Saturday, May 17, 2008

God the Father: A God of Love?

The following description of the Christian god was sent to me by a faithful believer, but what is stated here is by no means unique to this individual believer. It tells us all we need to know about the Christian worldview in a nutshell:

He allowed His own Son to be tortured, mocked, spit upon and beaten beyond recognition, then crucified on the cross to die for your sin, my sin and the sins of all mankind.

What father allows "his own son to be tortured, mocked, spit upon and beaten beyond recognition, then crucified on the cross to die" for someone else's misdeeds? Answer: the first member of the Christian trinity allows this. And it is apparently proud of doing so.

Christians refer to the god described above as a “Father,” and rejoice in counting themselves among its “children.” They claim that their god is a "God of love," and its greatest act of love is said to be the sacrifice of its own son. Its son was the ideal man, they say, flawless in every possible way, morally, spiritually, intellectually, etc. And this innocent son’s father deliberately sacrificed it for the sake of totally depraved beneficiaries. This god’s greatest act of love, then, was the sacrifice of the ideal for the sake of the non-ideal.

Christian witnesses clearly take delight in telling non-believers about how their god sacrificed its own son, as if we would find this attractive in some way. Believers find it attractive because ultimately they seek the unearned and do not understand the relationship between love and values, and between values and human life. They think love finds its greatest expression not only in sacrifice, but also in death. For in Christianity, the two are wedded in a marriage arranged in heaven. "Greater love hath no man than this," it is written in John 15:13, "that a man lay down his life for his friends."

Who desires that his friend lay down his life for him? Who would want to gain from the sacrifice of someone he calls "friend"? Who in good conscience could live with the knowledge that his friend gave up his life so that he could... do what? And who would want to be the friend of someone who expects such sacrifice as a term of friendship?

As a parent myself, I would never allow what the Christian describes above to happen to my child. In fact, on my understanding of love, it would be an utter contradiction to say that a parent who did allow this to happen to his child, loves his child. To call the destruction of something you value “love” is to destroy the concept of love by obliterating its genetic roots. For values are the genetic root of the concept of love. But clearly Christianity divorces the concept of love from one's values, for the sacrifice of values - i.e., their surrender to something beneath them - is the ideal according to the Christian scheme of things.
Even more, it would be anathema to good parenting to look to someone who willingly allows such things to happen to his own child as a model of good parenting. Good parenting requires one's devotion to values, not the willingness (or, as we find in the Christian gospel formula, the eagerness) to sacrifice values. Indeed, love is devotion to one's values, not indifference, not animosity, not what the Christian gospel formula models.

So the question now comes to, who would want to become a child of a father whose love is expressed by sacrificing his own son? Who would want a "father" who allows such carnage to happen to his own child to become his adopted parent? A Christian would. So who would want to become a Christian? Someone who sees the sacrifice of one’s only son as an act of love.

Carnage is obviously very important to this god, in spite of the religion's emphasis on "the spirit." For without carnage, its "plan" could never be fulfilled. Carnage is integral to the plan. Without carnage, there is no salvation. Believers typically try to justify this by saying that carnage is what gave rise to the need for salvation in the first place. But this only shows how hard they've fallen for the scam. For if you posit a perfect creator, how can you have any imperfection in its creation? If there is any imperfection in the creation, its creator could not, by definition, be perfect. With an omnipotent creator, any flaw is traceable back to the creator. The Christian notion of "perfect" is just another stolen concept.

And notice the implications this has for the Christian view of justice. Justice in Christianity involves sacrificing the ideal for the sake of the non-ideal; and its model of justice enshrines the punishment of the just for the crimes of the unjust. Meanwhile, opportunity (i.e., "grace") is extended to the unjust to escape their rightful penalty, which means those perpetrators of crime who sanction this twisted view of justice, need not pay for their crimes. On the Christian model of justice, the good must be sacrifice for the sake of the evil.

How is any of this just? What father would consider it "just" to turn his own child over to a squad of vicious thugs for the express purpose of being "tortured, mocked, spit upon and beaten beyond recognition, then crucified on the cross to die"? Christianity calls such a father "a God of Love." It calls its god "merciful,"

Now someone who admits to choosing to believe that such a being exists, to choosing to worship a father whose greatest act of love is the sacrifice of his innocent son for the sake of guilty criminals, acknowledges in his admission that it is simply a matter of choice, that his belief is ultimately arbitrary. This “love” that the Christian has for his god who sends its own son to die a convict’s excruciating death, is the ultimate presupposition, the “heart commitment,” of the Christian worldview.

And people wonder why we're concerned about the state of the world...

by Dawson Bethrick

Sunday, April 06, 2008

The Double Whammy

A visitor to my blog, apparently a Christian, recently left an excited comment under the moniker “TruthTRUTH” attempting to defend the claim that his god exists with a very common approach. (It’s always curious to me why God’s self-appointed representatives conceal their identities with monikers like this one.)

TruthTRUTH’s approach has two distinct steps. First he proves that his god exists by arguing that the universe needed a creator, and quite coincidentally his god happens to be its creator. "Stuff doesn't pop out of thin air," he writes. The second step is that one cannot disprove the existence of his god simply because we don't "perfectly understand its nature," and "because it isn't tangible or even explainable." Significantly, he puts love, thoughts and emotions into this same category, suggesting that "just because you can't show someone else your thoughts, or explain exactly what a thought even is, doesn't mean thoughts don't exist."

We can call this an example of the “double whammy” approach to apologetics: it seeks to produce a proof as well as preempt certain avenues of disproof. Seems simple enough, doesn’t it? The first step establishes that the desired deity must exist, and the second step establishes that one cannot disprove its existence. But how well do these arguments fare? In the course of my interaction with TruthTRUTH’s comments, I will show that both steps are riddled with insuperable problems, problems that are easily avoided by adopting a position which, to the disappointment of theists, is incompatible with theism.

So without any further ado, let's jump in and take a look at TruthTRUTH's apology.

TruthTRUTH wrote:

Dawson, you make some very compelling arguments. But who created humans? The universe? Who created that very first particle that ever came into existence?

I would recommend some serious premise-checking here. Why suppose that the universe was “created”? Why suppose that “the very first particle that ever came into existence” was “created”? Why even suppose that there was a “very first particle that ever came into existence” in the first place? And why think a person (implied by the use of the interrogative pronoun ‘who’) “created” these things? What does “create” mean anyway? Why suppose that there was a time when the universe or particles or anything that exists did not exist? If we suppose that there was a “very first particle that ever came into existence” (a supposition that I would like to see argued for), why suppose there was some pre-existing person “who created” it? Your questions make assumptions which need support, but here you ask these questions apparently unaware of this fact.

The issue that is being raised here is one of starting point. I see two options here: either we start with existence, or we start with non-existence. If we start with existence (as my worldview does), then there’s no puzzle to sort out here – no need to come up with an explanation for existence. It’s only if we start with non-existence (as TruthTRUTH apparently thinks we need to do) that we need to come up with an explanation for the obvious fact that things do in fact exist.

TruthTRUTH writes:

You speak of reason. Here's my reasoning.

Okay, let’s take a look at it.

TruthTRUTH writes:

A. Stuff doesn't pop out of thin air.

I agree. That’s one reason why I don’t accept the “creation ex nihilo” idea. It’s a fantasy that is based on a falsehood. Besides, if we start with existence rather than non-existence, then there’s no need to suppose that anything had to “pop out of thin air” – existence already exists.

TruthTRUTH writes:

It comes from a source. Babies come from their mommies, Plants grow out of the ground, factories must be built by hands.

But even in each of the examples given here, we have things coming from other things that already exist. The material that a mommy’s body uses to manufacture a baby already exist. Similarly with plants: seedlings use water and nutrients to grow into plants. Again with factories, men build factories from materials they gather from the earth. There’s no example here of anything coming into existence from non-existence; we never observe things coming into existence from nothing. The source of the specific objects mentioned in the example here is: existence, not non-existence.

TruthTRUTH writes:

B. Thus we can trace back all of creation, if we must.

On the contrary, everything traces back to existence, not “creation.” You yourself admitted that “stuff doesn’t pop out of thin air.” Every “new” thing (be it babies, plants, factories, or what have you) are in fact re-arrangements of pre-existing materials. Find one example of something that “pops” into existence. You won’t find one. To say that the universe is an example of such a thing begs the question, and is thus invalid. Also, since ‘creation’ assumes the fact of existence (especially in that it requires a creator to do the creating in question), it assumes what it is trying to explain, namely existence. Thus it commits the fallacy of the stolen concept: it asserts a concept (namely ‘creation’) while ignoring its genetic roots (in this case the fact of existence).

Futher reading:

Basic Contra-Theism
Theism and Its Piggyback Starting Point
Responding to Pavielle
Responding to Chris


TruthTRUTH writes:

Suppose the following, which many believe to be true. We evolved from primates, who evolved from ... etc. etc. all the way back to microscopic bacteria in the ocean. Who created that bacteria? Where did it come from?

In the case of the ancestry of organisms, we see that each species evolved from some previously existing species. In other words, nothing is “popping” into existence from nothing in such a case. In fact, I see no reason why we should not suppose that the first or original species did not come from something that already existed as well. After all, the elements which we find in living organisms are also found naturally occurring in non-living things - such as carbon, oxygen, nitrogen, iron, and other elements. So it seems a tall order, one that exceeds the bounds of credibility, to suggest that the first species (assuming there was a “first species”) came into existence from nothing. As I pointed out above, we never observe something coming into existence from nothing, so why postulate such a phenomenon when, granted certain illicit premises, we seem to have been backed up against a wall? Moreover, why suppose there was a person “who created” the original bacteria that you propose here? In other words, why suppose that some act of consciousness was necessary to bring these things into existence, even if we grant the untenable premise that they did come into existence?

