Sunday, January 13, 2008

The Imaginative Basis of Vytautas' God-Belief, Part 2

Continued from Part 1.
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In regard to the bible, I had written: It’s a storybook. The stories it contains are no more historical than the stories we read in a Harry Potter novel.

Vytautas responded: “J. K. Rowling does not claim that Harry Potter is real, but the authors of the gospels claim Jesus is real.”

I then wrote: That’s irrelevant and misses the point. A storybook is still a storybook, regardless of whether or not its author claims its contents are historical.

Vytautas then replied: “The point of a storybook is to say that the characters and events are not real. If the author claims that the events are real, then the book is not fiction, since the purpose of fiction is to tell a story that is not real in order to reflect the values of the author.”

And then I wrote: I don’t believe she does. But that would be irrelevant. Someone reading it and thinking it’s true could claim Harry Potter is a real person. Someone who invests his imagination in what he reads in a Harry Potter novel, and operates, as Christians do, on an epistemology which fails to provide the necessary mental tools needed to distinguish between the actual and the imaginary, the real and the fictitious, could easily succumb to the impression that what he is reading is “historical.” All the more if he *wants* it to be true, and even more if he’s fallen for various psychological sanctions (which are present in the bible, but absent in the case of Harry Potter books) which manipulate one into being afraid to recognize it’s all fiction. It wouldn’t be the first time (Christians and Muslims have been doing this for centuries), and it wouldn’t be the last time.

Vytautas: “Show me were people claim what they read in the Harry Potter novel is real.”

I don’t know any who do. But perhaps there are some who do think what they have read in a Harry Potter novel is true. To the extent that young people reading Harry Potter novels recognize that those novels are fictitious, they are indeed philosophically more mature than adult Christians who think that the stories they read in the bible are true.

Vytautas: “If you cannot, then I do not see the relevance of your claim.”

It’s very simple. I’ll explain it below.

Vytautas: “You posit people that claim the Harry Potter is real, but would it not be better to deal with the truth claims of the New Testament, since the difference is that Harry Potter does not claim to be true, and the New Testament claims to be true.”

But the New Testament’s claims have been dealt with: its stories are legends, and its philosophy is irrational. Moreover, taking it seriously requires one to ignore the distinction between reality and imagination, as I have pointed out numerous times, and as you are unable to defuse. It’s silly to take the bible’s stories as if they were truthful, and in fact heartless to boot. Imagine saying to someone who’s dying of cancer, “Oh, don’t worry. After you die, you’ll wake up in paradise. Your life is no big deal, besides, you’ll wake up in eternity.” But this is essentially what the religious view of the world teaches. And we see this modeled in the gospel stories themselves, when Jesus is made to have a conversation with the two malefactors who were crucified beside him.
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Vytautas wrote: “If Harry Potter is either real or fantasy, then that does not say anything if the New Testament is historical.”

I responded: It doesn’t have to in order for my point to stick.

Vytautas: “You point is people could claim Harry Potter is true, but they don’t, since it is a modern fiction novel.”

My point has several layers to it. For one, it is the content of the Harry Potter novel (supernaturalism) which decisively puts it in the category of fiction; and similarly it is the content of the bible (supernaturalism) which decisively puts it in the category of fiction. Also, the reader of a Harry Potter book engages his imagination as he contemplates to understand what he is reading, just as readers of the bible do when they read the bible. Only the readers of the bible deny the fact that what they’re reading is fantasy. But the process for both is very much similar. Both require the believer to imagine things that he does not observe in the actual world. We don’t observe men walking on unfrozen water, just as we don’t observe adolescent boys flying on broomsticks. But as we read the stories and the persons and events they describe, we imagine them, and in our imagination the stories take on a kind of life which we invest in them as we envision what we read.

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I asked: So what are these other criteria which the New Testament has going for it that Harry Potter novels do not have going for them? Is it simply the part about the author of one storybook claiming his storybook is true, while the author of the other acknowledges hers to be fiction?

Vytautas: “If it is not true that historical works don’t have to claim to be true, but that people can write history and think it is fiction at the same time, then that person is not writing history but fiction. The book’s claims are the first step to seeing if it is history or fiction. If this is not the first step, then I am not sure where to begin. Our criterions for history should allow for historical works and disallow for fictional works.”

I agree with the point that a “book’s claims are the first step in seeing if it is history or fiction.” The bible is full of stories which claim all kinds of supernatural events have taken place. This puts it squarely into the category of fiction, just as the content of a Harry Potter novel puts it into the category of fiction as well. That the bible says its events are true does not make the events it describes factual. Believing it on such frail basis would be utterly silly. But there are a lot of silly adults out there. So I do agree with your point that “our criterions for history should allow for historical works and disallow for fictional works,” except to point out that fictional works produced by a community and held by that community to be actually true (when in fact they are obviously fictional) can indicate for historians what at least some members of that community believed. But their belief in fiction does not make the fiction in question reality.
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Vytautas wrote: “When I give a single criterion for history, then that does not mean it is the only criterion for history, but all the criterions work together to give a method for history.”

I responded: Understood. But you see how weak this one criterion is, don’t you? It is so weak that it does not work in concert with others. It would be silly to think it does.

Vytautas: “You are saying that the criterion of understanding what the book is claiming is incompatible with another criterion.”

It’s not a question of compatibility, but of sufficiency to the task at hand. The criterion that you had given was that the fact that the places where the events in question took place were in fact real, e.g., Jerusalem. Your argument at this point seemed to be that, since the places where the events described in the bible are real (and were real at the time), then the stories that the bible purports to have taken place in those real places must have actually happened. This is so weak that it amazes me anyone would put any stock in it.

In response to this, I wrote:

I now write a story about my encounter with a magic leprechaun in my garage. In my story about my encounter with the magic leprechaun I describe what he was wearing, how he climbed on top of my washing machine and started talking to me about a pot of gold he hid in my neighborhood. Is my story about the leprechaun true because it takes place in a place that is in the real world? Are you going to start looking for this hidden pot of gold now?

My garage is a real place – it actually exists. Does the fact that the setting of my story is a real place, indicate that the story I set in that real place is true? Of course not. Have you acknowledged this? No, you haven’t. You still hide in the closet on this, claiming to have other criteria by which the content of the bible can be validated as actual history. What are those criteria? Let’s see.

Vytautas: “For example another criterion is that the book gives real times and places. If the book says that it was written 710 A.E. in Enroth, then we would not know when and where these times and places are, and this would be a work of fiction for all we are concerned. The former and latter criterions are compatible, since they do not contradict each other.”

I was hoping you were going to divulge another criterion by which the historicity of the bible could be established. It’s disappointing that you do not come through on this.
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I wrote: How many witnesses are testifying of the event which Paul records in I Cor. 15, which claims that the resurrected Jesus was seen by some 500 or so brethren? How many people have stepped forward to corroborate this event? What are the names of the 500 brethren? Where is their testimony? What exactly did they see? Did they see an apparition? That could be a mass hallucination. Did they see an actual human being? It could be a case of mistaken identification. Did it really even happen? We only have Paul saying in passing that it happened. Was Paul there? He does not claim to have been there. In fact, the way the passage reads as a whole suggests very strongly that Paul himself was not there. Also, if Paul is simply reciting a creedal formulation, as many have suggested, then he’s simply repeating hearsay. Robert Price argues quite persuasively that I Cor. 15:3-11 is an interpolation, and is not even authentic to Paul’s original letter.

Vytautas: “The citation would be more meaningful to the Corinthians at the church who could ask the 500 witnesses to the event at the time.”

For one, this doesn’t do us any good. But would it have done the Corinthians that you have in mind any good? I’m persuaded that it wouldn’t have. The passage gives no names of any of the 500 brethren to whom it alludes in passing, so how would the Corinthians reading Paul’s letter know whom to ask? The passage does not even indicate a time or place of the alleged event. For all we know it could have taken place 20 years earlier in a location 500 miles or more away. So how would a member of the Corinthian church follow up on the claim in Paul’s letter about 500 people seeing Jesus? Indeed, what exactly does the passage say they saw? Did they see an actual human being, or did they have an experience like Canon Michael Cole? The passage gives far too little information for it to be considered reliable in any way.

As for this passage being a creedal formulation that Paul is simply repeating in his letter, this is the position of none other than Christian apologist Craig Blomberg, who tells Lee Strobel on p. 34 of the latter author’s book The Case for Christ, that “Paul incorporated some creeds, confessions of faith, or hymns from the earliest Christian church” in his letters. On p. 35 Blomberg quotes I Cor. 15:3-7 and then says that “Paul was given this creed, which had already been formulated and was being used in the early church.” So if this is true, Paul was not even recounting something he had firsthand knowledge of. He was essentially reciting hearsay, so it is of no value (even if it could be said to be of value given its dearth of detail). But what’s interesting is that this position which Blomberg endorses conflicts directly with what Paul himself tells us in Galatians 1:11-12, that he received his gospel, not from men (including other believers), but directly from Jesus. He states:

But I certify you, brethren, that the gospel which was preached of me is not after man. For I neither received it of man, neither was I taught it, but by the revelation of Jesus Christ.

Why does Blomberg want I Cor. 15:3-7 to be an early creed? So that he can claim that Paul was incorporating an early tradition in his letter to the Corinthian church. The rationale here is that the earlier the tradition, the more credible it is as factually historical. But this goes directly against what Paul himself tells us. For Paul, his gospel was not a tradition that he picked up from other believers, such as in the form of early creeds.

Vytautas: “A mass hallucination could not have happened, since a hallucination is an individual experience.”

So more than one person cannot have an hallucination? That’s interesting. Where is the science to support this? At any rate, I don’t see any need to posit a mass hallucination anyway. They could have had what I have come to call a waking fantasy, like what Canon Michael Cole describes, and like what I have observed many individuals in church experiencing when they are at the height of their ecstasy in worship. I have watched a church full of more than 100 persons become ravished with their “experience” of Jesus. Ask every one of them, and they’ll tell you that they’re experiencing Jesus, feeling him in their lives, “seeing” him next to them. There’s no indication in the passage in Paul’s letter suggesting that the 500 brethren he mentions experienced anything more than this. I don’t think it’s hallucination what the churchgoers I’ve witnessed experienced. It is a self-induced and communally encouraged emotional frenzy which they artificially attribute to their Jesus. In other words, a waking fantasy.

Vytautas: “Paul knew about some the people because he says some have fallen asleep, so that Paul knew that some have died from the group of 500 witnesses.”

That Paul tells us that some of the 500 brethren had died is not sufficient to indicate that he actually knew some of them. If he were reporting hearsay (which would be the case if he were merely reciting a creedal formulation, as apologists like Blomberg insist), then Paul would have no firsthand knowledge of anything contained in that report. But let’s say Paul did know some of the people he mentions in I Corinthians 15. Then all the more we should ask why he didn’t give the Corinthian church any more details. This is one of the earliest reports in the New Testament of a sighting of the post-resurrection Jesus. Why does Paul breeze over it in passing like this, as if it were so insignificant? He never mentions it again in any of his letters, and no other writer mentions it, either. Paul devotes far more attention to matters like marriage and communion dinners than he does to sightings of Jesus.

Again, as I pointed out above, he does not give anything near sufficient information for his Corinthian readers to follow up on his claims; indeed, it is likely that the suggestion of following up on them would be slapped down as too distrusting of a venerated source. Christians then as now are supposed to believe indiscriminately and unquestioningly, to waver not, to doubt not, and accept what they are told by the powers that be without hesitation, even if they don’t understand it, even if it seems utterly incredible. That’s why you indicate that you have already strayed from the proper Christian mindset in seeking to uncover evidence in support of the biblical record to help establish its claim to truth. The Christian is supposed to treat the bible as “God’s word,” as if it were coming directly from his god’s mouth (supposing it had a mouth in the first place). Does a Christian go up to his god and say, “Well, gee, Lord, what’s your evidence for this?” And yet you treat the demand for evidence seriously, even try to satisfy it (although very weakly), and act as if you were convinced by what you propose as evidence. Meanwhile you can produce no evidence to support the claim that what we read in I Corinthians 15 is historically bankable, just as you fail to explain how we can reliably distinguish between what you call “God” and what you may merely be imagining.

Vytautas: “If there are early manuscripts where it contains I Cor. 15, but they are missing verses 3-11, then we would have evidence of interpolation.”

