tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11714522.post460033997949990126..comments2024-03-27T09:11:00.450-04:00Comments on Incinerating Presuppositionalism: Do Objectivists Try to "Define God out of Existence"?Bahnsen Burnerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11030029491768748360noreply@blogger.comBlogger58125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11714522.post-26077580568290510242009-01-27T21:36:00.000-05:002009-01-27T21:36:00.000-05:00Thanks and have it with that line! I have to give ...Thanks and have it with that line! I have to give credit to a guy who first introduced me to the concept of "imperfect incarnation" (people too scared to actually arrive here in existence on existence's terms). He was an entrepreneur, the owner of a gourmet food store on Martha's Vineyard, back in 1977. I'll never forget that day. Since then I've just AynRandized it.<BR/><BR/>The cool thing is you can use the word "incarnation" without the supernatural. These people just stop their individuation at some point short of the Fourth Plane of Development (Montessori) and turn it over to God.<BR/><BR/>Meanwhile, don't get me started on Soros. He is a conscious collectivist. MM I am sure you know about his famous article in Atlantic, but for anyone else reading this, here are the links, complete with credit for Popper:<BR/><BR/><A HREF="http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/97feb/capital/capital.htm" REL="nofollow">Link</A><BR/><A HREF="http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/98jan/opensoc.htm" REL="nofollow">Link</A><BR/><BR/>John DonohueJohn Donohuehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15002005729072165615noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11714522.post-44486891884156617512009-01-27T19:33:00.000-05:002009-01-27T19:33:00.000-05:00"Anyone who needs infinite perfection in cognition..."Anyone who needs infinite perfection in cognition without context and bounds has not accepted objective reality; they have not fully incarnated."<BR/><BR/>Awesome line. I'm definitely stealing that one!<BR/><BR/>"I completely agree with you on Popper. He has too much popularity for an ordinary Kantian with a new wrinkle (falsifiability). He is an enabler of post-modernism. I think he is popular because of his political/social beliefs and that gets him fans of his 'epistemology.'"<BR/><BR/>He most definitely is an enabler of post-modernism. Essentially all Leftists love Karl Popper. That in itself tells you something. As for his political beliefs, his "open society" seems to be something Leftists would love. Its not "doctrinaire" or "ideological" but "open". Who could be against things that are "open"? Some would say that Popper was advocating Classical Liberalism but I think he gave a great boost to the defenders of the mixed economy welfare state.<BR/><BR/>Popper's most popular student, George Soros, makes this argument all the time. He says that Laissez-Faire is just like Communism or Fascism: its "too ideological", too wedded to principles. And of course Popper proved that principles and induction don't exist. So we need to find a middle-of-the road way like the semi-managed economy or the semi-welfare state. Soros bases all this on Popper's epistemology. <BR/><BR/>Popper is in my opinion the greatest carrier of the disease of Kantianism in the 20th century. I would love for our great Incinerator himself to turn his laser beams on Popper at some point in the future if he was so inclined. I would do it myself, but I am just not strong enough on matters epistemological. As you say, practical life gets in the way of me ever really getting into depth on these complicated philosophical subjects.madmaxhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14375140131881725965noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11714522.post-87914943148665857122009-01-27T19:13:00.000-05:002009-01-27T19:13:00.000-05:00Madmax,Good information.Yes, I see the Binswanger ...Madmax,<BR/><BR/>Good information.<BR/>Yes, I see the Binswanger post over there and I made some comments on it at <A HREF="http://gusvanhorn.blogspot.com/2009/01/quick-roundup-397.html#comments" REL="nofollow">Gus Van Horn</A> this morning. I am 100% behind Harry, but that is way too polite! He should at least strive to beat me in 'quickest to be banned by Kantians!' [just kidding]<BR/><BR/>Affirmed on the swan illustration. The reason I feel it is a good candidate for rebuttal is that it illustrates the finite! The finite with certainty inside the context. Because Presuppositionalist want either God or Radical Skepticism at the root, they consider anything short of infinite perfection in certainty cheap, stupid and useless. And amateurish. Beneath them.