Incinerating Presuppositionalism

Are the Laws of Logic "Thoughts" of the Christian God?

2012-01-01T07:00:00.000-08:00

Hello my readers.

Happy 2555 to all!

Yes, here in Thailand, it’s not 2012. Thailand goes by a version of the Buddhist calendar, and it’s already the year 2555 here. Perhaps you could think of me as writing to you from the future.

As I predicted in earlier messages to you on my blog, I’ve been busier than Wall Street on a bull rally since getting back to Bangkok late November. The flood waters are for the most part gone, and life for most people is back to normal. But there’s a sense of urgency to make up for lost time, both in the private sector and also in public works. Schools are even going six days a week here, which means my daughter, who’s only in kindergarten, has a brutal schedule to keep.

Unfortunately, that means I haven’t been able to keep up with my blog. I see that Nide is still going at it, and that Justin Hall and Ydemoc are continuing to engage him. They’re all welcome to continue doing so. I’m sure it will all make for some interesting reading one day, supposing I get the time.

In the meanwhile, I’ve been feasting – really, nibbling and grazing, when opportunity arises – on a paper recently published by James Anderson and Greg Welty called The Lord of Non-Contradiction: An Argument for God from Logic. In this paper, the authors set out to “argue for a substantive metaphysical relationship between the laws of logic and the existence of God” (p. 1). Specifically they aim to prove “that there are laws of logic because God exists,” that “there are laws of logic only because God exists” (Ibid.). Presumably this is the Christian god of the New Testament whose existence their argument will finally prove. They say of their own argument that it is “a fascinating and powerful but neglected argument for the existence of God.” Of course, this is not meant to be self-congratulatory, but rather a device intended to hook the reader’s interest so that he’ll continue on for the next twenty-plus pages of fun-filled reading. (I’m guessing that, for Sye Ten Bruggencate, 22 pages devoted to the development of a single argument does not constitute “argumentum ad verbosium,” since it’s intended to establish, once and for all, the existence of a deity.)

After an introduction, the paper is divided into the following sections which function essentially as steps to the paper’s desired conclusion, namely that a god exists:

1. The Laws of Logic are Truths
2. The Laws of Logic are Truths about Truths
3. The Laws of Logic are Necessary Truths
4. The Laws of Logic Really Exist
5. The Laws of Logic Necessarily Exist
6. The Laws of Logic are Non-Physical
7. The Laws of Logic are Thoughts
8. The Laws of Logic are Divine Thoughts

While there’s nothing that I saw in Anderson and Welty’s presentation which challenges my own exploration of the question of whether or not logic presupposes the Christian god, it is gratifying to see an argument from logic to the existence of a god so nicely and systematically laid out. Anderson and Welty have been hard at work in their effort to prove that their god exists.

While I have not had the time I need to develop a full response to every point which Anderson and Welty raise in their piece, I did have some initial general concerns when I peruse their work. Of course, I have many, many objections to much of what I have read in their paper, but a more penetrating analysis of their paper will have to wait till another time.

For now, I just wanted to note some of the following concerns of mine, hopefully to get the discussion moving in the right direction.

1. Necessary vs. Contingent: Throughout their paper, Anderson and Welty clearly take the necessary-contingent dichotomy for granted. This distinction (dichotomy) plays a central role in the build-up to their desired conclusion (I found 20 instances of the word ‘necessary’ and 16 instance of the word ‘contingent’, most of which are used in the context of the necessary-contingent dichotomy, throughout their paper). So granting the truth of the necessary-contingent appears to be vital to their conclusion. But if this dichotomy is rejected, how could one accept their paper’s conclusion as they have set out to draw it?

Objectivism rejects the necessary-contingent dichotomy, and for many good reasons. Leonard Peikoff, in his essay “The Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy,” spells out those reasons, fundamentally arguing that the dichotomy and all its variants (including the necessary-contingent dichotomy) rest on a false theory of concepts. Given this fact, it is not surprising to find Christians making use of the necessary-contingent dichotomy in their theistic arguments, for Christianity itself (as I’ve pointed out numerous times before; see for instance here) has no native theory of concepts, and thus as a worldview cannot account for conceptual thought. This can only mean, with regard to the necessary-contingent dichotomy, that Christian thinkers are at a profound disadvantage when it comes to detecting the epistemological defects of this commonly accepted mechanism of analyzing knowledge.

What struck me specifically in Anderson and Welty’s paper is the fact that they seek to establish the laws of logic as “necessarily existent” on the one hand, and as “thoughts” on the other (see points 3 and 7 of their paper’s outline above). Assuming the necessary-contingent dichotomy which underwrites much of Anderson and Welty’s methodology, these two premises seem quite at odds with one another. Something that is “necessarily existent” is something that could not have failed to exist. Anderson and Welty make the first point explicitly when they say:

The Law of Non-Contradiction… could not have failed to exist—otherwise it could have failed to be true. (p. 19)

So the Law of Non-Contradiction must be something that is “necessarily existent.”

They proceed to argue that “If the laws of logic are necessarily existent thoughts, they can only be the thoughts of a necessarily existent mind” (Ibid.). Anderson and Welty argue, in their characteristic way, that the laws of logic are “necessarily existent” and also that they are also “thoughts,” but arguing that something is a “necessarily existent thought” seems to go beyond even the most generous charitableness. Thoughts cannot come into being unless a thinker thinks them, which means: thoughts are dependent on thinking. Also, thinking is volitional in nature: a thinker - especially a thinker that is a free agent, as the Christian god is supposed to be – must choose to think what it thinks. Given the fact that thinking is volitional in nature, any specific thought that a free thinking agent thinks cannot be “necessary” in the sense that it “could not have failed to exist,” for supposing this would deny volition to said thinker. It would render said thinker to a mere automaton, a robot performing actions that it “needs” to perform given some extraneous constraints which hold it in check.

The result is that Anderson and Welty’s argument, so far as I understand it, results in one of two very difficult binds: either the laws of logic are “necessarily existent thoughts” (in which case the thinker responsible for thinking them is not a free agent), or the deity which supposedly thinks the thoughts which we call “the laws of logic” is a free thinking agent (in which case its thoughts are volitional and consequently could have been different, which would mean that no thought it thinks could qualify as a “necessarily existent thought”). Neither alternative seems to jive well for Anderson and Welty’s Christian position (since Christianity affirms the existence of a deity which can do whatever it pleases – cf. Ps. 115:3). Perhaps Anderson and Welty have built some prophylactic into their argument which safeguards against such uncomfortable outcomes, but from what I can tell in my reading, none is necessarily existent.

2. “Intuitions”: Also throughout the paper, there are several vague references to “intuitions,” not only treating them as apparently unquestionable (maybe even infallible), but also suggesting a uniformity of intuitions among all thinkers which they nowhere establish. These “intuitions,” which are never specified, appear to have a certain significance for the overall goal of their paper. For instance, on page 1, Anderson and Welty write:

The bulk of the paper will be concerned with establishing what kind of things the laws of logic must be for our most natural intuitions about them to be correct and for them to play the role in our intellectual activities that we take them to play.

I’m taking the “our” here in “our most natural intuitions” as intended to refer to human beings in general – to all of us; if it referred only to Anderson and Welty, readers might find their exercise to be of little interest: why care if Anderson’s and Welty’s most natural intuitions about the laws of logic are correct? On the other hand, if “our most natural intuitions” means everyone’s “intuitions,” then anyone reading this paper has a stake in its outcome. This latter interpretation seems to be what our authors have in mind.

Of course, what is meant by “intuition” as Anderson and Welty understand it, is of great significance here. They do not offer a definition, but I’m guessing that’s because the notion is used as a matter of routine in the philosophical literature they prefer to read. Perhaps they are so accustomed to seeing the word used and granted casual legitimacy that it would seem silly to explain it. But even philosophers who invest the notion of intuition with philosophical validity are not monolithic in their view of what it is or how it operates. So if “our most natural intuitions” about logical principles have any bearing on the argument which Anderson and Welty are presenting, it might help readers like me to clarify their understanding on the matter.

I say this because I tend to be rather suspicious of the term ‘intuition’ to begin with. A standard dictionary definition of ‘intuition’ is “direct perception of truth,” which might strike most readers as rather innocuous. But I’m an Objectivist, and as such, I recognize that what human beings perceive are concrete objects, while truth is an aspect of identification, which is a function of conceptual cognition and thus post-perceptual. In other words, on the Objectivist view, we do not perceive truths; rather, we perceive objects (specifically, primary-type objects – objects of which our senses give us perceptual awareness), and subsequently identify those objects using a conceptual method resulting in identifications which may be true or not true. To the extent that this analysis of what “direct perception of truth” means is correct (and without further clarification of the notion which endows the notion with better chances for philosophical solvency, I’d say it is correct), I’d say that appeals to “intuitions” need to be reconsidered in light of rational philosophy.

But thinkers who invoke “intuitions” might not have this definition in mind. Some hold “intuition” to denote some kind of a priori knowledge – knowledge that is supposedly known without any firsthand experiential participation of the knower in the knowing process. This is essentially the view that one “just knows” something, in which case questions like “How do you know?” simply do not apply, since there’s really no epistemology to speak of in assessing (or accessing) such “knowledge.” I’m quite persuaded that there is no such thing as “a priori knowledge,” and tend to view appeals to “a priori knowledge” essentially as an admission on the part of the one making such appeals that he really doesn’t know how he knows what he claims to know. (Sort of like John Frame, such as when he announces: “We know without knowing how we know” - Presuppositional Apologetics: An Introduction (Part I).)

Still others hold that “intuition” refers to some kind of a posteriori knowledge, though don’t be surprised when explanations of how one supposedly goes about collecting this kind of knowledge wax murky. Defenders of this understanding of “intuition” may have in mind some automatized item of knowledge; for in fact, the human mind does automatize many epistemological processes (consider your knowledge of how to tie your own shoes, or how you know not to touch a hot stove with your bare hands). But it does not follow from the mere fact that one has automatized the path to some ideational content that he holds as knowledge, that what he holds as knowledge is therefore true, or that the process which he has automatized in arriving at such ideational content is rational. Rationality has not only to do with the logic of the process, but also the objectivity of the inputs which are integrated by that process. The process by which we automatize a certain item of knowledge, is not automatically rational.

But maybe I’m wrong on all this. Perhaps I’m just some dunderheaded Neanderthal who in his contemptible naïveté has the annoying habit of wincing when thinkers treat some unspecified mass of assumptions which they style “intuitions” as some kind of sacred bull that must be preserved and protected, as though their dismantling would mean the entire artifice of human thought will come crumbling down into a worthless heap.

Perhaps my detractors would find this view comforting. But I don’t think so.

3. Presuppositionalist Reaction: My attention was first brought to Anderson and Welty’s paper when I visited the blog Choosing Hats, where Chris Bolt had posted an entry about the paper. What I found most interesting here is a comment posted on the blog entry by Brian Knapp. In his comment, Knapp was responding to Mitch LeBlanc. LeBlanc had expressed pleasure with and enthusiasm for the paper in a previous comment. In his response to LeBlanc, Knapp announced that he “shall be the presupper who will criticize [Anderson and Welty’s] argument,” which I would like to read when it’s finally available.

In response to LeBlanc’s statement that Anderson and Welty’s paper is “a refreshing read,” Knapp commented:

I will say you find this refreshing because it doesn’t challenge your autonomy. Just because the argument is not transcendental in nature, there is no requirement for you (at least as far as the argument goes) to give up yourself as the standard of what is rational. That means you can evaluate the argument and toss it aside (or even accept it), and nothing will really change, as the argument doesn’t prove the Triune God of the Bible exists – even if the argument is sound.

I find this curious in part because the under-title to Anderson’s blog (where he posted a link to the paper) reads: “Faltering Attempts to Think God’s Thoughts After Him.” “Autonomy” in presup-speak is typically contrasted with “analogical thinking,” which John Frame defines as “Thinking in subjection to God’s revelation and therefore thinking God’s thoughts after him” (per his A Van Til Glossary). Presumably the “analogical thinker” is still actually thinking, but apparently he’s not allowed to think his own thoughts; or, rather, he is to make “God’s thoughts” his own by accessing them somehow and giving them primacy in his overall cognitive activity (without question, according to Bahnsen). And even though Anderson’s blog indicates that he’s doing his best to accomplish this, Knapp is essentially saying he’s failed to do so in the paper he’s put together with Welty. One wonders what Van Til would think of all this. But as Knapp indicates, hardcore V’illains will likely take abundant exception to the methodology employed by Anderson and Welty in their joint effort to prove the existence of their god. Knapp assures us that Anderson and Welty’s “argument doesn’t prove the Triune God of the Bible exists – even if the argument is sound.” Having some familiarity with Anderson’s background in apologetics, I’d think he’d have a lot to say in response to this. But this wouldn’t be the first time that we saw more believer vs. believer conflict erupt with the Choosing Hats crowd. A feud between Jamin Hubner (to whose book The Portable Presuppositionalist several of Choosing Hats’ “staff” have contributed writings) and Triablogue’s Steve Hays (see specifically here) and TurretinFan has been heating up in recent months.

Depending on what ‘autonomy’ specifically means (the notion of “yourself as the standard of what is rational” is more vague than helpful), I’d have to agree with Knapp’s point that Anderson and Welty’s paper offers nothing to challenge my “autonomy” (which I take to denote my ability and willingness to think for myself). But then again, nothing that Knapp or any member of the clan at Choosing Hats has written does either. Or, for that matter, any presuppositionalist paper that I’ve read or argument that I’ve examined. Perhaps Knapp would say that my “autonomy” has been challenged and I just don’t realize it. That would be the easy path to take.

While I am still examining Anderson and Welty’s paper, and surely there are many other things to say in response to it, I have to say already that I’m quite sure I won’t be persuaded by their argument. After all, the argument and its conclusion still leave us with no alternative but to imagine the god whose existence they are attempting to prove. While theists who delight in indulging in fantasies about “the supernatural” will no doubt have no problem with this, it signifies that the argument is a non-starter so far as rational philosophy is concerned. One can imagine all kinds of things in some realm “beyond” the one which actually exists. But at the end of the day the fact remains: what we imagine is merely imaginary.

Although my time in the ensuing months is going to be very constrained (to put it mildly), if I do get a chance, I would like to post some further reactions of mine to specific aspects of Anderson and Welty’s argument. I have many thoughts in response to every paragraph in the paper, but insufficient time to prepare them for my blog. So it will have to wait until some future date that I cannot specify now.

by Dawson Bethrick

A Reply to Michael: Further Thoughts on the Issue of Supernatural Deception

2011-12-10T19:00:00.000-08:00

In the comments section of a previous blog entry of mine, Cognitive Reliability vs. Supernatural Deception, Christian blogger Michael Russell has offered numerous points of reaction. His last two comments, dated 7 December, were so loaded with topical material that I decided to post my response to him in a new blog entry here on Incinerating Presuppositionalism.

Michael wrote:

The question you left me with, was a clarifying comment on whether the human mind is subject to supernatural deception.

Yes, I was hoping for a clear and definitive ‘yes’ or ‘no’ from you on this, since your previous messages on the matter have left your position a little murky here.

Michael wrote:

Again, you've pushed me beyond my previous thought with our interaction on this specific point. I can see that my previous post on 1 Tim 4 would be better if complemented with discussion of the rest of the Biblical witness on the subject of demons, in particular, demon possession.

I think specifically the area of my inquiry can be narrowed to the supernatural abilities which Christianity ascribes to demons (“deceptive spirits”) and the abilities of men to detect and resist those abilities. From what I can tell, the NT characterizes human beings as pretty much sitting ducks for the supernatural pick-off. Human beings are always “in season,” and it’s just a matter of which supernatural spirit gets to them first; or, it’s just all a matter of “God’s plan,” which no man can alter. The lesson to take home, on the Christian view, is that man never has the upper hand when confronted with a supernatural will. If a supernatural spirit wants to move in and make its home in a human being’s mind, what’s going to stop it? How can any human being resist a supernatural force?

I’m reminded of an old Star Trek episode – one from the original sixties series, perhaps you’ve seen it – where the Enterprise crew picks up a group of children who were orphaned by a scientific team that encountered disaster on some distant planet. The crew of the Enterprise don’t realize it, but these kids have supernatural powers. In one scene, the crew on the bridge of the starship are deceived into thinking that the ship is still orbiting a planet when in fact it’s traveling at maximum “warp” speed to another system. Poor Sulu and Chekhov are none the wiser – they’ve been supernaturally deceived.

What I’m saying is that, if my worldview sincerely affirmed the existence of supernatural beings, I don’t see how I could ever rule out the possibility such belief invites that I myself could be the victim of such deception. It seems extremely tenuous to think that Romans 1 alleviates such a possibility. Indeed, the whole approach that you’ve offered so far relies on inference, and thus assumes that one’s own mental faculties, including the ability to draw inferences, are immune to supernatural deception, which is the very thing in question. To date your approach seems to rely on assuming the very thing in question.

Michael wrote:

I can also see that I have not accounted for how the demonic teaching first enters into humans. So let me amend (and perhaps contradict) would I previously said. It seems I need to propose some kind of ability in demons to 'propose false teaching to a person's heart and mind'. How this actually works is beyond me. The Bible says little.

Why do you suppose that is? Why would this god, which is said to have authored the bible and “so loved the world that He gave His only begotten Son,” choose to keep his believers in the dark on such matters? Speaking as a parent myself, I do everything in my power to inform my daughter about the world and the hazards she might encounter. I certainly wouldn’t tell her something like, “Well, there are these supernatural spirits that might be a real menace to you, and I know precisely how they operate, but I’m not going to give you any details – I’m just going to leave you completely uninformed on the matter.” Since I genuinely love my daughter, I have every intention of disclosing everything I know about the hazards that could harm her. I certainly wouldn’t choose to withhold vital information from her that she could use to protect herself, as though to say, “Enjoy the darkness of your ignorance. Good luck! You’ll need it!” But perhaps on the Christian view there really is nothing that a human being can do to protect himself from supernatural forces. So why go into it? Either way, the state of affairs as we find it in the bible does not speak well for the worldview it endorses.

Michael wrote:

Let me turn to your actual question. A one word answer to your question is 'yes', I think the human mind is potentially subject to supernatural deception. This is because the Bible teaches that human minds do get deceived by demons and their teaching.

Yes, it does teach this, so I don’t see how one could avoid answering ‘yes’ to my question, even though previous efforts on your part to answer my blog Cognitive Reliability vs. Supernatural Deception implied that you were essentially trying to answer it with a ‘no’.

So it’s good to have a clear answer to this: Yes, you do think that the human mind is potentially subject to supernatural deception, given what the bible teaches.

Of course, I’m guessing there will now be a need to qualify this affirmation somehow, perhaps with a set of disclaimers which are intended to preserve other teachings also found in the bible, namely teachings which hold man culpable for his spiritual state, even though it is ultimately in the hands of supernatural forces beyond his control.

Michael wrote:

Demonic possession would obviously severely change the experience of the person who is possessed.

I don’t know why you would say this. It seems that the contrary would be the case, given the supernatural abilities of deceptive spirits. You yourself have acknowledged that “the Bible teaches that human minds do get deceived by demons and their teaching.” Effective execution of such deception would, I’d think, by virtue of such efforts qualifying as successfully deceptive, result in seamless and undetectable reshaping. Presumably demons (“deceptive spirits”) have had millennia or longer to perfect their craft. So I’m not disposed to readily accept the view that demonic possession, or merely supernatural deception (if these are distinct somehow – the latter is what I’ve been concerned about), “would obviously severely change the experience of the person” who is deceived. On the contrary, I’d expect that it would be so subtle as to be completely undetectable by any human faculty. Otherwise it seems that efforts on the part of supernatural spirits to deceive men would never get off the ground: they would result in such an “obvious” and “severe” change in a person’s experience that it would be detected right away.

Perhaps this comes down to a distinction between “supernatural deception” and “demonic possession.” Perhaps Michael has something like The Exorcist in mind here. By contrast, I don’t have such spectacular depictions in mind. Rather, I’m thinking of the average human being who simply doesn’t realize that supernatural spirits have infiltrated his consciousness and imperceptibly influenced his cognition somehow. I’ve been talking about “supernatural deception” all along, but you’ve introduced the notion of “demonic possession” while interacting with my questions on the matter. I don’t know that they are one and the same. Again, “the Bible says little” here.

Michael wrote:

But would such possession be rightly called 'deception'? In certain ways, yes. We're limited in how much we can say about this, given the limitations of what the Bible says about demon possession. We have very little in the Bible about what it feels like to be demon possessed.

Again, the concerns which I originally raised in my blog had to do with supernatural deception. It’s unclear whether or not this is distinct from or identical to “demonic possession.” In fact, it’s not for me to answer, since none of this is part of my worldview. The concept ‘deception’ inherently implies that those who have been deceived do not realize that they’ve been deceived. If victims of “demonic possession” are aware that they’ve been taken over by some demonic force, then clearly my concerns do not apply in such cases. Rather, I have in mind situations analogous to the Star Trek episode I mentioned earlier: the victims of deception have no idea that they’ve been deceived, they have no way of detecting the deception on their own, since the deceivers possess skills that are far beyond the ability of those who have been so deceived to sense or detect in any way.

So in response to your point here, I would say that the person who’s been supernaturally deceived doesn’t feel any different. Since he’s been deceived, he has no idea that he’s been deceived, and whatever deception has taken root in his being feels perfectly natural. It’s seamless in is experience.

Michael wrote:

I'll try a few comments, nonetheless: I don't know what it feels like to be demon possessed, or whether one manifestation of that might be to have one's faculties playing tricks on you.

My concern at this point is that the discussion is incrementally drifting from man’s inability to know whether or not he’s been supernaturally deceived, to what it “feels like to be demon possessed,” the latter of which was never the focus of my concern. It’s one thing to say that when a human being is possessed by a demon, he senses this, recognizes that he’s been taken over by a demon, and essentially says, “Hey, I like this! It feels great! Take me for a ride, Asmodeus! Have your way with me!” It’s quite another to say that a human being has been deceived “unawares,” which can only imply that he’s been led down the wrong path without realizing it by some supernatural influence that he can neither detect nor successfully resist on his own.

If human beings can be deceived by other human beings “unawares,” how much more can they be deceived by supernatural beings “unawares,” especially when the very nature of those supernatural beings is not only malevolent, but also beyond the reach of man’s senses as well as vastly more powerful than any human being? By nature it’s a ludicrously uneven match. But on the Christian worldview, this is all part of “God’s plan.”

Previously, Michael, you focused on I Timothy 4:2 (“by means of the hypocrisy of liars (A)seared in their own conscience as with a branding iron”) in order to draw the inference that supernatural deception finds its way into the stream of human thought through other human beings. Your interpretation of this verse apparently assumes that the “liars” mentioned in it were human in nature (even though the content of the verse does not necessarily require such an interpretation so far as I can tell). Specifically you had stated (in your 3 December comment to this blog, timestamped 3:25 am), regarding I Timothy 4:

Notice from verse 2 [I Tim. 4:2] that the deceitful spirits are doing their deceiving through teachings which come through human hypocritical liars.

We must keep in mind that certain verses in the NT indicate that supernatural beings have the ability to disguise themselves in human form. For instance, Hebrews 13:2 instructs believers as follows:

Be not forgetful to entertain strangers: for thereby some have entertained angels unawares.

This is one of those “just in case” instructions that the NT gives to believers, given the potential that things aren’t as they appear to be in terms of “spiritual” (i.e., supernatural) matters. As I wrote in my 3 December comment to the same blog (timestamped 7:06 am):

I do not see that Paul specifies that the ‘hypocritical liars’ he mentions are to be understood as *human*. I say this partly because I recall, when I was a believer, how my pastor & his crew would continually refer to certain “worldly folks” as “demons” and “devils,” and very often imply that the “wicked” individuals we encountered were actually malevolent supernatural agents disguised as human beings (perhaps sort of like Jesus being the Christian god “become flesh”). In other words, given Christianity’s overt supernaturalism and the powers it ascribes to supernatural spirits, I could not take it for granted that every individual I encountered was actually a human being. I really had no way of knowing one way or another. And I don’t think this kind of self-doubt and confusion is either unbiblical or accidental.

So the biblical worldview in fact ascribes tremendous powers and abilities to supernatural beings. If I were a believer (and I’m speaking from personal experience as a former insider here), I certainly wouldn’t presume to have the intellectual confidence to discount or downplay the abilities of supernatural beings. On the contrary, their very presence in the Christian worldview seems to be deliberately affirmed for the purpose of undermining any confidence in one’s own mind on the part of the believer who takes such teachings seriously, which I’d suppose anyone calling himself a Christian would need to do, given his confession qua Christian. In other words, I think it’d be wrong – indeed “arrogant” – on the part of any human being taking Christian teachings as actually true, to say “Well, those supernatural spirits really can’t do anything harmful; they’re just a nuisance is all. They really have no power. Don’t take them seriously.”

Michael wrote:

To lose control of one's speech and action etc. to another being who is within you, that seems to be what happens to some of the demoniacs in the Bible.

What you describe here (i.e., losing control of one’s own speech and actions, one’s own will, as it were), does not seem to be restricted, going by the stories I’ve read in the bible, only to demoniacs. Indeed, there are passages, such as in the gospel of John and the Acts of the Apostles, which suggest something similar, only the supernatural agent involved is the “Holy Ghost,” not some devil or demon. Some examples might include:

John 14:26: “But the Helper, the Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in My name, He will teach you all things, and bring to your remembrance all that I said to you.” (How will it “teach” these things to those whom it teaches?)

John 15:26: “When the Helper comes, whom I will send to you from the Father, that is the Spirit of truth who proceeds from the Father, He will testify about Me” (How will it do this “testifying”?)

Acts 1:2: “until the day when He was taken up to heaven, after He had by the Holy Spirit given orders to the apostles whom He had chosen.” (Jesus “gives orders” through the “Holy Spirit”? How does anyone become aware of them?)

Acts 1:16: “Brethren, the Scripture had to be fulfilled, which the Holy Spirit foretold by the mouth of David concerning Judas, who became a guide to those who arrested Jesus.” (So, did David just mouth the words that were given to him by the “Holy Spirit” to speak, regardless of his knowledge of what they meant? Or was such knowledge just implanted into his head supernaturally?)

Acts 2:4: “And they were all filled with the Holy Spirit and began to speak with other tongues, as the Spirit was giving them utterance.” (So, these people supposedly spoke in some actual language that they had not already learned, and they did so because the “Holy Spirit” spoke through them?)

Acts 2:17: “’AND IT SHALL BE IN THE LAST DAYS,’ God says, ‘THAT I WILL POUR FORTH OF MY SPIRIT ON ALL MANKIND; AND YOUR SONS AND YOUR DAUGHTERS SHALL PROPHESY, AND YOUR YOUNG MEN SHALL SEE VISIONS, AND YOUR OLD MEN SHALL DREAM DREAMS;” (So, this “Holy Spirit” will be “poured forth” onto “all mankind,” and as a result, this will cause them to “prophesy” and “see visions” and “dream dreams”? How is this not an example of a supernatural being taking over human cognition?)

Acts 4:31: “And when they had prayed, the place where they had gathered together was shaken, and they were all filled with the Holy Spirit and began to speak the word of God with boldness.” (So, this “filling” with the “Holy Spirit” results in the ability “to speak the word of God with boldness”? Is it the ability to speak, or the ability to speak “the word of God,” or the ability to speak this word “with boldness” that the “filling” with the “Holy Spirit” gives to men?)

Acts 8:29: “Then the Spirit said to Philip, ‘Go up and join this chariot.’” (How does an immaterial, incorporeal, non-biological, and invisible “spirit” tell a man to do something like this?)

Acts 8:39: “When they came up out of the water, the Spirit of the Lord snatched Philip away; and the eunuch no longer saw him, but went on his way rejoicing.” (Here the “Spirit of the Lord” performs what is apparently a physical action, namely “snatching” someone from where they are. Perhaps many of the individuals who go missing each year have really just been “snatched away” by the “Holy Spirit.” How would anyone believing any of this know otherwise?)

Acts 10:19: “While Peter was reflecting on the vision, the Spirit said to him, “Behold, three men are looking for you.” (How did “the Spirit” say this to Peter? How did the author of Acts know what a “spirit” said to one of the characters of his story, if not by imagining this?)

Acts 13:4: “So, being sent out by the Holy Spirit, they went down to Seleucia and from there they sailed to Cyprus” (How did the “Holy Spirit” send them “out,” such that “they went down to Seleucia”? How does that work?)

Acts 16:6: “They passed through the Phrygian and Galatian region, having been forbidden by the Holy Spirit to speak the word in Asia;” (How does the “Holy Spirit” forbid a person to speak? Is it through persuasion or by means of force? Again, “the Bible says little” here.)

Acts 16:7: “and after they came to Mysia, they were trying to go into Bithynia, and the Spirit of Jesus did not permit them;” (Here the “Spirit of Jesus” inexplicitly prohibits people from doing something. Apparently people do not have the ability to make their own decisions. And how does one person know whether another person is being prevented from doing something because of some supernatural force?)

According to these verses (and others which I simply haven’t had time to rummage through), the “Holy Spirit” (which is not supposed to be “deceptive,” since it represents “the Truth,” regardless of its compulsive practices), seems to work in a manner similar to the “deceptive spirits” which are said to infiltrate human minds and turn them into puppets. If the concern is to figure out how it “feels” to be supernaturally commandeered, it’s hard to see how there would be any significant difference between demonic and divine possession in this regard.

Also, consider the very phenomenon by which the “Holy Spirit” is said to manifest itself in believers, namely through “speaking in tongues.” If this is not a clear example of losing control of one’s own speech, I don’t know what is. Indeed, it seems quite strange, given the breadth of the unfolding epic of the Christian bible. In the Old Testament, diversity of tongues was a sign of divine punishment (cf. Genesis 11:1-9), while in the New Testament speaking an unknown tongue is evidence of the “indwelling” of the “Holy Spirit.” First it’s representative of something bad, then it’s representative of something good.

At any rate, I see no indication in anything I’ve read in the Christian bible which necessitates that a person who’s been taken over by a supernatural spirit will feel any different or notice the intrusion to begin with. Rather, it seems that supernatural spirits have the ability to take over one’s speech and other cognitive faculties while maintaining the impression that one is in full control of himself. Otherwise, how could it be legitimately called ‘deception’?

The curious thing to note here is that the “Holy Spirit” is characterized in the NT as behaving in a manner very similar to “deceptive spirits” in that it allegedly moves into the mind of a human being and essentially takes over. It is unclear whether or not the person so affected is actually aware of this or not. But this actually seems to be what believers are encouraged to desire: that they should invite a “spirit” to enter into their minds, hearts and/or souls and “indwell” therein, taking control or at least taking the lead in one’s life.

I remember a common piece of instruction I heard so often when I was a church-goer. The expression was “Let go and let God.” Even then I couldn’t keep images of Luke Skywalker flying an incredibly sophisticated piece of hardware through space, preparing to bomb a massive space station, and suddenly the voice of his deceased mentor could be heard, “Let go, Luke. Let go. Use your feelings.” For all the Christians who claim that atheists have no consistent foundation for reason, logic, science, morality and the rest, the appropriate response may simply be, “May the Force be with you!”

But clearly the NT indicates that spirits, both wicked and divine, essentially inhabit human beings somehow. The stories of the “Holy Spirit” guiding missionizing travelers in the Acts of the Apostles wouldn’t make sense otherwise, nor would he many instances in the gospels where Jesus is portrayed as “casting out demons” from characters inserted into these narratives.

Michael wrote:

But it's hard to guess what you would see and feel and think and know if that happened to you.

I’d think that, were supernaturalism true and some supernatural being deceived a person, that person would be deceived, and thus think everything he’s experiencing is completely normal. Since the supernatural spirit is actively deceiving him, that spirit would no doubt ensure that there weren’t anything available to the deceived’s consciousness calling attention to the deception. Certainly a supernatural being would be capable of concealing its own presence in one’s life, no? Indeed, what objective evidence do Christians provide to support the claim that the “Holy Spirit” is dwelling in them? None that I’ve ever been able to find. Frankly it all seems to be in the imagination of the believer.

Michael wrote:

I can't think that anyone would choose to be demon possessed, or 'demonized' (to use a more accurate translation of the Greek verb), knowing all that it would imply.

But you do think that the vast majority of persons have in fact chosen to “suppress the truth in unrighteousness,” no doubt knowing all that this implies, right?

Michael wrote:

Therefore I think it's fair to say that demons work in a deceptive way, in order to end up possessing/'demonizing' a person.

This would mean that there is in fact a distinction between “supernatural deception” (which is what I have been inquiring about all along) and “demonic possession,” which you have recently introduced into the discussion. According to what you say here, the latter (“demonic possession”) is a goal of the former (“supernatural deception”). The nefarious spirits do not begin by “possessing” their victims (which implies full custody of the person’s mind, heart and soul, like locking a cage door and allowing no escape), but by coaxing, misleading, perhaps seducing or beguiling their victims without letting on that their being deceived (which implies that the victim is not under full custody, but may in fact be able to escape somehow). Would you say this is at least roughly accurate? At any rate, it seems that you do in fact hold that, according to your worldview, the human mind is subject to supernatural deception.

That being the case, and given the fact that “the Bible says little” on all of this, particularly on the epistemology of discovering and identifying what’s taking place in the “supernatural” realm, how can someone who believes that there are supernatural spirits malevolently seeking out victims of their deceptive tactics, have any confidence that their mind is free of any and all deceitful intrusions on the part of supernatural spirits?

Michael wrote:

I would discuss this topic under the theme of whether a person ends up with an excuse on the last Day before God.

In other words, the preservation of this doctrine – that man is without excuse before the Christian god – is your guiding non-negotiable in determining whether or not supernatural spirits can deceive human beings, and if so, when, where and how; whatever view you end up affirming regarding deceptive spirits and whether or not supernatural beings can deceive human minds, it must be conform to this doctrine. Correct?

Michael wrote:

For example, if a person were demon possessed at birth or at a very young age, they could complain on the last Day to God that they had no opportunity as an adult to process God's revelation of Himself to them, so they are not to blame for their rejection of him.

So I suppose that, on your understanding of Christianity, you would rather believe that human beings, perhaps even from a very young age, are actively deceiving themselves – “suppressing the truth in unrighteousness” – presumably on purpose. That’s how I understand the Christian view which is explicitly informed by the interpretation of Romans 1 that you have adopted: that everyone pretty much starts out actively deceiving themselves, apparently without influence from supernatural spirits. Would you say this is an unfair assessment, and if so, why? Would you rather say that there’s a point in people’s lives when they make some choice or decision to “suppress the truth in unrighteousness”? If so, can you elaborate on this?

Or consider this: Do you think it’s simply not possible for someone genuinely to believe that Christian theism is irrational, that its claims about supernatural beings are false? My view is that supernaturalism finds its source in people’s imaginations. Do you think I’m suppressing some truth by coming to this recognition? If so, is that because you’re simply trying to be faithful to Romans 1? Or, do you have any objective input from reality (i.e., actual facts about the case rather than claims made by someone 1900 years ago to keep believers from straying from the churches he wanted to grow) to support this assessment?

Michael wrote:

Lacking control over one's actions would also seem like a potentially good excuse for evil actions.

That’s interesting you say this. Would you agree with Van Til when he says “God controls whatsoever comes to pass” (The Defense of the Faith, p. 160)?

Or how about when Greg Bahnsen writes: “God’s thoughts make the world what it is and determine what happens” (Van Til’s Apologetic: Readings & Analysis, p. 243)?

Or how about when he writes: “God controls all events and outcomes (even those that come about by human choice and activity)” (Ibid., p. 489n.43)?

If the Christian god is controlling everything that happens, determining “all events and outcomes,” including “those that come about human choice and activity,” it seems that a human individual really doesn’t have any control over his own actions. In fact, I don’t see how one could. And yet, Van Til & co. affirm this all-encompassing theistic determinism while still maintaining the “no excuse” doctrine. It all strikes me to be sheerly self-contradictory, or at any rate a complete mockery of morality (which is already evident in their view that evil is morally justifiable).

So again, it seems hard to maintain the “no excuse” doctrine with any logical consistency here.

Michael wrote:

Therefore, I would conclude that God does not allow very young children to be demonized.

So if a demonic spirit wants to “demonize” a little toddler, for instance, you think something’s going to prevent it? If so, what? The “hand of God”? Why would that same god allow any of its human children to be harmed in such a way, even when they are older?

