Rational Morality vs. Presuppositional Apologetics

It has become fashionable among contemporary Christian apologists to assert the charge that atheists "borrow" their morality from the Christian worldview. And while some atheists may in fact have done this (notable examples such as Marx, Lenin and Stalin come to mind), I have already weighed in on this matter, showing how my morality does not even come close to being guilty of this charge. That being said, the persistent fetish of the typical Christian apologist is to claim that non-Christians have no basis for morality, and because of this non-belief in their god is vilified as an evil force from which men should abstain. Examples of infamous dictators who happened to be atheists are often cited as evidence, and without deeper knowledge of the philosophical premises driving their terror, the association between atheism and atrocity may appear inevitable to the superficial thinker. In order to encourage this one-dimensional viewpoint, elaborate critiques of the writings of high-profile atheist writers, such as R. Dawkins, P. Kurtz, D. Barker et al., are proudly published by defenders of the faith who seem only too pleased with themselves, gloating over their quashing of yet another outcropping of anti-religious rebellion.

What is common to these critiques authored by Christians, however, is their surprising inclination to take key points for granted, leaving them indefinite, unexamined, at best approximate and uninformative. The very term 'morality', for instance, is tossed around as if both authors and their intended readers automatically had the same understanding of its meaning in mind. Just as the definition of the crucial term 'universe' is neglected in most expositions of the cosmological argument, the definition of 'morality' tends to remain unstated in apologetic treatments. In fact, one gets the impression that the term 'morality' is used more for emotional or psychological effect than for its philosophical importance to man, for man is essentially a secondary concern when it comes to religious morality. This leads to another common oversight: apologists treat morality as if it were important, but they tend not to indicate why it is important, or to whom. It is usually implied that morality serves a purpose, but exactly what that purpose might be is typically not explained very clearly. To make things even murkier, Christian debaters more often than not tend to jump beyond the moral needs of the individual and headlong into the fray of often silly or exaggerated dilemmas involving two or more individuals, often in emergency situations, effectively slighting morality as such.

When atheists encounter Christian apologists (especially those inclined to rely on presuppositional tactics) and the darts start flying from mystic predators as they try to assume control of this discussion on their terms from the outset, a few basic questions should be considered by both sides before weighing in on complicated (or even deliberately contrived) scenarios. For instance:

What is the definition of 'morality'?
Does man need morality?
If yes, why?
What is the purpose of morality?

These questions are straightforward enough not to cause too much controversy by simply asking them. The controversy will likely come when both sides start addressing them. If it is the case that the Christian's general conception of morality is fundamentally different from the atheist's conception of morality, this contrast should be brought out into the open at the very beginning of the exchange. After all, even Van Til asked: "Is not the important thing that Christian meanings be contrasted with non-Christian meanings?" (1) Given that the non-believer's moral views may significantly differ from the Christian's dogma, I wonder how well prepared Christians will be for such questions, because the issues these questions raise do not seem to figure very prominently in their treatments and critiques involving morality. In fact, no explicit definition of the concept 'morality' even seems to be given in the bible; I can't even find this term in any of my bibles, let alone a definition. It appears to be completely alien to its design.

Now, since I am proposing these questions to facilitate painfully needed clarification on these matters, here is how I would answer them on behalf of my worldview:

Definition of 'morality': Morality is a code of values which guides an individual's choices and actions.

Man's need for morality: Yes, man does need morality, and he does so because he faces a fundamental alternative (life vs. death), and to live he needs values which he can use in order to sustain his life. Since those values are not automatically provided, he needs a code of values to identify what values he needs and the actions he must take in order to achieve and/or protect them.

The purpose of morality: The purpose of morality is to teach an individual how to live and enjoy his life.

Of course, it is expected - even hoped - that these answers will generate a variety of questions, perhaps even outright friction given their certainty. (Christians hate it when non-believers are certain about things.) But one thing is for certain: I did not get these answers from the bible.

What should be noticed right off, however, is the crucial role that this conception of morality grants to values. A value is something one acts to achieve and or protect. An important point to note about rational values is that they are selfish in nature: they are chosen by an individual according to his own needs, his own judgments, his own code of values. People share the same basic values on the most general level, such as food, water, clothing, shelter, health and well-being, companionship, security, personal fulfillment, options, etc. We know that a person values these things when he puts forth effort to achieve them. Since 'rational' here means committed to reason as one's only means of knowledge and his own guide to action, a rational morality applies reason to man's task of living his life, and takes into account the fact that man's actions are chosen and goal-oriented. Given these points, the picture is now in sharper focus, and it is quite the contrary to what is often assumed by theists: since faith in magic beings will not repeal the fundamental alternative which man faces or quench his need for values, religious belief is essentially irrelevant to morality.

Morality addresses the question "What should I do, and why?" Theists are correct in recognizing that not all species of morality are equal. In addition to those posed above, general, over-arching questions are useful in sorting the fit from the unfit when it comes to determining which morality is proper to man. For instance, should I live in fear of an invisible magic being which disapproves of my existence (even though it is said to have created me in the first place)? Or, should I live in happiness and enjoy my life, even if others disapprove? The former is the basic ideal of religion, and the latter is the norm for rational human life. If one wants to spend his life in the futility of trying to please something that does not exist, the religious model is recommended. However, if one wants to enjoy his life, pursuing those goals of his own choosing, then the rational model of morality is recommended.

The morality that I have defined here is fit for man because it offers him a hierarchical ordering of his values which enables him to guide his choices and actions according to his chosen priorities: basic life needs will of course come first if he wants to live (his first moral choice); after these are satisfied, he can pursue other goals which make his life worth living (his choice of happiness). Man needs such a guide because, as a biological organism, he faces a constant fundamental alternative: life vs. death. That is, man needs a clear understanding of his values in order to live, and he needs a code by which he can govern his judgments in a changing and sometimes hostile environment. Unlike an immortal and indestructible being which can know no threat and for which no hostile environment exists, man has no choice about the fact that he must act in order to live. If man does not act, or if he takes the wrong actions, he will die. Additionally, man must choose to act. Man's actions are goal-oriented and he is able to choose which goals he will pursue. Rational morality enables him to thus manage the choices and actions which make his life possible. Given his nature and and the nature of his needs, man requires a morality which is wholly able to integrate these basic facts, facts which are common to all men, facts which no man can evade. These facts are not the outcome of a consensus; no matter how many people can be assembled and persuaded to agree otherwise, man will still face a fundamental alternative, and he will still need to act in order to live. Nor are they subject to commandments or wishes, for no matter how strongly one might deny them or hope they go away, they will nevertheless continue to obtain. Consistent with the primacy of existence principle that provides the firm basis of a rational, this-worldly philosophy, these facts are the metaphysical conditions which man must deal with if he is to exist.

For religion, however, morality begins with a set of mystical presuppositions, rooted in the primacy of consciousness, which are accepted on faith and asserted in place of the facts which should be taken into account if a morality fit for man is sought (which, considering religion's lethal track record, is a big "if"). Where the rational view of morality is based on man's need for values whose characteristics are ultimately determined by reference to his nature as a biological organism, religion views morality as a code of duties which man is to perform regardless of his needs or understanding, for the sake of a being which could not benefit from the performance of those duties in the first place, for it could have no needs to satisfy to begin with. A man has needs, but an invincible deity does not. Where rational morality views man as the primary beneficiary of his own actions (cf. rational self-interest), religious morality views man as the means to someone else's ends, specifically the pleasure of an invisible magic being which, accordingly, would be unaffected if man were annihilated (cf. mystical self-denial). And where rational morality is premised on man's nature as a biological organism whose needs must be met by means of chosen actions, religious morality is premised on the character of a supernatural, immortal and indestructible being which has no needs, either the need for values or the need to act in order to exist. (As described, for instance, the Christian god could feasibly sit on its hands in absolute idleness for all eternity, and, being unchangeable, it would still be the Christian god forever.) And while religious morality does recognize, at least on an implicit level, that man has a need to act, his actions are to be motivated by fear of divine threats rather than the reward of earthly values. This is simply a consequence of the types of goals each moral model upholds for man: for religion, the goal is to appease an angry god which cannot change, while for the rational man the goal is personal happiness and a life of fulfillment and enjoyment. Already we see profound differences which define the nature of the debate between religious morality and a morality fit for man's life on earth, confirming the fact that the presuppositionalist's charge that atheists necessarily "borrow" from Christianity's morality is bogus to the hilt.

Typically, however, apologists do not want to acknowledge these fundamental differences when framing the terms of the debate, for they do not play into their strategy. On the contrary, theists tend to focus more on situational ethics, that is, on hypothetical anecdotes involving more than one individual, especially when one of the individuals involved has for unspecified reasons the desire to harm someone else. Ironically, the answer to such scenarios is precisely what religion rejects, namely the fact that man has a right to exist for his own sake, a core teaching of rational philosophy which is the basis of the concept of political rights. But the theist then pretends to be concerned to find the proper morality which will effectively inhibit the harmful behavior and thus appears to have in mind the best interest of the individual in particular and society in general. If, however, he had the best interest of society in mind, why then is the theist so willing to neglect the moral needs of the individual, needs which are defined, not by social relationships (which are prone to frequent change), but primarily by his nature as a biological organism (which does not change)?

Christian apologists like to say that man's capacity for morality stems from his being "created in the image of God." But as we have seen, it is precisely what is not god-like about man which determines his morality and his need for it. The differences between the Christian god, as it is described by its self-appointed earthly representatives, and the human being, could not be more striking. As described, the Christian god, for instance, could not be said to be biological, and could not be said to face the fundamental alternative that man faces. Indeed, given the imaginative attributes that theists use to describe their god, it could have no needs whatsoever.