<BR/><BR/>Anyone who needs infinite perfection in cognition without context and bounds has not accepted objective reality; they have not fully incarnated.<BR/><BR/>I completely agree with you on Popper. He has too much popularity for an ordinary Kantian with a new wrinkle (falsifiability). He is an enabler of post-modernism. I think he is popular because of his political/social beliefs and that gets him fans of his 'epistemology.' Someone should take him on. (Maybe our host the esteemed Incinerator?)<BR/><BR/>Well, I don't have time to work on my swan idea for a few days, nor another idea I call the "Rewind Illusion" about Gould's thought experiment as a red herring. Practical life is in my path until the weekend, I fear.<BR/><BR/>John Donohue<BR/>Pasadena, CAJohn Donohuehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15002005729072165615noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11714522.post-60070952063974400692009-01-27T18:11:00.000-05:002009-01-27T18:11:00.000-05:00John,Harry Binswanger has commented on the swan ar...John,<BR/><BR/>Harry Binswanger has commented on the swan arguments for denying induction for HBL. It has been some time since I read his answer to it though. I think it comes down to a rational theory of concept formation but in brief, a white swan does not destroy induction, it just means that our previous definition of swans needs to be modified in light of new knowledge. <BR/><BR/>Also, Binswanger has engaged the Maverick Philosopher. He posted his response on HBL. His approach seems to be a polite one. I think HB just wants to show that Rand was a serious philosophical thinker and possibly reach one or two people. I respect Binswanger and he knows his stuff, but I doubt he'll convince anyone at MP's site. The committed skeptic and Kantians are, IMO, unreachable.<BR/><BR/>Lastly, fascinating stuff about Karl Popper. So many people, especially in the sciences worship Popper. They think he was a great defender of science. But, as I understand him, he was a great destroyer of science as he basically helped in further undercutting induction and unleashing skepticism. <BR/><BR/>So many science oriented types I know or read will make statements like "you can never prove a hypothesis, you can only disprove a hypothesis." My guess is that Popper's entire system consists of stolen concepts, package deals, and other logical fallacies. I hope an Objectivist philosopher writes a good dissection of Popper one day.madmaxhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14375140131881725965noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11714522.post-12938758527346716222009-01-26T17:04:00.000-05:002009-01-26T17:04:00.000-05:00notice here:http://skepchick.org/skepticsguide/ind...notice here:<BR/>http://skepchick.org/skepticsguide/index.php?topic=15985.15<BR/><BR/>These guys keep claim we old school people don't "get it" that induction is dead. And they bring up the swan example.<BR/><BR/>I like the swan example, too, because it illustrates Objectivist concept formation in contextual knowledge. Hopefully i can find time tonight to write that up. I've wanted to for a long time.<BR/><BR/>John DonohueJohn Donohuehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15002005729072165615noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11714522.post-70213043574129383792009-01-26T16:33:00.000-05:002009-01-26T16:33:00.000-05:00I am looking into the role of Popper here. He is a...I am looking into the role of Popper here. He is addicted to the usual Kantian schisms, it seems. He throws a tremendous number of things into the category of only being open to a priori truth.<BR/><BR/>I found this to be useful:<BR/>http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/popper/<BR/><BR/>Section 3 on demarcation is the interesting matter.<BR/><BR/>So his tack is: out with induction altogether. Make the claim that even science does not actually engage induction. But unlike the complete skeptic Hume, instead, toss in his famous new term "falsifiability" and say that all science can do is "somehow" come up with hypotheses and then test them over and over again with deduction. Then there is further despair on even validating the point at which falisifiability is reached. Popper says the propositions cannot be arrived at logically, you need intuition, and even Einstein is trotted out to declare his disbelief in induction.