tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11714522.post8920769511764772636..comments2024-03-29T07:36:41.429-04:00Comments on Incinerating Presuppositionalism: Prayson Daniel vs. the Imaginative Nature of Christian TheismBahnsen Burnerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11030029491768748360noreply@blogger.comBlogger179125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11714522.post-92168246585772780982013-03-04T13:40:28.326-05:002013-03-04T13:40:28.326-05:00@Robert
Thank you, I have the day off today so I ...@Robert<br /><br />Thank you, I have the day off today so I will follow the link and try to comprehend it. In the meantime I think you might find this short article of some interest. http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2013/03/130303154958.htmJustin Hallhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17804641315202800289noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11714522.post-10171233420930631522013-03-03T10:23:03.650-05:002013-03-03T10:23:03.650-05:00Hi Justin: Good morning my friend. I hope you and ...Hi Justin: Good morning my friend. I hope you and yours are doing well.<br /><br />Sir, I am unable to explicate Smith's assertion any better than he did in his 1998 paper that can be read at the link I posted above. Here's the url again.<br /><br />http://www.philoonline.org/library/smith_1_1.htm<br /><br />The quoted text comes from section 6 of the paper where Smith explains why the doctrine of Divine conservation argues Science is false. Smith's argument depends upon the truth of Hartle-Hawking quantum cosmology. If HH is true and is a solution to the gravitational Schrodinger equation (the Wheeler-DeWitt equation)that governs evolution of the quantum mechanical system Q in quantum cosmology, then as Smith noted, the doctrine of Divine conservation is an introduction of a ceteris paribus clause (Ceteris paribus means "all other things being equal" and implies such equality lacks affect.) that argues Science is false. This is so because the Feyman path integrals that Hartle and Hawking employed to discover the Wave Function of the Universe have a scope of coverage that includes all identity, action, causality, and entity in existence since inception of cosmic inflation. If HH is true, then This means Science demonstrates that existence just exists all alone without any grand cosmic consciousness holding existence instantiated.<br /><br />I apologize that I am unable to explain it better than Smith, but then again professor Smith is piled high and deep and I only have an associate degree from my local community college. Nevertheless, I appreciate you, Dawson, and all the readers. <br /><br />Best Wishes for Continued SuccessAnonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03469718358131331499noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11714522.post-84707779626994610662013-03-03T00:03:29.889-05:002013-03-03T00:03:29.889-05:00@Robert
Hello there friend. You said
"This...@Robert<br /><br />Hello there friend. You said <br /><br />"This is the doctrine of Divine Conservation. This doctrine carries an axiomatic corollary that Science is false."<br /><br />could you expound on that some more. I don't see the automatic connection. Justin Hallhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17804641315202800289noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11714522.post-72707313251544084452013-03-02T11:01:22.798-05:002013-03-02T11:01:22.798-05:00Hello Dawson, Prayson, Friends and Readers.
The C...Hello Dawson, Prayson, Friends and Readers.<br /><br />The Christian God is defined in part as <i>God is necessarily present everywhere in space as the immanent cause and sustainer of creatures.</i><br /><br />This is the doctrine of Divine Conservation. This doctrine carries an axiomatic corollary that Science is false. That Science is false or true is testable, and Science proves to be true. This means the Hartle-Hawking Wave Function of the Universe as a solution of the Wheeler-Dewitt Equation is true. Quentin Smith Explained.<br /><br /><i>God cannot conserve (in the sense of continuous creation) the successive states of the universe if the wave-function law is true.<br /><br />It is part of quantum mechanics that any quantum-mechanical system Q is governed by a wave function, and that the wave function evolves in accordance with the Schrodinger equation unless interfered with by an outside influence. Now the evolution of the quantum mechanical system Q in quantum cosmology is governed by the gravitational Schrodinger equation (the Wheeler-DeWitt equation). Since the system Q that is the subject of quantum cosmology involves a physically closed system, the entire universe, there can be no outside influences. The evolution of the probabilities of the metric and matter field of the universe cannot be due to divine influence.<br /><br />This argument can be presented more formally.<br /><br />1a. The universe is a physically closed system that is described by the Hartle-Hawking "no-boundary" wave function of the universe.<br /><br />2a. The probability distribution of the metrical and matter properties of any given three-dimensional spatial slice of the universe that has a preceding three-dimensional spatial slice, follow deterministically from the metrical and matter properties of the preceding 3-space in accordance with the "no-boundary" solution of the Wheeler-DeWitt equation.<br /><br />Therefore,<br /><br />3a. There are always sufficient conditions for the probabilistic evolution of the universe that are physical.<br /><br />Therefore,<br /><br />4a. There is no causal role for the god of classical theism to play in determining the probabilistic evolution of the universe.<br /><br />Note that if we introduce at this point a theological ceteris paribus clause about divine conservation, we are introducing an argument that science is false, and are not showing how science is consistent with theism. Note, first, that there cannot be a theological ceteris paribus clause about divine conservation that is logically consistent with quantum cosmology, for such a clause would entail that the probabilities of the successive 3-spaces of the universe never evolve in accordance with initial conditions and the "no-boundary" solution of the Wheeler-DeWitt equation. But if they never evolve in this way, Hawking's "no-boundary" quantum cosmology is false.</i> ~ <a href="http://www.philoonline.org/library/smith_1_1.htm" rel="nofollow">Link</a><br /><br />Since God is not the immanent cause of existence, then it does not necessarily exist in this actual universe of this possible world which means it does not exist at all. Thus notions of God are internally generated by the subject of thought and aren't perceived objects of thought.<br /><br />Best, Good, Cheers!Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03469718358131331499noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11714522.post-4807483603243207612013-03-02T08:35:16.058-05:002013-03-02T08:35:16.058-05:00Hi Photo,
Thanks for your comment.
