Paulianna Apologetics

In spite of the fact that such an effort is self-refuting, Paul again sought to attack the axioms.

Let's review the Objectivist axioms. They are:

(1) Existence exists
(2) An entity is itself (A is A)
(3) Consciousness is consciousness of an object

In response to these axioms, Paul had written:

It’s dubious how these are used as an argument against theism, though. For example, how does the fact that “things exist” even remotely count as an argument against theism?

In response to this, I had written:

What about (1), (2) and (3) did Paul not understand? The axiom 'existence exists' is a starting point. If we begin with the fact that existence exists, then there’s no need to posit something that created existence.

Paul's reply to this began as follows:

First, as Bethrick says, “things exist” tells us nothing of what kind of thing exists. So, according to Bethrick, (1) cannot mean that what exists is “uncreated.”

Paul continues to act as if Objectivism affirmed the axioms in a contextual vacuum, as if cognition came to an abrupt halt with the utterance of "existence exists." I have already pointed out the glaring error in Paul's understanding here. He repeatedly recycled this context-dropping argument throughout his tirade, so I don't mind repeatedly pointing out the error it makes. By trying to make room for his theism, Paul finds it necessary to misrepresent what Objectivism teaches, which should not surprise us. The recognition that things exist is merely an explicit starting point for cognition, but Paul’s point here can only be advanced on the supposition that this fundamental recognition is where cognition stops. Cognition does not stop with the recognition that existence exists, it begins with it. The mind needs a starting point, and it starts with the three-fold recognition that things exist, that one has awareness of things that exist, and that the things it is aware of are what they are independent of the process by which it is aware of them. That's why I asked Paul to explain what he does not understand about the axioms. These recognitions are implicit in any act of perceiving or thinking; Objectivism simply makes them explicit and recognizes their fundamentality to all cognitive endeavors. Any attempt to argue against them would have to assume their truth from the beginning, and thus be self-defeating.

Now consider the concept ‘creation’. This concept is not axiomatic; it assumes prior concepts, so it could never qualify as an axiomatic concept. So even to consider whether existence is created or not, we need additional knowledge beyond that supplied by the axiom of existence. It should be obvious that existence as such was not created, because creation requires a type of causation, and causality presupposes existence. Objectivism recognizes this because it recognizes that knowledge has a hierarchical structure, and that we are not born with knowledge already implanted in our minds. The axioms provide this structure with its bedrock foundations, identifying the fundamental, general context in which that knowledge is available. Existence is the metaphysical precondition for any creative process.

But consider: if existence exists independent of the process by which we are aware of this fact, as Objectivism holds, then obviously existence was not created by that process. When I find a pebble on a trail, pick it up and look at it, preconditional to my ability to find it, pick it up and examine it is the fact that it exists. It would have to exist before I could pick it up and look at it. Also, my awareness of the pebble does not change the pebble in any way; it still is what it was before I looked at it. Nor did my awareness put the pebble there. The pebble, as an object of my cognition, had to come first, before my cognition could have awareness of it as an object. This is the fact that the axioms are recognizing: that the objects of cognition exist and are what they are independent of the processes of cognition, i.e., independent of consciousness.

Is Paul really willing to defend the view that existence was created by the process by which one is aware of existence? What would be the starting point to such a defense? Would his starting point be the position that existence does not exist? He would have to exist in order to advance such a position, so just by endorsing it he would be presenting himself as a counter-example contradicting his starting assumption. If he has another starting assumption, what would it be? To what would it refer? Again, what is Paul really trying to argue here? What is Paul's position, and why is it so difficult for him to identify it?

Paul tried to find another backdoor around the axioms. He wrote:

God has always existed, so “something exists” could not possibly be used to prove that God doesn’t exist. And, given His existence, existence has always existed.

Here Paul provides a “naked assertion” of his own, one which bypasses the conceptual integration it needs to be meaningful. He says that “God has always existed,” and yet the existence of his god is precisely what he needs to prove if he's going to be an effective apologist. So citing this faith-based belief-assumption is not helpful to his case, which he seems either reluctant or unable to present. Meanwhile, if what Paul calls “God” is merely a figment of his imagination, then claiming that it exists is a purely arbitrary claim, and thus we have no onus to prove that it does not exist. Indeed, no one needs to accept the burden to prove that the non-existent does not exist.

Moreover, no one is claiming that the axiom of existence disproves theism singlehandedly - that is, without the benefit of integrating it with the axioms of identity and consciousness, for instance. The statement “something exists” neither proves nor disproves the existence of Paul’s god; it's an affirmation summarizing a basic recognition, not an argument. My point above was that if we begin with the fact that existence exists, then we slash off the dubious notion that we need an explanation for the fact that existence exists. Paul’s response to this point suggests that he no intelligent response to it. Rather, he’s slinking about to find ways of making his god-belief rest easy with such facts. But in the process, he shows that he’s not willing to recognize fully the distinction and relationship between the object(s) and means of cognition, a relationship which is fundamental to any knowledge claim. Nor does he offer a clear methodology by which we can distinguish between his god and what he may merely be imagining.

Our ability to come into the knowledge of the axioms begins with our most fundamental form of awareness, which is sense perception, the level of consciousness which man shares with the higher animals. Sense perception is an autonomic biological process. So long as we are alive, we cannot turn off all of our senses. (Try telling a burn victim to turn off his pain receptors while he lays in agony in his hospital bed.) So this is the given state of awareness with which we naturally begin, and it gives us direct awareness of objects in our immediate environment. Thus the first objects of which we are aware are going to be physical objects. Our sensory receptors are physical, and they operate on a physical basis. Moreover, they are stimulated by physical objects in their vicinity. When my hand comes into contact with a pebble, I acquire tactile awareness of it. When smoke comes into contact with my olfactory nerves, I smell it. When my tongue comes in contact with the flesh of a lemon, I taste it. When sound waves reach my eardrums, I hear the sound. When light reflected from the lemon reaches my eyes, I see the lemon. Perceptual awareness is the base.

Now consider what Paul is trying to say. He is trying to say that his god’s existence, which he alleges to be eternal, gives truth to the recognition that existence exists. Now he seems to be affirming that Objectivism’s starting point is in fact true (elsewhere he said that my starting point is "not true"). The problem is that our recognition that existence exists is not based on awareness of the existence of a supernatural being that is beyond the reach of our senses. Since our most basic awareness is sensory in nature, and since our axiomatic concepts are based on direct perceptual input, the axioms could not in any sense be based on the existence of the Christian god. That is, to be objective, our cognitive starting point could not be based on the claim “God exists.” Quite the opposite, the claim that "God exists" could only be made after the concept 'exists' has been formed. So again, we find Christianity piggybacking on Objectivist fundamentals.

Paul asked:

What kind of things “didn’t need to be created?” Before this silly little post of his, it didn’t exist. Therefore, some existents are created!

It is true that man is capable of creating things. But we must be careful here if we are going to have any hope of maintaining philosophical credibility. When man creates things, he does not create them "ex nihilo." For instance, if I am going to create a post, I do not wish it into place. Blogger.com does not simply obey my conscious intentions, and I certainly do not possess powers of psychography. On the contrary, I need to act, and I need to use materials which already exist in order to create it, and even then, I can only create by obeying the nature of the materials I use in my creativity. But in his desperation to protect his god-belief, Paul runs roughshod over such details, even though they are factual and pertinent.

As Porter observes:

Awareness has effects, most human achievements among them, but only through the actions in reality of the organism possessing it. Cognition alone has no effect on its objects; it doesn’t change existence in any way. (Ayn Rand's Theory of Knowledge, p. 18, emphasis added)

Thus, preconditional to any action one can take in order to produce something that did not already exist (such as a bowl of rice, a post on the internet, a skyscraper, etc.) is the prior existence of both the materials which are used in producing the new artifact and the organism possessing the conscious capacity it would need in order to take the actions that result in the production of the new artifact. So again, existence comes first. Thus the question Paul should be asking is not “What kind of things 'didn’t need to be created?'” but rather: What kinds of things do need to be created, how are they to be created, and from what are they to be created?

Paul then asked:

Who posits the “creation of existence?” Not any Christian I know of. This would imply that God created Himself. So, some thing has always existed, some things exist contingently. Thus you’re little axiom isn’t a threat to theism.

Just as Anderson suggests that a non-believer’s impression that presuppositionalists typically do not offer actual arguments for their position “tells us more about [that person’s] diet of reading than about the efforts of presuppositionalists to defend their arguments,” Paul’s confession that he knows of no Christian “who posits the ‘creation of existence’” tells us that he needs to “get out more” and mingle with other believers.

In actuality, the problem that Paul has stumbled upon here is nothing less than a result of Christianity’s failure to a) provide an explicit understanding of the relationship between awareness and its objects, and b) provide such understanding in terms of fundamentals. The result is that, when pressed on fundamental matters, one Christian’s answers will often conflict with another Christian’s answers. They have their bible to blame for this letdown, for it provides no consistent intelligence on these matters. Indeed, many Christians have affirmed that their god created existence. One creationist, Jerry L. Steen, wrote the following statement in an essay titled “God Our Creator” (which to my knowledge is no longer posted on the internet):

The creationist sees God as the source of all existence.

Seth Brotherton, in his essay God’s Existence and Nature, writes:

This everyone calls ‘God’ because it is the source of all existence.

The Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed begins with this statement of faith:

We believe in one God, the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth, and of all things visible and invisible.

The phrase “all things visible and invisible” does not leave room for anything else. Indeed, if this creed is about the Christian god, and this god is said to be “invisible” (cf. I Tim. 1:17), then this statement is essentially saying that this god created itself! Christians will no doubt try to rescue the creed by insisting that their god is not a “thing.” That would be tantamount to saying that their god is a non-thing. And at that point, I can say: I rest my case. Now really, what could be more amusing than Christian apologetics?

Many Christian apologists who seek to take down Objectivism will respond to Objectivism’s axiom of existence by asking “Where did existence come from?” The obvious implication behind such lines of interrogation is that their god was needed to create existence. Others have tried to hide behind Heidegger’s famous question: “Why is there something rather than nothing?” Again, the implication is that we need to posit an invisible magic being in order to “account for” the fact that things do exist. Sound familiar? It should.

Peikoff rightly points out that even the religious thinker

does not contest the need of an irreducible starting point, as long as it is a form of consciousness; what he finds unsatisfactory is the idea of existence as the starting point. Driven by the primacy of consciousness, a person of this mentality refuses to begin with the world, which we know to exist; he insists on jumping beyond the world to the unknowable, even though such a procedure explains nothing. (OPAR, p. 21)

We need a conceptually irreducible starting point, but only Objectivism identifies it explicitly with the axiom of existence. Christians are continually stupefied by this axiom as they seek alternately first to discredit it, and then to cohere their god-belief with it. Right on schedule, Paul has been dancing between both angles of restlessness.

by Dawson Bethrick

Chronic Manatism: Boy Wonder and His Invisible Magic Being

Readers will recall how offended Paul Manata has become whenever I use the word 'magic' in reference to his god-beliefs. He repeated over and over that my expression "invisible magic being" is "pejorative" while referring to me as a "monkey," "bafoon," "baboon," "hack," "joker," "fool," "goof ball," etc., which Paul apparently does not consider to be pejorative expressions. Beyond that, Paul did make some meager efforts to challenge the appropriateness of the expression "invisible magic being" when used to refer to his god, but these have proved to be, well, rather meager.

I had written:

This source [a dictionary] also acknowledges the association of magic with "the supernatural." Christians want us to believe in "the supernatural," so it seems they should welcome the use of the adjective 'magic' when speaking of their god and other invisible beings.

Paul responded:

There’s plenty of ways to understand “supernatural” and only one of them is “magical.”

Paul's statement here is sufficient to concede the whole point to me, for he acknowledges that there is a kinship between "the supernatural" and magic, which is what I have been maintaining all along. As I had showed, "magic is associated with that which is alleged to be supernatural." Since Paul acknowledges here that this is valid at least some of the time, then he's basically handed the issue to me in full, whether he likes it or not.

Regardless, I am only speaking for what I personally mean by 'magic' when I use the expression "invisible magic being" to refer to religious fixtures, like the Christian god, demons, devils, angels, etc. Magic essentially means of, relating to or possessing supernatural power. So in my view it is applicable to anything that is said to be "supernatural" or exemplified by what is said to be "supernatural" power.

Now the Christian god is certainly thought, by Christians anyway, to possess supernatural powers. So by my definition, 'magic' suitably applies to the Christian god, given how its own self-appointed spokesmen have described it. According to Christianity, it's clear that demons, devils and angels are also thought to have supernatural powers, though in lesser degree or capacity. Demons, for instance, can strike otherwise healthy people with disease by inhabiting their bodies or causing some other kind of mischief (which is never explained) which can in turn affect the human body adversely. Angels, too, have supernatural powers. According to the bible, they can visit men in their dreams (and yet they're not themselves supposed to be dreams). It all certainly seems very magical to me.

Paul also writes:

Bethrick totally fails to make any apology for equating “magic” with the “supernatural” in the sense that Christians and philosophers around the globe mean it.

If by 'apoplogy' here we mean a defense of my usage of the word 'magic' to apply to the Christian god, then I have more than met the challenge that has been brought against me. Magic is associated with the supernatural (indeed, I use it specifically to refer to supernatural power), and the Christian god is said to be supernatural. So the shoe fits. But Paul prefers to go around barefoot.

Besides, I was not attempting to speak on behalf of “Christians and philosophers around the globe” and what they might mean by ‘magic’ (as if they were monolithic in viewpoint or necessary to appease). I was asked to explain my use of the word ‘magic’, and I did just that. And it fits. I don’t need to run to “Christians and philosophers” for their approval for my use and meaning of the word ‘magic’.

Again, it is important to remember why I use the term that Paul finds so discomforting. As I had written:

I use the term 'invisible magic being' because it is open-ended. That is my primary purpose in using it: it is intended to cover any postulated mystical entity which is said to exist beyond the reach of our senses…

In response to this, Paul wrote:

No, you use it to make fun of theists.

No, I use it because it is open-ended, just as the concept 'man' includes all men who exist now, have existed in the past and will exist in the future. The fundamental difference is that the concept 'man' denotes actual things, and its basis is objective fact rather than projected imagination. But the open-ended range in reference is a trait that both share due to their conceptual nature. The expression "invisible magic being" can be used to refer to any allegedly supernatural being, whether Christian or otherwise.

But I take Paul’s statement here as evidence that his feelings are hurt when I use the expression ‘invisible magic being’. That’s why he’s so sore at me. Christians can’t stand it when non-believers do not take his god-beliefs as seriously as they do. At any rate, what would be wrong with making fun of people who believe in invisible magic beings? Does Paul think that I should respect them for their folly? It’s funny to me that grown adults carry on with their imaginations the way they do. It’s certainly sad, but it’s funny, too.

Besides, if my primary objective were "to make fun of theists," I'd just call them names, like Paul does to me.

Paul wrote:

Bethrick can’t debate, so he resorts to making fun.

What exactly am I supposed to debate about?

Then Paul shows that he really does want me to stop using the expression “invisible magic being” when referring to his god:

You can stop now Dawson;

Yes, I do have that option. I also have the option of continuing to use it. And since it performs the task that I want it to, I see no reason not to continue using it. Paul’s tender feelings are not sufficient to persuade me to change my mind on these things. I'm confident that, with effort, Paul can get over it if he wants to. Of course, it would help if he dissolved his emotional investment in Christianity. But then who would provide such entertainment?

Paul shows that he puts a lot of stock in the herd mentality when he writes:

we are definitely all laughing at you.

Again Paul speaks about himself and what he values when he makes statements like this, and projects them onto unidentified nobodies whom we're supposed to imagine standing behind him in unanimous agreement. He assumes that others put as much stock in the approval of others that he does. But Paul needs to understand something about me on this point: if a group of people who believe in invisible magic beings are laughing at me because I do not believe in invisible magic beings, I'm happy to consider the source. The group-giggle that Paul alludes to here is something he values, because he’s so desperate for the approval of others.

Now recall that Paul had also denied that there are any natural laws. Indeed, a person seeking to defend belief that reality is dominated by magic would need to find a way to discount the fact-based principles that scientific minds have formed to identify certain regularities and constants observed in reality. The reason for this is two-fold: for one, the affirmation of regularities and constants in nature makes it harder to defend the doctrine of miracles (i.e., magical incursions which defy and overturn those regularities and constants), and two, the affirmation of regularities and constants implies an autonomous universe, i.e., one which is not under the control of an invisible magic being. In order to justify his rejection of natural law, Paul quoted Bahnsen on the matter. (Paul did not identify where exactly he got the quote, but I'm very glad he quoted it!) In that quote, Bahnsen affirms the following:

God personally created and now personally directs all the affairs of the world.

This is the cartoon universe premise in a nutshell. As I had suspected, Paul rejects natural laws because he conceives of the world in a manner analogous to a cartoon whose every detail and action is controlled by a master cartoonist which exists independent of the cartoon world in which Paul exists. Paul is simply a cartoon character – Boy Wonder – doing what his cartoonist wants him to do.

by Dawson Bethrick

Wishing and the Christian Deity

Below I present some more thoughts in response to Paul Manata's 4 Nov. diatribe against me.

Those who have paid attention thus far will remember that Paul denied that his god wishes. He explicitly stated this:

The problem is that God doesn’t wish.

