tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11714522.post114839561819780975..comments2024-03-29T07:36:41.429-04:00Comments on Incinerating Presuppositionalism: Manata Overboard: Adrift and Without a PaddleBahnsen Burnerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11030029491768748360noreply@blogger.comBlogger12125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11714522.post-1149816920449545032006-06-08T21:35:00.000-04:002006-06-08T21:35:00.000-04:00Poor Zach,He writes,"An "entity" is a particular e...Poor Zach,<BR/><BR/>He writes,<BR/><BR/>"An "entity" is a particular existent. Thus, concepts cannot be entities"<BR/><BR/>"Yes, concepts are material."<BR/><BR/>""Matter" is any entity"<BR/><BR/>Thus according to Moore we have:<BR/><BR/>If something is material then it is an entity.<BR/><BR/>Concepts are material.<BR/><BR/>Therefore concepts are entities.<BR/><BR/>You see, I didn't even need to show up. I'll just have Moore refute Moore!<BR/><BR/>"since concepts are metaphysically derived from matter but are not themselves material entities"<BR/><BR/>No, above you said that they were matter. So you need to change your definition as we debate. You're dishonest Moore!<BR/><BR/>Anyway, your post was a bunch of assertions without so much as an apology.<BR/><BR/>I already refuted "meta-date" because I pointed out that logic is dataless (uhh, ask any logician).<BR/><BR/>I missed your argument for why concepts cannot be material because you'd have to have a correlating material entity???? This is a non-sequitur.<BR/><BR/>"Doubtless, this is because he believes as you do that concepts like "red" are immaterial"<BR/><BR/>and <BR/><BR/>"concepts are metaphysically derived from matter but are not themselves material entities"<BR/><BR/>So are they or aren't they material???<BR/><BR/>Do you know how you look?!<BR/><BR/>And, Zach, it's not that theat proff disagrees with you because he believes in immaterial entities (which he does), but it's that NO ONE (except you fellow internet hacks) agrees with you. I have asked plenty of materialists if they agree with you and they have said "no." Jeff Lowder is one of them.<BR/><BR/>"Concepts are ideas or thoughts inferred from specific instances of matter."<BR/><BR/>Show me works. Take me through the stepts of inference. Show me how the concept "noseness" is "inferred" from particular noses.<BR/><BR/>It's funny that you're a epiphenominalist now, you're getting closer and closer to my position all the time.Errorhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10615233201833238198noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11714522.post-1149636134488984602006-06-06T19:22:00.000-04:002006-06-06T19:22:00.000-04:00You don't have to hide your curiosity with a sneer...You don't have to hide your curiosity with a sneer, Paul. I'm more than happy to indulge your interest in "my wild theory."<BR/><BR/>"Matter" is any entity which can be, directly or indirectly, perceived with the senses. A tree is an example of a material entity. Concepts are ideas or thoughts inferred from specific instances of matter. The concept of "green" is an example. Concepts are metaphysically material in that they depend on the qualities of matter to be coherent, and on a material brain for existence. For example, to refer to the concept of "blark" is to speak incoherently, because "blark" has no material correlate. To say, "That tree is blark" is to make no sense. Additionally, since concepts are metaphysically derived from matter but are not themselves material entities, it is incoherent to speak of "destroying" a concept in the same way that one might "destroy" a material entity. One can destroy a green leaf, for example, but one cannot destroy the concept of "green," since there are other particular material instances in existence with which to derive that concept. Even destroying the neural networks which store a concept cannot "destroy" that concept, for the same neurological pathways which store concepts can perform the same inference again with another group of neurons. Aaron Kinney refers to this as <A HREF="http://killtheafterlife.blogspot.com/2006/02/manata-if-it-doesnt-burn-it-isnt.html" REL="nofollow">"meta-data."</A><BR/><BR/>To speak of concepts as immaterial is to claim knowledge of a concept without experiencing any correlating material entity. For example, this "Notre Dame professor" which you continually mention (but refuse to name... I wonder why you need to hide such an astounding intellectual behind a veil of anonymity?) claims me to be a "redneck," without ever having seen my neck. Doubtless, this is because he believes as you do that concepts like "red" are immaterial, and thus can be known without a material foundation. Thus, he can claim fallaciously that my neck is red- even though he is ignorant of the actual material color of said neck. Such a blunder is unfortunate, but I've learned to expect this kind of intellectual disappointment when confronting those who argue against material reality.Zachary Moorehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16991061670470673718noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11714522.post-1149631404023122892006-06-06T18:03:00.000-04:002006-06-06T18:03:00.000-04:00well then Zach neds to define "matter."One of the ...well then Zach neds to define "matter."