RazorsKiss on the Christian God as the Basis of Knowledge – Part 6: RK on the Christian’s “Certainty”

In the opening statement of his debate with Mitch LeBlanc,Christian apologist “RazorsKiss” (“RK” hereafter) claimed that

Christians have the privilege of certainty

which implies that no one else does.

But privileges can be taken away.

Consequently, Christians cannot know with certainty when they can enjoy this "privilege of certainty," and when they cannot. And given their worldview’s premises, the recognition of the Christian's inherent uncertainty on this matter is accurate.

This is because Christians affirm the existence of a supernatural consciousness which can alter the nature of any thing which exists in the universe at any time, without seeking the prior approval of believers before doing so. (What believer would say that his god needs his approval to do anything?)

In essence, what RK calls “certainty” is based on proclamations inserted into the mouth of a storybook character. But this can only undermine his profession of certainty, not only psychologically, but also philosophically, since its basis (even on Christianity’s own premises) is beyond the reach of the believer’s epistemological grasp.

That the nature of this “certainty” is at best utterly fleeting and elusive for the believer, is especially true given the context in which RK informs his claim to certainty, namely that this is

a certainty based on the most fundamental guarantor of truth.

That “fundamental guarantor of truth,” which, on RK’s worldview, can only mean the Christian god, is no "guarantor" of certainty for the believer at all.

The granddaddy of presuppositionalism, Cornelius Van Til himself, makes this clear when he writes:

God may at any time take one fact and set it into new relation to created law. That is, there is no inherent reason in the facts or laws themselves why this should not be done. It is this sort of conception of the relation of facts and laws, of the temporal one and many, imbedded as it is in the idea of God in which we profess to believe, that we need in order to make room for miracles. And miracles are at the heart of the Christian position. (The Defense of the Faith, p. 27)

Because Christians affirm belief in an omnipotent supernatural being which can do what Van Til claims here, they cannot bank on any fact with any certainty, for unless they are themselves omniscient (which would make them “God,” and there can be only one “God”), they cannot know if or when their god might take any fact and “set it into new relation to created law.” The believer's god is supposed to have a will of its own, independent of the believer's own will. So how can the believer know if or when his god is going to cause another miracle to take place, especially if he relies on "divine revelation" (i.e., information which his god chooses to distribute to the believer) for all his knowledge?

For instance, a believer cannot be certain that the water he is drinking won’t suddenly be turned into wine the instant he puts a glass of water to his lips.

Then again, on Van Til’s view, he might not even notice that what he thought was water was turned into wine, because the facts pertaining to his perception of such things have been “set into new relation to created law.” He may be drinking wine and not know it!

The believer cannot assume that this is a matter of deception, since according to Van Til it would merely be a matter of individual facts being “set into new relation to created law.”

Since the Christian god is under no obligation to its creatures, it has no obligation to give believers advance notice that any facts are about to be “set into new relation to created law.”

So the Christian’s protestation that his god would not deliberately "deceive" him in such a manner, would be misdirected.

Moreover, protests from apologists that their god is “rational” and therefore will not change things willy-nilly, miss the point of Christianity’s own theological teachings.

If one affirms the existence of such a being, why suppose that it would be irrational for it to change water into wine? Blank out.

Was it irrational for Jesus to turn water into wine at the wedding at Cana (cf. John 2:2-11)?

If the Christian affirms that it was not rational for Jesus to change water into wine, then he’s already admitting that he worships an irrational deity anyway.

On the other hand, if the Christian affirms that it was in fact "rational" for Jesus to turn water into wine, then such protests are inapplicable. Whatever Jesus does, is "rational" because Jesus does it. If Jesus decides that a car should blow up and destroy human lives, it is "rational" simply because Jesus decides this. If instead of turning water into wine, Jesus decides that a hurricane should blow into town and take 1836 or more lives, would the believer call Jesus' decision "irrational"?

I trow not.

Similarly, if the believer affirms that Jesus’ miraculous transformation of water into wine was rational at the wedding at Cana, then why suppose it would be irrational for Jesus to do this or anything else on other occasions?

Believers are caught in a pickle of their own doing here, and so long as they remain committed to Christianity’s teachings, they’re simply stuck on this one.

So while RK may think that “Christians have the privilege of certainty,” it’s clear that their worldview does not grant them any epistemic right to certainty whatsoever (they get only "privilege"). They affirm “certainty” in word only, with no objective support for their claim to certainty at all.

Is this a reliable basis for epistemology?

If course it isn't.

by Dawson Bethrick

RazorsKiss on the Christian God as the Basis of Knowledge – Part 5: Exodus 3:14

In his interrogation of Mitch LeBlanc, presuppositional apologist RazorsKiss (“RK” hereafter) immediately drew attention to a statement found in Exodus 3:14:

God said to Moses, “I AM WHO I AM”; and He said, “Thus you shall say to the sons of Israel, ‘I AM has sent me to you’.”

It is not clear from his own statements why RK deemed it important to bicker with LeBlanc over the significance of this passage, unless it was to demonstrate LeBlanc’s own supposed ignorance of the historical meaning of the “I AM” clause, which by itself would have no relevance to the thesis which RK has elected to defend.

Now some Christian apologists claim that this passage contains biblical affirmation of the law of identity, a fundamental law of logic, in the clause “I AM WHO I AM.” Gary Crampton, for instance, makes the following statement:

Also fixed in Scripture are the two other principle laws of logic: the law of indentity (A is A) and the law of the excluded middle (A is either B or non-B). The former is taught in Exodus 3:14, in the name of God itself: “I AM WHO I AM.” And the latter is found, for example, in the words of Christ: “He who is not with Me is against Me” (Luke 11:23). [SIC] (The Westminster Confession of Faith and Logic)

I do not know whether or not RK holds the view which Crampton expresses here regarding Exodus 3:14, but there are some points to be made against it.

First of all, the passage in which the “I AM” clause is found does not identify what it states as a fundamental law of logic. (I’m assuming that Crampton means the law of identity, for I have never heard of a logical law known as “indentity” – perhaps this is a principle which copyists used in reproducing ancient manuscripts.) For that matter, the bible nowhere speaks intelligibly of logic as an epistemological method. The claim that this passage conveys a divinely inspired statement of a fundamental principle of logic, is a blatant case of trying to assimilate legitimate philosophical principles into a Christian context and back-fill them with Christian presuppositions. The law of identity is axiomatic, so it’s not as if we need an invisible magic being to communicate it to us, or to “make it true” (which would simply abrogate the objectivity of the law in the first place).

Moreover, logic as a method of inferring and validating new knowledge is anathema to what the bible does promote as the believer’s source of knowledge. RK himself pointed to what he calls the “sensus divinitatus” as the faculty by which the believer presumably acquires knowledge. Transmission of “knowledge” from the beyond into one’s mind by supernatural means is not a function of logic; reception of “knowledge” via the “sensus divinitatus” is characterized as a passive process, while scrutinizing the logical integrity of knowledge claims is an active process. Also, to suppose that one must submit the deliverances of the “sensus divinitatus” to the tribunal of logical evaluation in order to determine their validity or truth value, would only suggest that logic is higher than the source of such deliverances. This would be an expression of “autonomous reasoning,” i.e., taking something other than the revelation of the Christian god as “the ultimate reference point” in one’s development of his knowledge, and presuppositionalism scorns “autonomous reasoning” as the fount of all sin. As presuppositionalist Richard Pratt puts it:

This, then, is the essence of sin: man’s rebellion against recognizing his dependence on God in everything and the assumption of his ability to be independent of God. (Every Thought Captive, p. 29)

Logic, of course, requires intellectual liberty. It requires that the mind be free to follow logic wherever it leads him, regardless of who disapproves. This means that logic is not possible apart from the precondition of independence, the very value which the presuppositionalist notion of “autonomous reasoning” is intended to vilify. Ayn Rand put this principle succinctly when she wrote:

These two—reason and freedom—are corollaries, and their relationship is reciprocal: when men are rational, freedom wins; when men are free, reason wins. (“Faith and Force: The Destroyers of the Modern World,” Philosophy: Who Needs It, p. 66)

Those who scorn the value of independence, scorn reason, scorn logic, and scorn man as a rational animal. This attitude is not difficult to find in the Christian worldview by any means. In Christianity, the disposition desired of the believer is that he take whatever his god tells him unquestioningly. The believer is not to question what he believes his god has told him, regardless of how his god has presumably communicated to him. Greg Bahnsen himself makes point this clear when he tells us that his god’s “word and character are not questionable” (Van Til’s “Presuppositionalism”).

Submitting statements which are said to have proceeded from the mouth of one’s god to tests intended to determine whether or not they are logical, is not an action indicative of the position which rejects independent thought. So if the believer gets his knowledge of the truth from an allegedly divine source, such as the so-called “sensus divinitatus,” then on what basis can he affirm logic as an arbiter of true knowledge, except he compartmentalize his god-beliefs and borrows from an epistemology which assumes the independence, or “autonomy,” of the human mind as the proper standard for man?

But some will nonetheless insist that this is the bible teaching a fundamental law of logic, in spite of the obvious conflict between logic as a means of testing knowledge claims and presuppositionalism’s overt rejection of “autonomous reasoning,” i.e., the position which does not accept assertions attributed by Christianity to the Christian god unquestioningly. The problem with this, however, is that the statement “I AM WHO I AM” could, at best, be an application of the law of identity, not an explicit statement of the law of identity as such. Certainly the statement assumes the law of identity, but all intelligible statements in fact do this, not just the clause found in Exodus 3:14. Exodus 3:14 is nothing unique.

Even worse for Crampton, the statement “I AM WHO I AM” could not be a statement isolating the law of identity, for it is restricted to a specific unit (one which is specified by the personal pronoun “I”), while the law of identity is open-ended (i.e., universal), and thus not restricted to a specific unit, but applicable to any and all units, whether persons, places, or things. The clause “I AM WHAT I AM” is, to put it mildly, far too narrow in its scope of reference to constitute a statement of the law of identity as such. It is because the law of identity is universal in its scope of reference that it is is customarily stated in the form of an equation using an open-ended term, e.g., A is A. For this reason, the clause in Exodus 3:14 cannot legitimately be taken an explicit statement of the law of identity as such, for the universality of the law is not entailed by “I AM WHO I AM.” And while the statement “I AM WHO I AM” can by rightly and logically uttered by anyone who can speak, such as actually existing persons (such as human beings), the law of identity applies not only to animate objects, but also to inanimate objects.

Lastly, in the case of the biblical passage, the statement “I AM WHO I AM” has simply been inserted by an author into the mouth of a storybook character, so ascribing the origin of the law of identity to a person who proclaims it a law (as if the law of identity could be legislated by an act of will) simply reduces to subjectivism.

by Dawson Bethrick

RazorsKiss on the Christian God as the Basis of Knowledge – Part 4: RK on Man’s “Warrant” for Using Logic

In his Rebuttal to Mitch LeBlanc, RK raised some issues regarding logic. Presuppositionalists commonly assert that the Christian god is the foundation of logic, and I have devoted a series of blogs investigating this claim already (see here, here, here, here and here).

Man's "Warrant" for Using Logic

Instead of arguing outright that logic presupposes the Christian god, RK attempted to take LeBlanc to task on the question of having “warrant” for using logic. In this section I will answer RK’s questions and objections from my own position.