In response to this amazing statement of denial, I quoted 13 bible verses which affirm that the biblical god does wish. I also quoted several definitions of ‘wish’ to clarify what is being discussed. For instance, wish means:

1. to want; desire; long for (usually fol. by an infinitive or a clause): I wish to travel. I wish that it were morning.

2. to desire (a person or thing) to be (as specified): to wish the problem settled.

If Paul’s god does not wish, then, accordingly, it must not either want or desire. But below we'll see that Paul affirms that his god does want! This is most topsy-turvy. According to the dictionary source which I had quoted, wish is just another word for want; they're basically interchangeable. By trying to dispute everything I say (simply because I’m a “wicked unbeliever,” and Paul doesn’t want to be caught agreeing with any “unbeliever”), Paul’s managed to get himself into quite a pickle here.

In addition to numerous bible verses, I also quoted the grandaddy of presuppositional apologetics himself, Cornelius Van Til, who also affirmed that the Christian god wishes:

... it was God’s will that sin should come into the world. He wished to enhance his glory by means of its punishment and removal. (The Defense of the Faith, p. 160; emphasis added).

In response to this, Paul wrote:

Obviously “wished” here is used differently than what a little child does on his birthday.

What does this have to do with anything? When I make a statement such as:

According to its spokesmen, this magic-endowed personal agent can wish things into existence (cf. “creation ex nihilo”)

does Paul think I am equating the Christian god specifically with "what a little child does on his birthday"? If he really thinks this, why does he think this? He gives us no clue. The question is: do Christians think that their god wishes, or not? That's the issue. I have already quoted numerous verses from the bible which indicate that its authors thought their god wishes, and I quoted Van Til, who likewise indicated that he believed the Christian god wishes. So what's the problem? Why does Paul insist that his god "doesn't wish"? He seems to have adopted a minority position, one which is in direct conflict with the bible. Don't they call that "heresy"?

Paul recited two of the 13 bible passages I had quoted which make it clear that the bible's authors believed their god wishes. They were:

Psalm 115:3: “Our God is in the heavens, and he does as he wishes.”

Proverbs 21:1: “The king's heart is like channels of water in the hand of the LORD; He turns it wherever He wishes.”

When confronted with evidence that solidly contradicts his own statement about his god, Paul wrote:

Obviously here, “wishes” MEANS wants. Yes, God does whatever He wants to do. He furthermore has the power to achieve what He wants to do.

And according to the dictionary I quoted, wishes is an appropriate word for this, and both biblical authors and Cornelius Van Til obviously agree, for they used exactly this word. But how does Paul's exclamation that his "God doesn't wish" fare against this evidence? The evidence clearly contradicts his statement that his "God doesn't wish." Does he take back his earlier statement? No, he does not. Does he admit that he was mistaken? No, he does not. Instead, he gives statements like this:

Bethrick’s song and dance only works on the other monkey’s who applaud his antics in his combox. Nevertheless, the world of thinkers sees Bethrick all hairy, with a party hat on and a tutu on.

When caught in a contradiction, he doesn't come forward and acknowledge it. I thought Christians were supposed to be humble and confess their wrongdoings. But notice that, in place of contrition or an argument which might explain his earlier denial, Paul resorts to ridiculing and maligning people who visit my blog and post their comments. Not only is Paul unable to back up his earlier claim that his "God doesn't wish," he's being rude to my guests when he's caught contradicting the bible! He had better apologize and learn to treat my blog's visitors with respect, or his comments are not going to be welcome on this blog any more.

I wrote:

So according to the bible, which I always thought spoke for Christianity, the Christian god is in fact supposed to wish.

Paul responded:

Not in the way Bethrick means it, and we all know it.

Well, what is so objectionable about the way I mean it? Obviously I could not have a little kid in mind when I apply the word "wish" to the Christian god, for I acknowledge that, according to Christian mythology, its god gets whatever it wishes for, and gets it immediately, just for the wishing. The Christian god wishes that the universe exists, and POOF, PRESTO, ABRACADABRA, there it is! According to this view, reality conforms directly to its wishes. Where does Paul get the idea that I think this describes "what a little child does on his birthday"? Blank out.

Paul continued:

To side with Bethrick here is to throw out any desire to make sure you understand your opponant [sic] and treat his position with care.

Look who's talking! What "desire" does Paul have to understand his opponents? What care does he apply in treating his opponents' positions? Paul dishes out more of his home-fired hypocrisy. We have already seen how he tries repeatedly to slink around very basic axioms which are not in the least controversial (unless of course you embrace a worldview built on imagination instead of facts). See here and here, for instance. Meanwhile, Paul fails to deliver an argument. He's standing on the side of a rural road shaking his fist at a passing bus because it didn't stop to pick him up. You show 'em, Paul!

I wrote:

Again, Paul thinks that he can say that his god does not wish, because Paul determines what his god is and is not, what his god can and cannot do. The reason why Christians have so many internal disagreements is because one Christian will imagine his god one way, while another Christian imagines his god another way, and never shall the two meet.

Paul responded:

More ridiculous claims by Bethrick. Hmmm, out of the 20 or so responses I could give here, which should I choose? I’ll choose this one: The reason atheists have so many internal disagreements is because one atheist imagines the world one way while the other another way, and never the twain shall meet. Bethrick just makes up a worldview, and so do his biddies. [?] Then they all argue about their made up worldviews. But to us they all look like monkey’s fighting over a banana.

How is it ridiculous to observe that differing religious views (such as the bible's version of a wishing god as opposed to Paul's god which "doesn't wish") are informed by the believers' imaginations? Human beings do have the ability to imagine, and there's ample evidence supporting the conclusion that religious ideas have their basis in imagination rather than empirical inputs. Rather than offer any intelligent response to this, Paul reaches for a tu quoque. His retort essentially reduces to "so do you, atheist!" He chose this “out of the 20 or so responses” that he says he could muster. Was this the best of the lot? Responding to a charge is one thing, but answering it is altogether different. Paul chooses to respond with wise-cracking reactions (are the readers of Triablogue really impressed by such antics?), but nowhere answers the point. By Paul’s own stated standard, I thereby “win this point by default” while all the squabblers who prod irresolvable Christian infighting "look like monkey’s fighting over a banana."

by Dawson Bethrick

The Axioms and the Primacy of Existence

As I mentioned in my previous post, I have much to say in response to many of the points that Paul Manata raised in his 4 Nov. diatribe against me. In this post, I focus on Paul's misunderstanding of the relationship between the axioms and the primacy of existence principle.

A Failure to Integrate

One of Paul's attempts to argue against Objectivism's affirmation of the primacy of existence principle is that the axiom of existence is not sufficent to support it. He presents this argument early on in the second section of his blog (point 5 under the heading "The More Substantive"), and must think it's very effective because he comes back to it over and over throughout the rest of his post.

He writes:

“Things exist” does not tell us that “things exist independent of any consciousness.” There’s no logical rule by which that inference can be made. Indeed, Piekoff [sic] tells us that “things exist” does not tell us anything about the nature of the things that exist.” Therefore, if “things exist” does not tell us ANYTHING about the nature of the things that exist it cannot; therefore, tell us that they are the kind of things that “exist independent of consciousness.” Same goes with his claim that thiese “axioms” tell us that “consciousness did not create reality.”

To those who are not very familiar with Objectivism, Paul's inference here may seem pretty devastating in that he seems to have found the exception to Objectivism's absolutism that theism needs to squeeze its gangrenous way into a rational worldview. To the untutored, it very well may appear that Paul has found Objectivism's Achilles' heel.

However, contrary to his apologetic intentions, the argument that Paul offers here does not refute anything that Objectivism teaches, or any criticism that I have raised against theism. As an attempt to criticize Objectivism, it commits the fallacy of context-dropping and serves as a prime example of what happens when one fails to integrate. It must be remembered that the axiom of existence, about which Paul is attempting to make his point, is only one of several axioms, and that Objectivism does not affirm the axiom of existence in the contextual vacuum that Paul’s concern here assumes. The axioms are our most fundamental recognitions made explicit. However, Objectivism nowhere proposes that the mind stops with any one of these recognitions, or that the axioms serve as a substitute for further knowledge that we may acquire about the world. On the contrary, they provide an anchor for knowledge, a foundation upon which to build our knowledge, not an escape from knowledge.

Now it is important to keep in mind that the axiom of existence is not the only axiom, that it is not a recognition that remains isolated from other recognitions. The act of recognizing the fact that existence exists begins a series of recognitions; it does not bring the mind to a halt. The recognition that “things exist” does not by itself indicate the relationship between what is perceived and the means by which it is perceived, because the mind that is doing the recognizing hasn’t gotten there yet; the discovery of consciousness is still to come. Once the mind recognizes both facts - that there are things and that it is aware of those things - then there’s a relationship to be grasped. This is the point that Paul’s argument fails to factor in, namely the axiom of consciousness. There is also the axiom of identity, which is implicit in both recognitions, that things exist and that one is aware of things that exist; it tells us that there is a distinction between what we perceive and the means by which we perceive it. Together the axioms of existence, identity and consciousness set the stage that subsequent knowledge requires by identifying the constants which apply throughout all knowledge and providing the mind with an explicit recognition of the fact that there is a fundamental distinction between what is perceived and the action of perceiving it, between what is known and the process by which it is known, between the object of cognition and the subject of cognition. Throughout the history of philosophy, there are many persisting errors which have resulted from a failure to grasp the nature of this distinction and understand its implications for knowledge and epistemology. Many still persist to this day, and the religious view of the world is definitely one of the more obvious ones.

The Initial Recognition Inaugurates Cognition

In the above statement, Paul alluded to a statement by Dr. Leonard Peikoff. Let’s look at what he writes. He writes:

The axiom [of existence] does not tell us anything about the nature of existents; it merely underscores the fact that they exist. (OPAR, p. 4)

This statement comes at the end of a primary point that Peikoff is establishing early in his discussion of philosophy:

We start with the irreducible fact and concept of existence – that which is. The first thing to say about that which is is simply: it is. As Parmenides in ancient Greece formulated the principle: what is, is. Or, in Ayn Rand’s words: existence exists. (“Existence” here is a collective noun, denoting the sum of existents.) This axiom does not tell us anything about the nature of existents; it merely underscores the fact that they exist. (Ibid)

Peikoff begins by addressing our need for a cognitive starting point: where do we begin? Objectivism holds that the fact that existence exists – the fact that there are things that exist – is irreducible, both metaphysically and conceptually. Theists who try to square their theism with Objectivist principles by qualifying their creationism with the footnote that their god is not supposed to have created itself, are in effect simply trying to assimilate this fact into their worldview, even though their worldview nowhere comes to grips with the issue of metaphysical primacy. However, they rightly sense that the fact that existence exists is undeniable and absolute. But even if they try to assimilate select Objectivist principles into their mystical concoctions, theists are still typically reluctant to identify the Objectivist axioms as their fundamental starting point. They want to have their cake, and they want to eat it, too. They want the respectability and dignity of affirming absolute reality, but they want the fantasy of their imaginations to be taken seriously as well. This never works because there is a fundamental distinction between reality and fantasy; the two will never be on the same par.

Paul’s argument here, however, is part of an effort to defang Objectivism’s ability to criticize theism. His concern is not to come to grips with the subject-object relationship and its implications for philosophy and knowledge, but to save an uninhabitable shack that has already burned to the ground (as well as a little face). He argues that, if the axiom of existence does not make any statement about the nature of what exists, then one cannot draw from this one axiom the conclusion that whatever does exist, exists independent of consciousness. But no one is suggesting that such a conclusion follows from this single axiom. (Indeed, where did he get the concept ‘consciousness’ if this axiom has not been reached yet?) So far as I know, he is not criticizing anything that has actually been endorsed. As I pointed out above, the axiom of existence is only the first of several axioms, it begins a series of recognitions, and it does not remain isolated in some contextual vacuum; to grasp the relationship between what exists and the means by which one is aware of it (consciousness), you need both concepts. But Paul's argument ignores this need. No Objectivist has suggested that we affirm the axiom of existence and then halt our knowledge-gathering there and try to wring all kinds of conclusions from this single, isolated recognition.

In fact, Paul is way off when he complains not to have found a "logical rule by which that inference can be made." That is, he wants to see a formal proof of the primacy of existence principle. But if that's what he's looking for, then he obviously hasn't been paying attention. The primacy of existence is a fundamental precondition of proof. Proof is a cognitive exercise, and so involves a subject and an object, and therefore requires both to already be enjoined in the proper relationship with each other. The primacy of existence is the proper relationship between subject and object that rational operations assume and require, and is thus preconditional to logical inference and formal proof.

But in spite of these facts, Paul still misconstrues what Peikoff (and I) have been saying. Observe:

If we don’t know ANYTHING (per Piekoff [sic] and Bethrick) about the nature of the existents then we don’t know that their nature is such that it is necessarily uncreated.

But we do know many things about the nature of the existents we encounter, because we discover things about them. Again, the mind does not stop with the axiom of existence, nor does this axiom say that we never learn more about the objects of our awareness than merely that they exist. Peikoff is not alleging that “we don’t know ANYTHING... about the nature of the existents” we encounter; he's just saying that our initial recognition of their existence does not tell us all the details about the nature of what exists. This discovery is subsequent to the initial recognition. There is nothing inconsistent between the facts that we recognize that there are objects on the one hand, and on the other that we discover data about those objects as we investigate them. Again, Paul fails to integrate the various points belonging to the position he’s trying to criticize. But it is interesting to note that Paul's statement here indicates that he realizes that the Christian worldview assumes the primacy of consciousness metaphysics, for he's obviously looking for a way to side-step the primacy of existence. It's true - the primacy of consciousness is the lifeline of Christianity.

The Axioms Work Together

Now consider: if a consciousness’s first act is to recognize that things exists, it makes no more sense to suppose that this initial recognition would provide it with total knowledge of the nature of the things it perceives than it does to suppose that the act of being aware of those things brings them into existence in the first place. That’s why Peikoff states what I quoted above. However, a mind does not need to know all the specific details about an object that it perceives in order for it to recognize that it exists and that it exists independent of the process by which it is aware of it. On the contrary, it would recognize that it exists before continuing on to discover what it is, should it choose to investigate further. Together the axioms of existence and identity and consciousness underscore the independent existence of objects by making the distinction between the objects of cognition and the processes of cognition explicit. Hence there is a distinction, there is a relationship, and since this relationship is involved in every act of consciousness (since every act of consciousness involves a consciousness conscious of some object), understanding the nature of that relationship, specifically the orientation between subject and object, is vital to an understanding of knowledge (though many philosophers throughout history have ignored it). Without this understanding, we would have at best a haphazard, unsure footing providing a hit-and-miss epistemology which would be ever prone to confusing fact with sheer imagination. And that is precisely what religion provides; it fails to deliver a rational epistemology because it confuses the relationship between subject and object at the fundamental level of knowledge and elevates imagination above reality, reason and man’s epistemological needs.

Now consider: for us to acquire any knowledge about the nature of any thing that exists, that thing would at the very minimum have to exist. And for us to acquire awareness of it, it would already have to exist. In other words, its existence would have to precede our awareness of it for awareness to be possible. How can you be aware of something that does not exist? Blank out. Additionally, since cognition is a process by which data is gathered from what we perceive (where what we perceive is the object), cognition does not add anything to the nature of an object. We can think anything we want about an object, and it will remain what it is. For instance, if I see a bottle that was manufactured in Atlanta, Georgia, my supposing that it was manufactured in Montréal, Canada will not alter the fact that it was actually manufactured in Atlanta, Georgia. Why? Because of the primacy of existence: the task of cognition is to identify reality, not to create or alter it. Objectivism recognizes all these facts in one sweeping principle: the primacy of existence - the fact that existence exists independent of consciousness.

The Primacy of Existence as the Foundation to Knowledge

Notice how this principle is integral to the concepts 'true', 'false', 'error', 'correct', 'incorrect', etc. Because cognition requires some object(s), and the data which informs cognition about an object must be gathered from the object by some process performed by the subject, and because it is possible to misidentify the nature of an object, we need a set of principles which guide the mind through the process by which it identifies what exists. The primacy of existence is the front line in the struggle for correct identification of objects, and therefore the fundamental principle of knowledge. Since our efforts to acquire knowledge of the world can result in error, we need a set of principles to guide us toward error-free results. Obviously a principle which states "reality is whatever one wishes it to be" will not suffice, for reality does not conform to wishing. Why? Because existence holds metaphysical primacy over conscious intentions. Should not a theory of knowledge recognize why reality does not conform to wishing? Objectivism holds that a theory of knowledge should do this. Other theories hold what amounts to "Who cares? Such truths are so obvious they do not interest us!" And those who have been paying attention have seen the results.

Above I gave an example of how the primacy of existence principle provides the foundation to truth and knowledge. The bottle in my example was in fact manufactured in Atlanta, Georgia. This is a fact. It does not depend on my knowing it. Nor does it require my consent, my approval, even my discovery. It was a fact before I discovered it. It would be a fact even if I never discovered it. I could even deny it once I did discover it, but it will still be a fact that the bottle was manufactured in Atlanta and not somewhere else. Essentially speaking, the fact obtains independent of my consciousness. My consciousness does not have the power to alter this fact. I cannot, for instance, wish that it were not the case that the bottle was manufactured in Atlanta and revise reality by so wishing. Due to the nature of my consciousness and the orientation between it and its objects, facts do not conform to my consciousness. On the contrary, my consciousness works properly only if it conforms to the facts, specifically by acknowledging them as facts which obtain independent of my conscious functions. Facts are the data we gather from the objects we perceive, and the objects are what they are independent of our perception of them. According to the primacy of existence principle, our perception of them does not alter the objects which we perceive. Nor do other conscious functions. Since my consciousness cannot alter the objects of my awareness, my consciousness does not originate the data which I gather from those objects. They are, therefore, absolute. And this is where truth gets the surety of its content - from the absolutism of facts, which is a corollary of the primacy of existence.