Suppose a person in his 20s becomes demonically possessed and driven to suicide. Why couldn’t this person point to his being possessed by a demon as an “excuse”? Couldn’t that person say something like, “If you [God] protected me from the demon, I would have been able to call on Jesus as my Lord and Savior. But since you [God] allowed me to be demonized, all opportunity for me to repent was taken from me, so I have a legitimate excuse”? Clearly he could say this (since people can say pretty much anything they want). But I’m guessing you would say your god would not accept it for some reason, right?

Michael wrote:

Since people will have no excuse before God, it follows that God does not allow demons to possess children when they are very young, because that would give them an excuse on the last Day before God.

I guess I just don’t see how being demonized for, say the last twenty years of one’s adult life, could not also constitute an excuse. At any rate, you’re implying that there is an age at which the gloves come off, so to say, and a child or young person is no longer immune to supernatural deception. Can you elaborate on this? What is that age, and how do you know?

Michael wrote:

I think what likely happens is that God only allows a significant level of demonic possession/influence on people when they have done something wicked enough to deserve such possession/influence.

But what, beyond being born as a human being, can a person do such that he “deserve[s] such possession/influence”? Consider the story of Job. Did Job deserve the injustices he suffered at the hands of demonic forces? My understanding of the story (and it’s been a while since I’ve read it) is that Job was “right with God” and thus did not deserve any injustice. But biblegod stood by and allowed it to happen, watching every moment of it. Perhaps it’s more like the line from Unforgiven: “Deserve’s got nothin’ to do with it.” In fact, that’s precisely how I read the Calvinist view of the world. On the Calvinist view, since every soul’s eternal destiny has been determined long before anyone has been born (and therefore before anyone’s had a chance to exercise his own volition in his life), man does nothing to “deserve” his eternal fate, whether it’s heaven or hellfire. His eternal destiny has been predetermined for all eternity. The Christian god does no choose to save anyone because he “deserves” it – there’s nothing anyone can do to “merit” salvation. It’s simply the Christian god’s arbitrary choice (only Christians will likely resist calling it arbitrary).

Also, your statement here suggests there are degrees of wickedness, some “level” of which will “earn” one the opening of the demonic floodgates. Of course, while some NT verses may confirm such a view, it does seem to go against the view expressed quite explicitly in James 2:10, that “For whoever keeps the whole law and yet stumbles in one point, he has become guilty of all.” This NT verse suggests that there are no “degrees” of transgression, no “levels” of “sin.”

Michael wrote:

That's why seances and witchcraft are so dangerous…

I know that the bible mentions witchcraft (and prescribes that witches be put to death), but I don’t think I’ve ever read about “séances” in the bible. Perhaps under a different name?

Michael wrote:

…if you explicitly invite demonic power to manifest itself in and around you, there is a justice in the demons taking some control over you and (perhaps) taking some control of your cognitive powers.

I will have to take your word for it. I have to admit that I really don’t understand what the word “justice” could possibly mean in a world ruled by the god described in the Christian bible. According to the NT, for instance, we’ve all been judged guilty even before we were born. I don’t understand how this can be just. Christians insist that it is. But they seem hard-pressed to explain how it’s an expression of justice.

And why suppose that “séances and witchcraft” are the only way to “explicitly invite demonic power” into one’s soul or life? If I recall, somewhere in the book of Proverbs it is intimated that the stubbornness of a defiant child is sufficient to “merit” death. Merely being born and “dying in one’s sins” is sufficient to “merit” eternal torment. Why isn’t using the Christian god’s name in vain or failing to observe the “Sabbath” sufficient to “invite demonic power” into one’s life? An “unsaved” person presumably does not have the protection of the “Holy Spirit” or the Christian god’s retinue of holy “angels,” so why not suppose that such a condition constitutes “open season” on behalf of the countless demons and devils seeking souls to consume and devour in their orgy of sin-making and soul-destroying? James tells us that one offence is sufficient to suffuse a soul with guilt.

Michael wrote:

You invited them, after all! (There are various embedded assumptions here that witchcraft and seances have real power on account of their using the real power which demons have)

But this line of reasoning you offer here somewhat implies that deceptive spirits need to be explicitly invited in the first place, when that’s not the understanding I get from the NT. They are not characterized as beings respecting the sovereignty of human beings who need to consent before being deceived or “possessed.” Rather, they are characterized as aggressive, opportunistic predators “seeking whom [they] may devour” (I Pet. 5:8). They’re actively on the prowl, not sitting back and waiting for invitations.

Michael wrote:

I strongly recommend warning your daughter against witchcraft and seances, Dawson!

I warn her about all forms of mysticism, Michael, including Christianity. Ultimately she will have to make her own decisions in life. But what a cache of resources she’ll have in what I have given her!

Michael wrote:

Incidentally, I also believe Christians can escape any potential demonization of themselves or their children, since if they 'resist Satan, standing firm in the faith... he will flee from them' (that's a conflation of a couple of Bible verses).

Yes, I’m familiar with those passages. But then I’m reminded of Matthew 5:39 where the following injunction is put into Jesus’ mouth: “But I say to you, do not resist an evil person.” Isn’t Satan a personal being? Aren’t devils and demons personal beings? It seems that Jesus would have believers not resisting evil persons.

Of course, one could be deceived into thinking that he’s really saved in the first place. There are, after all, hundreds if not thousands of different denominations, sects, factions and divisions within Christianity, many of them vehemently criticizing others for getting Christian doctrine wrong and essentially sending people to hell. Given the enormous variation among Christian teachings, and the exclusivity to truth that they claim to enjoy, the question as to which version is the correct one (assuming one of them is correct in the first place) seems entirely unanswerable. It’s a spiritual crap shoot. One might think he’s found the right church, the right doctrine, the right interpretation of that doctrine, only to have been deceived by some conniving spirit that he can’t see, hear, taste, touch or smell. He could be deceived and simply not realize it. A person in this situation may think he’s going through the right motions in protecting himself against supernatural spirits bent on deceiving him, but he could be playing into their hand all along, given the premise of supernaturalism to begin with. There really seems to be no “epistemology of the supernatural” to equip believers with the cognitive resources they would need to navigate the spirit world with any confidence. That’s what it all really boils down to.

Michael wrote:

One strength of my take on all of this, is the number of people who actually describe 'weird' things happening through witchdoctoring, seances and so on.

I’m guessing what you’re calling a “strength” here is the number of reports of such things, and its supposed value in confirming the truth of the beliefs you’ve developed in your Christian walk. I’m guessing there are people who are so anxious for confirmation that, even if there were only one or two such reports, they would happily point to them as vindication. But perhaps you think a higher number is required. If so, what is that number, and why? Is it 10? 20? 100? 1000? Would one less than the number you find significant impact your beliefs negatively?

Michael wrote:

Dismissing the reality of all these testimonies would be a weakness of your position, Dawson.

Why? People who put stock in such things are already predisposed to confusing what they imagine with reality, so it would not surprise me if persons who consider such expressions of mysticism to be legitimate forms of communing with the supernatural to report “strange occurrences” happening through such activities. Here in Thailand, mysticism is pretty much rampant throughout the culture. I see some pretty bizarre things here, and I hear some of the most outlandish stories. It’s not only generated by the mysticism of their worldview, it’s also interpreted as confirmation of its “truth.” Many people put faith in fortune-tellers, for instance. But it’s amazing how often they get things wrong, and yet still people return to them and pay for additional services. I don’t know how they rationalize the failures, but I have known people in the west who rationalize the failures of their palm-readings and horoscopes. Christian apologist Phil Fernandes, in his debate with J. J. Lowder, describes the attitude of the mystic very well when he says: “I just believe that we are very good about lying to ourselves, and only accepting, uh, or interpreting the evidence the way we would like to.” Of course, I take it that he’s speaking for himself here.

Michael wrote:

Have you not had any friends who've gone to seances and reported strange occurrences?

I certainly don’t recall any. But I’m not questioning that people who engage in such activities will come away with stories about what happened. But anything along the lines of what we see in movies like The Changeling and The Haunting in Connecticut? None that I’m aware of. The imagination seems to run wild once one buys into any form of supernaturalism.

Michael wrote:

Have you not met any Africans who ascribe real power to witchdoctors?

I work with a fellow from Cameroon. If I get a chance, I’ll ask him about this. But I don’t doubt the fact that people around the world put a lot of stock in mysticism. They do it today just as they did 2,000 years ago in Paul’s time.

Michael wrote:

Do you treat with sheer disbelief all the accumulated accounts all over the world of the power of witchcraft in its various forms and guises?

It’s not clear what I’m being asked to affirm or disaffirm here. My view is that mysticism (including belief in the supernatural) is irrational. Does that answer your question?

by Dawson Bethrick

Some Thoughts on the "Sensus Divinitatis"

2011-12-06T07:00:00.000-08:00

In the comments section of my blog Cognitive Reliability vs. Supernatural Deception, a Christian blogger by the name of Michael Russell (whose blog Something to say has some interesting posts) challenged my view that Christianity’s supernaturalism undercuts any assumed cognitive reliability on the part of the believer given the possibility, implied by its supernaturalism, that malevolent spirits may be deceiving them undetectably.

In his rebuttal to this point, Michael cited Romans 1, arguing (as best I can tell) that the content of this chapter essentially guarantees the reliability of man’s cognitive faculties. The ensuing discussion focused on Romans 1:20, which states:

For since the creation of the world His invisible attributes, His eternal power and divine nature, have been clearly seen, being understood through what has been made, so that they are without excuse.

Seizing particularly on the part of this verse which says that human beings are “without excuse,” Michael’s rebuttal to my point went as follows:

But given we are all without excuse, it follows that our senses and perceptions must be have a certain degree of proper function. That degree of proper function must be such that (within our epistemic environment)we are without excuse before God for ignoring him.
For this to be so, it must be the case that despite the supernatural demons and whatever else might negatively impinge on our perceptions, God has so ordered the world to ensure people have no excuse for ignoring him. God makes sure there will be no saying, "you weren't clear enough God".

Now after some going back-and-forth with Michael on the matter, I indicated that I have gotten the impression from him that he thinks that, in spite of Christianity’s affirmation of the existence of malevolent and deceptive spirits (demons and devils and the like), the human mind is immune to supernatural deception. I have since asked for explicit clarification from him as to whether or not this is his position, and am waiting for his reply.

Since Michael drew attention to Romans 1:20, I pointed out that this verse contains a self-contradictory statement. It states that something that is “invisible” has been “clearly seen.” At this point I had asked: “if something is ‘clearly seen’, what basis does one have to call it ‘invisible’?”

Michael seems to agree that a plain reading of this text seems to contain a self-contradiction, and suggested that “seen” here should be understood more broadly than “merely about optics.” In this passage, Michael suggests that ‘seeing’ may better be understood as meaning ‘perceiving’. And this would indeed alleviate the impression that the apostle was contradicting himself, for we in fact can and do perceive things which are invisible (i.e., not perceptible by means of “mere optics”), such as a piece of music: we hear (i.e., perceive) the symphony’s melodies, harmonies and musical events, but we do not see them. Of course, if something perceived by means of hearing were in mind, one would not use “see” to denote the means by which he perceived it; we have another concept for this. If man had perceptual awareness of “the invisible attributes” of the Christian god by means of hearing, for instance, one would not write that they are “clearly seen,” but rather “clearly heard.”

But since Michael suggested that ‘seen’ in Romans 1:20 really means ‘perceived’, I then pointed out that this requires us to identify the mode of perception by which all human beings everywhere and throughout all time perceive the “invisible attributes” of the Christian god. Michael satisfied this need by introducing the notion of the “sensus divinitatis,” which, he writes, is

'a kind of faculty or a cognitive mechanism, which in a wide variety of circumstances produces in us beliefs about God.' (that's how Plantinga put it).

In response to this, I pointed out that appealing to the “sensus divinitatis” (SD) “seems only to deepen the mystery,” amounting to the claim of “a sixth mode of perception which all humans presumably possess” (in addition to vision, hearing, smelling, tasting and touching). The notion of the SD raises a number of new sticky questions. Examples that I cited included:

- [C]an it be studied scientifically, as the other five modes can be?
- Is it a part of our biology, like seeing, hearing, tasting, touching and smelling?
- Is it associated with any specific sensory organs, as hearing, seeing, touching, smelling and tasting are?
- Or, is it altogether non-biological?
- If so, what is it if it’s not biological?
- How does it work?
- Is it infallible?
- How are its workings (if it has any workings) to be discovered and examined?
- How does one reliably distinguish it from human imagination?

Additionally, in one of his comments, Michael stated in passing that “the knowledge of God… is innate in us.” When I read this, I found it difficult to put together with his earlier statements which sought to avoid a contradiction in Romans 1:20 by proposing that “seeing” really meant “perceiving.” By saying that “the knowledge of God… is innate in us,” Michael gave me the impression that man’s (alleged) knowledge of the Christian god was a priori - i.e., known independent of experience. But the earlier discussion indicating that this “knowledge of God” comes to us through some means of “perception” – a la the “sensus divinitatis” – suggested that such (alleged) knowledge is a posteriori - i.e., known as a result of experience.

Michael indicated that he had not considered these questions before, and did not have ready answers to supply in response to them. Specifically he wrote:

These are high quality responses you've made and questions you've asked. There is no doubt I am being pushed to think new thoughts in these interactions, and I'm learning things in this interaction. let me acknowledge that at this point you are now asking me questions to which I have not before tried to formulate an answer.

Michael indicated that he needed some time to think about “the question whether the sensus [divinitatis] is a priori or a posteriori.”

Of course, it should be noted that the term “sensus divinitatis” is not found in the bible, nor are the concepts a priori and a posteriori. And because Romans 1 is rather vague, a variety of conflicting implications can be drawn from what can be read in that passage.

At any rate, I can certainly appreciate a thinker’s need to gather his thoughts on an issue before he commits them to writing. So in this regard, and in regard to the openness and cordial manner which Michael has displayed so far in our exchanges, I can definitely say that his conduct is very refreshing and commendable, especially in comparison to apologists who have unfortunately succumbed to the “bunker mentality” which S. Joel Garver associates with the inclination of many internet presuppositionalists to “come across as cocky know-it-alls who continually try to insult non-Christians.” Michael has exhibited none of these undesirable traits, and I wish more Christians like Michael would come and comment on my blog!

After a brief intermission, Michael posted a two-part comment (necessitated of course by Blogger’s very annoying character limit) in which he expressed willingness to focus attention on the epistemological questions raised by the notion of the “sensus divinitatis.” In the remainder of this post I will focus on Michael’s statements in this comment.

Michael wrote:

First, most importantly, I say this: 'You know deep down that God is there, you're just suppressing that truth'. I say this partly because it rings true to my experience, and partly because Romans 1 implies I should say just that.

While it’s true that I really don’t believe there are any gods (I’ll speak more directly to Romans 1 on this below), I would not say that I think Michael’s claim is “arrogant,” but rather presumptuous, since it is a claim to know what other people believe in spite of what they say, especially about things which are said to reside beyond the reach of man’s five natural senses and in a realm that is accessible (from all that I can tell) only by means of imagination, and also because it necessarily implies that those whom it references are morally opposed to truth. I don’t see how anyone could legitimately know such things about other people’s minds, especially those whom he’s not met, when in fact if he received a box in the mail from some mysterious address that had no markings other than the address label to him, he’d have no way of knowing what’s in it until he opened it and checked. How could one know what’s in the mind of a person he’s never met who resides some 10,000 miles away, when he couldn’t know what’s enclosed in a sealed box he holds in his own hands?

Needless to say, a believer in any supernatural being could make any claim about those who don’t believe, and he might very well think it “rings true” to his experience, and may even have some document which states it explicitly.

Then again, I could very well point out (as in fact I do think) that Michael knows deep down that he’s really only imagining his god, but has been suppressing this fact. I would say this because of numerous points of evidence in favor of this recognition and the fact that there’s no evidence that refutes it. (See, for instance, my blog The Imaginative Nature of Christian Theism.)

But I wonder if Michael would say that this claim he’s making would “ring… true to [his] experience” if he had never read Paul’s epistle to the Romans, or the entire NT for that matter. I know that before I ever studied the NT, I probably never would have thought this, unless I were simply imagining on my own and projecting from my imaginative experience. In fact, it seems that the contents of the bible serves as a source of suggestions from which believers draw when they interpret the world and its elements according to their worldview.

Romans 1 suggests that I, as Michael puts it, “know deep down that God [exists]” and that I’m really just “suppressing this.” If I really do know something to be the case but am “suppressing” that knowledge, I want to know this. I am aware of my desires, and I am not aware of any desire of mine to suppress something I really know to be true. But this is what I’m accused of. So, I take a look into my mind to see what I can find. When I introspect and look at the “knowledge” I have of the Christian god, I recognize that it is actually imaginary in nature. I can imagine the Christian god just as easily as anyone else who is familiar with the NT. But the problem is that what I’m imagining is still imaginary. And I’m adult enough to recognize that the imaginary is not real. To say I “believe” that the Christian god is real, would require me to suppress the fact, which I have confirmed by firsthand review, that my imagination is doing the alleged “knowing” here, and to do that I would have to be dishonest. But I refuse to be dishonest. So now what?

Not only do I find that I have to use my imagination even to think about the Christian god (drawing from the OT and NT for primary inputs to assemble an integrated image in my mind), but there’s also the unfathomable diversity of god-belief even within Christianity proper, complete with dynastic schisms, doctrinal infighting, raging debates, backbiting quarrels, party shunning, charges of heresy, break-off sects, etc., all dividing the “body of Christ” almost down to a person. There’s no end to all the –isms which Christian thinkers invent to distinguish one group of believers from another, and this has been necessary only because of the profound lack of uniformity of teachings among the plethora of Christian factions that exist today and have existed since its earliest founding (for Paul’s epistles themselves indicate that in his day, rival factions already colored the Christian landscape). Today’s seminary graduate might refer to himself as an “a-mil supralapsarian compatibilist” holding to the substitutionary theory of atonement, to which the Jesus of the gospels would, in great despair, probably say, “What!?”

When discussing possible objections to the Christian view, Michael invoked Sigmund Freud and pointed out that he “was full of 'you really think this deep down, even though you deny it', and he was taken reasonably seriously.”

Yes, Freud took a similar approach, and for a while he enjoyed wide popularity. But while his influence may still hold sway with some thinkers, his ideas have been questioned pretty much beyond repair. And Michael’s not the first, so far as I’m aware, to liken the claim we find in Romans 1 to what we find in Freud’s theories. I’m reminded of Anton Thorn’s retort to the view that “all men know” that the Christian god exists, but some “suppress it in unrighteousness” when he wrote:

This is as unfalsifiable as the Freudian claim that all women suffer from penis-envy. Any woman's denial of it can be interpreted as evidence of her guilt. (A Dialogue with Greg Bahnsen)

But yes, I will deny the claim that I actually “know” that the Christian god exists, and I deny it because I know it’s not true.

However, I don’t want to focus on me, but rather on the Christian doctrine itself, specifically with regard to the epistemological questions which Romans 1 raises (which I presented above).

The notion of the SD is apparently inspired by verses like Romans 1:20 which basically say that everyone automatically knows the Christian god. When Michael says that it “could be a priori or a posteriori or both,” he’s basically saying that to whatever extent this notion is suggested in the NT, its nature is vague, even unknown, at least to him. But he’s the one who invoked it in response to objections to Christianity in the first place.

Before one can address the question of whether the “sensus divinitatis” is a posteriori or a priori, one would need to know what specifically the word “sensus divinitatis” is supposed to denote. Does it denote some item of knowledge, a method by which knowledge is acquired and validated, or a mode of awareness? Or, does it denote something else? Once we have this part ironed out (and that would include good reasoning or solid evidence to support the claim that the “sensus divinitatis” actually exists in the first place, a task which is still outstanding so far as I can tell), then we can determine whether or not either category - a posteriori or a priori - applies, or perhaps even doesn’t apply. Typically these categories are applied to *knowledge* which one holds or claims to have. Either way, none of this rests on me. Since my worldview does not affirm something called “sensus divinitatis,” these questions are not something I need to answer.

I have to say that the whole notion of the SD seems to have been invented by believers to bolster the credibility of verses like Romans 1:20. The bible itself does not name any faculty or item of knowledge as “sensus divinitatis,” and my experience with the term as it is used in apologetics is that it is sometimes invoked, but typically not explained. It’s as though the notion were invented to fill the need to point to some “faculty” which human beings allegedly have to correspond to the claim that all men have knowledge of the Christian god. But this is precisely where the claim breaks down: since a “faculty” has been identified as presumably the means by which human beings “know” the Christian god, we can now explore the anatomy of human knowing to see if in fact such a faculty really exists. That’s why I asked the question that I did in a previous message, beginning with: if the SD is a mode of perception, is it biological (like all of man’s other modes of perception), or not? We’ve made no progress so far in answering this question.

Michael wrote:

If 'what has been made' is 'that which we experience of the world around us', the SD is a posteriori, since in that case, we know God on the basis of our experience of the external world.

If the “sensus divinitatis” is a mode of perception, then presumably any knowledge one acquires by use of it would be a posteriori,since personal experience is involved in the knowing process (as is the case with any knowledge acquired through the use of any of the five known modes of perception). But again, I would point out that if the “sensus divinitatis” is a mode of perception, then we’re again back to the point which I have already raised, namely that perception gives us awareness of objects, not knowledge Perception by itself is not sufficient to give us knowledge. We perceive objects but merely perceiving them does not give us knowledge of what they are.

I can drive down a street here in Bangkok and perceive building after building, with signs written in a different language, but that’s not enough to give me knowledge of what those signs say or what kind of buildings they are (whether residential, governmental, commercial, etc.). And it’s not because I just haven’t perceived one more object that I am still lacking knowledge here, but because I need to perform a series of mental processes – namely abstraction and integration – in order to identify what I have seen and thus have knowledge of the objects of my perception.

In fact, just this afternoon as I was preparing to pick up my daughter from school, I was getting ready to leave my condo; I grabbed my wallet, my cell phone, my keys, and headed out the door. Once I got out the door and had already locked it, I suddenly realized that I had locked my keys in my condo! I had grabbed the wrong set of keys. What had happened was that I did in fact perceive the keys, but I didn’t take the time to identify them properly. Luckily a friend of mine has a full set of my condo’s keys, so I was able to get back in without much trouble.

But since identifying what we perceive is a process subsequent to perceiving itself, merely perceiving is not sufficient to give us knowledge. Indeed, dogs perceiving things everywhere they go, but they lack the conceptual ability to identify and integrate what they perceive, and thus have nothing that compares to what we understand by knowing something.

Really, if we want to exonerate Romans 1:20 from containing an internal contradiction (“clearly seeing” something that is “invisible”), it seems to be saying we are unavoidably aware of something and this something is unmistakable evidence of the Christian god. So we have to ask, regarding the “sensus divinitatis” and the claim made in Romans 1:

a) What is it that we are aware of which supposedly gives us knowledge of or serves as unmistakable evidence of the Christian god?
b) By what means do we have awareness of a)?
c) If in answer to b) the Christian points to the “sensus divinitatis,” what sense organ(s) (if any) does this (alleged) faculty of awareness require and use?
d) Since the objects of our awareness are finite, material, natural, and corruptible, what justifies the supposition that they are evidence of something that is said to be infinite, immaterial, supernatural and incorruptible?

Also, since all human beings are said to be “without excuse,” not only would we have to suppose that the knowledge process contained in this mysterious epistemological chain which produces knowledge of the Christian god is infallible (there can’t be any possibility of making mistakes, since we’re all said to be “without excuse”), but also that any sensory organ or cognitive faculty involved in this knowing process must be incorruptible. For instance, a person can be born blind or lose his vision during the course of his life. Thus, he cannot reasonably be expected to have visual awareness of something when he can’t see. Similarly with hearing, smelling, and tasting. Some people even lose tactile sensation in parts of their body, such as if they become paralyzed. But in the case of the “sensus divinitatis,” given the claim that all human beings are “without excuse,” every element involved in the process by which one is said to have knowledge of the Christian god must be immune to impairment of any kind. But our bodies are fragile and subject to deterioration, and many are born lacking certain faculties. What faculties do we have that are impervious to impairment, corruption, deterioration, disfigurement, or damage?

Again, we have a very tall claim, but upon investigation, it appears that there’s no objective evidence whatsoever to back it up.

Michael wrote:

If on the other hand 'what has been made' is 'ourselves', then the SD may be a priori. In this case, we can say that we know God because we sense within ourselves that we are made by God. In this case, our knowledge of God may simply be in us, in an a priori fashion.

But if the “knowledge that God exists” (or something akin to this) is something comes by “sensing” something (cf. “we know God because we sense within ourselves that we are made by God”), then we’re talking knowledge that is a posteriori, and this will necessarily involve a volitional operation of identification, and it seems wildly unrealistic to expect all individuals regardless of when and where they live, or even perhaps how much they may have matured cognitively, to perform precisely the same cognitive operation, and wind up with the same results to boot.

At any rate, if one holds that all human beings who have lived, are living, and will live, do this, then I’d say the onus is on him to produce some very powerful evidence indeed. And involved in this would be the need to identify the mode by which the “sensing” in question happens, and an analysis of the identificatory operation which everyone supposedly has, does and will choose to perform. If the volitional aspect of identification is denied, then we are essentially robots, and just doing what we are programmed to do, in which case there’s no justice in saying everyone’s without excuse. ‘Excuse’ in such a context would be a stolen concept, since one of its key genetic roots – namely volition – is being denied.

Needless to say, there are some problems here. And they aren’t for me to resolve.

by Dawson Bethrick

Christianity's Psychological Price Tag

2011-12-04T06:00:00.000-08:00

Alex Botten recently commented on my blog. He wrote:

I find it slightly disturbing that the Christians are complaining that they can't deal with anything other than bite sized points.
At a guess, their religion's absolute failure to account for knowledge causes them to run from any situation where they might learn something.

No doubt Alex is reacting here to statements by Christian apologists - individuals who style themselves as “ordained” by the Christian god to go out into the world to defend the Christian faith and preach their god’s “word” to everyone – wherein they complain about the length (of all things!) of writings critical of Christianity, such as those which can be found on my blog.

Such complaints may indeed seem puzzling given the vast amounts of writing found in, say, Bahnsen’s Van Til’s Apologetic: Readings & Analysis (at over 700 pages), N.T. Wright’s The Resurrection of the Son of God (also over 700 pages), Craig Keener’s Miracles: The Credibility of the New Testament Accounts (at over 1200 pages!), or the bible itself (my copy is well over 1000 pages). Such writings would take an individual weeks to read, supposing he has the time available to devote to them. In the case of the bible, a man is essentially expected to accept all of its contents as “knowledge,” even though statistically few individuals set down to digest it cover to cover, and the human mind does not have the ability to integrate all its contents into a cohesive whole, even if one accepts all the conflicts and contradictions one would have to navigate through in trying to understand it.

In the blog in which Alex posted his comment, a Christian apologist who has essentially set up camp in my blogspot’s comments files and posts under the moniker “Hezekiah Ahaz,” made the following statement:

I don't have my snow gear with me right now so I'm afraid I won't survive the avalanche of words(your writings).

Hezekiah Ahaz had challenged me to a debate and asked me to provide an “opening statement,” to which I directed him to several blog entries which I have already written and would be happy for him to consider as my opening statement. The above statement was his reaction to this proposal in response to his invitation. He’s clearly not up to a debate if he cannot read more than two sentences. But if he reads Christian writings, his inability to read more than a few sentences seems to be rather selective.

Perhaps Alex is write: folks like “Hezekiah” really don’t want to learn. In fact, I wish I knew of any evidence which suggests otherwise, but sadly I must confess: I don’t.

Elsewhere, and similarly, Christian apologist Sye Ten Bruggencate has proudly denounced my writings as “verbal diarrhea” and “argumentum ad verbosium,” without of course actually interacting with my arguments. Apparently he thinks a “debate” can be won by issuing epithets and aspersions. No counter-argument or thoughtful interaction need be presented in dealing with criticisms of Christianity.

If a non-Christian used this “method” of “rebuttal,” apologists would no doubt have a field day in pointing out the myriad fallacies it commits.

But Alex’s comment provides even broader insight here. Consider:

While some Christian apologists – primarily the “theorists” who travel in packs and limit their direct interaction with outsiders to cordial one-on-ones which remain ever-detached from the kind of heat that is often generated by newbies valiantly trying to defend the faith – emphasize the importance of at least maintaining an appearance of scholarship, those who are out trying to make a name for themselves in internet skirmishes with vocal critics of Christianity, seem to have little grasp of the concept of scholarship to begin with.

At least in the case of the drive-by apologists who like to post their tried-but-bogus charge of “begging the question,” and those who continually seek to redirect the focus of conversation on the personalities of their opponents, it's as though they resented persons who really do understand things, as though understanding itself constituted some kind of threat.

For instance, Hezekiah Ahaz’s running commentary continues to remind me of Proverbs 3:7, which states:

"Trust in the LORD with all thine heart; and lean not unto thine own understanding."

Driven by faith in the imaginary, the believer seeks to embody this teaching in himself throughout his life, and in so doing he must pay a hefty price tag. And what he gets out of it is surely not worth what he’s invested in it. This is, ironically, why he continues to invest more of himself in it: he’s hoping for a big pay-off that will never come.

The result is a psychologically painful emotional investment which leaves a man in spiritual ruin.

When the gung-ho apologist encounters other individuals who are not making the same sacrifice as he is, he naturally wants to validate his choice to make such an investment himself. Since he’s caught in a rotten deal to begin with, he cannot validate his choice by pointing to results that those who haven’t made the same investment would find positive or attractive. Instead, he finds that, in order to validate his gamble on the imaginary, he needs somehow to denigrate those who have not made the same sacrifices as he has. They need to be cut down, overcome, vanquished, by any means necessary.

This is why it's so imperative in the believer's mind to make encounters with non-believers a personal matter, for intellectually he has no ammunition whatsoever. He's been suckered, and this is what he's trying to hide himself. So he does what he can to put the spotlight on his adversaries personally, and his goal is to discredit them as individuals rather than interacting with their position in a mature and intellectual manner.

The apologist thus fulfills the teaching which the New Testament puts into Jesus’ mouth, namely:

Verily I say unto you, Except ye be converted, and become as little children, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven. (Mt. 18:3; emphasis added)

Observe how often internet apologists for Christianity display a most childish attitude, asking the question “How do you know?” in response to everything one says on behalf of his own position, if not simply making the empty charge of “you’re begging the question.” These apologists would have us all believe we’re simply too stupid to be Christian in the first place.

Are they really doing their interest in defending their faith any good?

by Dawson Bethrick

Christianity's Sanction of Evil

2011-12-01T06:00:00.000-08:00

Prologue

Over the past two weeks or so, while I’ve been living temporarily in the seaside resort town of Cha’am, Thailand (since the part of Bangkok where I live has been flooded and unreachable), I’ve been party to several discussions with presuppositional apologist Sye Ten Bruggencate. Readers of my blog will remember my critique of Sye’s website where he’s published his version of a presuppositional argument for the existence of his version of the Christian god.

Well, we’ve butted heads again, and the results have been, shall I say, historic.

My conversations with Sye can be found in the comments sections of these blog entries on Alex Botten’s blog An Atheist Viewpoint:

Why I’ll Not Be Bothering With Bahnsen
I’ve Heard Some Bullshit…
We’re Still Waiting for Sye to Answer

Some heated controversy erupted throughout my conversation with Sye as I presented a number of questions for Sye to answer on behalf of his worldview. (My questions are quoted in the main body of the last of the three blog enties listed above). I think my questions are entirely appropriate given what is claimed about Christianity by its defenders. After all, Sye runs around the internet doing podcasts and YouTube videos telling the world that Christianity is true, that Christianity alone accounts for knowledge, logic, reason, science, morality and all the rest, and that people are fools for not swallowing this nonsense hook, line and sinker, just as he’s done. So if the Christian worldview really is so pregnant with unmatched philosophical authority in all these areas of consideration, questions from a puny little mortal like me should be a cinch to answer persuasively.

Unfortunately, however, instead of answering my questions when I posed them, Sye sought tirelessly to redirect the conversation to the topic of whether or not I would engage him live on some recorded Skype broadcast, where he promised he would answer my questions. It was clear to the rest of those who were participating in these conversations that Sye was simply trying to distract attention away from my questions and any way he might be able answer them from the perspective of the Christian worldview which he defends so vociferously in other venues. If he were really willing to address my questions, why not address them where the conversation was currently taking place, where the questions were posed to him in the first place? Certainly Sye’s continued participation in the discussion on a blog (in writing even!) demonstrated that he could present answers to my questions right there where the conversation was taking place if he had answers he could put forward with any confidence.

Eventually, after much pressing by not only myself, but by others who also participated in the conversation, Sye Ten Bruggencate finally solicited some brief answers to my questions. His answers can be found in the initial comment of this blog which Alex Botten had posted in order to document the outstanding status of Sye’s reluctance to address my questions. Since the issue I raise in my question is so important to the investigation of comparative worldviews, I decided to devote a separate blog entry to considering the implications of Sye’s response to it.

STB on the Justifiability of Evil

Among the several questions that I posed to presuppositional apologist Sye Ten Bruggencate, I asked:

According to your worldview, is evil ever morally justifiable?

Sye’s eventual answer to this question was conspicuously terse. He wrote:

“Commission of it, no, ordination of it by God, yes.”

In other words, committing evil is not morally justifiable, but “ordaining” evil is morally justifiable, so long as the one doing the “ordaining” here is “God.” So we have a yes and no answer to a yes or no question. But given the wording of my question – is evil ever morally justifiable? – Sye’s answer can only be understood to come out as a yes. So just to be clear, Sye gives us a yes in response to my question as it is stated, so as to say: “Yes, evil is morally justifiable.”

Answering yes to my question is perfectly compatible with the “solution” which Greg Bahnsen offers to settle the problem of evil in his book Always Ready. In his “solution” to the problem of evil, Bahnsen holds that the Christian god is “all-good” and “all-powerful,” but also acknowledges the existence of evil in the world. How can this be when the world is said to be sourced in an all-good, all-power, indeed perfect creator? How does Bahnsen get out of this jam? Simple. He writes:

God has a morally sufficient reason for the evil which exists. (p. 172)

Clearly one would have to suppose that evil is in essence morally justifiable in order to propose the idea that a person “has a morally sufficient reason” for evil in the first place. And here we have presuppositional apologist Sye Ten Bruggencate explicitly affirming as much.

Of course, Sye hopes to camouflage an affirmative response to my question by introducing a distinction within the rubric of evil: on the one hand, there’s the “commission” of evil; on the other, there’s the “ordination” of it “by God” (as though Christians supposed anyone else could “ordain” evil). By including the qualifier “by God,” Sye implies that it would not be morally justifiable for anyone other than the Christian god to “ordain” evil, supposing such action were possible. But this makes the apologist appear to be special pleading the case. If it’s morally justifiable for one person to “ordain” evil, why wouldn’t it be morally justifiable for another person to do the same? Apparently for the Christian it depends on who is doing the “ordaining” here. This strikes me as similar to saying it’s morally justifiable for one person to lie, cheat and steal, but not for anyone else. What justifies such exceptions, especially if morality is supposed to be objective and absolute? Of course, Sye’s answer nowhere indicates that he has ready answers to such problems. And if standard presuppositional procedure can serve as an indication of the quality of any would-be answer to such objections, we might expect similarly terse and uninformative clichés which are intended to stop further questioning rather than provide legitimate solutions to such conundrums.

What’s noteworthy about Sye’s response to my question is that, on the Calvinist interpretation of Christianity (which is typically associated with presuppositionalism from a theological standpoint), a human being could not “commit” evil unless “God” ordained that he commit it in the first place. In other words, the “ordaining” of evil would have to come before any “commission” of evil could take place. Nothing in the “created realm” takes place without the sanctioning incorporation of it within the scheme of “God’s plan.” And because no one does anything outside of “God’s plan,” any action one performs must conform entirely to that “plan.” The “plan” is the preconditional template for any event actually taking place in the “created realm” according to deterministic Christianity (which presuppositionalism positively affirms). This would include any action which is evil in nature, whether it’s a child telling a lie to his mother (e.g., “No, I didn’t chop down the cherry tree! Honest, Mom!”) to the mass slaughter of millions of Jews (cf. “I vaz only folloving orders!”) to the destruction of the Twin Towers (i.e., “Glory to God!”).

