STB: Two Years and Counting

It has now been two years to the day since I posted my refutation of the argument showcased on Sye Ten Bruggencate’s website “proof that god exists dot org.” While the argument on his site remains unchanged, Bruggencate has so far failed to vindicate the defense of his worldview which he has presented to the world against my critique.

Is Anyone Truly a Christian?

Non-Christians generally accept a person’s claim to be a Christian without hesitation. If a person claims that he or she is a Christian, non-believers typically take their word for it. And rational individuals usually grant that other adults are mature enough to identify themselves accurately and honestly upon first meeting them. And generally speaking, Christian believers themselves are happy with this situation: they typically expect non-Christians to accept their self-identification as Christians at face value.

Christians themselves, however, are not nearly so accepting. To be sure, they expect others to accept their own self-identification as Christians. But they are not always so accepting of the claims of other individuals to be Christians as well. Internal squabbles among Christians, complete with accusations of heresy and denunciations of deviant practice, are commonplace and have colored the landscape of Christendom since its earliest days. Even in his letters to the churches he had planted, the apostle Paul warned Christians of imposters, contributing from Christianity’s first moments to the “who can you trust?” atmosphere of Christian “fellowship.”

Chris Bolt vs. the Evils of Demanding Evidence in Support of Truth Claims

In his blog Answering the Evidentialist Objection, Chris Bolt makes it clear that does not like the idea, attributed to W.K. Clifford, that

It is wrong always, everywhere and for everyone to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.

He calls this a “marvelously strong claim” (perhaps stronger than the claim that a first century Palestinian Jew was resurrected by a supernatural consciousness after dying by means of crucifixion) and asks, “What reason does one have for thinking it true?”

Bolt’s reply to this question is “Probably none,” which strikes me as somewhat deficient in confidence. Perhaps this is the reason why he has turned off the commenting option for this blog entry.

Craig Keener on Miracles

To date I have not devoted a specific entry on my blog to a discussion of miracles. This is partly due simply to more important priorities, lack of time, and the fact that I’d expect anyone familiar with my worldview could surmise why I reject miracle claims. But it’s very simple: the notion of ‘miracle’ presupposes a universe governed by the primacy of consciousness metaphysics, and we can know this because it denotes an event in which some or all entities involved are under the direct control of a supernatural will - i.e., a form of consciousness. Since I reject any version or expression of the primacy of consciousness, I consequently reject the notion of miracles since the notion of miracles is an expression of the primacy of consciousness.

Presuppositionalism’s Finest?

Below is my transcription of two excerpts from Fundamentally Flawed’s Episode 47: Hezekiah Ahaz, Round Two.

In Shambles: Nide's Crumbling Worldview

Nide has posted some comments replying to my previous blog entry responding to him here: Christian Anti-Morality: A Response to Nide. While it does not appear that Nide has finished his response to what I stated to him in that blog entry (he left his last comment with an indication that there was yet more to come), I am moving on with a response to what he stated in his reaction to what I wrote.

Christian Anti-Morality: A Response to Nide

The following is a reply to comments made on this blog by Nide (aka “Hezekiah Ahaz”).

Greg Bahnsen on the Problem of Evil

Greg Bahnsen (1948 – 1995) was the most high-profile popularizer of presuppositional apologetics of his day. He remains today one of the foremost interpreters of Cornelius Van Til’s apologetic works, his lengthy Van Til’s Apologetic: Readings & Analysis being published posthumously from Bahnsen’s own manuscript, which he completed shortly before his death (p.xv). The result is 764 pages, including a bibliography and three indices (for bible verses, names and topics) of excessively repetitive droning about how the “unbeliever” can’t account for this, can’t account for that, doesn’t know how to put on his pants in the morning, doesn’t know how to put his shirt on, etc. Throughout all this Bahnsen nowhere lays out an actual epistemological method for one to apply and come to the same “knowledge” Bahnsen and other Christians claim for themselves. Truly, it is a most ironic spectacle.

What some may find surprising is the fact that, in the space of 764 pages, there is in the topical index only one reference to the problem of evil, and that is to a footnote straddling pages 525 and 526 of Bahnsen’s thick tome.

And while it is rather lengthy in itself so far as footnotes go, Bahnsen states in that footnote that the problem of evil is, in his experience, “the most popular argument urged against Christianity.” So while his book is over 700 pages, he spends just one paragraph, relegated to a passing footnote, on addressing what he says is “the most popular argument urged against Christianity.”