Christianity vs. the Primacy of Existence

Now, Christians tell me that they have awareness of a being which has a conscious ability not only to alter facts in a way that I cannot, but also create them out of nothing as well. It can do this, they claim, because its consciousness - quite unlike my consciousness - has the power to conform reality to its will. Essentially, they are claiming that this consciousness enjoys the exact opposite relationship that my consciousness has in respect to its objects. Where my consciousness can only perceive and identify the objects which I discover and which exist independent of my consciousness, this being that Christians tell me about essentially has the power to wish its objects into existence from nothing - "ex nihilo" in their words. Their god wished that the universe exists, and POOF! - it exists, just like that. It's a neat trick I'd love to witness sometime.

Paul's concern is to protect his belief in such a being, and thus seems to resist Objectivism precisely for making these distinctions explicit and incorporating them into a system-wide, fundamental principle. Does Paul not realize that there is a distinction between a thing that exists and the cognitive process by which we acquire knowledge of that thing's nature? Does Paul deny that there is such a distinction? Or, does he think it's not philosophically important? In other words, does he think knowledge can still have an objective basis if one ignores any distinction between the object of knowledge and the processes by which that knowledge is obtained? On occasion, he has suggested that such recognitions are not "interesting," as if this were supposed to constitute an argument challenging their truth, importance or fundamentality. But if knowledge is the product of a cognitive process, and there is a fundamental, absolute distinction between the object of knowledge and the cognitive process by which we acquire knowledge of it, then how could this distinction be untrue, unimportant or non-fundamental? Paul does not say. Instead, his protestations suggest that he wants to defy their implications in order to protect something. What does he want to protect? Indeed, he wants to protect the blurring of this distinction which is central to his worldview from being exposed. This is one of the primary reasons why Paul resents Objectivism: it spoils his fantasy.

Validating the Primacy of Existence

So what does tell us that the primacy of existence is true? Objectivism’s answer to this is that our conscious interaction with the objects of our awareness tells us this on a constant basis; we merely need to attend to it if we are going to grasp it. A simple experiment is sufficient to settle any disputes on the matter. If the objects of consciousness depended on consciousness, then one should be able to alter the objects of his awareness at will. That is what the primacy of consciousness holds: that the objects of consciousness depend on the functions of consciousness in order to exist, in order to be what they are, in order to be anything at all. It holds that consciousness has the final say on what exists and what is true. (Sound familiar?) The objects of such a consciousness would conform to whatever that consciousness desired, expected, or commanded of them. A simple experiment is sufficient to show whether or not this is the case, and anyone can try it.

In this experiment, just find any object in your immediate awareness and focus your attention on it. Any object will do. Right now I’m looking at an ordinary paperclip that’s sitting on my desk. It is a single continuous wire bent round three times into its pristine manufactured shape, about one and a half inches long, steel-colored, and by all accounts a normal paperclip. This is the object that I see. But now I begin to exercise my consciousness in regard to the paperclip, to see what effect it will have on it. First I begin imagining the wire of the paperclip to unfold itself, straightening itself out. In my imagination I can "see" this happening, but the paperclip sitting on my desk remains in the shape it had when I first looked at it. My imagining had no effect on it. Now I make a wish: that the wire of the paperclip straighten itself out. It remains motionless, still folded into its paperclip shape. My wishing had no effect on it. (Perhaps I didn't wish hard enough?) Now I command it: “I command thee to unfold thyself!” I say in a loud booming voice. The paperclip stubbornly defies my command, which has no effect on the paperclip whatsoever. Then I simply deny that the paperclip is not simply a straight piece of wire, without any curves from end to end. This too, has no effect. The paperclip remains just as it was when I first looked at it. I can do this all day long, varying my imagination, wishing, commands and other conscious functions. But what will remain constant throughout? What remains constant is the relationship my consciousness has with the paperclip: the primacy of existence. The object of my consciousness does not conform to the dictates of my consciousness. This is inescapable, and Objectivism holds that this inescapable, constant fact is philosophically important, since it pertains to all instances of man’s consciousness, and therefore also to his knowledge.

Similar experiments can be performed by anyone at any time. But if the primacy of consciousness were true, we would not expect these results in this type of experiment. We would not have found that consciousness is so ineffectual in merely altering its objects. On the contrary, we would have found that the objects would conform to our imagination, wishing, commands and other conscious functions, if consciousness held metaphysical primacy over its objects. But the objects of consciousness are not so easily pushed around after all. Reality has its terms, and it is up to us either to accept them or live in denial, protesting what we cannot change, imagining a fantasy world beyond it and pretending that a super-dooper-double-whammy consciousness somewhere out there or nowhere out there can change what we cannot change. Meanwhile, reality remains what it is, independent of our preferences, likes, dislikes, temper tantrums, etc.

Do theists offer any experimental evidence to confirm the opposite of the primacy of existence? If not, what do they offer? "Arguments"? Well, what is their starting point? What orientation between subject and object do their premises assume? What orientation between subject and object do their conclusions affirm? Do their premises and conclusions assume the same orientation? It would not bode well for theism if their arguments' premises and conclusions pointed to opposite metaphysical orientations between subject and object. It should already be clear that, whatever their premises, their conclusion (to whatever degree they offer arguments for it) that a god exists and created the universe unmistakably points to the primacy of consciousness. But they nowhere validate this assumption, and they nowhere show how it can live side by side the primacy of existence principle, which they use any time they make a truth claim (even if it is false). They don't because they can't.

An Attempt to Evade the Primacy of Existence

The theist, still recognizing the need to salvage the primacy of consciousness in some way, may pull back at this point and suggest that, even though the primacy of existence may be true in the case of human consciousness, this is no indication of the relationship enjoyed by a divine consciousness with respect to its objects. According to this approach, assuming that the universal, absolute truth of the primacy of existence principle applies to all forms of consciousness, even those which are not human, is simply a grand over-generalization.

What this approach represents is a failure to recognize and integrate the profound implications that the primacy of existence principle has for epistemology. Like any human being, the theist initially formed his concept of consciousness implicitly through his own conscious interaction with the world. As pointed out above, Objectivism holds that our own interaction with the objects of our consciousness constantly confirms the primacy of existence principle. The actions of his own consciousness serve as the units which he isolates and integrates to form the concept. They are the initial inputs which give his understanding of consciousness its content.

So what inputs inform the theist's concept of consciousness beyond his own firsthand experience such that he thinks it is meaningful to suppose that there exists a consciousness possessing the exact opposite relationship that his consciousness has with its own objects? What gives his concept of consciousness such latitude? What units has he discovered and integrated into his concept of consciousness which allows him to affirm two contradictory metaphysics? We know already that the method by which he informs his concept of consciousness must be consistent with the nature of his consciousness, for he has no alternative to using his own consciousness in developing and securing the knowledge he seeks to hold. So this rules out his own use of the primacy of consciousness as a means of arriving at a point where he can reasonably affirm the primacy of consciousness. For instance, since the primacy of existence applies to his own conscious interaction with the world around him, he cannot reasonably adopt a method of affirming the primacy of consciousness which reduces to the assumption that reality conforms to his conscious operations. Not only would this be fallaciously circular, it would short-circuit the nature of his own consciousness and invalidate any conclusion he wants to draw. He cannot, for instance, rationally say that the primacy of consciousness is valid because he wants it to be valid, for his consciousness does not have the power to alter reality; his wants and wishes are ineffectual. We already know from experimental evidence that his consciousness simply does not have such authority over reality. The facts of reality do not conform to his imagination, wishing or commands, so if he wants to claim that the primacy of consciousness orientation obtains in the form of consciousness other than his own, he will need to show how this is the case by means of a methodology that is consistent with his own consciousness' orientation to its objects. In essence, he needs to use a primacy of existence methodology in order to show that the primacy of consciousness is true. Such a procedure would amount to using a principle (thus affirming its truth by using it) to prove what contradicts it, thereby denying the truth of the principle which he used to arrive at his goal, which is: self-contradiction as such.

Additionally, we have already seen how concepts of truth necessarily assume the primacy of existence metaphysics. It would contradict the nature of our consciousness to say that some state of affairs obtains merely because we want it to. The bottle manufactured in Atlanta was not suddenly manufactured in Montréal because we wanted it to be, and the paperclip did not unfold itself because we wanted it to. So already it appears that the theist's project is doomed from the very beginning, precisely because what he wants to defend denies the truth of a principle that he needs to use in defending it. Thus he cannot avoid the fallacy of the stolen concept.

So again we should ask: what inputs does the theist factor into his conception of consciousness that allows him to recognize (if only implicitly) the truth of the primacy of existence on some occasions, and on other occasions affirm the primacy of consciousness? All examples of consciousness that we have found so far in nature are examples of consciousness possessing the same fundamental orientation to the world that our consciousness has - i.e., the primacy of existence. But theists are quick to call the consciousness of their deity "supernatural," and thus caution that we should not expect to find evidence of such a consciousness in nature. In other words, we're looking in the wrong place. So, they tell us where not to look for their god. But to give their claims any hope of credibility, they need to tell us where we should look. Without this, their god-belief claims dangle helplessly in the chill void of a conceptual vacuum.

Imagination: The Source of Mystical "Knowledge"

Let us try another approach. Let us ask: where do they get this idea of a supernatural consciousness to which reality conforms? Christians make no attempt to hide the source where they get this idea. They get it from a storybook - "the Bible" is what they call it. And this storybook provides the inputs which they factor into their understanding of consciousness which allows them to affirm two contradictory metaphysical orientations between subject and object. The storybook was inspired by the imagination of its ancient authors, and today it inspires the imagination of its readers. But as we saw above, there is a fundamental distinction between reality and imagination. We can certainly imagine Jesus feeding the 5,000, or walking on the waters of the sea, or raising Lazarus. And we can also imagine Dorothy in the land of Oz, Alice in Wonderland, Bilbo Baggins hobbling through Middle-earth, etc. Stories like those found in the bible did for the ancients what cartoons do for us today: they put one's imagination into concrete, perceptible and communicable form. They can certainly entertain, but they are not true. The primacy of existence guarantees this.

In a primacy of existence universe, a man will not grow a third arm simply because someone wanted him to. But in a primacy of consciousness universe, whatever consciousness wants dictates whatever happens. Just as in a cartoon, a man could grow a third arm just because the cartoonist wanted it to. And in the cartoon universe of theism, if the ruling deity wants a man to grow a third arm, what would stop this from happening? In such a universe, the ruling consciousness’ wants and pleasures are the final court of appeal.

The Primacy of Existence is Important to Knowledge

Now that it is clear that the primacy of existence principle is undeniably true, let us look at a couple reasons why it is important.

One reason why the primacy of existence principle is important, is that it serves as the mind’s most basic safeguard against error. It is not sufficient to prevent all errors, but it is necessary to avoid any error. If it is observed consistently throughout one’s reasoning, it will keep him from making the most fundamental error, namely reversing the orientation between himself as subject and the objects of his awareness. The primacy of existence allows a mind to avoid such errors by making the distinction between the an object and the subject with its cognitive operations explicit and by recognizing the proper relationship between them. Errors are misidentifications of something. The very idea of error assumes that a mind is not always right in its identifications. Any act of identifying something requires a standard to give that act an objective basis. And the standard is the object being identified, to which consciousness must conform in order to identify it accurately.

By recognizing that the task of consciousness is to perceive and identify the objects of awareness (rather than create or alter them at will), the primacy of existence principle equips a mind with the fundamental context in which concepts like ‘true’, ‘false’, ‘right’, ‘wrong’, ‘accurate’, ‘inaccurate’, ‘correct’, ‘incorrect’, etc., are rationally meaningful. It would not make sense in a cartoon universe, for instance, to say that something is “wrong,” for “wrong” presupposes an objective standard to which cognition must conform. A consciousness to which the facts of reality conform could never be either wrong or right. "Right" is when a consciousness accurately identifies an object that exists independent of itself, and "wrong" is when it misidentifies an object that exists independent of itself.

Another way which the primacy of existence is important is related to the one above. This principle is important to man because it teaches him not to confuse what he imagines with what is real. If there is a distinction between the subject of knowledge and the object of knowledge, then there must be a distinction between what a subject knows and the cognitive process by which he knows it. And if this is the case, then there must be a distinction between what actually exists in reality and what one merely imagines. Mistaking what one imagines for reality would hardly be beneficial to man's life, and it could easily prove fatal if he acts on such confusion. I can imagine, for instance, that a T-shirt will keep me warm in the winter, but if I walk out into a blizzard without appropriate clothing, I may very well be overcome with hypothermia and die. Reality does not conform to my imaginations (my imagining will not make a T-shirt sufficient to protect me from the cold in a wintry blizzard), so I need to conform my choices and actions to this fact if I want to live. So there is a practical as well as rational advantage to recognizing and respecting the distinction between reality and imagination.

Even the theist recognizes the distinction between what he wants to say is real and what he is willing to admit to be imaginary at some point. He will, for instance, object when a rival theist’s imagination of deity conflicts with his own. We see this inside Christianity all the time. One group of Christians will develop their imagination of their deity in one direction, while another group of Christians develop their imagination in another direction, each claiming the same source for inspiration and authority. But when the two conflict, each side accuses the other of “vain imaginations” which, if unchecked by the “authorized” imagination, will lead to "heresy," i.e., the unapproved imagination. So even theists will sooner or later admit that there is a difference between reality and imagination when it suits their position to do so. Unfortunately for them, it is too late at that point, for they have already sacrificed the concept of objectivity on the altar of faith in invisible magic beings.

Excuses and Ridicule to Be Expected

When I ask for evidence to support their claims, Christians typically give me a string of excuses. If I am to accept excuses as evidence for anything, I can only accept them as evidence for the likely fact that they cannot provide evidential support for their claims about this being they allegedly have awareness of. When I point out the various problems that I see in their claims - for instance, they have no objective starting point (cf. Prov. 1:7), they affirm metaphysical subjectivism, they do not clearly identify the means by which they are allegedly aware of their deity, they confuse the imaginary with the real, they endorse faith over reason, etc. - Christians scramble in a panic to turn the tables, find counter-examples, hoping to trap me in some kind of quandary which usually turns out to be more casuistry on the apologist's part. He is threatened by my certainty, and this is what he wants to undermine more than anything: my confidence in my own mind.

Then come the name-calling, the insults, the condescension. Like the 9 Powell bus, right on schedule. This is typically an indication that the apologist really has no defense for his position at all, and he's trying to cover it up with bluster and loud barking. Apologists get frustrated when people do not accept their religious assertions on their say so, for they know they have nothing else to back them up.

I can certainly imagine some of the things Christians tell me. But what I imagine is not real. When I ask how I can distinguish between what they claim and what they may be merely imagining, I get flack in return. This is another indication of a problem. Why else would this be what they give me when I try to learn more about their position?

I do not indulge in the name-calling and personal insults because I know what I teach is true, and I enjoy teaching what I know. Do they want a dialogue? Then why the attitude, condescension and ridicule? Do they think that they are all-knowing? If so, then why the impatience with those who are so willing to acknowledge that they themselves are not all-knowing? If they don't think they're all-knowing, then perhaps they're willing to admit that there are things they still have to learn. If that's the case, why aren't they more eager to learn and more grateful for the effort others put into helping them learn? They claim to be thankful to a being which can help them without effort, but unthankful to those who have no choice but to apply effort if they choose to help them. Don't they to learn? don't they want to know? Don't they want to understand?

by Dawson Bethrick

"Do unto others..."

Happy Turkey Day, everyone!

I have been away on vacation and recently returned after two adventure-filled weeks in Thailand! I posted a few pictures online here. It was sweltering hot, unlike the frigid temperatures that greeted me upon my return to the US. Much of central Thailand was flooded out due to heavy storms in the northern part of the country, so many people's homes were submerged under waist-deep waters. It was sad to see so much devastation. But the people there are very resilient and know to expect this kind of flooding every decade or so. For them, life goes on without skipping a beat.

Now that I am back, I have had a chance to see Paul Manata's latest diatribe against me. It is a long post full of mockery, insults, mischaracterizations, contorted inferences, brazen evasions, etc. The usual fare.

I have made many notes in response to what Paul has stated, and some of them I will be posting on my blog over the next few weeks, as time allows.

In this post, I wanted to briefly explore the topic of pejoratives, as it was one of the sparks that initiated our recent volley of exchanges.

As anyone who may have been reading should already know, one of Paul's chief complaints in his recent messages concerning my blog, is that my use of the expression "invisible magic being" is "pejorative." This suggests to me that he finds this expression to be offensive when applied to his god, which in turn tells me that my use of this expression to refer to his god hurts his feelings. Indeed, he has made a big deal about this ever since I explained to James Anderson, who mentioned in a comment that he did not understand why I use it, that I use this expression because of its open-endedness in referring to a whole smorgasbord of allegedly supernatural entities which, according to mystical worldviews, exist in some realm beyond the reach of our senses and influence the world in which we exist. I find it useful because it neatly subsumes not only the Christian god, but any god, deity, demon, devil, angel, gremlin, fairy, pixie, or the like. Believers in such mystical notions do not have to like the term, but their likes and dislikes are not my concern.