<BR/><BR/>One of the standard analysis is that matter is particular.<BR/><BR/>Maybe he should tell us what he means by "particular" as well.<BR/><BR/>I mean, Zach's got the wild theory here, not me. Zach's got burden here.<BR/><BR/>Anyway, I fail to see how a material concept, which is located inside of a neuron (which is a particular entity, no?), is itself not a particular? Are non-particular things located "inside" of particular entities?<BR/><BR/>Zach, do you now have an idea why the prof at Notre Dame called you an "ignorant redneck?"Errorhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10615233201833238198noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11714522.post-1149465711409957762006-06-04T20:01:00.000-04:002006-06-04T20:01:00.000-04:00I just can't help picturing you in a frilly set of...I just can't help picturing you in a frilly set of lace lingerie, Paul, because your blustering responses evoke the quote, "Methinks the lady doth protest too much."<BR/><BR/>Yes, concepts are material. No, they are not entities. Not all materialities are particulars. I've already said this, and I don't have a problem with you disagreeing, but I do think it germane to point out that now <I><B>for the fourth time</B></I> you've projected your own definitions onto others. I mean, really- is it just me, or does it seem hopelessly desperate that the only way you can hope to "win" points is by projecting straw men? It's sad, really.Zachary Moorehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16991061670470673718noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11714522.post-1149436523807240622006-06-04T11:55:00.000-04:002006-06-04T11:55:00.000-04:00No panties here Zach, though I wonder why you like...No panties here Zach, though I wonder why you like to think of guys in panties???<BR/><BR/>What dictionary would that be? I'll quote you all the standards. Anyway, you blew it since you picked on me for on a definitional dispute whjile you could have agreed with what I wrote.<BR/><BR/>You never "corrected" me. To "correct" me I'd have to be wrong. Did you show where I was wrong? Where? Alll you did was say you had a different definition than me. I fail to see why you think your definition is correct? Oh, because you *define* it that way. Well, I don't. So, you've NOWHERE shown me wrong, Zachary Moore.<BR/><BR/>Even if "concepts are stored in neurons" you still think they are material. You said above that they exist, and you also have told me (cf. my dismembering of you on Craig's blog) that all that exists is matter.<BR/><BR/>1. If something is material then it is a particular existent.<BR/><BR/>2. Concepts are material.<BR/><BR/>c1. Therefore concepts are particular exixstents.<BR/><BR/>3. If something is a particular existent then it is an entity.<BR/><BR/>4. A concept is a particular existent.<BR/><BR/>5. Therefore, a concept is an entity.<BR/><BR/>QED Zach!<BR/><BR/>Even on Moore's own terms he must believe concepts are entities.<BR/><BR/>Zach must believe logic is an entity.<BR/><BR/>Everything on Zach's worldview, if it exists, is material, as he's to9ld us time and time again. (Or, have I just slammed your materialism?). So, EVEN ON ZACH'S OWN PREMISES, he holds the belief that concepts are entities!<BR/><BR/>Zach started out saying this: "In classic Manatan form, the belief that concepts are entities is projected without apology." LOL.<BR/><BR/>ANyway, I kow Moore thinks it's safer to debate here because big Dawson can help him out.<BR/><BR/>Actually Moore has no clue about "concept formation" and follows the out-dated and refuted bastardization of Aristotle and Locke, in Rand.Errorhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10615233201833238198noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11714522.post-1149426483401188842006-06-04T09:08:00.000-04:002006-06-04T09:08:00.000-04:00Don't get your panties in a twaddle, Paul. Firstly...Don't get your panties in a twaddle, Paul. Firstly, I gave my definition from my own understanding of concept-formation, not by running to a dictionary as you did (prejection, <I><B>yet again</B></I>). Secondly, I just looked up "entity" in a philosophical dictionary, and it gives the definition as "Genus: Existent; Differentia: As a particular and discrete unit." Thirdly, I understood that given your definition of "entity" concepts are included, but I also understood your definition to be incorrect, which is why I did you the favor of correcting you. Fourthly, I don't recall ever saying that "neurons are concepts," it's more likely that I said "concepts are stored in neurons," or "concepts are dependent on neurons," or something similar. If not, then I have just clarified the issue for your benefit.<BR/><BR/>Have a great Sunday, Paul. Would you like some orange juice with that egg on your face?Zachary Moorehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16991061670470673718noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11714522.post-1149389004517037052006-06-03T22:43:00.000-04:002006-06-03T22:43:00.000-04:00p.s. you should know how I was using entity, but n...p.s. you should know how I was using entity, but now thta you do know, there should be no problem.