You ask where that original bacteria came from. That’s easy: they came from existence. However, the creationist finds this answer unsatisfying. The creationist posits a creation of these things because he doesn’t want to begin with existence; this would annul his religious beliefs. Instead, he assumes that we need to begin with non-existence. But since deep down he recognizes that beginning with non-existence is utterly nonsensical, he posits a supernatural consciousness which “creates” these things. But this presupposes precisely what he didn’t want to grant in the first place, which is: existence, my very starting point. Otherwise he posits not only a consciousness which has nothing but itself to be conscious of (a clear contradiction in terms), but also a consciousness which doesn’t exist (given his presumed starting point of non-existence). Yes, the more we explore TruthTRUTH’s reasoning, the more unpluggable holes we find in it.

TruthTRUTH writes:

Or take the Earth. Our solar system came from a giant explosion called the big bang. But the big bang assumes particles already existed. Who created these particles?

Again, why suppose anything was created in the first place? The assumption that they were created could only be reasonable if first we assume that nothing existed at some point in the past. But why suppose this? Again, why begin with non-existence, when we know for a fact that existence exists? And supposing we accept non-existence as our starting point, why suppose that a person was need to “create” these particles? If non-existence is our starting point, how can we posit the existence of a creator who creates these things? You want to ask where these particles come from? My answer is: they came from existence. The only alternative to my answer is to say they came from non-existence, but you yourself have already gone on record affirming that “stuff doesn’t pop out of thin air.” The alternative you want to go with – “creation” – really isn’t an alternative to existence; it’s a way to try to have your cake (deny existence – hence the need to explain existence) and eat it, too (affirm existence – by imagining a person “who created” it all). But this is internally incoherent due to the self-contradiction which this assumption attempts to smuggle into the argument.

TruthTRUTH writes:

C. Thus it is impossible to escape the reality that at some point, way back along the line of creation, there is an "Un-caused cause".

If there is such a thing as an “un-caused cause,” it would be existence. This is not only metaphysically necessary, it is also conceptually sound, for the concept ‘cause’ presupposes existence. We can know this because causality is the necessary relationship between an entity and its own actions: in order for there to be any action, there must be some entity which does the acting, and for any entity to act, it must first exist. In other words, there could be no causality apart from or outside of existence. So my position, as atheistic as it is, is secure with the notion of an ‘uncaused cause’ so long as it recognizes these fundamental, undeniable truths.

But somehow your “reasoning” took you elsewhere, to something we can only imagine. For you stated:

This uncaused cause is GOD.

Now, the word “god” is typically supposed to refer to some supernatural, conscious being. And yet, where is the reasoning to support the premise that the things you’ve been asking about find their source in a form of consciousness? What supports the assumption that they were "willed" into existence? What supports the assumption that there exists a consciousness with the power you attribute to this being whose existence you affirm? We do not find any example of a consciousness possessing such power in nature, this much is certain. So what inputs give content to the concept ‘consciousness’ such that we can validly suppose that such power exists? As I have pointed out before, I can imagine such a consciousness, and I suspect that this is what theists are doing. But this means that their god is imaginary. If you protest at this point and declare that your god is not imaginary, that you do not apprehend it by means of imagining it, then by what means do you discern it? Do you perceive it? If so, what does it look like? Do you conceive of it? If so, what facts does it integrate? Does it name something that you have awareness of directly, or does it name something whose existence can only be inferred? If the former, then what is this mode of awareness that gives you direct apprehension of what you call "god"? If the latter, I hope you have something better than the “uncaused cause” argument you’ve put forth, because I’ve obliterated that one already. In the final analysis, we only learn of this god's alleged existence from those who believe that it exists (or who want it to exist), not from the being itself (which, according to the legends we read in the NT, is able to make itself known to human beings). None of this bodes well for the theist.

TruthTRUTH writes:

Whether you call this being, Blakko or Jehovah, or whatever, THERE IS A CREATOR, since there is a creation. How can there not be a creator? What is the alternative?

These things you name, Blakko and Jehovah, are imaginary. The imaginary is not real. You point to existence, and then affirm that it was created (without arguing for this premise), and then conclude that there must have been a creator (which you can only apprehend by means of imagination). And if you affirm that anything that exists needed a creator, who created the creator? Why arbitrarily stop with one creator? You may say that there can be no infinite regress. Fine. That still doesn’t explain why you stop with the first creator. How would you know when it’s time to stop? It could be the second, tenth, 82nd or 5,291st iteration of a prior creator which is the original “uncaused cause.” How would you know when you've finally reached the "uncaused cause"?

You ask what the alternative to a creator is? Easy: Existence. Begin with existence, and there’s no need to posit a creator before it. Indeed, if you attempt to posit a creator before existence, you’re still positing existence, the thing you say that needs a creator. Thus your reasoning shipwrecks on the rocky shore of stolen concepts. Not a very good way to conduct your reasoning.

TruthTRUTH writes:

Our universe is so vast its size [it] is incomprehensible.

It’s pretty big, yes. As for comprehending it, we begin by identifying it with generalities. The concept ‘universe’ itself is a case in point: it is a concept that is so wide in its scope of reference that it includes everything that exists. In fact, even if one could prove that “God” exists, it would exist as just one more entity in the universe, subject to scientific examination just as everything else that exists in it is. To exclude “God” from the access of scientific examination would be to say that it has no objective identity, which would put us right back into the realm of the imagination.

TruthTRUTH writes:

Similarly it is difficult to understand the nature of God.

Well, that’s certainly the case, especially when “the nature of God” seems to vary from believer to believer. Even within Christianity, there are so many different views of what its god is, what it does, what it doesn’t do, why it does what it does, why it doesn’t do what it never does, etc. Incidentally, that is exactly what we would expect to be the case if in fact “God” is simply imaginary. And no believer has ever given me any good reason to suppose it is not imaginary.

TruthTRUTH writes:

But you cannot deny the existence of some power, some force, SOMETHING that created all of this around us.

Why can’t I deny such claims? If I don’t think they’re true, you bet I’m going to deny them. And if their defenders can’t avoid conceptual errors (such as the stolen concept I exposed above) when they display the “reasoning” they use to conclude that such a “power” exists, then all the more reason to deny their claim. As I have pointed out before, I don’t have faith in “God” for the same reason I don’t have faith in square circles.

TruthTRUTH writes:

Or are you supposing that we all popped out of thin air, Dawson?

I have never affirmed anything even remotely approaching the view that "we all popped out of thin air." As I have always maintained, I begin with existence, not with non-existence. Therefore, your god is out of a job, flat and simple.

TruthTRUTH writes:

That's not a very compelling "reason".

Tell you what, since you’re so interested in dealing with compelling reasons, what is your compelling reason to suppose that the universe needed to be created by an act of consciousness? This is something theists typically like to gloss over.

TruthTRUTH writes:

And if we didn't pop out of thin air, where did the universe come from?

First, let’s clarify what we’re talking about. As with most theists who argue for a beginning of the universe, you offer no definition for ‘universe’, even though you’ve used the term several times now. Because of this, it remains unclear what exactly we're talking about. So

I’ll offer my own: universe is the sum total of everything that exists. Given this definition, it is both nonsensical and self-contradictory to assert the existence of something outside the universe. Why? Because if something exists, it is part of the sum total of everything that exists by virtue of its existence. So, where did the universe “come from”? The word “where” would point us to a place. But every place that exists, exists in the universe (for reasons stated). The question performatively contradicts itself by asking us to accept the hidden premise that a place exists outside of the sum total of everything that exists. So the question is invalid. What’s the alternative? As I’ve stated already: Begin with existence, and there’s no problem. The universe didn't come from anywhere, because it didn't "come" to begin with. There has always been existence, which means: there has always been a universe.

TruthTRUTH writes:

Furthermore you're most popular argument seems to be this: "How can you separate God from your imagination?"

That is a question, not an argument. And since theists seem very hard-pressed to answer it, it's all I need. Vytautas could not answer it. At this point, I need no argument; if a simple question like this is enough to bring theism to a shattering crumble, why would I need to argue anything? I ask the question, and sit back and watch the entertainment.

TruthTRUTH writes:

I would pose this question to you, my friend: Do you believe in love? Rage? Envy? Of course you do. But please, distinguish to me where the love ends and your imagination begins.

Okay, I’ll explain it to you. Both the emotions which you list and imagination are faculties of consciousness, and thus have some commonality as such. But emotions and imagination are distinct from each other. First let’s look at emotions. Emotions are non-volitional reactions to new information that we learn as we understand that information relates to our values. If new information promotes my values (e.g., my wife bought me a new pair of pants, I’m getting a big tax refund this year, my daughter said her first words, etc.), my emotions respond positively: e.g., gratitude, relief, excitement, joy, etc. If the new information reveals a threat against my values (e.g., my wife got into an auto accident, I have to pay big time in my tax return, my daughter hurt her finger), my emotions respond negatively: concern, worry, anxiety, panic, frustration, etc. The new information is something I discover (rather than imagine), and the values they impact are actual (not imaginary).