Yes, that would be evidence of interpolation. Other things can indicate interpolation as well. Again, see the Price article.
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I wrote: That’s more than you’ve offered in response to my challenge. But it’s moot anyway: if the gospels are fiction, then we cannot accept the claim that they are “testifying to [actual] historical events of Jesus.” It’s a storybook, just like Harry Potter.

Vytautas: “John writes that these are written so that you may believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and that by believing you may have life in his name.”

So they’re written with a religious agenda in mind, not with actual historical value in mind. But we already knew this. Certainly it does not follow from what John writes that it is truly historical. The bible is clear in its urging readers to believe rather than know. You can believe all you want. I want to know, and as one pastor once told me, “You know too much.” He was right.

Vytautas: “The purpose of the Gospel that John wrote was to record the life of Jesus so that you may believe that they are true.If that was John’s purpose, then he has simply failed at it. For here I am, I’ve studied the New Testament many times, and I’m less convinced every time I examine it.Vytautas: “In other words, he is saying that these historical events that he wrote about are true. Is this another interpolation?”

There is evidence of interpolation in the gospel of John. For instance, the very last chapter of John has been widely regarded as tacked on by another writer. Burton Mack sums it up quite nicely:

Since chapter 20 provides a clear and appropriate conclusion to the gospel (especially in light of John 20:30-31, which states the purpose for the gospel as a whole), many scholars have noted that chapter 21 must have been tacked on at a later time... This means that the person who added chapter 21 also invented the fiction of authorship for the whole gospel. The author was now understood to be one of the disciples. (Who Wrote the New Testament?, p. 218)

But I’m confident that the author of the gospel of John, the latest of the canonical gospels, wanted his community of readers to believe every word he wrote in it. However, just because someone slaps the label “historical” on a fictitious account does not make it genuinely historical.
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I wrote: It would be very easy for someone putting his imaginary story into writing to create characters who “witnessed” the events of the story. If he wanted readers to believe the story was actually historical, he would probably not hesitate to insert characters who are said to have witnessed the events in that story. So if the witnesses themselves are fiction, then they’re worthless as witnesses of an actual historical event.

Vytautas: “It would be easy also to write down an actual historical event as well.”

I don’t think so. Francois Tremblay makes an excellent point in this regard when he states:

The disadvantage of following reality is that you also need to follow its complexity. Fictional positions are not bound to this restriction.

Fiction is easier than truth, especially when there’s an overt religious agenda. By its very nature religion is prone to fantasy, hyperbole, a striving to express superlatives which transcend natural possibilities. So the motive to subvert reality is not only present, but also strong. At any rate, apologists have struggled since Christianity’s earliest days to show that their stories about Jesus are historical. Unfortunately, they conflict with each other, are preciously thin on detail (as we saw in the case of Paul’s account of early Jesus sightings), and read like fictional inventions (most apparent when comparing the different accounts side by side and noting the pattern of elaboration with each iteration). What we have is a legend that grows with each retelling. When there is little or no concern for actual history, and the guidance of a worldview which blurs the distinction between what is real and what is imaginary, the writing of fiction becomes far easier than the writing of actual historical events. Writing fiction does not require, for instance, the gathering of evidence and interviews with witnesses that reporting of actual historical events requires. To report on actual history requires a lot of effort and a lot of homework, which can’t be faked. We find none of this in the storybook of the bible; there is no indication of a carefully methodical effort to ensure historical accuracy. Instead, what we find in the bible is a pervasive attitude of “believe on my say so.” If what is recorded is actual history, such an attitude would not be needed; it would simply get in the way and undermine its credibility, just as it does in the case of the bible.

Vytautas: “If some one wants people to believe a historical story, then that person does not write fiction.”

He would if he does not know how to distinguish between reality and fiction. I have shown this to be the case with the biblical worldview. From its very foundations, the biblical worldview reverses the orientation between subject and object and blurs the distinction between fact and fantasy.

Vytautas: “If a person wants someone to believe a fiction story as true, then that person would not cite people who you can go talk to in order to tell a story as if it were true, since the witness would not be in agreement with your fiction story.”

So whom does Paul cite that his contemporaries could go talk to? He doesn’t give one name of the alleged 500 brethren. Not a single detail. How could anyone reading Paul’s letter to the Corinthians know who they could “go talk to” in order to verify what Paul wrote?

Vytautas: “Conspiracies seem unlikely, since people have no motive in to believe Jesus rose from the dead if Jesus did not really rise from the dead.”

If they believed Jesus rose from the dead, as they were taught by their elders to believe, they would certainly have the basis for such motivation in place. Though I would suggest that “conspiracy” is too heavy for what went on in the early church. I suspect they were much more innocent than this, that they were simply duped. Much like today’s youngsters who go around handing out tickets for their god.

Vytautas: “If you say money and power was the motive, you must understand that the early Christians were persecuted for their faith.”

Many early Christians were persecuted, but by outsiders. Within the church, however, their leaders held instant sway over their adherents. For some people, especially those who are willing to sacrifice their own integrity, such authoritative power could be intoxicating. And as for the adherents who subordinated themselves to early Christian leadership, they were propagandized into believing they were doing “God’s will,” just as today’s Muslim suicide bombers believe in the context of their religious views. The belief that a supernatural, omnipotent, omniscient and sovereign deity is pleased with a person’s actions and life, can be a powerful aphrodisiac for religious conformity.
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I wrote: So why accept the claim that there are witnesses to the events described in the bible? Who witnessed Paul’s conversion on the road to Damascus as recorded in the book of Acts for instance? Paul does not describe his own conversion in the same manner that Acts does in his own letters. So who witnessed this? The author Luke? Was he present then? Would you claim that he was reporting what Paul had told him? Where’s your proof? How do you know that Luke was infallibly reporting firsthand reports, especially when Paul himself, when he takes the opportunity to describe his own conversion, fails to corroborate what we read in Acts?

Vytautas: “The reason we can trust the Bible is because it is reliable because it depends on God who is truth itself.”

Do you recall what you had stated about numbers? You stated:

Consider the natural numbers. They do not have the property of love, since love requires a will, but the natural numbers do not have a will, since they are not a person.

My response to this was to point out that numbers are conceptual. I stated that numbers “are the form in which we understand the fundamental values of measurement,” and that they “do not possess consciousness.” The fact that numbers do not possess consciousness accounts for the fact that “they do not have the property of love.”

But now you want to say that your god “is truth itself.” But just as numbers are conceptual, and thus do not possess consciousness, truth is a property of concepts, and similarly does not possess consciousness. If concepts themselves do not possess consciousness, why suppose that a property of concepts possesses consciousness? Truth is not an entity which possesses a will of its own. Truth is not even an entity. To assert an invisible magic being, call it “God,” and then equate that being with truth as such, is to confess a most desperate ignorance of the nature of concepts and how the mind works. Indeed, I don’t think you affirm the Christian adage “God.. is truth” because you really think this to be the case, but because “it is written” and, as a Christian, you are supposed to affirm whatever is written in the sacred storybook. It’s all part of the robotic reflex that has been cultivated in your psyche as a result of Christian propagandizing.

Vytautas: “If we need the witness to write about the event themselves in order to for us to accept their witness, then we can only accept first-hand accounts of what actually happened in history.”

If the event in question is something quite fantastic, then I look for the reliability of the witness reporting it. If the person reporting it did not in fact witness the event in question, then it’s quite possible that what he has reported is misinformed, mistaken, garbled, exaggerated, or simply false. If the report is not corroborated by other individuals whom we would expect to corroborate it, that’s another big strike against it. And if the report conflicts with other reports, that’s another big strike. But this is what we find all over in the New Testament – a series of major strike-outs.

Vytautas: “That is, we can only accept the experience of the person writing and not the experience of people that the person writes about.”

If Jane writes about Melissa’s experience of Drodt’l, how do we really know what Melissa actually experienced? If it turns out that Jane wrote about Melissa’s experience decades after the time when Melissa is said to have experienced what she experienced, then how reliable should we assume Jane’s account about Melissa’s experience of Drodt’l to be? And if we have Melissa’s own writings, and in her own writings she fails to corroborate what Jane says she experienced in her writings decades later, how reliable is Jane’s account? I’d say not at all reliable. There are just too many holes in it.

Vytautas: “But the person’s first-hand account of the experience of the people he writes about is only as good as the people he writes about.”

What if it turns out that Jane never even knew Melissa? Perhaps Jane does not even mention a person named Melissa, but simply refers to someone anonymously. For instance, Jane refers to Melissa as “a sister,” where “sister” is supposed to indicate relationship by sorority affiliation rather than by bloodline, familial or biological relationship. Is Jane’s account of this anonymous sister’s experience of Drodt’l still credible at this point? And what if Jane just mentions this event in passing, giving no details about what this anonymous sister supposedly experienced? Again, more holes.

Vytautas: “So if we accept an historical account, then we also accept the persons and events that the historian writes about.”

Note the camouflaged circularity here: to accept the one, you must first accept the other; and to accept the other, you must first accept the one. Meanwhile, where’s the corroboration? Is there any other mention of the 500 brethren that Paul mentions but fails to identify in I Cor. 15?

Vytautas: “The people who witnessed Paul’s conversion were Jesus, Paul, and the men who were traveling with Paul.”

Is this Paul’s conversion as related in the book of Acts? The conversion account which Paul himself, when he mentions his conversion (cf. Galatians 1), nowhere corroborates? So, the author of Acts was surely not there. So where did he get the story if he didn’t make it up? Apologists like to say that he “would have” gotten it from Paul himself. If we had any corroboration of the event from Paul’s own hand, I would say this position might have at least some credibility (though it would not be enough to show that the author of Acts was actually a traveling companion of Paul; many scholars have shown reasons why this is quite unlikely). And it would still be possible for someone who knew Paul personally to exaggerate about what he supposedly experienced. The imagination of the believer is a wild beast that is hard to tame. I know this, I’m a former believer.

But not only does Paul fail to corroborate what Acts says about his conversion, Acts’ account further conflicts with things that Paul does say in his letters. For instance, Acts portrays Paul immediately subordinating himself to the Jerusalem church upon his conversion. But in his letters Paul indicates quite clearly that he operated independently of the Jerusalem church, and didn’t even contact them until three years after his conversion, and even then for only a fortnight. While Acts wants to portray Paul and the Jerusalem apostles as working with one accord (one big happy family of apostles), Paul’s letters shows that there were some major conflicts between him and the Jerusalem elders.

Vytautas: “The purpose of Paul’s letters was not to give another historical account of his conversion experience on the road to Damascus.”

This is a classic post hoc. Since Paul in his own letters does not corroborate the story of his conversion as we find it in the book of Acts, it must be the case that his purpose was not to do so. This approach could be used to explain away any failure to corroborate legendary intrusions. But even this objection misses an important fact: Acts was written well after Paul had written his letters. If Paul describes his conversion in his letters, he would not be giving “another historical account of his conversion experience on the road to Damascus,” for the book of Acts was not yet written. Similarly with the virgin birth: many apologists have told me that Paul was not interested in repeating the account of Jesus’ virgin birth that we find in Matthew, and this is supposed to be taken as sufficient reason for Paul’s silence on the matter. However, this kind of dodge misses the fact that the gospel of Matthew was written well after Paul had written his letters, so if Paul did mention Jesus’ virgin birth, he would not have been “repeating” it. And it seems extremely unlikely that, had Paul known the tradition that Jesus was born of a virgin, he would have failed to mention it. Paul was eager to tell people about his Jesus, not suppress important details about him.

In fact, Paul’s letters are not written with just one purpose in mind. He set out to accomplish many things in a single letter. But one thing that was at the forefront of his mind in each letter, as we can tell by reading them, is that he wanted his readers to believe that he was deliberating on whatever matter he touches in his letters with the authority of Jesus. At many points in his letters he is anxious to establish his credentials as an apostle. Had he had the kind of conversion experience which Acts gives him, he would have not hesitated to cite it, for Acts characterizes Paul as being handpicked by Jesus himself to carry out his missionary work. Indeed, it is because Paul was so determined to establish his apostleship to the budding churches he founded that the silence of this important detail is all the more deafening. It cannot be dismissed by the canned excuse that you give here, that it was not Paul’s purpose “to give another historical account of his conversion experience on the road to Damascus.” Had Paul told about his conversion experience in his letters, it would have been the first time it was put down in writing. It would not have been a repeat of something that was already circulating in written form.