You wrote: “M...Hi Photo,<br /><br />Thanks for your comment.<br /><br />You wrote: “Maybe that's why they don;t pay attention, afraid that they might discover that they are wrong.”<br /><br />Whether they pay attention or not is hard to discern from what they write. But it’s clear that they try to redirect the discussion, in order to take control of the focus of what’s being discussed. I remember Steve Buscemi’s line from <i>Fargo</i> when he says “Two can play at that game, smart guy!” I’m happy to do what I can to keep the focus of the conversation on the essentials.<br /><br />As Prayson indicated in a comment above, he stated in <a href="http://withalliamgod.wordpress.com/2013/01/28/burner-a-proof-that-the-christian-god-does-not-exist/" rel="nofollow">his first blog entry interacting with my argument</a> that “Christians would probably agree that premise 1-3 are true.” But does he make his own agreement with these premises explicit? In the same breath, he points out that Christians would retort that “[premise] 4 is false.” In regard to Premises 1-3, Prayson states above that “Yes there are same who disagree, but I do not see how.” He also says that “Following dictionary definition, what is imaginary does not have factual reality, period. P1-P3 are true.”<br /><br />So I can infer, at least tentatively, from Prayson’s statements that he agrees that Premises 1, 2 and 3 of my argument are true.<br /><br />But if that’s the case, then his objections are incoherent. For instance, he wrote above: <br /><br /><< I contended you did not give reasons to accept P4 because to show something is imaginary, you have to show that it does not have factual reality and not the other way around. >><br /><br />Again, if Prayson agrees that, per Premise 1, the imaginary is not real, then why would it be wrong to infer that something is not real if there are good reasons to conclude that it is imaginary? <br /><br />My argument takes this approach: that <i>if something is found to be imaginary</i>, then it can be concluded, given Premise 1, that it is unreal. <br /><br />Since Prayson apparently agrees that the imaginary is unreal, it remains completely unclear why he would find the approach my argument takes objectionable. He certainly has not given any reasons why my argument’s approach is wrong, and he has not given any argument to support the claim he makes in the bracketed quote above.<br /><br />So Prayson needs to explain himself.<br /><br />If he wants to present his case, I am willing to examine it. But at this point, it’s up to him if he wants to take this up.<br /><br />Regards,<br />DawsonBahnsen Burnerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11030029491768748360noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11714522.post-24711351579933745812013-03-01T21:12:37.099-05:002013-03-01T21:12:37.099-05:00Dawson,
These guys can't read. You give them ...Dawson,<br /><br />These guys can't read. You give them explanations and when they "answer" they ask you to explain despite you just did. It's as if they filter out explanations when they "read" what you wrote, and keep only a few wordings to make it appear as if they are acknowledging what you wrote, but not really.<br /><br />It's shitty, frankly. I think that the reason I was able to escape Christianity is that I do listen. I pay attention. Maybe that's why they don;t pay attention, afraid that they might discover that they are wrong.<br /><br />So glad that those aren't my problems.<br /><br />Great weekend to all!Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11714522.post-46945212083142337422013-02-28T17:32:48.783-05:002013-02-28T17:32:48.783-05:00Robert wrote: “If they were honest, they'd app...Robert wrote: “If they were honest, they'd apply a uniform rationality.”<br /><br />That’s right – honesty, or the lack of it as the case may be, is the fulcrum on which all this hinges.<br /><br />Consider the following:<br /><br />Back on 2 Feb. in this thread, Prayson wrote:<br /><br /><< For Dawson case to succeed, he need to show that God lacks factual reality, and that my friends means giving a positive case against existence of God.<br /><br />One cannot show that x is imaginary unless he shows x does not exist. If x does not exist, then x is imaginary. The problem, Dawson get this backwards, which I think is a problem with his case. >><br /><br />Then on 3 Feb., he wrote:<br /><br /><< 13 points, Dawson offered are irrelevant, because I could say the same with John. Namely John is superstious, myth lover, and put coins on Janes belly and imagined it is a boy. It does not matter how John imagined, but is John imagined object have factual reality or not. For that Dawson need to show does God have factual reality or not. >><br /><br />I find this very odd given Prayson’s expressed agreement with my argument’s first two premises. The first premise affirms that the imaginary is unreal, and the second merely reminds us that the unreal does not actually exist. So if he agrees with my argument’s first two premises, then he agrees that if something is imaginary, it does not actually exist. Given this, it seems he would happily concede that if one determines that something is imaginary, it would therefore be sufficient basis to conclude that it does not exist.<br /><br />But his two quotes above say that this procedure is reversed and that the proper method is first to prove that something does not exist before one can show that it is imaginary. This is wrong on so many levels, but I’m thinking presently of its utter impracticality. <br /><br />Here in Thailand, the locals generally believe in ghosts and believe that ghosts are present in many public places. It’s very common to find young people afraid to go into bathrooms alone because they say they’re afraid of ghosts. On my worldview’s premises, such irrational fears are easily dismissed: since ghosts are imaginary, they are not real and thus do not actually exist anywhere, bathrooms included.<br /><br />But on Prayson’s view, one would first have to grant the possibility that ghosts are real and then set out to prove that they are not real before establishing that people are really only imagining them. How does Prayson suggest one go about doing this?<br /><br />Notice how Christians turn epistemology completely on its head. If I announced “there’s no such thing as ghosts,” they would immediately start probing my position with as many “how do you know?” questions as they could fire off. But if someone says he thinks there’s a ghost somewhere, this concern for how one knows something vanishes. They dare not question it because it might be revealed that someone is imagining the ghost, and that would give away the big secret that Christians are trying to hide from themselves and from others.