Indeed, if the Christian god “ordains” evil to take place in the “created realm,” what could stop that evil from taking place? What can stand against the omnipotent will of the Christian god? In a contest of wills between the god of Christianity and puny mortals like myself, the Christian god’s will is always going to prevail over mine. So on the Christian view of the world, even if I would wish Hurricane Katrina to fizzle out before hitting New Orleans, if the Christian god wills that it destroy the city, it will. The destructive force (in this case a natural evil) has been “ordained” by the Christian god to deliver is decimating blow to human civilization, and nothing in “creation” can stop it. The “ordaining” of evil cannot be successfully opposed by anything in the Christian god’s “created realm,” and no evil could occur without first being “ordained” by the Christian god. So the “commission” of evil is always an effect that follows the “ordaining” of evil “by God.” The Christian god, then, by choosing to “ordain” evil (it could have chosen not to “ordain” evil) is the cause of evil, for in Christianity, there is no resisting of the Christian god’s will. Evil therefore finds its source in the Christian god. Given the view that evil is morally justifiable on Christianity’s premises, this conclusion is unavoidable. Perhaps this is why Sye was reluctant to face my questions for over a week.

So why would an all-good, all-holy, all-perfect and all-loving deity choose to “ordain” evil in the first place? What would motivate such a being to “ordain” evil? Evil results in the destruction of values. Why would an all-good, all-holy, all-perfect and all-loving deity choose to have values destroyed? What value is gained by destroying values? And if it’s “morally justifiable” to destroy values, isn’t any supposed “value” that is said to be gained by destroying values also justifiably subject to destruction as well?

The upshot is that Sye cannot give an unqualified “no” in response to this question. According to his worldview, there is a sense in which evil is morally justifiable. This is the Christian worldview we’re talking about. According to one of its spokesmen, the Christian worldview allows for cases in which evil is morally justifiable. In other words, as a worldview, it does not take a firm, absolute and uncompromising stand against evil, but in fact allows it under certain circumstances. In fact, the Christian worldview allows for evil in achieving some “holy purpose.” According to Christianity, then, evil is ultimately moral!

Sye does not explain how the “ordination” of evil “by God” can be morally justifiable, even though it is preconditional to any commission of evil as we have seen. It strains credibility to suppose that committing evil is not morally justifiable while the ordination of evil, which is the precondition to any commission of evil, is morally justifiable. Sye leaves these matters completely untouched, as though they couldn’t possibly be an issue to be concerned about, or as though he preferred to keep them undisclosed.

In his brief answer to my question, Sye leaves all these issues completely untouched. But it’s clear that if the Christian god “ordains” evil – which is really just another way of saying it compels lesser beings which cannot resist its will to perform evil actions by some divine injunction – then clearly it is essentially forcing other beings to do what Sye says is not morally justifiable. Thus on the Christian worldview, doing something that one cannot resist doing is not morally justifiable, while

choosing to compel lesser beings to do something that is not morally justifiable, is morally justifiable. Go figure.

But these objections are indeed perfectly valid considering what Christianity teaches. The Christian worldview teaches that its god is in control of everything that happens within the “created realm,” which of course includes human activity. This view is affirmed repeatedly in the presuppositionalist literature. For example:

God controls whatsoever comes to pass. (Cornelius Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, p. 160)
God’s thoughts make the world what it is and determine what happens – which is why all facts are revelatory of God… (Greg Bahnsen, Van Til’s Apologetic: Readings & Analysis, p. 243)
God controls all events and outcomes (even those that come about by human choice and activity) and is far more capable and powerful than modern machines. (Greg Bahnsen, Van Til's Apologetic, p. 489n.43)

Also, the Christian god is said to have a will: it does what it chooses to do. It is not restricted by something outside its control, since there is nothing outside its control. There is nothing metaphysical which constrains the Christian god’s choices or limits the range of its will. And nothing external to the Christian god compels it to make one set of choices as opposed to another. It sets the rules everywhere and always. It is “free” to do what it chooses, and has the power to do whatever it wants to do. If it wants X done, nothing can stand in its way of making X happen.

So any lesser being which is “ordained” by the Christian god to “commit” evil, will “commit” evil by virtue of divine ordination.

So this raises a number of questions, such as:

Why isn’t “ordaining” evil, itself evil?

Or:
How could “ordaining” evil be legitimately construed as a good?

Or:

How could “ordaining” evil be morally justifiable?

Or:

How is being the ordainer of evil not also being the author of evil?

Or:
How is being the one who “ordains” evil not also the one who authors evil?

Or:
By saying that “God ordains evil,” how is this not ultimately saying that evil originates with said god?

Or:

How is ordaining evil not a species of committing evil?

There seems to be no answer to any of these questions which would positively recommend Christianity as a moral worldview, let alone preserve its self-bestowed title as the only worldview which can offer an objective standard for morality.

It seems that if a truly good person has a choice between “ordaining” evil and not “ordaining” evil, he would – being a truly good person – choose not to “ordain” evil by virtue of his goodness. A truly good person would not choose to “ordain” evil, since a truly good person will stand against evil every opportunity he has. Which means: to any extent he has any influence over a situation, he will not allow evil to happen.

But according to Christian mythology, the Christian god has a long and detailed history of allowing evil to happen. From allowing Adam and Eve to fall to allowing vicious persons torture and execute its own son, the Christian god is characterized throughout the bible as having the power to stop evil in its tracks – even before it has a chance to get rolling – but standing idly by in spite of its alleged goodness and allowing evil to take its course on human values. According to Christianity’s own narratives, evil could find no better friend than the Christian god.

Something else that’s curious is the fact that thesaurus.com suggests “commission” as a synonym for “ordain.” But clearly Sye’s answer assumes a significant difference between these two concepts. Unfortunately he does not explain what that assumed difference may be and how it is relevant to his duplicitous answer. At any rate, it would be interesting to examine the apologists’ explanations for how the “ordination” of evil is not itself an act of evil. Don’t be surprised to find different explanations in conflict with one another, even though Christians are all supposed to be “of one accord.”

In Conclusion…

The foregoing is not some petty gripe against the Christian god (for it is merely imaginary in the first place), but a powerful and damning indictment against the Christianity as a viable worldview and the claim that it provides the necessary foundations for morality. Flat and simple, Christianity holds that evil is morally justifiable. Without this underlying premise, Christianity has no “solution” to the problem of evil; and by incorporating claims which assume this premise, apologists give away the fact that it really has no solution to the problem of evil to begin with. For by offering the view that “God has a morally sufficient reason for the evil that exists” (Bahnsen), or the view that the “ordination” of evil by the Christian god is morally justifiable (Sye Ten Bruggencate), presuppositionalists inadvertently acknowledge that evil is sourced in their god and that without the choices and actions their god has, according to Christian narratives, made, evil would never have existed in the first place. The logic is impeccable: given the premises of presuppositionalism, any act of evil can ultimately be "justified."

Like Bahnsen’s treatment of the problem of evil in his book Always Ready, Sye’s efforts to defend his belief in an all-good god amount to nothing more than a clumsy attempt to disguise the contradictions lurking in his position with mere word play. Not only because of the nature which Christians attribute to their god and the cozy relationship their response to the problem evil necessitates, but also because of the cognitive dissonance, compartmentalization and downright dishonesty that belief in such a fantasy requires of Christian beliefs, the conclusion is inescapable: Christians worship a god that would be evil if it truly existed.

Of course, we will see the presuppositionalist respond to this conclusion by declaring that we have no ultimate objective standard to “ground” our moral judgments in the first place. This ignores several facts, including:

a) the objections raised herein afford an internal critique which uncovers problems that lurk within Christianity regardless of what other individuals may belief;
b) the declaration that those pointing out these objections have no objective standard to “ground” their moral judgments in fact accurately characterizes the Christian’s predicament (for by granting metaphysical primacy to a form of consciousness, Christianity has only a subjective basis for anything it affirms, and look what it affirms!); and
c) in Objectivism we in fact do have an ultimate objective standard which “grounds” our moral judgments, namely the primacy of existence.

But even if it were the case that we had no ultimate objective standard to “ground” our moral judgments, it would not follow from this that the Christian view is therefore logically consistent, for the problem still remains: Christianity affirms that an all-good and all-powerful consciousness chooses to “ordain” evil, and cannot erase the contradictions contained within this affirmation.

So the next time you encounter a Christian apologist claiming that the Christian worldview is the only worldview which can “account for” objective moral absolutes, be sure to direct them to this blog entry: he has a huge mess on his hands, and I don’t think he’ll be able to untangle it if he holds, along with Sye Ten Bruggencate, Greg Bahnsen, and other presuppositionalists, that evil can be morally justifiable.

I’m sure glad these aren’t my problems.

by Dawson Bethrick

Cognitive Reliability vs. Supernatural Deception

2011-11-21T03:00:00.000-08:00

Today we join presuppositional apologist Sye Ten Bruggencate in mid-session with the Goodness Over God crew, Ben Wallis and Michael, Long, on their recent podcast featuring both Sye and Dustin Segers, who also practices presuppositional apologetics (and has his own blog). The TAG team are at it again, battling non-believers and doing what they can to shut the mouths of atheist spoilsports.

Make no mistake about it: Christians are eager to increase their numbers. They desire to “plant” more churches and lure more gullible fish into their nets. And given some statistical reporting, the pews in many American churches are growing cold, so to speak. So heat is on apologists to turn things around, to “vindicate” the Christian worldview in the public light. What better way to do this than to make critics of their worldview look like dimwits in front of audiences composed of their peers as well as other Christians? Presuppositionalists are predatory by nature, continually seeking out new object lessons in humiliation to hold up as trophies before throngs of admiring comrades.

In the discussion with the folks at Goodness Over God, the presuppositionalists can be found pushing the same old chicanery, with no positive information whatsoever to offer on behalf of their own worldview. The impression I often get while listening to presuppositionalists dialogue with non-believers on the notion that there is a god, is that they’re continually trying to find ways to get into someone’s mind in order to locate some vulnerability that can be exploited for the sake of taking control of it. This disintegrate-and-conquer motif is ever-present throughout presuppositionalism. Its “vigor” is thought by its enthusiasts to be found in the skill with which apologetic “debaters” seek basically to demolish other minds, reducing them if at all possible to mere rubble, and hoping to re-image them according to the template of their religious program if their apologetic efforts ever make it this far.

Much of their apologetic methodology almost seems to regard any instance of ignorance in the human mind as evidence for the existence of their god. One element which virtually all deployments of the presuppositional apologetic that I have observed have in common is the asking of a series of “How do you know…?” questions, often asked in unending succession in order to keep the critic continually on the defensive. It appears that presuppositional apologists are after any instance of “I donno” in order to fill it in with “God did it.” To the extent that this accurately characterizes their apologetic methodology (and after examining literally hundreds of examples of presuppositional methodology in action, I think it does), presuppositionalists genuinely seem to think this is a legitimate means of vindicating their worldview.

Among their ranks, some apologist apparently believe that they have been “called” by their god to drop their fishing nets as it were, and take up absurd arguments intended just for this purpose. It may seem most ironic to hear Christians preaching how their worldview “accounts for” human dignity, when their worldview in fact regards human beings as an inherently depraved blemish worthy of the eternal trash bin that needs to be bathed in someone’s blood.

Both the view that human beings are inherently depraved and the view that human beings were created in their god’s image, allow apologists to presume that they have some special right to other individuals’ minds. They are in essence would-be body-snatchers who seek to score their successes by invading individuals’ minds and destroying all confidence in their ability to think for themselves. A broken spirit is a mind that more easily releases itself to the control of others and offers no prevailing resistance to subjugating suggestion. They belch forth a load of pretentious filibuster in the hopes of absorbing new victims into the Christian matrix and setting them back out into the field to belch forth the same load of pretentious filibuster.

With these observations about the general character of the presuppositional method in mind, let’s take a look at a brief snippet from Sye Ten Bruggencate’s latest verbal spew. We start at the minute marker 30:59 where our swashbuckling hero STB launches into yet another interrogation of the presumably defenseless Michael Long:

[Start: 30:59]
Sye: "So you’re saying that there are some things you cannot be wrong about."
Michael: "Yeah, there are some things where it’s meaningless to suggest that I could be wrong about it."
Sye: "Okay, so that follows then, I’d like to ask the question: What do you know for certain and how are you able to know it? And if you appeal to your senses, memory and reasoning, I’d like to know how you know they are valid."

Presuppositionalists are conspicuously concerned about any expression of certainty on the part of a non-Christian. If a non-Christian claims to be certain about something, the presuppositionalist acts as though there were a fire that needs to be put out, and that he’s the only one able to extinguish it. So off he goes in his little red fire truck, sirens a-whirrin’. When he shows up to the conflagration, he whips out his hose and starts spraying the entire scene with a barrage of “How do you know?” questions that are intended to keep the fire from spreading.

But if we step back and observe the apologist’s own behavior, we just might find that it is he who is reluctant to address on behalf of his own worldview the very questions he so casually fires off in rapid succession to representatives of other worldviews. He enjoys posing questions which ask, “How do you know?” but tends to resist answering those very questions with respect to the knowledge claims he makes.

Now there is no tu quoque fallacy in pointing this out. For one thing, I am happy to address such questions. (And I would if I thought Mr. Bruggencate were sincere in his inquiries.) But second, I am not affirming my worldview on the claim that it is sourced in divine revelation, that its originator is both omniscient and infallible, that the collective truth of all its claims is itself the necessary precondition to sense-making, or that failure to subscribe to my worldview will result in eternal torment. Christians make very tall claims on behalf of the importance of believing their worldview, so they should be more than prepared to address questions about its epistemology. Unfortunately, it is precisely here where presuppositionalists hold things closest to their chest, as though they were afraid to have their cards seen while placing their bets. Such behavior is not indicative of someone in possession of unchallengeable truths.

Now in response to Sye’s questions to Michael here, I could go on and point to certain facts that are themselves preconditions to the points he lists as objects to which one might appeal in answering his questions (such as the fact that there is a reality, the primacy of existence, that man is biological in nature, and so is his consciousness, etc.), thus heading off his quiver of objections at the pass. Sye’s own line of questioning itself presumes that both he and his interlocutors are conscious, and thus he assumes the validity of his own consciousness. But how does he validate it without begging the question? If he says his god validates it somehow (which he can be predicted to say), he would be begging the question, for he would be using his consciousness – and thus assuming its validity – in the answer he gives. But since he’s apparently willing to grant validity to consciousness as such in his line of interrogation, then we must ask: What’ the problem?

But here’s the rub: If I believed that there are invisible magic beings running around the universe “back of” everything I see, touch, smell, etc., beings which I believed to be in possession of the ability to manipulate anything that exists, including the things that I perceive, then clearly I couldn’t reliably appeal to my senses, memory and reasoning to establish anything resembling what we know as ‘knowledge’, for they could, for all I know, be subject to such manipulation.

The Christian at this point will probably say that his god does not lie and therefore would not deceive, and therefore this is not a worry. But even if one accepts the premise that the Christian god itself does not lie and therefore would not deceive, it would not follow from this that this worry is thereby dissolved. For Christianity teaches that there are other invisible magic beings which possess supernatural powers as well, such as Satan, devils, demons, fallen angels, and perhaps other nefarious beings whose existence has not been revealed by the Christian god. And these beings are explicitly characterized by the Christian bible as deceitful beings which do have powers beyond human understanding and, importantly, detection.

This bears emphasizing. Christianity affirms the reality of “the supernatural.” We have to keep in mind the fact that, for the Christian, the category ‘supernatural’ is broader than just his god. It includes a whole pantheon of other beings, all or many of which are imagined to have powers beyond human estimation, control, and awareness as such. And since the Christian worldview affirms the existence of such beings, its epistemology must take their supposed existence into consideration, and from the looks of things, it doesn’t.

So while the Christian might maintain that his god does not lie and therefore would not deceive man, his worldview does in fact teach that there are other beings which can and do deceive man. So on Christianity’s own premises, man’s senses, memory and reasoning are hopelessly vulnerable to supernatural manipulation, including deception. This can only mean that one who accepts all of Christianity’s teachings and takes those teachings seriously, would have to concede precisely what the presuppositionalist playbook seeks to compel non-believers to admit: that man’s senses, memory and reasoning cannot, on Christianity’s premises, be presumed to be either valid or reliable, regardless of how certain they want to think they are in their belief that their god guarantees them, since they are subject to manipulation which lies beyond one’s ability to detect, which means: they are open to deception.

The apologist might respond to this by claiming that his god would not allow lesser supernatural beings to fiddle with reality or cause mischief in man’s mind which results in deception, misunderstanding or misinformation about the world or his own spiritual plight. But how would he know this with certainty? Claiming that his god has the ability to reveal things “such that” one can be certain of them, does not overcome this problem. Indeed, it seems to be a manifest attempt to simply wish it away by positing hypothetical possibilities. Indeed, appealing to supernatural revelation is really nothing more than an admission that one does not know, and in fact begs the question by assuming precisely what’s being challenged, namely the reliability of his own cognitive faculties and the assumption that some supernatural being whose existence Christianity affirms or at least allows (e.g., devils, demons, and the like) has not already deceived him.

Once supernaturalism is granted validity in the mechanics of one’s worldview, all bets are off on the reliability of human cognition. The unknown and the unknowable will always hold epistemological primacy in the worldview of the true believer.

So the problem which the presuppositionalist is trying to raise against the non-believer, is actually an inescapable problem for the believer himself.

By contrast, the non-believer can simply say that his senses, memory and reasoning are valid because there’s no supernatural being that can mess with it. And that’s all one needs to say to the presuppositionalist. Any attempt on the presuppositionalist to inquire, rebut or challenge this response, would require the presuppositionalist to make use of his senses, memory and reasoning, and as we’ve already seen, on his worldview’s premises, they are unreliable.

So the presuppositionalist is beaten at his own game, and without recourse. It is in such a manner that we see the presuppositionalist’s own gimmicks get the best of him, and choke him where he stands.

by Dawson Bethrick

A Reply to Dustin Segers’ Dismantled Blog Entry on Objectivism

2011-11-01T17:00:00.000-07:00

Dustin Segers, who attempted to refute the primacy of existence in a podcast with Sye Ten Bruggencate and the folks at Fundamentally Flawed, also posted an entry on his blog restating and to some extent elaborating on the refutations he gave in that podcast. Unfortunately Segers has subsequently decided to remove his blog entry after I brought to his attention that he had made a fundamental error (namely confusing the principle of the secondary objectivity of consciousness with the primacy of existence). This was not what I had expected or even desired, for it is always good to have examples of failed critiques of Objectivism on the web to learn from.

Luckily I was able to save a copy of Segers’ post before he removed it from his blog. I have reposted it on my personal website here: Dustin Segers’ Failed Attempt to Refute the Primacy of Existence. My repost of Segers’ blog entry includes all the comments which I know were submitted to his blog, including his own final comment announcing his decision to take it down.

I have already interacted with Segers’ objections to the principle of the secondary objectivity of consciousness (i.e., the position that consciousness can in fact have itself as an object, but only after it has acquired awareness of objects other than itself) in a previous blog which can be accessed here: Has the Primacy of Existence Been Refuted?

In the present entry I will explore some of the issues which he brought out in his blog entry on the topic that were not covered in his initial statement of his refutation on the Fundamentally Flawed podcast.

In his podcast, Segers quotes Ayn Rand, the discoverer of the secondary objectivity of consciousness principle, as follows:

A consciousness conscious of nothing but itself is a contradiction in terms: before it (the “I”) could identify itself as a consciousness, it (the “I”) had to be conscious of something.

In his blog posting, Segers responded to the Rand quote with the following points:

* False, one of the first things a conscious mind is conscious of is itself. Thus, this argument fails to show a contradiction.
* Self-Refuting: Rand refutes her own “primacy of existence” argument by presupposing the primacy of her own consciousness in order to argue against the primacy of consciousness! In other words, if you claim you need something to be conscious of to be conscious, then you have to first presuppose that the conscious “I” or “self” is the one doing the conscious observing in order to claim that existence is primary over consciousness.
* Begging the Question: (1) She assumes her own conclusion implicitly as her own premise. It would be akin to saying “A consciousness that isn’t conscious of anything but itself is a contradiction in terms because it isn’t conscious of anything.”
* A posteriori epistemology: I.e., they believe only those things that are empirically verifiable exist and this is the fundamental assumption behind their definition of “existence”. They are defining all that exists as all space, time, energy, and matter that we can observe. God isn’t made of space, time, energy, and matter that we can observe. Therefore God doesn’t exist (John 4:24; 1 Tim. 1:17; 6:16). However, like logical positivism, this is self-refuting since it claims a priori that the only way we can know things are through the five senses when that proposition itself isn’t known through the five senses.
* For Rand, the primacy of existence equals the material world and not consciousness. But why must the only the material world count as what actually exists instead of a non-material entity like an all-knowing, personal, and self-sufficient conscious Mind?

Segers offers nothing new in his first and third points, so I’m content to rest on my response to both in my previous blog entry. I will instead focus on his second and fourth points, as well as his last paragraph and concluding remarks, which contain new claims in need of correction.

In the case of his second point, Segers adds something new to what he originally stated in his presentation on the Fundamentally Flawed podcast. In the restatement of Segers’ second point below, I have underlined the portion which was not present in the podcast:

Self-Refuting: Rand refutes her own “primacy of existence” argument by presupposing the primacy of her own consciousness in order to argue against the primacy of consciousness! In other words, if you claim you need something to be conscious of to be conscious, then you have to first presuppose that the conscious “I” or “self” is the one doing the conscious observing in order to claim that existence is primary over consciousness.

Numerous points can be made against this.

First, notice that Segers offers no reason for supposing that one needs “to first presuppose that the conscious ‘I’ or ‘self’ is the one doing the conscious observing in order to claim that existence is the primary over consciousness.” Even more importantly, Segers gives no reason why one’s identification of himself as a conscious subject (as the “I” or “self” performing the conscious activity) cannot be a later discovery, a discovery made after the subject has experienced awareness of objects distinct from itself. This is in fact what can be observed in human children as they develop. Their first conscious experiences are of the objects which they see, touch and hear around them. In fact, in the case of my own daughter’s first moments outside the womb, her conscious state was as primitive as they come, operating purely on the sensory level of consciousness. She did not have the ability to distinguish different objects from each other qua <>entities - this would come much later in her cognitive development. Specialists who have investigated the matter scientifically have even identified various stages in the cognitive development of infants and toddlers. They certainly do not come out of the birth canal knowing propositions, language, mathematics, logic, etc. If that were the case, why would we send our children to schools?

Take a non-human organism which possesses consciousness as an example. For instance, the family dog. A dog is an organism possessing consciousness, namely in the form of sensations and perceptions. Unlike man, however, it does not have conceptual ability. It will never form the concept ‘I’ or ‘self’, and yet this does not preclude its ability to be conscious of objects. It does not “presuppose that the conscious ‘I’ or ‘self’ is the one doing the conscious observing,” it just perceives the objects it perceives in its environment without knowing that it is conscious. It does not introspect (i.e., turn its consciousness inward on itself), so its own consciousness is not one of the objects it’s aware of – its consciousness remains focused on primary objects (things which it immediately perceives with its senses) without the secondary objectivity of consciousness ever becoming an issue.

Man also has consciousness in the form of sensation and perception, but also possesses along with this the ability to form concepts. This ability allows him greater latitude and refinement in focusing on objects and distinguishing them from others, retaining them in memory, and of course identifying and integrating them in the form of concepts. It also enables him to introspect once he’s explicitly grasped the fact that he is conscious. But before he can do this, he needs to be conscious of something in order for his consciousness itself to be an object to be identified and examined via introspection.

A more detailed answer to Segers’ unargued objection is found in the objective theory of concepts. Concepts for nouns such as ‘self’ and pronouns such as ‘I’ are not first level concepts – they are complex abstractions integrating numerous more primitive concepts, including but not limited to the axioms – and thus their formation or the mind’s grasp of these concepts could not in any way be preconditional to consciousness of objects independent of one’s own conscious activity. To insist that such is the case would simply collapse into stolen concepts –it would be using higher abstractions (i.e., concepts such as ‘self’ and ‘I’) while denying or ignoring their genetic roots.

I suspect that Segers’ confusion lies in failing to distinguish between conscious activity as such (such as direct perception of objects in one’s immediate environment) and one’s discovery and identification of this activity. These two activities are not the same, nor do they occur simultaneously. On the contrary, the former must occur before the latter can ever be possible, and in fact, it may be the case (and is the case with children, for instance, and many adults unfortunately) that the former occurs while the latter never occurs. For one thing, perception of objects needs to take place before it can be an object of one’s own consciousness. I made the case for this in my previous reply to Segers. If one does not first perceive some object(s), his activity of perceiving them will not have happened, and thus cannot be something one discovers and identifies. If you come to a swimming pool and there’s no one swimming in it, there’s no swimming (an activity) to be aware of, simple as that.

Let us also not forget the inescapable fact that the former activity – direct perception of objects in one’s immediate environment – is in fact autonomic, non-volitional cognitive activity (if I’m awake and my eyes are open, I cannot help but see; also, we cannot turn off pain at will, or expect to feel pleasure when pressing the palm of our hand on the surface of a hot stovetop). By contrast, identifying what one discovers (whatever it might be) is a volitional process, meaning one would have to choose to perform this activity once he’s capable of it, and nothing will force an individual to make this choice. Many in fact choose not to identify important facts, especially if they implicitly sense the fact that doing so would compromise a commitment they hold on faith.

Segers himself is a case in point. It’s clear that he’s aware of the fact that he’s aware, but he has failed to identify and integrate this fact in an objective manner. His denial of the secondary objectivity of consciousness is proof of this: he doesn’t want consciousness inherently to need to be conscious of objects other than itself before it can be available to itself as a secondary object. Rather, he wants it to be the case that a conscious mind can be its own first object, apparently unaware of the absurdities that such a view leads to. And he wants this to be the case because it’s clear that the alternative has fatal implications for his god-belief, and that’s what’s important to him: protecting his god-belief. Since he is essentially acting on what he wants to be the case (rather than on what he can discover in reality by means of an objective method), he is attempting to replace facts with fantasies, as if fantasy could substitute for fact, which means his argument reduces to an expression of subjectivism.

Quite simply, Segers’ confessional investment compels him to accept an innumerable series of contradictions, and this is one of them.

So not only would I contend that Rand in fact does not “presuppose that the conscious ‘I’ or ‘self’ is the one doing the conscious observing in order to claim” either that existence enjoys metaphysical primacy over existence, or that consciousness requires an object independent of its own activity in order to be available as an object itself, I would argue that such a feat would actually not be possible given the fact that she makes this identification on the basis of self-evident facts and through an objective process.

Segers’ fourth point in his dismantled blog entry also included additional material that was not present in the version of his “refutation” that he gave in the Fundamentally Flawed podcast. The underlined text below represents the content which is unique to his blog entry:

A posteriori epistemology: I.e., they believe only those things that are empirically verifiable exist and this is the fundamental assumption behind their definition of “existence”. They are defining all that exists as all space, time, energy, and matter that we can observe. God isn’t made of space, time, energy, and matter that we can observe. Therefore God doesn’t exist (John 4:24; 1 Tim. 1:17; 6:16). However, like logical positivism, this is self-refuting since it claims a priori that the only way we can know things are through the five senses when that proposition itself isn’t known through the five senses.

The portion of text without underlining, which likens Objectivism to logical positivism, has already been dealt with in my previous reply to Segers.

As for the text which is underlined above, what is noticeable right off is that Segers attributes a position to Objectivism without citation or supporting quotes. If Segers had read such views being affirmed in the Objectivist literature, it seems he should give some references; indeed, it’s probably the first thing he would have done! But the Objectivist literature does not affirm what Segers attributes to it, so he is either casually assuming that it does, or is simply misrepresenting Objectivism for the sake of making for an easy kill.

The fact is that Objectivism nowhere affirms that “only those things that are empirically verifiable exist,” nor is such a view “the fundamental assumption behind their definition of ‘existence’.” Nor does Objectivism define “all that exists as all space, time, energy, and matter that we can observe.” Had Segers any genuine familiarity with the basics of Objectivism, he would recognize that the concept ‘existence’ is in fact an axiomatic concept, which means (among other things) that it is not definable in terms of prior (i.e., more fundamental) concepts. Because of this, it is entirely inaccurate to charge Objectivism with “loading” the concept ‘existence’ with underlying assumptions which supposedly – even surreptitiously – inform its meaning. Therefore it is important to point out that, on Objectivism’s own terms, its fundamental axiom could not mean what Segers says it means.

Objectivist philosopher Leonard Peikoff reminds us that the axiom of existence “does not tell us anything about the nature of existents; it merely underscores the fact that they exist.” (Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, p. 4). The axiom of existence – constituting a formalized recognition of a general fact at the fundamental level of thought – makes no claim about the constitution of the things which actually exist. Knowledge of this sort will come later, after reason has been systematically applied to what we discover in the world around us. To make the point clearer, it may in fact be discovered that all that exists is some kind of matter or another, but even then, as a later discovery, this would not be an axiomatic truth; it would be a truth founded on an enormous hierarchy of more fundamental truths.

Elsewhere Peikoff makes the following point:

Existence is a self-sufficient primary. It is not a product of a supernatural dimension, or of anything else. There is nothing antecedent to existence, nothing apart from it—and no alternative to it. Existence exists—and only existence exists. (“The Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy,” Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, p. 109)

Seriously, I cannot for the life of me understand how a rational adult could think there’s any legitimate dispute against the position expressed here. Occasionally objections against this view arise from an attempt to understand it through a prism which informs key concepts involved in its statement with conspicuously non-Objectivist notions, and these can typically be easily corrected by explaining what specifically Objectivism means by its key terms. I’ve performed such corrections numerous times on my blog and elsewhere, so I’m somewhat of an old hand at it. But when Objectivists state “Existence exists – and only existence exists,” as Peikoff does here, many “thinkers” bristle in reaction to the tone of certainty contained in that statement, and it is this – the mere presence of certainty in affirming one’s position, especially at the fundamental level of thought – that some individuals find objectionable, even threatening. Such certainty as is found in Objectivism is commonly met with a mixture of resentment and envy – both arising from the same cause: such certainty is something Objectivism’s detractors wish they had in their fantasies, but realize in their conscience that they’ll never achieve it.

But speaking directly to the matter: If one denies the view that “existence exists – and only existence exist” – what other than existence does he think exists, and why? By what means would one have awareness of it? How would one discover it? Do not expect direct answers to such questions at this point. Rather, understand that what will be offered in place of answers will be a series of evasions, rationalizations, highfalutin-sounding counter-questions, murky notions, perhaps even name-dropping and maybe even faltering attempts at poetry. For at this point, knowledge of reality is not the legal tender securing such transactions.

So Segers will not find any support for his claim that Objectivists begin their worldview with the “presupposition” that “only those things that are empirically verifiable exist.” I have never read this claim in the Objectivist literature. What Objectivism denies is the supposition, secretly implicit in theistic worldviews, that the things which the mystical mind imagines are real. While Christian apologists prefer to frame the debate between theism and atheism as a contest between materialism and immaterialism, the real issue is in fact the proper orientation between the subject of consciousness and its objects, and the worldview perspectives which result from the primacy of existence (i.e., the objects of consciousness hold metaphysical primacy over the subject of consciousness) and the primacy of consciousness (i.e., the subject of consciousness holds metaphysical primacy over its objects). The former (i.e., the worldview which is based on and consistently applies the primacy of existence) is the objective view of the world (since the object(s) of consciousness hold metaphysical primacy) while the latter (i.e., the worldview which grants metaphysical primacy to some form of consciousness, whether one’s own, to some alleged “group consciousness,” or to some imagined supernatural consciousness) is the subjective view of the world (since in either case the subject of consciousness holds metaphysical primacy). The objective view (informed consistently by the primacy of existence) is the position which recognizes that wishing does not make it so. The subjective view (which grants metaphysical primacy to consciousness in some capacity at some point) is the position which ultimately reduces to: wishing does make it so. This is the issue of metaphysical primacy which Segers portrays himself as tackling, but in fact seems not even to understand to begin with.

Given these points, it’s hard to see how one might seriously suppose that the Objectivist response to theism would be to concoct an argument such as Segers suggests:

Premise 1) All that exists is space, time, energy, and matter that we can observe.
Premise 2) God isn’t made of space, time, energy, and matter that we can observe.
Conclusion: Therefore, God doesn’t exist.

I’ve never seen such an argument in the Objectivist literature, and given the fact that Objectivism in fact does not inform its fundamental concepts as Segers mistakenly assumes it does, one should not expect to find such an argument in the Objectivist literature to begin with. And indeed, it is no surprise that Segers nowhere cites an Objectivist source endorsing such an argument. In fact, while individual Objectivists may in fact produce arguments which secure the conclusion that theism is irrational, Objectivism as such recognizes no obligation to devote time to the matter since the claim that a god exists is ultimately arbitrary. Besides, there are far better reasons to reject theism than arguments such as the one illustrated above, and Objectivism supplies them.

If Segers wants to examine an argument against theism informed with Objectivist principles, perhaps he might have a look at my article How Theism Violates the Primacy of Existence. Instead of interacting with positions to which Objectivism does not subscribe and calling it Objectivism, Segers can rectify his course of worldview analysis by examining what I have argued from specifically Objectivist premises.

In his blog entry, Segers offered an additional statement which I would like to address:

For Rand, the primacy of existence equals the material world and not consciousness. But why must the only the material world count as what actually exists instead of a non-material entity like an all-knowing, personal, and self-sufficient conscious Mind? [sic]

Statements like “For Rand, the primacy of existence equals the material world and not consciousness,” only tell those of us who are informed on the issues involved here, that Segers simply doesn’t know what he’s talking about. The primacy of existence has to do with the relationship between consciousness and its objects. Preconditional to such a relationship is the existence of both consciousness and something for consciousness to be conscious of. There is nothing in the Objectivist literature which equates the primacy of existence with “the material world and not consciousness,” or suggests that only “the material world” is real and consciousness is simply a non-issue. Existence exists. Consciousness also exists. It is part of existence. Consciousness is an attribute of those organisms which possess it. These are facts which Objectivism is content to take into account in developing its philosophical perspective on reality, man, and knowledge.

Segers asks: “But why must the only the material world count as what actually exists instead of a non-material entity like an all-knowing, personal, and self-sufficient conscious Mind?” If Segers governed his thought by means of reason, he would not have to ask others to help him with this question. We know without any doubt that “the material world” exists. Why suppose that something else “actually exists instead of” the material world?

As I stated above, since Objectivism is built self-consciously on the primacy of existence metaphysics, Objectivists recognize that figments of the imagination are not real. If I imagine a giant four-legged man walking down the beach juggling 747s in his bionic arms, I would have to be dishonest to suppose that what I am imagining is actually real. Similarly, when I imagine Segers’ god creating the universe out of nothing by an act of will and incarnating itself in the form of a human being in first century Palestine, I would have to be dishonest to suppose that what I’m imagining is actually real. We can, along with Segers, imagine the “all-knowing, personal, and self-sufficient conscious Mind” that he mentions, but it would be beyond foolishness to mistake what we imagine for what is real. Part of the problem which apologists like Segers face but cannot overcome is the fact that their apologetic program provides no objective alternative to the imagination as the means by which one can apprehend what he calls “God.” Another part of the problem he faces, which again he cannot overcome, is the fact that the worldview informed on the basis of such beliefs, assume the primacy of consciousness, a metaphysical perspective which is self-contradicting given the fallacy of the stolen concept which undergirds it.

As part of his “Biblical Refutation” – i.e., a response which explicitly presupposes precisely what is in question – Segers baldly asserts:

God existed logically and temporally prior to the existence of the material world as a non-material, personal entity (cf. John 17:5). This is possible because God’s own nature possesses the attribute of aseity; i.e., God is sufficient in His own being and so needs nothing external to Himself. God is eternally triune and eternally interpersonal (cf. John 17:5), thus, the three persons of God enjoyed eternal consciousness of each other within the community of the Trinty.