<BR/><BR/>I think to sum up, rather than fix induction by grasping context and bounds and proper rational concept formation, this is some other faint grasping at a thin and poor explanation of how science goes about its business. It certainly is congruent with the postmodern attack, under which all things are arbitrary power constructs, with just the faintest nod to the remote echo of some tiny universality in the really hard sciences, and 'we will eventually show that to be subjective too."<BR/><BR/>I can only put so much energy into understanding the Kantian apparatus. It hurts my brain.<BR/><BR/>John Donohue<BR/>Pasadena, CAJohn Donohuehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15002005729072165615noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11714522.post-30602058501822829362009-01-26T15:36:00.000-05:002009-01-26T15:36:00.000-05:00er hazy, not hazing,:) dusted off my Irving M. Cop...er hazy, not hazing,:) dusted off my Irving M. Copi Introduction to Logic. well gives me something to do. Thanks againJustin Hallhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17804641315202800289noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11714522.post-83815036302140354262009-01-26T15:32:00.000-05:002009-01-26T15:32:00.000-05:00thank you, that clarifies the issue somewhat and g...thank you, that clarifies the issue somewhat and gives me something to further research. I admit I am hazing on what distinguishes between formal and informal fallacies so I have to read up on that. Would it be fair to say that ultimately all deduction is a form of or based on prior induction. For as you pointed out the premises have to be validated and that no matter how far removed must start with perception of something, in other words existence.Justin Hallhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17804641315202800289noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11714522.post-75716970007573223282009-01-26T14:08:00.000-05:002009-01-26T14:08:00.000-05:00Hi Justin,I would think that they could try to est...Hi Justin,<BR/><BR/>I would think that they could try to establish such a conclusion deductively. They could try virtually anything I suppose. But what would the premises of such a deduction be? And how did they establish those premises? The conclusion "induction is fallacious" seems very generalized, such that it allows for no exceptions. I.e., “<I>all</I> instances of inductive inference are fallacious.” If that is what is being argued, I'd like to see how such a conclusion can be reached without using induction at any point in its contextual support. In that case, while they may try to deploy a deductive argument to establish the conclusion that induction is fallacious, it seems that this would simply push the question back a step, into an examination of said argument's premises. <BR/><BR/>I'm open to considering that at root of such pronouncements, there lies some confusion about the nature of induction in the first place. Bnonn Tennant seems to think induction is informally fallacious, while Clarkian presuppositionalists claim that it is formally fallacious. These are two very different claims. But from what I have seen, neither party seems to have a very good grasp of the conceptual basis of induction, and that is the key to a fuller understanding of induction. It may also be due to a rather Procrustean interpretation of validity. For instance, Tennant supported his claim about induction being fallacious by simply quoting an encyclopedia (of all things) which says induction is “a type of nonvalid inference or argument.” The quoted text does not give any argument for this conclusion. I guess for Tennant, whichever text he prefers is infallible. Then again, he told John Donohue that "existence exists" is "not actually true." So for him, there is no existence. No wonder he has chosen not to interact with <A HREF="http://bahnsenburner.blogspot.com/2008/10/reply-to-tennant-on-theistic.html" REL="nofollow">my blog</A>. He also said that "there's no certainty in [Objectivism]." This overlooks the fact that we begin with certainties. The mock dialogue which I quoted from Peikoff's OPAR in <A HREF="http://bahnsenburner.blogspot.com/2008/10/reply-to-tennant-on-theistic.html" REL="nofollow">my blog</A> shows that one cannot deny the axioms without assuming or resting on their truth. But I digress.<BR/><BR/>Hope that helps, but maybe it just generates more questions?<BR/><BR/>Regards,<BR/>DawsonBahnsen Burnerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11030029491768748360noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11714522.post-4596889672312926712009-01-26T13:15:00.000-05:002009-01-26T13:15:00.000-05:00Concerning the claim that all induction is a falla...Concerning the claim that all induction is a fallacy.