objectivism.

Danielj: “I don’t have any time to waste on your blog.”

You’re like a lot of theists. Suddenly you’re out of time when it comes to interacting with a position that poses a challenge to their theism.

Next?

I asked: “Where did I deny that consciousness develops? Didn’t you read what I wrote?”

Danielj responded: “What are the necessary elements of consciousness Dawson?”

Notice that Danielj does not show where I allegedly deny that consciousness develops. He said that I denied “proto consciousness,” but anyone who examines the record will see that I did not do this. It’s not even been discussed beyond his broaching of the notion.

As for the necessary elements of consciousness, I would list the following as bare minimums:

- To be conscious, an organism needs some means by which it acquires awareness of objects, e.g., sensory organs, a nervous system, a brain, etc.

- Consciousness requires an object to be conscious of (the notion of “consciousness of nothing” is a non-starter)

- Consciousness requires a purpose, e.g., as a means of survival for the organism possessing it.

Danielj asked: “Do you, or do you not agree that biology is not sufficient for consciousness?”

It’s not entirely clear to me what exactly this question is asking. Since consciousness is a biological phenomenon, an organism must have certain biological structures in order for it to be conscious. But not all biological organisms have these structures. So saying “biology is sufficient for consciousness” is somewhat broad and may be misunderstood. But if the biological organism has certain structures which give it consciousness of objects, then its biology is clearly sufficient in such cases.

I wrote: “Where did I deny that consciousness develops? Didn’t you read what I wrote?”

Danielj responded: “You didn’t explicitly deny it.”

No, I didn’t. I didn’t implicitly deny it either. My points about a fetus developing the organs needed for consciousness should clearly indicate that consciousness does develop, just as do heartbeat, respiration, circulation, etc. Consciousness is a biological function, just as these other functions are biological functions. Show us a non-biological entity which has consciousness (and actually exists). I am unaware of any.

Danielj wrote: “You equated sensation with it, then, you proceed to declare sensation a type of consciousness.”

My points have all along been consistent with the view that sensation is a type of consciousness.

Danielj wrote: “I believe that you do it implicitly and unintentionally.”

I asked you to show me where I denied a position, not what you happen to believe. At any rate, I hope you understand now.

I asked: “Do you think that sensation is not a form of consciousness?”

Danielj wrote: “No. I believe sensation is a part of and not a form of consciousness.”

For developed human beings, sensation is definitely part of our conscious experience. But this does not constitute a point of evidence against the recognition that sensation is a form of consciousness. Many organisms have not reached the perceptual level of consciousness, and have only sensation as their means of acquiring consciousness of objects. On Danielj’s view, these organisms are apparently not conscious. But this is arbitrary.

I asked: “What do you mean by “free,” and how does your claim follow from the fact that consciousness is biological? It’s not self-evident.”

Danielj responded: “I mean that biology is not sufficient for volition (or, freedom) which means that biology is not sufficient for consciousness.”

Notice that Danielj does not address my question. Instead, he simply asserts that “biology is not sufficient for volition,” without argument, perhaps because he “believes” that “biology is not sufficient for consciousness,” again a position for which he has provided no argument at all. I’m guessing that’s because he has a faith to defend.

Danielj continued: “I don’t think consciousness is biology. I’m accusing you of that belief which I believe to be an absurd belief.”

Either you do not understand what you read, or you are simply careless. I stated very clearly that consciousness is biological, not biology proper. Biology includes many other things, such as musculature, circulation, respiration, etc. So it’s unclear what you’re calling “an absurd belief.” Besides, on theistic grounds, what could possibly be “absurd”? You must be borrowing from my worldview. That would account for your clumsy use of the concept.

I asked: “Do you have any arguments to back up your claims? Or just questions?”

Danielj responded: “You know the arguments. You’ve proved you are capable of transcendental argumentation.”

I was specifically asking for you to provide some sort of argument (something more substantial than merely your belief or unsupported assertion) for the view that *if* consciousness is biological, “then the will is not free.” I’ve asked you to define your term “free,” which you failed to do, and I asked you to provide an argument for the view you have affirmed. But you produce no argument. Are you stalling so that you can think of one?

I wrote: “If you do not think consciousness is biological, what is it?”