<br /><br />Remember Sye Bruggencate and all his “how do you know?” questions? If you’ve ever watched one of his videos, you’ll never see him pulling out questions of this sort on his fellow believers. One could come along and say “I believe Jesus rose from the dead!” and STB would never respond with “How do you know?” If the means by which one knows something were truly important to these folks, they would as Robert puts it “apply a uniform rationality.” But they don’t.<br /><br />Regards,<br />DawsonBahnsen Burnerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11030029491768748360noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11714522.post-70290470154262122292013-02-28T17:13:00.933-05:002013-02-28T17:13:00.933-05:00Hello friends. Ydemoc noted So eager are these Chr...Hello friends. Ydemoc noted <i>So eager are these Christians to have the imaginary be real, that they seem to take no notice (or to not even care) that, in the process, they end up sacrificing their minds on the altar of irrationality.</i><br /><br />Ironically, those same Christians use rational reasoning to find the many holes in the Swiss Cheese of other religions they reject in order to buttress their confirmation bias for whatever version of Christianity to which they adhere. If they were honest, they'd apply a uniform rationality, as if they were outsiders, in critically examining Christianity as they do to religious claims they reject. They would be wise to apply John Loftus' Outsider Test for Faith. <br /><br />http://debunkingchristianity.blogspot.com/2011/06/ouitsider-test-for-faith-otf-is-not.html Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03469718358131331499noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11714522.post-38046830851136091392013-02-28T17:01:58.315-05:002013-02-28T17:01:58.315-05:00All,
Prayson has submitted yet another comment to...All,<br /><br />Prayson has submitted yet another comment to my blog, but as I pretty much expected, he has not answered one of my questions. That’s right, <i>not one</i> of my questions which I have repeatedly urged him to address. So I will not be publishing it.<br /><br />Minus salutation and closing, and one smiley icon, Prayson’s new comment is 395 words long. He begins his comment with the following words:<br /><br /><< I am more interested with the logic truth of your argument's P4 and the soundness of the whole argument. >><br /><br />Clearly he wants to keep the focus on trivial issues he’s tried to raise against my argument rather than allow the focus of attention to be directed on his worldview. After holding Prayson’s hand and stepping him through the logic of an argument that already seemed to me to be painfully obvious, he still says that he’s “more interested with the logic truth” of my argument. He has not raised any challenges to the many defenses that I have presented on behalf of my argument, nor has he raised any new criticisms of my argument proper.<br /><br />He also suggests that I ignore the fact that he is a Christian apologist. He writes:<br /><br /><< Let's assume I am a fellow atheist for argument sake. >> <br /><br />In other words, <i>pretend</i>. But he ignores the fact that merely being an atheist would not make him my “fellow.” Many atheists out there are as opposed to reason as Christians naturally are. I seriously doubt that another Objectivist would have a hard time grasping the simple, direct logic of my argument.<br /><br />He then writes the following: <br /><br /><< Remember we agree that if x is imaginary then x does not have factual reality. Here is where we differ: How do we rational judge/know if x does not have factual reality? >><br /><br />This simply raises an old point that I addressed earlier: if someone is <i>imagining</i> something, he’s forming an image in his mind; he is not perceiving something independent of his consciousness and validating knowledge of it. I know I’ve addressed this at least twice before by my recollection. That I found need to point this out to Prayson before only suggests that he doesn’t realize that imagination is not a means of acquiring knowledge of entities independent of his mind.<br /><br />He continues:<br /><br /><< You think by showing how a person P came to know(epistemology) x (if it is through reading ancient books, holding it by faith etc your soon 14 points) is unwarranted then x does not have factual reality. >><br /><br />This only confirms that Prayson is confusing imagination with a means of epistemology. With background confusions of this magnitude, how can he judge the logical integrity of any valid inference? How?<br /><br />He then wrote: <br /><br /><< I think that is committing a genetic fallacy since you gun down the source(genesis) of the belief/knowledge and not the merit of that belief/knowledge. >><br /><br />Again, this was already addressed: if we have good reasons to suppose that someone is imagining in the first place, then we have to follow the implications of my argument’s initial premises. But Prayson may object to the suggestion that believers merely imagine their god. That’s why I posed Question 3 above:<br /><br /><b>3. By what means are you aware of your god, and how can I reliably distinguish between those means and what may actually only be your imagination?</b><br /><br />But again, he demonstrates no willingness to address this question.<br /><br />Then, in spite of his persistent unwillingness to have a genuine dialogue (i.e., one in which he addresses questions posed to him just as I have addressed questions posed to me), he again suggests that we move the discussion to another forum. <br /><br />Why is it that every time I dialogue which a Christian, I have the growing sense that I’m dealing with a child who refuses to grow up?<br /><br />At any rate, if Prayson refuses to address my questions, which would be the polite thing to do, he can take his comments elsewhere.<br /><br />Regards,<br />DawsonBahnsen Burnerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11030029491768748360noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11714522.post-71280494936096182352013-02-28T12:45:17.674-05:002013-02-28T12:45:17.674-05:00The Ontological Argument demonstrates that the ima...The Ontological Argument demonstrates that the imaginary nature of the Christian god has been on apologists' minds for a long time. <br /><br />Dawson's views on the OA can be found <a href="http://bahnsenburner.blogspot.com/2006/12/axioms-and-primacy-of-existence.html" rel="nofollow">here</a>: <br /><br /><i> As for why the ontological argument fails, in my opinion it fails because ultimately it reverses the orientation of the subject-object relationship. The existence of something does not follow from our ability to conceive of something or stipulate that what we conceive exists by definition. Consciousness does not have this kind of power.</i> NALhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12244370945682162312noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11714522.post-37871203506865668552013-02-28T11:35:04.557-05:002013-02-28T11:35:04.557-05:00Prayson,