<BR/><BR/>Dawson, could not the defenders of Hume claim that its a deductive argument instead that concludes with all induction is a fallacy. Thus avoiding the fallacy of begging the question. I am not saying this is the case however it occurred to me that this line of argumentation might be tried.<BR/><BR/>I deleted my earlier post because it would challenge the best of us to decipher its grammar:)Justin Hallhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17804641315202800289noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11714522.post-66666802843050217722009-01-26T13:06:00.000-05:002009-01-26T13:06:00.000-05:00This comment has been removed by the author.Justin Hallhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17804641315202800289noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11714522.post-81307044494992894262009-01-25T18:22:00.000-05:002009-01-25T18:22:00.000-05:00John wrote: “But the outright brazen claim that in...John wrote: “But the outright brazen claim that induction is fallacious, expounded by Hume, kicked up by Popper (Popper not only rejects induction, he apparently says science does not actually use it. He must not be aware of context)”<BR/><BR/>The claim that induction is fallacious, suspiciously looks like the conclusion of an inductive argument. It is essentially saying that all instances of inductive reasoning are fallacious. But if induction is in fact fallacious, why should we trust this conclusion? I suspect that the confusion behind such claims can be traced back to a faulty understanding of concepts. Conceptual integration provides the human mind with a working model for inductive generalization. <BR/><BR/>I discuss induction in the comments section of <A HREF="http://bahnsenburner.blogspot.com/2006/02/presuppositionalism-and-argument-from.html" REL="nofollow">Presuppositionalism and the Argument from Ignorance</A>. You’ll see that the theist who engages me on the matter there was not very open to considering a new perspective on the matter. His loss. <BR/><BR/>Regards,<BR/>DawsonBahnsen Burnerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11030029491768748360noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11714522.post-37762916257581308722009-01-25T18:19:00.000-05:002009-01-25T18:19:00.000-05:00J wrote: “Not parlor chat at the Chez Aynnie.”Are ...J wrote: “Not parlor chat at the Chez Aynnie.”<BR/><BR/>Are comments like this really necessary? They do not add to your points, do they? <BR/><BR/>J wrote: “Better to prove it, or attempt to prove it, rather than assume it as a point of faith:”<BR/><BR/>Proof and accepting something on faith are not exhaustive. There are such things as axiomatic truths. The validity of the senses is an axiom; there is no need to “prove” that they are valid. Any proof presupposes their validity. This is basic rational philosophy 101 stuff. <BR/><BR/>J wrote: “So, the econ. texts are not accurate--nor is the Objectivist who insists on rationality.”<BR/><BR/>I see. So you instead insist on irrationality? <BR/><BR/>J wrote: “For that matter, given different ways of perceiving the world (ie say inner city hood, vs. oh, wealthy westsider), then people would probably view the world, differently, right? They have been conditioned differently.” <BR/><BR/>Sounds like some cheap collectivist ideology to me. Try treating human individuals as individuals for a change.<BR/><BR/>Regards,<BR/>DawsonBahnsen Burnerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11030029491768748360noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11714522.post-15983054982277583832009-01-25T17:27:00.000-05:002009-01-25T17:27:00.000-05:00J there is an element of argument from authority w...J<BR/><BR/> there is an element of argument from authority when dealing with history, we grand authority status to historians and such. However this is a way of for the sake of expediency of glossing over the inductive arguments in support of history. There are archaeological sites all over modern Russia on the sites of battles eye witnesses have recorded, there are actual government documents, tho not so much in the Russian's case. There is equipment still in existence today and theres our current geo political situation all best explained if in fact WWII took place and took place in the manor recorded. Think of it as multiple lines of argumentation that do not contradict each other and all arrive at the same conclusion. Thus the simplest inductive answer in good old Occam fashion is WWII happened. Objectivism makes a clear distinction between the perceptually self event and the inductive. They represent two forms of knowledge. However if induction is a fallacy aka Hume, then I guess I cant say anything about anything except whats right in front of my face at the moment I say it :)<BR/><BR/>By the way, thanks to all involved in this thread, I have been motivated to reread what I know of Hume and am gaining a better in depth understanding of his philosophy.Justin Hallhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17804641315202800289noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11714522.post-74288454486432932842009-01-25T16:41:00.000-05:002009-01-25T16:41:00.000-05:00Perception is perception of objects. Do you think ...