Danielj responded: “It is a God given soul that supervenes on biology, or something. I don’t know exactly.”

Your god is imaginary, Danielj. If you choose to be honest to yourself one day, you will recognize this. I realize that it’s difficult right now.

I wrote: “It’s clear that you do not accept the primacy of existence. Why not go all the way?”

danielj stated: "You’re a genius! I’ve already tipped my hand in a wildly gesticulatory manner. I don’t accept the unequaled primacy of existence but I don’t go all the way on a first date Dawson.”

Again, I find I need to ask this: do you know what the primacy of existence means? To say that the primacy of existence is not true is in fact to assume its truth. Do you understand why? I’ve explained this from a variety of perspectives in a variety of contexts on my blog.

I wrote: “Sensation is a form of consciousness.”

Danielj asked: “How do you know that?”

By means of reason.

I wrote: “It’s not a matter of consciousness ‘following’ sensation.”

Danielj wrote: “Then it is a matter of consciousness following biology, which, as I’ve already tried to explain, is a dog that doesn’t hunt because biology isn’t a sufficient condition for consciousness.”

Your “explanation” has so far consisted simply of your unsupported denials. Do you think that dog hunts?

I wrote: “Again, sensation is a form of consciousness. So is perception. So is conceptualization.”

Danielj responded: “So one could sense without perceiving or conceptualizing?”

Yes. Many organisms have not reached the perceptual level of consciousness (and therefore not reached the conceptual level of consciousness as well). Moreover, many organisms have reached the perceptual level of consciousness, but have not achieved the ability to conceptualize.

Danielj wrote: “Conceptualize without seeing or perceiving?”

Human beings who have been blind from birth have been able to conceptualize without seeing, but they had to perceive in some form in order to conceptualize. Rand’s study of Helen Keller is remarkable on this topic.

Danielj wrote: “It seems to me that they all ‘add up’ to consciousness.”

You’re assuming strictly human consciousness. Human consciousness is not representative of the type of consciousness which all organisms possess. All biological organisms which possess consciousness have at least the level of sensations; many have the ability to perceive objects qua objects; so far as we can firmly establish, only human beings have achieved the conceptual level of consciousness. But all three levels are types of consciousness. Sensation is the most primitive species of consciousness; perception is more primitive than conceptual consciousness. Perceptual consciousness would not be possible without sensations, and conceptual consciousness would not be possible without perceptual consciousness.

I wrote: “There are many forms of consciousness.”

Danielj asked: “What else besides those three?”

When you get to the perceptual level, there is memory. Dogs, which operate on the perceptual level of consciousness, can remember how to get back to their owners homes, for instance. When you get to the conceptual level of consciousness, in addition to memory there is something called imagination. Many worldviews fail to equip their adherents to distinguish between reality and imagination properly.

I asked: “Are you assuming that something must be eternal to be an object?”

Danielj responded: “No.”

Then I’m having difficulty understanding what you stated.

Danielj asked: “Are do you assume that existence must be eternal for objects to be temporal?”

No. Did you think I was?

Danielj asserted: “If it is simply biology it cannot be volitional.”

I asked: “Why not? What is your argument for this? What assumptions of yours are driving conclusions like this? I’m biological, and I have a volitional form of consciousness. Why can’t it be biological? Is it just that your conception of biological is so narrow that it arbitrarily excludes volition? Or do you think there’s a legitimate reason for this? If so, please state it.”

Danielj wrote: “Biology is not sufficient for consciousness. Do you deny this?”

See above.

Danielj wrote: “If you do then I would suggest to you that plants are sentient and conscious and that alone serves as a reductio of your entire worldview.”

Again, see above.

Danielj wrote: “If you don’t then I would suggest to you that consciousness is biology in addition to something else.”

No, organisms which possess consciousness are still biological organisms. There’s no “in addition” here.

I wrote: “You might start with Binswanger’s The Metaphysics of Consciousness”

Danielj wrote: “I’ll check it out.”

You will?

Danielj wrote: “I was thoroughly disappointed with your last recommendation to me (or perhaps it was recommended by somebody who frequents your blog), Piekoff’s Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand.”

That’s a great book!