Besides, if Paul’s conversion happened the way it did, what keeps Jesus from appearing to all men in the same manner? I have raised this question in my blog The Problem of Saul. So the apologist hoping to validate Acts’ account of Paul’s conversion may think he’s won the battle, but at that point he loses the war itself.

Vytautas: “The author of Acts is Luke, since if you compare the opening paragraphs to Luke and Acts, then you will note that they are of the same author.”

I understand that the author of the gospel of Luke and the author of the book of Acts are most likely the same individual. I’m open to the possibility that the author of these texts did not actually have the name Luke as well, but that a known companion of Paul was later ascribed as the author of both.

While you suggest that I “compare the opening paragraphs to Luke and Acts” in order to “note that they are of the same author,” what I have always found most curious is the comparison between the end of the gospel of Luke and the beginning of Acts. In the last chapter of Luke we read how the resurrected Jesus met with his disciples on the day of his rising, and on that same day, after evening, Jesus ascends to heaven (see Lk. 24:51). But according to Acts (1:1-9), Jesus lingers around with his disciples for some forty days, and only after this span of time is he taken up by a cloud into heaven. Apologists like to say that the author, who wrote both Luke and Acts, would not have contradicted himself like this. But if he were writing stories which were to be understood for their allegory and symbolism, this would not be a contradiction in their minds. But today’s believers are overcome with hard literalism, and want all this to be historically true. But this forces the contradiction.

Vytautas: “Luke joined up with Paul when he met him at Assos, then sailed to Mitylene (Acts 20:14). So Paul would be the main source for Luke’s information.”

For specifically which information? For Paul’s conversion? Again, why would we expect more detail about Paul’s conversion from a text purportedly written by a companion of Paul, than from the hand of Paul himself? And why the many contradictions between Acts and Paul’s letters?
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I asked: Who witnessed Jesus’ resurrection? It took place in a sealed tomb. You might say that people who knew Jesus saw him after he died on the cross and therefore must have been resurrected. Sounds like a made up story to me, and you’ve given nothing substantial to counter otherwise.

Vytautas: “The apostles are some witnesses to Jesus resurrection.”

Which apostles were in the tomb where Jesus allegedly came back to life, such that they could be “witnesses to Jesus’ resurrection”? And where does any gospel account put any apostles in the sealed tomb with Jesus when he allegedly came back to life? According to the stories themselves, no one witnessed Jesus’ resurrection. I defy you to show me where anyone in the canonical gospels is portrayed as having watched Jesus’ incarnated body come back to life.

Vytautas: “If the story was made up, then the Jews and the Romans could just point to the tomb with the body of Jesus in it to show the Jesus did not rise from the dead.”

This response assumes historical reliability of the gospels by supposing that the events they portray up to and including Jesus’ crucifixion are true, which is what you are called to prove in the first place. Thus your objection begs the question. In tandem with this error, it constitutes an argument from ignorance: why suppose that contemporary Jews and Romans did not “point to the tomb with Jesus when he allegedly came back to life”? Perhaps many people did, but their testimony was never recorded, or if it were recorded, it was censored by later Christians.

Vytautas: “If the body was stolen, then the 11 of the 12 original apostles would not have seen Jesus,”

Even if the body were stolen, the eleven remaining apostles could have claimed to have experienced Jesus, just as Canon Michael Cole claimed, just as hundreds of thousands of Christians today claim. Even in Luke (24:37), the apostles are made to wonder whether or not they saw a spirit when they allegedly interacted with the risen Jesus. Also, the earliest accounts, as I have pointed out, are preciously thin on detail, giving no indication of what exactly the earliest “witnesses” supposedly saw or experienced. Furthermore, a later writer could come along and pen a fictional narrative portraying 11 of the 12 apostles as seeing the resurrected Jesus. Given what he sought to portray, such a writer would be motivated to ignore the fact that the body was stolen. Readers coming along later, not realizing that the body was stolen, might be prone to believing the fictional portrayal they read about the 11 of the 12 apostles. At any rate, I do not argue that Jesus’ body was stolen. Indeed, that would presuppose that Jesus actually existed, and I think there are many very good reasons to suppose that the Jesus we read about in the gospels is a mere legend.

It’s interesting, incidentally, that you specify “11 of the 12 original apostles.” For in I Cor. 15, Paul specifies that Jesus was seen by “the twelve.” This is the only instance in any of his letters where he mentions “the twelve,” and it’s noteworthy that he does so only in passing. Many commentators have tried to explain this nearly complete absence of mention of “the twelve” as being part of a creedal formulation which Paul was reciting. But if “the twelve” were an important leading body in the early church, why does Paul mention it only once, and only in passing? Acts likes to portray Paul as having subordinated himself to the Jerusalem elders. Why don’t his letters reflect this? Again, more holes in the holy storybook.

Vytautas: “and the apostle Paul would not hear the voice of Jesus at the Road of Damascus.”

Where does Paul tell us that he heard any voice on the Road to Damascus?

Vytautas: “It sounds made up to say Matthew was on drugs, the witness had mass-hallucinations, or the witnesses of the resurrected Jesus were all mistaken who saw someone look like Jesus.”

Let me get this straight: Stories about a god-man coming to earth, being born of a virgin, receiving baptism from a mere mortal human being, performing miracles and miraculously curing individuals suffering congenital afflictions, being crucified by the Romans and resurrected three days later in a sealed tomb, do not sound “made up,” and yet the proposal that the authors of such stories (even though they conflict at many points, and fail to corroborate each other where we would expect them to) may have been under the influence of narcotics which were readily available at the time and often incorporated into religious practice in the areas where these writings are thought to have been written, “sounds made up”?

Vytautas: “Historical accounts are better than possible delusions of the witnesses to the events.”

Historical accounts are quite valuable. I grant this. Nothing I have stated indicates that historical accounts are worthless. But if you assume that the gospels are historical accounts, then you beg the question. It’s your call, Vytautas.

Stay tuned for Part 3!

by Dawson Bethrick

Saturday, January 12, 2008

The Imaginative Basis of Vytautas' God-Belief, Part 1

Again Vytautas has attempted a response to me, but unfortunately he has managed to ignore my challenge throughout it. In spite of the length of his most recent response to me, and the apparent point-by-point nature of that response, he has failed to address the essence of my challenge: he has not indicated how I can reliably distinguish between what he calls "God" and what he may merely be imagining.

This is not surprising, as I do not think he or any other theistic apologist will be able to meet my challenge. Regardless, a review of his many accompanying errors will be educational for readers who are ready to learn.

Below I begin with the first part of a comprehensive response to Vytautas, and I thank him for the opportunity to showcase the many points which are relevant to my challenge and develop them for field-ready application. It is because of my gratitude to Vytautas for this opportunity that I direct my response to him. However, readers should bear in mind that my responses to Vytautas' statements can serve as models for responding to other defenders of theism who are afraid to admit the fact that their god-belief rests ultimately on imagination.

* * * *

I wrote: Again, this is all imaginary stuff, Vytautas. You simply assert that your god is there, that it has all these properties, and that possession of these properties means it necessarily exists. As I’ve pointed out several times now, one can say this about anything he imagines. Sorry, you’re just not scoring any points here.

Vytautas: “By imaginary stuff, you mean only things conceived in the mind and not in reality. When you say God is imaginary, then you say that you can only think of God and he does not exist in the world outside my mind.”

It’s a fantasy. Fantasies are not reality. There is a difference between what is imaginary and what is real. The religious view of the world blurs this fundamental distinction in the mind of its adherents such that they have a hard time discerning what is real as opposed to what is imaginary. Religion encourages such confusion.

Vytautas: “But if you start with the definition of God, you know that you cannot predicate the incommunicable attributes of God to a contingent being such as a chair because we can see the chair is finite. Thus, we see a distinction between one sense object on the one hand and God on the other.”

I have already pointed out the error in attributing definition to a specific entity. Definition is a property of concepts, not of entities which exist independent of man’s consciousness. Also, man’s mind does not begin with definitions; it begins with perception. Since definition is the final step in concept-formation, there’s a lot that goes on in the mind before we get to the definition of any concept. Moreover, while those who ascribe to analytic philosophy may be impressed with the necessary-contingent dichotomy which drives much of your defenses, it is a dichotomy which I reject. (See Peikoff, Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, pp. 88-121.) Lastly, the important “distinction” which I “see” between a “sense object” like a chair on the one hand, and your god on the other, is that the former is real, and the latter is imaginary.
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I wrote: Everything you’re saying about your god can be said about something that is not real, Vytautas. Do you not recognize this simple fact? I can imagine an invisible magic being, call it “infinite, eternal and unchangeable,” stipulate that it is “necessary,” and on this basis affirm that it exists, that it is real, that it did whatever I imagine it to have done. But at the end of the day, all these assertions are worthless, for they are merely assertions. There’s no objective backing to them. And, they can be said about anything one imagines. The history of the world shows that almost every culture has invested in some imaginary conscious being which supposedly explains the things we find existing in the world, things which are not imaginary. The result is a most perverse reversal: the non-imaginary is being explained by the imaginary.

Vytautas: “You are saying that an infinite, eternal, and unchangeable being does not exist since there is no objective backing for the being.”

What I said is that everything you say about your god can be said about anything one might imagine. As for whether something that is “infinite, eternal, and unchangeable” can exist, I did not speak on this directly, but I will now. I do think that something eternal and unchangeable exists, which is reality proper. But reality proper is not “infinite,” it is finite. I do not accept the view that an entity or group of entities can be “infinite.” To exist is to be something specific. The concept ‘infinite’ refers merely to the potential to extend a series beyond any specifically designated point, such as the number series. And even this would have to be qualified, because no one has the time to continue such an exercise forever, nor would it be useful to do so. At any rate, by saying that an entity is “infinite,” you have already excluded it from the realm of existence by denying it a specific identity. What lacks objective backing is not the “being” that you claim exists, but your claim that such a being exists. You’ve offered nothing objective to support the claim that your god is real, and you’ve not shown how one can reliably distinguish between what you call “God” and what you are imagining. In fact, in reviewing your comments, it seems you do not even understand the nature of this challenge.

Vytautas: “But God does not require the creation in order for God to exist because he does not depend on the world which we experience in our every day lives.”

One can make claims like this about anything he imagines. So this point is useless in meeting my challenge.

Vytautas: “Once you have defined a subject with the properties of infinite, eternal, and unchangeable, this cannot be the properties of anything one imagines, since the description that is given is well defined.”

The argument here seems to be: “since the description that [I have] given [to God] is well defined,” the object so described “cannot be the properties of anything one imagines.” Why? How does this follow? We can test this: let’s imagine Drodt’l, which I describe with the properties of infinite, eternal, and unchangeable. Is Drodt’l now real because I have attributed these properties to him? I trow not, as Jesus would say. All you have done is given us the claim that his god possesses these properties and that it is real. Now you seem to be suggesting that the knowledge that his god is real follows from your attribution of these properties to what you call “God.” How does that follow? As my test shows, one can make this kind of claim about anything he imagines; one can attribute any properties he wants to something he has imagined. So again, it is another useless point. Indeed, it appears that you are so deeply mired in the confusion between what is real and what is imaginary that you do not understand the significance of the challenge that I have raised against your god-belief.

Vytautas: “That is, there is no other being other than God that fits the above criteria.”

This too could be said about something one is merely imagining. And I would expect him to say it, too. The religionist wants his fantasy to be real, so he will make all kinds of claims of exclusivity here. But again, these are nothing more than idle assertions.

Vytautas: “If you change the subject name God to any other name and do not change the predicate, they you do not change the proposition as a whole since God is unique. There is nothing else in creation that you can compare to him.”

These are more claims that one can make about something he is merely imagining. I can imagine Drotd’l, and claim that Drotd’l is a unique, infinite, eternal and unchangeable being, that these properties which I have ascribed to Drodt’l guarantee Drodt’l’s existence. I can say that anyone who wants to make the claim that a unique, infinite, eternal and unchangeable being exists must be talking about Drodt’l, even if he gives it a different name (like “Yahweh” or “Elohim,” for instance). Again, this is all imaginary stuff.

Vytautas: “If God only exists in the minds of men, then it is problematic that the history of the world shows that almost every culture has believed in some conscious being that cannot be sensed directly. If the belief in God is the popular position, then this would be evidence that God exists because the nearly universal belief would show men know God innately in their minds. That is, the wide spread belief of distorted views of God demonstrates that man have an idea of God within them. However, the belief is not another mass-hallucination that most men have, since hallucinations are personal experiences and not collective experiences.”