<I>Perception is perception of objects. Do you think that the objects you perceive are not real?</I><BR/><BR/>What about reading say history of WWI or WWII: what is being perceived there? We perceive some words and sentences, and then match the sentences to ..what? Our abstractions of history, or concepts if you like of what happened. But no way to prove (or verify really) that the writtten history matches the facts (a point Bertrand Russell often made via knowledge by acquaintance, and knowledge by description). <BR/><BR/>So there are not direct referents (or existents, in randSpeak) when reading a history book (or really say Moby Dick either). Not quite the same as perceiving say the caviar next to the aquavit at the Objectivist soiree, is it. Ta taJhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11567400697675996283noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11714522.post-63198005689772507922009-01-25T16:31:00.000-05:002009-01-25T16:31:00.000-05:00Why would anyone need to “prove” that our percepti...<I>Why would anyone need to “prove” that our perceptions correspond to an external reality? Even the notion “external reality” is somewhat misleading, suggesting that consciousness is not part of reality.</I><BR/><BR/>That's a philosophical problem. Not parlor chat at the Chez Aynnie. Better to prove it, or attempt to prove it, rather than assume it as a point of faith: besides, it's sort of important. Say in regards to economics (as well as psychology), which depends on the so-called rational man standard. There's evidence that the standard does not hold: many people are not rational, even at level of say consumer choices--they make irrational choices, which are not in their best interest, depending on marketing, or different contexts, etc. So, the econ. texts are not accurate--nor is the Objectivist who insists on rationality. Twersky wrote on this issue. <BR/><BR/>For that matter, given different ways of perceiving the world (ie say inner city hood, vs. oh, wealthy westsider), then people would probably view the world, differently, right? They have been conditioned differently. In fact social psychology deals with that problem.Jhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11567400697675996283noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11714522.post-57802997624760466572009-01-25T16:16:00.000-05:002009-01-25T16:16:00.000-05:00J wrote: “Hume, unlike Rand, acknowledges the prob...J wrote: “Hume, unlike Rand, acknowledges the problem: there's no easy way to prove (ie via logic, or mathematics, or even science) that our perceptions correspond to an external reality: yes we can posit, agree to that--but that is not proof.”<BR/><BR/>Why would anyone need to “prove” that our perceptions correspond to an external reality? Even the notion “external reality” is somewhat misleading, suggesting that consciousness is not part of reality. Consciousness is part of reality. Perception is perception of objects. Do you think that the objects you perceive are not real? How could you perceive them if they were not real? Your dilemma also misconstrues the purpose of proof. The purpose of proof is to trace conclusions ultimately back to the perceptual level of cognition, for that is the given that we start with. We don’t have to “prove” that perceptions “correspond to external reality” any more than we need to prove that digestion is digestion of food. There’s plenty of scientific research which explains the causality of perception, so this is not at all a problem. It was for Hume, but certainly not for Objectivists.<BR/><BR/>J wrote: “There's an ‘agency’ issue as well to perception, especially in regards to skill. A good samaritan might see an injured person, and make the wrong diagnosis, say in regards to a broken bone. A doctor would on the other hand do the right thing. so again, the good samaritan and the Doctor have different perceptions of the same event. In fact the law recognizes that.”