Now let’s look at imagination: Imagination is the volitional process of selectively rearranging inputs we have discovered in ways that we do not perceive. Let's look at an example. I imagine a skyscraper that is 400 stories tall. Although I have seen skyscrapers, there is no such thing as a 400-storey skyscraper in existence, but I can imagine one nonetheless. My imagining it is a volitional process: I can choose to vary the inputs at this point, since I own the imagination, since it is a function of my consciousness. I can imagine the skyscraper being 410 stories, or 267 stories, or anything else I wish. I can imagine it has panorama elevator banks, that it has bay windows, that it is glass and steel, that it has gargoyles mounted on the corners, that it is square, or domed, or a jumble of different shapes. I can imagine it existing in a big city such as New York or Singapore, or in the middle of a barren desert, or even on the moon. Since I am in control of what I imagine, I can vary its attributes as I please.

Emotions do not respond to our volition in this manner. If I get a bill from my doctor for $100,000.00 for a routine check-up, I can't help but feel at the very least baffled by this. I certainly wouldn't experience joy, nor could I choose to be happy about this. I may initially suppose it's a mistake and experience amusement, but if I initially thought it was legitimate I couldn't choose to feel joy; joy is not an emotion one experiences when he learns that something is threatening his values. Emotions are non-volitional in this sense, unlike imagination. It is because of this fact - that emotions are involuntary - that certain commands contained in the bible indicate to me that its authors did not have a very good understanding of the human mind. The commandment that we "love our neighbor as ourselves" is a case in point. Love is not subject to commands. I cannot choose to love my neighbor when I know that he abuses his children, can't hold a job, beats his wife, lets his dogs poop on my lawn, etc. I can say I love him, but this would be a pretense, a lie, and I'm simply too honest for that. If I don't love someone, I'm not going to say I do love him. And someone like I just described, I would not love, even if an invisible magic being demanded that I love him.

So there is a significant distinction here between the emotions one feels and the things he imagines. However, in both cases, we have awareness of these things directly and immediately, and understand them through introspection. They are not entities that exist apart from us; they are an integral part of our experience. You won't learn about these things from the teachings in the bible. For more information on this, see my blog Lord Oda's Problem With Pain.

TruthTRUTH writes:

This line of reasoning is a simple cop out.

It is? How so? Consider: if someone comes to me and says that some invisible magic being created the universe, and he goes on to say that this being is imperceptible, beyond any capacity of mine to perceive, that I must have "faith" to believe in its existence, and that "everything in this universe is proof of God" (such as Peter claimed), how is my question about how I can distinguish between what he's claiming and what he's merely imagining a "cop out"? What exactly am I copping out of by asking this kind of question? And why is there so much difficulty in answering it?

TruthTRUTH writes:

You can't disprove something just because you can't perfectly understand its nature.

I'm under no obligation to disprove any claim, especially if the person issuing the claim can't prove it in the first place. Moreover, if he claims that something exists but fails to identify a clear and reliable method by which one can distinguish between the thing he claims exists and what he may merely be imagining, then I reserve the liberty to take solace in the fact that he may very well be delusional. Besides, it's not a matter of understanding the nature of what is claimed; theists use concepts to describe their god, concepts whose basis could only be the real world in which we live to the extent that those concepts are legitimate. So as long as those concepts have objective meaning, I have no problem understanding what is being claimed. The problem arises in that they use these concepts, concepts which originate in the finite, corporeal, natural and corruptible realm to describe something that is supposed to be infinite, incorporeal, supernatural and incorruptible. Legitimate concepts find their legitimacy ultimately in what we perceive and the process by which we formed those concepts. Concepts whose basis is the natural world and the natural process we use to form them could have no reference to something that allegedly exists in some alleged realm contradicting the natural world.

TruthTRUTH writes:

Nor can you disprove something because it isn't tangible or even explainable.

See above. Again, there's no need for me to disprove something that is real: if it's real, it's real. Also, there's no need to prove that the non-existent doesn't exist: if it doesn't exist, it doesn't exist, no matter who believes it exists. If theists have a hard time proving that their god exists (which has historically been the case, hands down), and there are good reasons to suppose that theism is invalid (as has been shown in both my writings and in the writings of other contrapologists; ask if you want references), then my task on the matter is done. It's at this point that theists start berating me personally for "arrogance" and other "sins," or - as TruthTRUTH himself will do below - issue pious threats of doom and gloom.

TruthTRUTH writes:

Try explaining to someone how anguish feels after a loved one passes away. Its very difficult to do, yet we all recognize the existence of anguish in our world today.

This is a learning experience which most individuals have faced to one degree or another by their early adulthood. Anyone who has lost anything - especially if it is a prized possession - understands firsthand the kind of emotion that accompanies such loss. But I want to make an important point here: our emotions are integrally bound to our values, and values are selfish in nature (see here; Christians are notoriously reluctant to admit this fact). If you lose something that you value, your emotions consequently respond accordingly: you feel grief, sadness, disappointment, etc., to one degree or another. Our emotions respond according to how our circumstances affects us personally. That's because we are not indifferent about our values. If values were selfless, as many Christians have insisted to me, then I wouldn't care what happened to them, I'd be indifferent about them. It's because values are selfish that what happens to our values effects our emotions the way it does.

Now back to the topically relevant point at hand: Isn't it curious how Christian apologists treat emotions as if they were analogous to their god? This is the card that TruthTRUTH plays while objecting to the challenge that he as a theist demonstrate that his god is distinguishable from something he is only imagining. Clearly he thinks there is some commonality between his god as an object of knowledge and his cognitive functions as an object of knowledge. What exactly makes them so similar? Theists tend to think of them as similar because our thoughts and other mental functions are said to be "immaterial," and coincidentally so is "God." In his debate with Gordon Stein, Greg Bahnsen similarly groups his god and what he called "abstract entities" into the the same general category, the common denominator being that both "abstract entities" and "God" are "immaterial entities." To say that something is "immaterial," however, is unhelpful in informing us of its identity, for it only tells us what something is not, not what it is. So again, if the Christian god is comparable to "mental entities," how is it distinguishable from something that the mind fabricates? The "immaterial" label also emphatically raises the question: How do we have knowledge of something that is "immaterial"? An even more primitive consideration would be: By what means do we have awareness of something that is "immaterial"? This question is topically relevant because we are constantly being told by Christians that we should not expect to perceive their god by means of our senses, and the reason for this is that it is "immaterial" and thus not subject to sense perception. These questions have been stubbornly difficult for theists to address in any clear manner, and I suspect there are good reasons why it's been so difficult.

By objecting to the challenge that I have raised against theism, theists are essentially saying that their god is not merely a thought or fantasy of theirs. And yet, their first line of defense is to compare the nature of their god to the nature of thoughts and other mental phenomena (such as emotions). Both are said to have the same characteristic - "immateriality." But what distinguishes them? This is the question I have posed. They treat their god as if it were an entity which exists independent of human cognition. But that's just the point in question here, so asserting this to be the case would simply beg the question and fail to move the theist closer to addressing the challenge that's been put before him.

TruthTRUTH writes:

When you're at a McDonald's thinking to yourself, "Hmmm, do I want a Big Mac or just a Coke?" are you simply "imagining" these thoughts, or are they real?

The thoughts are real - they are a function of one's consciousness, and consciousness is real. But the Big Mac and Coke that I'm think about in my mind are imaginary. My hope is that, whatever I do end up getting in the order I place is significantly like what I imagined. They are distinguishable though: actual burgers and fries will fill my stomach, but imaginary ones will not. But I've learned to be careful here at fast food joints. For instance, I don't like pickles and I don't like whipped cream. When I imagine a burger, I don't imagine any pickles in it. But many places add pickles as a standard part of the burger's build. Just because the burger I imagine has no pickles, does not mean that the burger I'm served will have no pickles. Again, existence holds primacy over consciousness. So I have to remember this in my orders. Also, I love milkshakes, but while the milkshake I imagine has no whipped cream, many places as a matter of routine top their milkshakes off with whipped cream, which I find annoying. So I have to keep this in mind when ordering.

TruthTRUTH writes:

Just because you can't show someone else your thoughts, or explain exactly what a thought even is, doesn't mean thoughts don't exist.

Since this defense is continually being raised, we must ask: What does this have to do with the topic at hand? To the extent that this is relevant, it confirms the essence of my critique. Thoughts are a function of one's consciousness, and consciousness is an attribute of human beings. I do not deny that human beings exist, or that they are conscious, so I certainly don't dispute that human beings can think. But this is not analogous to the theistic claim. Theists are not saying that their god is merely a thought (if so, they would be openly conceding my criticisms of theism). Rather, they claim that their god is an independently existing entity, a being which is "extra-mental" as one might say. So apparently it is supposed to be like other entities (such as rocks, flowers, automobiles, etc.) in that it exists independent of human consciousness, but it is also supposed to be like thoughts and emotions in that it is "immaterial" or "non-physical" or "incorporeal." Many theists suggest that we can "know" this god by consulting some kind of "internal witness" provided by the presence of a "Spirit" which presumably infallibly testifies of its existence and will for one's life in his "heart."

