Peikoff on the Invulnerability of the Objectivist Axioms

Since it is inevitable that Christian apologists will, when it is expedient to do so, dispute the truth of the Objectivist axioms, I thought it might be helpful to dedicate a single entry here on Incinerating Presuppositionalism showcasing Leonard Peikoff’s mock dialogue between a defender of the axioms and someone who denies their truth.

Here Peikoff shows how a denial of each of the axioms both exposes the detractor’s own absurdity as well as confirms the inescapability of their truth.

For reference, the three axioms in view here are:

One: The axiom of existence, which states: existence exists – i.e., things exist, there is a reality. 

Two: The axiom of consciousness, which states that consciousness is consciousness of things that exist, consciousness is real. 

Three: The axiom of identity, which states: to exist is to be something specific, distinct from other things that exist, A is A, a thing is itself.

The axioms denote fundamental recognitions as formal statements of the most basic of all truths. All other truths depend on the truth of these axioms in that without their truth, there would be nothing to be true to begin with. We know these truths implicitly because they are self-evident in all experience, i.e., in all conscious interaction with reality, with our surroundings, with our daily life. As formal statements, the axioms make explicit what we’ve known implicitly all along. To deny the truth of the axioms is to commit the fallacy of the stolen concept, for the very act of denying the truth of the axioms performatively confirms their truth: one would have to exist in order to deny the axiom of existence; one would need to be conscious in order to deny anything; the axiom of identity would itself need to have identity in order to be singled out and denied as against anything else.

The following excerpt appears on pages 9-10 of Leonard Peikoff’s book Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand:

The three axioms I have been discussing have a built-in protection against all attacks: they must be used and accepted by everyone, including those who attack them and those who attack the concept of the self-evident. Let me illustrate this point by considering a typical charge leveled by opponents of philosophic axioms. 

“People disagree about axioms,” we often hear. “What is self-evident to one may not be self-evident to another. How then can a man know that his axioms are objectively true? How can he ever be sure he is right?” 

This argument starts by accepting the concept of “disagreement,” which it uses to challenge the objectivity of any axioms, including existence, consciousness, and identity. The following condensed dialogue suggests one strategy by which to reveal the argument’s contradictions. The strategy begins with A, the defender of axioms, purporting to reject outright the concept of “disagreement.” 

A. “Your objection to the self-evident has no validity. There is no such thing as disagreement. People agree about everything.” 

B. “That’s absurd. People disagree constantly, about all kinds of things.” 

A. “How can they? There’s nothing to disagree about, no subject matter. After all, nothing exists.” 

B. “Nonsense. All kinds of things exist. You know that as well as I do.” 

A. “That’s one. You must accept the existence axiom even to utter the term ‘disagreement.’ But, to continue, I still claim that disagreement is unreal. How can people disagree, since they are unconscious beings who are unable to hold ideas at all?” 

B. “Of course people hold ideas. They are conscious beings—you know that?” 

A. “There’s another axiom. But even so, why is disagreement about ideas a problem? Why should it suggest that one or more of the parties is mistaken? Perhaps all of the people who disagree about the very same point are equally, objectively right.” 

B. “That’s impossible. If two ideas contradict each other, they can’t both be right. Contradictions can’t exist in reality. After all, things are what they are. A is A.” 

Existence, consciousness, identity are presupposed by every statement and by every concept, including that of “disagreement.” (They are presupposed even by invalid concepts, such as “ghost” or “analytic” truth.) In the act of voicing his objection, therefore, the objector has conceded the case. In any act of challenging or denying the three axioms, a man reaffirms them, no matter what the particular content of his challenge. The axioms are invulnerable. 

The opponents of these axioms pose as defenders of truth, but it is only a pose. Their attack on the self-evident amounts to the charge: “Your belief in an idea doesn’t necessarily make it true; you must prove it, because facts are what they are independent of your beliefs.” Every element of this charge relies on the very axioms that these people are questioning and supposedly setting aside.

The axioms of existence, consciousness and identity are inescapable. To deny them is to performatively concede their truth.

I challenge any and all Christian apologists to make one coherent pronouncement which does not assume or concede the truth identified by the axioms of existence, consciousness and identity. Just one. You won’t be able to do it. You won’t be able to assert any statement as true without assuming or conceding the truth of the Objectivist axioms. Comments are open and apologists are welcome to post their attempts there.

by Dawson Bethrick