Consider the following points of contrast (2):

The Christian god is said to be immortal, eternal, invincible and indestructible. Thus it could not need to take specific actions or acquire anything in order to exist and remain what it supposedly is. But man is neither immortal, eternal, invincible nor indestructible, and thus he needs to take specific actions and acquire specific kinds of things (values) in order to live.

The Christian god is said to be both omniscient and infallible, and thus it has no need to discover and validate its knowledge, including any moral knowledge it is said to possess. But man is neither omniscient nor infallible, and because of this he needs a set of principles that he can apply in identifying those values his life needs.

The Christian god is said to be omnipotent, able to wish the universe into existence and conform objects to its every whim. Thus even if it could be said that something could possibly threaten the Christian god, it could wish it out of existence, or command it to become what it is not, turning A into non-A at will. Man, however, is not omnipotent, which means he cannot wish his values into existence, nor can he wish away those things which can pose a threat to his life. He must put forth effort to achieve and protect the values his life requires.

Thus premising morality on the nature of such a being puts man at a severe disadvantage from the very beginning, since his needs could at best only be a secondary matter of concern, and only then in the shadow of compulsions to obey contextless commandments which he is to follow whether he understands them or not.

These points and distinctions serve as the key pretext to keep in mind when it comes to considering the superficial arguments non-believers can expect to encounter in presuppositional apologetics. Many atheists, however, having not succeeded in fully shrugging the mind-crippling effects of their former religious lives, remain confused about morality and its purpose for man as a result of the anti-intellectual influence of Christianity. Unfortunately, many non-believers have a difficult time recovering from their acceptance of unearned guilt which the religious view of man requires of him. Although such individuals may often intend to provide an improved view of morality, many have bought into the fallacies and deficiencies of religious morality unwittingly. For them, as for theists, morality is primarily concerned with social behavior; right and wrong are defined, not in terms of values chosen by the individual on the basis of objective needs determined by his nature (which he did not choose), but on false premises and non-essential outcomes whose causation remains unspecified and whose impact is often confined to mere emotions.

Even worse, many atheists have adopted what is nothing more than a secularized version of religious morality, essentially viewing man as a means to some end beyond himself (as did Marx, Lenin and Stalin), such as to serve "the common good," to preserve the species, to save whales, spotted owls, yellow-spotted toads and forests, to provide for everyone else's children, etc. The common ground between such secular versions of morality and religious morality is the call for self-sacrifice on the behalf of someone else's interests (or non-interests, as the case may be). Both models, either implicitly or explicitly, hold that man is innately guilty, depraved and repugnant by his very nature, and thus he should not be free to choose his own goals, govern his own judgments, or seek his own form of happiness. Such choices are to be made either by the State or by the priesthood, gangs of Atillas or cliques of witch doctors, each pretending to possess a knowledge to which the "common man" has no firsthand access. The starting point for such models of morality entails the rejection of the view that man is an end in himself and that he has the right to exist for his own sake.

Because secularized versions of religious morality are just as weak and open to criticism as is religious morality proper, they serve as 'easy pickins' for Christian apologists, who like to presume that non-Christian philosophies can offer nothing better. After all, an authoritarian morality requires an omnipotent authority, and the actual power of a state could never match the powers concocted in the religionist's imagination. The preferred tactic in this case is to subject defenders of these secular models to a barrage of questions and scenarios which are supposed to be taken as serious examples which a morality is supposed to resolve. Given this formula, pettiness and exaggeration quickly replace focus on relevant facts and integration of rational principles. Of course, since the religious model of morality thrives on blurring man's need for values and for principles which he can use reliably in identifying the values he needs and the actions he needs to take in order to achieve and protect them, secular variations of religious morality tend to do the same, thus effectively handing the debate to apologists tutored on techniques of deception, wordplay, and entrapment as means of propping up a grandiose bluff.

All these points should be considered the next time a presuppositionalist wants to pick a fight over moral questions.

by Dawson Bethrick

Notes:

(1) Cornelius Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 3rd ed., p. 23n.1.

(2) See also my blog Is Man "Created in the Image of God"?

Will the Real TAG Please Stand Up?

Paul Manata, favorite son of amateur presuppositionalist tiddlywinks, tells me that I am wrong for concluding that TAG relies at least in part on an appeal to ignorance, even though I cited actual examples which strongly support this appraisal. To the contrary, Paul told me that he had already dealt with this contention in his exchanges with Dr. Zachary Moore, who independently drew the same conclusion that TAG may in fact rely on a veiled argument from ignorance. I reviewed Paul’s messages in that exchange, hoping to find the argument that he says is innocent of relying on ignorance in some way so that I could review it and thus confirm his contention that it is in fact innocent of this error. Unfortunately, I was not able to determine exactly what argument Paul had in mind, for he can’t seem to make up his mind on what exactly TAG is saying.

I went through his responses to Dr. Moore in search of any statements which Paul might have intended to encapsulate TAG, and in my estimation the following seem to come closest to what he believes TAG is trying to argue:

1. "we are saying something more like, because you ARE NOT ignorant of X, that shows you presuppose that God exists."
2. "The argument is that if your worldview were true, [logic] would not exist."
3. "The argument is that laws of logic are inconsistent with your worldview."
4. "E’ is only possible in the a Christian worldview, CW, therefore, using E’ is to assume the truth of CW."
5. "The claim of TAG is that you cannot explain or account for ANYTHING."
6. "My argument is that the Christian worldview is true because it is transcendentall necessary for the possibility of knowledge."
7. "I argue that the character of logic is incompatible with the character of matter, therefore the cannot exist because immaterialk entities do not exist, and never will, given *what you say*."
8. "I'm saying, for the upmteenth time, that the *reason* you can't account for logic is because it wouldn't exist given your worldview."
9. "I'm saying something about the character of matter and the character of LoL. If matter is all there is, then logic does not exist (except as convention, or linguistic constructs, but then you have the conventionalists problems)."

I suppose that Paul’s few typos are the result of lapses from "thinking God’s thoughts after Him" indicating that salvation is a work in progress, while the rest of his statements is to be accepted as "next to gospel." But clearing past these mistakes, it's not clear from Paul's statements what he considers to be TAG, for he presents several different statements which can be taken as conclusions. And with the exception of perhaps two of them (namely 4 and 7), it's not clear what their premises or the structure of their inference might be. Without seeing exactly what TAG looks like according to Paul's view, it cannot be confirmed that TAG does not rely at least in part on an appeal to ignorance.

For the most part, however, Paul's arguments seem to be concerned with materialism in particular; specifically he seems concerned to prove that materialism and logic are incompatible. And while this ambition has its own share of problems, even if it were successful, it would not prove the reality of the Christian god, which is what I understand to be the goal of TAG. After all, the acronym TAG is short for "transcendental argument for the existence of God," is it not? However, the supposition that logic and materialism are incompatible with one another in no way necessitates the existence of any invisible magic beings, unless of course that supposition is inserted by theistic prejudices. But if that is the case, then the supposed tension between logic and materialism could not itself be used to validate those theistic prejudices as this would beg the question.

So already it seems that Paul has introduced some confusion into the fray, for the argument that he wants to say is innocent of the charge of reliance on ignorance does not appear to be TAG proper. And this is what he seems to overlook throughout his messages to Dr. Moore: that while TAG is concerned (or at least supposed to be concerned) with proving the existence of the Christian god, atheism is not incompatible with the view that logic is not material. Occasionally one finds an astute Christian believer who is willing to concede this, such as when Greg Welty admits that

materialism is not 'the consistent testimony of the modern atheist.' Many atheists believe that something more than concrete, material objects exist, and present plenty of arguments for that view. Acting as if they're all materialists makes us look, well, a bit outdated. Sort of like never progressing beyond Hume in our understanding of 'the inductive problem'. (Re: On b) and possibly not-a)

In trying to defend the thesis that TAG is innocent of appealing to ignorance, Paul was concerned to present a conception of TAG which goes out of its way to avoid the argumentum ad ignorantiam fallacy. Consider the first condensation that Paul offers of his version of TAG:

we are saying something like, because you ARE NOT ignorant of X, that shows you presuppose that God exists.

And at first blush, if we take this as a summary of TAG, it in fact appears to avoid any appeal to ignorance. But of course, we should not expect a celebrated apologetic method to openly declare its conclusions on the basis of stark naked ignorance. If apologists are to be credited for anything, they are to be credited for their ingenuity in camouflaging their devices such that their questionable nature is not readily detected. Indeed, as I indicated in my prior blog on this topic, an arguer may in fact not realize that he is actually drawing his conclusion on the basis of his own ignorance of some relevant point or fact. We are all capable of this, whether theist or non, since we all start out ignorant in the first place. Here Paul is deliberately going out of his way to portray TAG (his conception of it, that is) as though it can expressly escape the charge of argumentum ad ignorantiam. But if we drill down into the premises and their supporting arguments that would be offered in support of this conclusion, what guarantee does Paul provide that his argument will not at some point be found resting on the mere lack of firsthand familiarity with contrary positions? Perhaps a look at other statements of his will enlighten us.

Again trying to summarize his conception of TAG, Paul wrote:

The argument is that if your worldview is true, [logic] would not exist.

Closely related to this was the next statement:

The argument is that the laws of logic are inconsistent with your worldview.

Naturally, neither of these "arguments" conclude that any god (let alone specifically the Christian god) exists, and simply seems to be a repetition of his case against materialism as such. Of course, the conclusion that a god exists does not follow as a result of proving that materialism is an invalid worldview. In regard to Paul's argument against materialism, however, it is unclear how he proves that logic is not composed of some material which lacks many of the perceptible characteristics of other things that are composed of matter. I do not state this as an advocate of such a view, but simply as a query on the security of his case since he seems to think whether or not logic is material or otherwise is important and his argument's ambition is apparently to rule out the view that logic is material in any way. For instance, he may say that it is self-evident that logic is not material in the way that rocks, fruit trees, dollar bills and stapling guns are material, but this would not rule out the view that logic is material in the sense of sound wave, magnetic field or electrical current. Indeed, it seems that the concern to conclude that the laws of logic are "immaterial entities" is already off track since this assumes that logic is composed of entities, and this would need to be argued for.