Unfortunately, one could make this kind of claim about anything he imagines. For instance, I can imagine that an invisible magic being - call it Bathuko - resides in my "heart" and guides my steps in life. I can easily interpret everything in my experience to conform with this imagination. If the phone rings, for instance, my choice to answer it and say hello are in accordance with Bathuko's will. If my boss invites me to a meeting, my choice to accept the invitation and attend the meeting is in keeping with Bathuko's will. After all, if Bathuko created my "heart" in the first place (I'm free to imagine this as well), then why wouldn't I suppose that what my "heart" decides to do is in keeping with Bathuko's will? I can also imagine that things that happen outside my control are actually being controlled by this same invisible magic being. If I get a raise in my salary, it's Bathuko's way of rewarding me and encouraging me to continue following his will. If I am struck with cancer, it must be Bathuko's will that I learn certain lessons in this life. If I am cured, it was Bathuko's will, not the chemotherapy I underwent, which effected the cure. Etc.

But the problem with all this is that the Christian god is supposed to be independent of any human mind, such that it would still exist even if there were no human beings to know of its existence. So using thoughts as an example case, as many theists commonly do, in fact only confirms that my criticisms are well placed. And since the Christian god does whatever the believer says it does (notice how quick believers are to explain why their god won't heal amputees, for instance), the likelihood that his god is simply a figment of his imagination is simply too compelling to ignore.

TruthTRUTH writes:

Thus it is with God.

There you go, then! All the more reason to suppose that my challenge for theists to distinguish between what they call "God" and what they are merely imagining is right on target. I know of no good reason to suppose that independently existing entities enjoy the same kind of epistemological privacy that our cognitive functions do. And even then, one's own cognitive functions are not hidden to oneself. Consciousness can be its own object, but only secondarily so - that is, only if one is first conscious of something else to begin with.

TruthTRUTH writes:

Simply because the nature of his being is indiscernible does not thereby disprove his existence.

I have already pointed out in three blog posts (see here, here and here) why I as an atheist do not have any burden to disprove your god's alleged existence. If you want to call your god "indiscernible," that's fine; one can make this kind of claim about anything he imagines. The problem is that theists fail to explain how we can distinguish between what they call "God" and what they may merely be imagining. I'm of the opinion that they fail at this challenge because there really is no distinction to begin with.

TruthTRUTH writes:

If that were the case, love and every other emotion, every thought, everything that makes us human would be a figment of our imagination.

This doesn't follow. For one, emotions and thoughts are not mind-independent entities. But what theist would allow that his god's existence depends on his mind, like emotions and thoughts do? In fact, it is precisely because believers use psychological phenomena like thoughts and emotions as the case in point for their theistic defenses, that the suspicion that their god is merely imaginary is raised and confirmed. Besides, your point here hazards yet another stolen concept by proposing that thoughts and emotions are "a figment of our imagination." Imagination makes use of our faculty of thought, so it would both assume and deny its own genetic roots to say that thought is a figment of our imagination. My position avoids such pitfalls precisely because it maintains fidelity with the proper orientation between a subject and its objects.

TruthTRUTH writes:

We haven't begun to understand the world around us.

Indeed, with the worldview theists assume, they are simply not equipped to understand the world around us.

TruthTRUTH writes:

Just 500 years ago science and reason said the world was flat!

Supposing that were the case (and many would contest this), how would we know that this assumption (that the world is flat) is wrong? Because "we haven't begun to understand the world around us"? That dog don't hunt.

TruthTRUTH writes:

From the tiniest of particles, which we have base elementary theories to explain, to the vastest reaches of deep space, which we know almost nothing about, mankind is far from an "expert" regarding the universe.

I see. So, in other words, "mankind" is ignorant, and therefore we should posit a god to fill this void in our knowledge? Appeals of this nature only confirm that the god of the gaps argument hasn't quite gone out of style with theists in today's world.

TruthTRUTH writes:

So if the Christian God is omnipotent, infinitely larger, and more powerful than our universe (which we do not understand), how could you possibly expect believers to fully explain to you the mysteries of God?

I don't expect Christians to explain "the mysteries of God" to me. Nothing would bore me more. I simply ask how I can distinguish between what they call "God" and what they may merely be imagining. This is far more entertaining. Anyone can imagine an invisible being that is "omnipotent." So how do I know you're not simply imagining something and claiming it's real, when in fact it simply isn't?

TruthTRUTH writes:

Although the analogy isn't perfect, it gets my point across: love is like God. You cant really explain it, but you know its there. [sic]

This only means that theists cannot answer my challenge. Here TruthTRUTH explicitly puts his god in the same camp as psychological manifestations like love. The problem with this move is that love is not an independently existing entity, while the Christian god is supposed to be extra-mental, extra-psychological, existing independent of human cognition. When I die, for instance, my loving will stop, and so will my other psychological experiences. But what Christian is going to say that his god stops existing when he does? Again, as I've stated, just by pointing to psychological phenomena as analogous to their god, theists essentially give away the game. They're basically telling us that their god is imaginary without coming out and openly admitting this to be the case.

TruthTRUTH writes:

And you know he's there too, Dawson. Look inside you, look at what makes you human. Therein lies the truth.

Statements like this only confirm my case. If I introspect (i.e., "look inside" myself) I can examine the functions of my own consciousness. But if I ignore the fact that what I'm examining at this point is my own consciousness, and allow myself to blur the distinction between the actual and the imaginary, then I can go along with such pretenses as this. But as I've pointed out, I'm simply too honest to say that something is real that I know is not real. Inside me is just parts of me, not a universe-creating, reality-controlling deity.

TruthTRUTH writes:

You may choose to denounce Christian theology (although I wouldn't recommend it, for you're sake), but to deny any higher power, any supreme being, any constructor or creator, is not only foolish. Its unreasonable. [sic]

Here we have a most predictable resort to threats. Since TruthTRUTH senses deep down that his apologetic is dismally weak, he chooses to end his plea with a pronouncement of impending doom if his faith assertions are questioned instead of uncritically accepted. But is it truly unreasonable to deny claims like those that Christians have been making for the better of 2,000 years? Obviously I don't think it is unreasonable. In fact, as I see it, any concern for preserving a commitment to reason would compel us to reject what Christianity teaches, precisely because what it teaches is contrary to reason. TruthTRUTH calls this "foolish," and yet what is "foolish" according to a worldview which teaches that the universe was created by the will of an invisible supernatural being who "took on flesh" and sojourned the earth in 1st century Palestine? We would do well to keep matters in perspective when we start entertaining accusations of unreasonableness and foolishness.

Conclusion: TruthTRUTH’s double whammy apologetic fails. His argument to the conclusion that the universe had a beginning or needed to be created, which constitutes the first step in his defense of god-belief, ignores the fact that our only alternative to existence as our starting would be non-existence as our starting point. This is relevant because the existence of the universe (which is the sum total of that which exists) is alleged to having been created. If we begin with the universe, then there’s no reason to posit a creator of the universe. Similarly, if we begin with existence (as Objectivism holds we should), then there’s no good reason to posit a god which is responsible for creating existence. The tacit premise in the first horn of the double whammy is that we must begin with non-existence, and it is upon this premise that the theist feels compelled to find an explanation for the obvious fact that existence does in fact exist. The presence of this premise is evident in the dichotomy, central to TruthTRUTH’s reasoning, that either “stuff... pop[s] out of thin air” (i.e., spontaneously “comes into” existence), or it was “created” by a conscious being (i.e., the Christian god or what have you). Beginning with existence as our starting point does away with such false dichotomies before they're even proposed.

In the second step of TruthTRUTH’s double whammy apologetic, he in fact confirms the relevance of my challenge that theists should explain how we can distinguish between what they call “God” and what they may merely be imagining, by putting his god on the same level as human psychological phenomena, which he accomplishes by resorting to a category of defenses which assert that his god’s existence cannot be disproved just as we cannot disprove emotions, thoughts, and similar aptitudes of human consciousness. So if the theist can liken his god to psychological phenomena (such as emotions like love) in an attempt to insulate his claim that it exists from disproof, why can’t we ask him to identify some process by which we can distinguish his god from those very mental phenomena to which his defenses compare it?

Sadly, we have another example of a theist objecting to skeptical inquiry while undermining his own objections.

By Dawson Bethrick

Wednesday, March 26, 2008

Incinerating Presuppositionalism: Year Three

Today we reach the third anniversary of Incinerating Presuppositionalism. Yes, on this date in 2005 I began this blog, and it seems like yesterday. But so much has happened since then, a lot of material got published, and it seems that presuppositionalism is finally being abandoned by many who enthusiastically championed it. This past year was particularly productive for me, with the rollout of several series focusing on specific interactions, including my comprehensive review of Bahnsen’s defense of supernaturalism.

Below is a listing of all the blogs which posted since the second anniversary of my blog.