RK writes:

Having success in using the laws of logic is not the same as saying that you have a warrant to be using it.

A man’s “warrant” for using logic is his ability to think, specifically his ability to identify and integrate what he perceives in conceptual form. Essentially, man’s nature as a rational animal is all the warrant he needs for using logic. He does not need to seek approval from anyone, either real or imaginary, before using his mind and governing his thoughts by means of logical principles.

The question is about whether we have warrant for considering logic as axiomatic.

Logic itself is not axiomatic. Logic is a set of principles which guides an individual’s reasoning about the facts he discovers in reality, and is composed of a wide assortment of concepts. So as a method of knowledge it is not conceptually irreducible (which is one of the criteria qualifying a position as axiomatic; see here). Moreover, logic is only applicable once one has formed a number of concepts, both from perceptual inputs as well as on the basis of concepts so formed (cf. abstraction from abstractions), which are formed in essentially the same manner as concepts formed directly from perceptual inputs. Even if one wants to say that logic is implicit in the formation of these baseline concepts in that some of its principles guide the process of forming concepts, it would not be something that could be identified until those concepts have been formed and thus be something which could be identified. Now this does not erase the fact that the foundations of logic are axiomatic concepts. As an objective method which teaches man to think rationally, logic presupposes the truth of the axioms which I discussed in my previous blog. If RK thinks that logic is axiomatic, he needs to explain this. But I do not see where he attempted to do so in his debate with LeBlanc. Quite the opposite, RK says very little about logic in his opening statement. In fact, his only statement about logic worth noting is his assertion that “an unbelieving man… has no basis for his use of logical laws,” a statement for which he provides no informed defense.

It seems apparent to me that Mitch is not providing a justification for using the law that he is using - nor did I see a case that did anything to disprove mine.

Keep in mind that LeBlanc had only presented his opening statement by this point in the debate. Contrary to what he apparently believes, RK is not reacting to LeBlanc’s rebuttal to RK’s opening statement. Moreover, had the topic of the debate been specifically about “providing a justification for using” logic, then RK could fault LeBlanc for failing to address this, if in fact he did fail to address it. Then again, I did not see where RK had provided a justification for using logic. In his opening statement, all RK essentially did was describe his position, affirm its exclusivity and assert that any other basis is insufficient. With regards to logic specifically, recall that RK had stated:

That any worldview asserting some sort of “objective” basis for the laws of logic specifically, but for nature and morality as well - is pure subjectivism wrapped up in an objective shell consisting of concepts stolen from their Creator.

Why does RK suppose that a worldview which affirms an objective basis for the laws of logic “is pure subjective wrapped up in an objective shell consisting of concepts stolen from their Creator”? Does RK think that Christianity affirms an objective basis for the laws of logic? If so, does he think he’s affirming “pure subjectivism wrapped up in an objective shell consisting of concepts stolen from their Creator”? If the “Creator” which RK has in mind here is the Christian god, he’s in for a surprise. RK claims that his god is “omniscient.” I have already made the case that an omniscient mind would not have its knowledge in conceptual form (see here), and a presuppositional apologist has expressed agreement with this conclusion (see here).

Moving on:

He is simply saying that it is usable - the same problem Martin falls into, in his TANG

Why is saying that logic is usable is a problem? Does RK not think it is usable?

That is not the question. On what grounds can it be considered warranted to be using abstract universals which apply to all (created) thinking beings? I have a proper ground to be doing so.

The use of “abstract universals” is “warranted” on the grounds of the primacy of existence and the objective theory of concepts, two vital philosophical components which are antithetical to the Christian worldview. The Christian worldview assumes the primacy of consciousness, and has no theory of concepts. So RK is deluding himself if he thinks Christianity provides “warrant” for “using abstract universals which apply” to anything at all. By endorsing the Christian worldview, he has rejected the two very things which make “abstract universals” possible and applicable in the first place.

Obviously, an atheist is able to /operate/ with success using the logical laws which his brain operates according to. In fact, they MUST do so.

An individual applies logic in his thinking volitionally, because he chooses to, not because he’s been forced or compelled to. This is the moral element to rational thinking which many thinkers (including presuppositionalists, who prefer to see morality as a matter of obeying the commands of an invisible magic being) tend to miss. Morality is involved where there is a choice to be made, and applicable only when there is a choice to be made.

As for the mechanics of the laws of logic, however, one will eventually encounter insurmountable difficulty when trying to understand and explain how logic works if his worldview does not equip him with an objective theory of concepts. It is because many individuals lack a worldview with an objective understanding of the nature of concepts that they give up on trying to understand logic and point to something which they can only imagine as the “basis” of logic, as we see in the case of presuppositionalists like RK. Since they have virtually no understanding of concepts, and have no idea how volition can be reconciled with objectivity, they give up and surrender their minds to mysticism. And this very act of giving up is understood, “interpreted,” as giving oneself over to the supernatural, as sacrificing oneself to his god, following the Christian model, as a devotional act garnering the approval of a divine being, as “pleasing” one’s god. The believer here imagines that he hears a voice from heaven, saying: “This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased.” This auto-suggestive con which the believer invokes upon himself, can be powerful in its persuasion, where persuasion at this point is merely a form of positive reinforcement of a vicious psychological habit.

It is no surprise, then, that RK presents no conceptual understanding of logic, and in place of such informed understanding seeks to associate logic with his storybook-based worldview.

Now it should be pointed out that, even if one does not understand concept theory, it would not follow from this that his use of logic is “unwarranted.” I may not understand how my microwave oven heats food, but this does not mean that my use of microwave ovens to heat food is unwarranted. The microwave heats food, whether I understand its behind-the-scenes functionality or not, so long as I can get it to run. One’s use of logic is analogous to this situation. In fact, one would need to use logic in order to understand both how a microwave oven works as well as how logic allows a thinker to scale the hierarchical structure of his knowledge. On the other hand, claiming that a worldview can "account for" the preconditions of knowledge, when in fact that worldview lacks a theory of concepts in the first place, simply undermines the credibility of those who champion such a position. This is the position in which we find presuppositionalists like RK, who claims that the Christian god is the basis of knowledge. Since Christianity does not have a theory of concepts, how could defenders of the view which RK seeks to defend going to produce an intelligible case for such a position?

Continuing, RK states:

The question at hand is not whether - but /why/ he is using them.

A thinker uses the laws of logic because his consciousness operates on the conceptual level of cognition. RK thinks that an appeal to a supernatural creator of logic is needed to justify man’s use of logic, but this does not address the issue informatively. It does not tell us why logic applies to man’s thinking, fails to take into account the nature of man’s consciousness, and is preoccupied with validating the contents of an ancient storybook which are irrelevant to logic and man’s need for it. RK’s view of logic teaches us nothing about the nature of logic or the nature of its relevance to human thought. It only seeks to wedge his god-belief into any conversation about logic, as if it had any relevance in the first place, a relevance which RK has not succeeded in establishing.


Are the Laws of Logic “created” by the Christian god?

Beyond these points, which have been answered, RK said very little about logic. But there was one other claim which RK made about logic which I found noteworthy due to the tension it generates in relation to claims about logic made by other presuppositionalists. RK made the following statement:

I am going to argue that God is not only the ordainer, but creator of the logical laws we use.

I really wish presuppositionalists would get on the same page. In Pushing the Antithesis: The Apologetic Methodology of Greg L. Bahnsen, it is stated:

We are not saying God created the laws of logic by His volitional self-determination. Were this so, then He could alter or discard them as well... (p. 210)

Bahnsen says that his god did not create the laws of logic, while RK says that his god is their "creator." The two are in direct conflict. Which is it? Are we to understand the presuppositionalist position as advocating the view that the Christian god did create the laws of logic, or that it did not create the laws of logic? Is the presuppositionalist’s view of logic so radically different from an objective understanding of logic, that the law of contradiction either does not apply, or its violations can still be called “logical”? Or, if one or the other position were true, how could two Christian apologists differ so dramatically on this point?

The real story behind this kind of disagreement between two presuppositionalists who want to claim some kind of fundamental relationship between their god and the laws of logic, is that there really is no fundamental relationship between the Christian god and the laws of logic at all, and defenders of Christianity are attempting to shoplift logic as if its principles were underwritten by the Christian god's alleged nature. This is why RK, Bahnsen and other apologists really don't provide an actual argument to support their claim that the laws of logic "reflect" their god's nature, rather they simply assert it and call their assertion an argument, which is what we see in RK's case (it's definitely what we find in Bahnsen). If there were genuinely an objective rationale for associating logic with the Christian god, I strongly doubt that we would find this kind of disagreement between Christian apologists essentially cut from the same cloth.

On the other hand, if presuppositionalists do have an argument for there being a fundamental association between the Christian god and the laws of logic, it seems that the first order of business would be to agree on whether that association is creative in nature (as RK affirms), or merely “reflective” (as Bahnsen affirms elsewhere). Of course, we would want to know what the premises of such an argument might be, but we can reasonably expect the argument’s premises to vary fundamentally on which of these two disparate positions is being defended. An argument for the view that the Christian god is the creator of logical laws would presumably look quite different from an argument which merely seeks to establish that the laws of logic “reflect” the Christian god’s nature.

Then again, an even more fundamental order of business would be to establish the existence of said god in the first place, for without this it would be nonsensical to claim a relationship between the two. Once this has been achieved (and so far as I’ve seen – and I’ve seen a lot – it has not been achieved), presuppositionalists would be advised to get their playbook in order. Did their god create the laws of logic, or not? There are certain risks with either position which could understandably make presuppositionalists uncomfortable.

If, on the one hand, it is held that the Christian god created the laws of logic, as RK wants us to believe, then – as Bahnsen warns – that god “could alter or discard them as well.” I’m confident that the religious mind could find a way to live with this, but it would be sufficient to repudiate the claim that said god is “rational,” a claim which can be found throughout the presuppositionalist literature.


Do the Laws of Logic “Reflect” the Character of the Christian god?

On the other hand, if the laws of logic merely “reflect” the character of the Christian god, it could be inferred from this that the laws of logic essentially exist independent of the Christian god, in spite of its alleged “reflection” of the Christian god’s character. The claim that the laws of logic “reflect” the character of the Christian god seems to have been devised specifically to avoid the pitfall of portraying logic as merely another the Christian god’s creations, which it can alter and discard at will, while still maintaining a sense of dependence of logic on the Christian god. So, given the above noted tension, presuppositionalists need to decide that whether or not their created the laws of logic. If it did create the laws of logic, then I see no reason why the warning which Bahnsen gives – that the Christian god “could alter or discard them” at will – would not apply. If the Christian god did not create the laws of logic, and yet it is acknowledged that the laws of logic do in fact exist, then it must be admitted that the laws of logic exist independent of the Christian god’s creative activity. In this case, the laws of logic are not created. Whether or not they “reflect” the Christian god’s character is a side issue which I will address below. For the present case, the question is whether or not the laws of logic exist as a result of its creative activity, or independent of its creative will. Given RK’s affirmation above, presuppositionalists seem torn on this matter, and I wager that this is due to the fact that there is no objective support for any relationship between the laws of logic and the Christian god.