Here are some more questions from a prev...Prayson,<br /><br />Here are some more questions from a previous message which you have yet to address:<br /><br /><b>3. By what means are you aware of your god, and how can I reliably distinguish between those means and what may actually only be your imagination?<br /><br />4. In regard to the ontological argument, which you say you’ve been reading up on recently, how does one distinguish what “conceive” means <i>as it is used in such arguments</i> from *imagination*? If one says that he can “conceive” of a god, of a supernatural realm, of life beyond death, etc., how is this distinct from imagining? How is imagination not involved?</b><br /><br />I have numbered them so that we don’t lose track of them. I would like you to answer them. If you have confidence in your god-belief, I would not expect you to shy away from these questions. By failing to address them, you only imply that you don’t have confidence in your god-belief. Indeed, it seems quite backward that Christians would squint, stammer and strain at the logic of a simple argument like I have proposed, and yet swallow without any hint of concern the notion that the creator of the universe was right in commanding Jewish males to be circumcised in OT times, only later to waive that commandment entirely. Believers seem extremely choosy about when it’s time to start checking for fallacies.<br /><br />Regards,<br />DawsonBahnsen Burnerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11030029491768748360noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11714522.post-29440409330759968972013-02-28T11:13:52.697-05:002013-02-28T11:13:52.697-05:00Prayson,
I realize that you want to rescue your g...Prayson,<br /><br />I realize that you want to rescue your god-belief in the worst way. Anyone watching this exchange sees that. However, an important fact that you’re overlooking in your efforts to make your charge of fallacy stick in regard to my argument is the member-class relationships of the terms distributed in my argument’s premises. <br /><br />Note the following relations present in my argument’s premises:<br /><br /> - Premise 1 affirms that members of Class A (imaginary things) are also members of Class B (unreal things). <br /><br /> - Premise 2 affirms a General Truth about all members of Class B (and therefore all members of Class A by virtue of their inclusion in Class B) (namely: unreal things are things that do not actually exist).<br /><br /> - Premise 3 hypothetically affirms that if Specific Case G (the god of Christianity) is a member of Class A (imaginary things), then it is also a member of Class B (unreal things) and therefore the General Truth which applies to all members of Class B thereby applies to Specific Case G by virtue of its inclusion in that class.<br /><br />- Premise 4 affirms that Specific Case G is a member of Class A.<br /><br />- The Conclusion is drawn that, since Specific Case G is a member of Class A, it is therefore also a member of Class B, and hence the General Truth which applies to all members of Class B therefore applies to Specific Case G.<br /><br />There is nothing at all fallacious in this logic. If you agree with the first two premises, then you would agree that those premises apply to any specific case which is a member of the first class.<br /><br />Consider the following:<br /><br />S1: Men are Human Beings.<br />S2: Human Beings are Mortal Entities.<br />S3: If Socrates is a Man, then he is a Human Being and therefore a Mortal Entity.<br />S4: Socrates is a Man.<br />C: Therefore, Socrates is a Human Being and therefore a Mortal Entity.<br /><br />Thus, if we establish that Socrates is a man (i.e., a specific case of the class Men), then per the first two premises we also establish that Socrates is a Human being, and therefore Socrates is also a Mortal Being.<br /><br />It’s hard to see how anyone familiar with basic logic would still object to the logical integrity of my argument. But again, I realize that you want to protect your god-belief. Since you are so anxious to immunize your god-belief from my argument, you are willing to sacrifice demonstrably logical relations. This is an example of how god-belief contaminates one’s rational judgment.<br /><br />Now I must ask you again, Prayson, since still you resist answering: <br /><br /><b>1. You have already expressed agreement with Premise 1 – that the imaginary is unreal. Thus, if one has good reason to suppose that something is imaginary, why would this not be sufficient basis to infer that that something is not real?<br /><br />2. Also, see my scenario of the murder trial. Do you really think that one would first need to prove that the bat which could turn into a man does not exist before it can be determined that the accused was imagining it? Do you really think that? That seems extremely naïve. But if that’s what you think, can you explain why?</b><br /><br />If you want to continue dialoguing with me on this, you will need to proceed by answering my questions. Over and over Christians come here and try to use my blog as their podium. It is not your podium. I have answered enough of your questions. It is time you start answering mine. <br /><br />Regards,<br />DawsonBahnsen Burnerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11030029491768748360noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11714522.post-22583834527670751422013-02-28T10:21:45.348-05:002013-02-28T10:21:45.348-05:00freddies_dead,
You wrote: "Not one of these ...freddies_dead,<br /><br />You wrote: "Not one of these people has managed to answer how we can distinguish between what they call God and what they are simply imagining."<br /><br />So true! <br /><br />So eager are these Christians to have the imaginary be real, that they seem to take no notice (or to not even care) that, in the process, they end up sacrificing their minds on the altar of irrationality.<br /><br />As Dawson put it: "That is a legacy of the Christian worldview."<br /><br />YdemocYdemochttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03498165330193613762noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11714522.post-11670165675231237502013-02-28T07:57:09.731-05:002013-02-28T07:57:09.731-05:00I have to say I'm loving this.