The fourth key statement from Paul actually takes the form of an argument. He wrote:

E’ is only possible in the Christian worldview, CW, therefore, using E’ is to assume the truth of CW.

This apparently is the structure of Paul's conception of TAG (I note that it is quite different from Butler's formalized version of TAG), but was proffered not in the interest of defending TAG per se. Paul emphasized this in a string of statements typed out in all caps. "The point of the above," writes Paul, "was to show that TAG is not an argument from ignorance." Of course, without seeing how the conclusion is supported by its premises, and, more importantly, what can be offered in the interest of justifying those premises, we have an incomplete picture of just how the inference represented in such an argument is thought to be supported. If, for instance, at any point in the substantiation of such arguments we find premises like "the atheist cannot accout for" some function of cognition, a course of interrogation which is distinctively characteristic of presuppositional apologetics, such affirmations may in fact represent an open invitation to argue from ignorance, specifically the apologist's ignorance of how an individual atheist may in fact answer such challenges. Presuppositional apologists exhibit the tendency to take the wide-sweeping generalizations of their theorists - like Van Til, Bahnsen and Frame - at their word, particularly those generalizations which supposedly put a capper on the potency of non-believing philosophies. Apparently apologists are supposed to rest their faith on the assumption that Bahnsen et al. have "done their homework" so comprehensively that they can vicariously conclude what they have claimed, thus effectively enabling defenders of Christianity to "think Bahnsen's thoughts after Him."

In the case of this version of TAG, E' is presumably supposed to represent some non-material something, with the name 'logic' slapped on it, and because it is said to be other than material, it "is only possible in the a Christian worldview." [sic] This is the same tired, outworn assertion that logic can only make sense on specifically Christian presuppositions - as if logic required a basis in metaphysical subjectivism and a universe analogous to a cartoon, as if logic were only possible in a reality in which the objects of consciousness conform to the intentions of consciousness. At least for the sake of entertainment, it is assertions such as this that achingly beg for support, and only then - once the apologist presents what he takes to be sufficient justification of such assertions - will we have something to examine for the purpose of determining whether or not presuppositionalists can make their case without relying at some point on their own ignorance of rival positions. As Paul has set up his conception of TAG, its whole strategy seems to assume that there are only two contenders to be considered: materialism (conceived as necessarily cancelling out logic) and Reformed Christianity (asserted to be the only worldview that can "account for" logic). Thus the deck is stacked, but not very cleverly. In fact, it is hard to see how one could assert such a dichotomy on any basis other than ignorance to begin with, and at this point we might question whether the apologist is truly concerned for the stability of logic, or for the welfare of his mystical precommitments.

Furthermore, by saying that logic "is only possible in the a Christian worldview" [sic], Paul is saying that logic is not possible in any worldview other than the Christian worldview (specifically, as he conceives of it, since there is such a wide assortment of Christian worldviews). In order to substantiate such a claim, the apologist seems to have three alternatives at his disposal:

1. Prove a negative (how and where does he do this, and what basis does he assume?)
2. Argue from ignorance (which proves only delusion or desperation, not intended conclusions)
3. Deliberately build the notion of the Christian god into one's conception of logic (which would strap the apologist into the ready room of circular argument).

Perhaps Paul has a different option in mind, though it is unclear what that might be.

Moving along, Paul attempted to summarize his conception of TAG again:

The claim of TAG is that you cannot explain or account for ANYTHING.

Well, if TAG's claim is that I "cannot explain or account for ANYTHING," then clearly TAG is false. There are many things I can explain, such as how to decline adjectives and conjugate verbs in Russian, resolve French sixth chords by primary function, market heavy and intermediate marine fuel oils in domestic and international ports, import foodstuffs into the US from Asian nations, add new print-on-demand items to online ordering inventories, etc. I can also explain why the versions of TAG that I have examined tend to rely at least in part on argumentum ad ignorantiam. There was a time in my life when I could not explain any of these things, but as I learned these processes firsthand (i.e., by thinking with my own mind, not by pretending to think someone else's thoughts), I can now teach others to do the same. I had thought that TAG claimed that the Christian god would need to exist in order for me to do these things, but now Paul has corrected me: TAG argues that I cannot do these things at all (apparently he thinks that the Christian god creates incompetent beings in its own image).

As Paul's TAG continues to change shape, he offers yet another version of it:

My argument is that the Christian worldview is true because it is transcendentall necessary for the possibility of knowledge. [sic]

Now, this is quite different from the argument that I "cannot explain or account for ANYTHING." It must be evolving as he tries to address new criticisms. Of course, what Paul presents here is not an argument, but an assertion - "that the Christian worldview is true because it is transcendentall necessary for the possibility of knowledge." To make this case, the apologist would at the very minimum need to show that knowledge can be possible on the subjective basis and in the cartoon universe of Christian theism. But we already know that knowledge requires an objective basis in a universe which is not analogous to a cartoon, both of which are incompatible with and disaffirmed by Christianity's metaphysics. Furthermore, one wonders how apologists could claim authority for Christianity in particular in the area of knowledge when their bible has no native theory of concepts. This is crucial since concepts are the building block of knowledge, and our conclusions and evaluations are no more valid than our concepts. Presuppositionalists seem frightfully unaware of this.

Paul's argument changes yet again. His argument now proceeds as follows:

I argue that the character of logic is incompatible with the character of matter, therefore the cannot exist because immaterialk entities do not exist, and never will, given *what you say*. [sic]

It is completely unclear what Paul might mean by his statement that "the character of logic is incompatible with the character of matter." Similar could be said about oil and water as well as heat and plastics. But these things exist nonetheless, and I see no reason why a materialist would not agree. Is Paul saying that logical principles do not apply when matter is involved? Well, when is matter not involved when we usefully apply logical principles? For instance, I would say it is logical to open the car door if you want to get out of the car (notice the application of logic to goal-oriented action). Certainly the car is made of matter. Is Paul saying that this would be a misapplication of logic? How then does he get out of a car? So, at best, Paul needs to make his argument clearer than it is so far, in spite of the constant revision to which he subjects it. While he's at it, it would be beneficial if he could tell us why he might think the laws of logic are "entities."

Paul's next two attempts to clarify his argument reiterate his contention that logic is incompatible with materialism and thus I will consider them together:

I'm saying, for the umpteenth time, that the *reason* you can't account for logic is because it wouldn't exist given your worldview... I'm saying something about the character of matter and the character of LoL. If matter is all there is, then logic does not exist (except as convention, or linguistic constructs, but then you have the conventionalists problems).

Notice how presuppositionalism has taught Paul to presume for himself the ability to speak on behalf of his opponent. He says that "logic… wouldn't exist given your worldview." It may be the case, however, that Dr. Moore's understanding of logic differs from Paul's understanding of logic in some relevantly significant way such that the incompatibility that concerns Paul does not really exist in Dr. Moore's worldview. What is ironic is that, in spite of the standard presuppositionalist worries about being able to provide an "account," Paul does not seem to have taken this possibility into account. Again, he seems to be merely regurgitating Bahnsen's thoughts after him.

Furthermore, it seems that Paul has assumed a false dichotomy, namely that either a) logic is set of divine or supernatural "entities" (in the sense that they "reflect" his god's nature and/or thoughts and thus necessarily imply the existence of his god), or b) logic is conventional, relative, non-absolute, non-existent or ultimately meaningless. Such bifurcation itself is something we would expect to see if someone did not have a conceptual understanding of logical principles, and thus seems to be borne on the clipped wings of ignorance. It is not unlike what some primitive human beings might have thought in regard to thunderstorms, volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, and other momentous natural threats which they did not understand. The god of lightning bolts has apparently given up its throne in deference to the god of the law of identity. And yet, when we investigate both the cause of lightning and the axiomatic basis of the law of identity, we find no gods whatsoever.

In conclusion, we have seen many broad generalizations, resolute assertions and shuffling of conclusions, but we have seen no guarantee that TAG is not a veiled argument from ignorance.

by Dawson Bethrick

In the beginning...

This sort of says it all -

In the beginning...

Presuppositionalism and the Argument from Ignorance

On whether or not the presuppositionalist "transcendental argument for the existence of God" (TAG) qualifies as a variation of the argument from design, Zachary Moore made the following comment:

I always thought it was just an argument from ignorance.

After examining numerous apologetic sources pontificating on TAG and presuppositionalism, I am inclined to agree fully with Zachary's statement here. Of course, presuppositionalists will resist and protest this recognition, but the evidence to support it is wide-ranging and substantial, and it's quite easy to spot in the presuppositional strategy integral to deploying TAG.

First, let's get a good understanding of what the fallacy known as argument from ignorance really is. In support of his assessment, Zachary offered the following description of what constitutes an argument from ignorance:

The argument from ignorance, also known as argumentum ad ignorantiam or argument by lack of imagination, is a logical fallacy asserting that if something is currently unexplained then it did not (or could not) happen, or that if evidence of something has not been proven to their satisfaction, then it cannot exist. (1)

Technically known as argumentum ad ignorantiam, an argument from ignorance essentially consists of resting a conclusion on the arguer's own lack of knowledge of or familiarity with some key point of central concern to the topic under consideration. The argument from ignorance can thus be reduced to the following formula:

I don't know how X could be the case, therefore it follows that X cannot be the case.