As for the claim that the laws of logic “reflect” the character of the Christian god, such a view can only be endorsed if one fails to recognize the profound differences between the nature of logic on the one hand, and the characteristics which Christianity ascribes to its god on the other. Specifically, logic is conceptual in nature. Not only does logic as a method which guides rational thinking consist of principles which take conceptual form, but its very application as a method of non-contradictory identification is inherently tied to the universality (i.e., the open-endedness) of conceptualization. Specifically, it is because logical principles are conceptual in nature, and therefore open-ended, that they are available to any individual to apply to any object or set of objects he perceives or considers, whether it be location of a house, the rate of flow of a river, a bank account balance, cooking an omelet, or deciding which political candidate to vote for. Thus, if the laws of logic reflect anything, they reflect the conceptual nature of human thought, where the objective theory of concepts identifies the proper norms implied by the conceptual nature of human thought.

Moreover, the laws of logic presume the primacy of existence, i.e., the recognition that the objects of consciousness are what they are independent of conscious activity. It would make no sense to attempt to apply logic to objects which can vary according to a thinkers will. If one sought to balance his bank account, for instance, and could alter the amount stated on his payment receipts according to his wishes (for instance, instead of having paid $2800.00 for transmission work, he decided that it cost him only $4.00), why would he need logic for such a task? If the nature of the objects of one’s awareness conformed to one’s conscious activity, he wouldn’t need to draw inferences about the way things are; rather, he could just reset everything according to his wishes, according to “His good pleasure,” as RK puts it. Psalms 115:3 makes this point explicitly clear: “our God is in the heavens; He does whatever He pleases.”

Unfortunately for the presuppositionalist, however, this disqualifies the Christian god as the object which the laws of logic reflect. For, as I have argued here (and with agreement from a presuppositionalist here), the Christian god would not have its knowledge in conceptual form. In other words, its knowledge would not be conceptual in nature. So if logic is in fact conceptual in nature, and man’s knowledge is also conceptual in nature, there is no reason to suppose that logic “reflects” the character of the Christian god, when in fact logic reflects the conceptual nature of human thought. Also, since logic presupposes the primacy of existence, and the very notion of the Christian god entails the contradiction of this principle, namely the primacy of consciousness, then we have all the more reason to reject the view that the laws of logic “reflect” the character of the Christian god. Presuppositionalists who make such a claim are in fact exposing their hapless ignorance of the conceptual nature of logic, as well as their failure to integrate the attributes which their worldview ascribes to their god into such claims.

by Dawson Bethrick

RazorsKiss on the Christian God as the Basis of Knowledge – Part 3: RK’s “No Brute Facts” Claim

In the section of his opening statement titled “Proper Epistemology,” RK basically just describes his position as opposed to presenting a reasoned defense for it. After reviewing his positional statement numerous times, I found no attempt to validate his overall position with argument. Instead of presenting an argument for the view that the Christian god is the basis of knowledge, RK preferred simply to assert it as a component of two heavily laden confessional affirmations which he characterized as “axiomatic, interrelated foundations” which, upon examination, turn out not to be axiomatic in the least.

The failure to provide an argument for various assertions he makes in his opening statement, is a trait common to much of what RK affirms. For instance, he makes the following statements about “facts”:

there are no brute facts. Facts are not neutral entities, and they cannot be interpreted in a neutral fashion. This is because facts can only exist in relation to other facts; further, without exception these are interpreted with reference to still other facts.

Here is a series of claims about facts which RK makes but does not seek to establish by means of argument. Each statement which RK makes here is in need of support, and neither statement seems to follow necessarily from any of the others.

RK makes the universally negative claim that “there are no brute facts.” How does he support this? He does so by asserting that “facts can only exist in relation to other facts.” How does RK know this? He does not explain. This is logically equivalent to saying that there is no fact anywhere which does not exist in relation to other facts. While universally negative claims are notoriously difficult to establish with certainty, even if we accept this to be the case (and RK does not demonstrate this, he only asserts it), how does it follow from this that “there are no brute facts”? RK does not explain this either. Why can it not be the case that “facts can only exist in relation to other facts,” but some of those facts are “brute” in nature? The issue here seems to be one of definitions, but RK does not state his definitions. What exactly is a “brute fact” as RK understands it? It may be the case that “there are no brute facts,” but the reason which RK offers in support of this seems insufficient to rule out their existence. It may even be the case that I would agree that “there are no brute facts,” but only on premises integral to my worldview, and RK has already made it clear in no uncertain terms that he would reject my worldview. Given RK’s claims to exclusivity of Christianity and the lines he has drawn in the sand against any non-Christian position, I would expect that my own reasoning for rejecting the notion of “brute facts” would fail to muster with RK’s position.

To understand RK’s position, we must know what he means by “brute fact.” For a specifically presuppositionalist understanding of what a “brute fact” is, I consulted John Frame’s A Van Til Glossary, which, curiously, offers two definitions for this expression:

(1) (in VT) fact that is uninterpreted (by God, man, or both) and therefore the basis of all interpretation; (2) objective fact: fact not dependent on what man thinks about it.

Since RK himself seems to be a presuppositionalist, I’m willing to suppose that he would endorse the definitions of “brute fact” which Frame offers here. The question becomes then, since Frame offers two definitions for this term: which definition does RK have in mind?

If by “brute fact” RK means the second of these two definitions (“objective fact”), then I’d say RK is in big trouble here. This would essentially be affirming that all facts are subjective. Indeed, since Christianity holds that all facts are created by an act of supernatural consciousness (cf. Van Til, who claims that “God is the creator of every fact” [Christian Theistic Evidences, p. 88; quoted in Bahnsen, Van Til's Apologetic: Readings & Analysis, p. 378]), then I would agree that this would accurately describe the Christian (and thus RK’s) view of facts. According to such a view, facts are dependent upon a knowing subject and conform to its will. In other words, on this view, facts are subjective. This would mean that any “fact” which RK cites on behalf of defending his worldview would be subjective in nature, and thus as unstable as a straw hut in a Category 5 hurricane. Moreover, if RK holds it to be a fact that “there are no brute facts,” then this “fact” itself would be subjective. So why should anyone accept it as an objectively reliable statement about reality? Blank out.

On the other hand, if by “brute fact” RK means the first of these definitions (i.e., “uninterpreted” fact which serves as “the basis of all interpretation”), then we need to understand what is meant by the term “interpretation,” since it is used here in a rather idiosyncratic manner (e.g., we interpret statements, symbols, language, bodily gestures, etc. rather than facts per se). Here John Frame has something noteworthy to add:

To my knowledge, Van Til never defines “interpretation,” but I gather he uses the term fairly broadly to describe all of a person’s activity in his attempts to understand the world. (Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought, p. 193)

Van Til used the term “interpretation” with very high frequency in his writings. It seems inexplicable if what Frame says here is true, that “Van Til never defines ‘interpretation’,” given not only his frequent use of the term, but also given Van Til’s own rhetorical question:

Is not the important thing that Christian meanings be contrasted with non-Christian meanings? (The Defense of the Faith, p. 23n.1)

At any rate, if “interpretation” denotes “all of a person’s activity in his attempts to understand the world,” and “brute facts” are facts which are “uninterpreted,” then “brute facts” would be facts which have not (yet) been processed by “all of a person’s activity in his attempts to understand the world.” Thus RK’s denial of the existence of “brute facts” so conceived would also be problematic, for it essentially denies that facts could exist independent of “a person’s activity in his attempts to understand the world.” This assessment is consistent with Frame’s first definition of “brute fact,” which he attributes to Van Til, and which posits “brute fact” as “the basis of all interpretation.” Thus RK’s denial of the existence of “brute facts” again denies the objectivity of facts, and essentially rules out any factual “basis of all interpretation.” If facts are not the basis of one’s interpretation, what is? Feelings? Wishes? Likes or dislikes?

The problem is even deeper for RK, for not only does he fail to follow through with anything approaching a solid defense of his claim that “there are no brute facts,” this claim, on either definition of “brute fact,” essentially amounts to claiming that there is no factual objectivity whatsoever. Either the claim “there are no brute facts” outright denies the existence of objective facts (Frame’s definition (2)), or it denies the existence of facts which exist independent of cognitive activity (which is just another way of denying the existence of objective facts).

On the presuppositionalist view, facts are, in the final analysis, presumably “interpreted” for all eternity, not things which are discovered by consciousness. This basically entails the general view that any facts which man discovers, were already known (“interpreted”) by a supernatural consciousness. So RK’s “no brute facts” claim essentially follows from the claim that the Christian god is omniscient (i.e., the Christian god’s omniscience necessitates the view that “there are no brute facts”), as opposed to a conclusion reached through an inductive investigation into the nature of facts themselves. So this is not a validation of the claim, but rather an indication of how it follows as a consequence of more fundamental religious commitments, in spite of the philosophical problems it generates for the Christian position. What is fundamental in such a case is a religious confession of faith rather than a factual basis, which is denied by the “no brute facts” claim itself.

It is not clear why RK felt the need to affirm such a self-discrediting position, for it is unclear how it ties to any positive argument he may be trying to make on behalf of the claim that “the Triune God of the Scriptures” is “the basis for knowledge.” Then again, as indicated above, I did not find any positive argument on behalf of this claim, which he elected to defend by taking the affirmative in the debate.

RK did say that “knowledge is interrelated” and that “facts cannot be interpreted outside of your epistemology,” but he nowhere explains why it must be the case that “there are no brute facts” for these points to be true. Certainly, rational knowledge is interrelated, since on the standard of rationality (where “rationality” is the commitment to reason as one’s only means of knowledge and only guide to action), new knowledge must be integrated without contradiction into the total sum of one’s knowledge. Also, one needs an epistemology (namely reason, as opposed to faith in revelations from invisible magic beings) according to which he can perform such an activity. But this does not in any way require that facts be subjective in nature, as RK’s denial of the existence of “brute facts” seems to entail. Facts can certainly be objective (i.e., have the identity they have independent of the cognitive activity of a knowing subject), and still be identified and integrated by a rational process into the sum of one’s knowledge without contradiction, so long as one employs an objective method. But if there are no objective facts, as RK’s position requires, then all bets are off.

RK continues, saying that “as philosophers, we have to consider the meaning of the facts – or the concepts – we examine.” RK seems confused here. Meaning is a property of concepts, not of independently existing concretes. For instance, one does not pick up a rock and say it has “meaning” of its own. Only in the context of other facts can we begin to speak of meaning with reference to a specific concrete. For instance, if a certain kind of igneous rock were discovered under several strata of sandstone, an inference could be made about a period of volcanic activity. But strictly speaking, meaning is the domain of concepts. So while I agree that “meanings are inseparable from our epistemological foundation,” since a rational epistemology is conceptual in nature and meaning is a property of concepts, RK fails to show how this requires the existence of his god, or how it relates to such a demonstration, which he had pledged to deliver in his debate. As I indicated in my previous posting, the primacy of existence and the objective theory of concepts are the fundamentals needed for such cognitive operations.