Of course, we can, along with Segers, imagine his god existing “logically and temporally prior to the existence of the material world as a non-material, personal entity”; we can imagine that what Segers calls “God” has a nature which “possesses the attribute of aseity”; we can imagine that Segers’ “God is sufficient in His own being and so needs nothing external to Himself.” But the problem is that we have no alternative but rely on our imaginations in order to apprehend these claims. Accepting these claims would also commit us to a series of stolen concepts as well as require us to ignore a plethora of facts that we can in fact know about consciousness and related matters for certain, such as that consciousness is biological in nature, that consciousness does not hold metaphysical primacy, that consciousness is finite and operates on the basis of specific means, that those means are identifiable, that consciousness terminates with the expiration of the organism possessing it, etc. We would also have to ignore the fact that the Christian notion of “the Trinity” is internally incoherent, and that accepting such as notion as knowledge of reality constitutes a fundamental departure from reality and the norms of knowledge as defined by the objective theory of concepts – something Christianity does not have.

Segers concluded that

the assumption that there must be a dichotomy between the primacy of existence and the primacy of consciousness and that because of this dichotomy God must necessarily not exist is a self-refuting argument that is easily answered by Scripture and reason.

Several points can be made here, and hopefully they will help to enlighten Segers on some of the profound mistakes which his attempt to refute Objectivism occasion:

* Objectivism does not assume that “there must be a dichotomy between the primacy of existence and the primacy of consciousness”; rather, Objectivism recognizes that there is an unbridgeable antithesis between the two perspectives, and also that anyone attempting to affirm the primacy of consciousness as a truthful metaphysical account would, if only performatively, have to assume the truth of the primacy of existence metaphysics (since the alternative would be to affirm openly that one thinks the primacy of consciousness is true because one *wishes* it to be true).

* The primacy of existence teaches us that the objects of consciousness are not only distinct from the activity by which a subject is aware of those objects, but also that those objects obtain independent of the activity by which it is conscious of them. This axiomatic recognition provides for many subsequent implications, including the recognition that the subject does not create its own objects, but in fact achieves consciousness of them by some specific means which also obtain independent of their present operation (just as a bulldozer exists independently of someone operating it; operating a bulldozer does not result in its existence). Thus the idea of a conscious “mind” creating the universe by an act of will clearly trades on the primacy of consciousness and is dismissable on this basis alone.

* Segers has not shown that either the principle of the primacy of existence, its discovery, its validation, or its application to any claim (including the claims of theism) is in any way “self-refuting.” Segers asserts this on the basis of his own wishing, which only tells us that he’s desperately trying his best to be consistent with the primacy of consciousness metaphysics which underwrites his theistic confessional investment.

* If by “Scripture” Segers means the Christian bible, he couldn’t be more wrong in claiming that this compilation of ancient poetry, narrative, letters, genealogies, legal records and prophetic musings have anything of substance or value to offer in reply to arguments consistently applying the primacy of existence principle. For one, no passage in the bible self-consciously addresses the issue of metaphysical primacy (i.e., the proper relationship between the subject of consciousness and its objects), and two, no biblical doctrine could survive for an instant in a worldview which is loyal to the primacy of existence.

* Segers is unclear on the metaphysical basis of reason. Reason does not operate on the assumption that “wishing makes it so,” but rather endorses the principle which tells us why wishing does not make it so, which is: the primacy of existence.

Of course, Segers’ statements are so pregnant with pernicious philosophical implications that I could go on and on here, but I simply do not have the time, and I admit that I’m confident that anyone who takes the time to review my two blog entries devoted to Segers’ attempt to refute a fundamental truth discovered by Ayn Rand , will see that his position has no avenue of recovery open to it. So I am happy to close with this.

by Dawson Bethrick

Has the Primacy of Existence Been Refuted?

2011-10-27T20:00:00.000-07:00

Theists who are aware of Objectivism are right to be concerned with the devastating implications which the principle of the primacy of existence has for their religious worldview. So it should come as no surprise when Christian apologists try to find some way of destroying the primacy of existence.

Once such attempt was recently executed by Christian apologist Dustin Segers, who posts under the moniker “Dusman” on various blogs. Segers’ comments can be found in this episode of a podcast program called Fundamentally Flawed. In this blog I will examine Segers’ four-point attempt to refute the primacy of existence.

This will not be the first time that I have interacted with comments made by Segers. In fact, Segers and I discussed various issues relevant to the “belief vs. unbelief” debate back in 2006 on the Unchained Radio discussion forum, which are apparently no longer posted on the web. My transcript of our discussion has been available on my website here for several years now. Astute readers who examine that record will notice that, back then, Segers was not familiar with the philosophical distinctives of Objectivism. It will be borne out in my present analysis of his attempt to take down the primacy of existence, that he has not grown in understanding of Objectivism in the intervening years.

In the Fundamentally Flawed podcast, Segers begins his criticism of the primacy of existence at about the 17:10 mark. I have transcribed his comments here:

[Begin: 17:10]…what this is getting to is the primacy of existence, which is the fundamental objection given by Objectivist atheism. And it basically says this. It says uh uh that a consciousness conscious of nothing but itself is a contradiction in terms. Before it – meaning the I, the self – could identify itself as consciousness, it – the I – in other words, the self – had to be conscious of something.
The problem is that that’s false. One of the first things that a conscious mind is conscious of is itself. So the argument fails to show a contradiction.
The second thing is it’s self-refuting. Because when Ayn Rand made that argument, she refutes her own primacy of existence by presupposing the primacy of her own consciousness in order to argue against the primacy of consciousness.
And thirdly it begs the question. She’s assuming her own conclusion implicitly in her premise. She’s basically saying a consciousness that isn’t conscious of anything but itself is a contradiction in terms because it isn’t conscious of anything.
Fourthly, it’s also self-refuting because it makes the same mistake that logical positivism made in the middle of the 20th century because it claims a priori that the only way we can know things is through the five senses when that proposition isn’t known through the five senses.
So there are four refutations of this argument that we don’t necessarily have to have a primacy of consciousness in order to make sense of existence. [End: 18:46]

Those who have a solid grasp of Objectivism will see right off that Segers seems quite unclear on just what the primacy of existence holds. Specifically it appears he’s confusing the principle of the primacy of existence with the principle of the secondary objectivity of consciousness – i.e., the principle that the notion of a consciousness conscious of nothing but itself is contradictory. The two are not the same, and I will make this clear below. The result is that Segers produces no arguments at all against the primacy of existence. Beyond that he makes several errors while trying to interact with the latter principle, with which he does attempt to interact.

First, let us clarify the distinction between the principle of the primacy of existence on the one hand, and the principle of the secondary objectivity of consciousness on the other.

The primacy of existence has to do with the relationship between consciousness and its objects. It specifically holds that the objects of consciousness exist independent of the activity by which a subject is conscious of those objects. This is not identical to the view that consciousness conscious only itself is a contradiction.

I have already written extensively about the primacy of existence – what it is and how it defeats theism. Readers who are unfamiliar with it can see the following entries on my blog:

How Theism Violates the Primacy of Existence
The Inherent Subjectivism of God-belief
The Axioms and the Primacy of Existence
Theism and Subjective Metaphysics
Confessions of a Vantillian Subjectivist

Readers may also find the following articles on my website helpful:

The Primacy of Existence: A Validation
The Argument from Metaphysical Primacy: A Debate

It should be clear from listening to Segers’ comments that he says nothing about the proper relationship between consciousness and its objects, and thus offers no criticisms whatsoever of the primacy of existence.

To be sure, however, the principle of the secondary objectivity of consciousness, which is what Segers’ comments actually pertain to, does in fact pose its own challenges to the theistic worldview. I have already shown how this is a problem for theism here:

Before the Beginning: The Problem of Divine Lonesomeness

Attentive readers of this last entry will note that my framing of the problem of divine lonesomeness assumes the truth of the Objectivist view that consciousness conscious of nothing but itself is a contradiction in terms. It does not set out to vindicate this premise since to date all theists I know of who have interacted with Objectivism have readily granted it. For instance, the late John Robbins (hailing from the “Clarkian” camp of presuppositionalists) makes use of this premise in order to argue against tabula rasa in this article (showing that he does not understand what is meant by tabula rasa very well). Also, Patrick Toner, in his critique of Objectivist atheology, grants the truth of this premise without question (see specifically pp. 212-213).

Given these and other precedents which I have seen over the years, I was a bit surprised when Seegers set out to disprove the view that the notion of a consciousness conscious only of itself is self-contradictory. It’s puzzling to find such fundamental conflict between individuals who we’re supposed to believe are guided by an infallible supernatural source.

On a broader note in this regard, Segers provides no indication that he genuinely understands the point Rand was making. He recites what the principle of the secondary objectivity of consciousness states, but he does not seem to have given the matter much consideration. Indeed, we already saw that he’s confused the secondary objectivity of consciousness with the primacy of existence. Unfortunately, it seems he’s denied himself a chance to learn a fundamental truth about consciousness and philosophy. This is a consequence of a zeal to protect a confessional investment at all costs – apologists tend to leap before they look, and the outcomes are often rather embarrassing. For instance, Segers seems not to have considered the physiological preconditions which make conscious possible (as a theist, he likely denies that consciousness has such preconditions in the first place), nor does he seem to grasp the absurd implications of the alternative to Rand’s thesis – i.e., a consciousness in a void. The fundamental reason why the notion that a consciousness that has only itself as its sole object is inherently contradictory, never seems to dawn on Segers.

Let me say a few words then about the nature of consciousness and how it secures the principle of the secondary objectivity of consciousness. This will help readers better understand what this principle holds and why Segers’ attempted refutation of it fails.

The principle of the secondary objectivity of consciousness holds that consciousness can in fact be its own object (where ‘object’ denotes something one is aware of), but only after it has content other than itself. Objectivism recognizes that consciousness is not an independently existing entity, but in fact a particular type of activity performed by a biological organism. I have already posted a discussion of mine in which I defend the view that consciousness is in fact biological (see my blog The Biological Nature of Consciousness). Speaking on the nature of consciousness as it pertains to philosophy, Rand wrote:

Awareness is not a passive state, but an active process. On the lower levels of awareness, a complex neurological process is required to enable man to experience a sensation and to integrate sensations into percepts; that process is automatic and non-volitional: man is aware of its results, but not of the process itself. On the higher, conceptual level, the process is psychological, conscious and volitional. In either case, awareness is achieved and maintained by continuous action.
Directly or indirectly, every phenomenon of consciousness is derived from one’s awareness of the external world. Some object, i.e., some content, is involved in every state of awareness. Extrospection is a process of cognition directed outward—a process of apprehending some existent(s) of the external world. Introspection is a process of cognition directed inward—a process of apprehending one’s own psychological actions in regard to some existent(s) of the external world, such actions as thinking, feeling, reminiscing, etc. It is only in relation to the external world that the various actions of a consciousness can be experienced, grasped, defined or communicated. Awareness is awareness of something. A content-less state of consciousness is a contradiction in terms. (Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, p. 37)

Various scientific experiments have vindicated this view (for instance, in his three-part lecture The Metaphysics of Consciousness, philosopher Harry Binswanger discusses various scientific experiments, some of which he himself participated in, which explored the physiological aspects of consciousness). Consciousness at its lower levels consists of physical action, such as the response of the retina to light, while on the cognitive activity at the conceptual level is also a type of activity. Consciousness at all levels is active in nature.

The axiom of consciousness holds that consciousness is consciousness of something - i.e., that consciousness always involves an object. This is a first-level recognition which one grasps when he focuses his awareness on his conscious activity: whenever he is consciousness, there will always be something he is conscious of. What he is conscious of is known in Objectivism as the object of his consciousness. Where there is no object, there is no consciousness.

To be an object of consciousness, the object first has to exist. One cannot be conscious of something that does not exist (save of course in the confines of his imagination). And just as one cannot be conscious of a thing unless it exists, one cannot be conscious of an activity until it happens. Since consciousness is essentially an action performed by an organism, the action of consciousness would need to happen before it could be available as an object of any consciousness, including its own. In other words, an organism cannot be conscious of its own consciousness until it has performed those actions by which it is conscious of something; before this, it’s simply not available as an object to be conscious of.

This is true for the three basic levels of consciousness which man possesses, namely the level of sensation, of perception, and of conceptualization. One could not be conscious of one’s own sensations until he has sensed something; only then could his sensory activity be available as an object of his own consciousness. Similarly with perception: one could not be conscious of one’s own perception until he has perceived something; only then could his perceptual activity be available as an object of his own consciousness. Lastly, one could not be conscious of one’s own conceptualization until he has conceptualized something; only then could his conceptual activity be available as an object of his own consciousness.

So there are three fundamental facts about the nature of consciousness to consider here:

1. Consciousness requires an object.
2. Consciousness is essentially active in nature.
3. Consciousness cannot be its own object unless it exists, which means: until it happens.

It is for these reasons, as explained above, that conscious can in fact be an object of itself, but only as a secondary object – it must have an object distinct from its own activity before its own activity can itself be an object of its own activity. Thus Objectivism is correct in affirming that the notion of a consciousness conscious only of itself is a contradiction in terms: it would constitute an affirmation of consciousness while ignoring the nature of consciousness. Thus the notion commits the fallacy of the stolen concept.

Notice something else which is often overlooked. When we think about our own conscious activity, the conscious activity about which we’re thinking is always in relation ultimately to some object other than itself. Take for example any instance in which you thought about your conscious activity. I’m thinking now about the time I was planning a trip to Hong Kong. The object of my present thinking is my planning of a trip to Hong Kong. My planning activity was itself a conscious activity, but notice that it had an object independent of that activity – namely Hong Kong and the various constraints involved in traveling there. In fact, I cannot think of any instance of conscious activity which did not have an object independent of that activity. If Segers or anyone else can think of one, I would have to ask: what would qualify that activity as conscious activity rather than, say, vegetative activity? Here’s where you will find a lot of blanking out among those who still want to say Objectivism is wrong on this point.

So, to put the matter in a nutshell and hopefully bring it home for those who may still be having a hard time understanding this, we can safely say: it is perfectly fine to speak of consciousness, and in so doing, consciousness is an object of our speaking – i.e., it is an object of consciousness at that point. But since consciousness requires and object, the very idea of consciousness of consciousness forces the question: Consciousness of consciousness of what? To answer this by saying “consciousness of consciousness of itself” is essentially to say: “Consciousness of consciousness of consciousness,” which in turn forces the obvious question: Consciousness of consciousness of consciousness of what? To continue lengthening the chain by adding more instances of “of consciousness” to answer this question, is to confess that one really has no answer, but insists on there not being any object independent of consciousness itself. At which point we can wonder why, but it couldn’t be important – no evasion of reality ever is.

Now that the Objectivist position has been more fully elucidated, and its affirmation of the principle of the secondary objectivity of consciousness validated, let us examine Segers’ attempts to vindicate the view that the notion of a consciousness conscious only of itself is non-contradictory.

His first objection is as follows:

The problem is that that’s false. One of the first things that a conscious mind is conscious of is itself. So the argument fails to show a contradiction.

Segers flatly declares the Objectivist principle of the secondary objectivity of consciousness “false,” but provides no proof for this. He asserts that “one of the first things that a conscious mind is conscious of is itself,” but he provides no support for this whatsoever. Indeed, in order to overturn the Objectivist view, he would have to do more than show that one’s own mind is merely one of the first things that one is conscious, but rather that it is in fact the first thing it is conscious of. And no, imaginative scenarios which posit unrealistic hypotheses of what “could” happen in some “possible world” (i.e., in some imaginary realm) will do here. Objectivism holds to the primacy of facts, not imagination, so it is facts that will need to be brought to bear against Objectivism if one is going to be able to mount an internal critique here.

In cross-examining Segers’ claim that “one of the first things that a conscious mind is conscious of is itself,” my first question in response to this is: How does he know this? Of course, Segers does not anticipate such a question, for he provides no indication of how he could know it. But indeed, how could one know that the first object one is aware of when he begins his awareness as such, is his own mind? What content would be there? What exactly is it that he would be aware of at this stage of experience? Segers apparently does not object to the view that consciousness does in fact require an object – that consciousness is consciousness of something (which means the issue of metaphysical primacy – i.e., the question of the proper orientation in the relationship between consciousness and its objects – is unavoidable and inevitable). But has he considered how a mind might have awareness of itself, especially before it’s been conscious of something independent of itself? By what means would a nascent conscious mind be conscious of itself? Segers does not say. How could there be a mind there unless it had accrued content in the first place, and thus could be identified as a repository of knowledge, memories, projections, inferences, and the such? Segers is so anxious to declare Objectivism false that he doesn’t dare consider the issues in an adult manner. Perhaps he senses that if he did, he’d find only good reasons to concede to Objectivism here, and he clearly doesn’t want to do that.

What’s noteworthy here is Segers’ acknowledgement, embedded in his statement, that there is in fact a sequence of stages in the conscious process. This is clear when he says “one of the first things that a conscious mind is conscious of….” Segers does not seem to be challenging the premise that a consciousness starts in some way. That this premise even seems intuitively true on the face of it is due to the fact that consciousness is active in nature, as we saw affirmed by Rand above.

When an organism first begins its life, it is initially conscious of that with which it first comes into sensory contact. This wouldn’t be a “mind.” It couldn’t, even on the Christian’s view, since “mind” is not something that one can be aware of through the senses. The Christian will likely want to contend against the view that an organism will first be conscious of things by means of sensation, for if he concedes this premise, then he must concede any objection against the position that consciousness conscious only of itself is a contradiction in terms. But since this would only prove fatal to theism in the long run (again, see my blog on the problem of divine lonesomeness), the Christian is pleased to depart from the realm of fact and fantasize alternatives.

But let’s consider the mind that is conscious only of itself, and of nothing else. Let us ask: What would qualify a consciousness conscious only of itself as a consciousness in the first place? What would it be conscious of? Of its own consciousness? Consciousness of what? Blank out. Segers calls it a “mind.” So let us ask then: what content would this mind have at this initial stage of experience? If it has any content, what would be the nature of that content? If that content is distinct from the mind’s own conscious activity, then Segers needs to rethink his objection (of course, we’ve already seen reasons why he should do so). What would be the source or origin of that content? If Segers is right, then it could not have gotten that content through some prior conscious contact with something, for the nature of Segers’ objection requires that this would not have taken place. Either the mind of which a consciousness is allegedly first aware has content – and thus requires an explanation of where that content came from and how it got there – or it has no content, in which case it needs to be explained what exactly this consciousness is supposedly conscious of, and how it qualifies as a “mind.” Neither option holds any promise of surviving scrutiny, for either alternative ends up committing the fallacy of the stolen concept: a mind that begins with content already in place would be a mind that could not have acquired its content by any objective means – for it did not “acquire” its content through conscious activity. Alternatively, a mind that begins with no content cannot qualify as a mind, for it would have no content to be mindful of.

Let us turn now to Segers next objection to the principle of the secondary objectivity of consciousness:

The second thing is it’s self-refuting. Because when Ayn Rand made that argument, she refutes her own primacy of existence by presupposing the primacy of her own consciousness in order to argue against the primacy of consciousness.

Segers charges that, in formulating the view that consciousness conscious only of itself is a contradiction in terms, that she was somehow “presupposing the primacy of her own consciousness.” But Segers does not show where Rand did this, nor quote her words in order to show that his charge against her is at all accurate.

Contrary to what Severs asserts, it is not possible for Rand to be “presupposing the primacy of her own consciousness” with respect to the present matter, for she is simply identifying facts that she’s observed. Identifying the facts that one observes does not imply that one is “presupposing the primacy of [one’s] own consciousness.” Rand would happily acknowledge, as consistency with her metaphysics would require, that the facts she was identifying obtained independent of her preferences, feelings, ignorance, limitations of understanding, imagination, desires, memories, etc., i.e., that their factuality did not depend on her own conscious activity in regard to them. The only way that Rand could be legitimately accused of “presupposing the primacy of her own consciousness” would be if in fact Rand argued as though the facts of reality were what she wanted them to be, that the facts conformed to her conscious dictates, that she had the power to command reality to obey her will. Rand certainly was not arguing on the basis of the assuming that the facts obey her consciousness, and no one – including Segers – has shown that she was. Segers doesn’t even try to!

What’s more, Segers has already shown that he does not have an informed grasp of the issue of metaphysical primacy to begin with, for, as I showed above, he has confused the secondary objectivity of consciousness with the primacy of existence itself. Besides, if Segers were right that the primacy of existence is false, and therefore the primacy of consciousness were right, then why would Rand be wrong in assuming the primacy of her own consciousness? Segers might say that in doing so she was being inconsistent with her own metaphysical premises. But the burden would be upon Segers to show that this would be a problem if the primacy of existence were false, as he has asserted. Any attempt to show that inconsistency is somehow a defect in one’s view would necessarily assume the truth of the primacy of existence (Segers surely wouldn’t be saying it’s a defect because he wants it to be so, would he?), which would simply undermine his own objection.

In fact, Segers’ does not realize how his own criticism depends on Rand being right, or how the success of his criticism would only mean that Rand would be correct in saying whatever she says regardless of why she said it. This is the beauty of Rand’s argument: to argue against it both assumes the truth of her position, and also implies that there could be no legitimate gripe against what she says if her opponents were correct. It is this kind of self-securing position that makes presuppositionalists green with envy when it comes to Objectivism.

But Segers does not stop there. His next objection proceeds as follows:

And thirdly it begs the question. She’s assuming her own conclusion implicitly in her premise. She’s basically saying a consciousness that isn’t conscious of anything but itself is a contradiction in terms because it isn’t conscious of anything.

In order to show that Rand begs the question with regard to either the primacy of existence (the actual primacy of existence, which Segers does not even criticize) or the secondary objectivity of consciousness, Segers would have to restate the allegedly question-begging argument that Rand supposedly gave on behalf of either position, using her own words (and not those manufactured for the purpose of finding fault), and show that their respective conclusions depend on premises which assumed the truth of those conclusions. Segers has not done this. If in fact she did do this, and Segers were aware of it, it would be puzzling for him not to support his charge with documentary evidence.

In the case of the primacy of existence, Rand held this recognition to be axiomatic (cf. Philosophy: Who Needs It, p. 24). If Rand is correct that the primacy of existence is in fact axiomatic, she could affirm it on the basis of its axiomatic nature alone, and thus she would not need to infer it as a conclusion from a prior set of premises. In other words, Rand was in fact not begging the question when she affirmed the primacy of existence, any more than one is “begging the question” when one sees a tree before him and says, “that’s a tree.” An axiom is not a conclusion in a proof; it is not something that one needs to argue to. Quite simply, then, since Rand did not need to argue on behalf of the primacy of existence, there is simply no opportunity for her to beg the question in the first place. Had Segers more familiarity with Objectivism (i.e., if he knew what he was talking about), he would know this much. Thus his very charge against Rand here shows that he’s acting on the basis of ignorance, not knowledge.

In her novel Atlas Shrugged, Rand characterized an axiom as follows:

An axiom is a statement that identifies the base of knowledge and of any further statement pertaining to that knowledge, a statement necessarily contained in all others, whether any particular speaker chooses to identify it or not. An axiom is a proposition that defeats its opponents by the fact that they have to accept it and use it in the process of any attempt to deny it.

The fact that existence holds metaphysical primacy over consciousness is foundational to knowledge. It is the principle which makes reason possible. Reason operates by gathering facts, identifying them conceptually and integrating them in a logical hierarchy. For this to be possible, one must acknowledge the objectivity of facts at the outset – i.e., that facts are what they are independent of one’s own conscious activity, whether it be one’s own preferences, fantasies, emotions, wishing, resentment, etc. It is the primacy of existence which underwrites the recognition that wishing doesn’t make it so. Consequently, to deny the primacy of existence is tantamount to affirming that wishing does make it so. Thus it should not come as any surprise when theists seek to undermine the primacy of existence – it’s devastating to their god-belief!

But what about the secondary objectivity of consciousness? Did Rand beg the question in any argument that she might have put forth on behalf of establishing this truth? Again, Segers does not quote Rand and show us where Rand actually did beg the question, or commit any other informal fallacy for that matter. Rand simply put two and two together and came up with four. She started with the axiom of consciousness – namely the recognition that consciousness is consciousness of something – and noted the fact that consciousness is essentially a type of action. Moreover, since one cannot be aware of an action until it happens, conscious activity in regard to some object independent of itself must take place before consciousness itself could be available as an object of itself. As such the principle of the secondary objectivity of consciousness is essentially the product of an integration of immediately available facts, namely those which I have just identified.

Piecing together what Segers says to arrive at what he thinks Rand’s supposed argument for the secondary objectivity of consciousness, I think it’s clear that he thinks the premise that “consciousness isn’t conscious of anything” somehow figures into Rand’s thinking (for Segers explicitly identifies this as the offending premise in what he takes to be a question-begging argument). But clearly Rand did not think that “consciousness isn’t conscious of anything.” She couldn’t be more explicit: “Some object, i.e., some content, is involved in every state of awareness” (Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, p. 37). For Rand, contrary to Segers’ construal, consciousness is consciousness of something. Rand herself offered support for this view by pointing out that “before [a consciousness] could identify itself as consciousness, it had to be conscious of something [other than itself]” (“Galt’s Speech,” Atlas Shrugged). And even though Segers quotes this statement in his recitation of Rand’s position, he has failed to integrate it into the broader view which Rand is affirming. Indeed, he has replaced it with a premise of his own making (“consciousness isn’t conscious of anything”) which Rand nowhere ever affirmed.

My exploration of the secondary objectivity of consciousness above vindicates Rand’s discovery that a consciousness would need to have awareness of some object distinct from its own activity before that activity could itself be an object of its awareness. As we saw, the axiomatic recognition that consciousness requires an object is key to this discovery about consciousness. Another key discovery is the fact that consciousness is essentially a type of activity, and as such, it cannot be an object of consciousness until it happens. So Rand does not beg the question here either, for she is not attempting to prove that “a consciousness conscious of nothing but itself is a contradiction in terms” from some a set of premises which conceptually reduces to this conclusion.

But I must say that, in terms of presuppositionalism itself, I’m often taken aback by the charge of begging the question from this brand of apologist. Indeed, one can detect among them a fickle attitude towards circularity in argumentation. It almost seems that presuppositionalists think circularity is acceptable when it occurs in their own arguments, but objectionable when it (supposedly) occurs in arguments offered by non-theists. It is clear from what Segers states here, for instance, that he finds the instance of circularity in an argument (even if it doesn’t actually exist) to be an instance of fallacy.

No less than the renowned popularizer of presuppositional apologetics Greg Bahnsen sought explicitly to excuse instances of circularity in one’s reasoning. In a footnote in his major opus on Vantillian apologetics, Bahnsen wrote:

’Circularity’ in one’s philosophical system is just another name for ‘consistency’ in outlook throughout one’s system. That is, one’s starting point and final conclusion cohere with each other. (Van Til’s Apologetic: Readings & Analysis, p. 170.n42.)

Segers himself has weighed in on this matter, essentially agreeing with Bahnsen. In an entry on his blog devoted to the question Is Circular Reasoning Always Fallacious? Segers clearly affirms that there are times when circular reasoning is not fallacious, and even holds that “Circular reasoning is unavoidable to some degree when proving one's ultimate standard.” (If you’re thinking, “My, that’s rich!” – you’re not alone, but it will have to wait for a future blog entry all its own.) Segers goes on to say that the Christian god “uses a non-fallacious type of circular reasoning when He makes an oath,” and believes that “clearly some degree of circular reasoning is necessary when proving one's ultimate authority.” On this view, a Blarko-believer’s argument for the existence of Blarko the WonderBeing which contains premises assuming Blarko’s existence, cannot be dismissed on the basis that it commits an informal fallacy!

Segers elaborates on the matter as follows:

…all circles aren't necessarily fallacious. Begging the question is often considered a fallacy because it is usually arbitrary. But it can be non-arbitrary if it goes beyond a simple circle (i.e., the Bible is true because it says so) and uses additional information to support its conclusion. If the ultimate authority is first assumed and you find out later you have good reasons for it because without it you cannot make sense out of anything, then its perfectly legitimate to reason in a circle.

And here I thought circular reasoning was objectionable because it seeks to bypass legitimate rules of inference! I suppose the question at this point becomes: How does one determine when begging the question “goes beyond a simple circle”? How – and when – does the use of “additional information to support its conclusion” divest a question-begging argument of its offending fallacy?

With Segers’ enlightening comments in mind, we can now ask: If Rand in fact begged the question in favor of the principle of the secondary objectivity of consciousness, why suppose it’s the fallacious kind of begging the question, and not the non-fallacious kind of begging the question that Segers finds perfectly acceptable, even “unavoidable”?

The upshot for Segers’ third objection then is:

(1) he’s not accurately represented Rand’s rationale for affirming the principle of the secondary objectivity of consciousness in justifying his charge that she begged the question in defense of it;
(2) he has not shown that Rand actually committed anything which his own analysis of circularity considers fallacious (i.e., he has not shown that any part of Rand’s position on the matter is “arbitrary” – whatever this concept could mean or be objectionable in the context of Christianity); and
(3) he has not shown that the facts which can be brought to bear on the matter do not themselves “go… beyond a simple circle.”

By Segers’ own criteria regarding question-begging arguments, even if he could legitimately establish that Rand begged the question (and he can’t), one could legitimately (on Segers’ own assumptions) say: “Well and good!” and not be bothered by the matter. For Segers has handed us an “excuse,” something which his own apologetic method loves to claim, in a display of feigned triumph, that men are universally without.

Segers’ then gives his final objection:

Fourthly, it’s also self-refuting because it makes the same mistake that logical positivism made in the middle of the 20th century because it claims a priori that the only way we can know things is through the five senses when that proposition isn’t known through the five senses.

Objectivism is not logical positivism. Nor does Objectivism inherit the errors and fallacies to which the logical positivists committed themselves. It really doesn’t matter how many different sense modalities man has. Say he had fourteen sense modalities instead of five. The same principle would still apply: he would still have awareness of objects by some means, and those means would be sensory in nature. Such a consciousness, if it also had the ability to form concepts as man in fact does, would still be able to formulate conceptual knowledge from the basis of sense perception, as man in fact does, and there’s no reason to suppose that it would be able to make discoveries about the nature of knowledge it thus forms. Man possesses five sense modalities, and he has the ability to form concepts from perceptual input. He also has the ability to discover facts about the nature of knowledge thus formed, by means of introspection. Such discoveries are performed firsthand as part of experience, and the knowledge formed from identifying the objects discovered in that experience and integrated according to an objective process (namely concept-formation, a process of abstraction, as laid out in Rand’s Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology), would be a posteriori knowledge, not a priori knowledge.

If man has the ability to form knowledge conceptually, then the knowledge he thus forms and the process by which he forms it can themselves be objects of his awareness, too. Remember that an object is what a consciousness is conscious of. This can be a particular concrete (such as a rock, a chair, a person, etc.), a process (such as the earth orbiting the sun, tying one’s shoe, writing a letter, forming concepts, etc.), an abstraction (such as the concept ‘man’, the concept ‘freedom’, etc.), a proposition, etc. So why cannot the sum of his knowledge be an object of his conscious activity? Why cannot the nature of his knowledge be the object of his probing inquiry? The theist might say, “But you don’t have awareness of your knowledge and its nature by means of sensation!” which is well and good. But then again, we don’t claim to in the first place. So what value has the theist added by interjecting this?

Of course, when we speak about the general nature of knowledge, one issue which should be clarified at the outset is: Knowledge of what? Just as consciousness needs an object, so does knowledge. For the Objectivist, knowledge is knowledge of reality acquired through an objective process. For the theist, “knowledge” is really a blurring of the distinction between reality and imagination while granting primacy to the imagination and confusing its products with reality. It lacks an objective process, and cannot develop by means of an objective process.

One of the inestimably valuable philosophical advantages which Objectivism has over a theistic worldview, such as Christianity, is the fact that Objectivism has a theory of concepts. Indeed, it is the objective theory of concepts, and this theory explains in step-by-step fashion how the human mind generates conceptual knowledge from perceptual input.

If we are capable of tracking the course of the development of our knowledge, and even discovering the proper methods by which knowledge is discovered and validated, why would it be so objectionable to formulate general truths which denote what we have discovered about knowledge? If we understand that knowledge is knowledge of reality, that there is a distinction between reality and imagination (the primacy of existence, wishing doesn’t make it so, etc.), and that the proper methodology by which we develop our knowledge of reality begins with objective input from reality (i.e., via the senses) and proceeds by means of a process of abstraction (as analyzed by the objective theory of concepts) by which we form concepts on the basis of perceptual input, why would the general recognition that (legitimate) knowledge of reality is ultimately based on sensory input? Obviously this is not an a priori declaration, but in fact an inescapable fact which we discover as we explore the nature of knowledge beginning at its roots.

Critics of Objectivism often make the mistake of assuming that, since Objectivism recognizes that knowledge of reality begins with sense perception, that Objectivism must therefore hold that all knowledge is therefore confined to the perceptual level of awareness. This is a most superficial non sequitur, and ignores the enormous data that Objectivism brings to bear in enlightening our understanding of the conceptual level of awareness. Quite simply, Objectivists do not claim to know that all knowledge is ultimately based in sense perception because they perceived this to be the case by means of the senses. We have the conceptual level of consciousness, and we have the objective theory of concepts to validate this recognition. It would be a most futile effort to attempt a refutation of this, as the Objectivist demolition of skepticism has shown (see for instance David Kelley’s The Evidence of the Senses which demonstrates how skeptical arguments against the senses crumble into a debris field of stolen concepts).

Presuppositionalists, however, adhere to a worldview which has no theory of concepts to begin with (you certainly won’t find such a theory in the bible), so they are in the dark when it comes to understanding the relationship between the conceptual level of consciousness and sense perception. It is in this systemic darkness to which their religious worldview holds them hostage that they generate superficial objections which trade illicitly on mischaracterizing their non-Christian targets.

So contrary to Segers’ accusation here, Objectivism does not argue on some a priori basis that “the only way we can know things is through the five senses.” We do not have to prove that man must be the way that he is any more than we have to prove that he couldn’t have been otherwise. All we need to do is discover what actually is the case, and this includes understanding his nature as a living organism possessing a consciousness capable of conceptual integration as well as the nature of knowledge produced by such means. Imaginary alternatives have no philosophical value, nor do they need to be treated as though they did have philosophical value.

In conclusion, we can see without a doubt that Segers’ efforts to refute the primacy of existence fail. For one thing, he never interacts with the primacy of existence in the first place. He has confused a different principle for it and, while proceeding to fire off objections to that other principle, believes he is in fact refuting the primacy of existence when in fact he isn’t. He ends up attacking the principle of the secondary objectivity of consciousness and leaves the primacy of existence completely intact.

Meanwhile, the four objections which Segers brings against the principle of the secondary objectivity of consciousness also fail. To summarize:

- His first objection is that this principle is “false” because “one of the first things a conscious mind is conscious of is itself.” This amounts to simply a flat denial with no argumentation, no evidential support to validate his counter-claim, and an announcement that he has in fact not seriously explored the matter intelligently.

- His second objection is that Rand defied the very principle she affirmed “by presupposing the primacy of her own consciousness in order to argue against the primacy of consciousness.” Unfortunately, Segers nowhere shows where Rand actually did this, and I contend that he won’t be able to because this charge is in fact not true. Even worse, it’s not clear that Segers would even recognize when someone was proclaiming something on the primacy of one’s own consciousness, for his comments on the matter reveal that he simply does not grasp what the issue of metaphysical primacy pertains to in the first place.

- Segers’ third objection is that Rand begged the question in her argument for the principle of the secondary objectivity of consciousness. But this fails because Segers does not even interact with the rationale Rand herself gives (and which Segers himself restates in his quote of Rand) on behalf of this principle. In place of Rand’s own stated reason for her position, Segers inserts a different premise – one which she in fact did not affirm – in order to raise the objection that she begged the question. I provide ample support for the position which Rand affirmed to buttress her own, so it should be clear that the recognition that a consciousness must be conscious of something other than itself before it could have itself as an object does not rest on informal fallacy. I also question why a presuppositionalist like Segers would find a question-begging argument objectionable in the first place, since presuppositionalism infamously excuses such arguments.

- Segers’ final objection is that Rand’s position must be an instance of a priori knowledge when Objectivism rejects the very notion of a priori knowledge. While it is true that Objectivism rejects the very notion of a priori knowledge, the principle of the secondary objectivity of consciousness is not affirmed, nor need it be affirmed, as being known a priori. I have provided a number of factors which together guarantee this principle as knowledge known through experience, i.e., a posteriori and not a priori.