Belief in invisible magic beings is nothing new. But the widespread popularity of such belief is not an indicator that those invisible magic beings are real, as you seem to think. (Notice how you are resorting here to an ad populum fallacy: “so many people throughout history have believed, therefore it must be true!”.) You ignore the fact that while people throughout history have believed in invisible magic beings, they did not believe in the same invisible magic being. The names, descriptions and careers of the invisible magic beings worshipped by people throughout history have varied from culture to culture. The Egyptians worshipped Horus, Osiris, Isis, etc., while the Canaanites worshipped El, Anat, Asherah, etc., the Norse worshipped Odin, the Hindus worship Brahma and Shiva, the Lahu worship Geusha, etc. It is only later, when for instance Rome adopts Christianity and spreads it by means of force, that a particular religious belief takes on international adherence.

In fact, the widespread popularity of such beliefs indicates how desperately human beings need rational philosophy. What you do not understand (and thus fail to integrate into your understanding of the world and the human mind) is the fact that the underlying root to all god-belief (including your own) is the primacy of consciousness metaphysics. Since the vast majority of philosophers have historically failed to grasp the nature of worldviews in terms of the subject-object relationship and the implications this relationship has for thought and philosophy, it should be no surprise that many worldviews throughout human history have been susceptible to blurring the real with the unreal, the actual with the imaginary, the objective with the fictitious. Early religion most likely had its origin in a most primitive situation like this. It is quite easy to imagine a conscious being lurking behind the things we perceive in the world, a conscious being which not only “created” those things that we see in nature (such as mountains, trees, bugs, clouds, raindrops, etc.), but also “uses” them to meet certain “ends.” We can imagine many invisible magic beings manipulating reality, or claim that there is only one. But even those who claim that there is only one such invisible magic being inevitably dream up rival invisible magic beings which vie against the one held as the supreme invisible magic being. Hence in Christianity you have not only the Christian god, but also innumerable devils and demons lurking in dark places and in other people’s minds, manipulating the places they haunt and causing all kinds of mischief intended to thwart the purposes of the supreme invisible magic being. In the end, however, it is all imaginary stuff. What makes this all possible, philosophically speaking, is the failure to observe the subject-object relationship in one’s view of the world. I have documented this failure in specifically the Christian religion in many of my writings. You have not interacted with those writings, nor do you give me the impression that you have any serious understanding of these points. Your present remarks indicate this.

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I wrote: Ever wonder why even within Christianity proper, there are so many different constructs of the Christian god? Some say the Christian god is one way (e.g., Arminians), others say it is another way (e.g., Catholics), and yet others say it is another way (e.g., Calvinists). Some say it wishes (e.g., the bible, Van Til, etc.), others say it does not wish (e.g., Paul Manata). How can this be? Obviously we have rival imaginations going on here. The problem is that believers are afraid to be honest and come out and admit the fact that their god is the product of human imagination. And I've asked how I can reliably distinguish between what you call "God" and what you may merely be imagining. You've not given me anything which speaks to this point.

Vytautas: “Show where the Arminians, Catholics, Calvinsits, the Bible, Van Til, or Paul Manata define God differently than I do. When Paul Manata says God does not wish, then Paul Manata means that God does not merely hope that his plan will be executed, but that God will certainly accomplish all of his holy will, since by wish you mean hope with little chance of success.”

Paul Manata was quite adamant in his affirmation that his god does not wish, and both Van Til and the bible are quite clear in affirming that their god does wish. Since neither point to anything objective to confirm or verify their respective claims, we have no choice but to take them at their word or, as I have proposed, recognize that they are retailing in the imaginary. At any rate, a god which does wish and a god which does not wish could not be the same god. As for the theological conflicts between Arminians, Catholics, Calvinists and other rival sects, I see no need to present a survey of these here. They are well documented and the rivalries continue to this day unheeded.

Vytautas: “God has revealed himself, so that men are able to think about God.”

By “God has revealed himself,” Christians typically mean we need to consult a storybook to get our information about their imaginary being’s identity. And it is true: “men are able to think about” this imaginary being; incidentally, so are women. And “think about” it they have. They have poured so much mental effort into developing this imaginary being that no single library could possibly contain one tenth of all the literature that collective effort has produced. There’s a god to suit every taste in the theological marketplace, for in the end personal taste is the final defining arbiter. Some prefer a god which wishes, for instance, while others prefer a god which does not wish. Some prefer a god which controls everything, others prefer a god whose control is less draconian. Sometimes individual believers flip-flop on which taste delimits their own god-belief program. The “nature” of their god often hinges on their mood swings, and yet still insist that their god is “unchangeable.” In a sense, everyone’s god is unchangeable, for change is only possible to something that exists. Things which do not exist don’t do anything, including change.

Vytautas: “If I imagine one thing that is not God, and show how this image is different from God, then it is shown that I distinguished between God and the image.”

The word of interest here is “show.” How do you propose to show the distinctions you have in mind here? You do not say. Now, of course, one can assert that there are differences, and I suspect that is what you would do, just as you have up to this point. But this is quite different from showing. You have not shown us your god, nor have you identified the means by which we could have awareness of it. In fact, in your last posting, it was clear that you need to infer its existence rather than possess direct awareness of it. So again, lost in the blurry confusion between reality and imagination, you fail to affirm a consistent position here. You’re all over the place, and apparently don’t realize it.

Vytautas: “Consider the natural numbers. They do not have the property of love, since love requires a will, but the natural numbers do not have a will, since they are not a person, but God is love, so that the natural numbers and God are not identical to each other.”

Numbers are conceptual; they are the form in which we understand the fundamental values of measurement. And you are correct here: Numbers do not possess consciousness. But why suppose that anything we conceive with our minds itself has consciousness? Well, if we imagine it has consciousness, then we can claim that what we imagine is a conscious being, that it has a will. Take god-belief for example. The believer imagines a god, ascribes various properties to it, such as “infinite, eternal, and unchangeable,” affirms that because it possesses these properties (on his say so, mind you) it must exist, and give it its own personal will. But it’s still imaginary nonetheless.
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Vytautas had written: “By knowing what God means we recognize that such a being must exist, since you cannot only imagine a necessary being because a necessary being must exist. God is necessary because he does not depend on any other thing for his existence.”

I responded: Here you reveal another epistemological reversal: the meaning of the term in question is supposed to determine that its referent is real. That’s backwards. We don’t do this with any other idea. In all other cases, we discover the existence of the existing thing first, by means of perception or by some instrument which expands our perception (e.g., microscopes, telescopes, amplifiers, etc.), and then we have awareness of an object which we then set about identifying and classifying and understanding. We don’t start with the “meaning” of a concept – for instance, clouds – and then say, “well the meaning of ‘cloud’ is [X], and because of this, clouds must exist!”

Vytautas: “God is non-contingent because he does not need to be derived from another being.”

One could say this about anything he imagines. For instance, Drodt’l is non-contingent because he does not need to be derived from another being. See? What makes the Christian version of this claim true, but not the Drodt’lian version?

Vytautas: “God does not depend on other beings since he is self-existent.”Another easily mimicked assertion: Drodt’l does not depend on other beings since he is self-existent. You are still trying to use descriptors to meet my challenge. But mere descriptors are insufficient to meet my challenge. Vytautas: “On the other hand, clouds are contingent beings, since they may or may not exist and must be derived by another being since it depends on water for its existence.”

One could swap out ‘clouds’ in my statement with anything he imagines, and make the kind of claim that you make about your god in reference to what he imagines. Additionally, one could easily make the claim that clouds are necessary beings, in spite of your question-begging denial of this view. Indeed, one could say “name a time when no clouds have existed!” and we would be at a loss to point to such a time. Indeed, he may say that he has something other than the clouds in the earth’s atmosphere in mind when he speaks of necessarily-existing clouds.

Vytautas: “The definition of cloud does not guaranty certainty that they are in at least one cloud somewhere.”

See, I was right. You expect descriptors to carry some kind of epistemological compulsion in affirming conclusions. They don’t, not in the sense that you’re attempting to use them. You appear not to have understood the points I raised in my above quote. In order to substantiate your claim that your god is real and not imaginary, you continually fall back on the description you attribute to your god, even though I have repeatedly shown this maneuver not only to be fallacious, but epistemologically backwards.

Vytautas: “The reason why we can look to the idea of God for his existence is because God is a necessary being unlike the cloud.”

Not only does this beg the question against the idea of a necessary cloud, the approach you use here could be used to defend any idea based in the imagination, just as you do in the case of your god. Not only do you fail to demonstrate the verity you assume for the position that there can be no necessary cloud, you fail to demonstrate not only that your god is real as opposed to imaginary, you fail to identify the means by which I or any other onlooker can reliably distinguish between your god and what you may merely be imagining. Still my challenge goes unmet.

Vytautas: “We can understand what the meaning of the term God asserts, and then discover the existence of God. The argument is given below.”

I’ll look forward to reviewing any argument you intend to give. So far, you’ve given precious little argument. Specifically, I’m looking forward to learning the way by which you think we can “discover the existence” of your god. If you know of such a way, I don’t know what’s taking you so long to identify it. Why didn’t you disclose this in the beginning? We’ll see why when we get to it.

Anyway, notice how you confirm my point about your epistemological backwardness. You want to start with “what the meaning of the term God asserts, and then discover the existence of God.” You start with a preconceived notion in mind, then try to make everything fit it. It’s the oldest trick in the book, but the whole basic approach is still backwards.
_________________

I had written: As for what I can and cannot imagine, how do you know that I “cannot only imagine a necessary being”? I can say anything I imagine is a necessary being. This is a volitional exercise. I imagine Alokutsura. What is Alokutsura, you ask? Alokutsura is a necessary, infinite, eternal and unchangeable being! Because of the properties which I assign to it, it must exist! That’s your whole argument, Vytautas. It can be used to “prove” the existence of anything I imagine. And still you make no progress in producing some process by which I can distinguish between what you call “God” and what you are simply imagining.

Vytautas responded: “You cannot only imagine a necessary being. That is, you cannot just say God is an idea in my mind and God is not real because then the being is not necessary because it does not exist in the present world. But if a necessary being exists then it exists in this present world, since present world is a possible world. If you eliminate the predicate exists from necessary being, it can be derived from the meaning of necessary being. If you deny that God is a necessary being, then you are not talking about God, but a contingent being that may or may not exist.”

I then replied: No, that’s not the reason why it would “not bode well for [your] defense.” The reason why a “material god” would not bode well for your defense is that a material god would be perceptually demonstrable. But you want your object of worship to lie beyond the access of our perception. This allows you to have control over it: it is whatever you say it is. In the end, it’s all your word, but you want to appeal to the word of your god for authoritative backing. That doesn’t help, for it’s all imaginary anyway.

Vytautas now states: “If I say God has a property that God does not have, then God does not have that property.”

Again, this is unhelpful. How do we know what property an invisible magic being possesses? By what means do we discover the properties allegedly possessed by a being which is said to exist beyond the range our awareness? In the case of an imaginary being, the answer is easy: the imaginary being possesses whatever property its imaginer says it has. For instance, if you say that your imaginary being possesses the properties of infinity, eternality and immutability, then by virtue of your sovereign control over your imagination, it must, at least in the confines of your imagination. This is the tyranny of the dreamer over his fantasies.

But even the believer in Drodt’l can use the same approach you use here. For example, if I say Drodt’l has a property that Drodt’l does not have, then Drodt’l does not have that property. This conclusion “follows” for Drodt’l just as securely as it does for your god. How do we discover what properties Drodt’l possesses? By consulting a storybook purported to be its “special revelation” and allowing it to inspire our imagination? Why not?

Vytautas: “The concepts that we construct should be accurate.”

So what method of concept-formation do you propose to safeguards the “accuracy” of your concepts? The bible presents no conceptual theory of its own. So where do youyou’re your understanding of concepts? Or, do you even have one? From your comments (see below), it appears you have little understanding of concepts.

Vytautas: “If I create God in my image, I am engaging in idolatry which is a sin against God.”

Is this supposed to be an argument for the "accuracy" of your theistic conceptions, or for the reality of the god you imagine? Again, you fail to grasp the issue at hand. What besides your imagination do you have to go on in contemplating your god?