RK states that “we judge all facts through the ‘prism of our epistemology’,” which is true if we have a unified, unfragmented epistemology and we guide our thinking consistently according to that epistemology. The question at this point, however, is: does this “prism of epistemology” have an objective or subjective basis? An epistemology which is subordinated to theistic affirmations is going to be subjective in nature. This is because theism entails enshrinement of an imaginary consciousness on which everything in the universe depends and to whose will everything conforms. As we saw above, Christianity teaches that all facts are created by a deity by means of conscious intentions, which means: the subject in the subject-object relationship holds primacy over its objects. This is the very essence of subjectivism, and it lies at the heart of theism as such. Moreover, since no one can consistently employ a subjective epistemology and survive very long, a theist is not going to operate on the basis of a unified, unfragmented epistemology. Rather, he’s going to have a mixed epistemology, which ultimately means that he will not be able to defend any position consistently. It also means that, in order to live in this world, the theist has no alternative but to borrow from the this-worldly epistemology of a rational (and therefore non-theistic) worldview which he has verbally rejected.

By contrast, an epistemology which is founded explicitly on the primacy of existence (i.e., the view that the objects of consciousness exist and are what they are independent of the conscious activity of the subject) and which benefits from the objective theory of concepts (as explained in Ayn Rand’s Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology), then he has the makings of a truly objective epistemology, one which allows him to recognize the objective nature of facts and enables him to identify and integrate them into the sum of his knowledge in an objective manner to produce a non-contradictory whole, which he can confidently and legitimately call “knowledge.” Any compromise of either of these two components – the primacy of existence and the objective theory of concepts – will result in a system which invites the arbitrary and inclines its users to confuse what they imagine with what is real.

For further discussion of the inherent antithesis between theism and Objectivism on the nature of facts, see my blog Rival Philosophies of Fact.

by Dawson Bethrick

RazorsKiss on the Christian God as the Basis of Knowledge - Part 2: RK's Axioms

We continue now with our examination of RazorsKiss’ case for knowledge finding its basis in the Christian god.

Given RK’s choice to defend the view that knowledge has its basis in the Christian god, he at least seems to recognize that knowledge requires a basis. Unfortunately, his concern is not genuinely for the integrity or objectivity of knowledge, but for safeguarding his god-belief by inserting it into the very foundations of knowledge as such. Make no mistake about it, RK’s concern is not for anchoring knowledge to reality, but rather to assimilate the entire body of human knowledge to Christian theism, as if knowledge could not be possible if Christianity were not true. This is one reason why RK affirms the alleged reality of his god’s existence and its revelation as “two axiomatic, interrelated foundations for my epistemology, and for everything else I encounter through the grid of that epistemology.” Those two “axioms” are:

1) “The Triune God of Scripture – who created the universe and all it contains; who established and even now maintains the laws which govern that creation.”

2) “The self-revelation of that self-existent, self-conscious, self-sufficient, omniscient, omnipotent, all-wise, immutable, eternal, and sovereign God; The Scrptures of the Old and New Testament, are the self-communication of the extent, nature, and specifics of His eternal properties – which are the guarantor of the laws and assumptions which we, as creatures in the image of that God, require to operate rationally and coherently.”

I find it baffling that anyone would call either of these two statements “axiomatic.” Not surprisingly, RK nowhere explains what he means by “axiomatic,” nor does he show how the two statements he provides here qualify as “axiomatic.” Rather, they appear to be faith assertions which he simply labels “axiomatic” as a shortcut to scoring a major debating point. By calling these statements “axiomatic… foundations,” RK seeks to front-load his god-belief claims into a fundamental position in his overall epistemological structure. But this is entirely artificial and disingenuous. Only if axioms, and knowledge in general, were completely arbitrary, could RK’s statements qualify as “axiomatic,” but in such a case any statement one may want to affirm would qualify as “axiomatic.” For instance, why would RK’s proposed statements qualify as “axiomatic,” but the following statements would not? Consider:

1’) The Infinitune Blarko of Wonder – who created the universe and all it contains; who established and even now maintains the laws which govern that creation.”

2’) The self-revelation of that self-existent, self-conscious, self-sufficient, omniscient, omnipotent, all-wise, immutable, eternal, and sovereign Blarko: The Wonder is the self-communication of the extent, nature, and specifics of Blarko’s eternal properties – which are the guarantor of the laws and assumptions which we, as creatures in the very vision of Blarko, require to operate rationally and coherently.

If RK’s proposals 1) and 2) should qualify as “axiomatic… foundations,” I see no reason why statements 1’) and 2’), or any others which one could invent in their place, cannot. And to help the uninitiated like me along, RK provides no rationale or criteria which validate his own claims as “axiomatic” and/or which rule out statements such as those which I have presented here. (And we can be assured that RK’s “axioms” are not affirming the same thing as my proposed alternates, for “Blarko” is not identical to the Christian god; for instance, Blarko did not have a son, and Blarko is not a three-in-one deity – Blarko is “infinitune,” not “triune.” Moreover, Blarko’s self-revelation is contained in The Wonder, not “the Scriptures.” Thus, one could argue from the basis of the two “axiomatic… foundations” which I have offered against RK’s, that any time one “wonders” he is making personal contact with Blarko.)

Yes, I would agree that all this is most arbitrary, which is why, in my blog Probing Mr. Manata’s Poor Understanding of the Axioms, I identified six criteria which a philosophical axiom would need to fulfill in order to be genuinely axiomatic. They are:

It names a perceptually self-evident fact
Its truth is not inferred from prior truths
Its truth is conceptually irreducible
Its truth is implicit in all perception
Its truth is implicit in all knowledge and any statement
Its truth must be assumed even in denying it

RK’s proposed “axiomatic, interrelated foundations” fail to provide knowledge with a starting point which is:

- objective
- conceptually irreducible
- perceptually self-evident
- undeniably true
- universal

My examination below shows why RK’s proposed “axioms” lack these qualities which legitimate axioms possess:

1) Objective: Genuine axioms need to be objective. However, by appealing to the “sensus divinitatus,” RK concedes that his axioms are not objective. Objectivity is intentional conformity to the primacy of existence. In his Rebuttal to RK, Mitch LeBlanc explained why “the Christian worldview has denied the metaphysical primacy of existence,” which means that, as a worldview, Christianity is fundamentally at odds with the very basis of objectivity. RK’s need to appeal to the “sensus divinitatus” confirms this, as my discussion of this alleged faculty in Part I demonstrates. If that which RK identifies as the basis of knowledge is not objective, then his account for knowledge should be rejected, for it can only lead to subjectivism. Since this is what his “two axiomatic, interrelated foundations for epistemology” in fact do, his case for the thesis that the Christian god is the proper basis for knowledge is doomed.

2) Conceptually Irreducible: To qualify as an axiom, a statement must at minimum be conceptually irreducible. Unfortunately, RK’s two proposed “axioms” are, to put it plainly, loaded to the hilt with prior assumptions, sub-assumptions and notions which themselves would need to be defined in terms of prior concepts in order to have any meaning at all. Thus they are not conceptually irreducible. Notice how, in RK’s first “axiom,” he needs to qualify his god as “Triune” (a concept which must be defined in terms of more fundamental concepts) and as belonging to “Scripture” (another concept which must be clarified by reference to prior concepts). RK’s axiom identifying his god also points to achievements in its career (it “created the universe and all it contains,” and “established and even now maintains the laws which govern that creation”), which are specified in his axiom. These notions are not themselves axiomatic in nature, since they are not conceptually irreducible notions. To have meaning, they need to be defined in terms of more fundamental concepts.

Similarly in RK’s second “axiom,” the notion of “revelation” is not a conceptually reducible idea. It must be defined in terms of prior concepts. The abundant verbiage of RK’s second “axiom” by itself indicates how much qualification is required to specify what it is supposedly identifying, which only tells us that it cannot be conceptually irreducible. Notions like “self-revelation,” “self-existent,” ‘self-conscious,” “self-sufficient,” “omniscient,” “omnipotent,” “all-wise,” “immutable,” “eternal,” and “sovereign,” are not conceptually irreducible ideas, and this we can know because they need to be clarified by definitions which make use of prior concepts.

All of RK’s qualifications, which are rampant throughout the content of his proposed “axioms,” can only invite further elaboration, because they contain a vast assortment of underlying presuppositions, which only means that they are not and cannot be conceptually irreducible. According to RK, even the notion “God” has a definition. This becomes evident in his defense against the proposal that his supernatural object of worship might be deceiving him, a question which LeBlanc raises in the cross-interrogation session of the debate. RK rejects this proposal on the basis that it “redefines” the Christian god. You cannot “redefine” something unless it is already supposed to have a definition in the first place (even though definitions pertain to concepts, and from what I understand “God” is supposed to be a supernatural being, not a concept). Genuinely axiomatic concepts are in fact conceptually irreducible in that their definitions are not in terms of prior concepts, but ostensive in nature, i.e., by pointing to something and saying “that’s what I mean.” The definition of the notion of a god cannot be ostensive since gods are supposed to be imperceptible. You cannot indicate something that you cannot perceive by pointing to it.

3) Perceptually Self-Evident: An axiom identifies a fact which is perceptually self-evident. But the final point in the discussion of the previous point indicates that RK’s “axioms” fail to meet even this qualification. RK’s “axioms” do not identify anything that is perceptually self-evident. Christians are always reminding us that their god is immaterial, non-physical, supernatural, invisible, beyond the reach of man’s senses. RK indicates no differently. We do not see RK’s god, we do not hear it, touch it, taste it, and thank goodness we do not smell it. If it were the case that RK did think his god were accessible to our sense organs, he would not need to make appeals to the so-called “sensus divinitatus,” which he describes as an “internal ‘sense’” through which he claims (along with everyone else) to have awareness of his god somehow. In fact, however, even though he claims to be in possession of this mystical faculty through which he receives transmissions from the divine, RK acknowledges that he really gets his information about his god from a storybook. In a response to a question from LeBlanc, RK stated:

Scripture states that God is good, that He is Almighty, that He is a God of order, not confusion, and that He knows even the thoughts of men (as well as the entirety of His creation) when He “knows all things”. The Created order attests to these things as well, in a lesser, and more inferential way.

Here RK confirms my point that the alleged truth of his “axioms” is not perceptually self-evident, for not only does he need to learn what he “knows” about his god by reading from a storybook, when it comes to learning about his god from what it allegedly made (e.g., the natural world), he must still rely on inference. Knowledge that is inferred is not perceptually self-evident. Genuine axioms are not inferred from prior truths or from facts which we discover through perception; on the contrary, axioms identify facts which are themselves perceptually self-evident. So RK’s “axioms” fail this criterion of what an axiom should be.

4) Undeniably True: The truth of an axiom must be undeniable. Specifically, it should be obvious that the truth of an axiom must obtain in order for one to deny it, dispute it, evade it, or simply wish it were otherwise. Thus, to deny an axiom (a real axiom) results in immediate contradiction. There’s certainly no obvious contradiction between having knowledge of the world and denying the existence of RK’s god. There is no obvious contradiction between having awareness of objects which exist in the world and concluding that god-belief (including RK’s) is irrational. In fact, in order to “know” RK’s god, we need to imagine it behind everything we know about the world – as Van Til puts it:

Looking about me I see both order and disorder in every dimension of life. But I look at both of them in the light of the Great Orderer Who is back of them. (Why I Believe in God, emphasis added)

Van Til makes it clear here that he must actively imagine his god existing “back of” everything he perceives and experiences in the world. Nothing in reality requires us to do this, even the fact that some people have adopted Van Til’s habit of imagining his invisible god lurking behind the scenes everywhere as a result of their confessional investment. Consequently, since the imaginary is not real, there can be no contradiction whatsoever between having knowledge of what is genuinely real and denying the alleged “truth” of what some people can only imagine. Thus RK’s “axioms” fail to meet this requirement of what an axiom must be.