So now that the principle of the secondary objectivity of consciousness has been soundly vindicated, the theist must now wrestle with its implications for theism. As I noted at the beginning of this blog, I have brought these out in an earlier posting, Before the Beginning: The Problem of Divine Lonesomeness. Also, for information on how the primacy of existence (a principle which Segers does not in fact even touch) has fatal implications for theism, I direct readers to the several links to blog entries of mine which elaborate on the topic.

by Dawson Bethrick

George H. Smith's "Atheism: The Case Against God" - Online - Free PDF

2011-10-16T03:00:00.000-07:00

The full version of George H. Smith's book Atheism: The Case Against God has been converted to a PDF file and is available here.

A link to the file of Smith's book was posted by Smith himself in this forum.

I have also added a link to it from the main page of my blog under "Recommended Resources."

For those who have not read Smith's book, it's an enjoyable read. So take a look.

by Dawson Bethrick

Strange Bedfellows?

2011-10-03T05:00:00.000-07:00

Paul Manata offers an interesting assessment of the “transcendental argument for God” (TAG).

In a blog post of his titled Do All Men Know That God Exists? Manata writes:

TAG, as I understand it, is something like the Osama Bin Laden of apologetic arguments. It’s been bombarded with rockets and is hiding out in the caves, licking its wounds.

Would someone please tell Sye Ten Bruggencate? If I try to, he’ll probably accuse me of indigestion or dysentery (when in fact, I’m quite healthy).

by Dawson Bethrick

Answering Nide's Questions about the Uniformity of Nature

2011-09-06T06:53:00.000-07:00

A visitor to my blog named Nide who posts comments under the pseudonym “Hezekiah Ahaz” has asked a series of questions relating to one of my favorite topics, the uniformity of nature.

Nide: “Well, of couse Ayn for you to take measurements you have to assume the nature is uniform. Something you can't account for.”

For this question to have stable meaning, he needs to explain specifically what he means by “account for” in the context of the uniformity of nature. What exactly is he asking here?

Nide: “So you have no choice but to take it for granted. Which assumes faith something your philosophy precludes.”

I can’t say which is the bigger impediment for Nide’s understanding, whether it’s his self-inflicted ignorance of his opponent’s position, or his commitment to mischaracterizing his opponent’s position by proposing simplistic implications which in fact are not suggested by that position. But either way, his lack of understanding is persistent and systemic.

What Objectivism precludes is the primacy of consciousness, confusing imagination for reality, substituting emotion for knowledge, etc. I don’t know how anyone could possibly object to these, but here’s Nide trying to malign a position which is distinguished by steadfast allegiance to the fact that wishing doesn’t make it so.

By ‘faith’, Objectivism means acceptance of ideational content without evidence or contrary to sound reasoning. It does not mean “taking something for granted.” Not even the bible equates faith with taking something for granted. But here’s Nide, acting as though it does.

So just to make this crystal clear: Objectivism rejects accepting ideational content without evidence or contrary to sound reasoning.

When Christians kick against this policy, they tell us about themselves.

The Objectivist view of nature is not void of evidence or contrary to sound reasoning. We perceive and deal with nature directly every moment of our lives. Nide has not shown that the Objectivist view of nature is void of evidence or contrary to sound reasoning. There is nothing about the Objectivist view of nature which is inconsistent with its epistemology, and this is why Nide cannot present a validation of his deliberately slanderous construals. If Nide or anyone else thinks that Objectivism’s view of nature is inconsistent in some way with its epistemology, he needs to show this, not simply say that such an offense exists without showing where such an offense occurs. He needs to do his homework instead of thriving on drive-by charges that only expose his gaping ignorance of what he’s talking about.

In the case of the uniformity of nature, the question that I raise with theists who want to make this matter a topic of debate, is whether the uniformity of nature is something which consciousness establishes in nature on the one hand, or a feature of nature which obtains independent of conscious activity. Theists of course, in particular presuppositionalists for whom the uniformity of nature is an apologetic centerpiece, typically avoid discussing the matter in these terms. (See for instance the questions I have posed to apologist Chris Bolt here back in March 2010, which still to this day have not been addressed.)

The Objectivist view is that nature is uniform independent of conscious activity, that nature’s uniformity is not something which consciousness provides to nature. On this view, nature is inherently uniform, and the uniformity of nature is something we discover and identify, not create and/or alter.

The Christian view is clearly the opposite: that some form of consciousness is needed to provide nature with its uniformity, which can only mean that nature is not inherently uniform, that nature is inherently chaotic, that the default of nature is disorder, that the law of causality is something foreign to nature and must be installed into nature by some volitional action of consciousness. This is the subjective view of the uniformity of nature, the view of nature found in Christianity, and it is in fact a distinguishing characteristic of Christianity since “miracles are at the heart of the Christian position.” (Cornelius Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, p. 27)

Of course, we can imagine that a magic consciousness gives nature its uniformity. But this would be a figment of one's imagination, not a rational identification of reality. If an individual is content with confusing what he imagines for reality, Christianity may very well be a fitting home for him.

Nide asked: “Ayn on what rational basis do you as an ‘atheist’ Justify belief in the inductive principle?”

To the extent that this question has any rational legitimacy (which would require some revision to make that the case), the answer is very simple: on the basis of the axioms, the primacy of existence, and the objective theory of concepts. I’ve stated this before, but so far no theist has been able to bring a lasting challenge to it. All theists can do is try to ridicule it. Meanwhile, they ignore the fact that their worldview attempts to defy the axioms, endorses the primacy of consciousness (e.g., wishing makes it so), and has no theory of concepts to begin with! If there’s a weaker position from which to try to attack Objectivism, I’d like to what it could possibly be.

Nide: “Ayn without begging the question or avoiding a circle can you explain to me why nature is uniform?”

This question is fallacious complex, for attempting to answer it on its own terms invites the fallacy of the stolen concept. To say “why” something is the case implies that it is the result of some cause. But causality is a law of nature. So you can’t affirm a cause prior to nature. This would constitute a stolen concept. I certainly reject the idea that some form of consciousness causes nature to be uniform. This is a blatant absurdity given the mountain of stolen concepts one would have to accept in adopting such a view.

Nature and uniformity are inseparable, like water and its wetness (to use Sye Bruggencate’s own metaphor – it fits, and in this context it finally has some legitimacy as a metaphor). To ask why nature is uniform not only invites stolen concepts (and is therefore fallaciously complex), it also misses the nature of uniformity.

by Dawson Bethrick

STB: One Year and Still Waiting…

2011-08-27T06:00:00.000-07:00

It has been an entire year now since I posted my critique of Sye Ten Bruggencate’s argument for the existence of the Christian god.

And Sye has yet to interact with my criticisms.

Before posting this blog entry, I visited Sye’s website and clicked through the steps of the argument for the existence of the Christian god which he presents there. I do not see that Sye has modified his case in any way since I posted my critique of his argument. For instance, his Step Five still has his visitors choose between the following alternatives:

Laws of Logic, Mathematics, Science, and Absolute Morality are Immaterial

and

Laws of Logic, Mathematics, Science, and Absolute Morality are Material

Also, the “proof” that Sye showcases on his website is still what it was when I published my critique:

The Proof that God exists is that without Him you couldn't prove anything.

This of course still seems as unhelpful to establishing the existence of the Christian god today as it did a year ago when I presented my critique. As I pointed out in my critique, this statement “seems merely to be the opinion of someone who already believes the claim that said god exists in the first place.” I see nothing in Sye’s case as it appears today to suggest that my assessment is in any way incorrect. Indeed, as I had pointed out, I see no reason why the ardent Blarko-believer couldn’t use essentially the same “reasoning” on behalf of his mystical affirmations, such that he might say

The Proof that Blarko exists is that without Blarko, you couldn’t prove anything.

I find it quite dubious indeed to suppose that a thoughtful person would really think that such statements would be at all persuasive.

But they apparently make for great show-stoppers in public debates. And I suppose this is what accounts for the staying power of this kind of sloganeering that is so characteristic of the presuppositionalist methodology.

But seriously, I see no reason why someone who believes in some non-Christian form of mysticism could not adapt essentially the same logical format that Sye uses to validate his god-belief, to validating an alternative set of religious beliefs. And nothing in Sye’s presentation of his “argument” preempts such assimilation by non-Christian mystics. So it defies the serious intellect to suppose that such a debating strategy can actually have any rational value.

Now it’s not like Sye has dropped off the face of the earth. On the contrary, he seems to be the talk of the town, at least in presuppositionalist circles. His big thing is the show debate, where he can verbally spar with non-believers and ply his arsenal of gimmicks and deploy the usual slogans. If I didn’t know any better, I’d say Sye’s ambition is to become the modern-day William Lane Craig of presuppositionalist apologetics, though without the weighty wall decorations from academic institutions. If so, I’d say it’s not a very lofty aspiration, since the gaping void is aching for someone to fill it.

by Dawson Bethrick

Five Years and Still Waiting...

2011-08-12T02:00:00.000-07:00

Five years ago, on August 11, 2006, Aaron Kinney over at Kill the Afterlife posted this blog entry in which he published a prayer request on my behalf.

In his post, Aaron wrote:

This post is a prayer request for all theists and afterlife believers to give Dawson Bethrick 20/20 vision! Whether a Christian, Muslim, Satanist, Hindu, or whatever other superstition you believe in, you are cordially invited to pray to, converse with, bargain with, sell your soul to, or by any other means necessary get your invisible sky fairy to magically grant Dawson Bethrick the 20/20 vision that he is so patiently requesting.

Don't let the derogatory references to your deity fool you; I am dead serious here. This is the perfect opportunity to win a convert for your religion of choice! Dawson Bethrick has stated that he is even willing to close his eyes and bow his head to increase the prayer's effectiveness. It's a small price to pay for 20/20 vision! All you need to do as the messenger of God is to set up an appointment with Dawson, and he will surely give the head bow and eyelid shutter at the requested moment.

And if Dawson's vision really does change to 20/20 because of your religious intervention, I have a good hunch that he will convert to your religion. I know I will! You hear that, theists? If Dawson Bethrick confirms with me that his vision has been miraculously enhanced to 20/20 because of your prayer or other negotiation with your God, then I, Aaron Kinney, will convert to your religion on the spot.

This is a grand opportunity for theists everywhere! Convert two extremely atheistic souls, and destroy two atheist blogs with one successful prayer request! It's a fucking bargain. Our souls are for sale at discount, theists. Can you cough up the spiritual dough?

Five years later, and I am in fact more dependent on corrective lenses than before. How can this be?

Now of course, some Christians might dismiss this prayer request by saying “God doesn’t do parlor tricks.” And yet, it’s not clear what exactly a “parlor trick” is understood in this context to be, while Aaron’s prayer request is not for the Lord to do anything different from what the gospel narratives in the New Testament already depict him doing, namely curing vision problems. Aaron certainly has not asked that the Christian pray that Jesus do something that’s arguably frivolous, like turning water into wine (if that’s not a parlor trick, what is?), but that Jesus do what he’s said to have done in passages such as Matthew 9:27-31, 20:30-34, Mark 8:22-26, 10:46-52, Luke 7:21, and John 9:1-41.

Sensing the futility of this move, some Christians might retort by saying that such passages are not meant to indicate cures of physical blindness, but rather “spiritual blindness.” But if Christians think I’m “spiritually blind” on account of the fact that I reject Christianity, then it seems again that these passages have relevance which the Christian could not deny, and that again we have yet another opportunity to find out how effective prayer is and how reliable the Christian god’s promises are.

Let’s put it this way: critics of Christianity are not going to be impressed by the apologists’ ingenuity in creating excuses for their religious doctrines not coming to pass. And yet, excuses are all that apologists seem capable of producing.

Now one Christian did comment in response to Aaron’s blog, and stated, “Dawson, I have been praying for you.” When I inquired on this, and pointed out that my eyesight still had not been restored to 20/20 vision, the same Christian responded, “I said ‘I am praying for you’ but I didn't tell you what I am praying.” This kind of response strikes me as simply childish, when in fact the Christians expect us to take their worldview’s doctrines of miracles and divine promises seriously.

If a Christian truly believes that his god has the power to restore my vision to 20/20 acuity, and actually believes that prayer has any efficacy, why would he hesitate or be reluctant to pray for my eyesight?

Some Christians might respond, as many I’ve known have, that my lack of faith prevents their god from working in my life. This only suggests that their god is a very weak god, so much so that it is rendered effectually powerless by a mere human being’s lack of faith. This doesn’t even seem biblical. The book of Acts depicts Saul of Tarsus as militantly opposed to Christianity, to the point of conducting aggressive campaigns against its followers. Clearly he could not be said to have had faith in Jesus at this point. And yet, his lack of faith did not prevent Jesus from working in his life, according to the holy storybook.

Besides, shouldn’t the believer’s faith be enough? After all, John 14:14 puts the following promise into Jesus’ mouth:

If ye shall ask any thing in my name, I will do it.

This is an unequivocal promise which Christians believe Jesus uttered. Are we supposed to simply ignore such things? Should we be surprised that apologists themselves do not introduce this and similar passages when trying to defend their god-belief? I’m not. They’re an embarrassing failure. But if a non-Christian bring them to the apologist’s attention, don’t be surprised if the apologist tries to make the non-Christian appear foolish or ignorant (or both) for doing so. While these verses are in fact in the bible and we’re expected to accept everything the bible says as “God’s word,” the apologist will try to show that the problem is with you when you remind him of their presence in “Scripture.”

Meanwhile, my eyesight continues to decay, which suggests either that believers who are aware of the prayer request that Aaron publicized are reluctant for some reason to pray for my eyes to be restored, or their god really doesn’t exist, or both. I can’t help but suspect that believers don’t want to pray on my behalf because they don’t want to give their god a chance to fail.

But what do I know?

by Dawson Bethrick

Presuppositionalism vs. Objectivism: How Objectivism Prevails

2011-08-02T04:00:00.000-07:00

In the final episode of his commentary on the exchange between presuppositionalist Sye Ten Bruggencate and atheist Justin Schieber, internet apologist Chris Bolt summarizes the presuppositionalist strategy as follows:

You demonstrate the impossibility of the contrary by an internal critique… This is where the real meat of the transcendental argument comes in… This is where we ask the unbeliever things like how do you account for logic, science, and morality in your worldview. The big three. And there are lots of other things of course that you might ask. This is where we demonstrate the inconsistencies in the unbeliever’s worldview. And when we do that, we are demonstrating the impossibility of the contrary. [8:48-9:20]

Did you get that?

The “real meat of the transcendental argument” is demonstrating what presuppositionalists call “the impossibility of the contrary” by means of an internal critique, specifically one which supposedly uncovers “the inconsistencies” within a non-Christian’s worldview. Bolt suggests a few areas of philosophical inquiry where this method can be applied, namely: how does the non-Christian “account for” logic, science, and morality? He also indicates that this method can be applied to numerous other areas of thought.

I have always understood that the “transcendental argument” which presuppositionalists champion is supposed to prove that the Christian god exists. After all, it’s typically referred to as “the transcendental argument for the existence of God,” or TAG for short. But “the real meat of the transcendental argument” as Bolt conceives of it is geared towards exposing inconsistencies in non-Christian worldviews. Even if this is successful in one particular case or another, it’s puzzling how one might think that the conclusion “Therefore, God exists” might follow from such findings. In fact, it strikes me as a wildly overdrawn non sequitur. Perhaps there are some “potatoes” to go along with “the meat” of the argument, and maybe even some gravy and peas, and therein lies the part that proves the existence of the Christian god.

Even more puzzling, the strategy which Bolt describes seems geared toward eliciting a wholesale concession on the part of the non-Christian. It is almost as if questions like “How do you account for logic?” or “How do you account for morality?” are supposed to pester the non-Christian into throwing up his arms in defeat and replying, Duh, I donno. Must be God did it! If the presuppositionalist case of the existence of the Christian god or the alleged truth of the Christian worldview did not depend so inherently on people’s philosophical ignorance, why is it so focused on finding it?

Of course, it may be the case that presuppositionalists are simply presupposing that all non-Christian worldviews have fatal inconsistencies plaguing their inner structure, truth sets, inferences, etc., and therefore bent on finding anything that might confirm this assumption, even if it must be manufactured on the basis of caricature or simply putting words into their opponents’ mouths. It’s hard not to suspect that this is the case when examining a presuppositionalist critique of a non-Christian position, for far too often such critiques tend to be little more than express fault-finding expeditions bent on construing anything the non-Christian position affirms into a most obvious error that astute thinkers would naturally avoid.

Presuppositionalists present themselves as rather foolish oddities in this respect. For one, they posture themselves as though they were truly concerned about the philosophical coherence and logical integrity of a worldview, while relying on an apologetic method which often consists of little more than canned, one-size-fits-all objections cast in the form of catchy sound bites and shallow slogans. But even worse, underlying this charade is the unself-conscious cockiness of apparently finding satisfaction in theistic confessions as actual solutions to the philosophical problems they raise in their criticisms of non-Christian positions.

For instance, presuppositionalists would on the one hand denounce as logically inconsistent, self-defeating or philosophically incoherent any worldview which looks at the world around us, identifies certain general facts which are available in any perception of the world as fundamental starting points, and builds its theory of knowledge and moral doctrines on the basis of general, indubitable facts about man’s nature that pertain to these issues, and treats man’s requirements for living on earth as relevant factors in developing a view of man’s purpose in life, all the while resting on the claim that an invisible magic being which we can only access by means of our imaginations, somehow addresses these issues without the need for further illumination. If credibility is something that thinkers must earn, presuppositionalists must be lobbying for raising the agitprop minimum wage.

But when it comes to putting the braggadocio of presuppositional apologetics to the test, it remains stubbornly unclear what internal problem they think they can find in Objectivism. Objectivism does not affirm belief in the supernatural, and in fact rejects supernaturalism as mere fantasy. Of course, this by itself is enough to put the presuppositionalist on alert. But in contrast to Christianity, which espouses a metaphysics of supernaturalism, faith in revelations from supernatural sources, the ethics of self-sacrifice and ultimately a collectivistic rendition of political theory (as the implications of its moral premises are taken to their logical conclusion), Objectivism affirms an objective metaphysics, reason in epistemology, rational self-interest in ethics, and individual rights in politics. It seems that anyone who elects to oppose Objectivism tells us a lot about himself by this choice.

Specifically in regard to the kinds of questions which Bolt raises in the section of his podcast quoted above, Objectivism has an integrated, non-contradictory and logically incontrovertible approach to each of the issues which presuppositionalists seek to challenge non-believers on. And depending on what “account for” may mean (a vague expression which presuppositionalists typically do not explain, and when it is defined, it is not uniform among various practitioners of presuppositionalism), Objectivism offers answers to the presuppositionalist challenge which will withstand anything they might throw at them.

Observe:

Question: How does Objectivism account for logic?
Answer: Objectivism accounts for logic by the axioms, the primacy of existence, and the objective theory of concepts.
Question: How does Objectivism account for science?
Answer: Objectivism accounts for science by the axioms, the primacy of existence, and the objective theory of concepts.
Question: How does Objectivism account for morality?
Answer: Objectivism accounts for morality by the axioms, the primacy of existence, and the objective theory of concepts.

For some insights on how the axioms, the primacy of existence and the objective theory of concepts work together to provide an account for logic, science, and the Objectivist view of morality, see the following:

Does Logic Presuppose the Christian God?
Resources on the Problem of Induction
Do I Borrow My Morality from the Christian Worldview?
Etc.

So the questions for presuppositionalists at this point are: What inconsistencies are lurking in Objectivism’s accounts for these issues? Where’s the inconsistency? Where does the presuppositionalist show that there are inconsistencies here? How can anyone, including the presuppositionalist, even reason without assuming the truth of the axioms, assuming the primacy of existence, and making use of concepts?

Recently a Christian visitor to my website announced “I reject everything rand says” [sic], referring of course to the philosopher Ayn Rand (see r_c321’s 18 July comment to this blog). Such sweeping dismissals, which are by no means unusual among zealous apologists for theism, strike me as utterly irresponsible. But so be it. Let the theist identify who he is. But how far is he prepared to go with such hyper-generalized renunciation?

Let’s take a look specifically at the Objectivist axioms, and consider how the presuppositionalist commitment to disprove non-Christian worldviews would play out when deployed against Objectivism.

Does the presuppositionalist contend that the axiom of existence is false? To do so would be to say that there is no reality. But this would not only deny the apologist’s own existence, but also the existence of his listeners, and even the god he expects others to worship. So this does not seem like a very fruitful stance for the apologist to take.

Is the presuppositionalist prepared to argue that existence is not fundamental? What could be more fundamental than existence? If the theist proposes something else as fundamental, is he saying that it does not exist? Can he identify what he thinks is fundamental, and explain why existence is not a factor? Can he point to something that is fundamental that is other than something that exists? What comes before existence, and how does the theist distinguish what he proposes as coming prior to existence from something he’s simply imagining? How do the rest of us make that distinction?

Does the presuppositionalist contend that the axiom of identity is false? To do so would be to deny that a thing is itself, that to exist is to have nature, that A is A. Is the presuppositionalist prepared to argue that existence has no identity? If so, then he would be saying that everything that exists has no identity and that anything which does exist is not distinct from anything else that exists. How would his own god-beliefs sustain such a self-defeating commitment?

Does the presuppositionalist contend that the axiom of consciousness is false? To do so would be to deny the reality of consciousness, the very faculty that the apologist would be using in proposing such a contention. As we saw with the axioms of existence and identity, to deny the axiom of consciousness is blatantly self-defeating. And yet, apologists for the Christian worldview seem to have no qualms with making statements like “I reject everything rand says.” This can only be translated as a rejection of, among other fundamental truths, the axiom of consciousness, as well as the previous two axioms discussed above.

Perhaps the theist is willing to backpedal a bit and grant the truth of the Objectivist axioms (indeed, after grasping the fact that they would need to be true even to question them, he should reconsider his blanket rejection), but instead contend that the primacy of existence is untrue. The primacy of existence is the recognition of the fact that the objects of consciousness exist independent of the conscious activity by which one is aware of those objects, and has system-wide implications and applications for one’s worldview (such as the recognition that wishing or wanting something to be the case does not make it so).

The alternative to the primacy of existence is the primacy of consciousness, which is the view that the subject of consciousness holds metaphysical primacy over its objects. This assumption can be expressed in the view that existence (either some or all) finds its source in conscious activity (such as creating things by willing them into existence), that the identity of objects depends on some activity of consciousness (such as the belief that a thing is what the subject wants or determines it to be), that wishing or wanting makes it so, etc.

So is the presuppositionalist willing to argue that wishing makes it so? If not, why not? And how can his worldview as a whole maintain consistent fidelity to the position he takes in responding to this question? If he holds that wishing doesn’t make it so, how does he account for this without granting the primacy of existence? How does he know that wishing doesn’t make it so? What implications do his answers to these questions have for his god-belief? Doesn’t he think that reality conforms to his god’s wishes? Or, does he want to bog down the discussion with a debate as to whether or not his god has wishes in the first place, in order to evade the issue? (See for instance Wishing and the Christian Deity.) If he doesn’t like the use of the word “wish” here, let’s replace it with a related word which Christians apply to their god all the time: want. Ask: Does wanting something to be the case, make it a reality? If I want a million dollars in my wallet, will a million dollars suddenly fill my wallet? If not, why not, unless of course the primacy of existence is true? And if the primacy of existence is true, why would the apologist dispute it? When the apologist says that his god exists, is he rejecting the primacy of existence and telling us that his god exists simply because he wants it to? It’s likely that this is not the case. On the contrary, the theist likely wants us to accept his claim as though his god exists independent of any psychological activity which his mind performs, i.e., that his god exists independent of consciousness. Thus he’s making use of the primacy of existence right there, and if he is contending that Objectivism is false, he’s assuming the truth of what Objectivism teaches just in affirming his god-beliefs.

What’s important to note in the conflict between presuppositionalism and Objectivism, is the fact that the presuppositionalist has to assume the truth of the Objectivist axioms and the primacy of existence in any account he or she may propose for these areas of inquiry, even though the worldview which presuppositionalism is intended to defend – namely Christianity – is expressly antithetical to them. (I’ve demonstrated this in numerous entries on my blog, but for starters newcomers can read more on this issue here, here and here.)

The situation facing presuppositional apologists is just as bad when it comes to the issue of concepts, for their worldview has no theory of concepts to begin with, and any understanding of concepts that they may have or think they have of concepts, would have to come from outside their worldview. In essence, as presuppositionalists themselves like to put it, they must “borrow” from a non-Christian worldview to the extent that they might propose any understanding of concepts.

This fact puts them in an even more insurmountable predicament when it comes to mounting an internal critique on the Objectivist worldview. For how are they going to uncover internal conflicts within the Objectivist worldview when they not only must assume the truth of the Objectivist axioms and the primacy of existence, but have no Christian-specific understanding of concepts which can help them navigate this uncharted region of their own worldview?

Naturally, for the presuppositionalist even to consider embarking on an internal critique of the objective theory of knowledge, he would need to know something about it. Of course, he’s not going to learn about the objective theory of concepts by reading the bible. I mean, let’s be serious. What does the bible have to say about concepts in the first place? Apologists eager to learn more about the objective theory of concepts should study (not just read, but study) Ayn Rand’s Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology. If they do not have a copy of this invaluable text, they might want to start with Allan Gotthelf’s paper Ayn Rand on Concepts.

In the meantime, presuppositionalists are invited to explain how their worldview can have anything of value to contribute to the area of epistemology when in fact their worldview has no theory of concepts in the first place. This I would like to see, along with an informed example of an internal critique by an able presuppositionalist seeking to uncover inconsistencies in the Objectivist account for logic, science and morality.

I shan’t be holding my breath.

by Dawson Bethrick

Nide's Snide

2011-07-22T16:00:00.000-07:00

A Christian who is apparently reluctant to identify his true name, has been active in the comments sections of my previous two blog entries, Considering Tony’s Offerings and A Proof that the Christian God Does Not Exist

This individual usually posts under the moniker “r_c321” but occasionally posts under the name “Nide Corniell.” When r_c321 posted under Nide Corniell, he wrote: “Nide is not my name. I accidentally signed in with someone else [sic] account” (comment posted July 12, 2011 7:22 PM on this blog). Since then, r_c321 has “accidentally” signed in on this other person’s account a handful of times. It’s hard to fathom that one would “accidentally” sign in with someone else’s account one time. It strains credulity to suppose he’s done it several times.

But this is not the only story of Nide’s that I find unconvincing. Nide has come to defend Christianity, and as the record in the two comments sections testifies, he’s been doing a pretty poor job of it. One might be forgiven for supposing he’s done an awful job at it.

Nide claims that the Christian god is real and that “God the father draws men unto himself through Jesus Christ and by the holy spirit raises them from ‘spiritual deadness’" (posted July 13, 2011 12:11 AM on this blog).

I have pointed out to Nide that I can surely imagine the things he claims. But Nide wants me to accept the claim that these things are real, not merely imaginary, even though he has not indicated any alternative to one’s imagination as the faculty by which one can apprehend the god and other supernatural things he says are real. I have asked Nide repeatedly to explain how something that I imagine, is not imaginary. In response to this, he quoted Romans 1:18-20, even though this does not explain how something I’m imagining is not real. In fact, he has nowhere challenged the fact that I am imagining his god when he tells me about it, nor has he explained how what I am imagining is not imaginary. So Nide, and frankly all Christians, have a huge problem on their hands.

But Nide continues to resent me calling his god imaginary, even though he has not identified any alternative to man’s imagination as the means by which anyone could “know” his god. It’s as if he wants us to disregard the fact that we are imagining when we consider his god-belief claims, and pretend that what we are really only imagining is actually real, when in fact it is merely imaginary.

Now he writes:

Sir, you keep making the claim that I am imagining things. But haven't been able the prove it. So, when will you?

Nide must not be reading very carefully. Not only has he not shown that I have not proved this, he ignores the fact that I have in fact proved it. I posted a link several times in our discussion, as well as in the very blog to which he has posted numerous comments, to an earlier entry on my blog, one which identifies 13 points of evidence to support the conclusion that the Christian believer is actually imagining his god. Here’s the link again:The Imaginative Nature of Christian Theism.

The question for Christians to consider is this:

What alternative to the imagination does any man have in seeking to apprehend what Christianity describes as its god, the other supernatural beings it describes, supernatural destinations like heaven and hell, and the narratives which are found in the Christian bible depicting characters and events that supposedly took place on earth some 2000 years ago?

I can imagine a garden and a naked man and woman walking around in their “Blue Lagoon” innocence. I can imagine a talking snake. I can imagine a man named Noah building a giant vessel. I can imagine him packing it with thousands of animals. I can imagine it raining for 40 days and 40 nights. I can imagine the vessel coming to rest and its occupants getting out and repopulating the earth. I can imagine a man named Moses confronting the Egyptian pharaoh. I can imagine Jonah being swallowed by a whale. I can imagine a virgin giving birth to a child. I can imagine a man rising from the dead.

I can imagine all these things. The question is: what alternative to my imagination do I have in apprehending all this? If there’s no alternative to my imagination in apprehending all this, then on what basis could I possibly say it’s all true? A rational basis is one which, at the very least, recognizes that the imaginary is not real. So I would have to abandon rationality in order to claim that all this stuff that I can *only* imagine, is real. This is the root reason why people sense that faith and reason are somehow at odds with each other. They are at odds with each other. Faith is a pretense while reason requires an unflinching commitment to honesty. An honest man will not try to carry on as if what he is imagining is real.

Consider the relevant facts here:

Fact 1: Christians tell me that what the bible claims is all true.
Fact 2: I can imagine all the characters, places and events depicted in the bible.
Fact 3: Christians fail to identify any alternative to the imagination as the proper faculty for apprehending what the bible claims.
Fact 4: When Christians are confronted with this problem and are challenged to explain how something one imagines is not imaginary, they have a profoundly difficult time addressing it (e.g., quoting bible passages just gives the problem another opportunity to manifest itself).

Christianity requires man to accept as real that which he can only imagine. And in so doing, Christianity requires man to abandon his honesty, just as biblegod required Abraham to be willing to kill his own child on command in Genesis 22. It requires one to sacrifice his honesty on the cross, just as the Christian god sacrificed his own son on the cross. What kind of man abandons his own honesty? What kind of father abandons his own child? The former is what Christianity requires of man, and the latter is what Christianity holds up as the model which men are expected to accept as their ideal.

I know for a fact that back when I was trying to be a Christian, the Christian worldview activated itself within my imagination, for that is where the story establishes itself- in the believer’s imagination. It’s all story from a storybook, like Harry Potter, like the tales of Narnia, like Tolkien’s “Ring” series, like The Wizard of Oz, etc. When one reads a story, he has no alternative but to imagine the characters and events he reads about.

I have asked Nide repeatedly to explain how what I am imagining when I imagine his god, is not imaginary. Nide finally reposted Romans 1:18-20, as if he wanted me to think that this somehow answers my question. It doesn’t answer my question, and to demonstrate how poor a response it is to my question, I explained that his answer requires me to rely on my imagination no less than 10 separate times just to consider it. I wrote:

Here’s the only way I can interpret this as a response to my question:
First I must imagine that there is a god (1). Then I must imagine that this god has wrath (2), it is “revealing” its wrath (3), and that it is revealing its wrath from something else that I must imagine, namely something called “heaven” (4). Then I must imagine that people (apparently *all* people) are “wicked” and “unrighteous” (5), that they are somehow aware of this god’s revealed wrath (6), and that they all “suppress” this awareness “by their wickedness” (7). Then I must imagine that “what may be known” about this god that I must imagine, is somehow “plain” to these wicked people (8). Then I must imagine that the reason why “what may be known about God” is “made plain” to everyone is that its “invisible qualities… have been clearly seen” by the wicked people (9), and thereby I must imagine that they are therefore without excuse (10).
In order to consider Nide’s response to my question, I had to use my imagination no less than 10 separate times. So again, how is what I imagine when I imagine Nide’s god, not imaginary?
Blank out.

See how unhelpful to the Christian’s challenge quoting bible passages is? It’s as if Nide simply doesn’t understand the magnitude of the challenge before him, or he simply doesn’t know what to do in response to it. Neither predicament bodes well for his worldview’s claim to philosophical solvency.

More broadly, it can safely be taken for granted that all human beings who have initiated their conceptual development have the capacity to imagine. Nide himself, for instance, is someone who has the ability to imagine. Since we can be assured that the Christian believer is capable of imagining, just as any other human thinker is, then we must consider the possibility that he is merely imagining the god and other supernatural spooks that you claim exist. We must consider this because we ourselves, as bystanders looking at Christianity from the outside, have no alternative to the imagination when it comes to considering Christianity’s totems and beliefs.

Indeed, Nide has failed to identify any alternative to the imagination by which his readers can apprehend what he claims when he claims that his god is real. I have no alternative to imagining it, and Nide identifies no alternative to my imagination as the psychological faculty by which I can apprehend what he claims. So even if he wants to deny that his own imagination is involved, he’s made no progress toward removing the imagination as the active faculty in my own effort to apprehend what he claims is real. So the problem he faces is very real, if in fact he wants to answer me.

I know it’s difficult for believer’s to allow themselves to come to the honest realization that what they’ve invested themselves emotionally into believing, is really only imaginary. For one, they sense that there is too much at stake. Socially they will lose face big time, and psychologically their whole world will be turned on its head. It is an experience that is comparable to suddenly find yourself becoming exempt from gravity. To embrace honesty will mean that the edifices that the believer has constructed from an enormous constellation of emotional indulgences, will come crashing down, and he will in effect have to start completely over in re-learning how to deal with the world. Regaining honesty once one has renounced it and turned his back on it, is not an easy thing to do, and few are man enough to do it. I did it, so I know it’s possible. But since I did it, I know how difficult it was for me to do it. But I wasn’t even halfway in as deep as Nide apparently is, at least in defending the belief. The very act of defending the belief in question will only serve to cement the believer’s devotion to the labyrinth of lies that he has swallowed in constructing the imaginative complex that informs his worldview.

As for me, I was a reluctant believer; I was unhappy from the get-go (believing in the Christian god certainly did not bring me joy), and happiness has always been very important to me. And one thing I have really come to understand is the truth of Rand’s view of happiness – that “happiness is a state of non-contradictory joy” (Atlas Shrugged). Nide will not make this discovery by reading the bible, and since he has already announced that he “reject[s] everything [R]and says” (comment posted July 18, 2011 8:53 PM on this blog), he must – if he thinks joy has any place in happiness – suppose that happiness is possible in spite of contradictions choking one’s joy.

The Christian worldview is teeming with contradictions. Many contradictions have already been pointed out to Nide. In fact, I have argued that Christianity is essentially the worship of contradiction (see here and here).

But the fundamental contradiction is in its adherence to the primacy of consciousness (see for instance here), its blurring of the distinction between reality and imagination (see, among others, here and here), and the dishonesty it requires on the part of the faithful adherent (I expose this throughout my blog).

I could not sustain the dishonesty that Christianity required of me – I could not keep conning myself that it was all really true, when in fact it so clearly wasn’t true, since it was merely imaginary. Eventually I had to face my abandonment from dishonesty, and find a way to reunite with it. That’s not possible for someone who has made the determination to continue propping up the lies that Christianity seeks to have men swallow.

by Dawson Bethrick

A Proof that the Christian God Does Not Exist

2011-07-15T10:00:00.000-07:00

Christians are continually challenging the non-believer to prove that their god does not exist, and like to heckle non-believers on the matter because they say one would need to be omniscient in order to know that there is no god hiding somewhere in the universe.

For instance, one Christian recently commented on my blog:

For anybody to reject something they have not seen takes a lot of work. For example seraching the entire universe. Which they can not do.[sic]

This is not an isolated case. Other theistic apologists have employed essentially the same reasoning.

In an article titled Strategies for Dialoguing with Atheists, apologist Ron Rhodes makes the following statement:

Some atheists categorically state that there is no God, and all atheists, by definition, believe it. And yet, this assertion is logically indefensible. A person would have to be omniscient and omnipresent to be able to say from his own pool of knowledge that there is no God. Only someone who is capable of being in all places at the same time - with a perfect knowledge of all that is in the universe - can make such a statement based on the facts. To put it another way, a person would have to be God in order to say there is no God.

Reasoning like this ignores the broader context of theism, namely that the theist’s god is said to exist outside the universe, that it is not just some item existing within it, like a rock, an asteroid, or particle of dust. If an atheist had traveled the entire universe and found no god, the theist could easily say he was looking in the wrong place, for the theist says his god is infinite and not part of the material universe.

In fact, reasoning like this is really an admission that god-belief rests on one’s ignorance, for it is where one has no knowledge that the theist’s god is supposed to reside.