As such, the argument from ignorance can be considered to be a form of non sequitur, i.e., an argument in which the conclusion does not follow from the premises offered in support of it. Of course, in actual conversation or debate, instances of this fallacy are typically not so bald-faced. In fact, the arguer himself may not even be aware that he is resting his conclusion on gaping holes in his summary knowledge. On the contrary, arguments resting their conclusion on the arguer's own ignorance of relevant matters usually tend to bury the arguer's ignorance under a mass of verbiage which conveniently disguises the fallacy such that the arguer himself may not readily detect his own error. Discovering and recognizing the error becomes all the more unlikely if the arguer is emotionally committed to the conclusion which his ignorance is supposed to validate.

It is clear to me that TAG and its customary defense strategy make use of an argument from ignorance in the hopes of securing the claim that Christianity is true. And this is not at all difficult to spot. Generally speaking, whenever the presuppositionalist says something along the lines of "you cannot account for [fill in the blank]," he's essentially just telling us that he simply does not know how the person addressed in such charges might "account for" such phenomena. And despite his announcement of his own ignorance of such matters in such an explicit manner, presuppositional apologists routinely regurgitate the same pattern throughout their defense of god-belief. Christian apologist Greg Bahnsen, who can be credited with popularizing this very approach to apologetics, used precisely this very tactic in his opening statement when he debated atheist Dr. Gordon Stein. Bahnsen simply asserted that

The atheist world-view cannot allow for laws of logic, the uniformity of nature, the ability for the mind to understand the world, and moral absolutes. In that sense, the atheist world-view cannot account for our debate tonight. (2)

An examination of Bahnsen's opening statement does not prove fruitful in discovering just how the apologist might go about proving this negative claim, and yet presuppositionalists typically mimick Bahnsen's approach as if it had actual substance (often referred to as "thrust"). If the apologist has an actual proof that "the atheist world-view cannot account for" said phenomena, why doesn't he offer it? Such questions are frequently asked, but they remain unanswered. In spite of this, apologists persist in using this very same tactic, even though it only serves in telling the world that they are simply unfamiliar with what any particular atheist's views are on the topic at hand.

That the assertion of inability on the part of atheists to "account for" various aspects of cognition and experience is integral to TAG, is clear from statements such as the following:

TAG says that the atheist can't account for logic. (3)

Another apologist followed up this remark, saying:

I don't just think you can't 'account' for just logic and a some other things. The claim of TAG is that you cannot explain or account for ANYTHING. (4)

The apologists' dependence on their own ignorance here is not only uncontained, but brazen and belligerent. And this much is clear: Since TAG is supposed to be an argument proving the existence of the Christian god, and central to this argument is the charge that non-Christians (perhaps atheists especially) are unable to provide an "account for" various things (or "ANYTHING"), one can certainly be forgiven for supposing that TAG is supposed to derive the Christian god's existence from the non-Christian's alleged inability to satisfy such challenges. For it appears that the apologist is essentially arguing as follows:

Premise 1: If the non-Christian cannot "account for" the "laws of logic, the uniformity of nature, the ability for the mind to understand the world, and moral absolutes," then the Christian god exists (or: the Christian worldview is true).

Premise 2: The non-Christian cannot "account for" the "laws of logic, the uniformity of nature, the ability for the mind to understand the world, and moral absolutes."

Conclusion: Therefore, the Christian god exists (or: the Christian worldview is true).

And while this appears to be the basic procedure in defending TAG, the apologist tends not to approach the matter as a topic of inquiry in which a comprehensive survey is conducted to review proposed "accounts" for the various phenomena in question in order to assure us that those proposed accounts are in fact flawed or somehow insufficient to the task. On the contrary, the apologetic method consists of simply stipulating this to be the case, as if the apologist's own say so were sufficient to seal the case. But in spite of the obvious reliance on his own sustained and indulged ignorance, the apologist fails to show exactly how the existence of an invisible magic being follows from someone's inability to develop a thesis on induction or some other mental process. So the non sequitur at the core of the apologist's argument from ignorance is clearly observed.

Presuppositionalists themselves demonstrate that they need to rely on argument from ignorance (or, should we say, assertion from ignorance) when critiquing rival religious beliefs. For instance, when certain "truths" were asserted on the basis of what were called "the messages of phil," one presuppositionalist attempted to criticize this position with the following:

We could do a transcendental analysis of the "messages of phil." But all you have done is make a blanket statement that the messages of phil are divine. Nothing has not been stated or worked out as a worldview.

Aside from the hapless use of a double negative, the apologist, who is clearly speaking out of ignorance, nowhere shows that the worldview associated with "the message of phil" has not been "worked out." For all he knows, there could be a 30-volume codex that defines and develops such a worldview from its fundamentals on up.

Now, after examining my reasons for agreeing with Zachary on this point, I asked myself the following question:

Is my conclusion that presuppositional apologetics bases its conclusions on the arguer's own ignorance of rival positions, itself based on my own ignorance of the presuppositionalist method and the evidences it recruits in deploying its defensive strategy?

I don't think it is. And here's why: As I mentioned above, I have examined numerous defenses presented by presuppositionalists, both in published works either in print or posted on the internet (cf. Van Til, Bahnsen, Frame, Pratt, Butler, Jones, Wilson, et al.), as well as in firsthand encounters with scores of apologists attempting to use this method of defense. In virtually all cases, the approaches employed share a similar basic strategy: the non-believer cannot "account for" some aspect or feature of cognition or experience, presumably because only an appeal to the believer's god can satisfactorily accomplish such a task and the non-believer by definition rejects or disavows the existence of the believer's god. But in each case, the feature or aspect of cognition or experience which the non-believer is said to be unable to "account for," can in fact only be addressed and understood if one has a good understanding of how the mind forms concepts and integrates them into larger conceptual structures. But this element is completely lacking from every deployment of presuppositional apologetics that I have examined, many of which I learned about because Christian debaters cited them as a supporting resource. (5) Not only do presuppositional apologists seem utterly ignorant of the importance of a good theory of concepts to such considerations, the worldview which they seek to defend - Christian theism - does not seem to have a native theory of concepts. (Apologists have been unable to show where in the bible one might find any information about concepts.)

Take for instance James Anderson's Secular Responses to the Problem of Induction, a paper intended to support the presuppositionalist position that non-Christian philosophy must confess defeat when it comes to providing a rational justification for induction. I give Anderson credit for at least trying to support this charge without simply stipulating it to be the case, for he does survey at least a few secular treatments of the supposed problem. But absent from his survey is any consideration of the Objectivist response to Hume's problem of induction. Granted, it may not be well known in some academic circles, but it does in fact exist (David Kelley summarizes his response to Hume in "Universals and Induction"). This can only indicate that Anderson's survey is incomplete and that the conclusion that "there presently exists no satisfactory solution to the problem of induction from a secular perspective" (6) is premature, in fact unwarranted. Indeed, his conclusion in fact rests on a gap in his knowledge of available treatments of induction. And I know that he was not familiar with the distinctive approach to induction that Objectivism provides when he wrote his paper based on his reaction to a statement I had made in our correspondence.

Specifically, I had written:

I must say, however, I'm always surprised, when reading a paper that attempts to deal with induction, that there is no discussion of concepts, the nature of their forming, or their relationship to inductive generalization, as if these issues did not matter.

In response to this, Anderson replied:

Well, it's not immediately obvious to me how the nature of concept formation bears either on the description of the problem of induction or on the development of cogent solutions. Perhaps you can elaborate.

This statement, especially coming from an apologist who has emphasized the "atheists can't account for induction" version of TAG so heavily, simply suggests to me that presuppositionalists do not approach induction as a conceptual matter. This tells me that they're ignorant of how induction is an extension of conceptual integration, which can only lead me to the conclusion that their apologetic ploy concerning this issue is based ultimately on their own ignorance of at least some opposing positions.

So unless presuppositionalists can do better than what they have done to date, the charge that TAG relies - at least in part - on an argument from ignorance, appears to be amply justified.

by Dawson Bethrick

Notes:

(1) Quoting this online source.

(2) The Great Debate

(3) TAG as Teleological Argument

(4) Ibid.

(5) For instance, section 7.4 "The Transcendental Nature of Presuppositional Argument," in Bahnsen's Van Til's Apologetic: Readings & Analysis, pp. 496-529.

(6) Secular Responses to the Problem of Induction

Dear Sal

Recently an individual who goes by the moniker Sal_et_Lucis, apparently a Christian, kindly stopped by my blog and posted a brief comment in which he asked me a question. In this blog entry, I will attempt to provide him with a comprehensive answer.

Sal asked: "Just how much of Van Til and Bahnsen have you actually sat down and read?"

My first reaction to this question was to wonder how much of either author one needs to read before he's allowed to have an opinion on something either one of them has written. My next reaction was to wonder how much those who ask me such questions have read my own writings. And though I think these are relevant questions, I doubt I'll get much of an answer to either in return.

Nevertheless, in response to Sal's question, I must admit that I have read quite a bit of both Van Til and Bahnsen, focusing primarily on their apologetic works. For example, VT's The Defense of the Faith, Christian Apologetics, various articles available on the net such as "Why I Believe in God," etc.; Bahnsen's Always Ready, Van Til's Analysis: Readings & Analysis (which contains lengthy quotations from many of Van Til's publications), and numerous articles available on the net, not to mention the writings of other presuppositionalists such as John Frame, Richard Pratt, James Anderson, David Byron, Greg Welty, Michael Warren, Massimo Lorenzini, Matt Slick, etc., etc. I have found much of these writings tiresomely repetitive (there seems to be no end to the list of woes that they attribute to non-belief in their invisible magic beings), and yet I've taken it upon myself to wade through their tortured prose in the hopes of finding anything that resembles an argument for their god-belief.