Now, while I have never denied that the expression "invisible magic being" may carry pejorative connotations for some readers, Paul is mistaken when he says that I "did write a post trying to argue that the expression was not 'pejorative'." I have no idea where he thinks I did this, for he does not link to a post in which I was "trying to argue that the expression [in quesiton] was not 'pejorative'." When I grant that this expression may have connotations for some readers, Paul apparently interprets this as some kind of concession to a point he was trying to make. But most expressions carry connotations, many of which are determined by the contextual sum assumed by a reader or listener. Regardless, it's fine with me if Paul or anyone else wants to think that this expression is pejorative; they can think whatever they want. The term suits my purposes, and I am justified in using it as I have explained. Paul then wants to say that my "response to Anderson was false." But what exactly is he referring to? Specifically which statement in my response to James does Paul think was false? He does not point it out for us. To make matters even more tiresome than they already are, Paul treats the matter as if it were sandbox squabble: "You lost, I won," he writes. "Don’t be a sore loser." Who is really sore here? Certainly not I.

Now, what I'm wondering is why Paul is so concerned with all this. Does Paul have something against the use of pejoratives? He does not come out and say explicitly one way or another whether he thinks using pejoratives is wrong. So if he does not tell us what he thinks in this regard, we have to infer his position from what he states.

For instance, he writes:

we see Dawson agree that he was being pejorative. He actually intends to use pejoratives.

This is interesting given the context of what has transpired between us, and given the fact that Paul professes to be a Christian. He accuses me of "being pejorative" and intending "to use pejoratives." Does Paul have a problem with the use of pejoratives? Does he think it is wrong to use pejoratives? Does he think it detracts from personal character, from one’s message, from one’s moral status perhaps? At one point he refers to my use of this expression as "poisoning the well." So from what he has written, it strongly appears that Paul considers the use of pejoratives to be bad in some way.

This is why I put these questions on the table: because Paul seems pretty handy with a pejorative peppermill of his own. Just glancing through his response to me, you will see him routinely referring to me personally (as opposed to something I have merely affirmed) with words like "monkey," "bafoon," "baboon," "hack," "joker," "fool," "goof ball," etc. Now, it does not bother me that Paul chooses to "pepper" his postings with words of this nature. In fact, I realize that he has no alternative, since his worldview is indefensible and his contentions against mine are untenable (more on this in later postings). But we should ask: are the expressions that Paul peppers throughout his post not pejorative in nature as he has used them? Is he not intending them as personal insults? Is he not using them as a shortcut to discredit me personally? To "poison the well," as it were? If not, why does he use them? If he admits that they are pejoratives, then why is he getting all into a fuss when I use expressions that he considers pejorative, especially when they are not the personal insults he has used against me?

Can you say hypocrite?

It is important for us to remember that, as a self-professing Christian, Paul implicitly affirms the teachings of the bible. That's well and good, for we have a standard to refer to in evaluating Paul's behavior, to see if his choices and actions match his stated commitments. But it's one thing to preach something, and entirely another to actually abide by it. For instance, Matthew 7:12 has Jesus give the following, what is commonly called "the Golden Rule":

Do unto others whatever you would like them to do to you. This is the essence of all that is taught in the law and the prophets.

Now, I could be wrong in supposing that Paul wants to try to following the teachings with the New Testament ascribes to Jesus. But I'm willing to give the benefit of the doubt and assume that Paul really means it when he aligns himself with orthodox Christainity. After all, Christian apologists, even amateurs like Paul Manata, love to make a lot of hay when it comes to matters of morality. It is an issue that is apparently close to their heart.

So by this token, we can infer, based on the teaching given in Mt. 7:12 and Paul's profession as a Christian, that his behavior toward me is indicative of how he wants me to behave toward him. Whatever he does to me, must be what he wants me to do to him. But I'm not going to follow his example. I am not going to call Paul "monkey," "bafoon," "baboon," "hack," "joker," "fool," "goof ball," or any of the other slanderous names he has used on me. If Paul feels a need to use abusive language, then I leave that choice up to him. Personally, I don't think it adds any merit to one's case when he resorts to such childish forms of ridicule. Perhaps Paul disagrees.

Sadly, I have not seen any of Paul's "brothers in Christ" call him on his behavior. So far as what I know (and I admit that I am far from "all-seeing"), none of his fellow Christians have made an effort to correct him on this. By not doing so, other Christians who have read Paul's writings tacitly condone his behavior. In fact, many seem to encourage it by praising his voluminous writing ventures. Indeed, James Anderson made it a point to raise a question on why I use the expression "invisible magic being," but I have not seen him raise any question on why Paul uses words like "monkey," "bafoon," "baboon," "hack," "joker," "fool," "goof ball," et al., when responding to his opponents.

Of course, I have no doubt that Paul or any other Christian will not have a hard time trying to find a way to excuse the name-calling and condescending tone that characterizes so much of Paul's writing. The religious mind is one that is constantly looking for a backdoor to sneak through. This is the kind of "righteousness" we can expect Christians to model before non-believers. Their contempt for people who do not profess belief in their invisible magic beings prevents them from raising themselves to the demands of civility and honor in their dealings with them. As apologists hoping to vindicate their faith commitments, they should realize how their behavior speaks louder than any arguments they may think they have. But will they? Not if they follow Paul down the path that he has paved with constant wear.

by Dawson Bethrick

Those Delicate Christian Sensibilities

Much of Paul’s recent attempt to discredit me is so preoccupied with his attempts to flex his rhetorical muscles that I had to stop myself as I was reading through it to ask: what is he trying to say? Is he really expending all this effort just to prove that the expression “invisible magic being” is pejorative? To say that a word or expression is "pejorative" means that it has a belittling effect in some way. As we go through life, we encounter some individuals whose feelings are quite delicate and consequently easily hurt. This is often a sign of emotional insecurity. But is this all that Paul wants to prove, that his feelings are tender and that he can't take what Christianity itself dishes out? This seems such a meager gain that it would hardly be worthy of his time and energy. It’s obviously very important to Paul, so why not let him have it? After all, all he’s essentially arguing at that point is that his feelings have been hurt. Okay, so what? Paul proves once again that he can dish it out, but he can’t take it. Fine.

Meanwhile, I wonder if those whom he hoped to impress (namely his fellow Triaboogers and those who come to drink the “Serious Trinitarian Theology” Kool-Aid) are in fact really dazzled by Paul’s overt efforts to mimic Steve Hays. They may themselves be so anxious in their faith that they may very well be.

Throughout his cliché-soaked diatribe, Paul tells us about himself as he attempts to dole out his usual series of accusations that I have committed some heinous fallacy or other, and in so doing supplies us with a model exercise in projection. In fact, we learn this time that my “method” is “fallacy ridden,” while we’re apparently supposed to believe his method is pure and untarnished. He calls my writing “hubristic,” which probably means that he’s envious of my ability and self-confidence. He says that I “argue by slogans.” In other words, I’m quotable and he's afraid my particular way of stating things will become household expressions one day. He says that the purpose behind my use of certain expressions is “to produce thoughtless knee-jerk reactions of agreement from the hoi polloi on the familiarity of the words, rather than on reason.” (Keep in mind that this is coming from someone who believes the central tenets of his worldview on faith.) He likens my blog posts to a logo for a failing sports team that is intended to “induce fear, or respect,” but it’s not clear why he makes such a comparison. Perhaps he thought it might sound catchy, or maybe my posts strike fear in him (we already know his feelings have been hurt). He says that I “draw absurd extensions from the claims of [my] interlocutors,” but he apparently fails to realize that many of my interlocutors (e.g., Christian theists) promote an absurd position while seeking to cloak it under a credible guise; just undo the façade and the absurdity shines right through (if it didn’t already). He then accuses me of ad baculum: “He takes the fear of having a ‘cartoon worldview’ and exchanges that for honest interaction with the other side.” Who's afraid of having a “cartoon worldview”? In response to my point that Christianity subscribes to the cartoon universe premise, many Christians have essentially told me "so what?" Paul tells us about himself as he stands limp before the mirror I’ve held up before him. This is no ad baculum, for I am not threatening the use of force or suggesting that some harm will come to my interlocutor as a result of denying my conclusions. The "obey or suffer" tactic of ad baculum is religion’s own, since religion dispenses with reason in the first place and insists that people believe its hocus-pocus balderdash on its spokesmen's say so, or else suffer the consequences. He says that I “also employ much argumentum ad ignominiam,” which apparently means that I think that I “can shame [my] opponent into submission by the use of employing claims which commit” the laundry list of fallacies he attributes to me. He apparently thinks that one’s efforts to educate and reason with people are a shaming tactic. Again, Paul tells us about himself here. Mind you, my approach to things is not “believe, or be condemned for all eternity,” or “believe, because I say so,” or “believe, because the ancients believed,” or “believe, or else you will be mocked by a group of Triaboogers who have nothing better to do.” Far from it. In fact, you’d think that someone like Paul might show a little gratitude for the one-on-one attention he has received in an area where he’s in desperate need for help. On the contrary, however, like a yapping junkyard dog, he’s prone to biting the hand that feeds. Instead of gratitude, Paul offers misrepresentation. For instance, he charges me with arguing “that the ‘all’ in Jesus’ claim that ‘all things are possible’ includes the possibility that God could cease to exist,” but that is not what I argued at all. If he’s not mischaracterizing my position, he either never understood it, or he suffers from an early onset of senility and needs to go back and review what I have stated. On the whole, Paul’s latest attempt to roast me is set up on a grand projection, attributing to me the very playbook which Christian apologists themselves follow. For examples, just read Paul’s post or the comments he leaves in response to mine.

Here's another example: non-believers are supposed to be afraid of having the “evolutionist” worldview, because it allegedly relies on something called “Chance” – a word which is intended to cause a knee-jerk reaction of its own – even if they have never affirmed something called “evolutionism” or suggested that “Chance” governs things in some haphazard, nonsensical manner (like an invisible magic being might). Or, non-believers are supposed to be afraid of having no “account for” consciousness if we do not kowtow to an invisible magic being. But if that invisible magic being is itself said to be conscious, how does kowtowing to it “account for” consciousness? Blank out. Then there's this: Paul plays dumb when confronted with the Objectivist axioms, claiming that he doesn’t see how the axiom that existence exists argues against the existence of an imaginary being; on Paul’s myopic understanding, even beliefs in non-Christian deities are supposed to be compatible with this fact. In terms of logical implications, the upshot for Paul is that, in his mind, anything goes (or as the bible puts it, "with God all things are possible"). No position, so long as it affirms the existence of an invisible magic being, is incompatible with any fact in reality. If you pay attention to Paul's defensive tactics, you'll see that they can be used to safeguard belief in any invisible magic being with only the slightest modification on non-essentials; he has already provided the fundamentals needed to squirm out of any tight place. Playing dumb is most appropriate for Christians, for they are not to lean on their own understanding, but to replace reason with faith-based fear and trembling.

But we’re supposed to believe that Paul is above all suspicion as he once again takes aim against me. This time Paul is concerned to “debunk” my explanation for my use of the expression “invisible magic being” to refer to his and everyone else’s gods, demons, angels, devils, and other imaginary personal agents. He must really think this expression is a threat to the sanctity of Christ to go to all this effort to skewer something he wants to consider unuseful. But even here Paul doesn’t pass up an opportunity to take yet another potshot at me. He says that I am “playing dumb” when James Anderson himself makes it a point to tell me that he “never understood why you feel the need to pepper your writing with playground pejoratives like ‘invisible magical beings’, which add nothing to your analysis.” I guess I’m supposed to be wrong for taking the man at his word; for Paul says that I “know precisely why James Anderson thinks the term ‘invisible magic being’ is ‘pejorative’.” But if Anderson himself confesses that he “never understood” this, on what basis would I turn around and call James a liar here? Paul must think I should have more understanding than Dr. Anderson does. Should I now be flattered that he thinks so highly of me? Besides, even if I do know why James thinks this term is pejorative (by calling it that, his feelings must have been hurt as well), I'm still most willing to explain why I use it. So what's the problem here?

Let's take a closer look at some of the things Paul stated in his blog, and see what we will see.

Imagination as the Only Means of Mystical Awareness

In my explanation of why I think the expression “invisible magic being” is appropriate, I wrote:

In a nutshell, I use the term “invisible magic being” because I think it accurately captures the imaginary personal entity that Christians and other religionists insist exists.In fact, it seems dubious to me that any religionists would consider my use of this expression ‘pejorative.’

Paul responded to this, saying:

We’ve made no progress. Well, we can add a new fallacy. Bethrick constantly peppers his posts with question begging epithets (e.g., “imaginary” personal entity). This is the fallacy of slanting. Bethrick uses terms like this to denote as well as connote an evaluating attitude.

With his head fuming, Paul seeks to find me guilty of yet more fallacies. This time it's the fallacy of slanting. This fallacy is explained as follows:

Deliberately omitting, de-emphasizing, or overemphasizing certain points to the exclusion of others in order to hide evidence that is important and relevant to the conclusion of the argument and that should be taken into account of in an argument.

Keep this description in mind. We will refer back to this at a later point in my analysis of Paul's blog.

In the meantime, however, we must ask (since Paul accuses me of committing this fallacy): what "evidence that is important and relevant" does he think I'm trying to hide?

Paul says I "constantly pepper [my] posts with question begging epithets," citing as an example my use of the expression "imaginary personal entity." The "personal entity" part does not upset him, but referring to Christianity's god and other invisible magic beings (e.g., demons, angels, devils, etc.) as "imaginary" does. Apparently it spoils the fun; someone who invests his emotions in an imaginary friend, for instance, surely resents it when others remind him that it is merely imaginary. But how is referring to the Christian god as imaginary "question begging"? Christian apologists are easily frustrated when non-believers do not take their mystical claims seriously enough to assemble serious refutations in every breath. But if their god is not real, why would anyone need to prove that it is not real? I certainly accept no onus to prove that Zeus does not exist; I certainly accept no onus to prove that Geusha does not exist. Why would I accept an onus to prove that the Christian god does not exist? The arbitrary deserves no refutation. Attempting to prove that an invisible magic being does not exist only feeds into the believer's delusions by dignifying them. Besides, I'm a non-believer: what is so difficult to understand about this? Am I begging the question by "assuming that God does not exist"? Of course not! I'm simply being consistent with my position. Of all people, presuppositionalists should know better here. I'm reminded of Greg Bahnsen's statement:

'Circularity' in one's philosophical system is just another name for 'consistency' in outlook throughout one's system. That is, one's starting point and final conclusion cohere with each other. (Van Til's Apologetic: Reading & Analysis, p. 170n.42)

So quickly presuppositional apologists forget their own talking points. Either that, or it's "consistency" when they do it, but fallacious arguing when everyone else does it. Don't be too appalled by the special pleading inherent to the apologist's approach; we'll encounter more of it down below, and it never loses its nastiness.

Paul says that I "use terms [like "imaginary personal being"] to denote as well as connote an evaluating attitude." But couldn't this be said about a sizeable output of anything anyone says? For instance, Paul chooses to call my words "question begging epithets" for its connotative impact; he doesn't explain why he thinks my statements are "question begging" - he's hoping that just by calling them this that it will sound the right signals in his readers' minds. "Look at that!" Paul's readers are supposed to say to themselves as they read through another skewering of a scorned infidel, "His highness Paul used 'question begging'. Didn't Dr. Bahnsen use that very term himself? Paul must be right up there with the grand poobah of presuppositionalism himself!" The only difference is that you don't see me getting all offended by this; I expect nothing more from Paul. It's okay when he does it, but by golly it's not okay when that rascal Dawson Bethrick does it!

At this point it is important to remind my readers why my use of 'imaginary' in this context is justified, lest they forget. Christians have themselves to blame for this, for they provide no alternative to imagination when it comes to considering the claims and descriptions they give of their god. That is, they indicate no objective means by which one might acquire awareness of their god. So I have no alternative to relying on my imagination in order to have any idea of what they're talking about when they say things like "God created the universe" or "God wants you remember the sabbath day!" Christians are no different from Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, animists and other mystics in this respect: one needs to retreat into his imagination to consider what they describe. If I want to "know" what the Christian is talking about when he claims there is a god, a gang of demons, angels, devils, heaven, hell, etc., how am I supposed to have awareness of them beyond their mere say so? Hearsay is not a substitute for direct awareness of something. They tell me that their god created the universe ex nihilo. Well, what inputs from the world that I perceive everyday serve as evidence for this? I look around, but I certainly don't see any gods creating universes. But I can imagine a lot of things that may come close to what Christians have in mind when they imagine things like this. After all, there was a time when I was a professing Christian myself, back when I simply didn't know any better. But even then, I could go on nothing more substantial than my imagination. What I lacked then is what Christians all around me lack: a rational means by which I could distinguish that which is real from what I was merely imagining. Imagination is the mental faculty we use to visualize what we read in storybooks. For instance, when I read the story of Jesus quieting the storm, I imagine a man dressed in a desert gown raising his hands to the sky and uttering the words "Peace, be still!" and the winds subsequently calming down. What alternative to imagining this do I have? Perhaps I could run out and see if I can rent the movie Jesus of Nazareth (which has a great score, by the way), but this would only enable me to see how other readers of the same storybook imagined its players and events. So really, I'm stuck here, because Christianity doesn't give me anything more substantial to go on. Either I use my imagination to get at least some idea of what they claim, or I don't and have no idea at all. This isn't my fault.