<BR/><BR/>The scenario you describe actually shifts the issue from perception to identification. The former is pre-conceptual, the latter is conceptual. That introduces a whole new ball game, and that’s where Rand’s theory of concepts comes into play.<BR/> <BR/>Again, you’re only showing what you do not know about Objectivism. If you think you’re making points, it’s not against Objectivism.<BR/><BR/>Regards,<BR/>DawsonBahnsen Burnerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11030029491768748360noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11714522.post-80464226955233758752009-01-25T16:02:00.000-05:002009-01-25T16:02:00.000-05:00J wrote: “Objectivists are really faced with the s...<I>J wrote: “Objectivists are really faced with the same problems that Hume was (proving we have various types of knowledge of the external world), but simply ignore them via superficial generalizations: yo, existence exists”<BR/><BR/>J, it’s getting old having to correct you over and over and over again. Do you have any points to make that are truly tenable?</I><BR/><BR/>You're not correcting anyone, merely chanting the Objectivist dogma. I don't think you understand the point--though if all your "philosophy" comes from Rand, you don't really understand philosophical disputation. <BR/><BR/>Sensations and perceptions are not quantifiable, or even observable. When a witness sees a crime--say a robbery-- his visual senses receive it, and he in some sense perceives it. Yet we have no access to his perception: you can't read minds. He might call the cops, he might not.<BR/><BR/>It seems that humans have a certain commonality of perception, but saying that is not philosophy: the claim needs backing and evidence. By simply insisting on "existents" you are nearly as dogmatic as the theists. Hume, unlike Rand, acknowledges the problem: there's no easy way to prove (ie via logic, or mathematics, or even science) that our perceptions correspond to an external reality: yes we can posit, agree to that--but that is not proof. (and psychological research also shows a certain relativism in regards to perception. Read Milgram's study on obedience, and similar research). <BR/><BR/>There's an "agency" issue as well to perception, especially in regards to skill. A good samaritan might see an injured person, and make the wrong diagnosis, say in regards to a broken bone. A doctor would on the other hand do the right thing. so again, the good samaritan and the Doctor have different perceptions of the same event. In fact the law recognizes that.Jhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11567400697675996283noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11714522.post-75630773188731536382009-01-25T15:26:00.000-05:002009-01-25T15:26:00.000-05:00Okay, now to ask Mr. Dawson....Hume famously decla...Okay, now to ask Mr. Dawson....<BR/><BR/>Hume famously declares induction to be a fallacy. I've also recently seen that Subjectivists completely bury the issue of concept formation (because that would have to admit induction) and deploy various methods of getting the definitions in. <BR/><BR/>For instance "divine revelation." Okay, lets let that one drift for the moment!<BR/><BR/>Of course, sliding all definitions into a priori status by the wrangling of the various Kantian schisms is the other gambit. But the outright brazen claim that induction is fallacious, expounded by Hume, kicked up by Popper (Popper not only rejects induction, he apparently says science does not actually use it. He must not be aware of context)....how can they get away with it, since all of science requires concepts/definitions to be proven through induction, embedded in context? <BR/><BR/>(if you have already responded to this, please just link the page in your writings so I can look at that first.)<BR/><BR/>John Donohue<BR/>Pasadena, CAJohn Donohuehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15002005729072165615noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11714522.post-17694091845973840452009-01-25T15:10:00.000-05:002009-01-25T15:10:00.000-05:00By the way, the "Analysis" of an absurd propositio...By the way, the "Analysis" of an absurd proposition dishonestly attributed to Dr. Peikoff has really accelerated. It is just jaw-dropping astonishing.<BR/>http://maverickphilosopher.typepad.com/maverick_philosopher/2009/01/why-god-cannot-be-the-creator-of-the-universe.html<BR/><BR/>I previously said 'there was nothing new over there' but may have to retract.<BR/><BR/>I think they surpass the achievements of the Mediaevals in their toils to ascertain the number of angels that can fit on the head of a pin.