5) Universal: To qualify as an axiom, a statement must, in addition to the above criteria, identify a truth which is universal. To test this, we must ask whether its truth is implicit in all perception and throughout the sum of our knowledge. Rk’s “axioms” are not implicit in all perception and throughout our knowledge. When we perceive a rock, a tree, or a skyscraper, we are not perceiving something which is supernatural, infinite, non-physical, transcendent, etc. When we identify these objects and integrate them into the sum of our knowledge, there is nothing implicitly supernatural, infinite, non-physical or transcendent about them. Even if RK wanted to claim that we can infer an origin to these objects which is allegedly supernatural, infinite, non-physical or transcendent, this would not make his proposed axioms universal in their scope of reference. RK’s god and its revelation, to which his proposed axioms refer, could at best be specific things, and consequently statements denoting their alleged reality could at best be considered specific truths - i.e., truths pertaining to specific things, not truths which pertain universally, i.e., which apply to everything which exists.

Curiously, Greg Bahnsen affirms that specific “truths” such as RK proposes in his “axioms” are philosophically insufficient to render one’s experience intelligible. He writes:

if one does not begin with some such general truths (universal) with which to understand the particular observations in one’s experience, those factual particulars would be unrelated and uninterpretable – i.e., “brute.” (Van Til’s Apologetic: Readings & Analysis, p. 38n.10)

Since RK begins with specific suppositions rather than universal truths, the “factual particulars” of RK’s experience must, according to Bahnsen, be “unrelated and uninterpretable – i.e., ‘brute’.” This means that RK’s proposed axioms are at odds with presuppositionalism’s own stated position (for how could Greg Bahnsen be wrong?). Moreover, statements which Bahnsen makes in his thick tome (cf. p. 466) suggest that the celebrated popularizer had a low opinion of axioms, chiding his mentor’s rival Gordon Clark for affirming “unprovable” axioms which are thereby “dogmatically posited” and consequently leading Clark to “a fideistic stance that precludes the apologist from offering the unbeliever rational grounds for believing the Christian’s presupposition.” Of course, there are no “rational grounds for believing the Christian’s presupposition,” and RK’s designation of his two statements as “axiomatic, interrelated foundations” of his epistemology is consistent with this. By calling them “axioms,” RK concedes that he does not establish their supposed truth by argument. Since they are proposed as axioms, they must be accepted at face value, without the benefit of informing concepts or supporting argument, essentially for no reason at all.

By affirming the statements he proposes as “axioms,” RK undermines the credibility of the position he seeks to defend with respect to identifying the proper basis of knowledge. His proposed “axioms” fail to meet each of the requirements of a legitimate axiom, and thus prove insufficient to serve as the basis of knowledge.

It must be borne in mind that the task of axioms is to anchor all of one’s knowledge to reality. RK and other presuppositionalists speak of “grounding” knowledge. But grounding it to what? They will say that their worldview’s foundations ground knowledge to “Truth. But it cannot do this reliably if their worldview blurs the fundamental distinction between reality and imagination. Moroever, their foundations are to be rejected if they depend on confusing the imaginary with reality, as we have seen.

The opposite of anchoring knowledge to reality is allowing the mind to detach its contents from what is real and consequently confusing the arbitrary with the real, thus treating the arbitrary as a substitute for the real. The Christian worldview invites such confusion by failing to address the question of the proper relationship between the subject of consciousness and its objects. By failing to address this question, a question which pertains to the most fundamental relationship in all philosophy, a relationship which is present in all philosophical inquiry, the Christian worldview fails to equip its adherents with the cognitive equipment needed for identifying the very basic distinction between the real and the imaginary. Consequently, by blurring this fundamental distinction, the believer is philosophically disabled when it comes to the task of discriminating the imaginary from the real, the subjective from the objective, the arbitrary from the factual.


The Objectivist Axioms

To correct this misuse of one’s own mind, an individual needs to grasp the distinction between the activity of his consciousness and the objects of his consciousness explicitly. The Objectivist axioms of ‘existence’, ‘consciousness’ and ‘identity’ empower a mind to do just this. Moreover, the Objectivist axioms meet each of the criteria identified above.

1. Objective: The Objectivist axioms are objective because they identify facts which obtain independent of anyone’s knowledge, preferences, evasions, imagination, wishes, fits or tantrums. The concept ‘existence’ denotes everything which exists, including everything one perceives as well as the faculty by which he perceives. The units of the concept ‘existence’ exist independent of any individual’s conscious activity. The concept ‘consciousness’ denotes the faculty which perceives, and this faculty exists even if one denies it, prefers that it did not exist, seeks to evade it, imagines that it does not exist, wishes otherwise, etc. To deny, prefer, seek, imagine and wish are all activities of consciousness. So consciousness would be a precondition to these actions. The concept ‘identity’ denotes the nature of anything which exists, including both the subject as well as the objects of consciousness. To exist is to be something, to be something specific, to have identity. A thing (including one’s own consciousness) has identity independent of anyone’s awareness, knowledge, wishes, preferences, imagination, desires, etc. A tree’s nature qua tree does not change even if one wishes it were a fireplace, or imagines that it does not need to be felled in order to be turned into firewood.

2. Conceptually Irreducible: The concepts of ‘existence’, ‘consciousness’ and ‘identity’ are conceptually irreducible. They are not defined in terms of prior concepts. What prior concepts could possibly inform them meaningfully, and to what would those concepts refer? Since concepts are the mind’s means of identifying things which exists, the facts which the axioms of existence, consciousness and identity denote are already implicit in the very act of identifying anything. To identify something genetically presupposes that at least something exists (e.g., a subject and any objects of which it is aware), that one is aware of what he is trying to identify (even if his identification is incorrect), and that the thing which he is trying to identify has an identity which can be identified, i.e., that it is distinct from anything else in his awareness. So any act of consciousness implies the validity of these concepts, and any attempt to define these concepts by means of more fundamental concepts would require that these prior concepts be formed by a conscious process of identifying things which exist. But this would be cognitively redundant.

3. Perceptually Self-evident: The concepts of ‘existence’ and ‘identity’ denote facts which are perceptually self-evident, and the concept ‘consciousness’ denotes the faculty which perceives. The concept ‘existence’ is the widest of all concepts, in that it includes everything that exists. Epistemologically, this begins with the objects which we directly perceive, and in this way the concept ‘existence’ denotes a perceptually self-evident fact. When you see a tree, for instance, you do not need to construct a proof to demonstrate that it actually exists; you see it directly, you are aware of it as an existent through immediate, firsthand means. The concept ‘existence’ includes the tree which you see with your own eyes, as well as all other trees which exist, have existed, and will exist. It is that wide in its scope of reference. Even if the believer claims that his god is a “concrete universal,” as Van Til did in regard to the god he worshipped, he would still have to concede that the concept ‘existence’ is wider than his “concrete universal,” for on his view the concept ‘existence’ would have to include everything distinct from his god as well as his god. Moreover, since there are no degrees of existence (where one thing exists “more” or “less” than something else), since something either exists, or it does not, there is no justification for pitting one kind of existence against another (e.g., “immaterial existence” vs. “material existence,” or “absolute existence” vs. “contingent existence”) at the fundamental level of an axiom. Additionally, since identity is concurrent with existence (to exist is to be something), when we perceive an object, we perceive it as distinct from other objects which we perceive. In this way, the concept ‘identity’ denotes a perceptually self-evident fact. And although we do not perceive our conscious activity with our senses, we are aware of it directly through introspection, and since we need consciousness in order to perceive anything, it comes along for the ride.

4. Undeniably True: The axioms of existence, identity and consciousness are also undeniably true. Specifically, they have to be true in order for one to question them. Leonard Peikoff presents an elegant illustration, in the form of a mock dialogue in which the defender of these axioms assumes for the sake of argument that they are false, in order to show how they are in fact inescapably true and fundamental, even in an attempt to deny their truth:

A. “Your objection to the self-evident has no validity. There is no such thing as disagreement. People agree about everything.”

B. “That’s absurd. People disagree constantly, about all kinds of things.”

A. “How can they? There’s nothing to disagree about, no subject matter. After all, nothing exists.”

B. “Nonsense. All kinds of things exist. You know that as well as I do.”

A. “That’s one. You must accept the existence axiom even to utter the term ‘disagreement’. But, to continue, I still claim that disagreement is unreal. How can people disagree, since they are unconscious beings who are unable to hold ideas at all?”

B. “Of course people hold ideas. They are conscious beings – you know that.”

A. “There’s another axiom. But even so, why is disagreement about ideas a problem? Why should it suggest that one or more of the parties is mistaken? Perhaps all of the people who disagree about the very same point are equally, objectively right?”

B. “That’s impossible. If two ideas contradict each other, they can’t both be right. Contradictions can’t exist in reality. After all, things are what they are. A is A.” (Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, pp. 9-10)

So contrary to what detractors of Objectivism’s foundations intend, their denials of the axioms only confirm their truth, since they would need to be true in order for them even to contemplate denying them. Even though this kind of reaction is common among Objectivism’s detractors, my question is: Why would someone deny truths which are so obviously true, all the while carrying on as if they were concerned for defending something they call “the Truth”?

5. Universal: Lastly, note that, unlike RK’s proposed axioms, the axioms of existence, identity and consciousness are universal. This should be most evident in the case of the axiom of existence. The concept ‘existence’ is the widest of all concepts in that it includes everything which exists. We do not need to know all the objects which it includes, since conceptual awareness does not require omniscience (in fact, it presupposes non-omniscience). The universality of concepts is their open-endedness, which allows the mind to include new units into their scope of reference as they are discovered. When a child first forms the concept ‘ball’, for instance, he does not know how many balls are in existence, nor does he know all the variations in which balls can come. But as he goes through life and discovers new specimens and types of balls, the concept ‘ball’ allows him to include them as additional units which the concept subsumes. Similarly with the concept ‘existence’: its open-endedness allows us to include every entity, attribute, action, relationship, etc., which we find in our experience. Moreover, since, as we saw above, identity is concurrent with existence, the same applies to the axiom of identity. This is precisely why the traditional formulation of the law of identity is given as: A is A. The symbol “A” can stand for anything in existence; it does not specify anything other than that it exists (or, in the case of hypothetical or fictional referents, that it is conceivable).

While the concept ‘consciousness’ is not as wide a concept as the concept ‘existence’, the axiom of consciousness is universal in the sense that it applies throughout all of one’s thoughts, desires, judgments, inferences, emotions, etc. In short, consciousness is universal to our experience. Every time we see a tree, we are engaged in an activity of consciousness. Every time we listen to speech or music, we are engaged in an activity of consciousness. Whenever we think, we are making use of our consciousness. Every time we introspect, we are adding new units to the concept ‘consciousness’, since what we are focusing our awareness on are new actions of consciousness. It is in this way that the axiom of consciousness is universal.


