Answering Nide's Questions about the Uniformity of Nature

A visitor to my blog named Nide who posts comments under the pseudonym “Hezekiah Ahaz” has asked a series of questions relating to one of my favorite topics, the uniformity of nature.

Nide: “Well, of couse Ayn for you to take measurements you have to assume the nature is uniform. Something you can't account for.”

For this question to have stable meaning, he needs to explain specifically what he means by “account for” in the context of the uniformity of nature. What exactly is he asking here?

Nide: “So you have no choice but to take it for granted. Which assumes faith something your philosophy precludes.”

I can’t say which is the bigger impediment for Nide’s understanding, whether it’s his self-inflicted ignorance of his opponent’s position, or his commitment to mischaracterizing his opponent’s position by proposing simplistic implications which in fact are not suggested by that position. But either way, his lack of understanding is persistent and systemic.

What Objectivism precludes is the primacy of consciousness, confusing imagination for reality, substituting emotion for knowledge, etc. I don’t know how anyone could possibly object to these, but here’s Nide trying to malign a position which is distinguished by steadfast allegiance to the fact that wishing doesn’t make it so.

By ‘faith’, Objectivism means acceptance of ideational content without evidence or contrary to sound reasoning. It does not mean “taking something for granted.” Not even the bible equates faith with taking something for granted. But here’s Nide, acting as though it does.

So just to make this crystal clear: Objectivism rejects accepting ideational content without evidence or contrary to sound reasoning.

When Christians kick against this policy, they tell us about themselves.

The Objectivist view of nature is not void of evidence or contrary to sound reasoning. We perceive and deal with nature directly every moment of our lives. Nide has not shown that the Objectivist view of nature is void of evidence or contrary to sound reasoning. There is nothing about the Objectivist view of nature which is inconsistent with its epistemology, and this is why Nide cannot present a validation of his deliberately slanderous construals. If Nide or anyone else thinks that Objectivism’s view of nature is inconsistent in some way with its epistemology, he needs to show this, not simply say that such an offense exists without showing where such an offense occurs. He needs to do his homework instead of thriving on drive-by charges that only expose his gaping ignorance of what he’s talking about.

In the case of the uniformity of nature, the question that I raise with theists who want to make this matter a topic of debate, is whether the uniformity of nature is something which consciousness establishes in nature on the one hand, or a feature of nature which obtains independent of conscious activity. Theists of course, in particular presuppositionalists for whom the uniformity of nature is an apologetic centerpiece, typically avoid discussing the matter in these terms. (See for instance the questions I have posed to apologist Chris Bolt here back in March 2010, which still to this day have not been addressed.)

The Objectivist view is that nature is uniform independent of conscious activity, that nature’s uniformity is not something which consciousness provides to nature. On this view, nature is inherently uniform, and the uniformity of nature is something we discover and identify, not create and/or alter.

The Christian view is clearly the opposite: that some form of consciousness is needed to provide nature with its uniformity, which can only mean that nature is not inherently uniform, that nature is inherently chaotic, that the default of nature is disorder, that the law of causality is something foreign to nature and must be installed into nature by some volitional action of consciousness. This is the subjective view of the uniformity of nature, the view of nature found in Christianity, and it is in fact a distinguishing characteristic of Christianity since “miracles are at the heart of the Christian position.” (Cornelius Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, p. 27)

Of course, we can imagine that a magic consciousness gives nature its uniformity. But this would be a figment of one's imagination, not a rational identification of reality. If an individual is content with confusing what he imagines for reality, Christianity may very well be a fitting home for him.

Nide asked: “Ayn on what rational basis do you as an ‘atheist’ Justify belief in the inductive principle?”

To the extent that this question has any rational legitimacy (which would require some revision to make that the case), the answer is very simple: on the basis of the axioms, the primacy of existence, and the objective theory of concepts. I’ve stated this before, but so far no theist has been able to bring a lasting challenge to it. All theists can do is try to ridicule it. Meanwhile, they ignore the fact that their worldview attempts to defy the axioms, endorses the primacy of consciousness (e.g., wishing makes it so), and has no theory of concepts to begin with! If there’s a weaker position from which to try to attack Objectivism, I’d like to what it could possibly be.

Nide: “Ayn without begging the question or avoiding a circle can you explain to me why nature is uniform?”

This question is fallacious complex, for attempting to answer it on its own terms invites the fallacy of the stolen concept. To say “why” something is the case implies that it is the result of some cause. But causality is a law of nature. So you can’t affirm a cause prior to nature. This would constitute a stolen concept. I certainly reject the idea that some form of consciousness causes nature to be uniform. This is a blatant absurdity given the mountain of stolen concepts one would have to accept in adopting such a view.

Nature and uniformity are inseparable, like water and its wetness (to use Sye Bruggencate’s own metaphor – it fits, and in this context it finally has some legitimacy as a metaphor). To ask why nature is uniform not only invites stolen concepts (and is therefore fallaciously complex), it also misses the nature of uniformity.

by Dawson Bethrick