And yes, the Judeo-Christian idea of “God” is very much modeled on human templates. Like human beings, this deity (like others in the historical pantheon) is aware, sees things, knows things, thinks and judges, gets angry, shows affection, reacts, plans, manipulates, devises, creates, acts on behalf of goals, etc., everything that human beings do. But this idea is not a legitimate concept, for it is not an integration based on objective inputs. “At best,” says Rand, “it is a concept in the sense in which a dramatist uses concepts to create a character. It is an isolation of actual characteristics of man combined with the projection of impossible, irrational characteristics which do not arise from reality – such as omnipotence and omniscience.” (Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, p. 148)

Vytautas: "If God is just imaginary, then you are not thinking about God, but a contingent being."

This is quite an admission: you actually do think that the imaginary is real, just "contingent." You thus confirm my suspicion that the failure to distinguish between the real and the imaginary is systemic to your worldview.

Vytautas: "The creature cannot force God to do anything, since all of the creatures actions have been planned out from before the creation event, so that history is God’s decree known after the fact."

This is another safe bet for theism, but for all the wrong reasons. In fact, one cannot force something that does not exist to do anything. But, we can imagine things which cannot be forced to do things, either. So on two points, your claim is "safe."
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Vytautas wrote: “God is spirit and does not depend on the material world for his existence.”

I asked: What would stop someone from making assertions like this about something he is only imagining?

Vytautas: "The Bible allows God to speak for himself, so that it is an objective standard for theology.”

On the conception of ‘objective’ that you assume here, a Harry Potter novel could be cited as “an objective standard” for Potterology. Never mind the fact that neither the bible does not proffer a worldview which safeguards the integrity of the subject-object relationship, which is the basis of objectivity. Indeed, where does any biblical author show any awareness for the subject-object relationship, the most fundamental relationship in all thought and philosophy, let alone concern for understanding it?

Incidentally, if the bible serves as “an objective standard for theology,” what can be said about Paul Manata’s theology? He was very clear when he affirmed explicitly that his god does not wish. And yet at numerous places the bible, as I have pointed out, affirms that its god wishes. Clearly Manata must not be taking the bible as his theological standard. Or, one can claim it as his standard, and still say what he wants in order to evade criticism. No?

Vytautas: “The Bible would stop me from making claims that are not true. Since the Bible tells that God is infinite, eternal, and unchangeable, then we understand that God is a necessary being that must exist in our real world."

This does not address my question above. In fact, it completely sidesteps it. So I’ll ask it again: When someone says that the being he worships “is spirit and does not depend on the material world for his existence,” as you say of your god, what would stop him from making this kind of assertion about something he is only imagining? Here’s a hint: he may not even recognize the fact that he is only imagining his object of worship. He may be so deluded that he really thinks his object of worship is real, or even that the description he gives to it adheres to an objective standard.

When you say “the Bible would stop me from making claims that are not true,” are you suggesting that you are controlled by the bible? Or, are you simply saying that you volitionally adhere to what you read in the bible (and how you have come to interpret its many ambiguities) as the standard for describing the deity you imagine? I suspect you meant the latter, though like other worshippers of imaginary beings, you resist admitting that your god is imaginary.

Personally, I don’t think anything can stop someone who wants to believe in an imaginary being from giving any description to it he wants to give it. We are solely responsible for our use of our imagination, and nothing can compel an individual to conform his fantasies to some arbitrarily designated “standard.” So in other words, nothing would keep someone from making the kinds of assertions that you make in regard to your god in regard to anything he imagines. The bible can say whatever it says, but this would not stop someone from making any kind of assertions he wants about something he has imagined, regardless of whether or not he has read any of it. Indeed, the bible is so self-convoluted that it can be made to endorse any imagination a believer invests his theism with.

But you, Vytautas, tell us that you won't do this because you're guided by the contents of a storybook. And since you operate on a worldview which systematically fails to distinguish between what is real and what is imaginary, you take what the bible says as truth, even though you identifu no objective basis for doing so. The bible could say anything, and since you suspend your rational judgment in preference for the imagery you read in the sacred storybook, you'll affirm it as truth.
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I asked: Where have I identified myself as a materialist? You are unfamiliar with my worldview… Wrong again. I don’t say that imaginary things are sense objects, and not for the reason that you suggest, either.

Vytautas: "Ok, you say you are a possessor of an immaterial mind.”

Where did I say this?

Vytautas: “I thought objectivists were materialists,”

Objectivists are Objectivists.

Vytautas: “but you do say there are two fundamental types of being: matter and consciousness."

Man is an integrated being of matter and consciousness. So are many other living organisms. I don't know what "immaterial" refers to; it only tells us what something is not, so it is not useful in identifying the nature of something real. Also, while consciousness is epistemologically fundamental (in that it is an inescapable axiom), it is not metaphysically fundamental. It clearly depends on the physical make-up of the biological organism possessing it.

Vytautas: "Was there ever time we there was no consciousness?"

I don't know. Also, not only do I not know how one would prove a yes or no answer to such a question, I don't see why it would be important. We exist, we possess consciousness. These facts are absolute, and these are the facts we need to deal with.

Vytautas: "If yes, then matter changed into minds at some point in the past. So then the immaterial mind can be explained in physical terms, if minds were derived from matter."

Even if this were true (and only science could tell us if it is), it would be irrelevant to my challenge and your inability to meet it: you still indicate no way for us to reliably distinguish between what you call “God” and what you may merely be imagining. Also, even if it were true that “matter changed into minds at some point in the past,” it would still be possible any of us today to imagine a god and claim it is real, just as you do.

Vytautas: "If the answer to the question is no, then man has always existed."

Why? Man is not the only animal which possesses consciousness.

I wrote: The thing I imagined is imaginary. If you want to say that what I have imagined is “equal to God,” then clearly you’re conceding that your god is imaginary as well. No matter what name we give to that which is imaginary, it is still imaginary.

Vytautas: "An infinite, eternal, and unchangeable being can be conceived in the mind."

In other words, it can be imagined. We certainly cannot perceive it; Christians have already told us that it is beyond the reach of our senses. So what alternative do we have to imagining the Christian's god? Christians do not tell us. And even though we have no alternative to imagining the Christian god (we have to assemble it in our imagination from the descriptions Christians use to "define" their god), Christians insist that it is real and not imaginary. And yet, their descriptors can be applied to anything anyone imagines.

Vytautas: "We see that this is a possible being, since it is non-contradictory to assert in the mind."

Notice the frail standard which you need to consult in order to determine whether or not something is possible: the idea is, in your estimation, non-contradictory. This supposition alone is sufficient, on your view, to secure the claim that the proposal in question is "possible." Positive evidence in support of the supposition is not required. I have already pointed out in our discussion that the god idea fails even in the non-contradictory department, since it is as internally incoherent and as absurd as the notion of a square circle.

Vytautas: "We also see that this is non-contingent being, since contingent beings are finite, temporal, and changeable things.”

“We... see” this? Who’s we? What exactly do they “see”?

Vytautas: “A non-contingent or necessary being does not depend on other contingent beings for being real.”

Why not simply recognize that existence does not depend on any alternative to it (like non-existence)?

Vytautas: “If there is not a necessary being at all, then it is possible for there to be no being. But nothing is not a possible world, since a possible world must contain at least one thing, otherwise it could not be described as a world.”

Since the universe is necessary, there’s no problem from my standpoint.

Vytautas: “Even if nothing is a possible world it would be unknowable since it could not be described. Therefore, God is necessary and thus must exist in our world.”

Where’d you get the “God” part? If not from a storybook, then from where?

Stay tuned for Part 2.

by Dawson Bethrick

Sunday, January 06, 2008

A Response to Vytautas

A Christian who wears the moniker “Vytautas” has sought to engage me in a debate on the existence of his god. Below I provide a response to his most recent comments.


I wrote: This is irrelevant. Anyone can make this kind of claim about something that is imaginary. Anyone imagining Blakko can say it cannot be imaginary, since no one’s finite imagination can contain it. Would it follow from such claims that Blakko exists in reality? Who would believe this?

Vytautas responds: “If God is infinite, eternal, and unchangeable, then God is necessary because a being that has those properties does not depend on anything else for his existence, so that God is not contingent. A necessary being must exist in reality because a necessary being exists in every possible world including ours. You should believe this, since it is true that the God of the Bible is there."

Again, this is all imaginary stuff, Vytautas. You simply assert that your god is there, that it has all these properties, and that possession of these properties means it necessarily exists. As I’ve pointed out several times now, one can say this about anything he imagines. Sorry, you’re just not scoring any points here.

Everything you’re saying about your god can be said about something that is not real, Vytautas. Do you not recognize this simple fact? I can imagine an invisible magic being, call it “infinite, eternal and unchangeable,” stipulate that it is “necessary,” and on this basis affirm that it exists, that it is real, that it did whatever I imagine it to have done. But at the end of the day, all these assertions are worthless, for they are merely assertions. There’s no objective backing to them. And, they can be said about anything one imagines. The history of the world shows that almost every culture has invested in some imaginary conscious being which supposedly explains the things we find existing in the world, things which are not imaginary. The result is a most perverse reversal: the non-imaginary is being explained by the imaginary.

Ever wonder why even within Christianity proper, there are so many different constructs of the Christian god? Some say the Christian god is one way (e.g., Arminians), others say it is another way (e.g., Catholics), and yet others say it is another way (e.g., Calvinists). Some say it wishes (e.g., the bible, Van Til, etc.), others say it does not wish (e.g., Paul Manata). How can this be? Obviously we have rival imaginations going on here. The problem is that believers are afraid to be honest and come out and admit the fact that their god is the product of human imagination.

I wrote: And I've asked how I can reliably distinguish between what you call "God" and what you may merely be imagining. You've not given me anything which speaks to this point.

Vytautas: “But you don’t know what I imagine unless I tell you what it is.”

You’ve been telling me what you imagine all along. If you don’t want to admit that your god is imaginary, then I challenge you to show me how I can reliably distinguish your god from what you are simply imagining. You’ve not done this yet.

Vytautas: “I think you are asking how we know that God exists.”

No, I’m asking how I can distinguish your god (which you say is real) from what you may simply be imagining.

Vytautas: “By knowing what God means we recognize that such a being must exist, since you cannot only imagine a necessary being because a necessary being must exist. God is necessary because he does not depend on any other thing for his existence.”

Here you reveal another epistemological reversal: the meaning of the term in question is supposed to determine that its referent is real. That’s backwards. We don’t do this with any other idea. In all other cases, we discover the existence of the existing thing first, by means of perception or by some instrument which expands our perception (e.g., microscopes, telescopes, amplifiers, etc.), and then we have awareness of an object which we then set about identifying and classifying and understanding. We don’t start with the “meaning” of a concept – for instance, clouds – and then say, “well the meaning of ‘cloud’ is [X], and because of this, clouds must exist!”

As for what I can and cannot imagine, how do you know that I “cannot only imagine a necessary being”? I can say anything I imagine is a necessary being. This is a volitional exercise. I imagine Alokutsura. What is Alokutsura, you ask? Alokutsura is a necessary, infinite, eternal and unchangeable being! Because of the properties which I assign to it, it must exist! That’s your whole argument, Vytautas. It can be used to “prove” the existence of anything I imagine. And still you make no progress in producing some process by which I can distinguish between what you call “God” and what you are simply imagining.

I wrote: Same with anything that is imaginary. You’re simply conceding that your god has a lot in common with imaginary things. This is on top of the fact that you’ve not explained how I can reliably distinguish what you call “God” from what you may simply be imagining. That doesn’t bode well for your defense.

Vytautas: "A material god does not bode well for my defense because a material god would depend on other things for his existence, since matter over time breaks down.”

No, that’s not the reason why it would “not bode well for [your] defense.” The reason why a “material god” would not bode well for your defense is that a material god would be perceptually demonstrable. But you want your object of worship to lie beyond the access of our perception. This allows you to have control over it: it is whatever you say it is. In the end, it’s all your word, but you want to appeal to the word of your god for authoritative backing. That doesn’t help, for it’s all imaginary anyway.

Vytautas: “God is spirit and does not depend on the material world for his existence.”

What would stop someone from making assertions like this about something he is only imagining?

Vytautas: “Since you are a materialist,”

Where have I identified myself as a materialist? You are unfamiliar with my worldview.