91. Incinerating Presuppositionalism: Year 2 – March 26, 2007

92. Virginia Tech – April 18, 2007

93. Christian Reaction to Virginia Tech – April 22, 2007

94. Would an Omniscient Mind Have Knowledge in Conceptual Form? – April 24, 2007

95. Pike on Concepts and Omniscience – April 27, 2007

96. Pike’s Pique – April 28, 2007

97. More Piqued Pike – April 29, 2007

98. Jet’s Flimsy Denials – May 2, 2007

99. Answering Ecualegacy, Pt. 1 – May 13, 2007

100. Answering Ecualegacy, Pt. 2 – May 15, 2007

101. Answering Ecualegacy, Pt. 3 – May 17, 2007

102. Answering Ecualegacy, Pt. 4 – May 20, 2007

103. A Succinct Summary of My Worldview – May 21, 2007

104. The Moral Uselessness of the 10 Commandments – May 22, 2007

105. The Problem of Saul – June 30, 2007

106. The Role of Imagination in Christian God-Belief – July 17, 2007

107. The Presuppositionalist View of Man’s Consciousness – August 1, 2007

108. Bahnsen on “Knowing the Supernatural” Part 1: Introduction – August 13, 2007

109. Bahnsen on “Knowing the Supernatural” Part 2: “The Reproach of the Transcendent” – August 15, 2007

110. Bahnsen on “Knowing the Supernatural” Part 3: “Defining the Metaphysical” – August 17, 2007

111. Bahnsen on “Knowing the Supernatural” Part 4: “Fundamental Distinctions” – August 19, 2007

112. Bahnsen on “Knowing the Supernatural” Part 5: “A Comprehensive Metaphysic” – August 21, 2007

113. Bahnsen on “Knowing the Supernatural” Part 6: “The Christian Metaphysic” – August 23, 2007

114. Bahnsen on “Knowing the Supernatural” Part 7: “Distinguishing Appearance from Reality” – August 25, 2007

115. Bahnsen on “Knowing the Supernatural” Part 8: “Ultimate Questions” – August 27, 2007

116. Bahnsen on “Knowing the Supernatural” Part 9: “Suprasensible Reality” – August 29, 2007

117. Bahnsen on “Knowing the Supernatural” Part 10: “Pure Motives?” – August 31, 2007

118. Bahnsen on “Knowing the Supernatural” Part 11: “The Case Against Metaphysics” – September 3, 2007

119. Bahnsen on “Knowing the Supernatural” Part 12: “Logical Positivism” – September 5, 2007

120. Bahnsen on “Knowing the Supernatural” Part 13: “Double Standards and Begging the Question” – September 7, 2007

121. Bahnsen on “Knowing the Supernatural” Part 14: “Philosophical Self-Deception” – September 9, 2007

122. Bahnsen on “Knowing the Supernatural” Part 15: “Further Difficulties” – September 11, 2007

123. Bahnsen on “Knowing the Supernatural” Part 16: “No Predictability” – September 17, 2007

124. Bahnsen on “Knowing the Supernatural” Part 17: “Naturalism versus Supernaturalism as Worldviews” – September 19, 2007

125. Bahnsen on “Knowing the Supernatural” Part 18: Final Assessment and Conclusion – September 21, 2007

126. Roadmap to Bahnsen on the Supernatural – September 23, 2007

127. Singhing the Greg Bahnsen Blues – September 25, 2007

128. Lord Oda on Faith – October 2, 2007

129. Lord Oda’s “Problem with Pain” – October 4, 2007

130. D. James Kennedy’s Impotent Jesus – November 26, 2007

131. My Chat with a Presuppositionalist – December 27, 2007

132. Van Til vs. Bahnsen – January 2, 2008

133. A Response to Vytautas – January 6, 2008

134. The Imaginative Basis of Vytautas’ God-Belief, Part 1 – January 11, 2008

135. The Imaginative Basis of Vytautas’ God-Belief, Part 2 – January 13, 2008

136. The Imaginative Basis of Vytautas’ God-Belief, Part 3 – January 14, 2008

137. The Imaginative Basis of Vytautas’ God-Belief, Part 4 – January 17, 2008

138. The Imaginative Basis of Vytautas’ God-Belief, Part 5 – January 18, 2008

139. Presuppositionalism and the Evasion of the Burden of Proof, Part 1 – February 1, 2008

140. Presuppositionalism and the Evasion of the Burden of Proof, Part 2 – February 3, 2008

141. Presuppositionalism and the Evasion of the Burden of Proof, Part 3 – February 4, 2008

142. Quixie on Witherington on Doherty – March 16, 2008


There's still a lot of work yet to do. So I now embark on the fourth year of Incinerating Presuppositionalism. I didn't get to everything I had planned to do in the third year, so the fourth year already has its work cut out for itself. I have lots of stuff in the mill, some almost ready to roll out. Hopefully I'll be able to carve out some time in my schedule so that I can finish it and post it up on this blog. So stay tuned, keep your eyes on the bouncing ball, for it moves quick.

by Dawson Bethrick

Sunday, March 16, 2008

Quixie on Witherington on Doherty

Christian apologist Ben Witherington recently published a blog attempting to refute Earl Doherty's book, The Jesus Puzzle, which presents his mythicist case about Jesus. Witherington's assessment of Doherty's case is typical of Christian reaction to the mythicist position in that it contains ample dosage of misinformation and unnecessary innuendo.

The Quixotic Infidel has posted his own examination of Witherington's reaction to Doherty in his blog entry titled wutherin' depths. In it, Quixie exposes the annoying nonchalance with which apologists are prone to take for granted points that are in fact racked with controversy as if they were undisputably favorable to the Christian literalist position. It's a refreshing read, and I recommend it to my readers.

Monday, February 04, 2008

Presuppositionalism and the Evasion of the Burden of Proof, Part 3

We now come to the third and final installment of Peter's series on the burden of proof, Christianity vs. atheism and the burden of proof, part 3. In my previous two examinations of Peter's position (here and here), we found that he offers no reason to suppose that atheists have any obligation to prove that the non-existent does not exist. Also, at several points he calls atheism "irrational," but nowhere explains what he means by "irrational," nor does he give much indication why atheism should be considered irrational. In his third installment, Peter repeats earlier mistakes (such as the claim that atheists presume to be "neutral," or that "everything in this universe is proof of God," etc.), offers some fresh errors of his own, and demonstrates just how confused Christianity is in the area of epistemology. Much of what he does say strongly indicates that, were he to attempt a proof of his god, it would seriously beg the question and thus fail because of its internal fallaciousness. Indeed, nothing he does say gives us any confidence that he could do otherwise if given the opportunity. All in all, Peter gives us some good opportunities to make some excellent contrapologetic points against presuppositionalism. So with that, let's jump into Part 3 of my series on Presuppositionalism and the Evasion of the Burden of Proof.

Peter writes:

In this third post on this issue I want to begin by highlighting the fact that the atheist is not at all neutral in the debate over God's existence even though he has deceived himself into thinking he is.

It should be clear now that Peter is simply repeating what he has read without examining whether or not it is true. For I am an atheist, and I make no claim to neutrality whatsoever. I’m wholly partial to truth, objectivity and rationality. So there’s no self-deception on my part here. What we have is Peter blindly and naïvely believing what he has read in some apologetics book. That is the essence of a worldview based on faith.

Peter writes:

He might even say that he's willing to accept God's existence if you meet the burden of proof.

But since one will never be able to prove that the imaginary is actually real, then whether or not the atheist is so willing is irrelevant. Besides, one does not catch fish with proofs and arguments. The Christian uses traps for this. The New Testament metaphor comparing evangelists as 'fishers of men' is no accident.

Peter writes:

But just consider, as was mentioned in the last post, that according to the Christian position everything in this universe is proof of God (e.g. Psalm 19).

But just consider, as was mentioned in my response to Peter’s last post, that according to the Objectivist position everything in the universe is proof that god-belief is irrational. Now what?

Peter writes:

Now, the unbeliever might respond that if God doesn't exist then that's not true, then nothing proves God's existence.

Not only this, but also that one could still imagine a god and make the kinds of claims that presuppositionalists like to repeat. Invisible gods and imaginary gods look and behave very much the same.

Peter writes:

The unbeliever might say that if God exists, ony [sic] then can the Christian position be true that everything proves God's existence, so you first have to prove God's existence. Think about that. The demand of the unbeliever is that he'll accept God's existence if you show him proof, but you can't use anything whatsoever as proof because the claim that everything proves God's existence already assumes His existence!

There are two claims here that Peter has confused: one is that his god exists, the other is that “everything proves God’s existence.” The latter claim clearly assumes the truth of the former, but instead of proving the former, Peter added the second to see if it would work. When this bluff is not accepted, he gets frustrated. Observe:

Peter writes:

As was said, the atheist is not at all neutral in the debate over God's existence, and that includes, as has been the topic of these posts, the dispute over who has the burden of proof in that debate.

I can’t speak for other atheists, but I have already gone on record indicating that I do not claim to be neutral. So why does Peter keep coming back to this issue? That an atheist considers himself neutral on the matter is not germane to Peter’s proof, is it? If so, then what does he do now when he encounters an atheist who acknowledges that he is not neutral?

Peter writes:

If everything is proof of God's existence, and this proof is overwhelming, unavoidable, perspicuous and compelling, just as the Christian position states, then the atheist is reasoning in a circle when he says that the believer bears the burden of proof in the debate over God's existence.

This doesn’t follow, and contextually speaking it is nonsensical on its own terms. If anything serves as evidence for something else, then clearly there is an inferential connection that has been made. When the believer claims to know of evidence to support his claim that a god exists, the non-believer may choose to have the believer explain this inferential connection. This alone would not at all constitute an instance of “reasoning in a circle.” Nor would the non-believer be “reasoning in a circle when he says that the believer bears the burden of proof in the debate over God’s existence,” especially if the believer claims to have proof. If the believer makes the two claims that a) his god exists and b) everything proves his god’s existence, then the believer should be willing to acknowledge that these two claims need to be supported. If he doesn’t, he’s in la-la land chasing a fantasy. The burden to prove two unsupported claims is not met by making a third unsupported claim. But this is basic procedure that Peter is using here. Meanwhile, the non-believer will simply shake his head and go his merry unbelieving way while the believer stews in his own self-inflicted frustrations.

Peter writes:

According the Christian worldview, God obligates Himself to make Himself known to everyone which He does on His own terms in a way that is completely clear, unavoidable and compelling.