Review

The upshot is that RK’s axioms do not meet the criteria of objective axioms, and thus fail to meet the task of providing objective grounding for knowledge. Moreoever, RK’s proposed axioms assume the truth of the Objectivist axioms, thus making use of their truth while simultaneously affirming that “every possible foundation for every way of thinking not in accordance with [the Christian god’s] perfect ordinance is utter, absolute folly.” Since RK’s position actually depends on the truth of the Objectivist axioms, one can legitimately note that RK’s position “borrows” from Objectivism, even though RK himself has stated that “any worldview attempting to argue from other than the Christian foundation is, in fact, borrowing from that foundation to do so.” Objectivism does not argue from “the Christian foundation,” or from the assumption of the metaphysical primacy of consciousness which the Christian worldview assumes. So while it can truly be stated that Objectivism does not borrow from Christianity to establish its philosophical foundations, the same cannot be said on behalf of Christianity. The very notion of a god would not be possible without the truth of the Objectivist axioms, but Christianity’s foundations deny the truth of the Objectivist axioms while making use of them. RK charges non-Christian worldviews of the very sin his own worldview commits.

RK’s “axiomatic… foundations” are actually a mask which he dons so that he can avoid identifying what his actual foundations are. His actual foundations are emotional in nature, as the bible itself admits (cf. Proverbs 1:7). RK claims that the foundation of his reason and knowledge is the Christian worldview. But what is the foundation of the Christian worldview? It is not “God exists” or “the Scriptures are the self-revelation of God,” as these are teachings of that worldview. The question I’m asking is: What is the foundation of the Christian worldview? To discover this, we need to understand the orientation between subject and object in the subject-object relationship assumed by the Christian worldview, for the question of the relationship between a subject and its objects is unavoidable throughout philosophy, including especially in epistemology. The fundamental teachings of the Christian worldview tell us what that orientation between subject and object they assume, so long as one knows what to look for.

It is here, in Christianity’s foundations, where we will find, endemic throughout all its teachings, the primacy of consciousness.

For further support on these points, I direct the reader to the following resources:

The Axioms and the Primacy of Existence
Theism and Its Piggyback Starting Point
Reveling in Reversals
A Reply to Tennant on Theistic Foundationalism vs. The Objectivist Axioms

The Proper Alternative to Christianity

Given the above points, both those identifying the failings of RK’s “axioms” as the proper foundations of knowledge as well those validating the Objectivist axioms as the proper basis for human cognition, I can say that, if I were called to identify the proper basis of knowledge, I would point to the following facts as the necessary preconditions of knowledge:

1) The fact that existence exists: This identifies the realm of objects which inform our knowledge, answering the question: knowledge of what?

2) The fact that consciousness is consciousness of objects: This identifies the faculty of awareness possessed by the knower, providing the meta-answer to the question: How do you know? The subject knows, and what he knows are the objects of his knowledge. Consciousness gives the knowing subject cognitive access to what he can know.

3) The fact existence is identity: This is the baseline recognition by a consciousness that an object is itself, that A is A, not something other than itself.

4) The fact that existence has metaphysical primacy: This is a baseline recognition that an object of consciousness exists as itself independent of conscious activity.

5) The fact that knowledge depends on concept-formation: This is the ability to form concepts on the basis of objects perceived by the subject. The method of how the mind forms concepts is explained by a theory of concepts.

There you go. These facts are fundamental, and should be identified explicitly in any discussion of the foundations of knowledge. Moreover, they must be assumed to be denied or disputed, and they are presupposed even by erroneous positions (such as RK’s “axioms”). Of course, we cannot say, when discussing a topic as important as the foundations of knowledge, that these points all go without saying. The “Yeah, that goes without saying” response to their explicit identification would only demonstrate an individual’s unpreparedness to discuss epistemology intelligently and credibly. Such a response only indicates that one is taking fundamentals for granted, without understanding the importance of identifying those fundamentals explicitly. It may even indicate that the person offering such a response is trying to hide something.

Not surprisingly, RK nowhere identifies these points as the preconditions of knowledge, as the foundations of a rational epistemology. Why? It is true that they are involved whether he acknowledges them or not. So why does he not acknowledge them? And is he aware that what he does identify as his axioms in place of these can only blur his understanding of these facts?

The primacy of consciousness in metaphysics leads to mysticism in epistemology (e.g., faith in revelations), self-sacrifice in ethics (e.g., Christ’s “work” on the cross, where Christ is considered to be the exemplary model of moral perfection), and collectivism in politics (e.g., we are all “servants” – either to a god or to a devil, we do not belong to ourselves, an invisible magic being “owns” each of us). If one follows RK’s “axioms” to their logical conclusions in philosophy, don’t be surprised when you come to these positions.

by Dawson Bethrick

RazorsKiss on the Christian God as the Basis of Knowledge - Part 1: Overview of RK's Epistemology

Recently there was a debate between presuppositional apologist “RazorsKiss” and non-Christian Mitch LeBlanc on the topic “Is the Triune God of the Scriptures the Basis for Knowledge?” A transcript of the debate is available here.

Mitch LeBlanc himself brought his debate with RazorsKiss to my attention, and he and I have carried on a lengthy discussion of the debate, particularly RazorsKiss’ statements, via electronic correspondence.

While I do not know what RazorsKiss’ real name is, I do know that he is part of the team over at the Choosing Hats blog. Choosing Hats, as some of you may recall, is the home of Chris Bolt, with whom I have on several occasions, with limited success, attempted to have a dialogue (see for instance here and here). RazorsKiss also has his own blog, and has posted a transcript of his debate with LeBlanc here. This version of the transcript also includes a question and answer section following the debate, which is interesting to read.

Interestingly, on RazorsKiss’ own blog, there is a list of links to non-Christian internet sites, including my blog. The section including these links is labeled with a “content warning,” which advises readers to “read at your own risk.” I’m not sure whether to be amused or flattered, but I admit I’m a bit of both.


RazorsKiss’ Opening Concerns

Presumably because RazorsKiss (“RK” hereafter) is a Christian and believes that the Christian god has something to do with the foundations of knowledge, he chose to defend the affirmative position in response to the question on the floor, “Is the Triune God of the Scriptures the Basis for Knowledge?” Mitch LeBlanc took up the negative.

In reviewing RK’s opening statement, I was reminded of Greg Bahnsen’s opening statement in his celebrated debate with Gordon Stein, in that, like Bahnsen, RK seems to present no argument at all for his position. Rather, like Bahnsen, RK prefers simply to repeat what his position affirms without providing any rationale for supposing any of it is true. In this way RK presents in his opening statement little more than a lengthy description of what his position advocates, with no case defending the claim that what he describes is true.

RK divides his opening statement into four subtitled sections:

1) Introduction

2) Epistemology

3) Proper Epistemology

4) The Impossibility of the Contrary

In the beginning of his opening statement, RK expresses concerns about issues which do not seem at all germane to a defense of an intellectual position, such as his compulsion as a Christian to be humble, to avoid pride and to resist looking down on others, accusations of arrogance from others, etc. In the same breath, he expresses an attitude which is hard to distinguish from “I’m right and everyone else is wrong” when he states:

if I am correct, there is a fundamental problem with the way the entire world thinks about the basis for their own knowledge… I claim to have a basis for my knowledge which is utterly higher, and transcendentally greater than I, or any other human being can ever hope to be.

So RK’s expectations to be accused of arrogance are understandable.

RK also announces that, on his view, everyone is “owned” by his god. Note how RK segues into this from his expressed worries about being charged with arrogance:

It is conceivable I suppose, to call a perfect Being arrogant for claiming to be your Creator; to own you and the dust of the earth man was formed from It is another thing to assert that His claim to ownership is unwarranted. If what I say is true - God owns you. He owns me. He owns every particle of matter, every joule of energy; established every law we think in accordance with, and ordained every law which governs the world we exist in, at His good pleasure.

So not only is every human being a piece of property belonging to RK’s invisible magic being, everything else is too, and whatever happens in the world originates from its “good pleasure.” Apparently RK’s god finds “good pleasure” in destructive earthquakes, tsunamis which level entire cities, babies being miscarried or aborted, the rise of dictators and the path of blood they carve into human communities, cancer, traffic accidents, etc. Since it owns all of us, RK’s god can do whatever it wants with us. And since it couldn’t possibly need us, it finds “good pleasure” in sending threats against our values.

RK has elected to defend the view that human knowledge finds its proper basis in such a being.


What RazorsKiss Hoped to Accomplish

In his opening statement, RK emphasizes the exclusivity of Christianity. For instance, he claims that

every possible foundation for every way of thinking not in accordance with [the Christian god’s] perfect ordinance is utter, absolute folly

It is easy to make such assertions. As they say, “talk is cheap.” But fortunately RK gives us an indication of what he hopes to accomplish in his debate with LeBlanc:

My intent Is to demonstrate that there is no other epistemological basis that can possibly compare to that possessed by a Christian holding the self-revelation of the Triune God. My goal is to show that my that any worldview attempting to argue from other than the Christian foundation is, in fact, borrowing from that foundation to do so. That any worldview asserting some sort of “objective” basis for the laws of logic specifically, but for nature and morality as well – is pure subjectivism wrapped up in an objective shell consisting of concepts stolen from their Creator.

By “concepts stolen from their Creator,” RK indicates what he means:

Concepts like universals. Universals which are abstract, binding, have inherent meaning, and apply to every person – whether they like them to, or WANT them to or not. They apply nonetheless.

Note here that RazorsKiss is not only drawing attention to the topic of concepts – in which case I would expect to find in his defense of the claim that the Christian god is the proper basis of knowledge, some indication of what his theory of concepts may be – but also what is clearly an expression of the primacy of existence – that something is the case independent of what anyone likes or wants. All of this is most interesting to me, especially coming from a Christian, since Christianity has no theory of concepts (see here), and its metaphysical foundations are entirely incompatible with the primacy of existence (see here). If anyone were to dispute this last point, let us ask: Would RK affirm that universals apply to a person if his god did not want them to? I very much doubt it.


Telltale Statements

A number of statements which RK makes throughout the course of his opening statement can be classed into three distinct categories. For instance, RK makes several universally negative statements about non-Christians without any argumentative back-up to support them, such as:

- “[non-Christians] do not have a justification for their beliefs”

- “An unbelieving man has no justification for his predication.”

- “He has no basis for his use of logical laws.”

- “There is no area in which [a non-Christian’s] thoughts, ideas or concepts can be said to be properly grounded.”

RK clearly has a low opinion of non-Christians, especially in regard to their understanding of things pertaining to knowledge. Again, RK takes the attitude that he is right and everyone else is wrong. If RK could support this position by validating the kinds of claims he makes in a credible manner, this might be forgivable. Unfortunately, what we find is that these statements are affirmed as if by fiat, in the manner of someone who expects reality to conform to his pronouncements.

Next, RK makes several autobiographical statements which tellingly expose his own ignorance on certain key matters. For instance:

- “I have yet to see an epistemological basis which accounts for universals in any
satisfying manner.”

- “The fundamental disconnect I see in secular epistemology (and Christians who use that same epistemology) is the universal lack of a solution from unbelieving philosophy for problems like that of induction, the one and the many, whether the will is free, and the like.”