Now, I'm not so naïve as to suppose that, even if I have read everything written by these and other authors, that this would eliminate all detractors who would want to charge me with not reading enough. I have found that the easy-chair routine of dismissing Christianity's critics by saying they don't understand or haven't read enough is overused by self-styled apologists, many of whom consider their defense of the faith a kind of "ministry" commissioned by their god. I want to believe that the fact that so few apologists attempt to answer my challenges is explained by the possibility that they're simply not aware of my blog; and I would prefer not to think that presuppositional apologists, with all the fire-power they claim to have in their "transcendental arguments," are choosing to shy away from my criticisms. Then again, I don't find that the criticisms I present in my blog and on my personal page can be found elsewhere that I know of, so it may simply be the case that those apologists who are aware of my writings currently have no answer to my challenges, or that they would prefer to simply dismiss me as someone who hasn't read enough (such as one Jeff Downs tends to do on occasion). That's fine with me, as I know the word is getting out.

But since Sal has inquired, I am always willing to read more Van Til, Bahnsen, et al., for I know there is much literature on the topic of presuppositionalism which I have yet to digest. I would be very eager, for instance, to find any passage in either Van Til or Bahnsen where they deal with the issue of metaphysical primacy. I take this to be the make-all/break-all issue in all philosophy, since it is inescapable to all cognition. And even though Van Til, Bahnsen et al. pay ample lipservice to "the necessary preconditions of intelligibility," this issue never seems to come up in their writings. I find this astounding. I have my own suppositions for why this is the case, but I'd like to know what Sal and other Christians might think on this. I'm inclined to suppose they will want to rescue Van Til by saying the issue of metaphysical primacy is unimportant, or they may say Van Til addresses it and yet will not provide any citations or quotes to support this.

And while we're on it, where do either Van Til or Bahnsen spec out a theory of concepts? Indeed, to what source would the Christian go for an understanding of concepts? The bible doesn't provide such a theory (and yet we're told over and over that "only the Christian worldview provides the necessary preconditions for the intelligibility of human experience"), so to find a theory of concepts, it seems that believers would have to either invent their own theory as they go or consult some extra-biblical source which does provide such a theory (thus putting the believer at risk of succumbing to "the wisdom of the world"). My suspicion is that Christianity has no native theory of concepts. I've asked believers who say I'm wrong on this to come forward and show me where the bible presents its own theory of concepts, but none have done this (many retort by saying that the bible is not a philosophical lexicon, but this only confirms my suspicion). And even though a good theory of concepts will go a long way in correcting a large number of presuppositionalism's mistakes and in answering most of presuppositionalism's characterizations of and challenges to "non-believing worldviews," it is precisely a theory of concepts which they seem to lack.

Ever anxious to find some way to turn a philosophical issue into an apologetic debating point, Van Til gives us some indication of his understanding of concepts in the following passage:

We seem to get our unity by generalizing, by abstracting from the particulars in order to include them into larger unities. If we keep up this process of generalizing till we exclude all particulars, granted they can all be excluded, have we then not stripped these particulars of their particularity? Have we then obtained anything but an abstract universal?" (The Defense of the Faith, 3rd ed., p. 26.)

If summaries like this are at all any indication of the presuppositionalist understanding of concepts (James Anderson, in his paper If Knowledge, Then God, cites pp. 23-28 of Van Til's The Defense of the Faith as "the most direct discussion of the problem [of the one and the many]" in Van Til's writings), then non-believers needn't worry whatsoever about what this camp has to say. Van Til errs by supposing that the process of abstraction involves "excluding particulars," when in fact this is not at all the case. The process of abstraction involves, among other operations, the omission of specific measurements precisely so that particulars can be included in the scope of reference subsumed by a concept. My suspicion is not only that Van Til did not understand this, but also that such facts would not be very welcome news to someone like Van Til for they do not avail themselves to the conclusions he hoped to draw, namely that "the problem of the one and the many" requires a supernatural solution (cf. the "concrete universal" which Van Til equated with the Christian trinity).

Sal listed three options to explain his impression of my understanding:

"You either are a poor reader, have a short term memory, or you haven't read them at all."

I can name two more possibilities which Sal overlooks. One is that I have misunderstood these authors. Consider the following admission which one presuppositionalist found necessary to make in order to highlight Bahnsen's contributions to presuppositionalism:

One of the major obstacles in the way of promoting presuppositionalism has been Van Til's own writing style. Friends and critics alike have expressed chagrin at his 'torturous English', his redundant and unclear style, his penchant for sloganeering, and his disorganization of themes. Though he considered these criticisms overstated, Bahnsen likewise recognized these shortcomings in Van Til. (Michael Butler, "The Transcendental Argument for God's Existence," ed. S. M. Schlissel, The Standard Bearer: A Festschift for Greg L. Bahnsen, p. 70.)

Even those who are sympathetic to Van Til's program have complained about the warbling mentor's muddled handling of the issues central to his primary thesis. And while many would point to Bahnsen one of the prime movers in clarifying Van Til's apologetic, he often turns out to be little more than a cheerleader who is content to cloak those same issues in similar vague jargon and "penchant for sloganeering." So if I have misunderstood Van Til, some apologists have already provided a good explanation for this.

The other possibility which Sal overlooks is that I have read and understood these authors, and that my detractors simply want to dismiss my writings out of hand by tarnishing their source (i.e., me). This of course only serves to attack me personally, and allows my criticisms to go unchallenged. This means that, if my understanding and criticism of these authors are in error, we will not learn of my faults from these detractors. Indeed, it's not unusual for my detractors to do a "drive-by comment," saying I don't understand, I've misrepresented, or that I'm simply dishonest, and yet provide no substantiation whatsoever to these charges when my own writings are right there, available for examination.

There are numerous examples in my writings where I examine and interact with the authors Sal mentions which provide opportunity for my detractors to cite when casting their character slurs against me. One such example is Bahnsen's opening statement in his debate with Gordon Stein. To my utter amazement, many Christians seem to think Bahnsen's performance in this debate was somehow impressive. For instance, John Frame recently wrote that "it was evident as the debate progressed that the audience became convinced that Bahsnen won the debate," and that "Bahnsen's transcendental argument was carefully put together and eloquently stated." I wonder if he attended the same debate whose transcript I read and examined. I've made my interaction with Bahnsen's opening statement available to my detractors for quite a while now, and even though many of them have, as Frame characterizes Stein, "huffed and puffled and sputtered away" in defiance of my conclusion that Bahnsen offered a poof rather than a proof, none have come forward to piece together an actual argument which validly infers the existence of the Christian or any other god from anything Bahnsen claims in his opening statement. I'm willing to entertain the possibility that I've missed something, but unless one of Bahnsen's defenders takes the time to point it out to me, I'll rest with my analysis.

So, to address Sal's question, the answer is yes, I have read these authors, and no, I don't think I'm a poor reader. But, I will also answer by saying again that I am always willing to read more, and if my detractors want to specify a passage in either Van Til's, Bahnsen's or someone else's writings which is supposed to present the knock-down, drag-'em-out argument that presuppositionalists think they have, I'm certainly willing to examine it.

by Dawson Bethrick

With Minds of Children

I have often asked Christian apologists if they expect non-believers to accept their god-belief claims on their say so, as if their voice carried the cosmic authority they attribute to the god they enshrine in their imagination. I ask this question because religious believers who set out to defend their beliefs from the threat of non-belief offer precious little in clearly explaining why they believe what they claim to believe, and why others should believe what they claim. In my experience apologists typically seem to think this not a serious question, for few have offered a sincere answer. In encounters with apologists, even if their claims are given the attention they apparently think they deserve, questions about why they should be believed or why one should think they are true are either ignored or ridiculed, or effort is made to discredit the character of those who posed them in the first place. Such behavior simply indicates that those who would defend the religious view of the world have little or no confidence in any answers they might provide in response to questions posed about their beliefs and the claim that those beliefs are true.

But this no doubt does not put a stop to apologists seeking to rationalize their mystical beliefs (often by vilifying alternative positions) even while evading questions that sometimes strike at the very core of those beliefs or the motivation to carry on the pretense that they are true. And what is it that they are saying is true? Stories of magical personae and events, tales of conscious beings existing beyond our perception and beyond our ability to discover and know rationally, claims of an invisible magic being which created the universe by wishing it into existence and which "controls whatsoever comes to pass" (1), etc. All this strikes a reasonable thinker as legends and tales which are no more true than Alice in Wonderland or The Wizard of Oz.

Some apologists are quite open about the fact that it requires the mind of a child to take such stories seriously and accept them as truth. This is quite refreshing in fact, since it serves to confirm a basic point that I have observed in religious believers who on the whole otherwise seem at least somewhat intelligent. And that point is that god-belief will take its root best when the believer, like a naïve child, is philosophically defenseless against the false premises which lurk under theism's pre-packaged exterior of anecdotes, pretended authority, fake promises of vindication and the like. It is, in the case of Christianity for instance, the absurd and nonsensical which distinguish its teachings from other worldviews most dramatically, insisting that adults lower their minds to the level of a 6-year-old, prone to trusting persons in postions of authority and intellectually unable to recognize any abuse of that trust. It is the recognition of religion's predatory defrauding of the human mind and spirit that prompted Rand to point out to us that "faith in the supernatural always begins with faith in the superiority of others," that "A mystic is a man who surrendered his mind at its first encounter with the minds of others." (2)

Various passages in the bible make it clear that one must have the mind of a child rather than an adult to qualify as an approved believer. For instance, consider the following:

"Except ye be converted, and become as little children, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven. Whosoever therefore shall humble himself as this little child, the same is greatest in the kingdom of heaven." (Matthew 18:3-4)

"Whosoever shall not receive the kingdom of God as a little child, he shall not enter therein." (Mark 10:15)

Presuppositional apologist John Frame tells us that

Scripture never rebukes childlike faith; indeed, Jesus makes such faith a model to be followed by adults (Luke 18:16). One who requires proof may be doing it out of ungodly arrogance, or he may thereby be admitting that he has not lived in a godly environment and has taken counsel from fools. God’s norm for us is that we live and raise our children in such a way that proof will be unnecessary. (3)

Luke 18:16, which Frame cites above, says:

"But Jesus called them unto him, and said, Suffer little children to come unto me, and forbid them not: for of such is the kingdom of God."