Answering Dustin Segers’ Presuppositionalism, Part IVb: Collectivism, Evil and Slavery

This will be the final installment of my extended reply to Dustin Segers’ questions for atheists. My previous responses to Segers can be found here:

Answering Dustin Segers’ Presuppositionalism, Part I: Intro and the Nature of Truth
Answering Dustin Segers’ Presuppositionalism, Part II: The Nature of Logic 

Answering Dustin Segers’ Presuppositionalism, Part IIIa: The Uniformity of Nature 

Answering Dustin Segers’ Presuppositionalism, Part IIIb: The Problem of Induction 

Answering Dustin Segers’ Presuppositionalism, Part IVa: Objective Morality

In the present entry, I continue my exploration of Segers’ final question, namely:

”How do you account for objective morality without God?"

I have already provided a direct response to this question in my previous blog entry. In this entry, I explore some of the political implications of the moral system found in Christianity, focusing on Christianity’s proclivity towards collectivism, its affinity with Nazism and communism, the problem of evil, and the issue of slavery.

Answering Dustin Segers’ Presuppositionalism, Part IVa: Objective Morality

I am back! I had originally intended to post my response to Segers’ question about morality back in April, but I had several conferences to attend and I also moved into a new house on the outskirts of Bangkok. There’s still much to do and I’m extremely busy, but I have managed to devote some snippets of time here and there to my writing. Not ideal, but I’ll take what I can get!

So many issues came up as I was writing about the contrasts between (genuinely) objective morality and what passes for morality in Christianity, that I have decided to split this portion of my reaction to Segers into two different blog entries. In the present entry I answer Segers’ question about morality, provide definitions for important terms relevant to his question (e.g., what is morality? What is objectivity? Etc.), emphasize the importance of focusing on the individual when discussing morality, examine the 10 commandments, explore the topic of how one determines his own values, and make some points about the abortion debate.

In the follow-up entry (IVb), I will highlight the collectivistic implications of Christian morality and explore Christianity’s permissive view of slavery.

Throughout all of my discussion I draw attention to the stark contrasts between objective morality and Christian morality, leaving no question that Christian morality is entirely unfit for human life and certainly not to be confused with a moral code which is in fact objective in nature. To serve this end I make use of some dazzling quotations from defenders of Christianity themselves.

The previous four entries in my response to Segers can be found here:

Answering Dustin Segers’ Presuppositionalism, Part I: Intro and the Nature of Truth
Answering Dustin Segers’ Presuppositionalism, Part II: The Nature of Logic 

Answering Dustin Segers’ Presuppositionalism, Part IIIa: The Uniformity of Nature 

Answering Dustin Segers’ Presuppositionalism, Part IIIb: The Problem of Induction

Answering Dustin Segers’ Presuppositionalism, Part IIIb: The Problem of Induction

Here is Part IIIb of my response to Dustin Segers’ four questions for atheists.

Previous responses to Segers can be found here:

Answering Dustin Segers’ Presuppositionalism, Part I: Intro and the Nature of Truth

Answering Dustin Segers’ Presuppositionalism, Part II: The Nature of Logic

Answering Dustin Segers’ Presuppositionalism, Part IIIa: The Uniformity of Nature

In this entry, I continue my response to Segers’ third question, which is:

3. Science - "How do you answer the problem of induction from a secular perspective?"

In my previous blog entry, I provided the first part of my answer to this question. In that previous entry, I addressed an area of concern which typically accompanies the presuppositionalist’s questions about induction, namely the uniformity of nature. I explained that, on the objective view, the uniformity we observe in nature is inherent in nature and obtains independently of conscious activity, while on the subjective view, any uniformity which we observe in nature is thought to be the product of some act of consciousness. Given the stark antithesis of these two contrasting positions, I recommend that rational individuals who encounter presuppositionalists raising the issue of the uniformity of nature as a debating point, ask the apologists to state explicitly whether or not they think the uniformity we observe in nature is a product of conscious activity, or if it is inherent in nature and obtains independent of any conscious activity. Watch for any reluctance to answer this question; watch for consistency with the apologists’ professed worldview in any answer that is given.

Now let’s turn our attention to induction and see if Objectivism, the Philosophy of Reason, can shed even further light in answering the presuppositionalist.

Answering Dustin Segers’ Presuppositionalism, Part IIIa: The Uniformity of Nature

I now continue with my series of responses to several questions Christian apologist and “church-planter” Dustin Segers poses to atheists. This will be the third installment in this series. The first two included my responses to Segers’ first two questions, which can be found here:

Answering Dustin Segers’ Presuppositionalism, Part I: Intro and the Nature of Truth

Answering Dustin Segers’ Presuppositionalism, Part II: The Nature of Logic

Let us now consider his third question:

3. Science - "How do you answer the problem of induction from a secular perspective?"

Ah, now this one’s juicy!