Now, if Christians think that they have an objective means by which I can have genuine awareness of what they call "God," they need to identify it and explain how it works. I asked one visitor to my blog how I can reliably distinguish what he calls "God" from what he may merely be imagining here and here. But so far, no answer has been forthcoming. So even when I ask Christians to identify some objective, non-imaginative means by which I can have awareness of the god they describe, they offer me nothing. And from what I have gathered, they don't have anything better than their own imagination. This is exactly what we would expect to be the case if their god were a fiction. Reminding Christians of this greatly frustrates them, because it hampers their evangelism. It keeps the fish they want to catch from unwittingly swimming right into their nets.

The Real Reason Why Paul is So Upset

Paul wrote:

Next, note that Bethrick isn’t certain as to why Christians would consider the use of “invisible magic being” in place of our Holy Lord as disparaging and belittling. Either Bethrick is so thick-headed that he sincerely believes we would find no problem, or he’s, again, playing dumb. I opt for the latter, the charitable reading.

I thought I had made it amply clear why I found it dubious that Christians would consider the expression "invisible magic being" pejorative. Recall what I had written:

In fact, it seems dubious to me that any religionists would consider my use of this expression “pejorative.” After all, look at what they tell me to believe. Christians, for instance, claim that their god exists, and often refer to it as a “being.” They claim that their god is “the supreme being,” a “divine being,” an “infinite being,” etc. So I don’t know why Christians like James would find my use of this term bothersome.

Paul takes this statement as evidence that I am "either... so thick-headed" or that I am "playing dumb." As is usual with Christian apologists, their insidious false dichotomies tend to leave out the more reasonable option. In actuality, I'm simply giving the believer the benefit of the doubt here, on the faint hope that he might be capable of the simple integration of what they claim and the fact that they want me to believe what they claim. But if use of this expression hurts their feelings, then all I can really say is: the truth sometimes hurts. So I have three words for Christians with delicate sensibilities: GET OVER IT.

Then Paul made a most quizzical statement:

Everyone knows that God is Dawson’s bête noire.

Where does he get this idea? And where does Paul get off speaking for "everyone"? How does he know what "everyone knows" about me or anything else? Is Paul omniscient? Has he confused himself with the god he worships? Paul has violated one of the first rules of debate, namely: know thy opponent. Paul's god is no more my bête noire than the Muslim's Allah or the Lahu's Geusha. In fact, I find the psychology of mysticism very interesting, enough to make it my object of study. But it should be clear if not already, that the Christian's bête noire is anyone who doesn't submit and yield his mind to the Christian's confessional investment. You see, we're the spoilsports, we spoil the fun of the believer's make-believe, and we hamper his efforts. So he resents us, hoping to discredit us (for burning at the stake has been outlawed).

Paul asked:

Does he expect us to believe that he intends no belittlement of God by this phrase?

Does Paul expect us to believe that Jesus was actually resurrected? Notice the tendency to make the non-believer's expectations (whether real or wrongly attributed) so unreasonable as to make him seem utterly daft, while the believer's expectation that we believe a bible full of tales and myths is completely normal. In many ways, the west has not recovered from the Dark Ages.

Paul asked:

Does he not think that “invisible magic being” has negative connotations? If he does not, then he’s plain ignorant. If he does, then he’s a liar.

So here we have another intentionally disparaging dichotomy: this time I am either "plain ignorant," or I am "a liar." But I'm curious here: Where did I ever say that the expression "invisible magic being" does not have negative connnotations? I merely said that it is an appropriate term, given what Christians expect us to believe. But that does not mean that it is connotatively sterile. And that's because I realize that the connotative impact of a word or expression can vary from individual to individual. I don't believe in any invisible magic beings, so I'm looking at the matter from a perspective that is not clouded by the confessional investment of someone who's nervous about the potential that such expressions can be appropriately applied to their object of worship. Paul seems to have lost sight of this fact.

Then Paul made the following telling statement:

Dawson acts concerned how we take his claim, but it’s obvious he’s laughing up his sleeve.

Here Paul identifies what must really be bothering him: he can't stand the thought that I might be laughing at his worldview, even the psychological strain and misery it causes him. He doesn't like it because it tells him immediately that I'm not about to take Christian nonsense seriously. And by making a big deal of it, he's only succeeded in encouraging the continued use of the expression "invisible magic being" to be applied to his object of worship. So the heaps of coals on his head are multiplied as he not only fails to accomplish what he set out to do (namely discredit me), he succeeds where he fears most. Now others just might pick up the term and use it.

Paul demonstrates his impoverished comprehension skills when he writes:

After the glad-handing, Dawson gives us the reasons for why he does not think this term pejorative. He writes,

Christians, for instance, claim that their god exists, and often refer to it as a “being.” They claim that their god is “the supreme being,” a “divine being,” an “infinite being,” etc. So I don’t know why Christians like James would find my use of this term bothersome.

I never gave these points as "reasons for why [I do] not think this term pejorative." Rather they were the reasons why "it seems dubious to me that any religionists would consider my use of this expression 'pejorative'." There's a difference here that Paul has obviously missed. As I said above, I recognize that the connotation of a word or expression can vary from person to person, so I never argued that the expression "invisible magic being" is not pejorative. Rather, I listed these as reasons why I think Christians would be unreasonable, given what they claim and what they want me to believe, to be so easily offended by such expressions. But then again, Christians seem to be offended by the mere existence of people who do not believe in their invisible magic being, so I admit that I'm granting them more reasonableness and levity than they are probably capable of. If I have erred, it was in choosing to be so generous.

Invisible Things

Paul continued:

Bethrick's tactic is to take each single word and conclude that we shouldn't have a problem with either "being" or "invisible" used to describe God, and so since "magic" is the only word left then we only have a problem with the phrase because "magic" is in there. But this isn't necessarily so.

My approach to uncovering what Christians might find emotionally upsetting about the expression "invisible magic being" was to analyze the elements in the term in order to isolate the cause of their umbrage. By process of elimination I concluded that, since their own religion claims that their god is both a being and invisible, that they must have a problem with my use of 'magic'. I don't see what is so objectionable about this, but Paul calls this a "tactic" - a word laden with its own connotations - in order to inject an evaluation of his own. I suppose it's okay when he does this, but when I do this it's an instance of the fallacy of slanting. Then again, we must remember that Paul is essentially trying to tell us what hurts his feelings, so I'm willing to let him speak for himself on this.

Paul says that I "seem to confuse words and terms." How so? Which words and terms have I confused? Paul admits:

Of course Christians have used the word "invisible," but it's not the word we're concerned with in Bethrick's case, but the meaning poured into the word.

Again, I'm wondering how carefully Paul read my blog. I explicitly explained what I meant by the term 'invisible' when I wrote:

Christians claim that their god is invisible – that is, no one can see it, not even believers themselves.

Notice that even when I do take the care to clarify what I mean, Paul belligerently stampedes over it, completely missing its relevance significant to the very point he is trying to make here. This makes him look quite clumsy.

The point he wants to make is that I have coupled 'imaginary' and 'invisible' together, so that when something is said to be invisible, that implies it is therefore also imaginary. In other words, he's accusing me of poisoning the well when I make use of a word which Christians themselves - as Paul himself admits! - use in describing their god. This is amazing! If anyone wonders why it's so difficult to dialogue with Christians, hear ye hear ye! But it's not at all the case that I equate the two. I cannot see oxygen, for instance, but I would not say that someone is merely imagining if he says that human beings cannot live without it.

Observe how Paul develops his case here point by point:

The “invisible” as used with respects to Jehovah is different than the “invisible” used in, say, the term “invisible friend.”

It is? It seems that if someone says that Jehovah is invisible, he means just what the person who claims to have an invisible friend means to say: that Jehovah cannot be seen, any more than the person's invisible friend. Paul seems to think that "invisible friend" is meant to be understood as imaginary. He writes:

When I tell people that my son has an “invisible friend” they know that this means he has a pretend and imaginary friend. "Invisible" here, then, is used to connote the idea of "imaginary." Indeed, when people hear that a child has an "imaginary friend" they know that this means he has an "invisible friend."

Was anyone besides me reminded of the Christian hymn What a Friend We Have in Jesus when reading what Paul wrote here? But Paul feels differently: "When I tell people that my son has an 'invisible friend'," he says, "they know that this means he has a pretend and imaginary friend." Likewise, when Christians tell me that they have an invisible object of worship, I know that this means they have a pretend and imaginary object of worship. If Paul wants to say that I am "begging the question" for recognizing this fact, then I'm sure Paul's son could turn around and accuse Paul for assuming that his invisible friend is also "pretend and imaginary." Meanwhile, I'm just being consistent with my "worldview presuppositions." Paul might say that it's obvious that his son's invisible friend is imaginary. But likewise, I say it's obvious that Paul's invisible object of worship is imaginary. I already pointed out above that Christians give us no alternative on this point. We're just not supposed to point this out, otherwise we're a part of the "bad" world of "unbelievers" who spoil the fun of religious make-believe.

Now, it is true that children often have imaginary friends. But did you know that many children never outgrow this childhood habit? I wonder if Paul's son really thinks his invisible friend is imaginary. After all, his daddy pretends to have an invisible friend named Jesus, so why would we be surprised when Paul's son picks up the same habit? Like father, like son, they say. Paul is modeling a behavior to his son when he goes to church every Sunday to worship something no one sees. And Paul's response to me for "confusing" invisible and imaginary together, is to point to an instance where this is appropriate! You can see why I like Paul so much - he's a great entertainer, though I don't think he realizes it.

Then Paul appeals to fiction - a cartoon no less! - in order to seal his point:

Or, take Wonder Woman’s invisible jet. In the cartoon this is meant to be real, and so it’s not imaginary, but is that what Christians mean when they say God is invisible?

Now this is rich! I have often marveled at how readily believers appeal to fiction in order to substantiate their faith. In this regard, Paul is right on schedule. But Wonder Woman and her invisible jet? Doesn't Paul know that Wonder Woman and her invisible jet are not real??? In the context of a cartoon, such things as Wonder Woman's invisible jet may be "meant" to be taken as real. But that's the case with anything in the context of a fictional realm. One would not enjoy a movie about Abraham Lincoln, for instance, if he were constantly pointing out that it's not really Abraham Lincoln, that it's only an actor dressed up to look like Abraham Lincoln. Going along with the story is a crucial part of the fun. Non-believers are simply those who don't think it's fun any more when people try to take the story out of the storybook and pretend it's all really true and we're supposed to "believe" it all, hook, line and sinker. We're spoilsports is all, and believers resent us for our honesty.

So on this matter, let me just say that Paul's angst is completely misdirected when he aims his phasers at me. For it is not my fault that the invisible and the non-existent look very much alike, and it's not my fault when invisible beings and imaginary beings behave very much alike.

Wonder Woman... That's a classic Manatism!

Let's move on.

Paul wrote:

Bethrick cites I Timothy 1:17 where we read that God is “invisible.” But what does this mean? Bethrick’s stuck at the superficial level of words. Of course this deficiency is advantageous for the one who employs equivocation as one of his main weapons. But if one were to be honest with his analysis one would move beyond the similarity of words and into the real of meaning. Only then can real critique be made. This only goes to show that Bethrick has no interest in honestly engaging Christian theists, instead he quibbles over words.

I love this: "Bethrick's stuck at the superficial level of words." I suppose anyone engaged in a debate which is conducted either verbally or in writing could say this about his opponent. In fact, why can't we say that Paul is "stuck at the superficial level of words," since he's the one who's so anxious to untangle worrisome connotations? And why leave it at that? After all, Paul's god is said to have given its "Word" on everything under the sun (except concepts, of course). Perhaps Paul's god is "stuck at the superficial level of words" as well, since it stubbornly refuses to show itself empirically. I would expect Paul to discount these inferences because of their discomforting implications for his god-belief. But when Bethrick uses words, well, he's "stuck at the superficial level of words." This is the stuff of compelling apologetics!

Yes, I did cite I Timothy 1:17 to justify my use of "invisible" in the expression "invisible magic being." This verse states:

Now unto the King eternal, immortal, invisible, the only wise God, be honour and glory for ever and ever. Amen.

Now, this verse seems pretty clear to me. It is saying that the Christian god is "invisible." "But," Paul interjects, "what does this mean?" Well, I explained what I take it to mean in my blog:

Christians claim that their god is invisible – that is, no one can see it, not even believers themselves.

Why is this controversial? Why does this understanding of 'invisible' mean that I am "stuck at the superficial level of words"? What other than words do I have to go by? It's either words or imagination at this point. Apparently Paul thinks I'm wrong not only for using my imagination to get an idea of what Christianity claims, I'm also wrong for taking Christianity's word for its descriptions! So Paul must have some other level of cognition (or non-cognition) in mind, a level which dispenses with words so that we don't risk the hazards of being "stuck at the superficial level of words." What that level might be, remains unidentified. Is I Timothy 1:17 saying that its god is not invisible? If I cannot take what the bible says on "the superficial level of words," how am I supposed to understand what it says, let alone believe it? Oh, that's right, we're supposed to believe, not understand!

But Paul should understand that I am plenty happy to engage Christians honestly. The problem is that I have not found any honest Christians. Theism by its very nature is dishonest; it is dishonest to reality, to truth, to man. And theists, especially those who are anxious to maintain division with non-believers at all costs, are notoriously prone to deception. But for the meanwhile, Paul himself seems content to "quibble over words," for it is with this triffling that he is preoccupied throughout his post.

Observe:

And so what is the Bible trying to convey when it uses the term “invisible” of God? It is indeed true that God cannot be placed into a Petri dish and examined, but that’s because he’s spirit. He’s a person without a body (or, more accurately, God is three persons without a body). He’s immaterial.

I had figured that, when the bible says that its god is invisible, that means no one can see it. Since Petri dishes did not exist back in Jesus' day (they weren't very scientifically advanced back in those days, invoking in all kinds of invisible magic beings to explain the weather, disease, strange behavior, etc.), I never got the impression from I Timothy 1:17 that it was intended to mean that "God cannot be placed into a Petri dish and examined." But that's the case with the non-existent: it cannot be examined. All one can do is make claims about it ("at the superficial level of words," mind you), and from there the imagination needs to take over in order for religious belief to progress. Here Peikoff makes a salient point:

It has often been noted that a proof of God would be fatal to religion: a God susceptible of proof would have to be finite and limited; He would be one entity among others within the universe, not a mystic omnipotence transcending science and reality. What nourishes the spirit of religion is not proof, but faith, i.e., the undercutting of man's mind. (Leonard Peikoff, "'Maybe You're Wrong'," The Objectivist Forum, April 1981, p. 12.)

So the Christian god's invisibility - that is, its inability to be perceived, empirically detected, and scientifically understood - is crucial to Christianity's mind-game formula. We're not supposed to question its existence simply because we cannot see it. "What, you doofus!! It's invisible! No one can see it! Why expect to see something that's an immaterial spirit that's invisible?" No, we're supposed to be afraid of what we cannot see. When we don't fall for the ploy and show no fear for the Christians' invisible boogeyman, they become exceedingly resentful, as we have seen.

But notice how the attributes that Christians list in describing their god, can be applied to anything one imagines. For instance, let's imagine an invisible being named "Wod." It's invisible, so we shouldn't expect to see it. Also, it's immaterial, so we shouldn't expect to be able to examine it in a Petri dish. In fact, it's beyond all empirical and scientific scrutiny, and therefore out of the reach of scientific understanding, because of the insufficiency of our sense modalities. We can't perceive Wod by looking out at the world, because our senses are not equipped to give us awareness of immaterial, spiritual beings like Wod. Also, being a spiritual being, Wod is conscious, and knows all your thoughts. Whatever you're thinking, Wod already knew that you were going to think it long before you thought it. Wod is omniscient! He knows everything. There's no knowledge possible that Wod does not already know, so don't think you're wiser than Wod! If you dare think such thoughts, then you'll anger Wod, and you don't want Wod angry at you! Not good! For when Wod gets angry, Wod demands a sacrifice. Wod requires that you sacrifice yourself for Wod's sake. No, Wod does not need your sacrifice; Wod has no needs to begin with. Wod is totally and completely sufficient already, lacking nothing, perfect in every conceivable way, and then some. Wod is great! Wod is omnipotent! Wod is whatever I want Wod to be, because Wod exists only in my imagination, and I control what I imagine. So if you want to know what Wod expects of you, come see me, as I know what Wod wants. Wod does what I want Wod to do, because Wod is nothing more than a figment of my imagination.

And so on...

That's how religion essentially works. Just add the elements of taking it seriously and being afraid that it all might be true, and you have a monstrosity that can debilitate any thinking man, so long as he happens to swim into your nets. The point is that it is easy to make up stuff about something that does not exist. You can even make up reasons to explain why doubters don't have awareness of what you've made up.

But Paul tried to qualify the bible's god being invisible:

I don’t think it is necessarily the case that “invisible things” could not be detected. Take Wonder Woman’s jet for a thought experiment. From what I remember, people could touch the jet and so there was some sort of empirical investigation that could be done on the jet. So it’s conceivable that something invisible could be detected by empirical means. It’s not conceivable that pure spirit could be directly investigated by one of the five (or, six) senses.

Paul seems to flip-flop back and forth on whether or not we have some means by which we can acquire awareness of the god he worships. It's invisible, but invisible doesn't necessarily mean that it cannot be empirically detected. Here Paul again slinks back to the cartoon imagery of Wonder Woman's invisible jet. He just can't get away from fiction, can he? How he thinks this can be helpful to his case is quite beyond me. Indeed, it only confirms the primary role of the imagination here.