Vytautas: “you would have to say that imaginary things are sense objects, since they are the chemical and electrical thoughts in your physical brain, unless you believe you have an immaterial mind.”

Wrong again. I don’t say that imaginary things are sense objects, and not for the reason that you suggest, either.

I wrote: This objection is essentially no different from the one you provided above. And it fails for the same reason: anyone can make this kind of claim about something that is imaginary. I can call Blakko “a necessary being.” Does that make Blakko real? According to the reasoning you offer here, it does. For you claim that “a necessary being must exist in all possible worlds including the actualized world we are apart of.” By this reasoning, Blakko “must exist in all possible worlds including the actualized world we are apart of,” for Blakko is “a necessary being.” And yet, Blakko is something that I have imagined. See? I can make the kind of claim you make about your god about anything I imagine.

Vytautas: “It seems you are giving an argument by contradiction, but you call God by the name Blakko. Since there is only one God any other thing that is equal to God is God. You are just using a different name for God, but both are essentially the same. Now we move to the historicity of the New Testament gospels.”

The thing I imagined is imaginary. If you want to say that what I have imagined is “equal to God,” then clearly you’re conceding that your god is imaginary as well. No matter what name we give to that which is imaginary, it is still imaginary.

I wrote: It’s a storybook. The stories it contains are no more historical than the stories we read in a Harry Potter novel.

Vytautas: “J. K. Rowling does not claim that Harry Potter is real, but the authors of the gospels claim Jesus is real.”

That’s irrelevant and misses the point. A storybook is still a storybook, regardless of whether or not its author claims its contents are historical.

I wrote: Simply "because of what is claimed"? That's your test for historicity? Anything better than this? What if someone said that a Harry Potter novel is history “because of what is claimed” in it?

Vytautas: “Show where J. K. Rowling claims that Harry Potter is a real character if you really believe that.”

I don’t believe she does. But that would be irrelevant. Someone reading it and thinking it’s true could claim Harry Potter is a real person. Someone who invests his imagination in what he reads in a Harry Potter novel, and operates, as Christians do, on an epistemology which fails to provide the necessary mental tools needed to distinguish between the actual and the imaginary, the real and the fictitious, could easily succumb to the impression that what he is reading is “historical.” All the more if he *wants* it to be true, and even more if he’s fallen for various psychological sanctions (which are present in the bible, but absent in the case of Harry Potter books) which manipulate one into being afraid to recognize it’s all fiction. It wouldn’t be the first time (Christians and Muslims have been doing this for centuries), and it wouldn’t be the last time.

Vytautas: “If Harry Potter is either real or fantasy, then that does not say anything if the New Testament is historical.”

It doesn’t have to in order for my point to stick.

Vytautas: “Also the claim a person makes about an event is not the only criterion for what is historical, but it is one of the criterions for historical events which eliminates Harry Potter.”

So what are these other criteria which the New Testament has going for it that Harry Potter novels do not have going for them? Is it simply the part about the author of one storybook claiming his storbook is true, while the author of the other acknowledges hers to be fiction?

I wrote: So, if the places I write about are in the real world, then anything I claim in writing took place in those places must have really happened, simply because those places are real? My garage is real – it is a real place. I now write a story about my encounter with a magic leprechaun in my garage. In my story about my encounter with the magic leprechaun I describe what he was wearing, how he climbed on top of my washing machine and started talking to me about a pot of gold he hid in my neighborhood. Is my story about the leprechaun true because it takes place in a place that is in the real world? Are you going to start looking for this hidden pot of gold now?

Vytautas: “When I give a single criterion for history, then that does not mean it is the only criterion for history, but all the criterions work together to give a method for history.”

Understood. But you see how weak this one criterion is, don’t you? It is so weak that it does not work in concert with others. It would be silly to think it does.

Vytautas: “Another criterion is of many witnesses testifying to an historical event.”

How many witnesses are testifying of the event which Paul records in I Cor. 15, which claims that the resurrected Jesus was seen by some 500 or so brethren? How many people have stepped forward to corroborate this event? What are the names of the 500 brethren? Where is their testimony? What exactly did they see? Did they see an apparition? That could be a mass hallucination. Did they see an actual human being? It could be a case of mistaken identification. Did it really even happen? We only have Paul saying in passing that it happened. Was Paul there? He does not claim to have been there. In fact, the way the passage reads as a whole suggests very strongly that Paul himself was not there. Also, if Paul is simply reciting a creedal formulation, as many have suggested, then he’s simply repeating hearsay. Robert Price argues quite persuasively that I Cor. 15:3-11 is an interpolation, and is not even authentic to Paul’s original letter.

Vytautas: “There are four gospels testifying to the historical events of Jesus, but you only give a short paragraph written only by one person about an event.”

That’s more than you’ve offered in response to my challenge. But it’s moot anyway: if the gospels are fiction, then we cannot accept the claim that they are “testifying to [actual] historical events of Jesus.” It’s a storybook, just like Harry Potter.

Vytautas: “The more people testifying to the event, then the event has more reason to be believed than just one person.”

It would be very easy for someone putting his imaginary story into writing to create characters who “witnessed” the events of the story. If he wanted readers to believe the story was actually historical, he would probably not hesitate to insert characters who are said to have witnessed the events in that story. So if the witnesses themselves are fiction, then they’re worthless as witnesses of an actual historical event.

So why accept the claim that there are witnesses to the events described in the bible? Who witnessed Paul’s conversion on the road to Damascus as recorded in the book of Acts for instance? Paul does not describe his own conversion in the same manner that Acts does in his own letters. So who witnessed this? The author Luke? Was he present then? Would you claim that he was reporting what Paul had told him? Where’s your proof? How do you know that Luke was infallibly reporting firsthand reports, especially when Paul himself, when he takes the opportunity to describe his own conversion, fails to corroborate what we read in Acts?

Who witnessed Jesus’ resurrection? It took place in a sealed tomb. You might say that people who knew Jesus saw him after he died on the cross and therefore must have been resurrected. Sounds like a made up story to me, and you’ve given nothing substantial to counter otherwise.

I wrote: I’m not sure why you think this is “a better explanation.” In fact, in reviewing all the defenses that believers have put forward in favor of the thesis that the New Testament records actual history, I’ve not found any evidence that legitimately secures that thesis.

Vytautas: “There are prophesies of the Old Testament that confirms the New Testament. Psalm 22 tells that a company of evildoers encircles Jesus; they have pierced his hands and feet-- Jesus can count all his bones-- they stare and gloat over him; they divide his garments among them, and for his clothing they cast lots. Matthew 27 says when the soldiers had crucified Jesus, they divided his garments among them by casting lots. And John 19 says when they came to Jesus and saw that he was already dead, they did not break his legs. But one of the soldiers pierced his side with a spear, and at once there came out blood and water. So the Old Testament gives evidence for the New Testament.”

Again this is all very weak. Anyone writing a biography about Jesus who wanted to give it the stamp of Old Testament authority, could (and would!) sprinkle that biography with allusions to the Old Testament, since the Old Testament was already held as an authoritative source. Much of the gospels read this way, and even suggest this explicitly when, for instance, Matthew writes things like “this was done, that it might be fulfilled which was spoken of the Lord by the prophet…” (Mt. 1:22, see also 21:4, 26:56, et al.). If a passage in the Old Testament says that some people cast lots over a suffering servant’s garments, the obvious thing to do would be to say this happened in the case of Jesus’ garments after he was crucified, and PRESTO, the Old Testament passage becomes “prophetic.” It’s an easy trick, one which actually has precedent in many parts of the bible. The so-called “fulfillment” in the New Testament of so-called “prophecies” drummed up in the Old Testament, is so contrived as to give away the game.

I wrote: At the very most, the stories we read record what some people (e.g., their authors) believed, not “sensed.” Even the New Testament makes it clear that no one “sensed” Jesus rising from the dead, for according to the stories it took place in a sealed tomb.

Vytautas: “But there are accounts of post-crucifixion accounts of the resurrected Jesus who is alive. They could not be all false, because there could not be mass-hallucinations, since hallucinations are an individual experience and not a group experience. A better explanation is Jesus actually rose from the dead, and other people saw him and wrote about him.”

That’s not a “better explanation” by any rational measure. A better, rational explanation is that we’re reading a legend that has germinated from relatively more inert seeds. Are you saying that is not possible?

Besides, in the case of I Cor. 15, which refers to a large group of people who supposedly saw Jesus, it’s important to keep in mind that this one reference does not constitute mass corroboration. That Christian apologists seem to think it does only shows how silly their position is, and how desperate they are to defend it. It is the statement of one man artificially given the weight of many. So there’s really no need to assert mass hallucination here. Although mass hallucination has been shown to be possible (really, are you expecting me to accept that mass hallucination is not possible, but resurrection of the dead is?), if the very claim that the people in question is very shaky at best, as in the case of the anonymous 500 brethren in I Cor. 15, then it’s moot to begin with.

I wrote: Are you saying that the author of the gospel according to Matthew “sensed” that Mary was a virgin when she gave birth to Jesus? What makes you suppose this?

Vytautas: “Matthew did not see directly Mary give birth to Jesus, but he used other testimony to account for this event.”

What “other testimony”? Where is that “other testimony”? Essentially, you’re saying that the virgin birth is hearsay for the author who put it in his biographical narrative of Jesus. Historically speaking, that’s as unreliable as it gets. Yet you want people to believe this as if it held sway over their lives forever. You’re emotionally invested in the story, just as you’re emotionally invested in the outcome of our discussion.

Vytautas: “He sensed the people who witnessed the event that gave the testimony.”

So, what people did he sense? Who are these “people who witnessed the event that gave the testimony”? Why didn’t those people record their testimony themselves? And think of the time span here. Earliest dates for the writing of the gospel of Matthew put it to 70 AD, if not later. When was Jesus born? At least 70 years prior to Matthew’s writing. Whoever these “people who witnessed the event” of Jesus’ virgin birth would have been adults at the time it allegedly happened. So some 70 or 80 years later, they’re telling this guy Matthew that Jesus’ mother was a virgin when she gave birth to him? Come now, Vytautas, surely you don’t expect me to believe this, do you?

I wrote: Who “sensed” the saints who according to the gospel according to Matthew (see 27:52-53) rose out of their graves and went walking through the city showing themselves to many? Only Matthew mentions this; no one else in all of history corroborates this story. Was Matthew the only one who “sensed” this? Perhaps he was on drugs, or hallucinating. We know that people take drugs and hallucinate. But you would prefer that we dismiss this possibility and accept, for apparently no good reason whatsoever, that this story is historical. Ain’t happenin’, Vytautas.

Vytautas: “We know people witness events and record them.”

Yes, we do know this. We also know that people make mistakes, report things without investigating them firsthand, imagine things, fail to distinguish between imagination and reality, and write fiction.

Vytautas: “But you would prefer that we dismiss this and accept, for apparently no good reason whatsoever, that Matthew took drugs.”

Well, if I am expected to believe that dead people rose from their graves and walked around in a city showing themselves to many, and only one person reports this – in passing, to boot – with no corroboration whatsoever, why shouldn't I at least entertain the possibility that the person who wrote this may have been under the influence?

Vytautas: “You have no historical evidence that Matthew took drugs.”

And likewise, we have no historical evidence whatsoever that a bunch of zombies crawled out of their graves, walked through a city and showed themselves to many. But if you want evidence that someone was taking drugs, look at what they say, do and write. There’s an indication there. Of course, it could be that the author of Matthew was not on drugs, and soberly invented his elaboration of Mark’s gospel.

Vytautas: “Matthew might be the only one that recorded the event, but he wrote that the saints went into the holy city and appeared to many.”

Matthew claims that this happened. But where’s the proof? If dead people rose out of their graves and showed themselves to a bunch of people, who were those people, and why don’t we have any of their firsthand testimonies? Was Matthew among these people? Even the author doesn’t claim to have seen this himself.

Vytautas: “If you can dismiss historical events because there is only one person that wrote about the event, then I can dismiss your stories that you tell me.”