Even worse, given this kind of reasoning, one would have to have searched the entire universe to reject the notion of a square circle. In other words, anyone employing this type of reasoning to defend his god-belief, would – in order to be consistent – scoff at any thinker who rejects the notion that square circles exist. Since no one can travel the entire universe to be assured that there’s no square circle hiding behind some asteroid or quasar, or under a pebble on some moon in another galaxy, no one is justified in believing that square circles do not exist at all.

If any thinker disputes the analogy between his god and the notion of a square circle, let him try to defend his god-belief. Meanwhile, readers are invited to review my own exploration of this matter here: Gods and Square Circles.

Does the theist really believe that one needs to be omniscient in order to justifiably reject the claim tat square circles exist somewhere in the universe?

But the atheist need not worry about not being able to prove that the Christian’s god does not exist. I don’t see why such a proof cannot be available. Below I present one that theists will have a very difficult time overcoming:

Premise 1: That which is imaginary is not real.
Premise: 2: If something is not real, it does not actually exist.
Premise 3: If the god of Christianity is imaginary, then it is not real and therefore does not actually exist.
Premise 4: The god of Christianity is imaginary.
Conclusion: Therefore, the god of Christianity is not real and therefore does not actually exist.

Presumably the Christian will accept the first two premises. Most human beings, when confronted directly with the question, will typically acknowledge that there is in fact a fundamental distinction between what one imagines and what is real, and admit that something that one imagines does not actually exist.

The stories of fictional works like the Harry Potter series or Tolkien’s tales of Middle Earth, are rooted in their authors’ imaginations. No one really believes that the heroes and villains of these storybooks actually exist (or existed, as the case may be), and that the events that move their storylines along actually happened someplace. That’s because it is introspectively obvious to most individuals, by reference to the world we live in and deal with everyday, that the stories and characters in these fictional accounts are ultimately imaginary.

Premise 3 is most likely going to make many Christians uncomfortable just in contemplating it. Many individuals who invest themselves emotionally in a life centered around a god-belief are likely to resent any suggestion, even hypothetical, that the god they worship is imaginary. If this premise produces in the theist a noticeable attitude change, perhaps it’s because you’re getting close to the central nervous system of his god-belief. But it seems that any adult thinker, even if she happens to be Christian, should accept the truth of this premise, assuming they don’t have any qualms with the first two premises.

Subtle discomfort is not what one should expect when he presents premise 4 to theists. Rather vehement protest is most likely to result. And of course, the theist can be predicted to reply with something like “Prove it!” (as if he were going to accept any proof that his god is imaginary). At this point I would suggest that he review my blog The Imaginative Nature of Christian Theism, in which I provide no less than 13 points of evidence – any one of which is damning enough – to meet his counter-challenge.

(Incidentally, I had posted the blog entry linked just above, in reply to a theistic apologist who had complained that I did not “prove” that his god was imaginary. Since posting the “Mighty 13,” that apologist has not offered any response to my answer to his challenge. In fact, it was not long after this that this apologist’s own blog posted an announcement that its own comments policy had been significantly revised, and debates were no longer to be allowed there. Go figure.)

The soundness and reasonableness of my argument’s conclusion should be easy for anyone to digest, even for the Christian, so long as his commitment to the existence of the Christian god is not emotional in nature. If it turns out that the Christian god is in fact imaginary, then by virtue of this fact it is not real, and therefore it does not actually exist.

Christian apologists who want to object to my argument’s fourth premise, which states that the Christian god is imaginary in nature, are welcome to address the points of evidence that I have cited in support of this premise. Ultimately, there is a single question that any atheist who encounters a pushy apologist need pose. And that question is:

When I imagine your god, how is what I am imagining not imaginary?

Since we have no alternative to imagining the Christian god when believers tell us about it, this question is most appropriate, especially since we’re expected to believe that it is real. If theists think we have an alternative to imagining their god, what is that alternative, and how is it different from imagination?

Christian believers who have invested their psyches so deeply with the ambition to convert the world to their god-belief, have long ago passed the great divide between imagination and reality, such that they are unable consistently to distinguish between the two, especially when their god-belief is involved. But that’s why challenges such as the one I raise are so highly resented by theists, for it ‘heads ‘em off at the pass’, so to say, and slashes off their god-belief before it has a chance to take root. For anyone who is not already predisposed to believing that the imaginary is real, if his attention is called to the distinction between reality and imagination and he is explicitly reminded that the imaginary is not real, he’s not likely to accept claims about imaginary things as truth. On the contrary, he’s going to wonder about the content of the character of individuals who insist that something which they can only imagine is real.

The bottom line is that, whether or not atheists really have the burden of proof in the matter, it has been met in spades.

by Dawson Bethrick

Considering Tony's Offerings

2011-06-02T22:00:00.000-07:00

A visitor to my blog named Tony recently posted a somewhat lengthy comment on my previous blog. Although Tony made no attempt to defend Van Til’s “argument from the unity of knowledge (which is the topic of the blog to which he posted his comment), I’m grateful that he did submit his thoughts on my blog. I’m always happy when new presuppositionalists seek to challenge me. It makes for such great sport!

I have written a response to Tony below.

Tony writes:

I find that you use the personal pronoun ‘I’ repeatedly in your blog as though it has genuine intrinsic meaning.

No, it has *objective* meaning. It does not have meaning apart from any referential context, and I don’t use it as if it had meaning apart from any referential context.

But if you pause and think carefully—reflecting deeply and using only your naturalistic, materialistic worldview assumptions about the nature of reality

I’m an Objectivist, Tony, not a materialist or “naturalist” (which has numerous definitions). If you’re going to critique Objectivism, it would be to your advantage to know a few things about it, especially the basics. It is certainly not a form of materialism. Materialism denies the axiom of consciousness. Objectivism explicitly affirms it from its foundations, and at no point denies it.

you will find that you cannot even validate, in terms of your own worldview, your own personal existence

I’m not even sure what this is supposed to mean. Existence is metaphysical. It exists regardless of what I can or cannot do epistemologically. Existence is not something that anyone needs to “validate.” The concept ‘validate’ simply doesn’t apply in such a context. Validation applies to epistemology, not to metaphysics. Specifically, we validate our *identification* of reality, not reality as such. Reality is what it is regardless of what we think, do, imagine, wish, command, or emote. That’s the primacy of existence.

…let alone "incinerate" presuppositionalism.

If you think you can rescue presuppositionalism from the glowing embers you’ll find in my archives, go ahead and knock yourself out.

In fact, you actually “incinerate"...yourself.

Can you elaborate on this point, Tony? How exactly do I incinerate myself? Identify the steps by which you think I’ve done this. Give me your point by point analysis.

It seems in blogging about metaphysical and epistemological matters, you should be able validate (in terms of your own materialistic worldview assumptions) the personal existence of you yourself, the blogger.

I’ve addressed this concern above. Not only have you made the mistake of ascribing a materialistic worldview to me (which means: you leapt before you looked), you’ve made the mistake of assuming that the concept ‘validate’ applies to existence. It doesn’t. You don’t even try to validate this assumption. Why not?

So consider. The next time you embrace a loved one, how do you know that ‘he’ or ‘she’ is actually there?

That’s an easy question to answer. I know this by means of reason. Reason is the faculty by which we identify what we have awareness of by means of the senses. Would you propose that one could know this by some means other than reason? If so, please explain.

Yes, matter is there. Neurons are there. Chemicals are there. But where is the loved one? What (not who) are you affectionately embracing?

So, you’re supposing we can be sure that matter is there, neurons are there, and chemicals are there, but not the loved one we embrace? Why would you adopt such an absurd view of the world?

If you are honest, given your worldview assumptions, you are actually only embracing matter—any personal nuance in the understanding of, and relating to, your loved one can only be but an irrational figment of your materialistic worldview's imagination.

This reasoning commits the fallacy of the stolen concept. It explicitly denies the axiom of consciousness (by assuming materialism) while performatively making use of it (by granting my ability to imagine, which requires consciousness) at the same time. It does not describe my worldview at all, Tony. If you really think it does, you only show that you know next to nothing about it.

Think about it, Tony: you say that on my worldview’s own assumptions, I’m “only embracing matter.” Presumably on your view this is not enough for me to say I’m actually embracing a loved one. Something must be missing, right? So what besides matter is needed, if not consciousness? My worldview explicitly affirms the axiom of consciousness as one of its foundational recognitions. What else do you think is needed, and why? Why isn’t consciousness sufficient to complement matter, if that’s what you’re implying?

Dawson, do you see it? You are living in world of make-believe—the very kind of world you accuse Christians of inhabiting.

What am I imagining as real that is not real, Tony? What “make-believe” am I living in? You make the charge, so please be specific, and cite some evidence for your indictment. Are you saying that my loved ones are not real? Are you saying I’m wrong for acknowledging the fact that my loved ones possess the faculty of consciousness? If so, I’d say you’re the one who’s imagining. If you’re trying to say something else, you’ll need to try again for clarity’s sake.

Moreover, no amount of wordsmithing or verbal tap-dancing will cause wooden Pinocchio to become a real little boy.

I agree. Just as no amount of obfuscation, evasion, appeals to ignorance or arguments that essentially seek to lead one to throw up his arms and say “Duh, I donno, must be God did it!” will transform an imaginary deity into an actually existing thing. Indeed, any flaws in my worldview are irrelevant to a serious case for validating the claim that the Christian worldview is true or that a god exists. My worldview could have all kinds of flaws, and your god could still be imaginary. So if you want to validate your belief that your god is something more than just a figment of your imagination, you need to focus on presenting that validation, not on finding some fault in my worldview.

Put it this way: the conclusion that your god is real does not logically follow from the premise that my worldview is somehow flawed. You need an argument. But you don’t present one.

Sadly, in embracing loved ones, you embrace the metaphysical ashes of your own (and their) incineration.

You grant far too much power to mere assumptions, Tony. Whether my worldview can or cannot support the view that my loved ones are fully functioning human organisms possessing consciousness (ostensibly the indispensible requirement for personhood), its failure – whether real or merely supposed – to support this view would not be sufficient to turn them into ashes. They would still continue to be real; they would still continue to be what they are, in spite of my worldview’s faults. Reality does not revise itself to conform to a thinker’s philosophical errors. Again, that’s the primacy of existence. Why is this principle so hard for people to grasp?

Other than the existence of the personal, Triune God of the Bible, how do you account for your personal relationships, much less your own personal existence?

I guess this is where I’m expected to throw my hands up in defeat and exclaim, “Duh, I donno, must be God did it!” But that’s not what I do, nor do I need to. No one needs to surrender his intellect in this manner.

In answer to your question, I must point out that I have no need to “account for” my existence. Any attempt on my part to provide such an “account” would require that I exist in the first place. So it’s unclear why such effort would even be expected, let alone needed. Even if my account were flawed, my effort to provide one could only indicate that I do in fact exist, since my very existence is preconditional to my applying effort to anything. So unless you can clarify your question in such a way that avoids such obvious absurdity as it implies, given the way you have stated it, I submit that it is a non-issue.

Now In regard to my personal relationships, I “account for” them by referencing the axioms, the primacy of existence and the objective theory of concepts. If you want to present some case to the effect that these three platforms are insufficient to the task, please go right ahead. But make sure you don’t assume their truth in the process, for that would only undercut your case and bolster mine.

Yet, He indeed does exist, and that is the only reason you do not intellectually, and relationally, implode...by unconsciously borrowing from the capital of Christian theism.

By “unconsciously borrowing from the capital of Christian theism,” I’m guessing you mean that I am unknowingly or even surreptitiously making use of specifically Christian assumptions – assumptions that can be only Christian in nature, for whatever reason – in order to sustain my intellectual interaction with the world around me. Is that at least close to what you’re saying?

If so, can you cite for me what those specific Christian assumptions are, and explain how they must necessarily be Christian in nature, and also point out where you think I’m making use of them in my intellectual interaction with the world around me? In other words, don’t just make the charge, Tony, follow through with it and provide some relevant support for it.

You have been created in His image, Dawson, and that is something that is not changing…no matter what part of the world you visit.

I can imagine that some invisible magic being has created me in its image, Tony. Your task is to show that what I am imagining when I imagine this, is actually real. How are you going to do that? For until you do this, why shouldn’t I acknowledge that the imaginary is in fact merely imaginary, and not real? Got any good guesses here?

But more than merely existing, God loves you Dawson,

I can imagine this with you all day, Tony. But that won’t make it real. If you want me to think that your god is real, you’ll need to explain how I can reliably distinguish it from something you’re merely imagining. Until then, you offer no reason for me to suppose that it is not imaginary. Even in my case, I know of no alternative to imagining your god. I cannot perceive it, I cannot deduce its existence from rationally informed premises, I cannot infer it from what I do know to be factual. So you have your work cut out for you if you want me to “believe.” Pointing out errors in so-called “non-Christian worldviews” does nothing to meet these challenges. One may be a non-theist and his worldview may be full of holes. But it would not logically follow from this that Christianity is true and/or that the Christian god is real. Surely you must understand at least this, no?

and sent His Son, in the Person of the Lord Jesus Christ, to conquer sin and death personally on your behalf

And people have been sinning and dying ever since. Some conquest!

—so that you may find true Life in Him.

The “true Life” you speak of is a life lived on the basis of imagination, Tony. I can imagine your god gives me “true Life,” or that Blarko the WonderBeing gives me “true Life.” Both fantasies are on equal footing, metaphysically speaking. Neither have any truth value, neither have any basis in reality.

By the way, Tony, a couple questions for you, since you bring this matter up. Can you tell me how the Christian worldview defines the concept ‘life’? Also, how does the Christian worldview account for life in the first place? Consider these questions for extra credit.

I pray that you find Him in SE Asia…perhaps that is why He has directed your pathway there.

Two things. For one, as the old song goes, nothing fails like prayer. In fact, prayer is the refuge of those who have given up on the ability of their own minds. It’s like hoping – on its own, it accomplishes nothing.

Second, I was not directed to SE Asia by the will of a being that is merely imaginary, but by my own choices and actions. See how you have to deny reality in order to treat the imaginary as if it were real?

by Dawson Bethrick

The Argument from the Unity of Knowledge

2011-05-25T05:00:00.000-07:00

I am now settling into my new life in SE Asia. So far it has been as bountiful an adventure as one could hope. With the house back home rented out and all my financial obligations State-side met, I am free to assimilate myself into a new culture, lifestyle and experience.

For now, I thought I’d throw out a question to consider about presppositionalism. Readers are welcome to post their thoughts from whatever perspective you may have. My life is unpredictable now so I don’t know when I’ll be able to chime in on the matter myself. But I’m eager to gather more input on this issue as it pertains to presuppositional apologetics.

In an essay titled If Knowledge Then God: The Epistemological Theistic Arguments of Plantinga and Van Til, apologetic theorist James Anderson presents a rendition of an argument which he attributes to Cornelius Van Til, which appears as follows:

[1] If no one has comprehensive knowledge of the universe, then no one can have any knowledge of the universe.
[2] Only God could have comprehensive knowledge of the universe.
[3] We have some knowledge of the universe.
[4] Therefore, God exists. (Op. cit., p. 20)

Anderson calls it “the argument from the unity of knowledge,” though it’s not clear whether Van Til called it this. Now I have a number of criticisms of this argument, and I find it wholly unpersuasive because of some serious flaws. But I’m curious what others think of its persuasiveness, whether or not they think it compels the conclusion it is intended to defend.

Please offer your own thoughts, positive or negative, in the comments section. At some point in the future I hope to present my own reaction to it.

by Dawson Bethrick

Imagine There's a Heaven

2011-04-29T23:00:00.001-07:00

I remember back when John Lennon’s song “Imagine” came out and reached wide popularity, how there was an outcry of protestation against it from the evangelical community. The song begins with the lyric, “Imagine there’s no heaven.” Evangelicals were outraged by this because we’re not supposed to do this – we’re not supposed to imagine that there is no heaven.

Rather, we’re supposed imagine that there is a heaven.

After all, what alternative do we have to imagination when it comes to contemplating the heaven which is described in the Christian bible? We can’t see it, we cannot infer its existence from empirical facts, we cannot conclude that it is real by reference to what we discover to be real. Indeed, we have no alternative to imagining when it comes to something as fantastic as Christianity’s heaven.

Just as important, if not more so, we’re also supposed to imagine that there’s a hell. Christians are encouraged to take the notion of hell seriously, and they want non-believers to take it seriously as well. Proverbs 1:7 tells us that “the fear of the Lord is the beginning of knowledge.” Without the threat of eternal damnation, Christianity would have only the incentive of a magic kingdom to encourage compliance with the devotional program. It would not have the psychological sanction needed to drive compulsion.

But before one can take the notion of hell – eternal torment, fire and brimstone, the bureaucracy of demons and devils which supervise the suffering that occurs there – one must imagine hell.

I have been told by at least one Christian, of the Calvinist persuasion to boot, that the Inquisitors “really believed in hell,” taking it so seriously that they believed nothing they could do on earth could match the suffering and torment that sinners will receive in hell. This same Christian also told me that Christians today typically do not believe in the existence of hell as fervently as the Inquisitors did. He did not explain how he knew what people long ago believed or how fervently they believed it. But the actions of the Inquisitors are in fact in line with what one might expect from those who take such fantasies seriously. But before they could take their belief in hell seriously, they had to imagine hell, for the imagination is the gateway to everything supernatural.

I will point out that this same Christian condemned the Inquisition as “a great evil,” and claimed that there is no biblical justification for what the Inquisitors did to people. I’m sure the Inquisitors themselves would disagree with both pronouncements. After all, the Christian bible has been, and can be, used to justify just about anything, including Calvinism itself. But debates over this point tend to distract us from the larger picture when it comes to evil and the Christian worldview. On the Christian worldview, there’s no doubt that there’s a place for evil in “God’s plan.” As the Christian worldview has it, the Christian god deliberately uses evil means to achieve its ends. Only we’re not allowed to call this action itself evil. We’re supposed to call it “good,” since its performer is supposed to be “all good” and have no evil in it. Who needs evil when good is misused in such a manner?

What’s noteworthy in this regard is that this same believer explained that where the Inquisitors went wrong is in their view of “God’s sovereignty as regards election.” The immorality of the Inquisitor’s position was not in their disregard of individual rights, but in improperly imagining their god’s nature. With thinking like this prevailing in some Christian quarters, the threat of the Inquisitors’ return will always be present.

While the imagination is indeed a powerful capacity of the human mind, it can go only so far in resolving such torturous incongruities as calling clearly evil actions “good.” Another case in point is the Christian notion of the trinity. According to Van Til & co., the trinity is supposed to be one person at the same time it’s three persons.

Now we can imagine fantasy realms like heaven and hell, and even invisible magic beings manipulating what we perceive from behind the scenes, thus satisfying the inceptive psychological demands of the Christian faith. But how does one wrap his mind around the notion of a god that is “one person, three persons” at the same time? I don’t think I can even imagine such a thing, let alone persuade myself to truly believe that such a contrivance is real. And if I can’t imagine it, how can I have faith in it? I could pretend, but I’m too honest to evade the fact that I would at that point be pretending, and such self-deception would be too blatant to sustain, even for the Christian faith’s own interests. Christianity tends to wield its sway best over a mind that has effectively buried its self-deceptions under the finely tilled surface of theological jargon and rationalizations.

But the imagination is still very powerful, and Christianity exploits this power most acutely in coaxing the believer literally to scare himself. It does this by urging with intense insistence the believer to imagine things which threaten his very being, things that are out of his control (even though, ironically, they are a figment of his own imagination), things that are malevolent and almighty, having the ability to dispatch a man’s very soul to the confines of inescapable torment forever and ever, amen. If a person invests himself in such imaginations, and takes them seriously, even seeking to validate them in his mind somehow as genuinely reflective of reality, he will find it terrifying. This simple scare tactic is the ultimate constable of the Christian faith. Once it is indulged and takes root in the mind of the bible-believer, it will hold him captive.

I recall, of all things, a John Stossel special I saw years ago called “The Power of Belief.” In it, Stossel explored the suggestibility of individuals disposed to confusing the imaginary with reality. I was delighted to find that portions of this documentary are accessible on YouTube (see here).

In the initial installment of the program (at the link provided), you will see an experiment conducted on several groups of children and a large enclosed cardboard box. The kids play in the room with the large cardboard box and eventually the kids inquire on the contents of the box. The children are told that it is empty and invited to look in the box to see for themselves that it is in fact empty. After the box is closed back up, the children are told a story about a hungry fox which lives inside the box. They understand that they’re supposed to pretend that there’s a fox in the box, and they play along with the story. Then the adult excuses herself from the room for a few moments, leaving the children in the room by themselves. After a short while, their curiosity about the box grows and they start to wonder if in fact there’s something in the box that they had earlier seen to be empty.

Soon the children begin to think they are hearing the fox in the box. Then they worry about it. Some get closer to the box to listen, but are afraid to open it. Some of the children in the experiment were confident that there was no fox in the box, but “most kids,” says Stossel,

aren’t sure. This is what happens in test after test. Almost every child begins to believe that the animal they helped create, might be real. Even when the researcher explains again that there was no fox in the box, most children believe it was there… Sometimes when we form beliefs, those beliefs persist against logic or evidence to the contrary. When I talked to kids later, many were convinced that the fox was in there.

Stossel says “magical thinking is fine for kids, but another thing when adults do it,” but quickly cautions that “we’re not talking mainstream religion here.” But why not? I’m guessing that Stossel didn’t want to alienate the mainstream religionists in his audience, even though the point he makes indubitably applies to their worldview.

There can be no doubt that the children in these experiments had active imaginations, and that their imaginations were fueled by suggestive input, in this case storytelling in which listeners use their imaginations to bring the story elements to life in their own minds. As children, they were not concerned with making a philosophical error. They were just reacting to their imaginations and the emotions that both fed and resulted from them.

The key here is the imagination, but not simply the ability to imagine, but rather the willingness to treat what one imagines as if it were real. This willingness is preconditional to taking the Christian view of heaven as a serious representation of reality, or “ultimate reality” as some believers might put it.

Is it any wonder, then, that Jesus is said to have mouthed the following words?

Except ye be converted, and become as little children, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven. (Matthew 18:3)

Adult Christians, then, are strikingly similar to children who have failed to distinguish between reality and imagination. The difference is that, as adults, they certainly should know better.

In the Christian worldview, it’s far more insidious than the experiments in the Stossel special. In the case of the story of the hungry fox in the box, the children were not encouraged to believe that the fox actually exists, and that it also demands their lifelong sacrifice. What the children did on their own as an innocent reflex of their own curiosity and sense of wonder, the Christian worldview systematizes as an essential part of its aggressive predatory gambits. The point is to undermine doubts in a person’s mind, to undermine his confidence in his own rational faculties, and consequently make him vulnerable to suggestion, even mind-control.

Compare:

Are you sure there’s no fox in the box?

with

Are you sure there’s no God?

From there, the imagination is supposed to take over and nourish the seeds of doubt and appease the fear that such doubts inevitably breed.

Even though the Christian himself has no alternative to his own imagination as the means of “knowing” heaven, he assures us that heaven is real, not imaginary. Some Christians have come close to conceding that the means by which the believer “knows” of heaven is very similar to imagination, and even that his imagination is involved in considering the wonders that heaven must possess. But, they hasten to add, this does not prove that heaven itself is imaginary. It does not necessarily follow, they might argue, from the fact that we must use our imaginations when thinking about heaven, that heaven is therefore imaginary. But this pushes the issue further into the realm of incredibility. If a Christian admits that the imagination is involved in his spiritual apprehension of heaven, then how does he distinguish what he calls “heaven” from what he may merely be imagining? They have all but outright admitted that their own imaginations are the psychological conduit by means of which they acquire cognitive access of this mysterious realm. And even if the believer is unwilling to admit the role of his imagination, he needs to consider the fact that the non-believer he’s trying to convince has no alternative to imagination as the means by which even to relate to what the Christian is telling him.

Rest assured, there’s a lot of heaving in Christianity about heaven. After all, Christians are emotionally invested in the hope that there’s a heaven awaiting them after death. And they actively seek out ways to convince themselves, once and for all, that the heaven they imagine actually exists. The desire to convince oneself is never satisfied, though, which only keeps them trying harder. Doubt is their sworn enemy. One is to “have faith, and doubt not” (Matthew 21:21), so doubt must be suppressed at all costs. Even if that doubt lingers in the minds of others. Even there it is a threat. And Christians treat it as such.

Some Christians have appealed to testimonies from so-called “near-death experiences,” in which a person who was close to death or actually pronounced dead at one point and subsequently revived, reports that he had visited heaven while apparently deceased.

The question I would have for such individuals is how they identified the “place” where they found themselves during their experience as heaven in the first place. What vetting process, if any, did they apply in determining that what they experienced was the realm which Christianity calls “heaven”? And if heaven’s so great, why did they return to earth? Perhaps the very indicators which confirmed in their minds that they were in heaven, persuaded them that life on earth was actually better. Was it the boredom factor? Was it the lack of caring for anything? Was it the chaos of the dream-like quality of the experience? Was it the obvious superimposition of storybook details accrued from bible-reading or gospel hymnals on the memory of a dream? In the attempt to validate the claim that the realm visited really was heaven, what “evidence” does one isolate to factor out the role of the imagination as the medium of the believer’s experience? This seems to be the unanswered question which Christianity is most unprepared to face.

by Dawson Bethrick

Incinerating Presuppositionalism: Year Six

2011-03-26T06:00:00.000-07:00

Today is March 26, which means another anniversary here at Incinerating Presupposition has rolled around once again. The first posting on Incinerating Presuppositionalism was published on March 26, 2005, a whole six years ago. And though this past year has been relatively sluggish in terms of posting activity, I am alive and well, and the state of IP is strong.

This past year has seen a fresh load of new posts. Here they are in all their glory:

225. Incinerating Presuppositionalism: Year Five - March 26, 2010

226. If Knowledge Then Non-Theism - April 4, 2010

227. The Imaginative Nature of Christian Theism - May 7, 2010

228. My Suppressed Comment Regarding TAG on Choosing Hats - May 19, 2010

229. TAG: Precariously Straddling the Horns of a Nasty Dilemma - May 21, 2010

230. Is Atheism Inherently Arrogant? - June 4, 2010

231. Answering Hutchinson’s Critique of Objectivism - June 11, 2010

232. A Response to David Smart on Arrogance - June 18, 2010

233. Was I Ever a Presuppositionalist Myself? - June 22, 2010

234. The Biological Nature of Consciousness - June 25, 2010

235. The Storybook Worldview - July 21, 2010

236. Is the Christian God’s Existence “Self-Evident”? - July 25, 2010

237. Nocterro’s Anti-Objectivist Pseudo-Terrorism - July 31, 2010

238. A Critique of Sye Ten Bruggencate’s www.proofthatgodexists.org - August 27, 2010

239. My Squabble with Andrew - September 3, 2010

240. A Reply to Andrew Louis - September 5, 2010

241. Another Reply to Andrew Louis - September 7, 2010

242. Andrew Louis’ Persisting Confusions - September 11, 2010

243. Rick Warden’s Critique of Objectivism - October 7, 2010

244. Some Thoughts on Presuppositionalism and the Problem of Evil - October 22, 2010

245. A Knock at the Door - November 17, 2010

246. Was Ayn Rand “Dead Wrong”? - December 7, 2010

247. Does the Double Slit Experiment Refute the Primacy of Existence? - January 29, 2011

248. Thoughts on Gallup’s Religious Wellbeing Polls - February 25, 2011

249. On “Justifying” the “Inductive Principle” - March 16, 2011

While all my blogs are worth reading (of course!), highlights from this past year’s activity include #227 The Imaginative Nature of Christian Theism, in which I cite no less than 13 points of evidence which indicate that Christian theism finds its basis in the believer’s imagination; #234 The Biological Nature of Consciousness, which points out several reasons why consciousness is in fact a natural, biological phenomenon, and not some mysterious item of supernatural origin which is beyond our ability to understand; and of course #238 A Critique of Sye Ten Bruggencate’s www.proofthatgodexists.org, which generated a lot of heat but has received no refutations whatsoever (it completely overwhelmed Sye Bruggencate himself). This blog entry also saw the highest number of comments, numbering at this time at 198, the most ever in response to one of my blogs.

Over the next few months I will be embarking on a great personal adventure and I’m expecting this to curb my own activity on IP for some time. So you might see fewer postings from me for a while. But don’t be too discouraged. I’ll still be lurking in the background, looking for opportunities to connect with my readers. In the meantime, you have six years worth of IP to feast on, and the great thing is that you can always return for seconds. Mmmm, mmmm, good!

by Dawson Bethrick

On "Justifying" the "Inductive Principle"

2011-03-16T02:00:00.001-07:00

In his debate with Eddie Tabash, presuppositional apologist Greg Bahnsen asked the following question:

Mr. Tabash, on what rational basis do you then, as an atheist, justify belief in the inductive principle?

If Mr. Bahnsen had asked me this question, I would have answered with the following:

I justify belief in the inductive principle on the basis of the axioms, the primacy of existence, and the objective theory of concepts.

Granted this is not the response which Tabash gave. But how would a presuppositionalist respond to my proposed response to Bahnsen? What “holes” could the anti-Objectivist uncover in my justification of the “inductive principle”?

Any thoughts?

by Dawson Bethrick

Thoughts on Gallup’s Religious Wellbeing Polls

2011-02-25T00:30:00.000-08:00

Christian apologist Rick Warden has posted numerous comments on my blog (see my blogs here and here), reaching for virtually any desperate means of attacking Objectivism that he can concoct on the spur of the moment. To his credit, Rick rightly recognizes that Objectivism poses a philosophical threat to theism, and his choice to dig in his heels to protect his god-belief from the very existence of other human beings who do not buy into the bible’s bull, has motivated him to deploy numerous deliberately distorting and, I dare say, underhanded tirades on my blog. His latest barrage of comments were posted in mid January on this blog, and I debated whether or not to respond yet again to someone who has proven to be quite unteachable on philosophical matters. Since I realize that some of my readers might benefit from points I have in response to Rick’s rants, and since I haven’t been posting much on my blog in recent months, I have decided to publish my reaction.

In the present entry, I will focus on some polling results published by Gallup which Rick apparently thinks are important to the debate.

Now when Rick Warden, in his continuing effort to find fault with Objectivism, seeks to turn our attention to Gallup’s polling data, this is a clear sign that he’s on the ropes. It indicates nothing more than that he senses his own position’s futility in trying to seal any philosophical case against Objectivism. If one cannot win his case by means of legitimate argument, focus your sights the latest Gallup survey.

But I’m happy to oblige and check out the surveys’ results.

Rick himself has posted an entry on his own blog regarding the polling data. His blog can be found here:

Gallup Polls Highlight Happiness, Health and Logic in Spirituality

Gallup’s own release of the polling results can be found here:

Religious Americans Enjoy Higher Wellbeing

Very Religious Americans Report Less Depression, Worry

Now I have never granted very much importance to polls. I’m of the considered opinion that one could pretty much create a poll to achieve whatever result he wants. But this is not the first time I’ve seen a theist point to polling data or popularity contests as a means of defending theism. What’s notable about the two Gallup polls which Rick Warden cites, is that religiosity as it is understood and measured in both polls is not specific to any particular religion. Both polls assume the following definitions:

Very religious -- Religion is an important part of daily life and church/synagogue/mosque attendance occurs at least every week or almost every week. This group constitutes 43.7% of the adult population.

Moderately religious -- All others who do not fall into the very religious or nonreligious groups but who gave valid responses on both religion questions. This group constitutes 26.6% of the adult population.

Nonreligious -- Religion is not an important part of daily life and church/synagogue/mosque attendance occurs seldom or never. This group constitutes 29.7% of the adult population.

At minimum, “religion” as Gallup measures it could be either Christianity (“church”), Judaism (“synagogue”) or Islam (“mosque”), and presumably could be any other religion for that matter. While I have not seen the questions which survey respondents were asked to answer in either poll, the definitions here suggest that “religion” as it is understood is widely open-ended. The poll also makes a point to indicate that religiosity is defined in part as “self-reported importance of religion,” and that this single criterion can by itself measure a respondent’s religiosity. So depending on how the question is asked, a person reporting that religion is very important – whatever that might mean to the respondent – would be classified by the survey in the “very religious” bucket.

Another point of note that I find troubling is that it is not clear what specifically is meant by “wellbeing” as the Gallup polls understand it. I’m sure Gallup has a worked-out understanding of what this is supposed to mean, but I could not find it in my review of the documentation (then again, I just “skimmed” it – a talent I learned from Sye Ten Bruggencate). Now the Gallup poll page does have a link to an advertisement for a book on wellbeing titled Wellbeing: The Five Essential Elements, by Tom Rath and John Harter. When I clicked on the link, the book’s advertisement showcases five boxes presumably corresponding to the “five essential elements” mentioned in the book’s title. Those elements are: career wellbeing, social wellbeing, financial wellbeing, physical wellbeing, community wellbeing. Lacking from these “essential elements” are personal wellbeing and philosophical wellbeing, the very categories that I would think are as important (if not more so) as physical wellbeing and career wellbeing. So if this is any indication of what Gallup means by “wellbeing,” perhaps it should come as no surprise that those who the survey categorizes as “very religious” might score high.

But clearly Rick Warden wants us to take Gallup’s polling results seriously. And his interpretation of the polling results is highly suspect. For example, in the comments section of this blog, he wrote:

If you look at my recent blog article on spirituality and happiness, you will find Gallup polls that show selfishness and materialism are not conducive to happiness, but spirituality is. Ayn Rand chose atheism at age 13, according to her personal notes. In her so-called “philosophy for life” she ended up addicted to meth as she wrote the Fountainhead.

In my review of both Gallup polls which Rick cites, I found no mention whatsoever about selfishness or materialism. This seems to be Rick’s own interpretation of the data. And yet Rick himself does not produce any rational basis for this interpretation of the data presented in these studies. Rick’s own blog entry on the topic does not make any mention of either selfishness or materialism either. And yet, here he is telling us that these studies indicate that neither selfishness nor materialism is “conducive to happiness.” But from what I can see, the studies in no way state this.

While I would not be surprised by any study finding that materialism – if taken seriously and applied consistently – resulted in depression, ennui, mental agitation, or emotional emptiness, it’s hard to see how a genuinely anti-selfish disposition and code of conduct could result in happiness. Happiness is the emotional result of achieving one’s own values. By its very nature happiness is selfish.

Let’s be clear on the meaning of these terms. Selfishness, as Objectivism informs it, is essentially concern for one’s own interests. When someone takes care of himself, works to earn his way through life, purchases a home for himself and his family to live in, buys his family food and clothing, pays the energy bill, educates himself and improves his talents and abilities, and the like, he’s acting selfishly.

Some dictionaries will define selfishness as concern exclusively for oneself while deliberately ignoring or even thwarting the values of others. But this is clearly not a suitable definition, for caring for another’s values could very well be in a person’s own self-interest. I look after my wife’s interests and my daughter’s interests, just as I look after my own immediate interests, because they too are among my interests. Their welfare is definitely very high in my hierarchy of values. When I tend to my wife’s and daughter’s needs, I am being just as selfish as when I tend to my own immediate needs. So, to be sure, there are some very persistent misconceptions about the meaning and nature of selfishness. Rand points this out in the Introduction to her book The Virtue of Selfishness:

The meaning ascribed in popular usage to the word “selfishness” is not merely wrong: it represents a devastating intellectual “package-deal,” which is responsible, more than any other single factor, for the arrested moral development of mankind.

In popular usage, the word “selfishness” is a synonym of evil; the image it conjures is of a murderous brute who tramples over piles of corpses to achieve his own ends, who cares for no living being and pursues nothing but the gratification of the mindless whims of any immediate moment. (vii)

The opposite of selfishness is selflessness. Selflessness is essentially indifference to values as such. A selfish person is someone who looks out for his values: he takes those actions which achieve and secure those values which he needs in order to live, including those which make his life worth living (for they offer the incentive he needs in order to continue living). He recognizes that values are not automatically achieved, but must be achieved and protected by means of chosen action guided by rational judgment.

A truly selfless person, if such a thing could exist, would take no interest in what he needs in order to live. He would be indifferent to his need for food, clothing, shelter from the elements, knowledge, ability, judgment, social relationships, etc. Obviously such a person would have minimal life expectancy. But this is the ideal which is offered by the anti-selfishness crowd: they don’t want you to be the primary beneficiary of your own actions; they want someone or something else to enjoy that role.