Answering Dustin Segers’ Presuppositionalism, Part II: The Nature of Logic

In this second installment of my series answering Dustin Segers’ apologetic questions for atheists, I focus on Segers’ question about logic. (My initial blog entry responding to Segers can be found here).

This one’s a biggie, so buckle up and hold on tight. You’re in for a wild ride!

Answering Dustin Segers’ Presuppositionalism, Part I: Intro and the Nature of Truth

Christian apologist Dustin Segers (remember him?) recently posted an entry on his blog in which he tells about his experiences at something called the “Reason Rally.” Segers used the words ‘sophisticated’ and ‘blasphemous’ to describe what he witnessed at the event, which he calls “an opportunity to trash religion in general and Christianity specifically.” I’m guessing any non-religious assembly must by its very nature be guilty of this particularly nefarious misdeed. Believers gather on a weekly basis to condemn non-believers and fancy themselves as numbering among “the chosen,” but when non-believers gather at an annual meet open to all comers, it’s specifically intended to “trash” Christianity.

Incinerating Presuppositionalism: Year Seven

Today is March 26, 2012, which means: another anniversary of Incinerating Presuppositionalism has been reached. That’s right, another milestone has been achieved.

The past year has signaled a most momentous transition for me. I moved with my then three-year-old daughter to Thailand from the United States in May 2011, started a new position, and have sought to live as a functionally single parent in a foreign country (where I do not speak the language). It’s been the experience and challenge of a lifetime. My lasting as long as I have – with my daughter reaching her fourth birthday, completing her first year of kindergarten, and developing as an exceptionally gifted child (albeit, with my special help) – is not a miracle, but a testament to my dedication and perseverance as a civilized human being and my ability as a father. Indeed, I’m not the kind of parent who’s about to stand idly by and let his child be abducted, tortured and executed by a bunch of lawbreakers and miscreants. Nope, unlike the Christian god, I’ll protect my child till my last breath!

In the meantime, I have continued with my blog, and have published the following entries since my blog’s last anniversary, the same time last year:

250. Incinerating Presuppositionalism: Year Six – March 26, 2011

251. Imagine There’s a Heaven - April 29, 2011

252. The Argument from the Unity of Knowledge - May 25, 2011

253. Considering Tony’s Offerings - June 2, 2011

254. A Proof that the Christian God Does Not Exist - July 15, 2011

255. Nide’s Snide - July 22, 2011

256. Presuppositionalism vs. Objectivism: How Objectivism Prevails - August 2, 2011

257. Five Years and Still Waiting… - August 12, 2011

258. STB: One Year and Still Waiting… - August 27, 2011

259. Answering Nide’s Questions about the Uniformity of Nature - September 6, 2011

260. Strange Bedfellows? - October 3, 2011

261. George H. Smith’s “Atheism: The Case Against God” – Online – Free PDF - October 16, 2011

262. Has the Primacy of Existence Been Refuted? - October 27, 2011

263. A Reply to Dustin Seger’s Dismantled Blog Entry on Objectivism - November 1, 2011

264. Cognitive Reliability vs. Supernatural Deception - November 21, 2011

265. Christianity’s Sanction of Evil - December 1, 2011

266. Christianity’s Psychological Price Tag - December 4, 2011

267. Some Thoughts on the “Sensus Divinitatis” - December 6, 2011

268. A Reply to Michael: Further Thoughts on the Issue of Supernatural Deception - December 10, 2011

269. Are the Laws of Logic “Thoughts” of the Christian God? - January 1, 2012

270. Reaction to My Critique of Anderson and Welty’s “The Lord of Non-Contradiction” - February 25, 2012

271. Nide’s 15 - March 6, 2012

272. Can a Worldview “Provide” the “Preconditions of Intelligibility”? - Part I - March 16, 2012

273. Can a Worldview “Provide” the “Preconditions of Intelligibility”? - Part II - March 17, 2012

274. Can a Worldview “Provide” the “Preconditions of Intelligibility”? - Part III - March 20, 2012

275. The Self-Attesting Absurdity of the Christian Worldview - March 22, 2012

Highlights from the past year include (not to mention being evacuated from a flooded Bangkok in the fall of 2011!):

- A Proof that the Christian God Does Not Exist;

- the one year anniversary of the publication of my refutation of Sye Ten Bruggencate’s argument for the existence of his god (which is still unrefuted);

- a most historic pwning of Dustin Segers in his fault-ridden attempt to refute the primacy of existence;

- two posts interacting with James Anderson and Greg Welty’s paper The Lord of Non-Contradiction, found here and here;

- and a three-part analysis of the presuppositionalist claim that the Christian worldview “provides” the necessary preconditions for intelligibility, found here, here, and here.