Christianity needs the believer to lower his mind to the level of a child because it can only survive by exploiting his ignorance, and exploiting an individual's ignorance will be more difficult if that individual thinks as an honest adult, is intellectually informed, does not indiscriminately give his trust to just anyone or automatically presume that other minds are superior to his. Apologists recognize that the only way to goad adult thinkers into renouncing their adult minds is by coaxing them into questioning their certainty. It is for this reason that the deployment of many apologetic schemes are so unpersuasive: not only do they fail to draw on objectively verifiable facts which can be examined impartially by all viewers, they also fail to apply concepts in a self-consciously meaningful and consistent manner (which can work against a child's mind, but many adults tend to sense that their leg is being pulled).

For instance, when apologists say things like "[t]he ground of rationality must be the living and triune God" (4), it is entirely unclear what they might be trying to say since the term 'rationality' is not a Christian concept. And we know that 'rationality' is not a Christian concept because a) it is not a biblical concept, and b) the very basis of the concept of rationality, which is the primacy of existence principle, is wholly antithetical to the fundamental metaphysical orientation underpinning Christianity (which is the primacy of consciousness view of reality). Moreover, apologists tend to use such terms while ignoring the need to clarify any working definitions they may assume in the context of their claims and characterizations.

In the interest of undermining the non-believer's certainty (which is rightly perceived as an obstacle that must be removed for there to be any hope of vindicating Christianity from criticism), a favorite tactic of Christian apologists is to barrage a non-believer with numerous questions, questions which they apparently picked up in an introduction to philosophy course or from some apologetics primer. The immediate aim is to uncover some area of ignorance on the non-believer’s part while the underlying strategy is to focus on any hint of ignorance on virtually any issue and exaggerate its proportions by driving a wedge of uncertainty deep into its core. This uncertainty is then used to manipulate the non-believer into doubting the efficacy of his mind and the truth of his verdicts, and Christianity - like a bully who takes pleasure in kicking a guy when he's down - waits in the wings to fill the void.

This tactic can be seen in action in these illustrative examples of questions posed by Christian apologists:

"how does the atheist account for non-material logical laws?" (5)

"Now, how does the atheistic worldview account for morality? ...how can one account
for laws of logic? How can the atheist account for any abstract, universal law?" (6)

"assuming that non-theism were true, on what basis could we assume the validity of the inductive principle (or, in simple terms, the continual uniformity of nature)?" (7)

Such questions are supposed by apologists to have no "cogent" answer on the basis of "the atheist worldview," an expression which implies a uniformity in the thinking of atheists which does not exist.

Statements from apologists repeating the affirmation that "the atheist worldview" or non-believers in general "cannot account for" some feature of cognition read like indistinct widgets rolling off an assembly line, as if those making the affirmations were as robotic as the machines manufacturing the widgets. The uniformity of mindlessly repeated utterances indicates uniform mindlessness on the part of those who make them. Some choice examples include the following:

The atheist world view is irrational and cannot consistently provide the preconditions of intelligible experience, science, logic, or morality. The atheist world view cannot allow for laws of logic, the uniformity of nature, the ability for the mind to understand the world, and moral absolutes. In that sense the atheist world view cannot account for our debate tonight. (8)

The atheistic world view is inadequate… [it] cannot adequately explain the existence of the world… is unable to provide the necessary preconditions to account for the laws of science, the universal laws of logic — and, of course, absolute moral standards… cannot account for the meaningful realities of life. (9)

The atheistic worldview is irrational and cannot provide an adequate basis for intelligible experience. An atheistic world is ultimately random, disorderly, transitory, and volatile. It is therefore incapable of providing the necessary preconditions to account for the laws of science and the universal laws of logic. In short, it cannot account for the meaningful realities people encounter in life. (10)

On an unbelieving basis, however, there is no particular reason to believe that there are laws that actually describe facts. Who is to know that reality is regular at all? If the world is ultimately the result of chance (or ‘ultimate matter’, which is the same thing), surely it is equally likely that the world will become random or chaotic; and if our senses and reason seem to be telling us differently, why should we believe that in a world of chaos they would be telling us the truth? And if chance is king, where do laws come from? They do not exist in the objective world, because that world is the result of chance, not the product of a designer who gives it a structure of regularity. (11)

In the atheist worldview, rationality and ethics are the anomalies that require explanation. In the Christian worldview, irrationalism and evil are the anomalies. At the very least, atheism, not Christianity, has the up-hill battle in explaining how the existence of human rationality makes sense in their worldview. But the atheist’s ultimate explanation for anything can be only one thing, the irrational. Therefore, in terms of the atheist worldview there can never really be a rational explanation for anything." (12)

The anti-theist worldview can not account for the uniformity of nature on which to base the scientific process. (13)

The non-Christian's presuppositions cannot account for any area of human experience. (14)

The essence of the presuppositional strategy is to lampoon non-belief as such, typically by charging it with crippling intellectual disabilities through a variety of vilifying caricatures, presumptuous generalizations and uncharitable translations of certain positions affirmed by certain individuals, thereby making Christian god-belief somehow seem superior, more empowering, more philosophically informed. This tactic and other trademark elements of typical apologetic maneuvers suggest that apologists are really hoping that non-believers respond to their line of interrogation by throwing up their arms and saying "I donno, must be God did it!" After all, apologists give us nothing to suppose that this is not what they did themselves when it came to the task of using their minds.

In such a way, this interrogative style of apologetics is intended to get the heat off the believer and his task of providing reasons for believing what he claims while trying to undermine the non-believer's confidence in reason and his own mind (ironically characterized as a fault-ridden faculty which was allegedly created by a perfect creator). Since the apologist likely knows deep down that his god-belief claims have no rational defense, his concern is to hide them behind a blanket of challenges posed to those who have not surrendered their minds in similar fashion, not because their philosophical orientation is truly faulty, but because they are perceived to be a threat. All the while, the apologist seems completely oblivious to the need to provide a reason for believing the claims he apparently wants us to accept.

This whole approach to apologetics smacks of the behavior of an incorrigible child hoping to entrap adults in his midst whom he resents for being right. Children are not only often overly trusting, suggestible, imprudently credulous and intellectually vulnerable, they are also often prone to lacking self-restraint, social crudeness, and depth of intellect. And it is common knowledge that a child who is reluctant to grow up is sometimes given to petty nitpicking, emotional outbursts, temper tantrums. Non-believers who are willing to engage Christian apologists should not be surprised that such tendencies may show in their opponents since, as we saw above, this childishness is actually encouraged by the Christian worldview. As Van Til confessed unabashedly,

My whole point [is] that there is perfect harmony between my belief as a child and my belief as a man… My unity is that of a child who walks with its father through the woods. (15)

And of course, this is because Van Til never grew up. Which just underscores the $64,000.00 question:

Why be born again when you can just grow up?

by Dawson Bethrick

References:

(1) Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, p. 160.
(2) Atlas Shrugged
(3) John Frame, Apologetics to the Glory of God, p. 66.
(4) Douglas Wilson, Second Rebuttal to Theodore Drange
(5) Michael Butler, TAG vs. TANG

(6) Dennis Nenadov, The Existence of the Triune God

(7) Sycamore, Reply to An Atheists perspective of God

(8) Greg Bahnsen, Opening Statement

(9) Hank Hanegraaff, Is Atheism Logical?

(10) Rolaant McKenzie, Why Christianity?

(11) John Frame, Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought, p. 77.

(12) Mike Warren, Christian Civilization Is the Only Civilization

(13) Justin S. Holcomb, Knowledge Falsely So-Called: The Theological Case Against Scientific Realism

(14) Harry Callahan, Opening Statement

(15) Van Til, Why I Believe in God

Bahnsen's Poof Revisited

BJ of Men of Athens recently sent the following comment in response to one of my earliest blogs, Bahnsen's Poof:

Hi, I just read your blog and I think you are misreading or not hearing the argument that Bahnsen is making...so let me help you...the thrust of the argument (TAG) says that without the truth of the christian God being presupposed nothing can be proven at all. Now how should an atheist understand this? Easy. Given the most fundamental assumptions about reality that the atheist "HAS" he now should reflect on those basic presuppositions and he will realize that given his presuppositions science, logic, and morality would be "impossible". In the correspondence that followed the debate between Stein and Bahnsen, Bahnsen again showed Stein that his atheistic worldview could not even allow him to make since out of balancing his checkbook. As in the debate Stein kept appealing to the notion that atheist do have morality, science, and logic. Bahnsen rightly would point out to Stein that he could not use such tools for human experience to be intelligible if his worldview were "true". POOF....Christianity is true because of the impossibilty of the contrary. In its technical form it is an "reductio ad absurbdum" argument. If P then Q, P therefore Q or If morality, science, and logic are the case (P) then Q (Christianity) has to be affirmed as logically necessary "because" ("because" clause is vital here)Q is the precondition of P. That is the indirect argument. Now, how is that bold assertion proved? Assume not Q (in this case non-christianity)and then look for internal contrsdictions within a particualr worldview for it to refute itself. If you do not understand Kant then the odds are you will not understand what Van Til was up to. Basically atheism can not provide the preconditions for logic, science, or morality to have any "meaning" to our human experience. [sic]

In this blog entry I will interact with BJ's statements.

BJ: "Hi, I just read your blog and I think you are misreading or not hearing the argument that Bahnsen is making...so let me help you..."