Prayson starts...I have to say I'm loving this.<br /><br />Prayson starts by hand waving away the evidence and claiming your argument is all irrelevant. He fails.<br /><br />Shotgun turns up and tries to claim premise 1 is false. Getting more and more convoluted with each post in an effort to blur the distinction between what is real and what is imaginary. He fails.<br /><br />In an attempt to show your argument is false "bethelbaptistchurchblog" as good as admits God is imaginary. Drawing what you imagine a leprechaun to be apparently makes them real - I haven't laughed so hard in quite a while. They failed.<br /><br />Now Prayson is back with a new tactic - mangling your argument beyond all recognition in a bid to call it question begging. He has, of course, failed.<br /><br />Not one of these people has managed to answer how we can distinguish between what they call God and what they are simply imagining.freddies_deadhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09688196534481642740noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11714522.post-89074744790244554342013-02-28T06:39:14.547-05:002013-02-28T06:39:14.547-05:00Dawson, I am not attacking a straw-man. Are you no...Dawson, I am not attacking a straw-man. Are you not familiar with rules of logic?<br /><br />Let's focus on logic and reason first and for most. Let present your case in a simple form so we can see the follow of meaning and that I can show you that my R4 is the correct reformulation of P4 thus question begging.<br /><br />Let <i>A</i> be "Imaginary", <i>B</i> be "not real", <i>C</i> be "does not actually exist" and <i>D</i> be "god of Christianity".<br /><br />So:<br /><br />P1: That which is imaginary is not real.<br /><br />S1: That which is <i>A</i> is <i>B</i> <br />S2: If something is <i>B</i> , it is <i>C</i> <br />S3: If <i>D</i> is <i>A</i> , then <i>D</i> is <i> B</i> , therefore <i>D </i> is <i>C</i> <br />S4: <i>D</i> is <i>A</i> <br />C: Therefore <i>D</i> is <i>C</i> <br /><br /> <b>Do you agree or disagree </b> with this simple presentation of your argument?<br /><br />- PDProteusIQhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12539150949997071268noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11714522.post-13890650954289503932013-02-27T16:50:03.666-05:002013-02-27T16:50:03.666-05:00Prayson,
You wrote: “Dawson, I am more interested...Prayson,<br /><br />You wrote: “Dawson, I am more interested with the case I presented, not my commenters on my blog nor what other Christians think.”<br /><br />I’m not surprised by this. <br /><br />But two points:<br /><br />1. I have already addressed your revised version of my argument. You continue to ask, which means you have not understood my counterpoints. This suggests that you have not read them. You need to go back and read what I wrote in response to your queries.<br /><br />2. I am very curious how you would explain the approach other Christians take with regard to my Premise 1 (i.e., they challenge its truth). Do you agree with my assessment, or do you have an alternative explanation? Or would you just rather not think about it at all?<br /><br />You write: “As I say, we have to separate the medium with the message.”<br /><br />I don’t know what this is supposed to mean.<br /><br />You asked: “You claim that my reformulation is not your case. How so?”<br /><br />Again, I explained this. Here is a portion of what I wrote:<br /><br /><< <b>… my argument does not have a premise which states “If the god of Christianity does not actually exist then it does not actually exist.” This revision of yours erases the substance of the inference which my argument actually does contain and make explicit. In order to discredit my argument, you find it necessary to squelch the very inference which establishes its conclusion. Thus it’s no longer my argument that you’re criticizing. This is called straw-man, Prayson. Are you familiar with it? </b> >><br /><br />Read that over again until it sinks in. It’s not that difficult to understand. Also, review the points I brought out from the Joseph quote.<br /><br />As for Premises 1-3, you have already expressed agreement with them. So I do not see any need to revise them. They are there for a purpose, mainly to make the truths they contain explicit.<br /><br />Again, I raised some questions which you have yet to address. I will ask again:<br /><br /><b>1. You have already expressed agreement with Premise 1 – that the imaginary is unreal. Thus, if one has good reason to suppose that something is imaginary, why would this not be sufficient basis to infer that that something is not real?<br /><br />2. Also, see my scenario of the murder trial. Do you really think that one would first need to prove that the bat which could turn into a man does not exist before it can be determined that the accused was imagining it? Do you really think that? That seems extremely naïve. But if that’s what you think, can you explain why?</b><br /><br />I await you to address these questions specifically.<br /><br />Regards,<br />DawsonBahnsen Burnerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11030029491768748360noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11714522.post-82443855613144940342013-02-27T07:34:14.733-05:002013-02-27T07:34:14.733-05:00Dawson, I am more interested with the case I prese...Dawson, I am more interested with the case I presented, not my commenters on my blog nor what other Christians think.<br /><br />As I say, we have to separate the medium with the message.<br /><br />You claim that my reformulation is not your case. How so? Let me show you again:<br /><br />Your P1:That which is imaginary is not real.<br /><br />Which is true.<br /><br />P2: If something is not real, it does not actually exist.<br /><br />which is true.<br /><br />If P2 is true, then we can substitute it to P1("not real" with "does not actually exist) since P2 states that if x = (is) not real, x = (does) not actually exist. since x = x what I do is logically acceptable.<br /><br />Thus P1 reformulated R1 is:<br /><br />R1:That which is imaginary is does not actually exist.<br /><br />Do you mean to say that R1 is not a correct reformulation P1?<br /><br />Yours,<br />PraysonProteusIQhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12539150949997071268noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11714522.post-61324065058669427052013-02-27T03:21:50.738-05:002013-02-27T03:21:50.738-05:00You wrote: “Let me know your thoughts Dawson.”