As we follow him on his circuitous red herring chase, we find that Paul does allow that his god is invisible (for as we saw above, this is crucial to religion's parasitism), but unlike Wonder Woman's invisible jet, "it’s not conceivable that pure spirit could be directly investigated by one of the five (or, six) senses." Why not? Well, ultimately because Paul is in charge of his god and what notions like "immaterial" and "pure spirit" - which he uses to describe it - mean. By stipulation, they mean that we'll never be able to acquire awareness of his object of worship by means of one of our five senses (Paul seems to think he has a sixth one that isn't up to the task either). So we know what will not work. The question is: what does work? When Canon Michael Cole described his personal encounter with Jesus, he forgot to explain how he had such awareness. What he described was really nothing more than a passing mood. So Jesus is a mood, not an actual person. For the Christian, everything depends on his moodswings, his emotional investment in Jesus-belief. That's why it is so important to Paul to prove that the expression "invisible magic being" is pejorative. Of course, merely being an "unbeliever" is pejorative to the believer in and of itself. So why wouldn't the expressions an "unbeliever" uses in critiquing the Christian god-belief also be pejorative?

Now, it is important to remember that Paul wanted to take me to task for allegedly investing the word 'invisible' with the connotation of 'imaginary' when I cited I Timothy 1:17. We will now see that it was not that I invested the word 'invisible' with added connotation per se that bothered him. He likes to supplement words with additional connotations as well, only he wants to be in charge of approving which connotations can be added:

I don’t think “invisible” is the term to use when describing God’s ontological status. Rather, I think “invisible” has epistemological and spiritual connotations in the Bible. God is “invisible” (I Tim. 1:17) because he “dwells in inaccessible light” (I Tim. 6:16). Frequently “see,” as used by Paul, means “understand” (cf. Rom. 1:20, 5:6, 7:23, 11:10; 2 Cor. 10:9, etc.,). (Do you see what I mean!) God’s “invisible” according to Paul because “He dwells in unapproachable light."

When applied to the Christian god, then, the word 'invisible' really means "beyond human comprehension." And we are expected to accept what is "beyond" our comprehension as knowledge. This furthers the religion's parasitic purpose: to hoodwink the human mind and bring men into submission. It worked on Paul, and he wants it to work on everyone with whom he comes into contact. The "light" in which the Christian god "dwells" is "unapproachable," because it doesn't exist.

Eager for a someone more authoritative to step into the ring at this point, Paul appeals to Calvin, another deepseated mystic:

He means two things, that God is concealed from us, and yet that the cause of obscurity is not in himself, as if be [he?] were hidden in darkness, but in ourselves, who, on account of the weak vision, or rather the dullness of our understanding, cannot approach to his light. We must understand that the light of God is unapproachable, if any one endeavor to approach to it in his own strength; for, if God did not open up the entrance to us by his grace, the prophet would not say: "They who draw near to him are enlightened." (Ps. 35:5).

So the deficiency responsible for our not being able to perceive the Christian god is in man, not in the Christian god. (Couldn't we say the same thing about Wod?) And yet, the Christian religion says that this god created us in its own image. So what is the origin of this deficiency, if we accept Christianity's premises? We are constantly being reminded that we did not create ourselves. So whatever created us, it created us with this deficiency such that we have no means of perceiving this alleged being which allegedly "dwells in inaccessible light." Calvin says that the reason why "God is concealed from us" is "the dullness of our understanding," but then turns around to say that "we must understand that the light of God is unapproachable." But we were just told that we suffer from "dullness of understanding." How can he proceed to urge us to understand if in fact our understanding suffers from such "dullness"? We're supposed to "understand" that our understanding is "dull." Also, did you ever notice how Christians love to speak for everyone? How does Calvin, if his own understanding is what he says it is of everyone, know that everyone suffers from this "dullness of understanding"? When Christians speak for everyone, let them first speak for themselves. For instance, when Christian apologist Phil Fernandes says

I just believe that we are very good about lying to ourselves, and only accepting, uh, or interpreting the evidence the way we would like to...

he's telling us about himself, even though he presumes to be speaking on behalf of everyone. Indeed, Christians continually confuse themselves with the omniscient being they worship in their imagination.

Paul concludes:

And so it certainly can be the case that we would even have a problem with Bethrick’s use of the word “invisible.”

But they don't have a problem when the bible uses the same word. And I'm accused of being "stuck at the superficial level of words"? The question is: Is the Christian god invisible, or not? Why no straight answers here? What is the believer afraid of? Is he afraid of committing himself to a position that will later be shown to be untenable? If not, then why all the squirming and wordplay?

Magic and the Supernatural

We have seen that Paul made a rather weak attempt to discredit my use of 'invisible' in the expression "invisible magic being." His red herring dodges, false dichotomies and fabricated charges have all been answered so far. Now we turn our attention to the last element in the expression that Paul finds offensive, namely the word 'magic'. In my blog on the topic, I had predicted that this word would be the most controversial, and Paul has confirmed that I am right on this point. And it is at this point that Paul's pettiness shifts into higher gear. He writes:

...let’s move on then to his justification for applying the term “magic” to God. It’s important to note that Bethrick calls magic a “term.” The problem is that he runs to the dictionary. Dictionaries do not have terms in them, only words and the building blocks for making a term.

Paul seems to be saying that a term cannot consist of a single word (if that's not what he's trying to say, then he needs to put more effort into making his position clear). But this is not my understanding. In fact, I've never heard that a term cannot be a single word. At the risk of committing more fatal errors (like "running to the dictionary"), I looked up the word 'term' at Paul's preferred dictionary.com. Here's what I found under the entry for 'term':

1. a word or group of words designating something, esp. in a particular field, as atom in physics, quietism in theology, adze in carpentry, or district leader in politics.
2. any word or group of words considered as a member of a construction or utterance.
3. the time or period through which something lasts.
4. a period of time to which limits have been set: elected for a term of four years.
5. one of two or more divisions of a school year, during which instruction is regularly provided.
6. an appointed or set time or date, as for the payment of rent, interest, wages, etc.

Note that none of these definitions stipulate that a single word cannot be a term. The first two defintions, in fact, specify that a term can consist of a word as well as a group of words. And if a term can consist of a single word, why think that "dictionaries do not have terms in them"?

Recall that I had stated:

The controversial element of the expression in dispute, then, must, by process of elimination, be the use of the adjective ‘magic’. But in my view, this term is wholly warranted.

I used the word 'term' to refer to the adjective 'magic'. According to the definition of 'term' quoted above, this is quite in keeping with the second definition above: "any word or group of words considered as a member of a construction or utterance." If "invisible magic being" is the "construction or utterance" in mind, then 'magic' is clearly a term by this definition, since it it is a member of that "construction or utterance."

Paul continues with his pettiness:

Also, a dictionary is something like a history book. It simply reports how words have been used by society. They are little more than helpful hints as to how used have been used.

To the extent that this is the case with dictionaries (and I'd say that dictionaries offer more than merely "helpful hints"), it does not at all worry me. We will see that Paul will appeal to common practice in order to argue that the word 'magic' should not apply to his god. But Paul's words here suggest that we have the green light to dismiss common practice as just a matter of how a word has been "used by society" historically. After all, the meanings of words do change over time, right?

Paul then writes:

Furthermore, he uses Webster’s, but that’s not the only dictionary.

Yes, that's true, there are numerous dictionaries out there. I never implied that Webster's is the only one.

Then Paul himself makes a mad dash for the dictionary himself:

Dictionary dot com has “magic” defined in various ways,

1.the art of producing illusions as entertainment by the use of sleight of hand, deceptive devices, etc.; legerdemain; conjuring: to pull a rabbit out of a hat by magic.

2.the art of producing a desired effect or result through the use of incantation or various other techniques that presumably assure human control of supernatural agencies or the forces of nature. Compare contagious magic, imitative magic, sympathetic magic.

In my blog, readers with above-mediocre comprehension skills will recall that I had stated:

By ‘magic’ I do not mean “the art of producing illusions by sleight of hand,” for such tricks can be performed by human beings who possess no supernatural powers and make no use of supernatural powers. If you slip him enough martinis, a magician might even divulge how he does his tricks.

So it should be clear that I did not have the first definition that Paul cites here in mind.

Let's take a closer look at the second defintion that Paul quoted:

the art of producing a desired effect or result through the use of incantation or various other techniques that presumably assure human control of supernatural agencies or the forces of nature. Compare contagious magic, imitative magic, sympathetic magic.

This approaches what I mean by 'magic' insofar as it acknowledges the association between magic and "the supernatural," which is what I have in mind when I use the expression "invisible magic being." This should not be difficult to understand: the idea of magic is intimately associated with belief in the supernatural.

Paul made another run for the dictionary:

The American Heritage dictionary cites these two examples first,

1. The art that purports to control or forecast natural events, effects, or forces by invoking the supernatural.

2. The practice of using charms, spells, or rituals to attempt to produce supernatural effects or control events in nature. The charms, spells, and rituals so used.

This source also acknowledges the association of magic with "the supernatural." Christians want us to believe in "the supernatural," so it seems they should welcome the use of the adjective 'magic' when speaking of their god and other invisible beings. The word 'magic' simply acknowledges the element of supernaturalism that is integral to religious belief.

But Paul is not comfortable with this, so he appeals to what he believes is the popular understanding of 'magic' in order to disqualify its applicability to his object of worship:

It seems, though, that most people have the idea of humans doing something that can be attributed to the divine, and so when the divine works a miracle, that is not “magic.”

Paul wants to dismiss the applicability of 'magic' to his god on the grounds that it has customarily been understood to involve human beings attempting to tap into a supernatural source. This is an appeal to custom, which has certain strengths, but also certain weaknesses. I have not taken any surveys on this to confirm or refute what Paul says, but I think there would be several reasons for why many thinkers might "have the idea of humans doing something that can be attributed to the divine," which I will explain. However, just note that even when Paul appeals to custom, the association between magic and supernaturalism is clearly present in his acknowledgement that "most people" have some reference to "the divine" in mind when contemplating stories of magic.

Now one reason why people might think of human beings instead of a divine being proper when thinking of magic per se, is due to preponderance of modeling, not because magic is inapplicable to "the divine." That is, most storybooks which include episodes involving the use of magic center around human beings who encounter seemingly insurmountable challenges but who also possess some favor or privilege (cf. "grace") bestowed on them from some supernatural source (say a miraculous birth, first instance, or an inheritance of some kind). The portrayal of otherwise human characters is not only to make the story interesting, but also to give it some relevance to those who might enjoy reading it. For consider: a story exclusively about a divine being which faces no fundamental alternative as man does (e.g., life vs. death) would make for very boring reading, because it would never face danger or challenge, so such stories would not survive because of their inherent lack of interest. Essentially, there'd be nothing to build a plot with, nor would human readers who do not live entirely in the world of fantasy find much to relate to in such stories. Only if human beings (or personified animals who behave like human beings and have needs similar to human beings) are involved does the story acquire any interest (cf. the book of Genesis). But it does not follow from any of this that the adjective 'magic' is inapplicable to what the Christians describe as their god. I see no problem with calling what the Christian god is said to have done magical. It is said to have created the universe. Did it create the universe through physical effort, collecting materials from here and there and assembling them into planets, stars and galaxies? No, it did so magically, by essentially willing it into existence. That's what we've been told to believe. If I saw Samantha Stevens summon a famous personality into her house ex nihilo, I'd call it magic. Why wouldn't I call what Christians say their god does magic as well? I call the energy that is available in the wall outlets throughout my house 'electricity'. Why would I not call the energy that is generated by and distributed from the power plant that feeds my house 'electricity' as well?

The second reason for why some people might resist using the adjective 'magic' when referring to "when the divine works a miracle," is lurking in the passage that Paul himself quoted from Easton's 1897 bible dictionary. Observe:

The Jews seem early to have consulted the teraphim (q.v.) for oracular answers(Judg. 18:5, 6; Zech. 10:2). There is a remarkable illustration of thisdivining by teraphim in Ezek. 21:19-22. We read also of the divining cup ofJoseph (Gen. 44:5). The magicians of Egypt are frequently referred to in thehistory of the Exodus. Magic was an inherent part of the ancient Egyptianreligion, and entered largely into their daily life. All magical arts weredistinctly prohibited under penalty of death in the Mosaic law. The Jews werecommanded not to learn the "abomination" of the people of the Promised Land(Lev. 19:31; Deut. 18:9-14). The history of Saul's consulting the witch ofEndor (1 Sam. 28:3-20) gives no warrant for attributing supernatural power tomagicians. From the first the witch is here only a bystander. The practice ofmagic lingered among the people till after the Captivity, when they graduallyabandoned it. It is not much referred to in the New Testament. The Magimentioned in Matt. 2:1-12 were not magicians in the ordinary sense of the word.They belonged to a religious caste, the followers of Zoroaster, the astrologersof the East. Simon, a magician, was found by Philip at Samaria (Acts 8:9-24);and Paul and Barnabas encountered Elymas, a Jewish sorcerer, at Paphos(13:6-12). At Ephesus there was a great destruction of magical books
(Acts19:18, 19). [sic]

All this merely shows that, for the religionist, 'magic' is what other religions practice. So naturally, when the term is applied to their own religion, they take offense. But where does this offense originate? Well, it originates in the pejorative intentions that prompted religionists in using it to refer to rival religious groups. They invested it with pejorative connotations in order to claim a moral high ground that simply does not exist. The passage states that "Saul's consulting the witch ofEndor (1 Sam. 28:3-20) gives no warrant for attributing supernatural power tomagicians." [sic] But we don't need the bible's sanction in order to attribute supernatural power to magicians. What is going to happen if we do something that the bible-thumpers don't like? They'll get offended is all. But so what? Even Easton's associates magic with religious ritual. So Paul's citing of Easton's only helps to seal my case.

Paul then confesses the worry that "with so many definitions there's an air of subjectivity to which definition one will choose." I take this as an acknowledgement that there are numerous ways that the word 'magic' can be defined, and thus it could be defined in such a way that my application of it to the Christian god is not inappropriate, given the way Christians describe it.

But Paul continues to pout:

Recall that Bethrick gave Webster’s definition and then said that he’s “warranted” in applying this term to God. Though he may think he is warranted in applying this term to God, we’ve actually steered off course now. Bethrick’s job, as he told us, was to show how this word was not pejorative as applied to God. But, since “pejoratives” are words meant to belittle or degrade something then it matters not if Bethrick is “warranted” in using the term! Betrhick forgot what he was trying to prove not even four paragraphs into his blog entry!

Where did I say that my "job... was to show how this word was not pejorative as applied to God"? Again, Paul's reading comprehension skills come under question. I stated the purpose of my blog quite explicitly:

James states that he “never understood why” I use this term, so I will take this opportunity to explain it.

Notice that I did not write to refute the charge that "invisible magic being" is "pejorative." I take Paul's tender sensibilities as sufficient evidence that this term has caused him plenty of emotional consternation, and I doubt that there's anything I'd ever be able to say to persuade him from believing that I use this term just to get under his skin. Christians have made it clear to me that they're going to believe what they want to believe, and nothing I can say will make much of an impact either way, even when they have admitted their ignorance on a relevant matter.

Paul suggests that

One should think twice about the “arguments” of a man who can’t even keep his own thoughts straight four paragraphs into a argument or defense piece.

And Paul should read a little more carefully, noting the purpose I state for writing something. Meanwhile, I would hope that my readers think about my arguments more than merely "twice." Perhaps Paul said this because he doesn't want people to think about the arguments he gives (whenever he might happen to do so), and skip right to the conclusion, hold up their right hands and say "Amen!"

Paul then feigns (again) to speak for everyone:

We can all agree that Bethrick failed to defend his case and answer James Anderson.

Specifically, defend what case? James expressed that he did not understand why I use a term that he considers pejorative. So I explained it. How did I "fail" in this task? Indeed, Paul seems to have had repeated trouble in simply comprehending what I wrote.

Paul writes:

More than that, I think it is obvious that Bethrick intends his claim that God is an “invisible magic being” to have negative and belittling connotations attached to it, and therefore it is indeed a pejorative.

"Bad Dawson! Bad Dawson! Naughty naughty!!!"

Again, I use the term 'invisible magic being' because it is open-ended. That is my primary purpose in using it: it is intended to cover any postulated mystical entity which is said to exist beyond the reach of our senses and possess conscious powers which we do not observe anywhere in nature (for instance, creating universes, turning water into wine, healing congenital blindness, causing diseases like epilepsy, stilling storms, and other magical feats). If in the meantime the Christian is offended by this, that's not my problem.

Paul then tried to disqualify the definitions which I did cite in my blog from applying to the Christian god. Recall that they were the following:

“the use of means (as charms or spells) believed to have supernatural power over natural forces,”

or

“an extraordinary power or influence seemingly from a supernatural source.”

Paul reacted as follows:

Now, we can knock out the first definition since God doesn’t use “charms or spells” to have “supernatural power” over “natural forces.”

I expected as much from the master of trivialities himself. But this is insufficient for while the first definition does include the phrase "the use of means (as charms or spells)," it in no way restricts the means by which magic is plied to only those which it specifically names. By saying "as charms or spells," I take these to be examples, not exhaustive possibilities. But even so, how does Paul know that his god "doesn't use 'charms or spells'"? Well, I'm glad you asked. As I pointed out above, Paul "knows" this because he's in charge of what his god is and is not, what it uses and does not use, what it can and cannot do. Paul offers no objective means for going out and confirming what he claims about his god; rather, his stipulation is given on a "take it on my say so" basis. Meanwhile, because of his finely-tuned pettiness, Paul misses the primary point to citing these definitions, which is the association they acknowledge between 'magic' and "the supernatural."