BJ apparently wants to say that the conclusion of my analysis of Bahnsen's opening statement in his debate with Stein is wrong. My conclusion was that Bahnsen failed to present an argument in his opening statement. This conclusion was established as the result of a line-by-line analysis of the last paragraphs of Bahnsen's statement, for which - as an opening statement in a debate on the existence of the Christian god - Bahnsen should have been most prepared to present. In fact, since he begins these last few paragraphs with the statement "And so I come thirdly then to the transcendental proof of God's existence," we would naturally expect Bahnsen to use this opportunity to present any argument he might have. But instead of presenting an argument for his claim that his god exists, Bahnsen launches right into accusing Stein of two fallacies, even though Stein hasn't even had a chance to speak yet! (Did Bahnsen feel a need to poison the well at this early point in the debate?) He then tells us that his god-belief "is not tested in any ordinary way like other factual claims." So there are all these reasons why we should not expect to validate Bahnsen's theistic claims in ways that other claims can be validated. And yet in spite of such limitations he still wants to say it's a fact that his god exists. Does Bahnsen explain how his theistic claims can be confirmed and verified? No, he doesn't do this - he just tells us how they can't be verified. He then tells us that "we can prove the existence of God from the impossibility of the contrary," which he nowhere establishes, and which conflicts with teachings which are explicitly laid out in the New Testament (see below). Bahnsen asserts that "without Him, it is impossible to prove anything." But upon what this statement is based is never explained. It sounds like a conclusion, but no argument is given to support it. In fact, the statement assumes that Bahnsen's god exists, which is precisely what Bahnsen is called to prove. Does he offer a proof? No, he doesn't. Rather, he goes on to charge "the atheist world-view" with all kinds of failings, as if this served as a proof of the Christian god's existence.

Given that the conclusion of my analysis is that Bahnsen did not present an actual argument for the existence of his god in his opening statement, to show that my conclusion is wrong BJ would have to identify an argument present in Bahnsen's opening statement. Does BJ do this? No, he does not. Instead of identifying any traceable argument in Bahnsen's opening statement, BJ says that he thinks I am "misreading or not hearing the argument that Bahnsen is making." (So it’s my fault!) But if there's no argument presented, then obviously I cannot "misread" or "hear" something that's not there. What specifically am I "misreading or not hearing"? I reviewed Bahnsen's own comments from his opening statement - the statement for which he would have been most prepared to present. In my analysis, I showed that there is no argument since the apparent conclusion (which, in the case of an argument for the existence of a god should be something along the lines of "therefore god exists") has no inferential support to be found in Bahnsen's opening statement. Nothing in BJ’s comment to me overcomes this. One cannot insert an inference into Bahnsen's statement when there's no inference there as that would simply constitute tampering with the evidence.

BJ: "the thrust of the argument (TAG) says that without the truth of the christian God being presupposed nothing can be proven at all."

That's the "thrust of the argument"? Exactly what is meant by the term "thrust" here? My concern is not to find out how Bahnsen blasted himself into orbit, but to uncover any inferential support that Bahnsen might have given for the claim that the Christian god exists in the first place. The "thrust" of his non-argument may consist of the claim that the Christian god exists. But a claim is not an argument. What I'm looking for is the argument which Bahnsen might have presented. His conclusion is clear enough, but what were his premises? For instance, what premises support the claim that "without the truth of the christian God being presupposed nothing can be proven at all"? Since this claim itself assumes what Bahnsen is called to prove, all that such claims accomplish is to multiply the apologist's burden of proof while failing to meet any burdens already sitting in his cart.

BJ: "Now how should an atheist understand this? Easy. Given the most fundamental assumptions about reality that the atheist 'HAS' he now should reflect on those basic presuppositions and he will realize that given his presuppositions science, logic, and morality would be 'impossible'."

Before addressing the points here, it should be pointed out that, had Bahnsen presented a clear argument for his god's existence, BJ's statements here would not be necessary. Also, it should be pointed out that BJ's statement here does nothing to rescue Bahnsen from the verdicts of my analysis. All that BJ succeeds in doing here is to give his own interpretation of TAG. But this does not get Bahnsen off the hook. Moreover, any problems which any particular atheist's "presuppositions" might have, whether actual or hypothetical, are irrelevant to the matter, for it does not follow from an instance of error in a non-believer's view of the world that the Christian god therefore exists. This would make said god's existence contingent on someone's intellectual error, and typically theists claim that their god's existence is absolute rather than contingent. So we have here already an instance in which the presuppositional apologetic is incompatible with the theism which it purports to defend (since presuppositionalism depends on the discovery of errors in rival worldviews). In spite of this, the typical habit of presuppositional apologists is to dwell on their resentment of what they call "the atheist world-view" rather than identify in clear terms why they believe what they claim to believe.

Turning now to BJ's own points, I offer the following points in return.

BJ seems to think that, as an atheist, I should consider my "most fundamental assumptions about reality" and subject them to scrutiny. I have no objection to this recommendation. In fact, it is a challenge which my "most fundamental assumptions about reality" are quite prepared to satisfy fully. That is because my "most fundamental assumptions about reality" are made explicit by the axioms as opposed to hiding in some dark cave of mysticism. (I respond to criticism of my worldview's axioms in my blog post Probing Mr. Manata's Poor Understanding of the Axioms.)

Specifically, my axioms are:

1) that existence exists (i.e., there is a reality),
2) that to exist is to be something (A is A, the law of identity), and
3) that consciousness is consciousness of something (the axiom of consciousness).

These axioms would have to be true even to deny them. In order to deny these axioms, there would have to be a reality which serves as a point of reference, the axioms would have to have identity (so that there is something that is being denied), and there would have to be someone who is conscious to do the denying (since denial is a conscious activity). Together these axioms imply a general, inescapable principle known as the primacy of existence - that is, that existence exists independent of consciousness, which means: the object(s) of consciousness holds metaphysical primacy over the subject of consciousness. This is the objective orientation of the subject-object relationship. The only alternative to this is the opposite view - that the subject of consciousness holds metaphysical primacy over its objects (such as when the Christian god creates the universe ex nihilo by an act of will, or causes an entity to behave in a manner that is contradictory to its nature by an act of will - cf. the doctrine of miracles).

Now, let's do as BJ recommends, namely "reflect on those basic presuppositions," and see if "given [these] presuppositions science, logic, and morality would be 'impossible'." First let's look at science. (By science I generally mean the systematic application of reason to specific areas of study based on controlled observations.) Does science presuppose that existence exists, i.e., that there is a reality? Sure it does. Without something that exists, there would be nothing for science to study. Does science presuppose that a thing has identity? Sure it does. If things existed but did not have identity, scientific study would be futile for it could yield no reliable conclusions. If the things that exist had no identity, then there would be nothing specific to observe. Does science presuppose that consciousness is consciousness of something? Sure it does. If consciousness were consciousness of nothing, then what faculty would make scientific inquiry possible? Non-consciousness? And if there were no consciousness at all, what would do the observing? Clearly scientific inquiry requires consciousness of things that exist, for science inherently involves observation of objects. So science requires the truth of the axioms.

Now let's look at logic. (By logic I generally mean a set of principles that guide the mind in forming non-contradictory identifications.) Does logic presuppose that existence exists, that there is a reality? Sure it does. If nothing exists, then logic doesn't exist, either. And if nothing existed, there'd be nothing to be logical about, and there'd be no one to think logically. So logic undeniably presupposes the first axiom. Does logic presuppose that things have identity? Sure it does. The very foundation of logic is the law of identity, that things are what they are, that to exist is to be something specific, that a thing is itself, that A is A. It is because things are what they are that the principles of logic can be applied in the first place. Does logic presuppose that consciousness is consciousness of something? Sure it does. It would be illogical to say that consciousness can be consciousness of nothing. The alternative to consciousness of something is consciousness of nothing. This would mean that there is no object to consider. But without an object to consider, what would be considered? Obviously nothing. And if nothing were considered, there would be nothing to think about logically. Thus there would be nothing to which logical principles could be applied. So like science, logic clearly requires the truth of the axioms.

Now let's look at morality. (By morality I generally mean a code of values which guides one's choices and actions.) Does morality presuppose that existence exists, that there is a reality? Sure it does. If nothing exists, then man does not exist, and consequently the fundamental alternative between life and death which he faces and which makes morality a necessity for him does not exist. This would mean that there would be no basis or need for morality. Does morality presuppose that a thing has identity? Sure it does. Specifically it presupposes that man and his environment have identity, and with this that man's identity is such that he faces a fundamental alternative, namely between life and death. If man did not face this alternative, he would not need a code of values which guides his choices and actions. Does morality presuppose consciousness? Sure it does. Since man's moral actions are chosen, he could not make choices if he did not have a conscious faculty which could identify alternatives and make selections among them in the first place. Clearly, morality presupposes the truth of the axioms.

So in the case of science, logic and morality, it should be clear: my "most fundamental assumptions about reality" would have to be true for these endeavors to be possible in the first place. By retortion (presumably a technique championed by presuppositionalists), let's deny these fundamentals and see if science, logic and morality can survive. Let's deny the first fundamental, the axiom of existence. Let's say there's no existence. Well, just by saying "there's no existence," we've already contradicted ourselves, for we would have to exist in order to say this. Since science does not stand on contradictions, this could not be true. Thus the axiom of existence would have to be true in order for science to be possible. The same outcome would be the case for logic as well: logic does not rest on self-contradiction. Nor does morality. Indeed, if existence did not exist, there would be no science, no logic and no morality. So by retortion the axiom of existence must be true for science, logic and morality to be legitimate human concerns.