Threatening to dismiss my stories will not make me suddenly believe what is written in the New Testament. You’re free to dismiss my stories all you like. Besides, it is not simply because the stories in the New Testament are not corroborated that I do not accept them. There are other factors. For one, they all presuppose the primacy of consciousness metaphysics, which I know is false. I’ve demonstrated this time and time again on my blog. That’s sufficient reason as any to dismiss them. Any position which reduces to a subjective foundation should be dismissed because of this. There’s also the fact that the New Testament is riddled with evidences showing that the Jesus story was elaborated on over time, growing from faint glimmers in Paul’s letters to full-blown legends in the gospels and the book of Acts. So there are numerous reasons why I “dismiss” the New Testament as unhistorical, not just the one reason you cite here.

I wrote: I simply point out that those who claim that there is a god fail to provide any way by which I can reliably distinguish between what they call "God" and what they may merely be imagining. Your response to my challenge is a prime example of this. I also point out that the traditional notion of “God” is internally incoherent, just as the notion of a square circle is. See my essay Gods and Square Circles for details.

Vytautas: “You seem to say that one cannot change the world by merely thinking something will change in the world, so that God cannot create the world because a mind cannot manipulate matter. But God is not a creature like you me, but he is the Creator that is able to create matter out of nothing.”

Good. Let’s see a demonstration of this ability. Give me more than just the claim that a being with such ability exists. Anyone can imagine such a being. But so far, you’ve not given me any good reason to suppose your god is something other than imaginary. And, I don’t think you can.

I wrote: I’ve never argued “I do not sense God, therefore God does not exist.” Nor are my criticisms of theism reducible to this. However, I would point out that, by describing their god as something non-sensible, and making the kinds of claims to knowledge that they do, Christians show how nonsensical their beliefs are. If you have no means of achieving awareness of your god, then by what means could you know that it exists?

Vytautas: “I know God exists by means of the creation he has made and the light of nature in man, since he is created in the image of God.”

These “reasons” not only fail to address my questions, they beg the question for they assume that the god in question exists, which is precisely what you’re called to validate. The notion of “creation” assumes a creator, which is your god (isn’t it?), so affirming that there is a creation created by the creator in question gets you nowhere. Similarly with the notion that man was “created in the image of God.” Man is nothing like the god which Christians describe, so it’s unclear in what respect man is supposed to bear the Christian god’s image. I’ve examined many attempts to validate this and will post some material on it soon on my blog, but nothing so far seems to answer the important questions. Rather, what we have here is a Christian slogan which doesn’t really mean anything and has no objective basis whatsoever, a slogan which is asserted in order to stop inquiry rather than address legitimate questions.

Also, notice that “by means of the creation he has made” fails to address my question because it does not identify an alternative to sensation and perception as a means of knowledge. By pointing to “creation” you’re suggesting that you had to infer your god’s existence, that you do not have direct, firsthand awareness of it. Did you mean to say this? If you infer its existence, what is your starting point, and how did you end up with the conclusion that the Christian god is real? Assuming “creation” only begs the question, as I mentioned above. So hopefully you have something better than this? Now, if you claim to have direct, firsthand awareness of this thing you call “God,” then by what means do you possess awareness of this object? You’ve identified how you do not have awareness of it when you say that your god cannot be sensed or perceived. So, how can one have awareness of it? Or, does no one have awareness of it? If no one has awareness of it, why believe it’s real? Again, try to answer these questions with the distinction between the real and the imaginary in mind. So far, you’ve performed miserably in this respect.

Vytautas: “You say that you do not argue that God cannot be sensed, therefore God does not exist. But then you say that we are nonsensical to describe God as non-sensible. You cannot have it both ways, since you are giving the same argument.”

Read it again: I wrote: “by describing their god as something non-sensible, and making the kinds of claims to knowledge that they do, Christians show how nonsensical their beliefs are.”

The stipulation that your god is non-sensible, coupled with other things Christians say about why they believe their god exists (such as the question-begging appeal to “creation” that we saw in your own statement above), indicate how nonsensical Christianity is.

I wrote: If you say that you infer its existence from things that you do perceive, then what is the rationale behind your inference? This is where arguments for theism come into play. I’ve not found one which is sound. If you say that you do possess a faculty by which you can achieve direct awareness of what you call “God,” what is that faculty, how does it work, and how do you distinguish that faculty from your imagination?

Vytautas: “It is necessary for a creation to have a Creator.”

I take it by this response that you are affirming that you infer your god’s existence rather than have awareness of it directly. So unlike many Christians, you do not claim to have direct, firsthand awareness of your god. Otherwise I would expect to see you identify the means by which you have such awareness (such as when I point to my senses to identify the means by which I have direct awareness of my computer screen, the shirt I’m wearing, the amount I need to pay on a bill I receive in the mail, etc.).

You say that creation needs a creator. Okay, fine. Now you need to prove that what you call a “creation” was in fact created, that it is in fact a “creation.” Let’s see how effectively you can do this.

Vytautas: “The Creator gives meaning and purpose for creation which was created by God. If not, then you can have the creation without a Creator. But then you have no explanation for creation, and then say that existence exists.”

Existence exists, and only existence exists. Existence is an irreducible primary. It is not the result of something “prior” to existence; there is no “prior” to existence. Either you start with existence, or you start with non-existence. Implicitly this is what the theist does; he finds beginning with the irreducible fact that existence exists unsatisfying, typically for reasons that are unclear to himself, and that is why he wants to posit a form of consciousness which is responsible for bringing existence into existence. My analysis of the theist’s dilemmas is not inaccurate. Observe:

Vytautas: “But where does existence come from?”

I love this question – it confirms that my antiapologetic approach has been right on all along. Let’s consider it: “Where does existence come from?” Well, what is the alternative to existence, if not non-existence? If we accept the premise buried in your question, the only answer that would satisfy it would be: from non-existence. But you want to say that existence comes from your god (it created existence, right?), but also that your god exists. So your question leads you to a self-contradiction. You demand an explanation for existence, suggesting that existence “came from” something other than existence (i.e., non-existence), and yet say that it came from something that exists. In rational philosophy, your question commits what is known as the fallacy of the stolen concept. Incidentally, this fallacy is inescapable in the religious view of the world.

Vytautas: “If it was always here, then we could not come to this point of time because before this time an infinite amount of time had to pass before we got here. But then we would never get to this point in time because an infinite amount of time had to happen before we got here.”

This line of argument not only ignores the fact that time presupposes existence, it also ignores the fact that it is always now - i.e., the present is eternally continuous. We could not conceive of past or future times if the present did not exist. Challenges to this point will inevitably involve a false conception of time. A rational understanding of time does not lead to the conundrum you try to raise because time is conceptual, not metaphysical. This is a common mistake among thinkers, but it is a mistake nonetheless.

Vytautas: “But on the Christian position, God created time at the moment of creation and a finite amount of time can happen until this point in time.”

It is true that I can imagine this happening. But again, the imaginary is not real. You can claim that “God created time,” but simply claiming this to be the case does not make it true. And notice that it is posited in answer to a fallaciously conceived problem. “God” is asserted as the solution to a problem that simply does not exist. If this is how you infer your god’s existence, no wonder so many people reject it.

Vytautas: “If you say that all that is real must be capable of being sensed, then do you know this claim about all of reality?”

Careful not to make a category mistake here. My knowledge is not an object that exists independent of me, so it is not bound to conditions that attend objects which exist independent of me. I know what I know by a means of knowledge. It’s called reason. It is the faculty which identifies what I perceive and integrates what I perceive into the sum of my knowledge. You want me to accept as knowledge something which I cannot perceive and integrate into the sum of my knowledge without contradicting it. Why should I do this? You offer no good reasons for this.

I wrote: I have not made this claim, so I do not need to defend it. My sensing something is not a prerequisite for it to be real. But if I am going to accept as knowledge the claim that something exists, that claim needs to have some kind of evidence to support it, it must be coherent, and it must be capable of being integrated with the knowledge that I have validated without contradiction. Christianity’s god-belief claims fail on all three points. Christians can’t even show me how I can reliably distinguish their god from what they may merely be imagining! I’m simply being honest to these facts. Would you prefer that I be dishonest and affirm the existence of a god anyway? Well, that would be dishonest. And I made the choice earlier in my life to be honest, and I’m sticking to that choice.

Vytautas: “I think you do not want to believe in God because if you did then, you have to worship him by the commands that he gives in Scripture.”

You ignore the fact that at one time I was a Christian and in fact wanted Christianity to be true. I demonstrated with my whole life at that time that when I thought it was true, I devoted my life according to Christianity’s dictates. There were many problems, but they all reduced ultimately to the fact that I was being dishonest to myself. When Christians urge me to return to Christianity, they are in effect urging me to be dishonest to myself. I won’t do that. When I was young, impressionable and philosophically defenseless, I was conned into such self-dishonesty. But now I know better. So it ain’t gonna happen, regardless of who disapproves.

Vytautas: “You do not want to have anything to do with God and detest him because you want to live in darkness and not come to the light.”

I’ve matured in many ways since my sojourn into Christianity. One way in which I have matured is morally. Today, if I thought the god of the bible were real, I would certainly not worship it. It is most worthy of contempt. But I realize that it is a fiction, that it does not really exist, that it is an imagination which has captured the fixation of millions of people. I’ve observed how this fixation on such a detestable construct degrades individuals to defending the most abhorrent evils imaginable.

Vytautas: “You are suppressing the truth in unrighteousness by choosing not to bow yourself to Jesus Christ.”

You accuse me of “suppressing” something that you’ve not been able to show is even true. So you affirm two falsehoods here in one breath: 1) that I am suppressing some truth, and 2) that your Jesus Christ is real. If you’re god-belief had something more substantial than baseless accusations, why do you resort to them when the going gets rough?

Vytautas: “You choose to dismiss the New Testament not for intellectual reasons but for moral reasons.”

I do not accept the dichotomy here that the moral is non-intellectual. In fact, I would say that moral reasons (assuming the morality of rational philosophy) are intellectual.

Vytautas: “It is idolatrous and sinful to deny God exists, so I council you to be reconciled to God by Jesus Christ who gave witness to his work that he did for those that believe.”

If your god exists, and wants me to know it exists, it is up to your god to make its existence knowable to my consciousness. Arguments which are laden with fallacy and threats of doom will not suffice.

Vytautas: “It would be most unwise to remain under the wrath of God, by not believing on the Son of God.”

As I said, threats of doom will not suffice. If you have something intellectual to offer, then I would expect to see it instead of threats. But by bringing out threats like this, you concede that your god-belief is not at all rational. Knowledge is not validated by threats, and we do not acquire knowledge by means of threats. Also, knowledge is what I prize, while clearly Christianity prizes “belief.” There is a profound difference, but typically Christians fail to make this distinction, just as they do between the real and the imaginary. I’m not afraid of your imaginary deity, Vytautas. Sick him on me all you want.

I wrote: No. But do I need to have “sensed all of reality” to know that the unreal is unreal, that the imaginary is imaginary? I don’t think so. Are you trying to find gaps in my knowledge? There are many; I was born ignorant, and I learn at my own, slow pace. Are you suggesting that I’ll discover your god in the gaps of my knowledge? That would constitute a blatant appeal to ignorance. To claim knowledge on the basis of ignorance would be dishonest. Remember my commitment? Ain’t happenin’.

Vytautas: “I gave reasons for God’s existence and defended the historicity of the New Testament. You gave Harry Potter, a story of a leprechaun, and Blakko in response, and I have answered these things above.”

And I have answered your responses above. And still, you offer nothing to answer how I can distinguish between your god and what you may merely be imagining. In short, you offer nothing to demonstrate that your god is real. And when pressed on the matter, you resort to threats. That tells me all I need to know about your god-belief.

Vytautas: “But you do know God exists, since you try to deny him and say that you can imagine Blakko who has all the essential properties of God and say that he is only apart of your imagination.”

I can imagine your god, yes. But again, the imaginary and the real are not the same thing. What I imagine is imagination; it is not real. To “know” your god, it would have to exist, and you’ve not shown that it exists. You’ve simply asserted that it exists, while failing to distinguish between your god and what you are imagining. I am right to dismiss it, even if you don’t like it, even if you want to threaten me with some kind of eternal cosmic doom. Such a move only discredits your position.

Vytautas: “But if you allow for the possibility that God exist, then he exists necessarily, since he does not depend on anything for his existence.”

And you’ve given me no reason to grant the possibility that your god exists. Is it possible that fallaciously derived conclusions are true? Not on their fallacious context. Is it possible that the imaginary and the real are the same? I certainly don’t think so. Perhaps you do? Again, you give me no alternative to my own imagination as the means by which I can “know” your god. If I have to imagine it, then why would I accept as a possibility the idea that it actually exists? Blank out.