Anyone who enshrines an imaginary object of worship could make this kind of claim about that imaginary object of worship. That’s because the imagination does not need to obey any rules or adhere to any facts. The imaginer can make up things as he goes. He can imagine that there is an invisible conscious being behind everything he perceives in the world, and even imagine that this invisible conscious being “obligates Himself to make Himself known to everyone” in whatever which way the imaginer imagines it. Hopefully the believer is not so foolish as to believe that repeating statements like the one Peter recites above is going to be very convincing to non-believers. Essentially, the believer has accepted his god-belief on faith, and imagines that everything he encounters in reality somehow confirms it. Proof is the wrong vehicle to maneuver the human mind into such a perverted relationship with the world.

Observe Peter's imagination at work. He writes:

Notice a couple of things about that statement. First, God is under obligation from no one but Himself to reveal Himself. After all, God is God -- there is no law above or outside Him that obligates Him to do so. There is no created person who can obligate God to do anything. Second, no one has an excuse for rejecting God. As Romans 1 says, ‘The wrath of God is being revealed from heaven against all the godlessness and wickedness of men who suppress the truth by their wickedness, since what may be known about God is plain to them, because God has made it plain to them. For since the creation of the world God's invisible qualities—his eternal power and divine nature—have been clearly seen, being understood from what has been made, so that men are without excuse.’ No one can reply to God that He offered no evidence. Why do many reject God? Because they ‘suppress the truth by their wickedness.’ And as v. 28 says, ‘Furthermore, since they did not think it worthwhile to retain the knowledge of God, he gave them over to a depraved mind...’ According to Christianity, everyone already knows God. Although, of course, not all know God in a saving fashion; not all know God in His redemptive mercy in Jesus Christ.

Peter’s departure from the original topic at hand takes the form of mock preaching constituted by canned statements recited in sequence as if he thought they would do any good. (We will see that he never gets back on track, for what follows in his blog has nothing to do with the issue of who really has the burden of proof.) But as I pointed out above, anyone can make up anything about an imaginary object of worship, for he is not bound by any facts. He says “there is no created person who can obligate God to do anything.” But who is trying to obligate the non-existent to do something? That would be utterly nonsensical. The non-believer does not expect the believer's god to present proofs; the non-believer asks the believer if he (the believer himself) can prove his claims. That Peter shifts the matter to whether or not his god has an obligation to prove anything only demonstrates how easy it is for the believer to confuse himself with the deity he claims to worship.

And who is rejecting a non-existent being? There’s no need to. What I reject is the subjective metaphysics which underlies the Christian worldview; along with all other species of mysticism, Christianity is thus slashed off at its very root. Peter shows how uncritical one needs to be when it comes to what the bible says, for he recites Romans 1:20 which includes the contradiction that “invisible qualities... have been clearly seen.” If something has been seen, why call it “invisible”? Indeed, the invisible and the imaginary look very much alike, just as the supernatural and the non-existent behave very much alike. But if you see something, then obviously it's not "invisible." I would not say that “God... offered no evidence,” for it would first have to exist in order to offer any evidence to begin with. So again, Peter begs the question by assuming precisely what he needs to prove, namely his god’s existence. But again, Peter manages to multiply his burden of proof yet again: not only does he claim that his god exists and that “everything” is evidence proving its existence, he now says that “everyone already knows God,” which is clearly just another faith claim. He's doing it again: he's trying to shirk the burden of proving a set of unsupported claims by making yet another unsupported claim. This is a common gimmick in all religious apologetics, and presuppositionalism is no exception.

For amusement, let's prod this last claim a little more. How could Peter know what “everyone already knows” unless he were himself omniscient? Again, the believer essentially confuses himself with the omniscient being he imagines, which is easy to do since in the end the being he imagines does and knows whatever the imaginer imagines. In the end, the believer's imagination is the final arbiter of his god's identity. I made this point to Paul Manata when he declared that his god "doesn't wish" while other believers, such as several of the bible's authors and the granddaddy of presuppositionalism himself, Cornelius Van Til, in fact affirm that the Christian god can wish. I pointed out to him that

he can say that his god does not wish, because Paul determines what his god is and is not, what his god can and cannot do. The reason why Christians have so many internal disagreements is because one Christian will imagine his god one way, while another Christian imagines his god another way, and never shall the two meet. Here's an instance where the way Paul imagines his god is at variance with the way Van Til imagined his god.

How can we test for this? Simple: ask the believer to produce some objective fact which proves his claim. The problem is that there are no facts which will prove that the Christian god either wishes or doesn't wish. Indeed, there are no facts which will prove that the Christian god is real to begin with. It's all in the believer's imagination.

Peter writes:

So how, then, does God make Himself known? Broadly speaking, in two ways: general and special revelation (See here and here.)

Here Peter tries to make it look like he’s willing to step up to the bar on at least one of the burdens in his growing debt. But he does so by sending the reader to two very large documents, presumably to get lost in reading them so that he forgets why he went there in the first place. One of the links takes us to the Belgic Confession, a very longwinded statement of faith which is supposed to improve upon earlier creedal formulations by touching more bases. It is an understatement to say that the Belgic Confession assumes that the Christian god exists, so as a source of proving its existence, it is worthless. Curiously, when it attempts to explain how men know the god which it describes, the Belgic Confession indicates two means for this knowledge:

First, by the creation, preservation, and government of the universe, since that universe is before our eyes like a beautiful book in which all creatures, great and small, are as letters to make us ponder the invisible things of God: his eternal power and his divinity, as the apostle Paul says in Romans 1:20. All these things are enough to convict men and to leave them without excuse. Second, he makes himself known to us more openly by his holy and divine Word, as much as we need in this life, for his glory and for the salvation of his own.

Sound familiar? Note the Belgic Confession's citation of Romans 1:20. I have already pointed out the contradiction within that one verse: something that is "clearly seen" cannot also be "invisible." Also, by pointing to "the creation, preservation and government of the universe," the Belgic Confession begs the question on the point it is attempting to address, for this assumes as knowledge key points which it identifies as the means by which that knowledge is supposedly acquired. Besides, the "creation" of something is not a means by which knowledge is acquired in the first place. The first part of the Belgic Confession's answer to how men can have knowledge of its god fails to address that question completely. This is an epistemological question, but the Confession gives no epistemology here. Indeed, by comparing the universe to a book, the Confession simply confirms the cartoon universe basis of theistic metaphysics. Many Christian apologists have denied the cartoon universe heritage of their worldview, and yet their confessions wholly and unflinchingly embrace it. The essence of so-called 'general revelation' is that the universe is analogous to a cartoon as such, that the Christian god is a master cartoonist, and that human beings are simply characters in a cartoon. This is the Belgic Confession's first answer to how men know its god.

But what of the second answer to this question? The Belgic Confession appeals directly to the contents of a storybook as the means by which men know its god's intentions and holy "plan." So while, according to the storybook itself, Saul of Tarsus was blessed with a personal visitation by the post-resurrected Jesus, the rest of us have to pull a book from a shelf and rely on our imaginations. The vicious circularity involved in this approach to adopting and shaping one's view of the world and history gorges itself by swallowing the believer's mind into a cyclone of cognitive destruction.

Now it is important to notice how both of the Belgic Confession's answers to how men know its god assumes the truth of what the believer ends up denying as a consequence of accepting its worldview, namely the Objectivist axioms and the primacy of existence. The believer assumes the truth of the primacy of existence, and with it the truth of the axioms which inform it, when he affirms that the Christian religion is true. For he is not supposing that it is true because he wants it to be true; he's saying it's true regardless of what he or anyone else might want to be the case. In other words, he assumes that facts obtain independent of conscious intentions. That's the primacy of existence in a nutshell. But now look at the content of what is being claimed: that a conscious being created the universe by an act of will, and by acts of will it preserves the universe and governs what takes place within it. In other words, the content of the Christian view of the world assumes the primacy of consciousness: that actions of consciousness hold metaphysical primacy over all objects, including any fact which might be said to obtain in reality. On the Christian view, whatever is factual in the universe, is factual only because the Christian god chose for it to be factual. Facts, on this view, depend on conscious intentions. But this contradicts the assumption made when this view is said to be true. So the Christian worldview reduces to an explicitly duplicitous and self-contradicting basis: it requires the believer to both assume and deny the primacy of existence. This fundamental contradiction is camouflaged by an enormous quantity of doctrinal affirmations which are intended to keep the believer's attention occupied so that its faulty basis remains hidden.

The test for this? Ask the believer to explain how Christianity addresses the issue of metaphysical primacy. If he at all tries to address this question, ask for his sources, and see how consistently his worldview adheres to the basic principle he espouses. If my experience is any indication, it is highly unlikely that the believer will even take a shot at it - there's simply too much at stake, for he has a confessional investment to protect.

Now let’s see if what Peter says in the following explains how the god of Christianity makes itself known to men.

Peter writes:

God is known immediately, by direct apprehension, in the entire created order, including our own selves. This is called general revelation. From the stars of heavens to the trees of the forest to the genetic make-up of creatures, God's power, sovereignty, and goodness are clearly and unavoidably known. But because sin entered the picture, God also, in His mercy, made and makes Himself redemptively known. Through miracles, theophanies, direct word, the prophets, etc. God revealed Himself, His will for our lives, and His plan of redemption for His people. This was most perfectly revealed in Jesus Christ. Though these events are in the past, many of them have been recorded in Scripture (itself a redemptive event) which, by God's grace, is now readily available.