Paul then stated:

Indeed, give[n] the reformed view of providence, there are no such things as “natural forces.”

Um, yeah. Again please: Paul says "there are no such things as 'natural forces'." Try telling this to the victims of Hurricane Katrina, or those who were swallowed up by the December 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean. "...no such things as 'natural forces'"? And people wonder why science and religion are so much at odds with each other? On Paul's view, there's no such thing as causality, inertia, thermodynamics, gravity, centrifical force, friction, aerodynamics, chemical reactions, hydrolics, etc. My, the delusion is strong with this one.

Paul tried to make another stab at the definitions I cited:

Second, these definitions clearly imply the common use of the word in that it is understood that humans are the ones doing the “magical acts.” They “have power” which comes from a supernatural force.

I already spoke to this point above, so I shan't repeat myself. I'll just remind my readers that "common use" does not always coincide with carefully considered use.

Paul made another ill-fated attempt:

Third, even if we applied this to God, this would not be a good definition since it fails to distinguish God from, say, another worker of magic. Stated another way, Dawson has broken one of the rules for making a good definition.

Again, Paul seems not to have read my entry very carefully. Note what I had written:

And contrary to what Anderson says, my use of this expression does in fact add to my analysis in that it covers more than just the Christian god; in addition to Christianity’s deity, it also includes any rival deity which non-Christian religionists might imagine.

I don't know how I could have made my point more explicitly clear: I use this term because it is open-ended. I don't want to leave out anything that would apply, so it would be unhelpful to my atheological purposes to specify just the Christian god, when in fact my points very well may suitably apply to other alleged gods and mystical beings. For instance, when I say that I do not believe in any invisible magic beings, it should be clear that I'm not singling out just the Christian god, or just the Islamic god, or just the Lahu god. I'm throwing a net wide enough to engulf them all. The expression 'invisible magic being' is the ultimate trash compactor in this sense.

Paul says that I have "broken one of the rules for making a good definition." He does not identify which rule he has in mind, so it appears to be another toothless charge. In fact, what holds a definition together is the centrality it gives to a conceptual common denominator. In the case of 'magic', the common denominator is the claim to some "supernatural power." This violates no "rules for making a good definition" that I'm aware of.

Paul made one last effort to discount the definitions I quoted:

Fourth, it is clearly obvious that the vast majority of people have something like Harry Potter in mind when they think of “magic.” Even when I was a god-hater I never thought of God as “magical.” Indeed, in all my research of this term I did not see one instance where Jehovah was ever referred to as magical. However, I did see a plethora of instances where this term was applied to something humans did.

I spoke to this point above as well. Simply, stories involving human beings would be much more interesting and relevant to human readers than stories exclusively about supernatural beings bearing descriptions like those that Christians give of their god. But points like this will not matter much to Paul, for he's bent on special pleading his case. For consider, if we read of someone turning water into wine in a Harry Potter book, Paul's point here acknowledges that most people would have no problem calling it "magic." But Paul insists that it is "pejorative" if we use this word the very same thing happens in a storybook called the Book of John.

Paul says that "in all my research of this term" - he's working on his dissertation, no doubt - "I did not see one instance where Jehovah was ever referred to as magical." So Paul offers us the stable footing of an argument from silence: "I never saw anyting referring to the Christian god as 'magical', therefore this word does not apply!" Paul's case doesn't get any stronger than this, and it can't.

Then after sharing his foot-and-mouth disease with his readers, Paul acknowledges an important point:

But, Dawson really has something more basic in mind when he applies this term to God.

Yes, I certainly do. What I have in mind is not "charms or spells" per se, for instance, but the orientation between subject and object. Magic is a name for the power alleged to belong to a subject which holds metaphysical primacy over the world of objects. It's a power that Jesus tapped into in order to perform miracles, and it is a power that Harry Potter taps into in order to get out of sudden difficulties.

Paul then quoted me:

Do not Christians believe that their god has "supernatural power over natural forces," that it possesses "an extraordinary power or influence"? Is their god not said to be "a supernatural source"?

Paul reacted to this as follows:

First, I do not believe in “natural forces.”

We saw Paul state this above. It makes me feel very sad for him, as it shows not only how out of touch with reality his worldview is, it also shows how desperate he is to maintain division with those who do not believe in his invisible magic being.

He then wrote:

Second, I don’t know what Bethrick means by calling God a “supernatural source.”

Well, what do Christians mean by 'supernatural'? Christians think that "the natural order" has a supernatural source. For Christians, that supernatural source is the will of the Christian god. It is conceived as a conscious faculty which has the power to will anything it wants into existence and conform whatever does exist to whatever it wants it to be. I know, bizarre, isn't it?

Paul took another leap of inference:

I take it that Dawson is calling the traditional attribute “omnipotence,” magic. He’s saying, “Hey, God is supernatural, and he has power, therefore he’s magical.” But this is obviously an equivocation. The problem here is that if this is what it is to be “magical” than the term can be applied to nothing else!

Amazing, isn't it? I nowhere affirmed that 'magic' is identical to what Christians mean by 'omnipotence', but here Paul wants to "take it" that I have made such an equation. Why? Well, it allows him to accuse me with another fallacy. So given this end, it doesn't matter what I have stated, the goal of discrediting me outweighs any need to deal with the issues in an honest manner. But I will say this, since he introduced the matter: While I do not say that "magic" means "omnipotence," I would say that the meaning of the word 'magic' is open-ended (as I mentioned above) and thus subsumes what Christians mean by 'omnipotence', for the conceptual common denominator - namely the primacy of consciousness - is there. This answers Paul's concern as to whether or not "the term can be applied" to anything else.

Paul again reiterated his point that "'magic' is traditionally understood as the non-supernatural 'tapping in' to the supernatural in order to have some control over the environment, or discern some information from the netherworld," but I have already dealt with this. It's a dead end for Paul for the variety of reasons that I have already spelled out.

Paul ignores the fact that the open-endedness of the word 'magic' allows for a broad spectrum of degrees:

God is not like this in any respect. Actually, what pops into most people’s minds when they hear the word “magic” is maybe an image of a Leprechaun. Or Harry Potter. But none of these beings are anywhere close to being like God. It’s not even a comparison.

This statement is tendentiously Procrustean, driven expressly to deny to the Christian god rightful membership in a class to which it belongs, just to avoid it from being tarnished with a word that Paul finds personally offensive. The foul odor of Paul's special pleading has become intolerable as he presumes to speak for "most people's minds." No doubt he's been endowed with a magical ability to know "what pops into most people's minds" given certain stimuli. So what if images of Leprechauns and Harry Potter "pop into most people's minds." This by itself is not an argument. Harry Potter, Leprechauns, gnomes, faeries, and the rest may simply represent the lower tiers of the magic continuum. I'm happy to let Paul suppose that his god occupies one of the higher tiers if it makes him feel better.

Paul tries to stipulate the debate into his favor again:

The only way that it’s close is if one views the God of the Bible as being a creature like this, but the problem is that this then is not the God of the Bible anymore.

No, that is not the only way. What unites notions like Leprechauns, Harry Potter, faeries, and sundry deities (including the Christian god) has nothing to do with "being a creature." On the contrary, whether something is thought to be a creature or a creator is a non-essential. The questions to ask are: Is the agent in question associated with belief in the supernatural? Does the agent in question possess or at any rate wield a power alleged to be performed by a faculty of consciousness but which we do not find manifested in nature or in man-made machines? Etc. Examples can include, but are not exclusively restricted to: flying on a broomstick, walking on unfrozen water, opening giant doors at the utterance of a command, parting the Red Sea, conjuring reptiles, turning water into wine, endowing love potions with their mystical properties, etc.

Wishing and the Christian God

Paul then sought to widen the great divide by denying that his god wishes. Recall that I had stated:

“According to its spokesmen, this magic-endowed personal agent can wish things into existence (cf. “creation ex nihilo”).”

In response to this, Paul wrote:

Bethrick again makes use of pejoratives (e.g., “wish). The problem is that God doesn’t wish. Wishing is usually understood as the desire for something you cannot have, or want really really bad, but it’s so unattainable that the only way to get it is by “wishing” for it.

I thought man was “created in the image of God.” How can man do something that god cannot do? At any rate, in one sense Paul is right: his god does not wish, but not for the reasons he has given. Rather, his god does not wish because his god is not real. It would have to be real in the first place in order for it to be capable of wishing. But even his come-back here is weak, and it would be easy to overcome by a believer who wanted his god to be capable of wishing. Paul says that "wishing is usually understood as the desire for something you cannot have," and applied to human beings, that may certainly be the case at least part of the time. A believer however could easily say that, when applied to his god, the idea of unattainability is logically excluded, for whatever the magic being wants, the magic being gets. After all, this is what we find in the bible. So our would-be believer could easily respond to Paul by saying that he is unnecessarily packing anthropomorphic presuppositions into the meaning of 'wishing'.

But Paul will probably insist until he's blue in the face that his god does not wish. Look at all the things Paul’s god cannot do:

–verb (used with object)
1. to want; desire; long for (usually fol. by an infinitive or a clause): I wish to travel. I wish that it were morning.
2. to desire (a person or thing) to be (as specified): to wish the problem settled.
3. to entertain wishes, favorably or otherwise, for: to wish someone well; to wish someone ill.
4. to bid, as in greeting or leave-taking: to wish someone a good morning.
5. to request or charge: I wish him to come.
–verb (used without object)
6. to desire; long; yearn (often fol. by for): Mother says I may go if I wish. I wished for a book.
7. to make a wish: She wished more than she worked.
–noun
8. an act or instance of wishing.
9. a request or command: I was never forgiven for disregarding my father's wishes.
10. an expression of a wish, often one of a kindly or courteous nature: to send one's best wishes.
11. something wished or desired: He got his wish—a new car.

I don't see any definition here which includes in it the idea that whatever is wished for will not be attained. In fact, the first definition equates wishing with wanting and desiring. And the bible models the Christian god wanting and desiring in many instances. But, more on this below.

For now I think it is noteworthy to point out that Paul apparently disagrees with Cornelius Van Til. For Van Til clearly assumed that the Christian god can wish:

... it was God’s will that sin should come into the world. He wished to enhance his glory by means of its punishment and removal. (Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, p. 160; emphasis added)

Again, Paul thinks that he can say that his god does not wish, because Paul determines what his god is and is not, what his god can and cannot do. The reason why Christians have so many internal disagreements is because one Christian will imagine his god one way, while another Christian imagines his god another way, and never shall the two meet. Here's an instance where the way Paul imagines his god is at variance with the way Van Til imagined his god.

Now for some bible quotes. Note how many times the bible portrays its god wishing:

Psalm 115:3: “Our God is in the heavens, and he does as he wishes.”

Proverbs 21:1: “The king's heart is like channels of water in the hand of the LORD; He turns it wherever He wishes.”

Isaiah 46:9-10: “Remember the things I have done in the past. For I alone am God! I am God, and there is none like me. Only I can tell you the future before it even happens. Everything I plan will come to pass, for I do whatever I wish.”

Daniel 4:17: "This sentence is by the decree of the angelic watchers, And the decision is a command of the holy ones,In order that the living may know, That the Most High is ruler over the realm of mankind, And bestows it on whom He wishesAnd sets over it the lowliest of men."

Daniel 4:25: “that you be driven away from mankind and your dwelling place be with the beasts of the field, and you be given grass to eat like cattle and be drenched with the dew of heaven; and seven periods of time will pass over you, until you recognize that the Most High is ruler over the realm of mankind and bestows it on whomever He wishes.”

Malachi 1:10: “'How I wish one of you would shut the Temple doors so that these worthless sacrifices could not be offered! I am not pleased with you', says the Lord of Heaven’s Armies, 'and I will not accept your offerings'.”

According to one gospel, Peter thought that Jesus could wish:

Matthew 17:4-5: “Peter said to Jesus, "Lord, it is good for us to be here. If you wish, I will put up three shelters—one for you, one for Moses and one for Elijah." While he was still speaking, a bright cloud enveloped them, and a voice from the cloud said, "This is my Son, whom I love; with him I am well pleased. Listen to him!"

According to another gospel, Jesus wished:

Luke 12:49: "I have come to cast fire upon the earth; and how I wish it were already kindled!”

Luke 19:42: “He said, `I wish you knew today what things would give you peace! But now you do not see what they are’.”

And according to yet another gospel, Jesus affirmed that his god wishes:

John 5:21: "For just as the Father raises the dead and gives them life, even so the Son also gives life to whom He wishes.”

Additionally, the apostle Paul thought his god could wish:

Romans 1:10: “I ask God that in some way now I may be able to visit you, if he wishes me to do it.”

I Corinthians 15:38: “But God gives it a body just as He wished, and to each of the seeds a body of its own.”

Ephesians 1:1: “I am Paul, an apostle of Jesus Christ. It was God's wish for me to be his messenger. I send greetings to God's people in the city of Ephesus, to those who believe in Christ Jesus.”

So according to the bible, which I always thought spoke for Christianity, the Christian god is in fact supposed to wish. Perhaps the way the authors of the bible imagined their god differs with the way Paul imagines his god on this point.

Paul then says that:

Creation ex nihilo has never been understood by any atheologian as “wishing.”

Really? How does Paul know this? He does not say. I guess we're all supposed to bow our heads and nod in silence.

Paul seems to confuse me with a believer:

Dawson’s claiming that: “a being able to do all His holy will, including doing anything with what He‘s created” created the world out of nothing.

This is wrong: I never claimed that anything "created the world out of nothing."

The Scourge of Objectivism

Paul then tried to launch an attack against Objectivism. He wrote:

Objectivism has three axioms which they think are unique to Objectivism and unique to Dawson’s own worldview and also devastating to Christian theism. They are: the axioms of (1) existence, (2) identity, and (3) consciousness.

Does Paul know of any other philosophies which name these facts explicitly as their axioms in the manner that Objectivism does? Paul sometimes tries to claim that these axioms are not unique to Objectivism, though I've not seen him identify any other philosophy which affirms them as Objectivism does. And if Paul could produce another philosophy which happened to agree with Objectivism's axioms, would it follow from this that either the axioms or Objectivism as a whole is false? Of course not.

Paul reveals his level of understanding when he gives his flash-card summary of Objectivism:

Real fast and in order, (1) is also called by the famous phrase “existence exists” (when you ask Objectivists what “existence exists” means they’ll tell you it means “things exist”). (2) Simply states that an entity is itself and not another thing (A is A). (3) States that (a) consciousness does not have primacy over existence (something must exist in order for you to be conscious, a consciousness with nothing to be conscious of is, according to Rand, a contradiction in terms) and (b) consciousness is axiomatic because you’d have to be conscious to deny that you were conscious.

This is pretty close, though much more can be said. For instance, the implication of all three axioms is that existence exists independent of consciousness, that consciousness did not create reality, that the task of consciousness is to perceive and identify what exists, not create and alter what exists at will. Paul makes use of these truths whenever he shoves a donut in his mouth, drives his car, makes love to his wife, or sets down to write another scathing post against Dawson Bethrick. But when he's confronted with these truths in the context of an apologetic debate, that's when he begins to buck.

Paul then wrote:

It’s dubious how these can be used as an argument against theism, though. For example, how does the fact that “things exist” even remotely count as an argument against theism?

What about (1), (2) and (3) did Paul not understand? The axiom 'existence exists' is a starting point. If we begin with the fact that existence exists, then there’s no need to posit something that created existence. We all have to start somewhere. What is your starting point? This question may be difficult to answer if one is reluctant to let go of sacred cow assumptions and beliefs that he's in the habit of accepting as true on faith. But if we cut past all those assumptions, uprooting them from below the surface where they were accepted uncritically, digging down to the very bedrock of our cognition, what do we find? Some Christians of course are going to say "God." But to what does this word refer? What does it mean? If he says it refers to "the creator of the universe," then already we can see he's not dug deep enough. For the notion "creator of the universe" is not conceptually irreducible; it clings to too many prior assumptions to be a genuine starting point. For one, it assumes the truth of Objectivism's starting points: to assert the existence of a "creator of the universe," something would have to exist (there's (1)), he would have to mean "creator" as opposed to something other than a creator (there's (2)), and he'd have to be conscious in order to make such a claim in the first place (there's (3)). Also we can ask: by what means do you have awareness of this thing you call "God"? If he says he inferred its existence from prior premises, then he's explicitly admitting that there are more fundamental assumptions lurking around that need to be identified and examined. That would discount "God" as his starting point. If he claims to have awareness of his god by looking inward, well, "inward" as opposed to what? "Outward"? Well, how did he make this distinction if he did not look outwardly first? If he thinks he looked inwardly first, how did he come to distinguish the inner from the outer? How does he distinguish what he calls "God" from what he is merely imagining? Again, Christians are out of luck on all these points on account of the stolen concepts they've accepted at the most fundamental level of cognition.

It is important to notice how the theist's would-be starting point assumes the truth of mine. In other words, my starting point would have to be true in order for the theist to assert his. I explained this here. The believer in Wod says that his invisible magic being exists, and I say existence exists. Where did the Wod-believer get the concept ‘exists’? He is borrowing from my worldview. Bugs ya, don’t it?