So there’s a lot here to sink your teeth into. So get busy – start reading, start digesting, start thinking. Consider the points I raise, and formulate your own view. Perhaps I’m wrong. If so, discover why. Perhaps I’m right. If so, understand why. In the meantime, I will do my best, given my haphazard and very full schedule, to keep up with my blog and carry it to its eighth anniversary.

by Dawson Bethrick

The Self-Attesting Absurdity of the Christian Worldview

Over the past week, I presented a three-part series exploring the common presuppositionalist claim that the “Christian worldview” is the “only worldview” which “provides” the necessary preconditions for intelligibility. My investigation of this claim, which can be found here, here and here, demonstrates why this claim simply cannot be true.

But in spite of giving the matter more careful and systematic attention than presuppositionalists themselves typically devote to their own talking points, this demonstration – and more importantly, just the idea of taking a critical look at such a claim – will likely be ignored by apologists.

Can a Worldview “Provide” the “Preconditions of Intelligibility”? - Part III

What Are the Preconditions of Intelligibility?

If intelligibility is the capacity of some thing to be an object of awareness and be identified and integrated into the sum of one’s knowledge without contradiction, then what can we say about the preconditions of this ability?

I would wager that we can say quite a bit, and everything we can say about them – it will be seen – vies against the presuppositionalist claim that the Christian worldview “provides the necessary preconditions for intelligibility.”

But let’s ask the question: what is needed for a thing to be an object of awareness and be identified and integrated into the sum of one’s knowledge without contradiction?

Can a *Worldview* “Provide” the “Preconditions of Intelligibility”? - Part II

What is “Intelligibility”?

In my initial post in this series, we saw that it is common for presuppositionalists to assume that a worldview is what “provides the necessary preconditions for intelligibility.” By ‘worldview’ presuppositionalists explicitly mean “a network... of beliefs,” and it has even been stated that “beliefs are preconditions for intelligible experience” (see here).

This is not an isolated example. Indeed, I gave several other examples in my previous entry on this topic, and here are yet two more:

TAG [i.e., the “transcendental argument for the existence of God”] asserts that only the Christian worldview provides the necessary preconditions for the intelligibility of human experience. (Michael Butler, TAG vs. TANG)

Van Til contended that the Christian worldview supplies the preconditions of intelligibility. (Steve Hays, Theonomy under fire-2)

Logically this all means that “a network.. of beliefs” – i.e., a worldview - is the source of the necessary preconditions of intelligibility.

Can a *Worldview* "Provide" the "Preconditions of Intelligibility"? - Part I

One of the more commonly met elements of presuppositionalism is the assumption that a worldview can “provide the necessary preconditions of intelligibility.” From what I have seen, this assumption in itself is never defended. Presuppositionalists typically do not present arguments for why one should expect that a worldview as such (regardless of the particulars of that worldview) “provides the necessary preconditions of intelligibility.” The assumption that “the necessary preconditions of intelligibility” are “provided” by a worldview is generally taken completely for granted by presuppositionalists, and I’ve never seen an argument which establishes this premise.

Rather, it is typically embedded into the presuppositionalist characterization of the antithesis between Christian theism and any acknowledged contenders, as though it required no substantiation whatsoever. This in itself is noteworthy since presuppositional apologists commonly seek to make a worldview’s ability to “provide the preconditions of intelligibility” the fulcrum upon which the debate between Christianity and any non-Christian position hinges.

In this series, I will argue that at least some (indeed, the most fundamental) preconditions of intelligibility are actually not provided by any worldview. The position which I will defend is the view that those preconditions in question would already need to be in place for any worldview to exist in the first place. Moreover, I will argue that in the case of those preconditions for intelligibility which a worldview should supply, Christianity as a worldview comes up far too short to be seriously considered as their source.

Nide's 15

Christian apologist in-the-making Nide Corniell, who blogs and comments under the pseudonym “Hezekiah Ahaz,” continues to insist on playing the court jester. I recently posed 15 questions for Nide to consider (in the comments section of this blog), and he addressed them in his usual evasive and tirelessly adolescent manner (see here.)

Most of these are questions that I had posed to Nide earlier in our comment discussion but which he had resisted answering. Now we have his answers. Let’s take a look and see what he says.