Vytautas wrote: You will say no, but that everything that you have experienced is capable of being sensed.

I responded: Actually, I didn’t say that. Put it this way. Suppose we had 150 different sense modalities instead of 5 (vision, hearing, taste, touch, smell). With 150 different sense modalities, we’d most likely perceive a lot more about our world than we do with the 5 we have now. But what would prevent someone from coming along and positing the existence of a being which we’d need a 151st sense modality to perceive? Since we don’t have that missing 151st sense modality, we can’t perceive it. So on what basis would we accept the claim that it exists? Simply because someone claims it is there? I’m not that gullible. Do you think I should be?

Vytautas: “It does not matter how many senses you have because God cannot be sensed directly.”

Exactly my point! No matter how many modes of sensation we might have, it will always be possible to posit the existence of something that exists beyond the reach of those sense modalities. We will always be able to imagine that there is something beyond the reach of our senses. And no matter what I imagine, I can say it exists beyond the reach of your consciousness, and on the basis of this supposition say you have no basis to dismiss its existence – for how could you know it doesn’t exist if “by definition” it cannot be sensed? You have fallen for a big lie, Vytautas.

Vytautas: “We can look to creation, the Bible, and the light of nature in man to understand God.”

I’ve already dealt with each of these points. And meanwhile, you’ve not provided an answer to my challenge which preserves any credibility on behalf of your god-belief.

Vytautas: “We should not deny the revelation that God has given to his creatures, since that would be immoral and against the law of God.”

I have no problem “denying” the “revelation” of an imaginary being. It’s good for the soul!

Vytautas wrote: But God can be known to be real because by definition he is a necessary being, so God must exist.

I responded: So you’re trying to define your god into existence now. You grant much power to your consciousness, Vytautas. I’m too honest to claim possession of such powers. Besides, your statement here is incoherent. Definition is a property of concepts, not of independently existing entities. Your god, if it were real, would not be a concept, but an independently existing being. Concepts are formed by human minds by integrating inputs perceived by their senses. By saying that your god can be defined, you’re implicitly conceding that it is a construct of your mind, like concepts are. That is understandable if your god is imaginary. But if your god is real, you’ve just sold him out.

Vytautas: “I am not claiming that once I define God, then God exists and comes into a point in time, since God is timeless.”

No, I wouldn’t expect you to make the error quite as blatant as this. But in terms of epistemological principles, as I explained, this is essentially what you are doing. You have stated in more ways than one that the meaning of the term ‘God’ is sufficient to indicate its actual existence. As I pointed out above, this is a perverse reversal. We don’t do this with anything else that we discover in reality. Discovery comes first, and always by some objective means. Then we identify what we discover, and only then it can be integrated into the sum of our knowledge without contradicting it. But even here we sometimes make mistakes. In the case of your god, you performatively concede that it is imaginary because you’ve shown that you have the whole process bass-ackwards. You see, if you could explain how you have awareness of your god, how you discover its existence (not simply imagining it from the inputs found in a storybook), then we can investigate whether or not you’ve accurately identified what it is you call “God.” You’ve identified it with several properties. If we can determine that what you’ve applied these properties to is actually real, then we can check out whether or not it actually possesses the properties you’ve attributed to it. So you’re far from done, Vytautas. In fact, you’ve not even gotten started. You simply claim that something exists. You don’t even explain how you have awareness of it; in fact, it’s not even clear whether or not you think you have awareness of it, since you’ve not made this point clear in your case.

Consider the case of Christian believer Canon Michael Cole, who claims to have had a firsthand experience with his Jesus. No one else could see Jesus, but Cole was certain that Jesus was standing right there next to him. Where above you stated that “God cannot be sensed directly,” Cole claims to have had direct awareness of his god. Of course, he does not identify the means by which he had this awareness. But he claims it nonetheless. For Cole, Jesus is a mood that came over him. He personifies this mood as if it were a living being existing independent of him, something he’s somehow perceiving, even though he can identify no means by which he or anyone else could perceive what he claims to be perceiving. What we have here is an active imagination.

Vytautas: “My consciousness is just recognizing what has been revealed by God and to think analogically as God would want me to think, since we are made in his image.”

Your consciousness is not guided by an epistemology which reliably distinguishes between the real and the imaginary. That is why you’re having such a hard time with this.

Vytautas: “The concepts that we have are analogies to what actually exists.”

Concepts are not analogies, they are integrations. Your “God” is neither concept nor analogy, but a fiction, a fantasy, a figment of your imagination which you have enshrined as an alternative reality to the reality which actually exists and which you perceive with your senses.

Vytautas: “If you say that a chair can be defined, you are implicitly conceding that it is a construct of your mind, like concepts are.”

You need to be a little more careful here. When you say “a chair” here, are you referring to a specific concrete, such as the chair you’re sitting on? That is not something we define. Are you referring to the concept ‘chair’ which denotes not only the chair in which you’re sitting, but also every chair that you’ve sat in, the chair I’m sitting in, and every chair that exists now, has existed, and will exist? That is what we define – the concept - not the concrete.

Vytautas: “But it does not follow that the chair is only imaginary and not real.”

The chair I’m sitting in obviously not imaginary; I wouldn’t be able to sit on it if it were imaginary. It is a physical object, it exists, it is real. Also, I perceive it by means of my senses, which interact with the chair physically. None of this applies to your god, for it is imaginary. We do not perceive what is imaginary, we imagine it.

by Dawson Bethrick

Wednesday, January 02, 2008

Van Til vs. Bahnsen

Van Til writes:

We say that Christ rose from the grave. We say further that this resurrection proves his divinity. (The Defense of the Faith, p. 7-8)

Bahnsen writes:

Why should anyone believe that Jesus was in fact “very God of very God”? Could any mere man’s evaluation establish such a claim? Even the estimation of a large percentage of people would be insufficient to establish that Jesus was more than a man. Even his miracles and resurrection do not in themselves imply deity (think of the other miracle workers in Scripture); they constitute evidence of divine status only because He authoritatively interprets them as such. So the only authority by which the identification of Jesus as God could be warranted would have to be the authority of Jesus Himself, taken as the one whom He claims to be. Such self-identification or self-authorization is, in the very nature of the case, “circular.” (Van Til’s Apologetic: Readings & Analysis, p. 201)

How can this be? Van Til explicitly states that Jesus’ “resurrection proves his divinity,” while Bahnsen says that Jesus’ “miracles and resurrection do not in themselves imply deity.” If Jesus’ resurrection itself does not “imply deity,” how can Van Til say that it “proves his divinity”?

by Dawson Bethrick

Thursday, December 27, 2007

My Chat with a Presuppositionalist

One day while on a short flight to Denver, a presuppositionalist apologist was seated next to me. He didn’t waste time and started right in with his robotic apologetic babbling. Our conversation went as follows:

Presuppositionalist: “God, as absolute personality, is the ultimate category of interpretation for man in every aspect of his being.” (Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, p. 52)

Non-believer: Are you simply trying to state your beliefs, or do you have a proof of your god’s existence?

Presuppositionalist: “There is the evidence of the created order itself testifying to the wisdom. power, plan, and glory of God.” (Greg Bahnsen, The Great Debate, opening statement)

Non-believer: Are you saying that you infer your god’s existence from things that you perceive, or are you saying that you perceive your god directly? It sounds like you’re saying you infer its existence rather than have direct awareness of it.

Presuppositionalist: “God is not found at the end of an argument; He is found in our hearts.” (Van Til, Why I Believe in God)

Non-believer: So, you don’t have an argument for your god’s existence. Instead, you look inwardly, consulting the subjective realm of your feelings and emotions?

Presuppositionalist: "The argument for the existence of God and for the truth of Christianity is objectively valid. We should not tone down this argument to the probability level. The argument may be poorly stated, and may never be adequately stated. But in itself the argument is absolutely sound. Christianity is the only reasonable position to hold." (Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, p. 62)

Non-believer: So you do have an argument? If you infer your god’s existence, from what do you infer it, and what is the course of reasoning by which you arrive at the conclusion that your god exists? Or, if you perceive it directly, by what means do you perceive it? And if you do perceive your god directly, why would you need any argument for its existence?

Presuppositionalist: "The theistic proofs therefore reduce to one proof, the proof which argues that unless this God, the God of the Bible, the ultimate being, the Creator, the controller of the universe, be presupposed as the foundation of human experience, this experience operates in a void. This one proof is absolutely convincing." (Common Grace and the Gospel, p. 192, emphasis original)

Non-believer: I don't find this convincing at all, let alone "absolutely convincing." And something is still not clear to me. I asked if you infer your god's existence. But here you say you presuppose it. One could say this about any arbitrary belief. So if you claim to have an argument for your god’s existence, you’re tacitly admitting that you do not perceive its existence directly (for we do not argue for that which we perceive directly). So, what’s your argument?

Presuppositionalist: “The proof of Christianity is the impossibility of the contrary. That is, the validation of the Christian worldview is that without it you cannot prove anything.” (Greg Bahnsen, Pushing the Antithesis, p. 148)

Non-believer: That is not an argument, it’s simply a naked assertion. Similarly, the Lahu tribesman can say “Geusha exists because of the impossibility of the contrary,” and I can say “All gods (including yours) are fictitious because of the impossibility of the contrary.” So you still need an argument.

Presuppositionalist: “The atheistic worldview cannot account for the laws of logic/absolutes, and must borrow from the Christian worldview in order to rationally argue.” (Matt Slick, The Christian Worldview, the Atheist Worldview, and Logic)

Non-believer: This too is not an argument. Even if it is true that a particular non-believer “cannot account for the intelligibility of human experience,” etc., this would not prove that no atheist individual or atheist philosophy can do so, or that a god exists or that Christianity is true. All it would prove is that the individual in question is ignorant on these things. Since we’re born ignorant, and the issues being inquired on are very complex and rife with controversy even among those who have devoted their entire academic lives to them, a particular individual’s ignorance in some area of philosophy is wholly understandable. Most people are too busy living their lives to delve into philosophy in the manner that the presuppositional method demands of them. So, do you have anything more than mere assertions?

Presuppositionalist: “It is impossible and useless to seek to defend Christianity as an historical religion by a discussion of facts only.” (Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, p. 7)

Non-believer: I realize that. Since the basis of your religion is not factual, you have no choice but to retreat into the imaginary. Only you refuse to acknowledge that it is imaginary. But you offer nothing other than one’s imagination as the means by which one can “know” its so-called “truths.” For instance, I can imagine Jesus rising from the dead in the confines of his stone sepulcher, but doing so does not establish what I imagine as actual historical fact. There is a difference between fact and imagination, and your religion trades on blurring this distinction.

Presuppositionalist: “To engage in philosophical discussion does not mean that we begin without Scripture. We do not first defend theism philosophically by an appeal to reason and experience in order, after that, to turn to Scripture for our knowledge and defense of Christianity. We get our theism as well as our Christianity from the Bible.” (Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, p. 8)

Non-believer: I realize this also. Your imagination of your god is inspired by the content of a storybook. The anecdotes, speeches and episodes that we read about in the bible supply inputs which the believer substitutes for actual facts, and quickened by the imagination they take on what seems to be a larger-than-life quality. The same process happens when we allow ourselves to be absorbed in a Harry Potter novel. We imagine the characters of the story and the events that the story has them go through, and in our imagination they take on their own life. The biblical realm, like the realm of Harry Potter, is a creation of the human mind invested in the imaginative elaborations inspired by what is given in the text.

Presuppositionalist: “If Christian theism is not true then nothing is true.” (Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, p. 208)

Non-believer: Okay, let’s try this. I have a simple challenge for you. You say your god is real, that it truly exists. Can you explain how I can reliably distinguish between what you call “God” and what you may merely be imagining?

At this point the presuppositionalist turned forward and stared directly ahead. His eyes were wide and bleak, and his mouth pursed shut. Completely mute, he looked like a gambler who was realizing that he had just lost his life’s fortune.

The man didn’t say anything for the rest of the flight, even when the flight attendant asked if he wanted anything. He just sat there in silence, staring off into space, as if pretending no one else existed.

When we finally landed and were preparing to disembark, I said to him, “Thanks for the chat. I hope you enjoy your stay in Denver.” He just nodded slightly and turned his back on me. I guess he couldn’t answer my challenge.

by Dawson Bethrick