- “If the unbeliever thinks he is the ultimate, not simply the immediate basis for epistemology - I see no possible way for that assertion to be justified.”

Statements like these tell us what RK does not know, and/or where he’s not been looking. Specifically, they indicate a lack of familiarity with his subject matter, which includes the content of non-Christian teachings on epistemology. Is RK suggesting that, since he has “yet to see an epistemological basis which accounts for universals in any satisfying manner,” that there isn’t one? Of course, this does not follow. What does he mean by “satisfying manner”? He does not explain this. But what he does imply by such statements is that Christianity does provide “an epistemological basis which accounts for universals in [a] satisfying manner.” Again, this tells us about RK, not about the quality of such “accounts.” For all we know, "satisfying manner" for RK may be any treatment on the issue in question which plays to his confessional investment in the Christian god-belief program. Thus any treatment which does not do this would automatically be dismissed as "unsatisfying." So long as the "account" ultimately says "God did it," it has a chance of meeting the grade. Without this, it dies on the vine.

As for the claim that there exists in secular epistemology a “universal lack of a solution from unbelieving [i.e., non-Christian] philosophy for problems like that of induction, the one and the many, whether the will is free, and the like,” again RK simply announces his own ignorance. Where is RK’s refutation of David Kelley’s solution to the problem of induction, or Ayn Rand’s theories of concepts and volition? Indeed, I have seen no evidence that he has any familiarity with these to begin with, let alone that he may be prepared to enumerate their presupposed deficiencies.

As for the final statement about the “unbeliever” thinking himself as “the ultimate…. basis for epistemology,” it’s not even clear what this is supposed to mean (similar statements in the presuppositionalist literature tend to be just as vague), or what exactly RK thinks is wrong with such suppositions (unless it’s just that he “see[s] no possible way for that assertion to be justified,” which again only tells us about RK). Presumably RK would say that his god is justified in thinking itself as "the ultimate... basis for epistemology," though this strikes me as utterly incoherent since said god is supposed to be omniscient and infallible, thus having no need for epistemology in the first place. (I'll develop on this point further below.) This would mean that, in principle, RK could have no beef with a person supposing itself as the "ultimate... basis for epistemology," he just wants to be able to say which persons are justified in this, and which persons are not. Of course, there is nothing to stop someone from imagining a god and claiming that it is "the ultimate... basis for epistemology" (however this is taken to mean) and consequently denying this role to any human being.

Lastly, RK makes a series of worldview claims which his readers are apparently expected to accept as truth on his say so (since they are presented without any support whatsoever):

- ”God owns you. He owns me. He owns every particle of matter, every joule of energy; established every law we think in accordance with, and ordained every law which governs the world we exist in, at His good pleasure.”

- “I have a Guarantor which is self-existent, self-sufficient, able to communicate, omnipotent, omniscient, immutable, and sovereign.”

- “I can say, with perfect certainty, that the Triune God of Scripture is not only the proper grounds for all knowledge – but the only possible grounds for all knowledge!”

- “there are no brute facts. Facts are not neutral entities, and they cannot be interpreted in a neutral fashion. This is because facts can only exist in relation to other facts;”

- “There is self-existence, which then guarantees all contingent existence.”

- “ There is omnipotence, which can guarantee the absolute authority of God over all His creation, including willing and thinking creatures.”

- “ There is the omniscience and self-knowledge of God, which guarantees that what His creatures can know is intelligible - that creatures can, in fact, derivatively know the facts about His creation, and those facts that He reveals about Himself.”

- “ There is the internal ‘sense’, that Calvin calls the ‘sensus divinitatus’, which all men possess, as image-bearers of their Creator - and which allow them to recognize the God that they even sometimes deny.”

- “Can someone without the axioms that Christians hold ‘know’ anything? As defined, no. They can’t.”

- “What the Christian position alone can guarantee is any contribution to knowledge whatsoever.”

- “What my claim really entails is that an unbeliever, trying to start from a position of epistemic autonomy, is like a child who sits on his father’s lap - and uses that position for the purpose of slapping his father in the face.”

- “Christianity has an answer for [the problems of induction, universals, free will, etc.] - provided the Christian answers them from Scriptural revelation, and does not adopt the same principles that unbelieving philosophy does.”

- “Since it is impossible to have knowledge on any other basis, save that of God’s intrinsic nature and self-communication of the properties of that nature - it is impossible for any human system of reasoning to have justification at all.”

- “Christianity’s epistemology is the only epistemology possible - because it’s impossible to have any other coherent, true, and justified basis for thought, perception, knowledge, or understanding of ourselves, or the creation in which we dwell.”

I read all of RK’s statement several times and pored over it looking specifically for how he might support any of these claims, but I found nothing which does support them. Of course, in regard to this last batch of statements, RK does make an effort in his opening statement to preempt the assessment that we are expected to accept these claims on his own say so. Specifically, in his Introduction RK states:

I have heard the claim to “arrogance” before. If I ever state something on my own behalf, I will grant that such an accusation is justified. Should I comport myself rudely, as if I am superior, or as if I think myself to be who I am because I am somehow higher - I request that you point this out. However, as a creature - I claim to have a basis for my knowledge which is utterly higher, and transcendently greater than I, or any other human being can ever hope to be… Since my claim is not based on myself, but upon a self-revelation from the Triune God described in Scripture - the claim in this case is on the behalf of another.

But given his worldview’s appeal to an invisible magic being which is accessible to the human mind exclusively by means of imagination, RK is on safe ground here. For he will always be able to say that whatever he affirms is not on his own behalf, but on behalf of an invisible magic being which is evidently unable to appear before all who are present and speak on its own behalf. If ever there were a formula for evading responsibility for the things one says, RK has cornered the market. In the question and answer section following his debate with LeBlanc, RK states, “God is who works in me, and through me.” Of course, anyone imagining that an invisible magic being operates behind the scenes of the things we perceive in reality, would be able to make claims such as this. RK gives us no reason to suppose that what he is talking about when he points to his god is anything other than imaginary.


What RK Does Not Address

Since RK seeks to defend the claim that the Christian god is the proper basis for knowledge, I was hoping to find some discussion in his defense of this thesis regarding the means by which knowledge is acquired and validated, that is, the how of epistemology. Since presuppositionalists in general make it no secret that they think their god is the source of all knowledge, that the content of “revelation” is the what of epistemology, what they should focus their attention is on how man acquires knowledge, and how their proposed method of acquiring knowledge (if there is one) coheres with their god-belief claims. Unfortunately, I found that RK’s discussion of epistemology was limited to his concern for what he considers the proper basis of knowledge as well as the exclusivity of Christianity’s approach to knowledge, with no mention of anything substantive in regard to the means or method by which one acquires knowledge. So far as epistemology is concerned, this is a glaring oversight. He does speak of “justification” of knowledge, but even here he does not outline any process by which his epistemology recommends that we go about justifying what we believe to be knowledge, so he provides nothing to be evaluated on this matter as well. Besides, one cannot undertake the task of justifying knowledge without understanding how that knowledge is acquired in the first place. The how of epistemology seems not to concern RK at all.

Then again, presuppositional apologist John Frame makes a most telling admission on this very point when he writes:

How is it that people come to believe a Word from God which contradicts all their other normal means of knowledge? How did Abraham come to know that the voice calling him to sacrifice his son (Gen. 22:1-18; cf. Heb. 11:17-19; James 2:21-24) was the voice of God? What the voice told him to do was contrary to fatherly instincts, normal ethical considerations, and even, apparently, contrary to other Words of God (Gen. 9:6). But he obeyed the voice and was blessed. Closer to our own experience: how is it that people come to believe in Jesus even though they have not, like Thomas, seen Jesus’ signs and wonders (John 20:29)? …I cannot explain the psychology here to the satisfaction of very many. In this case as in others (for we walk by faith, not by sight!) we may have to accept the fact even without an explanation of the fact. Somehow, God manages to get his Word across to us, despite the logical and psychological barriers. Without explaining how it works, Scripture describes in various ways a “supernatural factor” in divine-human communication. (a) It speaks of the power of the Word. The Word created all things (Gen. 1:3, etc.; Ps. 33:3-6; John 1:3) and directs the course of nature and history (Pss. 46:6; 148:5-8). What God says will surely come to pass (Isa. 55:11; Gen. 18:149; Deut. 18:21ff.). The gospel is “the power of God unto salvation” (Rom. 1:16; cf. Isa. 6:9-10; Luke 7:7ff.; Heb. 4:12). (b) Scripture also speaks of the personal power of the Holy Spirit operating with the Word (John 3:5; 1 Cor. 2:4,12ff.; 2 Cor. 3:15-18; 1 Thess. 1:5). Mysterious though the process may be, somehow God illumines the human mind to discern the divine source of the Word. We know without knowing how we know. (Presuppositional Apologetics: An Introduction, Part 1)

So for Frame, the process of epistemology (at least so far as it concerns the believer’s “knowledge” of the divine) is “mysterious.” I’m not sure how well this bodes well with RK, who in his opening statement specifically expressed disagreement with the “tendency to make [things like epistemology] mysterious – to make it something only the initiated can truly understand.” Why, then, does Frame, when addressing the question of how one has knowledge of a supernatural being which Christians call “God,” throws his hands up and confesses, “We know without knowing how we know”? While it is hard to square RK’s concern to keep epistemological matters comprehensible, that he may privately agree with Frame’s position on this matter would explain why the how of epistemology garners no mention from him in his defense of the view that the Christian god is the proper basis of knowledge.


A Fundamental Disconnect

In the second section of his opening statement, subtitled “Epistemology,” RK acknowledges that epistemology is the branch of philosophy which addresses questions such as

Why do we know what we know? How do we know? How is this knowledge acquired? What is this knowledge? On what basis do we know it? By what standard? On what (or whose) authority? Those questions are the realm of our discussion.

And RK is correct: it is these kinds of questions which epistemology is supposed to address, specifically what knowledge is, and how is it acquired and validated. Unfortunately, as mentioned above, when RK gets to a point where he starts talking about his theistic epistemology, he seems preoccupied with aligning knowledge as such with his god-belief as its proper ground and authoritative basis, and says essentially nothing about the method by which knowledge is acquired and validated. Since he acknowledges that “those questions are the realm of our discussion,” I found this oversight rather disappointing. If the Christian god is considered to be the proper ground and standard of knowledge, by what means does one acquire and validate knowledge? Since, as we will see, RK claims that knowledge is based specifically on axioms which clearly assume the existence of the Christian god, his knowledge of his god must somehow be immediate, such as when the rest of us (in the real world) see a tree or speeding car. But how? That’s what I want to know.

This question has vital importance, for just in considering it we should be aware of a fundamental disconnect on the part of the Christian position which RK seeks to defend. Claiming that the Christian god is the ground and standard of knowledge suggests that the Christian god’s own cognition in one way or another serves as the model for human cognition, that there is an analogous relationship between man’s knowledge and the knowledge allegedly possessed by the Christian god. As Bahnsen puts it,

man’s thinking must follow after or replicate God’s thinking on the level of a creature, thus being ‘analogical’ and recognizing two levels of knowing (original and derivative, absolute and subordinate). (Van Til’s Apologetic: Readings & Analysis, p. 100n.31)

Elsewhere Bahnsen states that

man knows anything he knows (whether the world or God Himself) by thinking ‘analogously’ to God’s thinking” (Ibid., p. 169n.40).