He...You wrote: “Let me know your thoughts Dawson.”<br /><br />Here are some thoughts, stated in the form of questions:<br /><br />If someone provided evidence that something is in fact imaginary, wouldn’t you accept that as sufficient reason to conclude that it does not exist? <br /><br />Yes or no?<br /><br />Now consider: If you were sitting on a jury in a murder trial, and the accused gave testimony to the effect that, although he was discovered seconds after the crime standing over the body of the victim with a bloody knife and blood all over his hands and clothing, the victim was really killed by a bat which flew into the room through a window, turned into a person wearing a big black cape, stabbed the victim repeatedly and then placed the murder weapon in the accused’s hands before turning back into a bat and flying out of the room, wouldn’t you suppose that he was imagining and therefore conclude that there was no bat which flew into the room and turned into a person to do the crime? Wouldn’t you infer from the fact that the person was imagining to the non-existence of the bat he claimed was there? <br /><br />Certainly you wouldn’t suppose that you would first need to go out and prove that there was no bat in order to then prove that the accused was imagining. <br /><br />But that is the methodology which you say I need to apply before I could conclude that the Christian god is imaginary. That is beyond ridiculous. But that is what you are affirming in defense of your god-belief.<br /><br />Amazing!<br /><br />Regards,<br />DawsonBahnsen Burnerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11030029491768748360noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11714522.post-80645800431253190772013-02-27T03:20:42.425-05:002013-02-27T03:20:42.425-05:00You wrote: “This is true with your P4 and 13 reaso...You wrote: “This is true with your P4 and 13 reasons you gave to think is true. They fall into the same error.”<br /><br />No, what you’re actually trying to do is hedge your position. You’re essentially trying to position yourself such that, if it turns out that Christians are imagining their god, you want to say that their god could still be real, in spite of their reliance on imagination. Sorry, Prayson, it doesn’t fly. Christians are still relying on their imaginations. Thus the god they imagine is not real, given the truth of Premise 1.<br /><br />You wrote: “Lets put that behind us and focus on the case I presented R1, R3 and R4.”<br /><br />I have already addressed it. <br /><br />You wrote: “Remember I simply substitute P2 to the rest of the premises.”<br /><br />No, what you did is erase the entire basis for the inference which my argument is intended to make explicit. If my argument were in fact fallacious, you wouldn’t need to do this. But you have chosen to do precisely this. I have already quoted H.W.B. Joseph to the effect that in an argument, “the premisses must implicitly contain the conclusion; otherwise you would have no right to draw it from them, and could deny it [the conclusion], while admitting them [the premises].” This is exactly where you think you’ve discerned an instance of circular reasoning. But in fact, as Joseph points out, “this much is true of every kind of cogent inference.”<br /><br />Indeed, my argument does not have a premise which states “If the god of Christianity does not actually exist then it does not actually exist.” This revision of yours erases the substance of the inference which my argument actually does contain and make explicit. In order to discredit my argument, you find it necessary to squelch the very inference which establishes its conclusion. Thus it’s no longer my argument that you’re criticizing. This is called straw-man, Prayson. Are you familiar with it?<br /><br />You wrote: “If what is imaginary does not exist in reality, then all places with ‘is imaginary’ can be substituted with ‘does not exist in reality’. If this is so, then I think P4, is question begging.”<br /><br />This is akin to saying that any instance of transitivity in logic is fallacious on the account that certain terms can be removed from an argument and replaced with their corresponding relation. But that’s absurd. It’s a blatant denial of transitivity. Indeed, it’s not even applicable to my argument in the manner that you intend it. “Imaginary” is at most a <i>species</i> of the unreal and non-existent; things that no longer exist can also be included in the concept ‘non-existent’, such as the Twin Towers in NYC, old receipts that I shredded, etc. The material that made up these things still exists in some other form, but the things they used to be no longer exist. Moreover, there will be things in the future that will exist which no one has imagined, and yet, they would currently belong to the ‘non-existent’ category. So ‘imaginary’ and ‘unreal’ or ‘non-existent’ are not interchangeable in the way that your revised version of my argument requires them to be.<br /><br />You wrote: “It was an atheist at reddit Philosophy of Religion who pointed out that the premises are redundant. He is the one who directed me reformulate your case.”<br /><br />Frankly that does not impress me. If you get right down to it, the statement “God does not exist” is redundant. It’s like saying “the non-existent is non-existent.” But since people want us to believe in something that is not real, I’m happy to point out why it’s not real. Hence my argument.<br /><br />[continued…]Bahnsen Burnerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11030029491768748360noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11714522.post-10985396423336844232013-02-27T03:20:12.132-05:002013-02-27T03:20:12.132-05:00You wrote: “Showing how x got to know y, to discre...You wrote: “Showing how x got to know y, to discredit y is a text book example of genetic fallacy.”<br /><br />Even if this is true, it is not a suitable criticism of my argument, since imagination is not a means of acquiring knowledge of things existing independent of one’s mind in the first place. Indeed, that you would seek to raise this objection suggests that the relationship between imagination and epistemology is unclear to you. That is a legacy of the Christian worldview. If people are imagining something, they are not performing epistemological actions by which they can acquire knowledge of what is real.<br /><br />I have asked numerous Christians over the years a question which I will now explicitly pose to you: <br /><br /><b>By what means are you aware of your god, and how can I reliably distinguish between those means and what may actually only be your imagination?</b><br /><br />Similarly, in regard to the ontological argument, which you say you’ve been reading up on recently, how does one distinguish what “conceive” means <i>as it is used in such arguments</i> from *imagination*? If one says that he can “conceive” of a god, of a supernatural realm, of life beyond death, etc., how is this distinct from imagining? How is imagination not involved?