<BR/><BR/>John Donohue<BR/>Pasadena, CAJohn Donohuehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15002005729072165615noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11714522.post-32415849598977569952009-01-25T14:50:00.000-05:002009-01-25T14:50:00.000-05:00re: http://maverickphilosopher.typepad.com/maveric...re: <BR/>http://maverickphilosopher.typepad.com/maverick_philosopher/2009/01/ayn-rand-on-necessity-and-contingency.html<BR/><BR/>This is my closure "Dear Bill letter." Thanks to Dawson for permission to post here.<BR/><BR/>1.25.2009<BR/>Dear Bill Vallicella,<BR/><BR/>Hilariously, you have now blocked me from posting at your website/blog. Your reasons are laughable. The laughs just deepen as you and your followers chide Objectivism's supposed dogmatism from inside the solid iron straight-jacket of your system.<BR/><BR/>I learned a lot from this encounter about how easy it is to expose the insane, ingrown emptiness of Analytic Philosophy. Your people went ballistic and absurd immediately on the arrival of smart Objectivists. They acted shamefully. So did you. Ridicule, bluster and standing on your orthodoxy are not arguments, and you already know the names of the fallacies in play.<BR/><BR/>While you were more cool and actually posted a few things that vaguely smacked of both understanding Ayn Rand and responding in a fair discussion, you still avoided addressing my real challenges. Then, finally, yesterday I made it too blatant and you could not avoid. Your post in response is full of holes. I'd love to drive a bulldozer right through, but alas you now decline my posts.<BR/><BR/>You avoid facing that your position is bankrupt. You cannot prove the existence of God, the 'supernatural' and any/all other a priori faith beliefs, and the entire Kantian system exists only to hide that fact. It exists to hide the root axiomatic beliefs of the radical skeptic, as well, but this encounter was obviously with apologies for God. You are probably aware that my arguments have been and would continue to narrow focus on that. Hence the ban.<BR/><BR/>Ayn Rand had an insight full of pathos in her novels. Yes, her millions-best-seller-decade-after-decade novels (oh shame*). To paraphrase: 'If you are living in fear your enemy is potent, secure and vast, too formidable for you, imagine your surprise when on confronting you find its just a scared little rat scurrying around in the corner.'<BR/><BR/>By the way, certain Objectivists [I speak only for myself specifically] are gathering forces to be ready in case the APs make another attempt to vandalize the Wikipedia posting on Ayn Rand. Those already in place at least stopped the AP sneak attack in the introduction, and eventually we will get a reversal to the normal article.<BR/><BR/>Adios. Irony intended.<BR/><BR/>John Donohue<BR/>Pasadena, CA<BR/><BR/>*The outrageous sales record of Ayn Rand's books is not meant to be an argument to refute Presuppositionalism; read Mr. Dawson's blog or email me for that refutation. The sales comment is happily admitted to be merely a joyful indulgence in rubbing it in.John Donohuehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15002005729072165615noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11714522.post-85148660036270601622009-01-25T13:58:00.000-05:002009-01-25T13:58:00.000-05:00By the way, John, my e-mail address is: sortion@ho...By the way, John, my e-mail address is: <BR/><BR/>sortion@hotmail.com<BR/><BR/>Feel free any time!<BR/><BR/>Regards,<BR/>DawsonBahnsen Burnerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11030029491768748360noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11714522.post-19869674267366976462009-01-25T13:53:00.000-05:002009-01-25T13:53:00.000-05:00I wrote: Knowledge begins with perception, not sen...I wrote: <I>Knowledge begins with perception, not sensation.</I><BR/><BR/>J responded: “That's according to Guru Rand--not according to empiricism (or empirical psychology).”<BR/><BR/>Objectivists are not Humean empiricists, J. Again you stand corrected. There is a significant distinction between the level of sensations and the level of perceptions. I thought you had read Peikoff closely?<BR/><BR/>J wrote: “Blind men don't do geometry (or invent it),”<BR/><BR/>No blind men do geometry? Not one? Really?<BR/><BR/>J wrote: “Later with much work, a blind person might learn of geometrical relations somehow, say via braille: regardless there's sensation involved--vision, for one.”<BR/><BR/>Sure sensation is involved. No one said it isn’t. Perception integrates individual sensations into percepts, so that we have awareness of entities qua entities, rather than awareness of momentary, passing sensations. Our vision is not merely sensation, it is perception. When you see a book, a car, a tree or a man, you have awareness of these objects as distinct entities, not as a collection of unrelated sensations.