I asked: “Where did anything I write or that you found in the Objectivist literature deny man’s capacity for self-consciousness? That is the view you attributed to me. Where did you read this? Please, show me. I want to see.”

Danielj wrote: “Let’s get off this whole train. I was simply affirming in my own way that you (and all objectivists) deny the ‘primacy of consciousness’ as you call it. It was unimportant and isn’t truly germane.”

So, are you taking back your claim that I deny man’s capacity for self-consciousness?

I wrote: “My point is that consciousness must first be conscious of objects other than itself in order for it to be possible for consciousness to have itself as an object.”

Danielj wrote: “Please define object.”

For the purposes of the topic of our conversation, an object is any thing (be it an entity, an attribute, an action, a relationship, etc.) of which one is conscious, whether by means of sensation, perception or conceptualization.

Danielj asked: “Do believe in proto consciousness of any kind?”

It depends on what “proto consciousness” refers to. This has not been explained.

Danielj wrote: “Do you believe in proto consciousness now?”

Again, it depends on what it is taken to refer to. At this point it is just as undefined as when you first introduced it. Do you ever explain your terms?

Danielj wrote: “Strange, since you are an objectivist, that you didn’t start with two here.”

Why do you find that strange? I was not listing them in any particular order. All three are necessary elements.

Danielj asked: “So consciousness is biology plus an object (which would reduce to existence in my opinion) plus a purpose?”

Purpose is concurrent with biology, Danielj. Non-living things are not inherently purposive.

Danielj wrote: “That is still just biology Dawson.”

Yep. As I said: consciousness is biological. I’ve asked for you to name one non-biological thing which actually exists and possesses consciousness. You’ve not produced it.

Danielj wrote: “You’ve also introduced the superfluous notion of ‘purpose’ as well.”

You asked me to identify the criteria necessary for consciousness. How is purpose superfluous? Purpose is concurrent with biology because goal-orientation is inherently biological. Living organisms pursue goals; this is part of their living condition. It is not superfluous in any way. Non-living things do not pursue goals.

Danielj wrote: “Purpose isn’t an object and it does not exist. It is a convenient, ad-hoc invention of yours.”

You’re speaking autobiographically here, showing us how little you understand about purpose. Purpose refers to a condition which is present in biology.

Danielj wrote: “The extremely simple question: Is biology alone a sufficient condition for consciousness?

And I addressed this. Let me spell it out for you: if an organism possesses consciousness, then clearly its biology is a sufficient condition for consciousness. Try to understand that there’s a context here.

I wrote: “But not all biological organisms have these structures. So saying “biology is sufficient for consciousness” is somewhat broad and may be misunderstood.”

Danielj wrote: “That is because it isn’t a sufficient condition for consciousness.”

Again, you’re misleading yourself. We can only address the question on a case by case basis, taking into account the particulars of an organism’s biology (since that’s what the question is asking about). A plant for instance lacks the necessary biological structures for sensation. Thus, its biology is insufficient for consciousness. A dog, however, does have the biological structures which give it the ability to perceive. Thus its biology clearly is sufficient for perception. You’re arbitrarily looking for a one-size-fits-all rule which ignores the context of various situations found in nature.

It’s like asking: “Is biology sufficient for flight?” Well, some organisms’ biology is sufficient for flight, while others are not. To salvage any hope for objective meaning to your question, it should be revised. For instance, *which* organism’s biology is sufficient for consciousness? Answer: those organisms which possess consciousness. Show me an organism which possesses consciousness and yet whose biology is insufficient for consciousness. If you can’t do this, then my position on the matter remains unchallenged.

I wrote: “But if the biological organism has certain structures which give it consciousness of objects, then its biology is clearly sufficient in such cases.”

Danielj responded: “That just does not follow from the simple fact that it is not sufficient in other cases.”

Again, you’re looking for something completely arbitrary here. Why wouldn’t we take into account the particulars of each case, from species to species, in considering the question? Each organism has its own biological identity. Why arbitrarily ignore this fact?

I wrote: “For developed human beings, sensation is definitely part of our conscious experience. But this does not constitute a point of evidence against the recognition that sensation is a form of consciousness. Many organisms have not reached the perceptual level of consciousness, and have only sensation as their means of acquiring consciousness of objects. On Danielj’s view, these organisms are apparently not conscious. But this is arbitrary.”