<br /><br />Speaking for myself, in order to “conceive” of any god, whether Christianity’s or Islam’s or the Lahu’s, I have to use my imagination. I am honest enough to recognize and admit this. Indeed, this is essentially what the commenter on your blog that I quoted above is admitting, though he’s not being honest about it.<br /><br />You wrote: “As from my examples of John Doe superstition led him to imagine Jane Doe is having a baby girl, to say that John superstitious imagine gender is imaginary, we need to show the gender of the baby, if the baby is a girl, then John imagined gender has factual reality therefore not imaginary, if not then it is.”<br /><br />And as we saw above, none of this is relevant as a criticism of my argument. If one is imagining, he’s imagining, and what he is imagining is not real, given Premise 1. Also, we need to be careful, as I pointed out in our earlier conversation, to distinguish between imagination and mere *guessing*, which is what your examples seem to have in mind. The examples that you raise to support your objections only show that you are confusing the two. Moreover, if the Christian god is imaginary, it is imaginary, and therefore it is not real. Your examples do nothing to challenge these truths.<br /><br />You wrote: “Showing it is not a girl(ontology) because John's methods of knowing(epistemology) is committing a genetic fallacy.”<br /><br />Again, this has no relevance to my argument. Imagination is not a method of knowing in the first place. If I imagine a giant robot attacking a city in the western United States (Justin, it does not have to be Pheonix!), do you think what I’m imagining is actually taking place? Yes or no, Prayson?<br /><br />Now, if you have some means other than imagination by which you have awareness of your god, then please identify them, and explain how we can reliably distinguish between your alleged means of awareness of your god, and what may in fact merely be your imagination. Otherwise, I am content to rest on my growing list of evidences which show that Christians are in fact imagining their god. Thus my argument stands.<br /><br />[continued…]Bahnsen Burnerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11030029491768748360noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11714522.post-24302600873856717692013-02-27T03:19:38.239-05:002013-02-27T03:19:38.239-05:00Prayson,
You wrote: “Dawson I think you are confu...Prayson,<br /><br />You wrote: “Dawson I think you are confusing me with someone else since I did not earlier ‘sought, without success, to challenge my[your] argument’s Premise 1’."<br /><br />You did. Remember your going-on about John Doe and the library example? That certainly was not an attempt to challenge Premise 4 of my argument. It did nothing, for instance, to show that the Christian god is not imaginary.<br /><br />You wrote: “If you read my blog article I believed that Christian would agree that P1, P2 and P3 are true.”<br /><br />But clearly that’s not the case. Even if you agree with my Premise 1, other Christians are clearly not comfortable affirming it and have sought specifically to challenge it.<br /><br />You wrote: “Yes there are same who disagree, but I do not see how.”<br /><br />They disagree because they realize, at some level, that their god-belief rests on imagination. Thus they cannot rest content when a non-believer presents an argument which explicitly affirms that the imaginary is not real. So they choose to attack exactly this premise. Why else would they dispute Premise 1?<br /><br />You wrote: “Following dictionary definition, what is imaginary does not have factual reality, period. P1-P3 are true.”<br /><br />Okay, good. You’re way ahead of other Christians.<br /><br />You wrote: “I contended you did not give reasons to accept P4 because to show something is imaginary, you have to show that it does not have factual reality and not the other way around.”<br /><br />Yes, you did contend that, and I corrected you on this. If the imaginary is not real (Premise 1, which you have affirmed), then it is perfectly reasonable to show that something is not real on the basis that it is imaginary. And to show that something is imaginary, all one needs to do is to cite reasons supposing that people imagine it. That’s what my 13, soon to be 14, points of evidence do. I do not have to prove that something does not exist first before I can show that it is imaginary. That is absurd. There’s no such thing as an obligation to prove that the non-existent does not exist. Meanwhile, if evidence can be cited to show that the Christian god is in fact imaginary, that evidence, given the truth of Premise 1 of my argument, is sufficient to show that it is not real, that it does not exist. <br /><br />[continued…]Bahnsen Burnerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11030029491768748360noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11714522.post-58475134186817175292013-02-27T02:09:06.049-05:002013-02-27T02:09:06.049-05:00Dawson I think you are confusing me with someone e...Dawson I think you are confusing me with someone else since I did not earlier " sought, without success, to challenge my[your] argument’s Premise 1."<br /><br />If you read my blog article I believed that Christian would agree that P1, P2 and P3 are true. Yes there are same who disagree, but I do not see how. Following dictionary definition, what is imaginary does not have factual reality, period. P1-P3 are true. I contended you did not give reasons to accept P4 because to show something is imaginary, you have to show that it does not have factual reality and not the other way around.<br /><br />Showing how x got to know y, to discredit y is a text book example of genetic fallacy. As from my examples of John Doe superstition led him to imagine Jane Doe is having a baby girl, to say that John superstitious imagine gender is imaginary, we need to show the gender of the baby, if the baby is a girl, then John imagined gender has factual reality therefore not imaginary, if not then it is.<br /><br />Showing it is not a girl(ontology) because John's methods of knowing(epistemology) is committing a genetic fallacy. This is true with your P4 and 13 reasons you gave to think is true. They fall into the same error.<br /><br />Lets put that behind us and focus on the case I presented R1, R3 and R4. Remember I simply substitute P2 to the rest of the premises. If what is imaginary does not exist in reality, then all places with "is imaginary" can be substituted with "does not exist in reality". If this is so, then I think P4, is question begging.<br /><br />It was an atheist at reddit Philosophy of Religion who pointed out that the premises are redundant. He is the one who directed me reformulate your case.<br /><br />Let me know your thoughts Dawson.<br /><br />-PraysonProteusIQhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12539150949997071268noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11714522.post-28400300898239450732013-02-27T01:50:47.962-05:002013-02-27T01:50:47.962-05:00Prayson,