These and similar assumptions are the basis behind Van Til’s infamous dictum that “man thinks God’s thoughts after him” (Van Til, “Nature and Scripture,” p. 278; quoted in Van Til’s Apologetic: Readings & Analysis, p. 225). As Van Til explains:

Since the human mind is created by God and is therefore in itself naturally revelational of God, the mind may be sure that its system is true and corresponds on a finite scale to the system of God. That is what we mean by saying that it is analogical to God’s system. (Introduction to Systematic Theology, p. 181)

Given the fundamental disparity between the nature of man’s mind and that attributed to the Christian god by the Christian worldview, I find this thesis utterly incredible. Man is neither omniscient nor infallible, and must develop his knowledge of reality through his own fallible efforts by applying a method to the data he gathers through his senses (i.e., an operation of his sense organs, which is a biological activity). It is through his senses that man has awareness of objects distinct from himself, and it is of these objects that he seeks to develop his knowledge. His knowledge is thus not automatic, nor is there any guarantee that he will discover any particular fact. On the other hand, however, the Christian god is said to be both omniscient and infallible, possessing all knowledge for all eternity, without error, gap or need of correction, as an inherent part of its alleged existence, not as a product of some procedure it elects to undertake. Its knowledge is not the result of a methodological process which it performs on data it discovers independent of itself through a biological process. Contrary to man’s knowledge, the Christian god’s knowledge would be automatic. It “just knows.” Naturally, anyone could imagine a being which “just knows” everything, and it is no secret that this is what Christians are doing when they claim that their epistemology has such a standard. But in so doing they ignore crucial distinctions which have direct bearing on the nature, method and basis of man’s knowledge. The Christian god’s “knowledge” would be automatic, inalterable and infallible, while man’s knowledge is procedural, developing and open to correction. Given these facts, how can the former at all serve as any kind of standard for the latter? What possible relevance could it have, since regardless of what some invisible magic being may know, man still needs to go through the motions he needs to go through in order to acquire and validate his knowledge? RK certainly does not anticipate this question, even though it is wholly relevant to the position he advocates.

But the fundamental distinctions do not stop there. There is also the issue of the orientation between the respective subjects of knowledge and the objects of knowledge which needs to be taken into account. In the case of man, the orientation between subject and object is known as the objective orientation. This means that the objects of man’s consciousness exist and are what they are independent of his conscious activity. For instance, the flower that a man sees is the kind of flower it is, has the number of petals it has, and is located where it is, regardless of whether he perceives it, identifies it as a flower or as a motor vehicle, likes it, wishes it were someplace else, etc. His conscious activity has no causal bearing on the flower’s identity qua flower. This is the primacy of existence principle, the very basis of the concept of objectivity. It is on the basis of this principle that we can affirm such truths as wishing doesn’t make it so and believing a claim will not make it true.

But this is not the orientation between subject and object which the Christian god, as described by the Christian worldview, is thought to have with respect to the objects of its alleged knowledge. The orientation between subject and object which the Christian god is supposed to enjoy is the subjective orientation. Unlike the relationship between man’s consciousness and its objects, the relationship between the Christian god’s consciousness and its objects is characterized by the primacy of consciousness. In this case, the subject holds metaphysical primacy over its objects. That is, the objects of the Christian god’s consciousness are what the Christian god chooses them to be. Their existence, nature and capacity for action are dependent on the Christian god’s conscious activity. Christian apologist Mike Warren made this crystal clear when he wrote the following:

In knowing a flower, for example, God knows everything about the flower. Humans can have that flower as an object of their knowledge as well, so there is a similarity in the knowledge; but a difference is that humans cannot know the flower exhaustively. Not only is there a quantitative difference between divine and human knowledge of the flower, but there are qualitative differences. God knows the flower originally. Everything about the flower originates from His own consciousness. Indeed, God's thinking about the flower makes it so. In contrast, humans know the flower as something originating external to them. Their thinking about the flower does not make it so. Human knowledge claims about the flower can be incorrect, unlike God's perfect knowledge. (Post to the Van Til List dated February 26, 2004, quoted in Confessions of a Vantillian Subjectivist; italics added)

The orientation assumed here between subject and object in the case of the Christian god’s consciousness is precisely the opposite of that belonging to man. While the objective orientation identifies the proper relationship between the subject of man’s consciousness and any object of his awareness, theism is inherently characterized by a fundamental subjectivism. The influence of theism’s inherent subjectivism has a direct bearing on epistemology, as Bahnsen unwittingly acknowledges:

In God’s thinking, there are no facts that are newly discovered or contingent (or, as Van Til sometimes put it earlier in his career, God’s knowledge is exclusively analytical, not synthetical). This is because God is the Creator of all facts, and the facts are what they are in terms of God’s sovereign plan; thus, to know anything “outside” Himself, God need only “analyze” or consult his own mind. (Van Til’s Apologetic: Readings & Analysis, p. 165n.33)

For the Christian god, wishing does make it so. And unlike man, who must discover facts which exist independent of his conscious activity and conform his knowledge of them to their nature by applying an objective method, the Christian god creates facts out of the exercise of its own will. To put it succinctly, for man (i.e., in reality) facts are objective (since they are what they are independent of man’s conscious activity), but for the Christian god (i.e., in the believer’s imagination) facts are subjective, (since they are what the Christian god wants them to be). Consequently, to claim that man’s knowledge finds its basis in the Christian god is to affirm that objectivity is grounded in subjectivism. But this is absurd.

So to go back to Van Til’s claim above, let us ask:

What “correspondence” could a mind geared with the objective orientation between itself as a subject and any objects it perceives or considers, have to a mind which enjoys precisely the opposite orientation between itself and anything distinct from it?

Of course, Van Til does not consider the issue from the perspective of the proper orientation between a subject and its objects, and from what I have seen, neither do any of his followers. Thus, given the implications which I have brought out here, it is not surprising that RK considers none of these distinctions in his comments about epistemology, even though it is undeniable that such distinctions would bear on those questions which he himself has raised.


The "Sensus Divinitatus"

Unfortunately for RK, however, since his worldview affirms a subjective basis for all knowledge (both in the case of his god’s knowledge as well as man’s), he cuts off from himself any objective means by which he can reliably distinguish between what is real and what he may merely be imagining. This failure to make such a critical distinction in human cognition, a distinction which is wholly germane to the matter at hand, brings into question all of RK’s god-belief claims. This includes RK's appeal to the so-called “sensus divinitatus,” to which he refers as an “internal ‘sense’” through which his god presumably guides and communicates to him. The "sensus divinitatus" is associated in Christianity with "the indwelling of the Holy Spirit," and appeals to the "sensus divinitatus" tend to call to mind the notion of "the Force" in the Star Wars epic. It is an imperceptible phenomenon possessing great power with which the believer considers himself positively aligned and which, he claims, guides his thinking, choices and actions. In the post-debate question and answer session, RK describes the workings of this alleged faculty in the following manner:

it’s the equivalent of having the author of the book standing over your shoulder, and correcting your faulty understandings, and continually adjusting your noetic “issues” as He also works to sanctify you in obedience to that revealed Word… It’s not me, it’s God in me… God is who works in me, and through me.

Since RK offers no argument to support his claim that he (and everybody else!) possesses such a faculty, we are presumably supposed to accept his claim that he benefits from such privy guidance courtesy of the supernatural on his say so. But his claim that every human being possesses this “internal ‘sense’” indicates that, if each of us turns the focus of our attention inwards, into the internal workings of our psyche, we should find evidence of the faculty he’s talking about. Curiously, however, if I introspect when reading a book and suppose that its author is standing over my shoulder and guiding my understanding of what I’m reading, I am certainly honest enough to acknowledge that all I am really doing is imagining at this point. If the “sensus divinitatus” has the same look and feel of imagination, RK’s Christianity is in big trouble.

But I expect that Christians like RK would resist this identification. In so doing, of course, they would be implying that they have better knowledge of what’s going on in my psyche than I do (and yet RK wants us to warn him when he’s verging on arrogance). So I have some questions for RK.

Suppose RK thinks he has received input from his god through this faculty he calls “sensus divinitatus.” How does he know it’s not his imagination? What distinguishes the input coming to him through the “sensus divinitatus” from the products of his own imagination? Both are “internal,” and if the “sensus divinitatus” can be referred to as an “internal ‘sense’,” I don’t know why the imagination cannot also. What about deceiving spirits, such as those dispatched by the Christian devil? How would RK distinguish communications he claims to have received from his god through the “sensus divinitatus” from those originating from this nefarious personality? Here’s another question: What kind of content is communicated to the believer by the “sensus divinitatus”? Its source is said to be omniscient, infallible and omnipotent. RK claims "It's not me, it's God in me." Thus he claims that he acquires his knowledge from an omniscient and infallible mind "who works in me, and through me." So presumably it could tell RK what I had for breakfast this morning, or who my boss was in June 1995. Surely his god knows these things. Why would it withhold this information from believers? Wouldn’t the display of such knowledge be an impressive witnessing tool? Or is there some reason why the believer will never have access to this kind of information in spite of having direct lines to an omniscient mind?

We should also ask if the “sensus divinitatus” redundant in any way. Does it only provide knowledge to the believer which he can acquire through other means, such as by reading what Jesus said in Matthew chapter 5, or consulting an Almanac to learn how many people live in Tokyo? Does the “sensus divinitatus” deliver knowledge which could not possibly be accounted for in some other way, whether by imagination, consulting public records, using one’s sense organs, or simply inferring conclusions from data gathered in a mundane manner?

Or does RK expect us just to accept his claim that he and everyone else possesses such a faculty on his own say so and forego such inquiries such that we never learn about how it functions and what is capacities are? RK does understand how it works, does he not? If so, he should be able to explain it. If not, then how can he claim that what he “knows” as a deliverance through such a faculty is at all reliable and sourced in the divine? Unless he can explain how one can reliably distinguish between what he calls the “sensus divinitatus” and what he may merely be imagining, why should we believe it’s the former and not the latter? RK does acknowledge that he has the ability to imagine, does he not?

If I cannot distinguish the “sensus divinitatus” which RK says I have within me, from my own imagination, how does RK distinguish it from his own imagination? Of course it would do him no good to appeal to the “sensus divinitatus” itself to address this question, since if “sensus divinitatus” is in fact his own imagination, he would be appealing to his imagination instead of to a divinely inspired portal of communication from the supernatural. So this would get him nowhere. Besides, it would only perpetuate the mysteriousness of RK’s epistemology insofar as its recommended method of acquiring and validating knowledge is concerned (which is of central importance to epistemology). So again, since RK is capable of imagining things, and people are generally capable of confusing what they imagine with reality, RK needs to address this matter, and he needs to address it seriously, with a detailed explanation of just how one (anyone, since he claims we all possess this elusive faculty) can reliably distinguish it from what may really only be one’s own imagination. Failing this, his case for knowledge finding its basis in the Christian god, since it makes appeal to the "sensus divinitatus," will never get off the ground.

by Dawson Bethrick