It should be noted that those who preach self-sacrifice often appeal to emergencies as the backdrop for making their points. For instance, a selfish man, it may be claimed, would not risk his life by running into a burning building to save his wife or children. He’s only going to look out for his own skin, and not worry about others. So he’d let them burn up. But this is not necessarily true, nor is it a just representation of what selfishness truly is. A selfish man may very well run into a burning house, especially if (a) something he values is threatened by the flames engulfing the house (especially if it’s an irreplaceable value, such as a family member or close friend), and (b) he believes, on what little assessment the situation allows, that he might have some chance at succeeding in saving his values. And while a truly selfless person would not care either way if persons and things were destroyed in a house fire (since he is to reject his self, and with it anything that could potentially be a value relating to his self), emergencies are not the norm of human life, and therefore not the standard condition for evaluating moral behavior. A person acting in response to an emergency does not have the luxury of being able to consider all available alternatives, scrutinizing the situation’s particular circumstances and subsequently weighing the pros and cons of his actions with adequate knowledge of their appropriateness. On the contrary, in an emergency, where life and limb face immediate threat, one must act without being able to assess the situation. The moral is the chosen under normal conditions, not what one might be compelled to do in an emergency.

Given these points, consider the lunacy of someone who says something to the effect that you need to sacrifice yourself in order to achieve something you want, such as happiness. If one sacrifices himself, he sacrifices everything he wants, including happiness. To suppose that happiness is only possible on the condition that one sacrifice himself – which would include everything he values, wants, and enjoys – is to distort happiness beyond recognition. On such a view, what is “happiness” and why would it be important? The mystic can say “If you want happiness, you need to deny yourself” all he wants. But he ignores the facts that “wanting” is of the self to begin with, and happiness requires a self which can enjoy it.

Now consider what must be the motivation of those who condemn selfishness and urge you to renounce your concern for your own interests. Could it be the case that they hope to gain something – anything – by means of your sacrifice? Even if it’s some form of satisfaction or sense of validation – as perverse as either would be – that they are seeking, such a goal is itself borne of a desire to gain. In such a case, we have clear case of hypocrisy.

But neither of the two Gallup polls which Rick cites suggests that one should go about seeking and achieving happiness by giving up himself, his ideals, his principles, his character, his self. In no way is self-sacrifice indicated as the proper means to happiness in any of these polls. Likewise, in no way do either poll indicate that selfishness is anathema or hostile to happiness.

What I found interesting in the polls were the results reported among those categorized by Gallup as “Very Religious.” In the poll measuring well-being, the “very religious” participants of the poll achieved a score of only 68.7 on the Well-Being Index. Assuming that the maximum score achievable is 100 (which may or may not be the case), why did the “Very Religious” category achieve such a mediocre score? On a traditional grading system, this score out of 100 would amount to a D+ at best. For those claiming to be filled with a divine spirit that’s supposed to be omniscient, infallible and omnibenevolent, that’s hardly something to brag about.

At any rate, why did the “very religious” score only a 68.7? Why did they not achieve an overall higher score?

Similarly I was struck by the results of the poll measuring depression among the surveyed populations. According to this poll, 15.6% of those answering to the criteria defining “very religious” were diagnosed with depression. Gallup’s own assessment says that “Nearly one in six (15.6%) very religious American adults have been diagnosed with depression in their lifetime.” One in six?! Why is the frequency of depression diagnosis for this portion of the population so high? Why would there be any depression among those who are “very religious” if their religious views actually contained the secret to better wellbeing? If the religious view of the world were in fact so superior to any non-religious view, as religious apologists like Rick Warden insist, such findings are in painful need for explanation.

Perhaps the depression reported by those in the “very religious” category could be explained as having been experienced prior to becoming “very religious.” If that is the case (and it’s not clear if the poll allows for such responses), perhaps it was depression which influenced their decision to become religious in the first place. I know from firsthand experience how religious proselytizers often seek to exploit difficulties in a person’s life in order to woo them into the religious fold. It is often the case that a person turns to religion when he is at a low point in his life. After all, one typically does not refocus his hopes on the supernatural when things in the natural world are going well. I’m reminded of one of Danny Barker’s tunes, which includes the observant statement, “before you can sell salvation, you have to sell damnation.” And damnation is a lot easier to sell when someone is deep in the doldrums of life.

But folks like Rick don’t want us to focus exclusively on the “very religious” results. Rather, they want us to be impressed by comparisons between the different groups that the surveys categorize and measure. In the well-being survey, for instance, we’re supposed to be preoccupied by the difference between those categorized as “very religious” – who collectively scored 68.7 on the Well-Being Index– and those categorized as “non-religious” – who collectively scored only 64.2. Apparently we’re supposed to be excited (or quickened) by the “Our group scored higher than your group” chorus of the “very religious,” even though the difference between the two scores is hardly significant. While the “non-religious” score may be a solid D, the “very religious” score is at best only a D+. And a D+ is hardly something to shout about. Indeed, one would think that, if the “truths” which the “very religious” have traditionally championed were in fact true, the divide between these respective scores would be considerably wider. We might even expect the “very religious” to be consistently scoring an A+ while the “non-religious” are hopelessly suffocating in the low Fs.

The survey also states that

Well-Being Index scores do not vary widely across sub-groups of the U.S. population. For example, across all 50 states, the range in Well-Being Index scores from the highest scoring state to the lowest scoring state is about 10 points.

In other words, as I understand this, the broadest range in score differential is about 10 points across the US, and yet the differential between “very religious” and “non-religious” is statistically averaged at less than half of this! If that’s the case, I’m even less impressed by the poll’s results, especially given the fact that the vast majority of Americans are products of a miserable educational system, and also the fact that most “non-religious” persons in the United States very probably accept many religious premises, whether they realize it or not, and thus float through their existence with little if any rational bearing on the course of their lives. On that note, a sure formula for depression would involve accepting religion’s man-damning premises on the one hand, and the futile belief that one could never measure up to religion’s standards, that one could never earn his dignity or sanctity, regardless of what he does or attempts to accomplish. Accepting such premises in one’s worldview would drastically reduce one’s philosophical capacity for achieving genuine happiness.

In the end, however, all that Gallup really gives us are some polling results, with little to no indication that I could readily find as to what questions the respondents were asked to consider. And the fact that neither poll measures for happiness among those self-identifying specifically as Objectivists only tells me that this distinction is ignored by the surveying process. Had the polls included this additional category, what would their results look like? I guess we’ll never know.

by Dawson Bethrick

Does the Double Slit Experiment Refute the Primacy of Existence?

2011-01-29T07:00:00.000-08:00

A visitor to my website sent me the following question:

I somehow came across your validation text of the primacy of existence, and found it very enlightening and interesting to read. However, it got me thinking of a quantum mechanics experiment I have heard about, the Double Slit Experiment. Have you heard of it? I have studied neither philosophy nor physics but am greatly interested in both, and my intuition told me that the double slit experiment contradicts the primacy of existence. Since you seem very adept at organising thoughts and arguing theories as these, I felt like asking you what you think of this matter.

Doesn't the fact that the behaviour of electrons, when shot through a double slit, alters from wave-like patterns to particle patterns, through the act of observation challenge the primacy of existence? It is like the electrons themselves become aware of us being aware of them, and therefor alters their behaviour. In other words, they become conscious of our consciousness and changes their existence, meaning their existence becomes relative to our awareness, nullifying their primacy.

The article pertaining to the primacy of existence on my website which the inquirer mentions can be found here.

The inquirer also mentions the so-called Double Slit Experiment. A brief video describing the Double Slit Experiment can be found here.

My response to the inquirer’s question follows below:

Thanks for your question.

You ask: “Doesn't the fact that the behaviour of electrons, when shot through a double slit, alters from wave-like patterns to particle patterns, through the act of observation challenge the primacy of existence?”

Yes, I am aware of the double slit experiment, and I have actually written on it, since some folks apparently think its results contradict the primacy of existence. But can you tell me who observes the behavior of particles at the quantum level, and by what means? The double slit experiment is often described as having a different outcome (e.g., a banded pattern as opposed to an interference pattern) when someone “observes” the electrons passing through the slits in the experiment. But who’s doing the “observing” here? No one that I know of can *perceive* an electron with the naked eye. (If you know of anyone, please identify him or her.) It is said that a “measuring device” is used to capture this information, but a measuring device is not the same thing as a human being (or any other biological organism) “observing” what the measuring device is measuring. A fundamental distinction seems to have been ignored in deriving the conclusion that “merely observing” the electrons in the experiment alters the experiment’s outcomes, which – if that’s what has happened – seems very sloppy to me.

Needless to say, there is no prima facie violation of the primacy of existence occurring when the presence of a physical object has an impact on other physical objects in its immediate vicinity. Whether it’s the earth orbiting the sun because of gravitational pull, or the after wash of a tractor trailer blowing a bicyclist on a road when it passes him, physical objects acting upon other physical objects produce physical effects. So the presence of a “measuring device” in the double slit experiment altering the outcome of the experiment does not in any way suggest to me that the primacy of existence has been violated.

Now if the behavior of the electrons in the experiment conformed to the scientist’s wishes, emotions, imagination, temper tantrum, or commands, then you could feasibly say that we have an instance of a violation of the primacy of existence. But no scientist that I know of claims that this is what is happening in the double slit case. Nor do I know of any scientists suggesting that electrons possess consciousness, as if the electrons in the double slit experiment are mischievously playing some kind of trick on us. But even supposing the electrons were conscious, and had the capacity of motor control (as we have, such as when I lift my coffee cup to my lips), their behavior would not in any way nullify the primacy of existence. Rather, they would be acting according to their identity, just as I act according to my identity when I take a sip of coffee. In neither case, there is no violation of the primacy of existence so far as I understand the mechanics and procedures of the experiment.

QM is admitted, by virtually every scientist in the field, to be a realm of mystery. It’s best not to try to shape one’s understanding of philosophy on the basis of a field of science that is still in its infancy.

I hope that helps.

Regards,

Dawson

The inquirer replied to my answer with the following statement:

It seems I was right in asking you about this since you made several things clear to me. I didn't realize how vital the distinction between a measuring device and an observing organism. Neither did I reach the conclusion that should electrons be conscious, would they still not nullify the primacy, but just be acting on their identity. It seems your validation on the primacy of existence was not enough for me to grasp it all but needed this mail conversation as well to realise that physical interference was not a way for consciousness obtain primacy. You've convinced me of the primacy of existence:) thanks again!

Your thoughts, questions, reactions are welcome.

by Dawson Bethrick

Was Ayn Rand "Dead Wrong"?

2010-12-07T12:00:00.000-08:00

I was recently asked for my reaction to Geoffrey James’ Top 10 Reasons Why Ayn Rand Was Dead Wrong.

James’ anti-Rand rant is so full of holes, it seems that anyone who is genuinely familiar with Objectivism wouldn’t need my response to detect its flaws.

James clearly has issues with Ayn Rand and her philosophy, and in the litany of alleged offences that he cites, he often toggles between Rand the person and Objectivism the philosophy as the target of his charges. In fact, some of the accusations which James presents, have nothing to do with what Objectivism actually teaches, but seem to stem from personal misgivings of his own.

James calls Objectivism “an absurd philosophy that got sold to the world of business and government,” and blames it for “creating a world of havoc in the United States.” While he points repeatedly to Alan Greenspan specifically as a link between Objectivism and the current economic crisis in America (an association which I address below), James fails to cite any piece of legislation governing American economic or other interest which finds its source in Objectivist philosophy. Given his stated understanding of the cause of this “world of havoc in the United States,” James would apparently have his readers believe that Washington has been inundated by Objectivists and Objectivist ideas for the past 50 years. If only that were the case!

Throughout his article, James makes some bizarre and apparently self-contradictory statements. We find a howling example in his first paragraphs:

Objectivism is important to sales professionals because it’s the kind of philosophy that, if you believe in it, you’re going to screw up your ability to sell effectively. As a profession, Sales has moved beyond the attempt to manipulate people selfishly for one’s own ends, which is how Objectivism plays itself out in the real world. [sic]

If what James says about Objectivism were true – namely that it will cause salesmen to “screw up [their] ability to sell effectively” – why would it be at all “important to sales professionals”? And if it were true that “Sales has moved beyond the attempt to manipulate people selfishly for one’s own ends,” why suppose that Objectivism has any influence on business practices today?

I’ve worked in sales for many years, and in that time I’ve not encountered anyone who expressed any familiarity with Objectivism. I’m sure there are some out there, but I haven’t run across them yet. But James makes it sounds like Objectivism is the Skull and Bones of every sales team in the land. But even he points out how Objectivism is at odds with the direction he apparently thinks “Sales” has taken itself since who knows when, by pointing out its inconsistency with appealing to the selfishness of consumers as a marketing tool.

James then goes on to say that “most successful sales professionals feel that they are in service to something greater than themselves.” While James’ ability to know what feelings “most successful sales professionals” have is itself impressive, he paints them as if they were motivated by some religious teaching that is completely alien to the content of what Objectivism teaches. Objectivism certainly does not teach individuals to think of themselves primarily as the means to some end that surpasses their own self-interests, as if they were sacrificial animals “in service to something greater than themselves.” But what successful sales professionals adopt such a view? Suppose you take a proven sales professional and tell him that, instead of his monthly commission, he would be paid with the blissful assurance that his earnings would go to the March of Dimes, the Salvation Army, or some other charity whose scope is “greater than himself.” How much longer do you suppose he would continue in his profession? Apparently James thinks contributing to some cause that transcends the salesman’s own interests is what motivates him. Why then aren’t more salesmen deferring their commissions and directing them to so-called non-profit organizations that are geared toward securing that cause?

James has already clued us in on his bizarre understanding of human nature and his affinity for sacrificial ethics (anyone paying attention should have no trouble seeing this). But we haven’t even gotten started on his list of objections against Objectivism, and already we’re encountering howlers like this.

So, let’s explore James’ indictment against Objectivism, and see how well his “top ten reasons” why Objectivism is “a total crock” stand up to examination.

James’ first objection is directed (at least on the surface) against Rand’s political philosophy:

Laissez-Faire capitalism doesn’t work. Laissez-Faire capitalism is a utopian fantasy. And like all utopias, it cannot actually exist. Therefore, as a philosophy, it needs to be judged on how it gets implemented in the real world, with all the real world’s inherent inconsistencies. Just like Marxism, in the real world, produced the Soviet system in Russia, the real world implementation of laissez-faire capitalism, led by Rand-disciple Greenspan, produced the great recession.

James wants to indict Rand’s philosophy for what he calls “the great recession,” but his only link between the two is a personality which defected from the Objectivist movement decades ago, namely Alan Greenspan. Essentially, James invokes the fallacy of guilt by association in order to incriminate Rand and her philosophy as the cause of the current economic malaise afflicting the United States. James produces no analysis demonstrating any Objectivist ideas as the cause of any economic crisis in America or elsewhere. It is true that Alan Greenspan collaborated with Rand in compiling her book Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal, to which Greenspan contributed three (out of 26) chapters. But it does not follow from this fact that Greenspan’s practices as chairman of the Federal Reserve were in line with Objectivism’s political teachings. Philosopher Harry Binswanger cites some clear evidence that this is the case in his article Greenspan on “Infectious Greed”, which supports his case with direct quotations from Alan Greenspan. I’m more than confident that a close examination of Greenspan’s decision-making in his role as Fed Chairman will reveal significant departures from Objectivism on Greenspan’s part. But I am certainly not the first to notice this or point it out.

Speaking more directly to the cause of the current economic crisis, many commentators have pointed to the subprime mortgage delinquencies and related high-risk loan indiscretions in the housing market as one of the chief culprits of the current economic situation. I am persuaded that such arguments have ample merit, and we can thank a handful of leftists in Congress for making this possible. But where does James link these immediate causes to Objectivist teachings as their root cause? He doesn’t. And he won’t be able to.

Instead, James trades in vague generalities with the sole intent to smear, calling laissez-fair capitalism a “fantasy” which “cannot actually exist.” He provides no argument for these characterizations; apparently he either thinks they are self-evidently true, or that they should be accepted on his own say so. But this undercuts his indictment of Objectivism as the cause of the current economic crisis in America: if Objectivism’s political philosophy is a mere fantasy which “cannot actually exist,” then it cannot have been in place as the condition in which the current economic crisis gestated and culminated into what it is today. Had James pointed out that America is not guided by laissez-faire capitalism, he would be correct. But again, this would only exonerate Objectivism from the economic sins he accuses it of bringing into being: if laissez-faire capitalism is only a fantasy that “cannot actually exist,” then it couldn’t possibly have been driving the American economy into the ditch over the past decade.

Considering James’ complaint more broadly, exactly what is it about Objectivism’s political philosophy that he thinks is so unrealistic? Objectivism defines ‘capitalism’ as “a social system based on the recognition of individual rights, including property rights, in which all property is privately owned.” Needless to say, this has hardly existed in the United States, particularly over the last century, for the federal government has always owned at least some property (and does so more and more with each passing moment). What is James’ objection against “a social system based on the recognition of individual rights” that has him so agitated against Rand and her philosophy? James does not explain this; he does not give any indication that he understands what Objectivism means by capitalism. But the fundamental point of contention should be clear: to oppose capitalism as Objectivism informs it, is to oppose individual property rights. In terms of essentials, there’s no other way to interpret it.

James’ second indictment against Objectivism states the following:

Reason has real-world limitations. While I’m all for valuing reason over superstition, the notion that one can use reason without emotion is science fiction. Maybe that works on the planet Vulcan, but human beings swim in a vast ocean of emotion. Emotion governs the “why” behind every exercise of reason, determining our choices of interest and intention. In the real world, people use reason as a way to buttress what their emotions desire.

Not only does James fail to quote Rand and thus establish the relevance of his objection to what Objectivism actually teaches, he also exhibits the tendency of equating what people do “in the real world” with what is philosophically proper. After all, since James is critiquing Objectivism as a philosophy, the concern here is the philosophical value of Objectivism’s teachings. At least, that’s what one might think given the task that James has set out to accomplish in his critique of Objectivism.

The problem for James is the fact that what people actually do “in the real world” is not a reliable indicator of what is true, false or philosophically viable. Nor does what people actually do in the real world have any bearing on whether or not Objectivism is true. “What people actually do” is a mixed bag, and includes everything from childrearing to running a business, from riding a bicycle to robbing a bank, from running a touchdown to participating in a riot. An individual might habitually make mistakes balancing his checkbook; but this is no sustainable implication against the validity of basic arithmetic. One would think that any adult, including Geoffrey James, could understand this.

Speaking more directly to James’ objection, Objectivism nowhere denies the facts that man has emotions, that his emotions are real, that they color his experience and accompany his decision-making. Objectivism nowhere teaches that one should “reason without emotion,” and James provides no citation which legitimizes this allegation against Objectivism. Rand’s fundamental epistemological point regarding emotion is not that reason and emotion are inherently antagonistic to each other, but that emotion is not a substitute for his faculty of reason. Specifically, Rand wrote:

There is no necessary clash, no dichotomy between man’s reason and his emotions—provided he observes their proper relationship. A rational man knows—or makes it a point to discover—the source of his emotions, the basic premises from which they come; if his premises are wrong, he corrects them. He never acts on emotions for which he cannot account, the meaning of which he does not understand. In appraising a situation, he knows why he reacts as he does and whether he is right. He has no inner conflicts, his mind and his emotions are integrated, his consciousness is in perfect harmony. His emotions are not his enemies, they are his means of enjoying life. But they are not his guide; the guide is his mind. This relationship cannot be reversed, however. If a man takes his emotions as the cause and his mind as their passive effect, if he is guided by his emotions and uses his mind only to rationalize or justify them somehow—then he is acting immorally, he is condemning himself to misery, failure, defeat, and he will achieve nothing but destruction—his own and that of others. (“Playboy’s Interview with Ayn Rand,” March 1964.)

James gives no indication that he understands these distinctions as part of Rand’s understanding of emotions and their role in man’s mental life, which makes me wonder just how familiar he is with his chosen subject matter. Where is he getting his understanding of Rand and her philosophy?

In his third complaint, James excoriated Rand’s character:

Ayn Rand was a [sic] emotional nut case. Regardless of what you think of her philosophy and writing, Rand’s personal life was a complete shambles. She became involved in an adulterous affair with a disciple (a “reasonable” decision on her part, of course), and then went all “old bat of out hell” when he made the “reasonable” decision to start boinking some younger woman. The resulting emotional pyrotechnics were a perfect example of the impotence of Objectivism as a life creed.

This is pure ad hominem. James is simply trying to smear Rand’s philosophy because she allegedly had character flaws. This is clear because he is saying that her personal life was an example of Objectivism in action. Of course, any high school sophomore should be able to recognize that this doesn’t follow.

Then again, if what James describes here actually happened as he describes it, what possible contention could he have against Rand? James just got through telling us that “emotions govern the ‘why’ behind every exercise of reason, determining our choices of interest and intention,” and that “in the real world, people use reason to buttress what their emotions desire.” Now he finds fault with Rand for allegedly doing precisely this. If what James says in his prior criticism is accepted as the guiding light, what justifies his calling Rand “a [sic] emotional nut case”? James’ prior criticism of Rand’s teachings (ever so threadbare as it is) is incompatible with his disparagement of Rand the person.

But is it truly the case that “Rand’s personal life was a complete shambles”? I hardly think so. Rand’s personal life was punctuated with heroic successes that most men in the West could hardly rival. Rand was born into a Jewish family living in Russia at the turn of the 20th century. Perhaps James is unfamiliar with the culture of pre-Soviet Russia, but having Jewish roots in Russia was not a precondition for success and celebrity. At a very young age Rand endured a traumatic event in which she believed she was going to be murdered, survived the communist revolution of the Soviets in the early 20th century, and emigrated to a foreign nation on her own with nothing more than the shirt on her back, leaving her entire family behind, most of whom she never saw again for the rest of her life. In spite of these tragic events which no doubt affected her life, she finished her degree at Petrograd State University, wrote screen plays for Hollywood films, published two best-selling novels in the United States, appeared as a witness before US Congress, and founded her own original philosophy which has influenced many individuals in the US and abroad. Rand was a successful novelist, businesswoman, public speaker and celebrity. She earned her every achievement, which, according to her philosophy, is the formula for genuine happiness, so it is hard to see how one could rightly call her “personal life… a complete shambles.” Indeed, Rand’s success was not the result of some lottery win, nor was she riding on a wave of “luck” given the “accident” of her birth. Rand was born a Jew in pre-Soviet Russia, endured the Communist Revolution in that nation, departed the land of her birth completely on her own, and created a successful life for herself in America often in the face of extreme opposition, such as is evidenced in the vitriol of her detractors, which persists to this day, long after her death.

As for Rand’s extramarital indulgences, James seems to be judging this episode of her life through Judeo-Christian goggles. The stigma of “adultery” is not Objectivist in origin. Rand’s affair with Nathaniel Branden needs no apologies since all parties to it, including Rand’s own husband Frank O’Conner, openly consented to it. Rand did formally part ways with Branden some time after her affair with him had concluded, but her reasons for this cited Branden’s dishonesty to her, not his “boinking” of some other woman. Regardless, Rand’s personal life is neither here nor there when it comes to assessing the merits of her philosophy, just as Euclid’s personal faults have no bearing on the validity of the geometry he developed.

James announces his next complaint:

Her philosophy is devoid of gratitude. While individualism has some value, Objectivism largely discounts the fact the every successful person stands on the shoulders of those who have come before. In addition, success always involves an element of luck, often consisting of having had the luck to be born into a rich family with plenty of connections. Success devoid of gratitude and the noblesse oblige to help others brings out the worst in people.

If there were any question that James were personally familiar with what Rand actually wrote on the issues he raises, that question should now be settled: Clearly he is not!
Rand cited the only rational basis for gratitude when she offered the following observation:

We inherit the products of the thought of other men. We inherit the wheel. We make a cart. The cart becomes an automobile. The automobile becomes an airplane. But all through the process what we receive from others is only the end product of their thinking. The moving force is the creative faculty which takes this product as material, uses it and originates the next step. This creative faculty cannot be given or received, shared or borrowed. It belongs to single, individual men. That which it creates is the property of the creator. Men learn from one another. But all learning is only the exchange of material. No man can give another the capacity to think. Yet that capacity is our only means of survival. (The Fountainhead)

Here Rand explicitly acknowledges the effort and productiveness of those who came before us and achieved values which we enjoy and build on today. In this passage Rand eloquently acknowledges both the contributions of those who came before us as well as the responsibility we have as individuals to make the choice to think for ourselves. I can only suppose that James is unaware of the sentiment Rand expresses here, even though she voiced similar thoughts elsewhere as well. Observe:

Just as a man’s actions are preceded and determined by some form of idea in his mind, so a society’s existential conditions are preceded and determined by the ascendancy of a certain philosophy among those whose job is to deal with ideas. The events of any given period of history are the result of the thinking of the preceding period. The nineteenth century—with its political freedom, science, industry, business, trade, all the necessary conditions of material progress—was the result and the last achievement of the intellectual power released by the Renaissance. The men engaged in those activities were still riding on the remnants of an Aristotelian influence in philosophy, particularly on an Aristotelian epistemology (more implicitly than explicitly). (“For the New Intellectual,” For the New Intellectual, 28.)

Elsewhere Rand wrote:

Have you ever looked for the root of production? Take a look at an electric generator and dare tell yourself that it was created by the muscular effort of unthinking brutes. Try to grow a seed of wheat without the knowledge left to you by men who had to discover it for the first time. (Atlas Shrugged)

Given statements like these and others which Rand published in her writings, what gives James the impression that “Objectivism largely discounts the fact the every successful person stands on the shoulders of those who have come before”? Does James show us where Rand supposedly did this, in spite of the statements which I have reproduced here? No, he doesn’t. Like so many of Rand’s detractors, James simply maligns her views without bothering to check the facts, perhaps hoping no one will notice.

James’ own words clearly indicate that success is the result of “luck,” comparable to a lottery win. How else are we to interpret his claim that “success always involves an element of luck, often consisting of having had the luck to be born into a rich family with plenty of connections”? Many successful people could arguably be said not to have had “luck” on their side, let alone the supposed advantage of being “born into a rich family with plenty of connections,” but chose to pursue their ambitions in spite of the odds against them. Being born into a wealthy family in no way ensures a person’s success; in fact, it often works against their potential by undermining their motivation to endure the struggle which success so often requires. A son or daughter born into a wealthy family can easily think he doesn’t need to pursue success if he’s already enjoying the fruits of someone else’s success. Thomas Edison, for instance, was not born into wealth, nor did he achieve success as a result of winning some lottery. He relied on his own mind and effort and took entrepreneurial risks to achieve his ideals. Countless other stories could be told. My own father was born in Dustbowl Kansas and, having abandoned school at the fourth grade, eventually became a very successful business-owner. James’ view of success clearly discounts the wise choices, effort and dedication that informs genuinely successful ventures by attributing success to “luck” and lottery wins. Why is that okay, but Rand’s alleged ingratitude (which is a complete mischaracterization of her views) isn’t? James does not explain this, for he has not rationally considered the issues involved, nor has he adequately familiarized himself with what Objectivism actually has to say on these matters.

Part and parcel with James’ view of success as the result of luck and raffle drawings, is his view that success bestows upon those who achieve it the obligation to sacrifice themselves, to who knows what extent, for the benefit of anonymous “others” who need not earn the favors which James believes the successful allegedly owe them. No doubt, these same “others” who James thinks should reap the rewards of the efforts of successful individuals, often hold those who succeed in contempt as an expression of their own seething envy. After all, they weren’t the winners of life’s lottery, and Lady Luck hasn’t graciously touched their lives with the gratuitous bounty that the successful must be enjoying given the specifics of their accidental birth, so there’s a metaphysical luck of the draw which divides the haves from the have-nots. We see this to unending degrees today as the growing moocher class is being systematically cultivated and coddled by elected officials and bureaucrats, all to the destruction of those who have produced wealth, like parasites scavenging on living carcasses. James must be very pleased with the present administration, unless of course he thinks the handouts aren’t “generous” enough.

If James were truly concerned about people showing gratitude, why doesn’t he focus on those who have been subsisting on the wealth confiscated from those who have produced it? If he trains his sights on this portion of the population, which is growing by the hour, he’ll find a boiling hotbed of ingrates. I wouldn’t be surprised if James numbers among them.

Wading more toward the fundamentals of Objectivist philosophy, James writes:

Reality is NOT an objective absolute. There’s no way to tell whether reality is objective or not because it can only be perceived subjectively. While it could be argued that the consensus of multiple subjective realities equals objective reality, the exact same logic would also assign objective reality to Jung’s archetypes, which appear inside every human being’s dreams. In any case, measuring something changes the thing measured, so simply perceiving “reality” changes the nature of reality. Therefore, so it can’t be absolute.

Does James have even the slightest inkling of what Rand meant by the concept ‘objectivity’? The congenital sloppiness of his entire paragraph here resoundingly indicates that he does not, or that he simply doesn’t care. First of all, what does James mean by his claim that reality “can only be perceived subjectively”? What does it mean to perceive something “subjectively”? On Rand’s account, perception is in fact objective just as reality is: perception is a biological process, just as blood circulation, respiration and digestion are. To perceive something “subjectively” could only be an instance of perceiving something that does not actually exist because someone wants to perceive it. But the senses do not behave in this manner. We perceive things regardless of any subjective intentions we may be experiencing. When I perceive a tree in my neighbor’s yard dropping leaves all over mine, it’s not because I want that tree to be there and the leaves to be littering my property, but because the tree in fact exists and it’s shedding its leaves, as typically happens this time of year. On James’ view, one could not know this is truly happening because “it can only be perceived subjectively.”

When Rand states that reality is “objective,” what she means is that existence exists independent of consciousness, that is: that things are what they are independent of anyone’s feelings, preferences, dislikes, frustrations, ignorance, commands, temper tantrums, etc. Rand certainly was not trying to make the case that “the consensus of multiple subjective realities equals objective reality,” nor was she consigning reality qua objective to background settings of everyone’s dreaming!

Furthermore, James is mistaken in drawing the inference that “simply perceiving ‘reality’ changes the nature of reality” because “measuring something changes the thing measured.” Perception and measurement are two different things, but James’ inference here trades on equating the two and granting both the power to rearrange the identity of objects. James provides no justification for this move, even seems oblivious to the fact that he is making it, and apparently expects his readers to accept its result unquestioningly. Besides, why suppose that “measuring something changes the thing measured”? If I measure my daughter’s height and find that she is 34.5” tall, in what way have I changed her? How does James know that any change in my daughter’s nature has occurred as a result of measuring her height? Perhaps he thinks it’s just a commonly accepted truism that this is the case. I suggest he give the matter some deeper thought.

James then attacks a leading character in one of Rand’s bestselling novels:

Howard Roark was a lousy architect. If Roark (the hero of Rand’s book The Fountainhead) wanted his “vision” to be his alone, he had no business getting other people to bankroll it. Instead, he should have done something like the Watts Towers, where he’d be responsible for every part of the project, including its construction. Large scale architecture is a collaborative venture that involves satisfying the desires and needs of the client. Good architects are expert at managing client expectations and working through creative differences.

James announces that Rand’s character Howard Roark “was a lousy architect,” but offers no reasons for supposing any of the buildings he designed were structurally unsound in any way. At best, James seems to be making the case that Roark was a poor businessman and suggests that would have been more successful not only as the designer of buildings, but also their financier, construction crew, general contractor, etc. In other words, Roark is faulted for having customers! And more, he is faulted for customers who sought him out for his visionary originality at his craft. Even in Rand’s novel, Roark is hired by rags-to-riches tycoon Roger Enright to build a tall skyscraper, allowing Roark to design it according to his ideals. This was the kind of customer that Roark wanted, and got. But James apparently finds the uncompromising pursuit of one’s ideals in his business transactions unsettling. Perhaps he believes that Frank Lloyd Wright also should not have had any customers, or that he should have built only outhouses. I suspect Peter Keating would prefer a world populated by Geoffrey Jameses.

James then switches gears back to Rand’s philosophy. He writes:

Facts do NOT trump feelings, wishes, hopes, and fears. As any sales professional knows, when dealing with human beings, facts ALWAYS run a distant fifth. That’s particularly true when dealing with people who are operating under the fantasy that their decisions are based upon “fact.” Emotion trumps reason every time, and nobody is easier to influence emotionally than those who are so unaware of that their emotions that they think they’re making “reasonable” decisions.

In response to everything James writes here, the obvious question to ask is, “Is that a fact?” The comic irony of James’ statements in conjunction with each other is indeed ripe. He says that people who base their decisions on facts are “operating under [a] fantasy,” and yet has chosen to point out that “when dealing with human beings, facts ALWAYS run a distant fifth,” apparently because he thinks that’s a fact! Well, I can say one thing for sure here, I am not operating under the fantasy that James is making any judgments on the basis of facts. But it would be naïve to project his deficiency on everyone else, which is what he’s apparently doing.

James’ view of salesmen’s customers is quite pitiful and condescending. According to James, customers are never guided primarily by facts, but are instead guided by emotion which “trumps reason every time,” even when they think (so deluded they are) that they are basing their decisions on facts. James would have us believe that this is common knowledge among salesmen. I can only suppose that James is projecting here (again), perhaps both in the perspective of the salesman as well as his customers. I worked in sales for over five years, and I don’t think I ever had one customer who bought from me based on his fleeting emotions. My customers were as shrewd as I was as a salesman, and they insisted on full disclosure of my product’s specifications, by pricing, payment terms, ability to make delivery in the specified time, etc. They wanted the facts, and I happily disclosed them. After all, my customers were paying hundreds of thousands of dollars for my product, so there was a lot on the line. Business ventures of this sort are not mere flights of fancy as James supposes.

But speaking to the point more broadly, the Objectivist view pertinent to James’ remarks is that one’s feelings, wishes, hopes and fears do not alter facts, for facts do not conform to man’s conscious activity. Take for example the fact that New York City is located on the eastern seaboard of the United States. Suppose this fact makes me depressed, that I wish New York City were located along the Mississippi River, that I hope one day it moves a thousand miles to the west, and that I fear New York City really is on the west coast and no one realizes it. According to James, since “facts ALWAYS run a distant fifth” and “emotion trumps reason every time,” he must think that New York City will conform to whatever I feel, wish, hope and fear. Needless to say, this is absurd. But so is any position which is motivated by the desire to subordinate facts and reason to emotion.

Moreover, Objectivism recognizes the fact that emotions are not a means of knowledge. Our feelings do not tell us what is true or false, what actions to take, or why one should take any particular course of action over another. As I pointed out above, Rand observed that “there is no necessary clash, no dichotomy between man’s reason and his emotions—provided he observes their proper relationship,” since both reason and emotion have vital roles in man’s life. Emotions are a response to new knowledge given its implications to one’s values. But they are not a means of validating knowledge claims, nor are they a substitute for proper inferential method.

James then turns his attention to man and his purpose:

Every man does NOT exist for his own sake. While Rand believed that pursuit of one’s own rational self-interest and one’s own happiness is his life’s moral purpose, the scientific fact is that man evolved as a communal creature, with bonds of family and community being tightly tied to health, happiness, longevity, and pretty much everything that makes life pleasurable. Objectivism thus runs counter to demonstrable scientific fact.

Whether he realizes it or not, James is bifurcating in order to set the stage for altruism as man’s ethical norm, and some form of collectivism as his political destiny. Rand’s view that man has the right to exist for his own sake (which is the view which she affirmed and defended) in no way denies man’s capacity for social relationships. Indeed, it is because man has this capacity that the concept of rights has application in his life in the first place. A man stranded all alone on a desert island need not worry about rights in a social context, since there’s no one else to bump into, no one else who could violate his rights. Moreover, in such a situation, he would have no one to whom he could sacrifice himself. It is when men interact with each other in social relationships that the concept of rights finds its importance. Some thinkers throughout history have, whether intentionally or otherwise, undermined the very notion that man has any rights at all. Others who have presented themselves as champions of rights have done even worse harm because they fail to understand the issue in terms of philosophic essentials.

Also, Rand never denied man’s capacity to find happiness in a family context or in community activities. Nor did she deny any man’s right to seek happiness in such quadrants. Rand conceived of happiness as a reward for productive effort, as “that state of consciousness which proceeds from the achievement of one’s values” (“The Objectivist Ethics,” The Virtue of Selfishness, p. 28). Free individuals are able to seek this reward in the context of the effort they put into their families or community involvement. So it is unclear exactly what James’ objection is here, especially when he cites “bonds of family and community” as “being tightly tied to health, happiness, longevity, and pretty much everything that makes life pleasurable,” i.e., what the individual wants for himself. Even in James’ conception of happiness (which he ultimately ties to what “makes life pleasurable”), man is really the primary beneficiary of his livelihood.