You wrote: “I have Dawson identified P4 ...Prayson,<br /><br />You wrote: “I have Dawson identified P4 as assumed in your argument’s premise which needs to be proven?”<br /><br />It’s not clear if this was intended to be a question or a statement, or what exactly it is stating or arguing. Premise 4 of my argument affirms that “the god of Christianity is imaginary.” If you are saying that I have not at least made any attempts to prove the truth of this premise, you are in denial. I have already cited 13 points of evidence which emphatically support precisely this premise. You have not made a single dent in even one of those points of evidence. Beyond that, you have not identified the means by which you are aware of your god and explained how one can reliably distinguish between those means and imagination as such. <br /><br />Moreover, as I mentioned in my previous message responding to Ydemoc, Christians who have sought to attack my argument have focused on Premise 1, namely the recognition that the imaginary is not real, you yourself among them. If Christians want to deny my argument’s Premise 4, why would they seek to undermine my argument’s Premise 1?<br /><br />Take a look at the statements made by the commenter on your own blog that I quoted above. He wrote: “since our leprechaun can be imagined, it has been given reality.” Using this “reasoning,” one could easily say: “since <i>our god</i> can be imagined, it has been given reality.” If that’s not what this individual is essentially saying, he needs to revise what he writes significantly. But this commenter is not alone: Michael David Rawlings, a Christian who left scores of comments on my blog since early November last year, made similar statements. So did “shotgun” in the present thread. Clearly Christians want to dispute my argument’s Premise 1. That is most revealing.<br /><br />You wrote: “I forgot about your case until I started reading contemporary ontological arguments last week, which made me think of your case and try to see if Christians could show that P4 is necessarily false if God is the greatest conceivable being.”<br /><br />The so-called “ontological argument” is about as blatant as one can get in trying to argue that something is real essentially because it can be imagined, without stating it in such terms. Typically such arguments use the term “conceived,” but in actually this is code for <i>imagined</i>, since what is involved in god-belief is not conceiving in the sense of forming concepts (not even close!). Ontological arguments try to establish the existence of “the greatest <i>imaginable</i> being.” <br /><br />You wrote: “Could you deal with my reformulation above.”<br /><br />I did, in my above comment. As I pointed out, you had to revise it in such a way that it no longer contain the inference of my original argument. My original argument inferred the non-existence of the Christian god from the fact that it is imaginary. This, by the way, made the previous premises relevant to the whole argument. Your proposed revision leaves this inference out and makes an abrupt departure from the foregoing premises, such that they are no longer relevant. You have had to mischaracterize my argument in order to find it guilty of a fallacy. But that only means you are no longer interacting with my argument, but instead with a straw-man.<br /><br />I also provided additional reasons for why my argument is not question-begging. Can you deal with my rebuttal to your criticism?<br /><br />Regards,<br />DawsonBahnsen Burnerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11030029491768748360noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11714522.post-21572962473012875562013-02-27T01:30:33.388-05:002013-02-27T01:30:33.388-05:00I have Dawson identified P4 as assumed in your arg...I have Dawson identified P4 as assumed in your argument’s premise which needs to be proven?<br /><br />I forgot about your case until I started reading contemporary ontological arguments last week, which made me think of your case and try to see if Christians could show that P4 is necessarily false if God is the greatest conceivable being.<br /><br />Could you deal with my reformulation above. I would enjoy if we focus on argument I presented to show that your argument is question begging. Lets put medium, I being Christian or you not being, out of this discussion and focus the case presented.<br /><br /> "Difficult as it may be, it is vitally important to separate argument sources and styles from argument content. In argument the medium is not the message" - Bruce N. Waller.<br /><br />Could you deal with R1, R3, and R4 showing that they cannot be the reformulation of your case, for if they are, then your case is valid but question begging since R4 a reformulated P4 is the same as your conclusion.<br /><br />-PraysonProteusIQhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12539150949997071268noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11714522.post-43656158290915454102013-02-26T19:32:44.090-05:002013-02-26T19:32:44.090-05:00Hello Ydemoc,
You wrote: “What this person writes...Hello Ydemoc,<br /><br />You wrote: “What this person writes is about as open an admission as you can get -- that the Christian god is merely imaginary -- that I've seen coming from a Christian in quite a while.”<br /><br />It is indeed an open admission that the Christian god is merely imaginary. I would say that Rawlings’ example of the DVD cabinet was just such an admission as well. Prayson’s examples are at the very least tacit examples of such admission. And shotgun’s efforts to take down Premise 1 also constitute an admission.<br /><br />Thus I could feasibly add a 14th piece of evidence to my blog <a href="http://bahnsenburner.blogspot.com/2010/05/imaginative-nature-of-christian-theism.html" rel="nofollow">The Imaginative Nature of Christian theism</a>, namely the fact that Christians themselves admit that their god is imaginary.<br /><br />What more does one need to show that the Christian god is imaginary? It’s entirely revealing that Christians want to dispute the view that the imaginary is unreal. Why else dispute it, unless of course Christians recognize that they are simply imagining the god they worship?<br /><br />I’m so glad these aren’t my problems!<br /><br />Regards,<br />DawsonBahnsen Burnerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11030029491768748360noreply@blogger.com