If we begin with the fact of existence, then it should be obvious that it is nonsensical to ask for an explanation of existence. There goes the cosmological argument. For details, see here, here, and here.

Paul asks:

And, how is this at all unique to Bethrick’s position?

Well, for one, Objectivism makes the recognition of these facts, and the conceptual hierarchy which they imply, explicit from the very beginning. Also, Objectivism remains consistent to these facts throughout its various branches. Where does Christianity explicitly affirm the axiom ‘existence exists’? It is unique to Objectivism because Objectivism is unique in affirming it explicitly as its conceptually irreducible starting point.

Paul writes:

Christianity teaches that God exists and has existed eternally.

And just to entertain such a teaching, the Objectivist axioms would have to be true: something would have to exist, that something would have to be itself as opposed to something other than itself, and you would have to be conscious in order to have awareness of such teachings.

Paul writes:

Christianity begins with the creation account.

Which, as I indicated above, takes for granted numerous prior assumptions that Christian teachings leave unexpressed and unexplained. Try this: start with the fact that existence exists independent of any consciousness, and build an argument which remains consistent with this fact but seeks to conclude that a conscious being created existence. The Christian may say: "But we say God exists." So he agrees that existence does not require an agent to "account for" it. Boom, you're done: the Christian's god is out of a job. It's no longer needed as an explanation of what exists.

Paul writes:

One could say that one of the things you come away with no matter what from reading Genesis 1-2 is that “things exist!”

For one, no one needed to read Genesis in order to recognize the fact that things exist. Genesis is completely irrelevant. Also, it's not what “you come away with no matter what from reading Genesis 1-2,” it’s what had to be true in order for it to be written and read in the first place. What had to be true in order for the Genesis story to be written? The Objectivist axioms did.

Paul writes:

The Objectivist makes a mountain out of molehill with this one.

How so? Objectivism is simply making the rational thinker's conceptually irreducible starting point explicit. How is that “mak[ing] a mountain out of a molehill”? Does Paul have any sustainable objection to make against Objectivism? So far he's shooting blanks.

Paul writes:

So, my contention is that one cannot possibly mount a successful atheological argument from the axiomatic claim that ‘things exist’.

Well, woop-di-doo. Paul's "contention" assumes much more than he lets on, and his understanding is selectively permeable. Remember earlier in this blog I asked you, my readers, to keep in mind Paul's charge that I committed the fallacy of slanting. That fallacy was defined as:

Deliberately omitting, de-emphasizing, or overemphasizing certain points to the exclusion of others in order to hide evidence that is important and relevant to the conclusion of the argument and that should be taken into account of in an argument.

It seems Paul is doing just this throughout his "devastating critique" of Objectivism. He deliberately ignores the crucial role that my atheology gives to the issue of metaphysical primacy, omits identifying any objective means by which he might have awareness of what he calls "God," ignores the fact that statements like "God exists and has existed eternally" and teachings such as "the creation account" draw on abundant prior assumptions that are needed to prop up such beliefs. He ignores the fact that Objectivism's axioms would need to be true in order for him to claim that Christianity is true in the first place. All this deception is integral to the way Paul frames the issues here.

Alright, let’s review Paul's contention. Does he begin by identifying a starting point that does not assume the truth of mine? No, he begins by mischaracterizing the Objectivist axiom 'existence exists', which he shouldn't need to do if he were so confident in his contention:

To the extent that an argument can be made, “existence exists” will not be axiomatic anymore and hence subject to all the epistemological missiles who choose to launch at it.

How will making an argument cause “existence exists” to no longer be axiomatic? What argument do you have in mind? What “epistemological missiles” could have any meaning if the axiom ‘existence exists’ were not true? The axioms are invulnerable; they have to be true for anyone to launch any "epistemological missles" in the first place. And if they direct those missiles at the axioms, they're simply shooting themselves in the foot. Hardly a surefire method of attacking Objectivism.

So far it seems Paul is the one who’s making a mountain out of a molehill here.

Paul writes:

So the objectivist has two options: (a) keep his axiom and loose his critique against Christianity or (b) loose his axiom and be forced to defend a position not unlike this one: “existence exists means that only indestructible hard bits of matter exist and even an omnipotent God cannot affect them.”

I was hoping that Paul would explain how assembling an argument (any argument?) would cause 'existence exists' to lose its axiomatic status. Instead, he does a drive-by on this and assumes that's sufficient, then lists two alternatives (as is so common with religious apologists: they love to back people in between an imaginary rock and a fictitious hard place) from which we're supposed to make some difficult choices. The question is: Why are Paul's (a) and (b) our only two options? Why do Christians so habitually suppress the rational alternative? Namely: Begin with the fact that existence exists, recognize that it exists independent of consciousness, and move on from there. What’s wrong with that? Paul doesn’t like it because it does not allow room for his invisible magic being. No wonder he’s in the business of making mountains out of molehills; he wants to practice using his faith to cast them into the sea!

Paul writes:

When the objectivist makes this move ((b)) it won’t be too hard to slice and dice him.

Paul needs to take his plan back to the drawing board, because chances are, most Objectivists are simply not going to accept his characterization of matter, and thus will simply scoff at his proposed dichotomies. They are like cardboard cut-outs of out-of-work actors in an auto parts store, tenuously held up by Elmer's and popsicle sticks.

Paul continues:

I’ll address (3) briefly since (2) concerns us with the post by Bethrick that I’m replying to. So, regarding consciousness: (i) Dawson’s a materialist and so I don’t think he can account for consciousness.

Where does Paul get the idea that I am a materialist? Does Paul not realize that one need not be a materialist in order to reject belief in invisible magic beings? I've pointed out to Paul before what apologist Greg Welty has said on this point:

materialism is not 'the consistent testimony of the modern atheist.' Many atheists believe that something more than concrete, material objects exist, and present plenty of arguments for that view. Acting as if they're all materialists makes us look, well, a bit outdated. Sort of like never progressing beyond Hume in our understanding of 'the inductive problem'. (Re: On b) and possibly not-a)

What is Paul's primary objection to materialism? Is it not its incompatibility with the fact that we are conscious? Consciousness is often thought to be something other than material in nature, so a view which stipulates that matter and only matter exists (and that nothing that is not matter does not exist) seems to pose a problem with this fact. Paul can put his missile-launcher down, for Objectivism explicitly affirms the fact that we are conscious. If Paul still thinks there's a problem here, he's welcome to produce a statement from the Objectivist corpus which stipulates that only matter exists and that consciousness does not exist. How long should we wait for him to produce such a quote?

Meanwhile, what exactly does Paul mean by “account for consciousness”? I simply recognize that consciousness is real. Why do I need to “account for” it? What am I supposed to say at this point? “Duh, I donno, must be God did it!”? How does Paul know that I have no “account for” consciousness?

Since he brings up the issue, we must ask: what according to Paul qualifies as a satisfactory “account for” consciousness? Does he think that an appeal to his god will satisfactorily “account for” consciousness? How so? If Paul thinks his god is conscious, then he’s simply pointing to what needs to be “accounted for” in the first place. So theism offers no progress whatsoever on this point. It's worse than vicious circularity; it's go-nowhere-quickly-itis.

Paul writes:

That is, if Dawson’s Objectivism (I say Dawson’s since I don’t know if materialism is necessitated by Objectivism) is correct, then we’re not conscious
in any interesting way.

Is this supposed to be an argument? For or against what? Precisely what does Paul mean by “conscious in any interesting way”? And why doesn't he explain this? To be conscious in any particular way (for instance, "in any interesting way"), one would have to have the capacity of consciousness in the first place. Paul is simply telling us about himself here: he’s so prone to taking consciousness for granted that explicitly recognizing it seems degrading somehow. But it's still a fact that consciousness is real, and it's still a fact that one would have to be conscious in order to deny his own or anyone else's consciousness. So the Objectivist axiom of consciousness prevails, while Paul is caught once again reaching for a non-argument. And yet at the same time, he quibbles with consciousness because it’s not sufficiently interesting to him (notice the subjectivity here). Paul’s concern is misplaced because he’s missed the point of the axioms. The axioms are the answer to the question: if we cleared the deck of all our knowledge and the assumptions they take from granted, what would be our first recognitions, our first discoveries, indeed our very first concepts? It seems dubious that someone who refers to himself as a “presuppositionalist” and thus implies that his concern is for what assumptions we take for granted, would find such inquiries uninteresting. But then again, I do not find that presuppositionalists are genuinely interested in human welfare anyway.

Paul wrote:

Indeed, beliefs, thoughts, and intentionality cannot be had on Dawson’s materialism.

Can Paul site one statement that I have made that pins me as a materialist? No, he cannot, for I have not affirmed materialism. And even if I did, would that be any better for him? Many materialists have affirmed the reality of consciousness. On Paul’s view, we need to imagine a supernatural consciousness before we can claim to be conscious. But imagining anything requires consciousness. So again, Paul demonstrates his inclination to offer stolen concepts instead of insights worthy of genuine consideration.

Isn't it interesting how Paul continually needs to deliberately misrepresent my position in order to pretend that he's critiquing it?

Paul wrote:

(ii) At best the axiom let’s us say that we are conscious, not any one else.

The axiom is a basic recognition. Why would its ability to “let us say that we are conscious” be problematic? Again, where is Paul's argument? What exactly is he trying to argue? That the axioms are not true? We've settled that already: they would have to be true in order for us to try to conclude that they're not true. Is he trying to say that they are not unique to Objectivism? Well, that failed when Paul failed to produce another philosophy which affirms them explicitly as its fundamental starting points. All Paul could do was demonstrate how Christianity assumes the truth of the Objectivist axioms, but I've already pointed this out before! Is he trying to argue that the axioms aren't "interesting"? Well, even if he could draw such a subjective conclusion, what would it prove? The axioms would still have to be true in order to assemble such an argument. Is he trying to argue that the Objectivist is incapable of putting together an argument against theism? Well, he hasn't proven this. I've seen many Objectivist assemble arguments against theism, many of them pointing to the metaphysical subjectivism inherent in theism as its own defeater.

Then Paul pops off with statements like this:

That is, Objectivism doesn’t escape the ego-centric predicament.

Similar efforts to criticize Objectivism have been tried before. For instance, see here. Such criticism is typically borne on a very poor understanding of Objectivism. Paul gives no indication that his is an exception to this.

Paul writes:

(iii) Dawson has made this claim: “Propositions are functions of a consciousness.” And so the problem here is what to do with necessary propositions? Granting Dawson’s claim that propositions are functions of consciousness, it would appear that he’d need to have a necessary consciousness that exists in all possible worlds.

Wrong. For one, I reject the necessary-contingent dichotomy that the conception rooting Paul's alleged problem takes for granted. Also, the concern here should be for truth, not some vague notion called “necessary propositions” which could mean anything and nothing. Furthermore, I do not take the “possible worlds” notion as a standard for testing claims for their truth value. “Possible worlds” is another name for “imaginary worlds.” Why would an imaginary world serve as a standard for determining what is true in the actual world? If we are able to identify certain facts which remain constant (again, we have the axioms; for instance, the fact that existence exists does not change), then we have the stability of an objective reference that subsequent truth recognitions require. This is where a good understanding of the objective theory of concepts becomes vital (and no, I did not learn about concepts by reading the bible). Meanwhile, if Paul thinks I am wrong for affirming that propositions are a function of consciousness, then it seems that he is quite at odds with his own worldview here: does he think that the “necessary truths” he has in mind do not require any consciousness? Are they free-floating ideas that exist independent of his god’s consciousness, that they needed to be discovered by his god as well as anyone else who needs them (since they’re “necessary”)? Again, we just have more blank-outs from the Master Manata himself.

Paul writes:

Though I’d not use the term “function,” it appears that Dawson’s stating Theistic Conceptual Realism!

In his perfidious ignorance of the matters in which Paul wants to feign knowledge, things have a way of appearing just how he wants to see them. It should be obvious that I’m not “stating Theistic Conceptual Realism” for a) I am not asserting the existence of an invisible magic being (that rules out theism), b) my statement in no way requires the existence of an invisible magic being (that rules out Christian presuppositionalism), and c) it is unclear to me what theory of concepts Paul’s theism could possibly be (for I’ve not found a theory of concepts provided anywhere in the bible; it does not even contain the word ‘concept’!). Meanwhile, I have a theory of concepts, and it does not need Paul's or anyone else's gods.

Paul continued:

And (iv), it’s hard to see how “consciousness” could be used as an argument against theism unless it has non-axiomatic meaning poured into it. At this point it looses it’s privileged protection as an “axiom” and is subject to critique.

What makes things hard for Paul to see is his reluctance to admit to himself that he doesn't know what he's talking about. What does Paul mean by using consciousness "as an argument against theism"? He makes it sound like he's interacting with an argument that proceeded as follows:

Premise: Consciousness.
Conclusion: Therefore, theism is false.

I don't know of anyone who has presented an argument that takes this form. At most, it looks quite incomplete. Might it be that Paul is deliberately suppressing the premises of arguments that have actually been presented?

This again only tells us about Paul Manata, namely his impoverished level of understanding for my position. I have nowhere presented as “an argument against theism” anything such as this:

Premise: If consciousness is real, then theism is false.
Premise: Consciousness is real.
Conclusion: Therefore, theism is false.

So not only does Paul demonstrate that he does not know what arguments I have presented (even though I have a blog and personal website full of my writings), he also demonstrates that he has no refutation for the arguments that I have presented.

Also, Paul does not explain how the concept ‘consciousness’ loses its status as an axiomatic concept. I submit that he does not know what he’s talking about.

Meanwhile, I've asked Paul before, and I'll ask him again: Can he produce any objective evidence for the existence of a consciousness which possesses the powers which Christianity claims for its god? Mere stories about such things do not count, because stories can be written any way their writers want to write them, and what we need is something that can be confidently said not to be the product of someone's imagination. We're waiting, Paul.

Paul writes:

Now, (2). Bethrick uses the idea of “reversing identity” to support his “invisible magic being” pejorative which, as we saw, may be warranted (even though it’s not given my analysis) but it’s still a pejorative. Why is turning water into wine a problem? Well, because A is A. Water is water. But we can gladly agree that A is A. Wine is wine. How does it follow that “a being able to do all His holy will, including doing anything with what He‘s created” can’t turn water in to wine. Water is still water. Wine is still wine. Jesus’ miracle at Cana didn’t mean that water was wine, it means that wine is wine.

Such a being can do anything its believers want it to do, in the confines of their imaginations. The problem for the theist is that he is unable to provide us with any objective means by which we can distinguish what he claims from what he (or his forebears) may have merely been imagining. But let’s get something straight here. Water is water, not wine. Right? In other words, A is A, not non-A. Good, now let’s move on. According to the Christian mythology, there exists a supernatural conscious being which can turn A (water) into non-A (wine), just by willing it. Right? Christianity’s invisible magic being “God” can sit there on its throne in the imaginary realm called “heaven,” look down on pitiful, puny little earth and say “I command the water in thy waterpots to become wine!” and presto, poof, zap, abra-cadabra, that water suddenly turns into wine, just like magic! Now if something like this happens in a Harry Potter book, we would call it magic. If it happens in Tolkein’s tales of middle earth, we would call it magic. What we have here is not equivocation on my part, but special pleading on the Christian’s part: he wants to be able to assert garbage in place of philosophy, but resents it when we point out that it stinks like other garbage.

The Christian view is that a consciousness created and rules the universe of objects. And Paul carries on as if he were concerned about what may be philosophically problematic with such a view. The view in question is called subjectivism. It is the view that the subject in the subject-object relationship holds primacy over its objects. So he's putting on as if he were concerned about what may be philosophically problematic with subjectivism.

The Christian asserts the Christian worldview as a truth. But on what basis does he do this? Does he assert Christianity as truth on the basis that the subject has the power to stipulate what is true and what is real? If so, then he's implicitly assuming that any consciousness could come and make a liar of him at any time just by stipulating that something else is true instead. Does he assert Christianity as truth on the basis that the subject does not have the power to stipulate what is true and what is real, but instead must discover and identify what is true on the basis of objects which do not conform to intentions? If so, then he needs to review the worldview that he is claiming to be true, for he has performatively contradicted it by calling it true.

Paul writes:

Apparently, it looks as if the Objectivist’s argument is that nothing could turn something into another thing, lest it defy the law of identity.

Notice that Paul does not present the argument in question, so readers will have no idea whether he's correct or not on this. What is he afraid of? Why doesn't he produce the argument that he's seen and show where it hold "that nothing could turn something into another thing"? Objectivism does not deny causality. But Paul is deliberately suppressing this fact. According to Objectivism, causality is the law of identity applied to action. Change is the identity of an action, and Objectivism recognizes that entities act according to their nature. Paul's readers will not learn this from what he presents.

So when he says that "the law of identity doesn’t tell us that... nothing could turn something into another thing," he's implying that Objectivism affirms this to be what the law of identity does tell us. Does Paul give any quotations to support his characterization? No, he doesn't. Does he not know what Objectivism teaches? If he doesn't, then how can he launch effective missiles against Objectivism? It is deception like this which prompted John Loftus, for instance, to exclaim that "Paul Manata is a deceiver." The problem is that Paul doesn't care if he needs to stoop to deceptive measures. The goal of protecting his god-belief must be achieved at all costs. It has cost him not only his credibility, but also his adult mind.

If Paul has succeeded in anything, it is in encouraging me to continue referring to his god as an invisible magic being. Now watch Paul try to argue that calling the bible a "storybook" is pejorative. What would we do without him?

by Dawson Bethrick