<BR/><BR/>You should read it as "something that exists within one's ontology." Certainly you believe that concepts exist, thus my using of entity is correct, it's just not the way you use entity. But considering the way I use it, there's no problem, unless you want to say that they don't exist!<BR/><BR/>LOL<BR/><BR/>Furthermore, I have your quotes where you say that concepts are neurons in the brain. So am I to take it that you don't think that neurons are particular existents?/??<BR/><BR/>So, either way you cut it, my definition or yours, I win.<BR/><BR/>Have a good night now, Zachary Moore. :DErrorhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10615233201833238198noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11714522.post-1149388815730010422006-06-03T22:40:00.000-04:002006-06-03T22:40:00.000-04:00okay, so all we're having is a definitional disput...okay, so all we're having is a definitional dispute.<BR/><BR/>You criticize me because I don't *define* 'entity' the way you do. Now *that's* embarrassing.<BR/><BR/>Oh, btw, EVERY dictionary of philosophy and encyclopedia of philosophy I have, defines entity that way.<BR/><BR/>I wonder what the university profs would call you now/<BR/><BR/>Notre dame profs already called you an ignorant redneck.<BR/><BR/>Furthermore, you're taking the definition from the "dictionary" while mine is also included.<BR/><BR/>More than that, EVERYONE knows that it's bad form to go to the dictionary for your philosophical definitions. LOL.<BR/><BR/>So, basically you're saying that I'm "fallacious" because I (1) don't agree with YOUR definition (from a dictionary (snicker)), and because I'm defining entity the proper way.<BR/><BR/>I mean, doesn't science have its set definitions for certain terms. How would a scientist like it if I went to the dictionary to define a scientific term and then called you wrong? I'd be pretty dumb, huh?<BR/><BR/>So, if all you're gonna do is pick on me because I don't agree with an online definition of 'entity' (one, of many, at that!), then you're just going to succeed in making yourself look ignorant. But you're used to that, right?Errorhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10615233201833238198noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11714522.post-1149356192934453042006-06-03T13:36:00.000-04:002006-06-03T13:36:00.000-04:00Once again, projecting your own definitions (and f...Once again, projecting your own definitions (and failings?) onto others, Paul. How embarrassing to do so twice in a row.<BR/><BR/>An "entity" is a particular existent. Thus, concepts cannot be entities because they are formed from particulars. For example, a tree is an entity, but a forest is not.Zachary Moorehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16991061670470673718noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11714522.post-1149353366419399002006-06-03T12:49:00.000-04:002006-06-03T12:49:00.000-04:00In classical Moorean form, Zach shows his ignoranc...In classical Moorean form, Zach shows his ignorance.<BR/><BR/>An entity is defined as something said to exist in one's ontology. Concepts exist, therefore they are entities.<BR/><BR/>I guess Moore is of the opinion that concepts don't exist! LOL.<BR/><BR/>Yeah, tey don't exist like rocks, trees, etc, but they exist nonetheless. indeed, you think they are neurons, so neurons don't exist?Errorhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10615233201833238198noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11714522.post-1149343540209495202006-06-03T10:05:00.000-04:002006-06-03T10:05:00.000-04:00In classic Manatan form, the belief that concepts ...In classic Manatan form, the belief that concepts are entities is projected without apology. You've got to admire his consistency, if not his fallacy.<BR/><BR/>Speaking of absurdity, <A HREF="http://onegoodmove.org/1gm/1gmarchive/2006/05/the_big_bang.html" REL="nofollow">here's</A> a "cartoon universe" take on the fairy-tale nature of creationism to which you alluded above.Zachary Moorehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16991061670470673718noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11714522.post-1149326337954872282006-06-03T05:18:00.000-04:002006-06-03T05:18:00.000-04:00http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2006/06/dawsons-dol...http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2006/06/dawsons-doltish-diatribe.html<BR/><BR/>I especially like this part:<BR/><BR/>DB: If we do not allow the words to speak for themselves, what good will it do for me to present an argument, which itself consists of words?<BR/><BR/>PM: Okay, let's let DB argue against DB. I'm, gonna take a break and let Dawson beat Dawson up. You see, we have hear an example of what I was referring to above. DB does not mean what his "words" do. I mean, I guess he does if he thinks that words have vocal cords and mouths by which they can "speak for themselves." Indeed, are words individual persons that have "selves?" This is utterly embarrassing for poor DB! So, we can conclude that if DB is going to be consistent with his argument he gives above, then we must agree that DB thinks that words are personal agents with bodies. And he thinks we have an irrational worldview!<BR/><BR/><BR/><BR/>LOL!Errorhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10615233201833238198noreply@blogger.com