Bahnsen’s “tremendous philosophical mistake”

Presuppositionalists love to tout the debate between Greg Bahnsen and Gordon Stein. In apologetic circles, it is commonly believed that Bahnsen got that evil atheist Stein real good, and no atheist thinker can really be capable of crawling back from that public whipping.

Of course, such evaluations are quite superficial and self-serving, and they willingly ignore many striking deficiencies in Bahnsen’s presentation (see for example here, here, here and here).

However, what’s curious is that apologists do not tend to point to Bahnsen’s discussion with George H. Smith, author of Atheism: The Case Against God.

Unlike his debate with Gordon Stein, here Bahnsen was dealing with someone more familiar with primary philosophy and thus was not able to get away with the gimmickry that is so characteristic to presuppositionalism. Audio of the discussion can be found on Youtube here (sorry, comments disabled…), and a written transcript can be found here.

Still, there are a few missed opportunities, and one in particular is worth exploring.

There’s a section in their discussion where Smith tries to education Bahnsen on the nature of causality, which Objectivism encapsulates as “the law of identity applied to action” (For the New Intellectual, p. 151). This is the observation that not only do actions have identity, but also that the actions which an entity performs (as well as those which it can perform, whether it actually performs them or not) depend on the nature of the entity performing those actions. Here I’ll quote the section at length to let readers enjoy this portion of their exchange without searching the transcript for it:

Smith: Well the underlying assumption is that a thing is what it is. An existing thing has specific characteristics, and it’s restricted to the range of behavior or action as defined by those characteristics. A cat will not give birth to baby elephants. 

Bahnsen: Why not? 

Smith: Because that’s the nature of the cat. 

Bahnsen: Well, that’s begging the question, to say it’s the nature of the cat. 

Smith: But you say that it’s the nature of God all the time. I can say it’s the nature of the cat. 

Bahnsen: No, actually I’m not just saying it’s the nature of God. I’m saying God reveals himself to people . . . 

Smith: I’m saying my view of causation is that causation is essentially the law of identity applied to action. Things act as they do because they have specific, determinate characteristics and the [unintelligible] the physical or whatever nature of an existing thing determines the nature of the actions that that thing can take. So when one billiard ball strikes another billiard ball, the nature of the billiard ball is the nature of the motion, determines what the causal result will be. That’s why we get down to the law of identity. There’s regularity in nature because things are existing, determinate things with specific characteristics. 

Bahnsen: Well, it’s a tremendous philosophical mistake to assimilate the law of causality to the laws of logic, but if you study the history of philosophy, you’d know that this idea that things have a determinate nature and that’s why they behave the way they do is associated with the conclusion that there can be no change, that is, it’s impossible for things to change, well, because the law of identity prevents things from changing. So now I would continue the discussion. Let’s look at our underlying assumptions. How is it possible to extrapolate into the future, if you use the law of identity—there’s no change to look for in the future.

The view that Bahnsen expresses here – that applying identity to action could only mean there’s no change – is not uncommon. The operative assumption underlying such views seems to be that ‘identity’ means whatever features an entity has are fixed and unchangeable, as though it were frozen in an instant of time. In other words, an entity’s identity could not, on this assumption, include or allow for any changes which the entity undergoes over time, or the potential for action that it has given its nature. Change of any sort, on this view, entails a metaphysical cancelling out of identity as such. On this arbitrary assumption, identity is an isolated, immutable snapshot severing the entity from the broader capacities of its features across time. Hence, ‘action’ and ‘identity’ are opposing concepts which cannot be integrated without contradiction. Consequently, Bahnsen explains, applying the law of identity to existents (rather than just in the hermetically sealed of logic, which for Bahnsen really has no connection to existence) necessarily leads to “the conclusion that there can be no change… because the of identity prevents things from changing.” 

While the view which Bahnsen repeats here may be commonly accepted, it strikes me as truly bizarre. In practice, this can only mean that action cannot have any identity, because otherwise everything in reality would be restricted to what it is in an isolated instant, which would obviously make action impossible.

But it should not take much critical examination to notice how every sentence in Bahnsen’s statement is inconsistent with the view he expresses. Take the following clause for example:

”…if you study the history of philosophy…”

What does the word “study” mean here? This is a verb. What do verbs do in a sentence? Verbs like “to study” denote action. Suppose instead Bahnsen stated:

”…if you deny the history of philosophy…”

Or:

”…if you ignore the history of philosophy…”

Would the overall point Bahnsen was trying to make with this clause remain the same if either of these two alternatives were put in place of Bahnsen’s original word choice? After all, both of the italicized words here - deny and ignore - are verbs. So why couldn’t Bahnsen have used one of these verbs instead of “study” to make his point?