As for James’ claim that it is a “scientific fact” that “man evolved as a communal creature,” I don’t know what sources he might cite for this (I’m sure he’d be able to find some, science these days being filled with a lot of nonsense at every turn). But it seems that the primary scientific fact in play here is that man has evolved as a biological organism with the capacity to reason, regardless (and often in spite) of his social surroundings. Man’s capacity to reason is his most fundamentally distinctive attribute, while capacity for social interaction is something man shares with dogs, cats, pigs, honeybees, ants, sheep, etc. Perhaps James means to eclipse man’s capacity to reason by characterizing him primarily as a “communal creature” because he doesn’t grasp what distinguishes man from these latter categories. Too bad.

Now consider this: James says that man is “a communal creature,” meaning he has an inherently social nature, and yet he has to be born into a certain family with wealth in order to have advantageous social connections? If man has an inherently social nature, why couldn’t a person who wasn’t born into wealth develop advantageous social connections? After all, everyone’s nature is inherently social, or “communal,” right? James cannot even integrate his own view on things.

Next, James attacks those who simply read Ayn Rand’s writings: Reading Rand creates instant jackasses. Anyone who’s been subjected to a friend who suddenly “discovers” Rand knows that reading her works causes people to act like selfish idiots. They combine a patina of “reason” over a self-righteous justification of whatever their “id” happens to want at the time and then insist that they’re just pursuing their own self-interest. They also become incredibly boring, about on the level of a newly converted Scientologist.

To be honest, Geoffrey James comes across as a jackass, though it’s pretty clear that he hasn’t read Rand (look how much he’s gotten wrong in just the previous eight points!). So while I cannot say whether or not James is consistently a jackass, or only when he gets onto the topic of rational philosophy and its champions, it’s clear that one need not read Rand in order to be a jackass.

Now James assures us that whenever “a friend… suddenly ‘discovers’ Rand,” that friend will begin to act like a “selfish idiot.” James does not indicate whether or not he is talking from personal experience here, but given the level of understanding he has demonstrated thus far (and we’re almost at the end of his list), “selfish idiot” seems to represent a rise in rank from where James himself is sitting.

What’s notable in James’ complaint here is that the indicators he identifies do not in any way suggest that the “convert” to Objectivism whom he has in mind has actually grasped or properly practices what Objectivism teaches. Objectivism did not invent selfishness, nor is it easily grasped by idiots – just observe how hard a time James has had in understanding even its more basic principles. Additionally, Objectivism advocates rational selfishness, not the overtly irrational selfishness which James has allegedly observed in unnamed newcomers to Objectivism. James exhibits not even a modicum of charity in his evaluation of the situation, for not only does he not critically take into account what Objectivism actually teaches, he also fails to take into account that newcomers to a comprehensive system are unlikely to be that system’s best representatives. Couple these intellectual infractions with James’ unexamined penchant for granting to Rand’s writings the magical power of transforming otherwise normal people into “instant jackasses” on their first reading, and we have on display before us a spectacle of unabashed irrationality for all to see (and hopefully avoid).

Besides, if someone acts like a jackass, so what? Why does Geoffrey James care? Everyone, including but by no means restricted exclusively to Objectivists, has the capacity to be a jackass from time to time. Objectivists do not lose their identity as human beings when they adopt the Objectivist philosophy. What James is really trying to say, however, is that Rand’s writings have the effect of turning adherents into jackasses. But even James’ own anecdotal report, if in fact he has actually had a friend who “suddenly discovered” Rand’s philosophy, is hardly sufficient to justify such a sweeping generalization. Human beings are not robots, and nothing has the power to evoke the same behavioral effect on everyone in the manner that James has suggested regarding Objectivism. James just doesn’t like Rand. Why doesn’t he simply state this plainly instead of trying to fault others?

One final point, which should be obvious to any honest thinker, is that the particular behavior of a person does not necessarily invalidate the views he espouses. If a geometry teacher acts like a jackass, does his behavior invalidate geometry as a science? James needs to show a causal relationship between Rand’s writings and the behavior he attributes to enthusiasts of Rand’s writings. He hasn’t done this.

Lastly, true to his leftist stance, James displays his contempt for business leaders:

Rand is the CEOs’ favorite philosopher. Most CEOs already have CEO disease, which the medical profession defines as “the enlargement of the sphincter so that it covers the entire body, creating an overwhelming itch that can only be calmed by the frequent osculation of underlings.” Let’s face it: if there was ever an human ilk who don’t need a philosophy that drives them to be even more selfish, it’s the overpaid and overpampered CEOs of the world.

James comes across as one who’s deeply afflicted with contempt for those who are successful in life. Why does how much a CEO makes even matter to James? Does James worry that CEO’s have not earned their wealth? How could this bother him, especially if he prefers the political model in which wealth is confiscated from those who produce it and subsequently redistributed to those who have not earned it? If James thinks people should enjoy the unearned, and believes that CEOs have not earned the wealth they enjoy, he should be consistent with his own premises and be happy with the situation. But clearly he’s not happy with the situation. What is probably the case is that James resents those who earn wealth and dispose with it as they choose. This is called the right to property. Perhaps James would like to abolish it.

James seems to think CEOs are all big fans of Ayn Rand. If only that were the case! By and large, prominent business leaders today demonstrate little if anything in common with the ideals advanced by Objectivism. In fact, a growing number have their hand out for government distributions and bailout funds, becoming more like wards of the state than independent businessmen as the federal amoeba ingests their means of production. But the incestuous relationships that have developed between some businesses and governments did not necessarily arise as a result of private enterprise initiative. Whether they are banks, automobile manufacturers, energy producers, medical service providers, commodity traders, etc., today’s businessmen have been regulated beyond recognition. The preponderance of leftist propaganda in media outlets has only increased pressures on businesses to continue conforming to this trend. How often do you see a company advertisement promoting itself because of its “environmentally friendly” so that it can appease the “public” concern for “green” causes?

James needs to realize that simply being a CEO, does not make a person an Objectivist. It does not even indicate that he’s at all familiar with Objectivism. I have known several CEOs myself, and I’ve yet to meet one personally who is at all knowledgeable about Objectivism. I know this because I introduced them to Rand’s writings myself, and in each case they seemed mostly disinterested.

Popular culture, infected as it is with leftist notions, is replete with example after example where businesses and CEOs are portrayed as vile scoundrels out to defraud everyone from their own mothers to crack babies. According to this paradigm, the unsuccessful will always be victims, and the producers will always be the victimizers, while its promoters are laughing their way to the bank with proceeds from the latest anti-business blockbuster. Whether it’s “big oil” or “big pharma” or “big tobacco” or what have you, businesses which have been successful at manufacturing goods have come under fire from a vast range of interest groups, often for only imagined sins, but always for a free slice of the pie. What’s telling is that resulting legislation allows these businesses to continue, but at a price, including increasing regulation, a growing list of fees and credentialing requirements, and an endless assortment of tax burdens. If businesses are so evil, why are they allowed to continue operating in the first place? Why is there never any concern about the growing size and scope of “big government” in our lives?

Sadly, today’s business leaders offer little if any public self-defense, very possibly because they’ve uncritically accepted the basic premises of those who are so hostile to wealth creators and consequently have no philosophical defense for their livelihood. That’s why they try to redeem themselves, as far as it’s possible, by getting behind the “green” movement or broadcasting their contributions to charities. They’ve sold themselves out. They’ve allowed the US government to ban the incandescent light bulb for crying out loud!

From all his griping, James concludes:

IMHO, it’s long past time to consign Objectivism to the same intellectual dustbin where we’ve thrown Marxism and Absolute Monarchy.

It’s unclear what specifically James is proposing here. Is he seeking to censor Rand’s writings by recalling all copies of her books and internet postings of her ideas, and banning them forever? To silence Objectivism’s defenders? By force, perhaps? And what exactly is it about Objectivism’s political philosophy that James objects to? We probed this above and I noted that capitalism as Objectivism informs it is distinguished from other political systems by its explicit recognition of individual rights, including the right to property. Essentially, capitalism is the social system premised on the view that man has the right to exist for his own sake. James did exclaim that “every man does not exist for his own sake,” but this does not speak to the question at hand, which is whether or not man has the right to exist for his own sake, regardless of what others happen to choose for their lives. James stays clear of making his stance on this matter clear; he does not come out and deny man’s right to exist for his own sake, nor does he affirm it. But the views which he has affirmed are incompatible with the view that man does have the right to exist for his own sake. Does James think he himself has the right to exist for his own sake? Does he think I have the right to exist for my own sake? Does he think that a corporate CEO has the right to exist for his own sake? Perhaps James weighs in on this matter elsewhere in his blog, but judging by what he has stated in the present entry, it appears not.

In conclusion, Geoffrey James has failed to show that Ayn Rand was “dead wrong.” Indeed, if he’s shown anything, he’s show that he is dead wrong on a whole variety of issues.

by Dawson Bethrick

A Knock at the Door

2010-11-17T16:00:00.000-08:00

One morning recently I was home minding my own business, when suddenly there was a knock at the door. I wasn’t expecting anyone, so I had no idea who it might be. When I opened the door there was a well dressed young man standing on my doorstep. In the distance behind him I saw two other young men, also well dressed, poking around the neighbor’s yard across the street. I suspected that he was a religionist out evangelizing.

Before he had a chance to say anything to me, I greeted him:

“Good morning,” I said. After a slight pause, I asked, “Are you LDS?” I suspected LDS because he was going door-to-door, but I noticed that he wasn’t wearing a name badge, as Mormon missionaries typically do, so I had to ask.

“No,” the young man answered. “I’m a Jehovah’s Witness.”

I was a bit surprised because most JWs who have approached me in my home cold call in pairs (this fellow was alone), they tend to be middle-aged women, and always have their Watchtower magazine-tracts clutched in their hands. This guy had a small bible in his hands, and definitely wasn’t a middle-aged woman.

“Ah, a JW, eh?” I replied. “Well, you’re going to be disappointed with me.”

“Why is that?” he asked.

“Because I’m an atheist. I don’t believe in any gods.”

He looked a bit puzzled, and after a moment he asked, “Why don’t you believe?”

Of course, it’s all too typical for theists to treat belief in invisible magic beings as the default position of the human mind, and to treat non-belief in such fantasies as some kind of anomaly that needs to be explained. This young man had come to my house, stepped onto my property, knocked on my door, and is now requiring me to explain why I don’t believe in his god. From my perspective, this is no different from going up to some stranger and asking why he doesn’t believe in Blarko the WonderBeing.

Even though his question stems from an improper understanding of the mind, I was happy to take the opportunity with this young man and practice my own version of “reverse witnessing.” After all, by asking me such an open-ended question, he put me in charge of the direction of the conversation. So I was happy to address his question:

“Basically, I don’t believe your god is real because I made the choice to be honest to myself,” I said. I briefly explained: “I was at one time in my life a Christian. But I knew deep down that I faced a pivotal decision for my life – either to be honest and admit that I didn’t think it was all true, or to evade honesty and pretend that it was all true, even though I really didn’t believe it.”

Although I wasn’t being confrontational (he was coming to me, not vice versa), the young man stood there silently with a puzzled look on his face, keeping a safe distance and not quite knowing how best to respond to my statement. Of course, he couldn’t say that I wasn’t answering his question, for what I stated speaks directly to what he asked. In fact, he seemed very alone, staring bleakly back at me, almost completely motionless, like a child before an adult who has tasked him with a monumental chore.

I realized that he was caught off guard and had no ready reply to what I had said, so I asked him his name. He said, “James,” and I reached out to shake his hand, and he met mine and we shook.

“Glad to meet you, James,” I said, hoping my courteousness would help him relax and not be so anxious. I wanted him to hear what I had to say, and if his defenses were piqued, he might just blather past me.

He finally asked (something to this effect), “How can you be so certain that God is not real?”

“Think about it,” I said, “no matter what argument one might present for the existence of a god, we are still left with no alternative to our imagination as the means of having awareness of it.”

Then I pointed to some objects across the street behind him: “Take a look at that tree, the fence, the street. You see these things with your eyes. You perceive them through a physical process. This mode of cognition – perception – will not give you awareness of any god. You have to imagine it behind everything you see, everything you perceive.”

“But,” James boldly interjected, “you don’t see the wind, but you believe it exists. You see its effects, that’s how you know it’s real.”

“It may be true that I don’t see wind, but I do perceive it, such as when it blows on my skin, like right now.” And there was a bit of a cold breeze blowing at this time. “Remember,” I had to point this out, “sight is only one of our modes of perception. We also sense by touching, tasting, smelling and hearing.” Why is it that theists tend to overlook these?

I continued: “I can imagine that your god is lurking behind that tree over there, making it what it is and governing its every action by an act of will. But we can’t ignore the fact that this is the imagination at work.”

James did express agreement here. “That’s true, but” – and you knew this was coming – “the Bible is God’s word, and it contains prophecies that could only have been fulfilled if he were real. I’ve studied this. I know it’s true,” he insisted.

Since he raised the notion of “divine prophecy,” I asked: “James, do you know what midrash is?”

“No,” replied James.

“Midrash is an ancient Hebrew method of literary interpretation. Biblical authors often re-interpreted stories that predated them by retelling them using motifs that are familiar to the intended audience, with the intention of bringing out some hidden truth contained in the original. Often the result of this process can appear to be a fulfillment of some past promise. It’s really an invention.”

Of course there’s much more to midrash and bible prophecy than merely what I had indicated to James. But in the flurry of a brief verbal conversation, the approximate is often the best that one is capable of offering. Also, James did not introduce any specific prophecies for discussion, so there was no opportunity to explore the issue any further. Too bad, as I had a lot to say about the New Testament!

It was clear that James found my words unsettling, but didn’t have any rehearsed position to offer in response. He noticed that his two colleagues who had been harassing my neighbors across the street had concluded with their call to their house, and were starting back to their van, which was parked across the street from my house. I could tell that he was ready to depart, so I tried to express my last point to him briefly.

“James,” I said, “you’re obviously very young and have your whole life ahead of you. I know you’re not going to concede to me that your god is imaginary. You don’t have to, I already know this truth. You need to recognize this fact for yourself. When you lay down at night and you’re alone with your thoughts, think about what I’ve been saying. Make that choice to be honest with yourself. It’s going to be a difficult choice, but you have nothing of value to lose by being honest. Maybe one day, some months from now, you’ll understand what I’ve been saying.”

At this point he was clearly anxious to get going, and said goodbye as he was turning away. I stood there and watched as he climbed into the van with the other missionaries. I can only imagine what their conversation at that point might have been. I suspect the other two tried to soothe James, while he promised himself never to come back to my door again. I hope not, but I wouldn’t be surprised if that were the case. Really, I wish I had had the presence of mind to invite all three of them in and sit down to discuss the matter with me, but I was home with my daughter, and she deserves my attention.

by Dawson Bethrick

Some Thoughts on Presuppositionalism and the Problem of Evil

2010-10-22T00:00:00.000-07:00

Christian apologist Dan of Debunking Atheists agreeably affirms Greg Bahnsen’s solution to the problem of evil, which reads as follows:

God has a morally sufficient reason for the evil which exists. (Always Ready, p. 172)

Bahnsen offers this statement (for which he cites no biblical citation specifically supporting it) as an overlooked premise which satisfies the problem of evil:

1. God is all-good.
2. God is all-powerful.
3. Evil exists. (Ibid., p. 171)

Bahnsen adds to this formulation of the problem of evil the claim that his god “has a morally sufficient reason” for evil. Bahnsen does not tell us what that alleged reason is. He does not even suggest possible candidates for what it could or might be. Bahnsen’s concern is to claim that his god does have a reason for allowing and/or committing evil, and that reason is “morally sufficient.” In essence, Bahnsen is passing judgment on something he has not seen; he is pre-judging as “morally sufficient” something which he cannot even show actually exists, and whose identity is unknown. Bahnsen nowhere explains how we can morally evaluate something that is unknown, and yet attempts to solve the problem of evil by affirming a premise which does exactly this. Such prejudice is rash and baseless, and the opposite of morally responsible.

All this is to say that Bahnsen offers a defense against the problem of evil, but fails to validate a crucial component integral to that defense, namely the notion of a “morally sufficient reason” for evil. As we examine Bahnsen’s own statements around his proposed defense against the problem of evil, and Dan’s additional comments on the matter, consider what kind of mind is required to take the view that there is such a thing as a “morally sufficient reason” for evil. Bahnsen himself shows no indication that he winces at the idea; in fact, he seems gleeful in affirming it.

Bahnsen clues us in on the psychological process by which the Christian mind comes to the evaluation of reasons which are unknown, as “morally sufficient” when he states the following:

If the Christian presupposes that God is perfectly and completely good -- as Scripture requires us to do -- then he is committed to evaluating everything within his experience in the light of that presupposition. Accordingly, when the Christian observes evil events or things in the world, he can and should retain consistency with his presupposition about God's goodness by now inferring that God has a morally good reason for the evil that exists. God certainly must be all-powerful in order to be God; He is not to be thought of as overwhelmed or stymied by evil in the universe. And God is surely good, the Christian will profess -- so any evil we find must be compatible with God's goodness. This is just to say that God has planned evil events for reasons which are morally commendable and good. (Always Ready, pp. 171-172)

Observe Bahnsen’s procedure here, and notice how its entire weight is borne on faith-based assumptions:

Step 1: Assume on faith (i.e., on the basis of hope and desire) that there is a god.

Step 2: Assume in advance of anything else, that this god “is perfectly and completely good.”

Step 3: Commit yourself “to evaluating everything within [your] experience in light of [these assumptions]” – i.e., deliberately allow them to predetermine the outcome of any evaluation, inference, supposition, judgment, conclusion you may make about said god.

Step 4: When you observe evil in the world, “retain consistency with [these assumptions] about God’s goodness by now inferring that God has a morally good reason for the evil that exists.”

Step 5: Don’t worry about what specifically that reason might be; you might never know what it is (in fact, it’s preferable that you don’t know what it is). Bahnsen himself concedes that he has no idea what this “morally sufficient reason” could possibly be when he writes:
the Bible calls upon us to trust that God has a morally sufficient reason for the evil which can be found in this world, but it does not tell us what that sufficient reason is.
The apologist finds delight in such ignorance, pretending that it indicates some “higher knowledge” to which man has no access. The purpose here is not to establish the claim that the Christian god has a “morally sufficient reason” for evil. Rather, it is simply to assume, on the basis of prior assumptions accepted on faith, that whatever reason said god supposedly has is, sight unseen, a “morally good reason” for evil. Don’t even worry about knowing what such a reason could be; don’t try to hypothesize examples; don’t think critically about what you are expected to accept as knowledge. The important thing is not to evaluate specific instances, but to settle in your mind at any cost that whatever reason this god might have for allowing or committing evil, it’s a “morally good reason.”

Step 6: Rationalize Steps 4 and 5. For example, remind yourself that “God certainly must be all-powerful in order to be God; He is not to be thought of [i.e., imagined] as overwhelmed or stymied by evil in the universe. And God is surely good.” Given these assumptions which are affirmed in advance of contemplating anything that might be called evil in the world, pretend to have drawn the conclusion “[therefore] any evil we find must be compatible with God’s goodness.”

Step 7: Put out of your mind the fact that the very notion of evil being “compatible with God’s goodness” is indistinguishable from evil being compatible with the nature of an evil god. I.e., suppress genuine moral judgment in order to replace it with morally bankrupt prejudices resting on faith-based assumptions which are to be accepted in advance of any judgment for no good reason whatsoever (for to evaluate a reason as “good” would defy the very procedure under consideration).

Step 8: Having gone through Steps 1 through 7, pretend that you’ve established as a conclusion to prior reasoning that “God has planned evil events for reasons which are morally commendable and good.” Again, do not inquire as to what these reasons might be; what is important is that you presuppose that they are “morally commendable and good.”

If those reasons are in fact “morally commendable and good,” then, by deeming them as such, the apologist is essentially saying everyone should go and do likewise, for they are “morally commendable and good.” But what if everyone went around, like the Christian god, allowing and/or committing evil and claiming to have a “morally sufficient reason” for doing so? If this would not be a suitable formula for man’s choices and actions, then how can one call the Christian god’s supposed “reason” for allowing evil “morally commendable and good”?

In attempting to turn the problem of evil into merely an emotional difficulty as opposed to an actual contradiction, Bahnsen openly admits that he does not know what reason his god might have for allowing or using evil to achieve its ends:

The problem which men have with God when they come face to face with evil in the world is not a logical or philosophical one, but more a psychological one. We can find it emotionally very hard to have faith in God and trust His goodness and power when we are not given the reason why bad things happen to us and others. We instinctively think to ourselves, "why did such a terrible thing occur?" Unbelievers internally cry out for an answer to such a question also. But God does not always (indeed, rarely) provide an explanation to human beings for the evil which they experience or observe. "The secret things belong to the Lord our God" (Deuteronomy 29:29). We might not be able to understand God's wise and mysterious ways, even if He told us (cf. Isaiah 55:9). Nevertheless, the fact remains that He has not told us why misery and suffering and injustice are part of His plan for history and for our individual lives. (Always Ready, p. 173)

I have already written on a broader problem in Christianity, what I call the problem of imperfection, in my blog Was Adam Created Perfect? Bahnsen avoids addressing, even acknowledging, that Christianity is unable to resolve the inherent contradiction in affirming the view that the universe was created by a perfect creator, while imperfections exist in that creation. The problem of evil is essentially a more isolated aspect, or manifestation, of this broader problem, which few apologists ever consider.

In trying to downplay the logical conundrum raised by the problem of evil, Bahnsen proposes a solution which affirms the notion that evil is justifiable if one has a “morally sufficient reason” for it, and, apparently pleased with himself, proceeds to call the persistence of the problem of evil a “psychological” problem rather than a philosophical problem. Bahnsen thus announces that he sees no philosophical problem in affirming the notion that evil is justifiable if one has a supposedly “morally sufficient reason” for it.

He says that the psychological problem of evil arises as a result of not knowing what that reason might be, for not having a suitable answer to the question, “why did such a terrible thing occur?” Bahnsen’s claim that whatever reason his god has for allowing or using evil to achieve its ends, it is a “morally sufficient reason,” is intended to calm the believer’s mind by appeasing the wrong end of the contradiction: by camouflaging evil with the guise of goodness to make it seem acceptable.

Bahnsen complains that “Unbelievers internally cry out for an answer to such a question also,” but “unbelievers” are not the ones whose worldview brews such a philosophical quandary in the first place, nor is it the “unbeliever’s” worldview which posits the notion of a “morally sufficient reason” for allowing or using evil as the solution to the problem of evil.

In spite of the raging nature of this question, given its mystical premises, Bahnsen reports that “God does not always (indeed, rarely) provide an explanation to human beings for the evil which they experience or observe,” that “He has not told us why misery and suffering and injustice are part of His plan for history and for our individual lives.” Bahnsen even suggests that believers “might not be able to understand God's wise and mysterious ways, even if He told us.” So Bahnsen acknowledges that he does not know what reason his god might have for using evil to achieve its purposes, and says that he probably wouldn’t understand it even if he were to learn of it, and yet he still calls it “morally sufficient.” For Bahnsen, the moral is not the understood, but the obeyed. Understanding plays no central role in the Christian conception of morality.

The bottom line for Bahnsen and his worldview, then, is that evil is morally justifiable so long as one does not disclose his reasons for adopting its use. Something does not need to be known or understood in order to call it “morally sufficient,” and Bahnsen was the type of individual who found this “solution” to the problem of evil satisfying.

Bahnsen does affirm that evil is a serious issue. He writes:

It is important for the Christian to realize –indeed, to insist upon – the reality and serious nature of evil. The subject of evil is not simply an intellectual parlor game, a cavalier matter, a whimsical or relativistic choice of looking a things a certain way. Evil is real. Evil is ugly. (Ibid., p. 164)

But if Bahnsen takes evil so seriously, why then does he offer as his solution to the problem of evil the claim that his god has a “morally sufficient reason” for evil? In giving this as his solution to the problem of evil, Bahnsen is essentially conceding that his god is ultimately responsible for the reality of evil in the world; we have already seen that Bahnsen thinks that “misery and suffering and injustice are part of His plan for history and for our individual lives” (p. 173). And, presumably, since this god is supposedly both omnipotent as well as free, it should be able to achieve its ends and create a universe without evil ever coming into the picture. So the conclusion that the existence of any evil anywhere is ultimately the responsibility of the omnipotent creator which is supposed to have created everything in the first place, seems unavoidable. Indeed, if Bahnsen didn’t think his god were responsible for the reality of evil, he wouldn’t need to claim that his god has a “morally sufficient reason” for evil. As I pointed out above, Bahnsen does not tell us what “morally sufficient reason” his god supposedly has for the evil that exists in the world; he doesn’t even give an example of a reason which he considers “morally sufficient” for allowing or committing evil. Indeed, to do so, Bahnsen would simply be giving us a glimpse into his own views, which he prefers to keep private for obvious reasons. So it comes as no surprise that Bahnsen does not elaborate on this point.

Dan writes:

This can't be a discussion as to "God is going to clear up the mess." He will, but that is not an adequately sufficient answer for the non-believers here. The question the Atheists here have is not whether God will 'take care of it' but, why did God allow it? Why is there a mess to begin with? Is God sadistic or impotent?

Actually, the question is more like:

How could a good god, which is characterized as a “loving father,” choose to allow it?

Or, consider the following:

How is a god which allows evil, and/or makes use of evil to achieve its goals, any different from a god that is evil?

If the Christian god is supposed to be “all-good,” then presumably any action it chooses to do must originate from good intentions, since all its intentions would supposedly be good. Also, bear in mind that this god is supposedly in control of everything. Presuppositionalists in particular are eager to affirm such a view. Observe:

God controls whatsoever comes to pass. (Cornelius Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, p. 160)

God’s thoughts make the world what it is and determine what happens – which is why all facts are revelatory of God… (Greg Bahnsen, Van Til’s Apologetic: Readings & Analysis, p. 243)

God controls all events and outcomes (even those that come about by human choice and activity) and is far more capable and powerful than modern machines. (Van Til's Apologetic, p. 489n.43)

So how does the Christian square events and outcomes which are not good in nature, with the view that the Christian god, which is supposed to be “all-good” and only “all-good,” is in control of everything? Bahnsen’s own proposal, that his god has “a morally sufficient reason for the evil which exists,” does not reconcile the matter. On the contrary, all it accomplishes is portraying the Christian god on cozy terms with evil. So the problem persists.

Predictably, Dan writes:

The Atheist are [is] in a real quandary when he tries to argue for the problem of evil, he has to first make a moral judgment that is objectively correct. Objective moral judgments can only be grounded in the transcendent God of Christianity.

Several points here:

First, Dan misses the internal nature of the critique launched by the problem of evil. The problem of evil points to a state of affairs which is inconsistent with what the Christian worldview would have us believe. Christianity affirms both horns of the conflict, namely that an all-good, omnipotent and omniscient creator created the entire universe and all its contents, even “control[ing] whatsoever comes to pass” within it, and that evil exists in the world. The conflict is thus confined within the Christian worldview.

Contrary to what presuppositionalists typically say, the conflict to which the problem of evil draws our attention is not the non-believer’s (alleged) failure to ground moral judgment without reference to the Christian god. On the contrary, since both sides of this conflict are affirmed by Christianity, so the problem obtains regardless of what the non-believer can or cannot do.

This conflict not only destroys the Christian worldview from within, it also has profoundly damning implications for the moral character of those who actively seek to defend it, especially in a manner like Greg Bahnsen. By definition and by virtue of its nature, an all-good being would not willfully use evil to achieve its ends: its all-good nature would preclude any willingness complicit with evil. Consequently, a being which does make use of evil to achieve its ends cannot rightly be called “all-good.” But this is what Christianity essentially teaches in this respect: that its god is all-good, but also that its creation contains evil, and the “all-good” god is ultimately responsible for the evil. The task of the apologist is to reconcile these teachings without contradiction. But the contradiction cannot be reconciled without compromising either side of the conflict, even if the believer wants to say that his god has a “morally sufficient reason” for the evil it uses to accomplish its ends. Indeed, the very notion of a “morally sufficient reason” to allow or make use of evil is a contradiction in terms: that which is morally sufficient abstains absolutely from evil. Is there such a reason as a “morally sufficient reason” to commit murder? Is there such a thing as a “morally sufficient reason” to rape children? Is there such a thing as a “morally sufficient reason” to burglarize a house? Is there such a thing as a “morally sufficient reason” to evade relevant facts in one’s reasoning? These are questions for the Christian who affirms the notion of a “morally sufficient reason” for allowing or committing evil to consider.

Second, Dan incorrectly assumes (most likely because he wants it to be the case) that “objective moral judgments can only be grounded in the transcendent God of Christianity.” He does not establish this claim; no apologist really does. Apologists love to repeat this kind of claim, but it is typically accepted by believers on faith: they want it to be true, and on the basis of this desire, they affirm it as if it were true. A dead give-away here is the use of the concept ‘objective’ in qualifying “moral judgments,” a concept that is anathema to the Christian worldview (see here).

We’ve already seen that the Christian worldview is opposed to moral judgment as such. Actions which are chosen by a volitional agent are always subject to moral evaluation. But Christians have imperatively insisted that no one has the right to judge their god’s chosen actions. Even this insistence, however, is at odds with what Christians like Greg Bahnsen urge us to swallow: they tell us that their god and all its actions are good, which is a moral evaluation. And yet we’ve been denied the right to make any moral evaluations. In fact, we’re told that we have no basis to make moral evaluations to begin with.

Now the apologist speaks of “objective moral judgments.” But does he understand what objectivity is? His claim that “objective moral judgments can only be grounded in the transcendent God of Christianity.” In other words, in the apologist’s view, objective moral judgments are not grounded in reason. The presuppositionalist literature in fact confirms this analysis. Bahnsen explains the presuppositionalist understanding of objectivity as follows:

For Van Til, objectivity in the Christian worldview is not a matter of having no presuppositions (and letting a pretended neutral reason find the pretended external truth, which is actually organized by the subjective mind of man), but a matter of having the right presuppositions – that is, having the divine point of view gained through revelation. (Van Til’s Apologetic: Readings & Analysis, p. 286)

So clearly, for the presuppositionalist, reason has nothing to do with objectivity. If it did, why wouldn’t Bahnsen make mention of this when he gives the Christian “understanding” of objectivity?

Moreover, the presuppositionalist conception of objectivity does not rule out the view that wishing makes it so. On the basis of the Christian worldview, wishing does make it so, especially if the wisher is the Christian god (see here). Think of it: a conception of objectivity which allows wishing to make it so!

This is how the Christian worldview divorces “objectivity” from reason: by underwriting its conception of objectivity with the primacy of consciousness, and doing away with reason in epistemology. It manifests itself by accepting an enormous sum of mystical premises as “truth” which are said to be “divinely revealed” and are consulted as the ultimate guide to understanding the world. It should be obvious that one can easily claim to “know” anything by an appeal to “revelation,” especially when it comes to “knowledge” of “the supernatural” and “duties” which men are supposed to adopt and follow. So the appeal to divine revelation offers absolutely zero safeguards for ensuring genuine objectivity in one’s identifications and conclusions.

Of course, apologist Dan does not anticipate this objection, for not only does he take it for granted that reason has nothing to do with moral judgment (he voices no concern over the absence of reason's mention in the presuppositionalist script), he expects his claim that moral judgments need the Christian god in order to be objective, to be accepted on faith (i.e., on the wish that it be true), essentially on his own say so. He gives no argument, so he does not even present this claim as a conclusion to prior reasoning. It’s a stipulation, not a conclusion, not a discovery one makes by applying reason to the world.

But perhaps I’m hasty in assuming that Dan means the same thing as Van Til does with the word “objective.” In that case, what could he possibly mean by “objective”? He uses this term as if its meaning were self-apparent. But going by what I understand by the concept ‘objective’, his claim that objective moral judgments need to be grounded in the Christian god is clearly false. This is because objectivity is essentially the methodical application of the primacy of existence to knowledge, while Christianity is fundamentally opposed to the primacy of existence (see here). Consequently, the apologist is using a concept (the concept ‘objectivity’) while ignoring its genetic roots (the primacy of existence) by underwriting it with a worldview which explicitly denies its roots (i.e., Christianity). In other words, we have here an instance of the fallacy of the stolen concept.

Dan writes:

The Atheist cannot logically generate the problem of evil.

What Dan means here is that, by virtue of his atheism, an atheist has no rational basis for moral concepts (like ‘good’ and ‘evil’) that is consistent with his non-belief in the Christian god. Of course this overlooks the internal nature of the problem of evil. As I pointed out above, the problem of evil is a problem within Christianity regardless of what any particular atheist can or cannot do.

Additionally, notice that Dan nowhere establishes this claim by means of proof. He simply asserts it, apparently expecting everyone to accept it on faith. After all, that’s how he accepted it. Accepting a claim on faith essentially means supposing it is true because you want it to be true. Dan wants this claim to be true, so he pretends that it is true. In this very sense, faith is a pretense.

Dan write:

Its not a problem for the believer

What Dan is really saying (without the courage to come out and say it plainly), is that the believer doesn’t have a problem with evil. He’s already conceded that, according to Christianity, his god has a cozy relationship with evil since it uses evil to achieve its purposes. Dan does not explain how this can be morally good, and apparently doesn’t see any need to. Indeed, he doesn’t see any need to explain this because he ultimately doesn’t care.

Like any believer, Dan’s concern is to be an obedient worshiper who disallows himself the freedom to judge his god as anything other than a “good” god. But by doing so, he destroys the meaning of the very concept ‘good’. Since his god is on friendly terms with evil, it is a god which deliberately chooses not to take an uncompromising stance against evil. So just by worshiping such a god and calling it “good,” the believer concedes by his own actions that he has no problem with evil. Just as the god he worships, the believer is ultimately indifferent to evil, because he’s ultimately indifferent to values, and this is because he is ultimately indifferent to life on earth. So logically, while the believer has no problem with evil, he has an insurmountable problem with good.

What should be noted here, however, is that even the believer himself is not consistent with the logical implications of his worldview’s stated position on its god and evil in the world. On the contrary, the believer routinely acts as if his own values were important. In other words, his own actions defy the moral ambivalence inherent in his theism.

Dan writes:

but it is, ironically, the problem for the unbeliever.

Not the Christian problem of evil. The atheist does not posit an “all-good,” “all-knowing” and “all-powerful” god which uses evil to achieve its own ends. That’s the problem of evil. This is a problem for the Christian worldview. As we have seen, the Christian’s “solution” to this is essentially to wipe out all rational meaning from the concept ‘good’ in order to justify his belief in a god which deliberately uses evil to achieve its ends. Notice that even when Dan repeats Bahnsen’s claim that the Christian god “has a morally sufficient reason” for evil, he does not (just as Bahnsen did not) identify what this supposedly “morally sufficient reason” might be. This only indicates that the apologist is not looking for a way to resolve the logical conflict highlighted by the problem of evil, but rather to prop up a psychological means of rationalizing belief in such a thing. He’s essentially trying to have his cake, and eat it, too. Most non-Christians should see right through this farcical distortion of morality.

Dan writes:

The Atheist need to make good on the statement that its evil first.

Again Dan ignores the internal nature of the problem of evil. It is Christianity which affirms the existence of evil in the world, regardless of what specifically the atheist’s worldview might happen to teach. Presuppositionalists guarantee us that they will continue in their failure to address the problem of evil so long as they ignore the internal nature of its critique of Christianity.

But presuppositionalists do have an incentive to ignore the internal nature of the problem of evil, namely the fact that it cannot be defeated. Christianity says that the world was created by an all-good, all-knowing, all-controlling and omnipotent god, and it also says that evil exists in the world. As an example of evil in the world, Dan himself cited the torture of children (he quoted Dostoyevsky’s Brothers Karamazov at length to give an example of this). If one accepts the premise that an all-knowing, all-controlling and omnipotent god created the world, he cannot logically escape the implication that any evil that exists in the world is ultimately there because that god put it there. Essentially, the apologist needs to explain how evil finds its source in something that is supposedly “all-good.” Bahnsen fails at this task. So does apologist Dan.

by Dawson Bethrick