<BR/><BR/>J wrote: “Or touching, via braille, in the few cases a blind person learns geometry (or physics, etc.), or listening via the ears. That's sensation.”<BR/><BR/>Actually, it’s perception. The blind man who reads Braille can distinguish each letter pattern from the next, perceiving each one as a distinct entity, not as a mere passing series of unrelated sensations. If that were the case, Braille would be useless. Indeed, Braille confirms my point rather than serves as a counterexample to it. Again, if you had familiarity with Objectivism as you had claimed, you should not need this explained to you.<BR/><BR/>J wrote: “So, as Hume says: knowledge begins with sensation--he calls it impressions. ‘no ideas (ie thoughts and concepts--knowledge) without antecedent impressions’. Perception follows sensation (though often closely related, and often used synonymously), and is a more cognitive act.”<BR/><BR/>That’s true: Hume did say we begin with sensations, as I had pointed out earlier. Where Hume erred is in thinking that perception is a volitional faculty, that we selectively piece together individual sensations to assemble percepts of entities. That’s not true. Perception is not volitional, it is automatic. We don’t consciously piece together individual sensations to give us awareness of entities qua entities; this is a built-in pre-conceptual operation. Again, I suggest you take a look at Kelley’s <I>The Evidence of the Senses</I> for some more intelligence on the matter.<BR/><BR/>J wrote: “Hume's schema is not perfect (tho often misread), but far more reasoned and thought out (even if his conclusions are not comforting to many) than Guru Rand's system.”<BR/><BR/>It is, eh? Why did Hume get so many things wrong then? And why did it take Rand to correct him?<BR/><BR/>J wrote: “Objectivists are really faced with the same problems that Hume was (proving we have various types of knowledge of the external world), but simply ignore them via superficial generalizations: yo, existence exists”<BR/><BR/>J, it’s getting old having to correct you over and over and over again. Do you have any points to make that are truly tenable?<BR/><BR/>Regards,<BR/>DawsonBahnsen Burnerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11030029491768748360noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11714522.post-53978573249748877302009-01-25T13:49:00.000-05:002009-01-25T13:49:00.000-05:00John wrote: “I can't locate an email address for y...John wrote: “I can't locate an email address for you, so I'll ask here in the forum: I have a final parting closure letter for the guy. It is firm, not smarmy but confrontive. May I post it here (I am posting it in various Objectivist locations with permission)?”<BR/><BR/>Be my guest, John! Let ‘er rip! I look forward to reading it.<BR/><BR/>Oh, and congrats on getting banned over at “maverick philosopher.” See it as a trophy of sorts.<BR/><BR/>Regards,<BR/>DawsonBahnsen Burnerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11030029491768748360noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11714522.post-24524611081828186902009-01-25T05:55:00.000-05:002009-01-25T05:55:00.000-05:00Knowledge begins with perception, not sensation.Th...<I>Knowledge begins with perception, not sensation.</I><BR/><BR/>That's according to Guru Rand--not according to empiricism (or empirical psychology). Blind men don't do geometry (or invent it), Later with much work, a blind person might learn of geometrical relations somehow, say via braille: regardless there's sensation involved--vision, for one. Or touching, via braille, in the few cases a blind person learns geometry (or physics, etc.), or listening via the ears. That's sensation. <BR/><BR/> So, as Hume says: knowledge begins with sensation--he calls it impressions. "no ideas (ie thoughts and concepts--knowledge) without antecedent impressions." Perception follows sensation (though often closely related, and often used synonymously), and is a more cognitive act. <BR/><BR/>Hume's schema is not perfect (tho often misread), but far more reasoned and thought out (even if his conclusions are not comforting to many) than Guru Rand's system. Objectivists are really faced with the same problems that Hume was (proving we have various types of knowledge of the external world), but simply ignore them via superficial generalizations: yo, existence existsJhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11567400697675996283noreply@blogger.com