The reason why he couldn’t do this should be obvious: Because each of these verbs denote different actions.

But if action has no identity, how can we say that one action is any different from another action? Is studying the same as denying, or are these different kinds of actions? Is studying the same as ignoring, or are these different kinds of actions?

If an individual supposes that studying is distinct from both denying and ignoring, and that denying is distinct from both ignoring and studying, is he therefore not taking for granted that these different actions are distinct because they in fact have differing identities? Of course he is.

What’s ironic is that, as absurd an idea as a cat giving birth to elephants may be, it is not Smith’s worldview which could grant validity to the claim that such a phenomenon is possible, but Bahnsen’s! On Bahnsen’s view, there’s a supernatural consciousness which could will anything to happen in “Creation.” If the Christian god wanted a cat to give birth to elephants, what could possibly stop this from happening? If “God’s will be done,” who’s to say what said god might will, and on what basis can a mere mortal like Greg Bahnsen say that something on “God’s green earth” cannot happen?

The “tremendous philosophical mistaking” here is failing to integrate fundamental philosophical pronouncements with your daily actions. The performative tension between Bahnsen’s denial of the applicability of the law of identity to action and his own ubiquitous assumption of the distinctions between actions is hard to miss here, once it has been pointed out.

How might this play out in daily interactions? Consider the following hypothetical exchange in the Bahnsen household:

Bahnsen: “Son, it’s time to do your chores. Get on it!” 

Son: “Sorry, Dad. Can’t. I’m busy right now.” 

Bahnsen: “Busy? What are you doing?” 

Son: “What do you mean, ‘what are you doing?’? You act as though action has identity. You said it yourself – that’s a tremendous philosophical mistake!” 

Bahnsen: [silent]

Consider the implications that Bahnsen’s position would have on our understanding of induction. If having an identity prevents a thing from changing, and “it’s a tremendous philosophical mistake to assimilate the law of causality to the laws of logic,” on what basis can one draw general conclusion from individual inputs? If entities and actions cannot have identity, then what could possibly connect an effect with any antecedent cause? There could be no such connection. And this was essentially David Hume’s view:

We have sought, in vain, for an Idea of Power or necessary Connexion in all the Sources, from which we could suppose it to be deriv'd. It appears, that, in single Instances of the Operation of Bodies, we never can, by our outmost Scrutiny, discover any Thing but one Event following another, without being able to comprehend any Force or Power, by which the Cause operates, or any Connexion betwixt it and its suppos'd Effect. The same Difficulty occurs in contemplating the Operations of Mind on Body; where we observe the Motion of the latter to follow upon the Volition of the former; but are not able to observe or conceive the Tye, which binds them together, or the Energy, by which the Mind produces this Effect. The Authority of the Will over our own Faculties and Ideas is not a whit more comprehensible: So that upon the whole, there appears not, thro' all Nature, any one Instance of Connexion, that is conceivable by us: All Events seem entirely loose and separate. One Event follows another; but we never can observe any Tye betwixt them: They seem conjoin'd, but never connected. And as we can have no Idea of any Thing, that never appear'd to our outward Sense or inward Sentiment, the necessary Conclusion seems to be, that we have no Idea of Connexion or Power at all, and that these Words are absolutely without any Meaning, when employ'd either in philosophical Reasonings, or common Life. (Philosophical Essays Concerning Human Understanding, Essay VII: Of the Idea of Power or necessary Connexion, Part II)

Notice that Hume’s assessment here itself contains sweeping generalizations – e.g., “All events seem entirely loose and separate.” Surely David Hume was not omniscient. So how would he know what he states here without implicitly grasping the fact that things have identity? What, for instance, is an “event” such that Hume could know that all of them “seem entirely loose and separate”? When he states that “we can have no Idea of any Thing,” whom does the “we” here include? Does it include just his immediate audience – individuals with whom Hume had firsthand familiarity? Or is it broader than this circle of intimates, including people whom Hume never met? Does it include all human beings – past, present and future? If so, how could Hume speak for them without some eligible basis in identity applying to the whole?

But the assumption that things and their actions have no identity would account for much in Hume’s skeptical assessment of inductive inference. For if it is assumed that things and their actions can have no identity, then the notion of a causal connection would have no objective basis to begin with, which is essentially Hume’s very position on the matter. Thus, it should not surprise us to find Hume scoffing at the very foundations of induction, all the while tossing generalizations to and fro as though they were still valid on his assumptions. The lack of philosophical self-awareness masquerading here as some kind of deeply probing insight is indeed grotesque.

The same goes for Bahnsen.

by Dawson Bethrick