The only things that I “know... immediately, by direct apprehension,” are the things that I perceive with my senses. The Christian god is said to be invisible, so on Christianity's own terms I certainly cannot see it. Is it accessible to my other senses? For instance, can I feel the Christian god brushing up against my skin? What would that feel like? Can I smell the Christian god? What does the Christian god smell like? Can I taste it? What does it taste like? Can I hear its voice? Many people claim to hear voices in their heads. But how would we know that it is the Christian god's voice we're hearing, and not the voice of, say, the god Neptune, or Iletus, or Odin, or Geusha? Or, perhaps we're imagining it? Immediately we see Peter's claim that we have "direct apprehension" of the Christian god start to crumble.

Moreover, the Christian god is said to be supernatural, infinite, immaterial, imperceptible, incorruptible, perfect, immeasurable, and otherworldly. But the things which I directly apprehend are natural (or manmade), finite, material, perceptible, corruptible, imperfect, measurable, this-worldly things that exist independent of consciousness. So what I “know... immediately, by direct apprehension” could not – even on Christianity’s own terms – be the Christian god. Also, the nature of the things that I apprehend directly as natural or manmade, finite, material, perceptible, corruptible, imperfect, measurable and this-worldly things, indicates that it would be quite a stretch, to say the least, to consider them 'evidence' of a supernatural, infinite, immaterial, imperceptible, incorruptible, perfect, immeasurable and otherworldly thing. This would require us to accept as evidence of the Christian god things which fundamentally contradict it. Furthermore, the fact that the things that I “know... immediately, by direct apprehension” exist and are what they are independent of consciousness, only confirms that existence does not find its source in a form of consciousness. So on two fundamental counts, we have good reason to suppose that the Christian is either painfully mistaken or simply lying when he claims that his “God is known immediately, by direct apprehension.” Couple this with the fact that the believer proposes no objective method for reliably distinguishing between what he calls “God” and what he may merely be imagining, and we have good reason to suppose that his god-belief is quite simply false.

But should we attempt to entertain this notion of having awareness of a supernatural being even by inference from what we “know... immediately, by direct apprehension,” we encounter other problems. For instance, if we suppose that behind “the stars of heavens to the trees of the forest to the genetic make-up of [biological organisms],” there exists a form of consciousness which is responsible for it all, how could we identify it? It is not until relatively recently in human history that we have been able to discover moons orbiting distant planets, and these exist within our very solar system. But the consciousness allegedly responsible for having created them and everything else in the universe is said to originate from beyond the universe. So how could we know that this consciousness is identical to the god of Reformed Christianity, and not Geusha, Zalbitralca, Avalokitesvara, Hu, Mozga'ebatel’, or some other supernatural candidate? How could we rule these other gods out and not the god of Christianity at the same time, unless it were in the end a matter of preference (as we would expect to be the case if all of them, including the Christian god, were imaginary)? For instance, when I look at the stars and begin to imagine a supernatural consciousness behind their existence (and Christians indicate no alternative to imagining as a way to "apprehend" their god), why would I imagine that this supernatural consciousness had a son? Why not a daughter instead of a son? Why any offspring to begin with? See, that’s the trouble with this course of apologetic rambling: there’s no necessary reason to suppose that any supernatural consciousness inferred from the “evidences” Peter lists would be the Christian god as opposed to some other god. That’s because: god-belief constitutes a complete departure from the principle of objectivity, for it’s not facts which drive theism's conclusions, it’s the imaginative contents of a storybook which does this. Without facts, there is no objective content to inform a logical inference. You’ll notice that, in the bible, it is not facts which we discover in the world which lead up to the incarnation of Jesus, but a series of stories – “events... in the past,” as Peter puts it – essentially no different from any other fictional account. The problem for the Christian is that he can give no objective reasons for supposing that the stories found in the New Testament, for instance, are anything other than fiction.

As for a will for my life, I already have one, thank you. Specifically, it is my own will, and my choice is to live and enjoy my life, regardless of who disapproves (for it is in my self that I live, move and have my being). How do I know this? Simple: by reason.

Peter writes:

It's also necessary to remind ourselves that mankind is created in God's image. As such, man is created and constituted by God in such a way as to recognize His "signature" and "voice" in all creation and in Scripture.

So, human beings, which are created, material, non-divine, non-supernatural, biological, corporeal, non-invisible, finite, mutable, mortal, non-eternal, non-infallible, non-omniscient, non-omnipotent, non-omnipresent, imperfect, corruptible, prone to sin, and destructible, were created in the image of a being that is uncreated, immaterial, divine, supernatural, non-biological, incorporeal, invisible, infinite, immutable, immortal, eternal, infallible, omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent, perfect, incorruptible, incapable of sin, and indestructible? How do you figure? On every fundamental point, man is that which the Christian god is said not to be.

According to the bible, the Christian god is said to be “a spirit” (cf. John 4:24) and “a spirit hath not flesh and bones” (Luke 24:39). But human beings have flesh and bones, so they could not be spirits on the bible’s own definitions, and yet we were supposedly created “in the image” of a spirit which “hath not flesh and bones”? Our identities are genetically tied to DNA, but what Christian thinks this is the case for his god? To put it mildly, we resemble bears, elk and trout for more than the supernatural deity of the bible.

Even epistemologically, there are fundamental differences. Man possesses his knowledge in the form of concepts. But, as I have already shown, the Christian god – on account of its alleged omniscience – would not possess its knowledge in the form of concepts. Man is not omniscient, nor is he infallible. So he needs a guide to acquiring and validating knowledge. That guide is called reason, and it is the faculty by which he identifies and integrates what he perceives. An omniscient and infallible being would have no need for reason, for it would already know everything – it wouldn’t need to acquire and validate new knowledge, for there could be no new knowledge for it to acquire and validate. This means that there is something man can do that the Christian god could not do: man can learn, while the Christian god cannot. And yet man, who must learn in order to exist, is created in the image of a being that cannot learn?

Moreover, there could be no resemblance between man and the Christian god in terms of morality. Morality is a code of values which guides one's choices and actions. Man needs morality because he faces a fundamental alternative: to live or die. It is because he faces this alternative that he needs values in the first place. Indeed, it is because man is not immortal and indestructible, like the Christian god is supposed to be, that values have any relevance to his existence in the first place. Also, since man not only needs to act in order to live, but also does not automatically already know what constitutes a value to his life or the actions by which he will acquire those values which his life needs, he needs a code of values - a hierarchy of value importance - by which his values and the actions required to achieve them can be identified. However, none of this could apply in the case of the Christian god. The Christian god is said to be eternal, immortal and indestructible, needing nothing, absolutely perfectly complete in every sense (to "comprehend" this, just set your imagination to maximum). So unlike man, the Christian god would not need to act in order to exist; its existence would be guaranteed, even if it chose to do nothing but remain idle for all eternity. Indeed, why wouldn't it just remain idle for all eternity, since it would have no needs to satisfy? It certainly would have no objective basis for valuing one thing over another, so consequently it would have no objective basis choose one course of action over another. Any choice it would make, regardless of what that choice might be, would be purely arbitrary in the fullest sense of the term. So far from the Christian god serving as some kind of basis or standard of morality for man (a claim that could only indicate how little Christians understand about morality and why man needs it in the first place), morality would be completely useless and irrelevant to such a being.

On every essential, then, from man's nature, to his epistemology and capacity for morality, man is the diametric opposite of the thing Christians describe as their god. The slogan that man was "created in the image of God" only tells us that those who affirm it as truth have failed to integrate what they should know about man and what they claim in their theistic affirmations on anything approaching a rational level. The more one examines it, the more certain the conclusion that the notion of ‘God’ as the Christians understand it, was created ultimately in the image of man. As Rand succinctly put it,

It is an isolation of actual characteristics of man [e.g., consciousness capable of thought, judgment, emotions, volition, memory, wishing, etc.] combined with the projection of impossible, irrational characteristics which do not arise from reality – such as omnipotence and omniscience. (ITOE, p. 148)

The evidence, then, points to the opposite conclusion, namely that the Christian worldview has it reversed. The idea of ‘god’ was created on the basis of certain characteristics belonging to man, amplified beyond their contextual limits (by setting one's imagination on maximum) and “combined with the projection of impossible, irrational characteristics” which find their basis in man’s imagination, not in reality. So the claim that “mankind is created in God’s image” is a demonstrably false premise. Therefore, anything concluded on the basis of this false premise must also be false.

Peter writes:

In the Christian worldview, man is no ‘tabula rasa’. When people look around at the universe or at themselves, or when they are reading Scripture, they know they are beholding their Creator.

The denial of tabula rasa as the initial condition of his consciousness, only earmarks one’s position as initially out of line with the facts of reality. This does not bode well for any conclusions one seeks to draw from such pronouncements. However, it is not surprising to find Christians denying tabula rasa. It is necessary for Christians to deny tabula rasa as man’s beginning condition, for they want to claim that knowledge of their god is a priori or innate. They have to do this, because they know that they cannot infer the existence of their god from facts which we find in the world. So instead of ditching the notion of a god, they ditch the nature of man’s mind, and with it all legitimate knowledge in sum. Thus they dichotomize at this point, affirming knowledge of an a priori nature as well as knowledge of an a posteriori nature, so that they can have access to the legitimate knowledge they need as human beings to live in the non-cartoon universe of atheism. Thus they show how necessary it is to borrow from a worldview which contradicts their own even just to live. For without doing so, they will wind up like Jesus: willingly embracing a premature death.