Danielj wrote: “So, sensation isn’t a sufficient condition for perception or concept-formation? Sensation, in addition to what, is sufficient for perception?”

There is a profound distinction between sensation and perception, just as there is a profound distinction between perception and conceptualization. A minimum requirement for perception is the ability to integrate sensations into a single unit, giving an entity awareness of entities qua entities. This ability is biological, but not all organisms have this. A minimum requirement for conceptualization is the ability to integrate percepts into open-ended unities by a process of abstraction. This ability is biological, but not all organisms have this.

I asked: “So, are you taking back your claim that I deny man’s capacity for self-consciousness?”

Danielj responded: “No, because what I ultimately meant was that you deny, what you would call, the primacy of consciousness.”

Oh, of course I deny the primacy of existence. Performatively, you do too. Only you don’t realize it yet.

But if you’re equating self-consciousness with the primacy of consciousness, or somehow think these are one and the same, or suppose that denying the primacy of consciousness entails or is tantamount a denial of self-consciousness, then clearly you’re confused on the meaning of at least one of these concepts. From what I’ve seen, it’s very possible that you’re confused on both.

I asked: “No. Did you think I was?”

Danielj wrote: “You don’t believe that existence exists and has done so eternally?”

Of course, existence is eternal. Time presupposes existence.

But that is not what you were asking. You asked: “Are do you assume that existence must be eternal for objects to be temporal?” And in response to this question, I answered no, because I don’t assume that existence must be eternal (in order) for objects to be temporal.

I wrote: “the notion of 'consciousness of nothing' is a non-starter."

Danielj asked: “I’m not sure I agree with this either. Isn’t ‘nothing’ a concept? Isn’t ‘things that don’t exist’ a concept as well?”

You’re confusing yourself. I was not stating that consciousness *of the concept ‘nothing’* is a non-starter. Rather, my point was that the notion of a consciousness without an object to be conscious of is a non-starter. It’s a contradiction in terms. You wouldn’t say that an organism is conscious, and then say “Well, it’s not conscious of anything.” If it’s not conscious of anything (i.e., no objects), how can one say it’s conscious?

I wrote: “Purpose is concurrent with biology, Danielj. Non-living things are not inherently purposive.”

Danielj asked: “Purpose, like purposeful? Like volitional?”

Not all purpose is volitional. In fact, statistically speaking, very little is volitional. For instance, your heart beats for a purpose, but it is not regulated by volition. A plant’s roots pull water and nutrients from the ground for a purpose, but this action is not volitionally initiated.

I wrote: “And I addressed this. Let me spell it out for you: if an organism possesses consciousness, then clearly its biology is a sufficient condition for consciousness. Try to understand that there’s a context here.”

Danielj asked: “You’ll now admit that consciousness reduces to biology?”

I’ve addressed this already. My position has not changed. Scroll up and read again if you did not catch it the first time.

I wrote: “For instance, your heart beats for a purpose, but it is not regulated by volition.”

Danielj asked: “What purpose is that? To pump blood? For what purpose is the heart pumping blood? Are you admitting final causes here?”

I thought you said you had read Objectivist literature. You don’t seem familiar with Objectivism at all.

“…admitting final causes…”? What do you mean “admitting”? With rhetoric like this, you make it sound like you think I’m making some kind of concession here. But if you were familiar with Objectivism, you wouldn’t do this (unless you simply insisted on being dishonest).

According to Objectivism, life is an end in itself. The organism’s actions are purposive in that they serve to meet the goal of living life.

Danielj wrote: “If human beings are purely and entirely circumscribed by their biology,”

I’m not sure what you mean by “purely and entirely circumscribed by their biology.” You make it sound as though human beings were some kind of alien substance encased in meat, implying that they are really something other than biological. If you do not think human beings are biological organisms, would you state this explicitly for the record? You don’t have to explain why – I already know that you embrace the primacy of consciousness.

Danielj wrote: “I fail to see how you aren’t just a run-o-the-mill materialist.”

Yes, there is much that you fail to see, Danielj. I submit that this is because you ascribe to a worldview which systemically stifles your understanding of reality.

by Dawson Bethrick