Let's try denying the second fundamental, the axiom of identity. Let's say that to exist is not to be something. If this were the case, then what would do science? We could not say that man will do science, for this presupposes that man is man, that a thing that exists is something specific and has specific attributes (such as a conscious faculty). And what would be observed and studied, if to exist is not to be something? We could not say that we would observe and study things that exist, for this presupposes that things are what they are, that they have a nature. What would do any logical thinking if things that exist had no identity? We could not say that man does the logical thinking, for this assumes that man is something specific, namely an entity capable of performing logical thought. And what use would morality serve? Morality is only useful to man because of his specific nature: he faces a fundamental alternative and his life is not automatically guaranteed to him - he must act in accordance with his nature in order to live because of his nature. So by retortion the axiom of identity must be true for science, logic and morality to be legitimate human concerns.

Now let's try denying the third fundamental, the axiom of consciousness. Let's say that consciousness is consciousness of nothing. That would mean that consciousness is irrelevant. (For to say that consciousness is consciousness of nothing is to assert consciousness without a relationship to any object to perceive and/or consider.) If consciousness were irrelevant, what would do the observing and studying that science requires? Obviously nothing, for on this view consciousness has been denied. So science presupposes consciousness of objects. What about logic? Could there be any use for logic if consciousness had no objects? This would mean that there is nothing for a consciousness to be logical about. Since logic requires objects to provide content to our identifications, inferences, deductions, etc., logic presupposes consciousness of objects. What about morality? Could there be any morality if we were not conscious of objects? If it were the case that we were not conscious of objects, we would not be able to identify either values or potential threats. Thus we would not be able to identify the kinds of actions we need to take in order to obtain and protect our values and avoid destructive threats. Consequently morality, too, presupposes consciousness of objects. So by retortion the axiom of consciousness must be true for science, logic and morality to be legitimate human concerns.

So by the presuppositionalist's own standard, the argument by retortion, the axioms obtain, and their denial would constitute their very validation at the same time (which means: denial of the axioms results in absurdity). Contrary to what the presuppositionalist would like to see, "the most fundamental assumptions about reality" made by my worldview are validated by the presuppositionalist's own preferred form of testing.

BJ: "In the correspondence that followed the debate between Stein and Bahnsen, Bahnsen again showed Stein that his atheistic worldview could not even allow him to make since out of balancing his checkbook."

This point is not relevant to my post, since my post was concerned with whether or not Bahnsen presented a proof for his god's existence in his opening statement, or if he simply offered a poof - i.e., a series of assertions which are presented on the pretense that they offer an argument when in fact the speaker offers no argument whatsoever. As for the claim that "Bahnsen again showed Stein that his atheistic worldview could not even allow him to make [sense] out of balancing his checkbook," yes, Bahnsen did make claims like this throughout the debate, but simply claiming this to be the case does not constitute a demonstration of the truth of that claim, nor does it constitute a proof of the existence of Bahnsen's god. Keep in mind that Stein was not a philosopher; rather, he was an expert in the special sciences, specifically biology if I'm not mistaken. So I would not expect Stein to have been prepared to give a play-by-play analysis of how the mind works (e.g., on how concepts are formed on the basis of perception and integrated into statements of recognition, inductive generalizations, deductive conclusions, etc.) since this was not the area of his specialty. At best, all Bahnsen may have shown is that Stein specifically did not have detailed knowledge of these things. It would be embarrassingly fallacious to try to draw from Stein's ignorance the conclusion that a god must therefore exist. But this is principally what Bahnsen seemed eager to do, which is simply an admission that his god-belief ultimately stands on ignorance as such. In this way TAG is just another tired god-of-the-gaps strategy (notice I did not say 'argument' here, since Bahnsen did not present an argument). The apologist is supposed to be able to ask vague and open-ended questions like "How do you account for logic?" and the non-believer is apparently supposed to throw up his hands and say "Duh, I donno! Must be God did it!" What else does the apologist offer?

BJ: "As in the debate Stein kept appealing to the notion that atheist do have morality, science, and logic. Bahnsen rightly would point out to Stein that he could not use such tools for human experience to be intelligible if his worldview were 'true'. POOF...."

Yes, Bahnsen did claim this. But that's not the same as proving this to be the case. And we already know that he didn't offer an argument in his opening statement, the very statement which he would have been able to prepare in advance. Furthermore, I just showed how the axioms of my worldview are necessary "for human experience to be intelligible" since they identify the preconditions of experience to begin with.

BJ: "Christianity is true because of the impossibilty of the contrary." [sic]

While Bahnsen does make a similar claim in his opening statement, he nowhere substantiated it. At any rate, I answer this mindlessly repeated slogan in my blog article Is the Contrary to Christianity Truly Impossible?

In that post I show how the presuppositionalist's claim that "Christianity is true because of the [impossibility] of the contrary" violates one of presuppositionalism's own feigned standards, namely that of internal consistency. Since the bible is clear in explicitly affirming that "all things are possible" (Matt. 19:26), a defense strategy which contradicts this (by affirming that there is something that is impossible) is unfit for what it's intended to defend, namely a worldview which clearly and explicitly affirms that "all things are possible." I've yet to see a good response to my point. Additionally, my worldview is clearly contrary to what Christianity teaches, and yet it is a reality. So on this point the claim that the contrary to Christianity is impossible is clearly false.

BJ: "In its technical form it is an 'reductio ad absurbdum' argument."

To the extent that TAG is a reductio ad absurdum, it is unsuitable as a defense of Christianity, for the reason I just gave above. Moreover, since Christianity assumes the primacy of consciousness view of reality (I prove this here), the very claim that Christianity is true contradicts itself, since the concept 'truth' assumes the opposite principle, the primacy of existence.

BJ: "If P then Q, P therefore Q"

If only Bahnsen could have developed his opening statement in such a logical fashion. Then (and only then) would there be an argument to dissect in that statement. Of course, he would have to validate the inputs plugged in for the variables here, had he presented an argument in the first place. However, not only did he not present an argument, he nowhere validated the inputs he plugged into any of his assertions. Essentially, he showed up DOA - defeated on arrival. No matter what faults can be found in what Stein presented, Bahnsen failed to prove that his god exists.

BJ: "or If morality, science, and logic are the case (P) then Q (Christianity) has to be affirmed as logically necessary ‘because’ (‘because’ clause is vital here) Q is the precondition of P."

On the contrary, since Christianity assumes the primacy of consciousness view of reality, it necessarily disqualifies itself as a viable precondition for any fundamental anchoring morality, science and logic since morality, science and logic, as I showed above, require the axioms and the primacy of existence principle. In fact, my analysis of the axioms and their relationship to science, logic and morality above demonstrate an opposite conclusion, to wit: If science, logic and morality are the case (P), then O (Objectivism) has to be affirmed as logically necessary because the truth of Objectivism is the precondition to P. Christianity falls as one casualty among a whole host of mystical worldviews which stand on the primacy of consciousness view of the world, which is anathema to science, logic and morality (since the primacy of consciousness violates the axioms while science, logic and morality would not be possible without the axioms).

BJ: "That is the indirect argument."

And as such, it shows that its defenders are not very aware of the nature of the fundamentals of either science, logic or morality. These areas of concern simply offer apologists an occasion for bamboozling unprepared non-believers. What is telling is that presuppositionalism fails to make any relationship between either science, logic or morality and the teachings of Christianity clear and traceable. All in all, presuppositionalism essentially consists of nothing more than a claim to magic (which is a consequence of enshrining ignorance).

BJ: "Now, how is that bold assertion proved? Assume not Q (in this case non-christianity)and then look for internal contrsdictions within a particualr worldview for it to refute itself." [sic]

Okay, I offer my non-Christian worldview. Where are the contradictions within it? Please, show me. Don't forget that the concept 'contradiction' assumes the primacy of existence principle, for only if the objects of awareness hold metaphysical primacy over the subject of awareness would contradictions be objectionable. To say that contradictions are objectionable, then, the theist must borrow from my worldview which is the only proper philosophical custodian of the concept of objectivity.

BJ: "If you do not understand Kant then the odds are you will not understand what Van Til was up to."

Even though Van Til sought to replace Kant's categories and antimonies with Christian theism and "apparent contradictions," both thinkers erred in granting validity to the primacy of consciousness view of reality, which is self-defeating.

BJ: "Basically atheism can not provide the preconditions for logic, science, or morality to have any 'meaning' to our human experience."

It is not the task of atheism to "provide the preconditions for logic, science, or morality" any more than the task of music theory is to provide men with the aural nerves they need for listening music. If music theory could do this, Beethoven would not have died such a frustrated man. Atheism is simply the absence of god-belief. As such, it tells us only what someone does not believe, not what one does believe. Therefore it constitutes a fundamental misunderstanding to hold atheism accountable for failing to "provide the preconditions for logic, science, or morality." Besides, I do not think it is at all accurate to say that a worldview "provides" these things; these preconditions are metaphysical and exist in nature, and they are competently identified by the axioms. To say that a worldview must "provide the preconditions for logic, science, [and] morality" is incoherent; those preconditions would need to be in place for the worldview in question to be possible in the first place. What a worldview enables one to do is to identify those preconditions in explicit terms (here's where the axioms come in) and integrate them into a coherent whole in accordance with those preconditions which in turn enables him to identify the values his life requires and the actions he needs to take in order to achieve those values. Writes Ayn Rand:

The task of philosophy is to provide man with a comprehensive view of life. This view serves as a base, a frame of reference, for all his actions, mental or physical, psychological or existential. This view tells him the nature of the universe with which he has to deal (metaphysics); the means by which he is to deal with it, i.e., the means of acquiring knowledge (epistemology); the standards by which he is to choose his goals and values, in regard to his own life and character (ethics) - and in regard to society (politics); the means of concretizing this view is given to him by esthetics. ("The Chickens' Homecoming," The New Left, p. 107.)

As for bickering over how many angels can dance on the head of a pin, the theologians are free to waste their time with such arbitrary and worthless matters.

by Dawson Bethrick