Notice, too, that, once one accepts as valid the notion of innate knowledge, one could claim any arbitrary notion as truth. The Lahu tribesmen could, like the Christian, claim that their knowledge of Geusha is a priori, denying tabula rasa and affirming their religious views on the claim to have been 'created' with this 'knowledge' already in their heads. If the Christian can claim this about his knowledge of the Christian god, why can't the Lahu tribesmen make the same kind of claim about their knowledge of Geusha? If the arbitrary is valid for one religion, why would it be invalid for a rival religion?

Peter writes:

Thus, in the Christian worldview, God's meets His own self-obligation to make Himself clearly known to everyone. Not everyone knows God unto salvation, yet no one has an excuse for rejecting God. All men know God but many reject Him because they 'suppress the truth by their wickedness'. According to Christianity, therefore, the burden of proof has been met beyond reproach by God Himself. The demands of the unbeliever for evidence are based upon his supression of the truth in his wickedness. This does not mean we shouldn't discuss and debate these things with unbelievers, but it does mean that we need to remember that God is God, not us. He validates Himself. Man is not the judge of God to see whether He exists.

Statements like this show the futility of presuppositionalism in producing any proof whatsoever for the existence of the Christian god. Peter makes it clear that a circular (i.e., fallacious) argument is the best we can expect from presuppositionalists when he says “in the Christian worldview, God... meets His own self-obligation to make Himself clearly known to everyone.” In other words, if you first accept the Christian worldview, then you’ll accept the claim that its god has done what it needed to do “to make Himself clearly known to everyone.” But if one had already accepted the Christian worldview, he would already believe that the Christian god exists, and thus would have no further need for proof (unless of course he in fact really didn’t believe, but didn’t want to admit this to himself or anyone else).

But what about those who are not “in the Christian worldview,” who want to know why anyone would accept it as truth to begin with? This is the area where presuppositionalism is weakest as a type of apologetics. It is most likely well suited to those who are eager to convince themselves that they are right when they claim that a god exists, or to temporarily chase off salvation doubt. But as a recruiting device, presuppositionalism is too laden with disclaimers, spring-loaded dichotomies, evasive ploys and dearth of positive arguments for its fundamentals to do much good. At most, apologists who make use of presuppositionalism can only hope that non-believers who encounter it will be overwhelmed with its aggressive offensiveness, predatory bluffing and rhetorical gimmickry, and consequently bamboozled by its piping hot bullshit.

But also note that the apologist gives us what anyone trying to defend belief in an imaginary being could say about the being he imagines. Simple parody is enough to show this. For instance:

In the Flabbergastian worldview, Flabbergast meets Her own self-obligation to make Herself clearly known to everyone. Not everyone knows Flabbergast unto flabbergation, yet no one has an excuse for rejecting Flabbergast. All men know Flabbergast but many reject Her because they 'suppress the truth by their anti-flabbergastianism'. According to Flabbergastianity, therefore, the burden of proof has been met beyond reproach by Flabbergast Herself. The demands of the unbeliever for evidence are based upon his suppression of the truth in his anti-flabbergastianism. This does not mean we shouldn't discuss and debate these things with uneblievers, but it does mean that we need to remember that Flabbergast is Flabbergast, not us. She validates Herself. Man is not the judge of Flabbergast to see whether She exists.

How does the Flabbergastian know all this? Well, because Flabbergast has put this knowledge into her head of course! In fact, everyone "just knows" this, just as the Flabbergastian does, only many people reject Flabbergast because of their anti-flabbergastianism.

This is on the same level as the Freudian insinuation that all women suffer from penis envy. How do you prove that they suffer from penis envy? Why, women prove it by virtue of the fact that they're women. Their denial of wanting a penis only confirms that they in fact do suffer from penis envy. It's utterly unprovable, unfalsifiable, easily parodied, completely baseless and could be claimed about any invisible magic being one sets up as an object of worship.

Peter writes:

We should appeal to the unbeliever's suppressed knowledge of God.

Likewise, the Flabbergastian should appeal to the unbeliever's suppressed knowledge of Flabbergast. Why doesn't the believer instead deal with the issue of metaphysical primacy, examine his own interaction with the world to see which version of metaphysical primacy he assumes when affirms a truth, reaches for a glass of water, or balances his checkbook? Does he believe that consciousness holds metaphysical primacy over the objects of his consciousness, or does he recognize that the objects hold metaphysical primacy over his consciousness? I wager that the believer will not investigate this issue because he senses that his professed worldview will not be sustainable once he does.

Peter writes:

I plan to do this in the next post when I reduce atheism to absurdity by showing that the atheist cannot make sense of the very idea of proof itself, and that the idea of proof and the burden of proof only make sense when reasoned about according the Christian worldview. I think I'd like to move on to other topics soon, so I'm going to try and do that in one post.

This is something I would really like to see. But just consider what Peter is saying (or parroting from some apologetics book). He says he's going to "reduce atheism to absurdity." We must ask: what is atheism? Break it down: the root word is 'theos' which means 'god'; -ism signifies belief system; a- means "not" or "without". Thus while 'theism' is god-belief, 'atheism' is absence of god-belief. So Peter says he's going to "reduce" the absence of god-belief to "absurdity." Now what could possibly be absurd according to someone who believes in the absurdity of invisible magic beings, miracles, divine revelations, etc.? For instance, would Peter consider it "absurd" if someone told him that he witnessed a group of rocks in the desert holding a conversation together? Well, according to the Christian worldview, the Christian god could make talking rocks. Bahnsen himself rhetorically asked of his god, "He could even make the stones cry out, couldn't He?" (Always Ready, pp. 109-110). In fact, how would the believer know that his god doesn't have a whole planet full of talking rocks revolving some star in our galaxy or somewhere else in the universe? This just underscores the problem with Christianity and the presuppositionalist ambition of reducing rival worldviews to "absurdity": the concept 'absurdity' would be meaningless in the cartoon universe of theism. So here the presuppositionalist gives us a prime example of conceptually borrowing from the non-cartoon universe of atheism in order to denigrate atheism.

But the presuppositionalist still may wonder how I as an atheist "make sense of the very idea of proof itself." I can assure you, it's not by asserting the existence of an invisible magic being. First, we need to understand what we mean by 'proof'. We won't find this information in the pages of the bible, so I'll give my own rendition: proof is the conceptual process of identifying the logical relationship between that which is not perceptually self-evident and that which is perceptually self-evident. This is a conceptual process because it makes use of logical principles, and logical principles are conceptual in nature. A principle is a general (i.e., open-ended) truth upon which other truths logically depend. In other words, universality is a property of concepts, and the universality of logic derives from its conceptual nature. Man is born not knowing anything, so he must learn by identifying and integrating what he encounters perceptually by means of a conceptual process. But this is not an infallible process, so he needs a guide which enables him to adhere his knowledge to reality - that is, to preserve the logical integrity of his knowledge which what he perceives. Proof is one way to do this. It is by proof that a thinker can assure that the identifications he makes about what he perceives are in fact hierarchically consistent with what he perceives and with other truths which he has validated. This is all in keeping with the primacy of existence principle, which is the recognition that the objects one perceives are what they are independent of the subject's intensional operations (e.g., awareness of them, wishing, hopes, emotions, cognitive errors, etc.).

Now consider: how can one make sense of proof on the metaphysical basis assumed by Christianity? At minimum, proof requires consistent as well as stable reference to facts; it requires the facts we discover in the world to be reliable. A non-theistic worldview is compatible with this requirement if it adheres to the primacy of existence, for upon the primacy of existence facts obtain as they are independent of consciousness – that is, there’s no invisible magic being that can mess with the facts. So the facts we discover in the non-cartoon universe of atheism are in fact reliable, since there's no supernatural consciousness which could come along and magically revise them at will. But on the Christian worldview, facts can change for no objective reason whatsoever. Van Til makes this very clear:

God may at any time take one fact and set into a new relation to created law. That is, there is no inherent reason in the facts or laws themselves why this should not be done. It is this sort of conception of the relation of facts and laws, of the temporal one and many, imbedded as it is in that idea of God in which we profess to believe, that we need in order to make room for miracles. And miracles are at the heart of the Christian position. (The Defense of the Faith, p. 27)

This can only mean that facts are neither stable nor consistent. Which could only mean: the facts we discover could not be reliable. At one moment, the pots are full of water, but at the next they are full of wine (cf. John 2:1-11). Why? Because on this view there exists a supernatural consciousness which can magically turn the water into wine just like that, completely at will. No fruit and yeast mixture, fermentation and aging are needed. As Van Til says, “there is no inherent reason in the facts or laws themselves why this should not be done.” Causality on this view has nothing to do with the natures of the objects involved, but has everything to do with the intentions of the supernatural consciousness which magically directs their movements, as a cartoonist directs the movements of the characters in his cartoons.
So logic is completely unhelpful on Christianity’s own premises. You can look into the pots yourself and see that there’s water in them. But moments later someone comes up to you and insists that they are now full of wine. You reply saying that you had just verified that they are full of water. No, says the other fellow, they’re full of wine. That’s not logical, you think, right? Well, you're assuming the non-cartoon universe of atheism at that point. On the Christian worldview, however, facts can change at the whim of the ruling consciousness, so logic will be of no avail in reliably identifying any state of affairs in the universe. To the degree that the believer relies on logic to identify facts, he is in fact borrowing from a worldview which fundamentally contradicts Christianity. At which point we can safely say: the Christian has conceded debate just by raising the issue of logic.

by Dawson Bethrick